Category Archives: Somalia

Kenyan Navy Softens Up Kismayo Prior to AMISOM Attack

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Andrew McGregor

September 13, 2012

Kenya’s navy continues to play an important role in the multi-national struggle against Somalia’s al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab movement by shelling the Shabaab-held port of Kismayo in southern Somalia. These operations come at a time when Kenya is making significant upgrades to its naval capacity through purchase or donation. These upgrades are intended to enhance Kenya’s ability to carry out anti-piracy and counter-terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean.

KNS 1KNS Harambee II

Kismayo’s port operations and lucrative charcoal trade are the main source of revenue for al-Shabaab since it pulled out of Mogadishu last year. Other forces that have gathered around Kismayo in preparation for the final assault include Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM troops, Somali government forces and the local Ras Kamboni militia of Ahmad Muhammad Islam “Madobe,” which were expelled from Kismayo by al-Shabaab in 2009. British experts are reported to have played a facilitating role in planning sessions for the assault on Kismayo held in Nairobi and attended by Ugandan AMISOM commander Lieutenant General Andrew Gutti (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 4).

Since Kenya joined the campaign against al-Shabaab with Operation Linda Nchi in October, 2011, the Kenyan navy has participated in naval operations designed to restrict al-Shabaab supplies of arms and fuel, secure Kenyan waters from terrorist infiltrators and deter piracy (see Terrorism Monitor, November 11, 2011). While the Kenyan Army deployment in Somalia formally joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on June 11, the Kenyan Navy and Air Force (which has also carried out bombing operations over Kismayo) were not included in the agreement and thus do not come under the Ugandan-dominated AMISOM command structure.

Kenyan warships are now playing an important role degrading the defenses and military capacity of those al-Shabaab militants who have not seized the opportunity to join the civilian flight out of Kismayo. There are reports that al-Shabaab has attempted to stiffen its resistance by bringing in hundreds of reinforcements in armored vehicles (Jowhar.com [Mogadishu], September 7). Even if al-Shabaab is forced to make a strategic withdrawal from Kismayo, occupying AMISOM forces are almost certain to be met by improvised explosive devices, land-mines and ambushes by hidden militants (after the pattern of  Mogadishu).

After reportedly being provoked by an al-Shabaab gunboat, a Kenyan navy ship fired ten rounds on Kismayo on September 3, while the port area and airport were shelled the next day (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 5; VOA, September 4; BBC, September 4). Kenyan ships fired on what they believed to be a Kismayo arms cache on September 5, killing a reported seven Shabaab militants and destroying a stockpile of “technicals” [armored battle wagons], arms and munitions (RFI, September 6). Residents of the town said the attack began shortly after the militants had dragged the bodies of four Kenyan soldiers killed in the battle for Afmadow into the town square for public display (RFI, September 6). A Kenyan ship fired on a Shabaab anti-aircraft emplacement on September 11.

In the last few months Kenya has added two ships to its fleet that will significantly enhance its naval strength. In June, France donated the 1976 vintage patrol boat La Rieuse, one of ten ships of the P400 class used to patrol the waters of its overseas possessions. Equipped with a 40mm cannon, La Rieuse operated in the Indian Ocean from the French base at Réunion. Most of the P400 class are now being decommissioned, but La Rieuse (now renamed KNS Harambee II) was donated in the interests of helping Kenya carry out high seas security operations (Meretmarine.com, June 7; Defenceweb.com, June 10).

KNS 2KNS Jasiri

Kenya has also finally taken possession of the 140-ton Jasiri, a Spanish-built oceanographic survey vessel that has been fitted with naval guns, missiles, machine-guns and radar and communications systems, making it the most powerful ship on the East African coast (Nairobi Star, August 30). The ship was supposed to be delivered in 2005, but the purchase became entangled in Kenya’s Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal. As a result, the ship sat without maintenance in a Spanish dock for seven years. A Kenyan delegation arrived to complete the deal in February but instead rejected the ship on the grounds that much of the equipment was outdated and no longer functioning. After an unsuccessful attempt to sell the ship to the Nigerian Navy, Kenya finally negotiated a deal with the Jasiri’s builders, Euromarine Industries (Nairobi Star, April 27).

Mombasa, the Kenyan Navy’s main port, was consumed by deadly street riots when the Jasiri arrived following the assassination of Muslim preacher Aboud Rogo Muhammad, a well-known supporter of al-Shabaab. A statement issued by al-Shabaab urged Kenyan Muslims to “take all necessary measures to protect their religion, their honor, their property and their lives from the enemies of Islam” (AFP, August 29).

Nonetheless, Kenyan Chief of Defense Forces, General Julius Karangi, warned that the arrival of the Jasiri had shifted the power equation on the East African coast: “Jasiri has capabilities and capacities that we did not have. If there are some people out there thinking they can come to our waters and worry us, let them know that things can get very tough for them” (Africa Review [Nairobi], August 31). The Navy has not yet announced whether the Jasiri will participate in the Kismayo operation, but its deployment there seems likely after trials are carried out.

This article first appeared in the September 13, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Qaeda Expands to Puntland in Anticipation of Oil Boom

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Andrew McGregor

March 8, 2012

Under military pressure from Kenyan forces, the African Union Mission in Somalia and various Somali militias and government forces campaigning in its traditional area of operations in southern Somalia, al-Shabaab has announced an expansion into Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia that has so far been better known as a center for offshore piracy than for Islamist militancy. Nevertheless, a dirty, low-level war of assassinations, bombings and clashes between Islamist gunmen and local security forces has been going on for several years.

Puntland Security Forces on Parade

The announcement, which follows last month’s unification of al-Shabaab with al-Qaeda, came in the form of a proclamation from Yassin Khalid ‘Uthman (a.k.a. Yassin Kilwe Yuma), the self-described “Amir of the Mujahideen in the Golis Mountains [an area of caves and rough terrain in northwest Puntland]” that his fighters have joined al-Shabaab and pledged loyalty to its leader, Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr.” The “Amir” was clear that his group was aligning itself with al-Qaeda: “I want to praise God for the unity of our Shabaab brothers with al-Qaeda fighters… I want to declare today that we are joined with our al-Shabaab brothers who are devoted to the jihad in Somalia” (al-Andalus Radio, February 26; al-Kataib Media, February 27). The new al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda chapter in Puntland may have announced its presence in a more material way on March 3, when at least nine people were killed at a Puntland security checkpoint near the commercial capital of Bosasso (25 miles from the Galgala region) during an attack by militants (Reuters, March 3).

Yassin Kilwe is thought to be part of the Galgala militia that operates in the Golis Mountains in a diminished capacity since it was targeted by a three-month military offensive by the Puntland Intelligence Service. [1] The militia, if not a formal part of al-Shabaab, has traditionally operated in sympathy with al-Shabaab’s objectives.

Puntland frequently accuses neighboring Somaliland, with which it has several territorial disputes, of providing support for the Galgala Islamists, while Somaliland accuses Puntland of seeking military dominance in northern Somalia. The known leader of the Galgala militants is Shaykh Muhammad Sa’id Atam, who routinely denies any formal ties between his group and al-Shabaab, assertions that have been confirmed in the past by al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage “Ali Dheere” (VOA Somali Service, July 29). However, it was also Ali Dheere who welcomed the merger of the “Mujahideen in the Golis Mountains” with al-Shabaab (Dayniile, February 27).

Greater Puntland – Includes disputed territories

Yassin Kilwe’s claim to be Amir of the Galgala militants immediately raised speculation regarding the leadership role of Shaykh Atam, who has not made any statement since Yassin Kilwe’s announcement (Raxanreeb.com, February 25). There were reports that many of the Galgala militants were unhappy with the merger with “a terrorist group,” and Kilwe may represent a new faction that has split from the main Galgala group to join al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda (Somalia Report, February 28). A Puntland government spokesman said the merger “doesn’t have any effect on Puntland’s peace and tranquility and the armed forces who already made them weak are ready to fight them” (Puntlandi.com, February 26). The Puntland administration has said that they already knew that the Galgala militants were part of al-Qaeda (a common refrain in government comments on the militants) and security has been tightened in the areas of oil exploration operations (Dayniile, February 27). AMISOM is expected to make a decision within days on whether to deploy African Union peacekeepers from an expanded force in Puntland.

Canada’s Africa Oil Corp. and its Australian partners Red Emperor and Range Resources began drilling in northern Puntland in January, the first oil operations in Somalia for two decades. The Nugaal and Dharoor fields are believed to have as much as 300 million to 4 billion barrels of oil, the first of which is expected to flow within a month (Reuters, February 25; Observer, February 25). There may be much more oil in offshore fields off Puntland’s coast. Galgala and other parts of the Bari region are also above the Majiyahan Ta-Sn Deposit, a zone rich in minerals such as Albite, Quartz, Microcline, Tantalite, Tapiolite, Cassiterite, Spodumene and Muscovite. Somali prime minister Abdiweli Muhammad Ali has promised a cut of his nation’s natural resources in exchange for foreign investment and reconstruction assistance: “There’s room for everybody when this country gets back on its feet and is ready for investment,” though he also noted: “The only way we can pay [Western companies] is to pay them in kind, we can pay with natural resources at the fair market value.” (Observer, February 25). Britain’s BP has been mentioned as the foreign oil company of choice for Somalia’s transitional government, but so far the firm has downplayed rumors it is working on a major deal for the offshore reserves. The British government has also denied charges that its sudden interest in Somalia (hosting international conferences on Somalia, providing humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance, etc.) is part of an effort to gain commercial considerations for British firms in Somalia (Garowe Online, February 27).

Last week, al-Shabaab began sending internet and Twitter messages warning that “Somali oil carries death” (SAPA-AP, March 1). The movement has said that it is canceling the licenses of Western oil and gas firms operating in Puntland, possibly the first step in a new campaign of attacks on Western exploration facilities.

Note

1. See Andrew McGregor, “Puntland’s Shaykh Muhammad Atam: Clan Militia Leader or al-Qaeda Terrorist?,” Militant Leadership Monitor, September 29, 2010. 

This article first appeared in the March 8, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Desperate Measures: Somalia’s al-Shabaab Joining al-Qaeda

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Andrew McGregor

February 23, 2012

In what he described as “good news” that would “annoy the Crusaders,” al-Qaeda leader Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the incorporation of Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants as an official new chapter of al-Qaeda on February 9. [1] Al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” appeared in the 15-minute videotape to pledge his movement’s obedience to al-Zawahiri and promised to follow “the road of jihad and martyrdom, in the footsteps that our martyr Osama bin Laden has drawn for us.”

The merger may be the first step in an al-Qaeda effort to ensure the survival of the movement by expanding into the larger Islamic world through the creation of official al-Qaeda affiliates without the so far apparent and unstated requirement for an Arab leadership.

 

Al-Shabaab Rally Celebrates Merger with al-Qaeda in Wilayet, Lower Shabelle

Faced with increasing military opposition and severe blows to its revenue streams, al-Shabaab faces the options of gradual annihilation in the field or scaling back operations to a more asymmetric model based on a diminished interest in holding territory and a greater use of terrorist tactics in an expanded zone of operations that would certainly include Somalia’s neighbors and possibly reach to the foreign supporters of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The announcement was remarkably ill-timed, coming only days ahead of an international conference in London in which many Western countries were already expected to announce some increase in their levels of military and economic support for the TFG and AMISOM. The al-Qaeda merger will almost inevitably result in greater levels of support than donor nations may have originally intended. The timing of the announcement seems inexplicable, unless al-Qaeda has started to believe its own propaganda efforts and actually believes such an announcement will send the TFG’s international supporters reeling in fear and dismay. The timing of the merger is also unlikely to meet with universal approval from Shabaab commanders and will exacerbate existing fissures within the movement’s leadership. TFG minister of information Abdikadir Husayn Muhammad suggested the unification could be a good thing for Somalia: “When Ayman al-Zawahiri described the merger between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda as ‘good news,’ it is also ‘good news’ for us, and the time when al-Shabaab terror group used to disguise itself as a Somali Islamic organization has come to an end” (Jowhar.com, February 10).

The February 23 conference, hosted by the UK government, has been convenedto address political instability and piracy in Somalia. There have been claims in Somalia, particularly from al-Shabaab, that the conference will discuss the “re-colonization” of Somalia, but TFG officials have urged Somalis to wait for the outcome of the meeting (Shabelle Media Network, February 11). According to al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage: “It’s the imperious nature of the Brits that sees them meddling in Islamic affairs in the hope of reviving a hopeless dream of a British Empire” (AFP, February 14). In a recent speech in Mogadishu, TFG president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad insisted al-Qaeda were the colonialists and everyone in Somalia was required to do their part in “liberating” Somalia from their grasp (Shabelle Media Network, February 13). There is also speculation in Somalia that the African Union peacekeeping mission may be taken over by the UN following the London conference, possibly even in a mission led by Turkey (Dayniile Online, February 10).

Al-Shabaab ordered businesses and schools in areas under its control to close for a one-day celebration of their merger with al-Qaeda (Radio Simba [Mogadishu], February 13; Shabelle Media Network, February 13). At one such rally in Afgoye, Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage promised “mujahideen fighters worldwide” that “the unification is a sign of the return of the Islamic caliphate worldwide” (AFP, February 13).

The existing cooperation between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab over the last few years has yielded little for either group: al-Qaeda does not possess the weapons, funds or military assets to tip the conflict in al-Shabaab’s favor, while Somalia’s crumbling infrastructure, prevailing xenophobia and isolation provides a poor safe haven for terrorists operating in the global arena. Non-Somali jihadists generally find Somalia an unattractive theatre and unification is unlikely to change this. The merger will also endanger al-Shabaab’s diaspora fund-raisers, recruiters and volunteers who have had some success so far in meeting terrorism-related charges with claims they were inspired solely by nationalism and not the Salafist-inspired global jihad. U.S. drones operating out of Djibouti can be expected to increase surveillance missions and targeted attacks of al-Shabaab leaders within Somalia.

Kenya is scheduled to increase its Somali commitment from the existing 2,000 men deployed in southern Somalia to 4,700 men under AMISOM command in the Middle and Lower Juba regions of Somalia, though Kenyan authorities maintain the KDF must complete Operation Linda Nchi before Kenyan troops can join AMISOM (East African [Nairobi], February 14). Uganda and Burundi are also preparing to increase their deployment to a total of 12,000 troops from the current level of 9,500.

KDF spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna noted international anti-terrorist protocols can now be applied against al-Shabaab and claimed that al-Shabaab’s revenue stream has been “totally disrupted” since the Kenyan incursion into southern Somalia: “In our own assessment, 75% of revenue collection of al-Shabaab has been disrupted” (KTN Television [Nairobi], February 11; AFP, February 11).

Somalia may now be faced by more al-Shabaab terrorist attacks such as the Mogadishu suicide bombing on February 8 that killed 16 civilians and severely wounded 30 more (al-Andalus Radio [Afgoye] , February 8; Africa Review [Nairobi], February 8). Somali MP and former information minister Tahir Muhammad Gili speculated that the merger would result in al-Shabaab changing its tactics to “carry out more bombings and transfer battles outside Somalia, particularly to Somalia’s neighboring countries, since those countries have troops inside Somalia at the moment. (al-Jazeera, February 12).

Note

1. “Glad Tidings: Announcement of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen Officially Joining al-Qaeda,” As-Sahab Global Media Front, shamikh1.info, February 9.

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 23, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Somalia’s al-Shabaab Explains Its Ban on Foreign Aid Organizations

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Andrew McGregor

December 9, 2011

Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants have provided a detailed justification of their recent and controversial decision to halt the work of 16 foreign aid organizations in areas under al-Shabaab control in drought and famine-stricken southern Somalia. The statement, prepared by al-Shabaab’s Office for Supervising the Affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA), was released to various jihadi websites (Ansar1.info, November 28). The statement allegedly comes as the result of a year-long investigation into what al-Shabaab refers to as “the illicit activities and misconduct” of the foreign aid agencies.

The 16 banned aid organizations include the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and a number of Scandinavian, German and French relief organizations.

The al-Shabaab statement charged the international aid organizations with the following:

  •  The collection of data on Shabaab-held territories “under the guise of demographic surveys, vaccinations reports, demining surveys, nutrition analyses and population censuses.”
  •  Conveying information about the activities of the Mujahideen.
  • Inciting the local population against “the full establishment of the Islamic Shari’a system,” in part by financing and aiding “subversive groups seeking to destroy the basic tents of the Islamic penal system.”
  • Working in league with unnamed organizations to “exploit the country of its natural resources.”
  • Undermining the “cultural values” of Somali Muslims by using corruption and bribery as methods of operation.
  •   “Failing to implement durable solutions” to relieve the suffering of internally displaced peoples.

Some organizations were accused of promoting “secularism, immorality and the degrading values of democracy,” while others were accused of working with “ecumenical [evangelical?] churches” to proselytize Muslim children. In light of these findings, al-Shabaab announced that a committee would perform a yearly review of all aid organizations working in their territory, warning: Any organization found to be supporting or actively engaged in activities deemed detrimental to the attainment of an Islamic State or performing duties other than that which it formally proclaims will be banned immediately without prior warning.”

Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have already fled southern Somalia to Kenya, where many of them live in the world’s largest refugee camp. Kenyan authorities, who regard the refugees as a security risk, are eager to return many of these refugees to new camps in southern Somali territory under the control of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Kenyan Defense Forces now operating in that region (The Standard [Nairobi], November 30).

This article first appeared in the December 9, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Israel to Assist Kenya in Battle against al-Shabaab

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Andrew McGregor

November 24, 2011

Kenyan reports say Israeli personnel will help secure potential targets in Kenya from terrorist attack. The Israeli security experts are expected to start work in the next few weeks. According to Israeli ambassador Gil Haskel: “Israel is willing to send consultants to Kenya to help Kenya secure its cities from terrorist threats and share experience with Kenya because the operation in Somalia is very similar to Israel’s operations in the past, first in Lebanon and then in Gaza Strip” (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 18). Since the Kenyan operation in Somalia began in mid-October, terrorists have struck the Kenyan cities of Nairobi, Garissa and Mandera. More attacks are feared as the operation progresses as al-Shabaab leaders call for major terrorist attacks within Kenya.

Kenyan Troops in SomaliaKenyan Troops in Somalia

A statement from the office of Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga said that Israel had agreed to help “rid its territory of fundamentalist elements,” with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserting that “Kenya’s enemies are Israel’s enemies.” The statement also said that the Israeli prime minister had pledged to help create a “coalition against fundamentalism” in East Africa together with Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Tanzania (BBC, November 4). The Kenyan prime minister’s four-day visit to Jerusalem concluded with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on internal security issues (Jerusalem Post, November 15). Various arms deals are expected to follow, with Kenya seeking patrol vehicles and maritime surveillance equipment. The latest meetings follow up on a Kenyan mission to Jerusalem last year to request Israeli military assistance in countering al-Shabaab threats (Shabelle Media Network, February 14; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 11, 2010).

Al-Shabaab is reported to have responded to the initiative by sending agents from mosque to mosque to announce Israel had now joined the Christian Crusaders to destroy Islam in Somalia (Daily Nation, November 18). Referring to the terrorist strikes already carried out inside Kenya, al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mahmud Raage warned Kenya that “things have not begun in earnest yet and it is now a month on. You still have a chance to go back to your border (Nairobi Star, November 17). Shabaab spokesmen also insisted the world’s Muslims had a responsibility to aid the Somali Islamists now that Israel was joining the struggle against them.

Israel has lately intensified its diplomatic efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. A recent meeting between Netanyahu and South Sudan president Salva Kiir was soon followed by visits from Kenyan Prime Minister Odinga and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, who actually bumped into each other in Jerusalem unaware of each other’s presence (Nairobi Star, November 18). Israel indicated last year that it was prepared to recognize the breakaway territory of Somaliland as an independent nation (Golis News, February 11, 2010). It is believed that Israel has an interest in establishing a military outpost in the Somaliland port of Berbera (Shabelle Media Network, February 14, 2010).  However, new complications in Israeli naval access to the Suez Canal since the Egyptian Revolution may put such plans on hold.

The question now is whether the Israeli-Kenyan agreement will provide the necessary fuel to sustain a successful al-Shabaab recruitment campaign in Somalia at a time it is hard pressed on several fronts and awaiting yet another potential military intervention by Ethiopia. TFG cooperation with the Kenyan offensive will also be easily interpreted by Somalis as cooperation with Israel, a development that would present a major setback for international efforts to restore security in the Horn of Africa region. Discussions regarding Kenya joining the existing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) could further complicate the local credibility of American-backed African Union efforts to destroy al-Shabaab.

This article first appeared in the November 24, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Was al-Shabaab’s Mogadishu Withdrawal a Strategic Retreat in the Style of Moscow or Kabul?

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Andrew McGregor

November 10, 2011

A review of the strategy behind al-Shabaab’s August withdrawal from Mogadishu that recently appeared on jihadi websites has compared the pull-out with Russia’s scorched-earth withdrawal into the Russian interior during Napoleon’s invasion and the Taliban withdrawal into the mountains from Kabul in 2001 (ansar1.info, October 25).

Ugandan AMISOM Soldier on Patrol in Mogadishu

In an article called “Mogadishu… the New Kabul!” author Abu Abdul Malik notes that prior to the withdrawal, al-Shabaab had seized 95% of Mogadishu, but the main facilities of the city, including its port, airport and presidential palace remained under the control of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

High security and inaccessibility prevented al-Shabaab from taking control of the military bases of TFG and African Union troops. In this situation, “a nucleus of the enemy remained which would enable them to grow through the importation of new weapons and more soldiers and training Somali hirelings from abroad.”

Al-Shabaab’s failure to eliminate these bases led to the further intervention of “foreign advisors from France and America, as well as mercenary Blackwater forces.” The Somali militants concluded that “prolonging this course of action did not serve the interests of al-Shabaab in any way…”

Following the failure of al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive in Mogadishu, the perceived solution was to abandon the long urban warfare campaign and turn to guerrilla warfare in areas controlled by AMISOM by forgoing the occupation of the city. This move allowed al-Shabaab to once more resume the offensive initiative by allowing it to determine when and where it wished to engage the enemy and in what numbers. While AMISOM forces were concentrated in a square kilometer of Mogadishu they were almost unassailable; however, forcing the undermanned African Union mission to attempt to occupy the whole of Mogadishu drew the normally reticent AU troops from their bases and spread them out across a city rife with opportunities for ambush. The result has been at least one highly successful attack on patrolling AMISOM forces (see Terrorism Monitor, November 3). According to Abu Abdul Malik: “Mogadishu has become what Moscow became to Napoleon. Just let the enemy come out, he will fall in the great Mogadishu trap! … Let them become intoxicated as Napoleon was intoxicated by Moscow and as the Russians and Americans were by Kabul…”

This article first appeared in the November 10, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Kenya’s Navy Joins Counter-Terrorist Operations Off Somalia

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Andrew McGregor

November 10, 2011

Kenya’s navy has joined the Kenyan military offensive in Somalia with operations designed to end al-Shabaab or third-party resupply or arms, fuel and other materiel to Shabaab-held territories in southern Somalia, secure Kenyan waters from terrorist infiltrators and prepare conditions for a two-pronged land and sea assault on the Shabaab-held port of Kismayo. Kenyan forces crossed the border into southern Somalia on October 16 as part of Operation Linda Nchi

The main objective of the Kenyan campaign is to seize the port of Kismayo, a vital source of revenues for al-Shabaab as well as a connection between the Islamist movement and the wider world. With al-Shabaab’s loss of the lucrative Mogadishu markets last August and a summer long drought that created massive out-migration from al-Shabaab-held regions of southern Somalia, the loss of Kismayo would represent a severe body-blow to the Somali militants. Kenyan military sources have indicated that the Kenyan navy will play an important part in the attack on Kismayo (Daily Nation [Nairobi], October 30). Kenyan jets have already started bombardment of the port region. Kenya’s navy possesses an amphibious assault vessel, though a risky amphibious assault on Kismayo would be ambitious for a nation still in the early days of its first extraterritorial operation.

Kenyan Naval Ensign

Kenya’s small navy consists largely of a handful of small British-built missile boats, Spanish-built patrol boats and a number of American and Spanish-built inshore patrol vessels (IPVs). In recent years the Kenyan Navy has come under local criticism for failing to do enough to tackle the problems of piracy, narcotics smuggling and illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Kenyan waters (Nairobi Chronicle, February 11, 2009). However, Kenya’s Navy has been hampered in carrying out deep-water operations by deficiencies in its fleet. The fleet’s two Spanish-built patrol boats (Shuja and Shupavu) have had unexpected range and sea-handling problems, while another ship designed for long-range patrols, the KNS Jasiri, has sat in a Spanish dock since its completion in 2005 due to an unresolved dispute between Kenya and the European contractor (Nairobi Chronicle, December 16, 2008; DefenceWeb, July 4).

Nonetheless, Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia has been greatly aided by the return of the missile boats Nyayo and Umoja from an over two-year refit in Italy. The two 1987 vintage ships had their Otomat missiles removed as part of the refit but were otherwise extensively modernized. Their return has given the Kenyan military greater confidence in their ability to control the southern Somali coastline during the ongoing operations.

On November 2, a Kenyan patrol boat in Somali waters sank a ship they claimed was transporting fuel and al-Shabaab fighters to Kuday in the Bajuni coral islands off the southern Somali coast. Military spokesmen claimed all 18 al-Shabaab militants aboard the ship were killed (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 3; Capital FM [Nairobi], November 3; The Standard [Nairobi], November 4).  [1] The Bajuni coral islands of Kuday, Ndoa, Chuvaye, Koyama, Fuma Iyu na Tini and Nchoni were traditionally inhabited by the non-Somali Bajuni culture, speaking a dialect of Swahili. Somalis began forcing the Bajuni from the islands during the Siad Barre regime, a trend that actually worsened after the collapse of his government in 1991 as many Bajuni sought refuge in Kenya.

A second ship was sunk on November 4, when a Kenyan ship opened fire on a vessel coming from the region of Ras Kamboni in southern Somalia. According to Kenyan military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir, “The boat was challenged to stop for identification but continued to approach the Kenya Navy at high speed, and consequently they fired on it” (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 4).

Kenyan Sailors on Parade

Soon after the attack, however, Kenyan fishermen in the Magarini district claimed that the eight killed were local fishermen. According to the three survivors, the unarmed fishermen had identified themselves and surrendered before the Kenyan ship opened fire, though the commander of the Kenyan ship denies any such surrender took place. [2] A district commissioner later affirmed the identity of the survivors as local fishermen (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 4). Kenyan officials say the government has issued clear instructions to fishermen that fishing off northern Kenya must be done in the daytime while fishing in Somali waters is prohibited (The Standard [Nairobi], November 4).

Kenya’s military has also warned merchant ships in the Indian Ocean against helping foreign fighters in Somalia to escape to Yemen. Kenya claims foreign fighters have gathered in Barawe and Marka to escape from the Kenyan offensive (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 4).

Notes

1. For video see http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/11/18-shabaab-killed-as-kenya-sinks-boat/.

2. See Nairobi TV interview, November 7, 2011:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBke-R0FEXo.

This article first appeared in the November 10, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Al-Shabaab Counteroffensive in Mogadishu Threatens African Union’s Military Gains

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Andrew McGregor

November 3, 2011

The cautious consolidation of its control over Mogadishu by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) encountered a pair of serious setbacks in late October as al-Shabaab Islamists ambushed a Burundian patrol on October 20 and mounted a suicide attack on Ugandan troops in their base at the German Metal Factory near Mogadishu Stadium.

ugandan soldier draggedBody of Ugandan Peacekeeper Dragged by Somalis Through the Streets of Mogadishu (Feisal Omar)

A statement from al-Shabaab describing the “Mogadish Bloodbath” claimed two “martyrdom seekers” disguised as Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops infiltrated the camp housing Ugandan troops and forces of Somalia’s TFG and set off their bombs, killing themselves and a number of Ugandan soldiers. This much is acknowledged by AMISOM; the Shabaab statement, however, describes a more complete victory obtained when mujahideen followed the blasts by raiding the base, securing all access routes in and out and massacring all Ugandan and TFG forces contained within. [1] Al-Shabaab spokesmen later claimed at least one of the two suicide attackers was an American citizen who had joined the Somali mujahideen (AFP, October 30). Uganda’s Lieutenant General Katumba Wamala claimed the Ugandans had suffered only three killed and two wounded in the attack, though some reports have suggested far greater losses (Sunday Nation [Nairobi], October 30). Nevertheless, sources in Mogadishu have confirmed that gunmen wearing TFG uniforms rushed the camp after the bombings, killing at least ten soldiers (AP, October 29; Reuters, October 29). Following the attack, a senior AMISOM officer promised that the African Union forces would soon “destroy” al-Shabaab (Shabelle Media Network, October 28; Horseed Media, October 28).

Corpses Alleged to be those of Burundian Soldiers Put on Display by al-Shabaab

Though al-Shabaab claimed to have killed anywhere from 76 to 150 Burundian troops in the earlier ambush in Dayniile district and displayed dozens of bodies wearing AMISOM gear afterward, the real figure appears to be closer to 50. Burundian authorities have claimed a much lower figure of ten killed, but this figure appears intended to ward off domestic opposition to the mission in politically volatile Burundi.The Bujumbura government reaffirmed its commitment to the AMISOM mission after the clash, urging its troops to “double their efforts and vigilance” while calling on the international community to supply the African Union peacekeepers with enough “hardware” to carry out their mandate (PANA Online [Dakar], October 27).

Al-Shabaab now describes their sudden August withdrawal from most of Mogadishu not as a sign of weakness, but rather as a strategic operation designed to focus efforts on causing as much damage to AMISOM as possible without having to defend ground. According to the Shabaab statement on the Dayniile clash of October 20, “The recent battles have lured the AU forces, who previously sought refuge behind their heavily fortified bases and underground bunkers, out into the open; thereby exposing their intense vulnerabilities and proving their inability to fight in an urban area” (Ansar1.info, October 24; Mareeg Online, October 24; Africa Review [Nairobi], October 25).  Al-Shabaab’s general withdrawal from Mogadishu has presented the undermanned African Union mission with the dilemma of how to occupy and consolidate its gains in Mogadishu without spreading AU forces too thin. According to AMISOM spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Paddy Ankunda: “The outer north and eastern fringes of the city must still be cleared, but key ground and buildings are no longer under the control of the extremists” (AFP, October 11). The Shabaab strategy also has the benefit of freeing up forces to fend off Kenyan occupation of the Shabaab-held port of Kismayo, which would constitute a crippling financial loss to the Islamist movement.

Note

  1. Press Office, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, “The Mogadishu Bloodbath – 80 Ugandan Soldiers Killed,” October 29, 2011.

This article first appeared in the November 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Was the Battle for Galkayo a Clan Dispute or a Victory for Puntland over al-Shabaab?

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Andrew McGregor

September 16, 2011

A gun battle between militants and Puntland security forces in Galkayo (the capital of Mudug region) on September 1 and 2 has left 68 dead and 153 wounded. The administration of the autonomous Somali province of Puntland announced the defeat of a group of al-Shabaab fighters in the battle in Puntland’s second-most populous city, but there are serious questions as to whether security forces were engaged with al-Shabaab or were actually fighting in a clan-based conflict.

The insistence of both President Abdirahman Muhammad Mohamud “Farole” and Puntland security minister Kalif Isse Mudan that Puntland security forces were battling al-Shabaab militants was challenged by the president’s own terrorism advisor, General Muhammad Dahir Shimbir, who said his unit’s investigation of the incident had revealed only local residents “mostly from one clan” involved in the fighting. The General further suggested that the massive number of killed and wounded could not be justified (Raxanreeb Radio, September 11).  A hospital and various hotels were also reported to have suffered from damage inflicted during the fight and subsequent looting by government forces (RBC Radio, September 10). Mortars and artillery are reported to have been used by Puntland forces.


The fighting was concentrated in the Garsor village district of Galkayo, populated mainly by the Leelkase sub-clan of the Darod (RBC Radio, September 10). One report claims that a police unit made up of men belonging to a rival sub-clan was deployed to Galkayo several weeks ago, heightening tension in the town (Horseed Media, September 8). The southern part of Galkayo is administered by Galmudug, an autonomous region of central Somalia with an uneasy relationship with Puntland. Puntland claims that South Galkayo, under the Galmudug administration, is a base for militancy in North Galkayo and supplied the fighters in North Galkayo with  “safe refuge, medical assistance and even ammunition” (Horseed Media, September 5; Radio Garowe, September 4). [2]

To confirm their version of events, Puntland authorities displayed a group of men they alleged were al-Shabaab fighters captured in two separate operations in the Garsor neighborhood of Galkayo. A police official informed journalists that all the men had pleaded guilty and were awaiting arraignment in court (SUNA Times, September 8). Puntland officials say the Garsor neighborhood is a base of operations for assassinations and violence across Puntland. Some of the prisoners displayed were said to have been captured during a raid on an al-Shabaab safe-house in Galkayo as they planned further acts of violence, while other prisoners were said to have been arrested while engaged in combat against Puntland security forces (Horseed Media, August 8). Journalists in attendance apparently did not talk to the prisoners.

A video of young men fighting the security forces in Galkayo did not show the organized and heavily-armed veteran fighters of al-Shabaab, but rather a line of young men hugging a building while waiting for their turn to fire off one of two weapons in their possession. [1] Al-Shabaab has not issued a statement regarding the fighting, odd for a movement that has rarely shied away from admitting its participation in battles against Somali authorities.

Puntland also condemned Galmudug leader Muhammad Ahmad Alim for telling the BBC the fighting in Galkayo was “clan-based” and asserted that the men killed or arrested by security forces in Galkayo came from a number of different areas and belonged to several different clans.

Most of the fighting on behalf of the Puntland government was carried out by the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS), the strongest armed group in Puntland, where it absorbs an enormous amount of the annual budget. The PIS is formed largely from the Osman Mahmud sub-clan of the Majerteen (which also dominates the Puntland administration) and has been accused of inciting clan warfare against the Warsangeli clan of the Darod in Bosaso. In the summer of 2010 the PIS engaged in battles against a militia led by Islamist Shaykh Muhammad Sa’id “Atam”(a Warsangeli) in the mountainous Galgala district of Puntland’s Bari Region (for a profile of Shaykh Atam, see Militant Leadership Monitor, October 2, 2010). Local radio reported on September 7 that Puntland security forces had engaged in an hour-long gun battle with militants led by Shaykh Muhamamad Sa’id Atam that killed five people (Radio Shabelle, September 7, 2010). The PIS has been targeted by al-Shabaab in the past, most notably with a pair of suicide car bombs that struck two PIS anti-terrorism offices in Bosasso, the economic capital of Puntland, killing six PIS agents (AFP, October 30, 2008).

According to a report in the Somaliland Press (generally unsympathetic to the regime in Puntland), the conflict started as a traditional dispute over water wells by members of the Issa Mahmud sub-clan of the Majerteen/Darod (the sub-clan of President Farole) and the Leelkase sub-clan of the Darod. The conflict spread to Galkayo, where members of both sub-clans live, before the government sent in troops and armor to subdue the Leelkase, dubbing them al-Shabaab fighters in the process (Somaliland Press, September 5). However, Puntland President Farole stated: “There was no clan fighting in Galkayo. Our forces were fighting against terrorists who target our citizens. This is our duty. Our government stops clan wars. We spend massive resources and manpower to stop clan wars, and presently our forces are deployed in many regions of Puntland to prevent clan wars. But al-Shabaab terrorist group is notorious for using the clan card, for hiding under local greivances, similar to methods they used during the Galgala conflict” (Radio Garowe, September 4).

Puntland officials never fail to point out that al-Shabaab’s leadership is in the hands of members of the Isaaq clan of Somaliland, and insist that the campaign of bombings and assassinations plaguing Puntland are organized and funded in Somaliland (Garowe Online, September 10). The town of Burao, in particular, is often mentioned as the source of al-Shabaab plots against Puntland (Radio Garowe, September 1).

There is very little incentive for regional governments such as Puntland to admit to clan-based clashes when it is more profitable to claim threatening incursions by al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda and watch the military support and funding roll in, strengthening the hand of the regional government against its neighbors. Admitting to clan clashes is also an acknowledgement that serious clan differences exist, an uncomfortable admission for a government almost entirely based on a single sub-clan. Though Puntland has undoubtedly been a target of al-Shabaab in the past, the ongoing series of killings and bombings is every bit as likely to have its motivation in pre-existing clan rivalries or in disputes over the unprecedented amount of cash that is rolling into Puntland as a result of the Puntland-based piracy industry

Notes

  1. Video provided by Waagacusubmedia on Sep 2, 2011, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=awoaw7Ax2Bk&feature=related.
  2. Press Release, Ministry of Security and DDR, Government of Puntland, September 2, 2011.
  3. Press Release, Communications Office, the Puntland Presidency, August 28, 2011.

This article first appeared in the September 16, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Internal Disputes Plague al-Shabaab Leadership After Mogadishu Withdrawal

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Andrew McGregor

August 19, 2011

Al-Shabaab’s sudden withdrawal from Mogadishu on August 6 in the face of a concentrated offensive by Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) appears to have been followed by a major internal dispute over the movement’s leadership, possibly resulting in the appointment of a new leader.

AMISOM Armor in Mogadishu

Al-Shabaab has tried to cover up the problems and issues that led to the withdrawal by maintaining it was a “tactical” move (Hiraan Online, August 12; AllPuntland, August 10). One al-Shabaab leader, Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys (former leader of Hizb al-Islam, now absorbed into al-Shabaab) admitted in an interview that the movement was forced to turn to a new strategy because it could no longer match the military strength of AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces in Mogadishu’s intense urban warfare  (Somali Channel TV [London], August 12).

However, there are signs that al-Shabaab’s withdrawal was not as planned as the movement would like to let on; AMISOM troops and Somali police discovered a store of 137 155 mm artillery shells left behind in a deserted house in a part of Mogadishu’s Bakara Market recently occupied by al-Shabaab. As the movement does not possess 155 mm artillery, it is likely the shells were being cannibalized for explosives needed in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (Horseed Media, August 13; AFP, August 13).

Al-Shabaab has claimed a certain number of fighters were left behind, explaining the resistance that AMISOM forces continue to encounter (especially in the north of the city) as they continue their cautious occupation of the neighborhoods newly vacated by al-Shabaab. The TFG has attempted to capitalize on al-Shabaab’s difficulties by offering an amnesty to those fighters still active in Mogadishu who are prepared to renounce violence (AFP, August 10). In some places, the retreating Islamists have been replaced by local clan militias under the command of powerful businessmen who have no desire to come under TFG rule. Many other of these fighters are reported to be veterans of Hizb al-Islam still under the direct command of Hassan Dahir Aweys (Jowhar.com [Mogadishu], August 9).

According to the Ugandan commander of AMISOM, Major General Fred Mugisha, the African Union peacekeepers “now have to cover a much larger area of the city and we risk being overstretched” (AFP, August 10).  Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has recently pledged to send another 2,000 soldiers from the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) to Mogadishu to consolidate AMISOM’s gains after repeated pleas for military support from other African Union nations to AMISOM’s Ugandan and Burundian contingents failed to win any positive response (Daily Monitor [Kampala], August 13).

Though his TFG fighters played only a small part in driving al-Shabaab out of the national capital, Somali president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad is now talking tough regarding his determination to defeat his former Islamist allies: “Al-Shabaab is a threat to Somalia as well as to the stability of the wider region and the world. We will not stop pursuing them. Our determination is to clear them from the territory of Somalia” (PANA Online [Dakar], August 11). However, many Somalis fear the expulsion of al-Shabaab will mean a return of the warlords who devastated Mogadishu for nearly two decades. Their fears were not allayed by the president’s appointment of former warlord (and serial opportunist) General Yusuf Muhammad Si’ad “Indha Adde” (Dayniile Online, August 9).

Faced with the consequences of its inability or unwillingness to deal with the growing famine in central and southern Somalia, al-Shabaab has resorted to ever more desperate efforts to prevent the total depopulation of its “Emirate.” Among their more fantastic theories is Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage’s explanation of the flight of many Somalis from Shabaab-controlled regions to refugee camps in Kenya or Ethiopia to receive the international aid that al-Shabaab forbids in most of its territory. According to the Shabaab spokesman, the non-Muslim enemy has devised a new strategy to “transport [Somalis] abroad, especially to Christian countries like Ethiopia and Kenya, so that their faith can be destroyed and [so] that they could be staff and soldiers for the Christians” (AFP, July 30).

It is very likely that the Islamist movement’s ineffectual response to the massive drought and famine (“pray for rain”) has irreparably damaged the movement’s credibility as a political movement in Somalia. However, al-Shabaab has displayed a remarkable resiliency for an often divided movement that seems to excel at disappointing old friends and making new enemies. Given its temporarily diminished capacity for direct military confrontation, it can be expected that the movement will pursue other highly familiar tactics, such as kidnappings, bombings and assassinations.

Some Somali sources report that Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr’s” controversial leadership of al-Shabaab has come to an end with his replacement by Shaykh Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani,” a former al-Shabaab chief in Kismayo, deputy to Godane and veteran of fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan. His activities since his return to Somalia, including the murder of several foreigners in 2003-2004, have earned him a 25-year prison sentence issued in absentia in his native Somaliland. Like Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Haji is a member of the Isaaq clan of northern Somalia. Abdi Godane inserted many Isaaq into senior leadership positions in al-Shabaab even though most of the movement’s fighters hail from southern Somali clans. Somali sources say the appointment was supported by senior al-Shabaab members Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur,” Shaykh Fu’ad Shongole and Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys (Somali Broadcasting Corporation Online [Puntland], August 9).   

Shaykh Mukhtar Robow, who commands the largest contingent in al-Shabaab, has sought Godane’s replacement for nearly a year now, following the failed “Ramadan Offensive” that was repelled with heavy losses to Mukhtar Robow’s southern Somali Rahanweyn fighters, who were pushed into the frontlines and then denied medical treatment for their wounds by order of Abdi Godane (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 21, 2010). Nonethelss, al-Shabaab’s spokesman, Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage “Ali Dheere,” has asserted that reports of a leadership struggle within the movement were nothing but “enemy propaganda” (BBC Somali Service, August 13).

This article was originally published in the August 19, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor