Israeli End Goals in Gaza: A Palestinian Expulsion?

Terrorism Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 2

Andrew McGregor

January 31, 2024

(NPR)

Executive Summary

  • Nearly all of Gaza’s 2.2 million people have been displaced by the current conflict, with Israel potentially considering “voluntary” resettlement plans for the Gazan population.
  • Various Israeli officials have proposed several such plans for the removal of Gazans to other nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Egypt, which they have justified by declaring that Gazans’ main desire at this point is to destroy Israel.
  • Egypt has firmly rejected Israeli proposals to resettle Gazans in its country, equating any “voluntary” resettlement to illegal forced displacement. In particular, relocating the Gazan population to the Sinai is felt by Cairo to risk peace between Egypt and Israel.

In January 2008, Hamas fighters blasted holes through the border wall separating Gaza and Egypt to allow hundreds of thousands of starving Palestinians to access food and fuel supplies in Egypt. The incursion occurred five days after Israel imposed a complete blockade on Gaza, following a series of Hamas rocket attacks. Egyptian security forces backed off to alleviate the growing humanitarian crisis, but forced the Gazans back across the border several days later (Al Jazeera, January 24, 2008).

Now, sixteen years later, Israel may be seeking a more permanent repetition of this incident by forcing nearly all of Gaza’s 2.2 million people into the Egyptian Sinai. Some 1.9 million Gazans are now displaced, with little or nothing to return to when the bombing stops (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 4). In this context, high-level Israeli discussions regarding the “voluntary” resettlement of Gaza’s Palestinian population have become an indicator of the Israeli government’s war objectives.

Israeli Plans for Transferring Gazans to Sinai and Beyond

Schemes to transfer Gaza’s population to Sinai have appeared repeatedly since the 1950s, but the Sinai is not the only place to have been considered as a destination for Gaza’s Arabs. Israel’s Likud government is reported to be engaged in secret negotiations with several nations to accept displaced Gazans, most notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a nation beset by environmental crises, humanitarian challenges, political instability, and ceaseless internal warfare (Times of Israel, January 3).

General Alfredo Stroessner, Dictator of Paraguay

A secret 1969 plan to encourage Gazans to migrate to Paraguay was only revealed in 2020. Negotiated by Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency with Paraguayan dictator and Nazi sympathizer Alfredo Stroessner, the deal called for 60,000 Palestinians to move to the South American nation. However, ultimately, only 30 Palestinians did so, two of whom stormed the Israeli Embassy and killed the ambassador’s secretary (Jerusalem Post, August 12, 2020).

Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel (X)

On January 2, Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel outlined a post-war plan to take control of the Egypt–Gaza border. She noted that by war’s end, there will be no municipal authorities in Gaza, no source of work, a 60 percent decline in agricultural land, and a complete dependency on humanitarian aid. All these conditions encouraged “voluntary emigration” (Times of Israel, January 3).

Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich (Israel Hayom)

Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich (of the Religious Zionist Party), National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir (of the Otzma Yehudit Party) and numerous members of the Likud Party have also advocated the external resettlement of Gazans and their replacement with Israeli settlers. Smotrich justified the “voluntary” emigration by claiming “two million [Gazans] wake up every morning with a desire to destroy the State of Israel and to slaughter, rape, and murder Jews” (Jerusalem Post, January 3). However, these calls do not have universal support in the Israeli government, with two Likud ministers describing them as “unrealistic” and damaging to Israel’s international reputation (Times of Israel, January 4).

“An Integral Part of Israel” – Israel’s Projected New Western Border

In mid-December, extremist Rabbi Uzi Sharbaf, a founding member of banned Israeli terrorist group “The Jewish Underground” (HaMakhteret HaYehudit), told a Tel Aviv conference attended by Knesset members that Jewish settlements must return to Gaza as part of an historic opportunity to “liberate” biblical lands from the Sinai up to the Nile River (Jordan News, December 15, 2023; Al-Ahram [Cairo], December 14, 2023). This “unique and rare opportunity to evacuate the entire Gaza Strip” was also cited in an October 17 paper released by former senior defense and intelligence officials of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy. Rather than the Sinai, the plan called for the resettlement of Gazans in existing housing in the Cairo satellite cities of “6 October” and “10 Ramadan” that would be purchased by Israel at a cost of $8 billion. [1]

General Giora Eiland (Jerusalem Post)

Giora Eiland, an influential retired IDF major-general and former head of the Israeli National Security Council who has compared Gaza to Nazi Germany, declared at the beginning of the current conflict that: “Israel needs to create a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, compelling tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Egypt or the Gulf… Gaza will become a place where no human being can exist” (Ynetnews, October 12, 2023; Yedioth Ahronoth, November 19, 2023). Eiland has promoted a population transfer from Gaza to Sinai since 2004.

Egyptian Reactions

A leaked document from Israel’s Intelligence Ministry dated October 13 called for a permanent relocation of Gazans to Sinai, initially to tent cities, and then to more stable accommodation in the Sinai Peninsula, with a buffer zone along the border preventing their return to Gaza. The first step would consist of shifting the population to Gaza’s south. Egypt’s minister of foreign affairs, Sameh Shoukry, described the leaked document as “a ludicrous proposition,” noting that displacement was itself “an illegal activity” (Asharq Al-Awsat, November 4, 2023). Shoukry later denounced calls for a “voluntary” displacement as a “full-fledged war crime” (Al-Ahram [Cairo], November 21, 2023).

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry (Daily News Egypt)

Israeli sources report that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested the World Bank write off Egypt’s considerable foreign debt (an estimated $165 billion) in return for accepting Gaza’s population (Yedioth Ahronoth, October 31, 2023). Some financial aid from the rich Gulf states might be included, but Egyptian authorities have loudly proclaimed their rejection of the deal (Egypt Independent, November 1, 2023). Egyptian prime minister Mustafa Madbouli has noted his government’s own plans to settle eight million Egyptians in the Sinai by 2050 (Al-Ahram [Cairo], November 23, 2023). [2]

Egypt fears that discontented and resentful Gazans might use Sinai as a base for attacks on Israel in contravention of the peace agreement between the two nations. President Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi has instead suggested that Israel transport the two million Gazans to Israel’s Negev Desert in the south of the country until they can be returned after the defeat of Hamas (Egypt Today, November 22, 2023).

Conclusion

Bitter divisions are already emerging in Israel’s war cabinet over the post-war destiny of Gaza’s people. The implications for Israel of a forced depopulation of Gaza are many, including international isolation, the collapse of the Abraham Accords, and even a renewal of hostilities with Egypt. So long as both Egypt and the Palestinians of Gaza reject the idea of resettlement, the scheme cannot be fulfilled without dangerous consequences for Israel’s future.

Notes:

[1] “A Plan for resettlement and final rehabilitation in Egypt of the entire population of Gaza: economic aspects,” Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, October 17, 2023. The paper was taken down from the web after an international backlash. See Middle East Eye, October 26, 2023.

[2] Cairo’s full plan for development in Sinai can be found here: “The New Republic Implements Comprehensive National Plan to Change Life in Sinai: The Land of Turquoise,” State Information Service, April 26, 2022, https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/165520/Mega-Projects-on-every-inch-of-Sinai?lang=en-us

Terrorism Will Justify Egypt’s Political Repression

Andrew McGregor

Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, August 6, 2019

Significance

Egypt recently extended its national state of emergency for an additional three months, the ninth time it has done so since April 2017. The state of emergency provides the president with extraordinary powers over all Egyptian media and the exercise of individual rights to movement and assembly.

Egypt is the Arab world’s largest and most influential state; attacks there on democratic norms and institutions whether by terrorist groups or the state have a direct impact on the direction of other Arab nations. How Egypt deals with extremist fighters returning from campaigns in Iraq, Syria and Libyan as well as its ongoing campaign against the MB will have repercussions throughout the Middle East.

Analysis

Six years after Egypt’s military overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government, the nation faces a three-pronged terrorist threat from the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda (whose leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, is Egyptian) and militant offshoots of the banned Muslim Brotherhood. The terrorists have multiple targets, including Christians, Sufi Muslims, politicians, civil servants and security personnel of all types.

President ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi used a July 23 speech to declare victory over the terrorists, stating their infrastructure and bases had been destroyed (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 23, 2019). The president’s announcement came only days after the Interior Ministry claimed it had broken up a major plot by the Muslim Brotherhood to incite riots and other violence in a campaign orchestrated through social media and satellite television channels.

Egyptian Immigration Minister Nabila Makram (CBC)

The Sisi regime has broadened its definition of terrorism to include most forms of political opposition. Independent reporting of terrorism issues in Egypt can bring about charges of supporting terrorism, with severe penalties. In an alarming statement, Egyptian Immigration Minister Nabila Makram used a July 23 speech in Toronto to casually suggest that anyone criticizing Egypt should be killed (Al-Jazeera, July 25, 2019).

Political dissent now equals terrorism, turning a significant and non-violent portion of the population into terrorists. As the number of individuals identified as “terrorists” by the state swells, it becomes harder to ever triumph over “terrorism.” Low-level insurgencies are common in authoritarian states and serve to provide justification for repressive measures. Hundreds of suspects at a time are processed through the justice system in mass trials. In the meantime, detainees are exposed to real terrorists in prison.

According to a 2018 report from the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), over 27,000 arrests have been made in al-Sisi’s war on terror, with half belonging to the MB and more than 11,500 detainees having no known affiliation to a terrorist group. This is in addition to more than 7,000 deaths in counter-terrorism operations, 95% of these being residents of North Sinai, where the MB has little influence (TIMEP, 2018, p.11).

Most Sinai Egyptians are Bedouin who are distrusted by the government, kept out of the security services and largely excluded from any but the most minor economic activity and development. Profitable tourist facilities in south Sinai that prohibit employment of local Bedouin have been built on land seized from Bedouin owners. Many of North Sinai’s 450,000 people have roots in Palestinian Gaza, just across the border, and see little reason to integrate with Egyptian society at large.

Demolition of Rafah by the Egyptian Army

Egyptian authorities have tried but failed to isolate the terrorist threat in northern Sinai by turning the region into an open-air prison where arbitrary measures prevail. Demolition crews have been hard at work demolishing buildings and homes and productive farms are razed. The city of Rafah (70,000 residents) no longer exists except as a memory in a new “buffer zone” established on the border with Israel. Services are nearly non-existent and departure from this armed quarantine can only be made by obtaining a special permit. These are hardly steps designed to encourage greater engagement by the local population in the anti-terrorism struggle.

IS has carried out a steady stream of ambushes, bombings and assassinations targeting security forces, Sufis and Christians. IS preachers have accused the Sufis of heresy, sorcery and cooperation with security forces to justify their mass murder. This includes a 2017 attack on the Rawda Sufi mosque that left over 300 dead after security forces ignored intelligence warning of the attack and were slow to respond once it had started (ICG, January 31, 2018).

Cairo claims to have killed some 3,000 terrorists in Sinai since the beginning of the insurgency, though this number is either inflated or includes innocent victims of security rampages and extrajudicial executions. An additional 9,000 residents have been arrested on suspicion of being members of the Islamic State or other terrorist groups.

The Egyptian Army has empowered local drug addicts and criminals by enrolling them as so-called manadeeb (“delegates”). Usually wearing masks and dressed in army camouflage, the manadeeb identify terrorist suspects (an easy way to take revenge on otherwise innocent residents) and participate in their interrogation and even summary executions (HRW, May 28, 2019).

IS targeting has forced nearly the entire Christian population of Sinai to depart for refuge in the Nile Valley, though they are still under threat from IS Wilayet Sinai terrorists who have expanded their operations to other parts of Egypt through attacks on tourists, diplomatic facilities and churches.

Terrorist cells have a very different composition elsewhere in Egypt. Many of the cells operating in the Nile Valley region are composed of well-educated middle class Muslim Brotherhood members or sympathizers. These members are not unemployed social outcasts or alienated from Egyptian society at large, a status that should alarm Egyptian authorities. The MB is highly resilient – it has endured persecution before, but is organized to survive these episodes.

Egyptian M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank

While Egypt’s militants are largely restricted to weapons such as firearms, explosives, IEDs and suicide attackers, Egypt’s security apparatus has brought a wide variety of sophisticated weapons and equipment to bear, including advanced surveillance aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, F-16 fighters, Rafale multi-role fighters, mortars, M1 Abrams main battle tanks, artillery, missiles and a variety of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

There is no improving economy to offer alternatives to terrorism. To the contrary, Egypt’s economy is struggling across the board, with major declines in foreign currency reserves, rampant unemployment, an industrial sector distorted by military involvement and a precipitous drop in investor confidence. The tourist industry, one of the nation’s largest employers, has been devastated by the impact of terrorism.

What Next

Al-Sisi’s supporters in parliament have introduced amendments to the constitution that will allow al-Sisi to remain in power until 2034. Egyptian political development is static, unable to break free from a cycle of generals turned politicians, from Nasser through Sadat and Mubarak to al-Sisi. This political stagnation will continue to foment opposition that can now find no legal form of expression other than violent means.

The majority of terrorist attacks in Egypt have targeted security forces rather than civilians, though there is a progression to more indiscriminate killings such as attacks on churches and mosques.

Impacts

  • Al-Sisi exploits his role as a front-line opponent of terrorism to gain Western tolerance for his rule, if not outright support.
  • Authorities insist the political violence within Egypt is supported by Egypt’s “enemies,” Qatar and Turkey in particular.
  • Egypt’s increasingly secret war on terrorism fails to engage the larger population.
  • Ayman al-Zawahiri has used the overthrow of Muhammad Mursi as proof that only violence can root out and destroy Egypt’s “deep state.”

Why are Egypt’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts Failing in the Sinai Peninsula?

Andrew McGregor

December 15, 2016

In October 2011, Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi declared “the military situation in Sinai is 100 percent secure” (Daily News Egypt, October 6, 2011). Four years later, Army spokesman Brigadier General Muhammad Samir assured Egyptians that the North Sinai was “100 percent under control” (al-Jazeera, July 2, 2015). Even Dr. Najih Ibrahim, a former jihadist and principal theorist of Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (GI – Islamic Group) declared as recently as last August that for Sinai’s branch of the Islamic State: “This is the beginning of the end for this organization…  It cannot undertake big operations, such as the bombing of government buildings, like the bombing of the military intelligence building previously … or massacre, or conduct operations outside Sinai. Instead, it has resorted to car bombs or suicide bombings, which are mostly handled well [by Egyptian security forces]” (Ahram Online, August 11; August 15).sinai-ea-map

Since then, Islamic State militants have carried out highly organized large-scale attacks on checkpoints in al-Arish, killing 12 conscripts on October 12 and another 12 soldiers on November 24. Together with a steady stream of almost daily IED attacks, mortar attacks and assassinations, it is clear that militancy in North Sinai is far from finished.

Since 2004 there have been a series of jihadist groups operating in the Sinai. The latest face of militancy in the region is the Wilayet Sayna (WS – “Sinai Province”), a name adopted by the Sinai’s Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM – Supporters of Jerusalem) following its declaration of allegiance to the IS militant group in November 2014. The secretive WS has been estimated to include anywhere from several hundred to two thousand fighters. Despite operating for the most part in a small territory under 400 square miles in with a population of roughly 430,000 people, a series of offensives since 2013 by the Arab world’s most powerful army in North Sinai have produced not victory, but rather a war of attrition. The question therefore is what exceptional circumstances exist in the North Sinai that prevent Egypt’s security forces from ending a small but troubling insurgency that receives little outside support.

As in northern Mali in 2012, the conflict in Sinai has merged a localized ethnic insurgency with externally-inspired Salafi-Jihadism. The conflict persists despite the wide latitude granted by Israel in terms of violating the 1979 Camp David Accords’ restrictions on arms and troops deployed by Egypt in the Sinai. Unsettled by the cross-border activities of Gazan and Sinai terrorists, Israel has basically granted Cairo a free hand in military deployments there since July 2015.

At the core of the insurgency is Sinai’s Bedouin population, culturally and geographically separate from the Egyptian “mainland.” Traditionally, the Bedouin of the Sinai had closer relations with Gaza and Palestine to the northeast than the Egyptian nation to their west, though Egypt’s interest in the Sinai and its resources dates to the earliest dynasties of Ancient Egypt. The Israeli occupation of the region in 1967-1979 left many Egyptians suspicious of pro-Israeli sympathies amongst the Bedouin (generally without cause) and led to a ban on their recruitment by Egypt’s military or security services.

According to Egyptian MP Tamer al-Shahawy (a former major-general and military intelligence chief), social changes began in the Sinai after the 1973 war with Israel: “After the war a major rift in ‎tribal culture occurred — on one hand was the pull of the Sufi trend, on the other the pull of ‎money from illegal activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking and arms dealing… For a number of reasons the government was forced to prioritize a security over a socio-‎economic political response.”‎ (Ahram Online, August 15).

Lack of development, land ownership issues and Cairo’s general disinterest in the region for anything other than strategic purposes erupted in the terrorist bombings of Red Sea tourist resorts from 2004 to 2006. The deaths of at least 145 people led to a wave of mass arrests, torture and lengthy detentions that embittered the Bedouin and further defined the differences between “Egyptians” and the inhabitants of the Sinai Peninsula. With the local economy struggling due to neglect and insecurity, many young men turned to smuggling, a traditional occupation in the region. Like northern Mali, however, smuggling has proven a gateway to militancy.

In recent decades, Islamist ideology has been brought to the Sinai by “mainland” teachers and by students returning from studies in the Nile Valley. Inattention from government-approved religious bodies like al-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments left North Sinai’s mosques open to radical preachers denouncing the region’s traditional Sufi orders. Their calls for an aggressive and Islamic response to what was viewed as Cairo’s “oppression” and the support available from Islamist militants in neighboring Gaza led to a gradual convergence of “Bedouin issues” and Salafi-Jihadism. Support for groups like ABM and WS is far from universal amongst the tribes and armed clashes are frequent, but the widespread distaste for Egypt’s security forces and a campaign of brutal intimidation against those inclined to work with them have prevented Cairo from exploiting local differences in its favor. The army claims it could “instantaneously purge” Sinai of militants but has not done so out of concern for the safety of residents (Ahram Online, March 21).

Egypt’s Military Operations in the Sinai

Beginning with Operation Eagle’s deployment of two brigades of Sa’iqa (“Thunderbolt) Special Forces personnel in August 2011, Cairo has initiated a series of military operations designed to secure North Sinai, eradicate the insurgents in the Rafah, al-Arish and Shaykh al-Zuwayad districts of North Sinai, eliminate cross-border smuggling with Gaza and protect the Suez Canal. While meeting success in the latter two objectives, the use of fighter jets, artillery, armor, attack helicopters and elite troop formations have failed to terminate an insurgency that has intensified rather than diminished.

sinai-ea-al-saiqaAl-Sa’iqa (Special Forces) in Rafah

The ongoing Operation Martyr’s Right, launched in September 2015, is the largest military operation yet, involving Special Forces units, elements of the second and third field armies and police units with the aim of targeting terrorists and outlaws in central and northern Sinai to “pave the road for creating suitable conditions to start development projects in Sinai.” (Ahram Online, November 5, 2016). Each phase of Martyr’s Right and earlier operations in the region have resulted in government claims of hundreds of dead militants and scores of “hideouts,” houses, cars and motorcycles destroyed, all apparently with little more than temporary effect.

Military-Tribal Relations

Security forces have failed to connect with an alienated local population in North Sinai. Arbitrary mass arrests and imprisonments have degraded the relationship between tribal groups and state security services. Home demolitions, public utility cuts, travel restrictions, indiscriminate shelling, the destruction of farms and forced evacuations for security reasons have only reinforced the perception of the Egyptian Army as an occupying power.  Security services are unable to recruit from local Bedouin, while ABM and WS freely recruit military specialists from the Egyptian “mainland.” It was a Sa’aiqa veteran expelled from the army in 2007, Hisham al-Ashmawy, who provided highly useful training in weapons and tactics to ABM after he joined the movement in 2012 (Reuters, October 18, 2015). Others have followed.

The role of local shaykhs as interlocutors with tribal groups has been steeply devalued by the central role now played by state security services in appointing tribal leaders. In 2012, a shaykh of the powerful Sawarka tribe was shot and killed when it became widely believed he was identifying jihadists to state security services (Egypt Independent, June 11, 2012)

The use of collective punishment encourages retaliation, dissuades the local population from cooperation with security forces and diminishes the reputation of moderate tribal leaders who are seen as unable to wield influence with the government. Egypt’s prime minister, Sherif Ismail, has blamed terrorism in North Sinai on the familiar “external and internal forces,” but also noted that under Egypt’s new constitution, the president could not use counter-terrorism measures as “an excuse for violating public freedoms” (Ahram Online, May 10).

Operational Weaknesses

The government’s media blackout of the Sinai makes it difficult to verify information or properly evaluate operations.  Restrictions on coverage effectively prevent public discussion of the issues behind the insurgency, reducing opportunities for reconciliation. Nonetheless, a number of weaknesses in Cairo’s military approach are apparent:

  • Operations are generally reactive rather than proactive
  • A military culture exists that discourages initiative in junior officers. This is coupled with an unwillingness in senior staff to admit failure and change tactics compared to the tactical flexibility of insurgents, who are ready to revise their procedures whenever necessary
  • An over-reliance on airpower to provide high fatality rates readily reported in the state-owned media to give the impression of battlefield success. The suppression of media reporting on military operations in Sinai turns Egyptians to the militants’ social media to obtain news and information
  • The widespread use of poorly-trained conscripts. Most of the active fighting is done by Special Forces units who reportedly inflict serious losses in their actions against WS. As a result, WS focuses on what might be termed “softer” military targets for their own attacks; checkpoints manned by conscripts and conscript transports on local roads. There are reports of poorly paid conscripts leaking information to Sinai-based terrorists for money (Ahram Online, October 21).
  • A failure to prevent radicalization by separating detained Sinai smugglers or militants with local motivations from radical jihadists in Egyptian prisons
  • An inability to stop arms flows to the region. Though effective naval patrols and the new 5 km buffer zone with Gaza have discouraged arms trafficking from the north, arms continue to reach the insurgents from the Sharqiya, Ismailiya and Beni Suef governorates

Islamist Tactics in Sinai

The Islamist insurgents have several advantages, including intimate knowledge of the local terrain and a demonstrated ability to rejuvenate their numbers and leadership. Possession of small arms is also extremely common in Sinai despite disarmament efforts by the state. The WS armory includes Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, RPGs and mortars. Many weapons have been captured from Egyptian forces operating in the Sinai.

According to WS’ own “Harvest of Military Operations” reports, IEDs are used in about 60% of WS attacks, guerrilla-style attacks account for some 20%, while the remainder is roughly split between sniper attacks and close-quarter assassinations. Since 2013, over 90% of the targets have been military or police personnel as well as suspected informants (al-Jazeera, May 1). In 2016, IED attacks have numbered roughly one per day. The bombs are commonly disguised as rocks or bags of garbage.

sinai-ea-checkpointEgyptian Army Checkpoint, al-Arish

Well-organized assaults on security checkpoints display a sophistication that has worried military leaders. Checkpoint attacks since October 2014 often involve the preliminary use of suicide bomb trucks to smash the way through fixed defenses, followed by assaults by gunmen, often in 4×4 vehicles which have been banned in military operational zones since July 2015. Car bombs and mortars have been used to launch as many as 15 simultaneous attacks, demonstrating advanced skills in operational planning. Snipers are frequently used to keep security forces on edge and the ambush or hijacking of vehicles on the road complicates the movement of security personnel.

Military intelligence has not been able to overcome WS security measures. WS is notoriously difficult to infiltrate – recruits are closely vetted and often assume new identities. Trackable communications devices are discouraged and the group’s cell structure makes it difficult to obtain a broader picture of its organization and membership. At times it is not even clear who the group’s leader is. Sinai Bedouin chiefs have complained that when they do give warnings to the military of militant activity, their warnings are ignored (Egypt Independent, August 7, 2012)

There is intense intimidation of residents not sympathetic to WS and its aims. The group has even warned ambulance drivers not to transport wounded security personnel to hospitals (Shorouk News, December 21, 2015). Suspected informants are shot, though the WS tries to remain on good terms with locals by providing financial aid and social assistance. Sympathetic residents are able to provide a steady flow of intelligence on Egyptian troop movements and patterns.

sinai-ea-brigadier-mahmoudBrigadier General Hisham Mahmoud (Daily News Egypt)

WS focuses on state institutions as targets and rarely carries out the type of mass-casualty terrorist attacks on civilians common to other theaters of jihad. However, public, security and religious figures are all subject to assassination. In November, WS beheaded a respected 100-year-old Sufi shaykh of the Sawarka tribe for “practicing witchcraft” (Ahram Online, November 21). Even senior officers are targeted; in November Air Force Brigadier General Hisham Mahmoud was killed in al-Arish; a month earlier Brigadier Adel Rajaei (commander of the 9th Armored Division and a veteran of North Sinai) was killed in Cairo. Both men were shot in front of their own homes (Ahram Online, November 4). In July, a Coptic priest in al-Arish was murdered by Islamic State militants for “fighting Islam” (Ahram Online, July 1). Religious sites inconsistent with Salafist beliefs and values are also targeted for destruction. The shrine of Shaykh Zuwayad, who came to Egypt with the conquering Muslim army of ‘Amr ibn al-‘As in 640 C.E., has been attacked multiple times in the city that bears his name.

When Egyptian military pressure becomes too intense, insurgents are able to take refuge in Jabal Halal, a mountainous cave-riddled region south of al-Arish that acts as a main insurgent stronghold and hideout for fugitives. The area is home to many old Israeli minefields that discourage ground operations, though Egypt’s Air Force claims to have killed scores of militants there in airstrikes (Egypt Independent, August 20, 2012).

Conclusion

Egypt’s large scale counter-insurgency operations have been disappointing for Cairo. Such operations do not have the general support of the local population and are regarded by many as suppression by outsiders. The army and police are not regarded as guarantors of security, but as the violent extension of state policies that discriminate against communities in the North Sinai. So long as these conditions remain unchanged, Egypt’s security forces will remain unable to deny safe havens or financial support to militant groups.  Air-strikes on settled areas, with their inevitable indiscriminate and collateral damage, are especially unsuited for rallying government support.

Excluding the Bedouin from Interior Ministry forces foregoes immediate benefits in intelligence terms, leaving security forces without detailed knowledge of the terrain, groups, tribes and individuals necessary to successful counter-terrorism and counter-smuggling operations. However, simply opening up recruitment is not enough to guarantee interest from young Bedouin men; in the current environment they would risk ostracization at best or assassination at worst. With few economic options, smuggling (and consequent association with arms dealers and drug traffickers) remains the preferred alternative for many.

Seeking perhaps to tap into the Russian experience in Syria, Egypt conducted a joint counter-insurgency exercise near al-Alamein on the Mediterranean coast in October. The exercise focused on the use of paratroopers against insurgents in a desert setting (Ahram Online, October 12, 2016). Russia is currently pursuing an agreement that would permit Russian use of military bases across Egypt 10 October 2016 (Middle East Eye, October 10; PressTV [Tehran], October 10). If Cairo is determined to pursue a military solution to the Islamist insurgency in Sinai, it may decide more material military assistance and guidance from Russia will be part of the price.

A greater commitment to development is commonly cited as a long-term solution to Bedouin unrest, though its impact would be smaller on ideologically and religiously motivated groups such as WS. Development efforts are under way; last year President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi committed £E10 billion (US$ 560 million) to new industrial, agricultural, transport and housing projects (al-Masry al-Youm, March 8). Unfortunately, many of these projects are in the Canal Zone region and will have little impact on the economy of North Sinai. More will be needed, but with Egypt currently experiencing currency devaluation, inflation, food shortages and shrinking foreign currency reserves, the central government will have difficulty in implementing a development-based solution in Sinai.

This article first appeared in the December 15 2016 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Plan to Ship Israeli Gas to Egypt Raises Political and Security Concerns

Andrew McGregor

May 15, 2014

Only two years after public opposition and attacks by militants brought an end to Egyptian gas shipments to Israel, there is a new proposal to begin shipping Israeli natural gas to Egypt.  Texas-based Noble Energy signed a non-binding letter of intent with Unión Fenosa Gas (UFG – a Spanish-Italian joint venture) on May 5 calling for the shipment of 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas from Israel’s offshore Tamar gas field over 15 years. The gas would be liquefied for export at Unión Fenosa’s Damietta liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant (20 percent owned by Egypt) before shipment to foreign markets by tanker, though the Egyptian government announced two days later that it had not yet issued the necessary authorization required for any imports of gas from Israel. Egypt’s Oil Ministry has said that any such deal would need to “serve the national interest of the country” (Wall Street Journal, May 6; Haaretz/Reuters, May 7).

The Tamar gas field is located 50 miles off the Israeli coast in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean and began production in March 2013. The largest partner in developing the gas field is Noble Energy, with a 36 percent share. Other partners include Israel’s Isramco Negev 2, two subsidiaries of Israel’s Delek Group and a subsidiary of Israel’s Dor Alon Group. The Tamar partners have already signed smaller deals to supply gas to the Palestinian Authority and Jordan’s Arab Potash Company and Jordan Bromine Company but have otherwise failed to find international markets for Tamar’s production. Turkey remains a potential customer for Tamar gas, but any deal with Turkish energy firms would come with its own political baggage, given the strained relations between Turkey and Israel.

Leviathan, a second Israeli offshore gas field, is owned by the same partners as the Tamar field. With twice as much gas reserves as Tamar, Leviathan is expected to go online in 2017 though financing has yet to be arranged due to the absence of large, long-term contracts with buyers. The Leviathan partners are expected to announce an export deal with foreign partners within three months. Tamar and Leviathan are expected to meet Israel’s domestic energy needs for at least the next 25 years.

The last natural gas deal between Egypt and Israel ended badly, with both parties entering arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) this year to resolve outstanding financial claims. In this earlier case, natural gas exports from Egypt to Israel were repeatedly interrupted by attacks by militants on the al-Arish to Ashkelon pipeline. The attacks began shortly after the January, 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak and continued even after the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) and the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) terminated their agreement with Israel’s East Mediterranean Gas (EMG) over a payment dispute following an Egyptian declaration of force majeure they claimed would excuse them from meeting their supply obligations.[1] By this time, there was massive popular opposition to continuing a deal to supply Israel with gas at below market prices that many Egyptians viewed as a prime example of the corruption that permeated the Mubarak regime.

There has been some discussion of using the existing pipeline to carry Israeli gas to Egypt until a proposed undersea Tamar to Damietta pipeline has been completed, though it seems likely the pipeline would again be the target of Bedouin and Islamist militants operating in the Sinai (al-Jazeera, May 8). Residual anger over this earlier contract is likely to help generate opposition to any new Egyptian gas project involving Israel. However, if the deal goes through, militants will have much greater difficulty interrupting the submarine pipeline than the exposed pipeline running through the Sinai Peninsula.

Egypt is trying to deal with severe energy shortages during a politically sensitive time. Natural gas is used to generate most of the nation’s electricity and blackouts have become common since the 2011 revolution. With steadily diminishing production and an inability to attract sufficient investment to develop remaining reserves, Egypt is finding it impossible to meet both heavily subsidized domestic demand and its export commitments (Reuters, May 6; al-Bawaba, May 7). Several gas-producing Gulf nations supporting Egypt’s political transition have supplied Egypt with $6 billion in free fuel to ward off potential popular unrest created by energy shortages this summer (Reuters, May 6).

With Egyptian natural gas now being diverted to the domestic market, UFG’s Damietta plant has been offline since December 2012 (al-Jazeera, May 8). A second Egyptian LNG plant located at the Mediterranean port of Idko is operated by the British-owned BG Group, the losing bidder on the Tamar gas deal. Like the Damietta plant, the Idko plant is also running well below capacity due to supply shortages and was unable to export any gas during the first quarter of 2014. The Egyptian government’s decision to divert natural gas supplies to the domestic market is estimated to have cost Unión Fenosa and the BG Group billions of dollars in lost revenue and has prevented both firms from meeting their commitments to customers in Europe and Asia.

Following the U.S. imposition of sanctions on Russia, European countries dependent on Russian gas imports are now seeking alternative supplies, mainly from nearby Algeria. After Egyptian negotiations with Algeria’s government-owned Sonatrach were halted when European markets began expressing interest in Algerian gas following the Crimea crisis, Egypt turned to Russia’s Gazprom Company for supply, reaching an agreement to import Russian liquefied natural gas beginning this summer (Daily News Egypt, May 13). The favorable payment terms offered by Russia may be viewed as part of its effort to re-establish influence in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East.

It remains uncertain whether any of the Israeli gas exported to Egypt would find its way to gas-hungry Egyptian markets or what the reaction of the Egyptian public might be to such a development. In the meantime, Unión Fenosa has brought its own complaint before the ICC over the Egyptian failure to maintain contracted payments as per its agreement and it is possible the BG Group will follow suit with reference to Egypt’s failure to supply its Idko LNG facility with natural gas. The BG Group has already declared force majeure for its Egyptian operations because of the government’s gas diversions and a $4 billion debt owed by the Egyptian government. Egypt has already faced 19 arbitration cases from international energy firms since the 2011 revolution, with most of these remaining unsettled. In the meantime, factories, businesses and retailers are all forced to reduce their hours of operation, damaging an already struggling economy. Alternatives to gas are being sought to supply Egypt’s energy needs as the high consumption summer months approach, including the use of coal and low-grade polluting petroleum products (Zawya [Dubai], April 15).

Note

1. Force Majeure refers to a party to a contract being relieved of their obligation to fulfill terms of a contract due an event or circumstance beyond the control of the party concerned that has resulted in the party failing or delaying its contractual obligations in circumstances that could not be prevented or overcome by the standard of a reasonable or prudent person or party. It excludes such relief (normally intended to be only temporary) in cases of negligence or malfeasance.

This article was published in the May 15, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Egyptian Military Offensive in the Sinai Follows Tourist Massacre

Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2014

Egyptian security forces have responded to the latest terrorist blow to Egypt’s vital tourism industry with a series of raids that have killed dozens of militants and resulted in the detention of many others.

Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis

On February 16, a bomb on a tourist bus carrying South Koreans making the trip from St. Catherine’s monastery to the resort town of Taba killed three tourists and their Egyptian driver, while a further 13 tourists were wounded (al-Jazeera, February 16). The attack was claimed by militant group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), who claimed the strike was “part of our economic war against this regime of traitors” (AFP, February 19). Tourism accounts for over 11 percent of Egyptian GDP and is an important source of foreign currency. The Sinai was the last part of the politically volatile nation to maintain a healthy tourist trade, but this has now been put in jeopardy. The bombing was denounced by the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, a militant Islamist group responsible for the murder of 58 tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor in 1997 (Ahram Online, February 17).

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) is the Egyptian branch of a Gaza-based Islamist organization. Since its first appearance in the Sinai in the days after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on oil pipelines, a strike on Israeli troops in 2012, the attempted assassination of Egypt’s interior minister in 2013 and the successful assassination of an important National Security Agency investigator the same year (see Terrorism Monitor, November 28, 2013).

The tourist bus bombing led to a number of operations as part of the ongoing Egyptian military response to radicalism in the Sinai Peninsula:

  • During the night of February 19, Egyptian Army helicopter gunships used missiles to attack houses suspected to harbor militants in the Shaykh Zuwayad area, killing at least ten people (AP, February 20).
  • On February 28, the Egyptian Second Field Army (responsible for the Sinai) reported killing six militants (including an alleged member of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) and the arrest of 14 others (Egypt State Information Service, February 28).
  • On March 1, the armed forces reported ten extremists killed and ten others wounded in the Northern Sinai communities of al-Arish, Shaykh Zuwaya and Rafah (Aswat Masriya [Cairo], March 1).

The military also continues to demolish tunnels to Gaza in the border town of Rafah

Militants in the Sinai also continue to attack another sector of the Egyptian economy – gas exports to Jordan. The gas pipeline running through northern Sinai was blown up south of al-Arish for the fourth time this year on February 25 (al-Arabiya, February 26). Most of the bombings of the pipeline (which brought an end to gas exports to Israel in 2012) have been claimed by Ansar al-Maqdis.

This article first appeared in the March 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis Intensifies Assassination Campaign in the Sinai

Andrew McGregor

November 28, 2013

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) is the Egyptian branch of a Gazan Islamist organization that first appeared in the Sinai in the days after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Since then, ABM has become one of the most active and aggressive of the many militant groups now found in the Sinai. Its latest high-profile operation was the November 17 assassination in Nasr City of Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Mabrouk Abu Khattab of Egypt’s National Security Agency (NSA), one of the leading investigators involved in the prosecution of ex-president Muhammad Mursi and other leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the past, ABM has mounted several attacks on the pipelines that carry Egyptian natural gas to Israeli and Jordanian markets, claimed responsibility for an attack on Israeli troops in September, 2012 and attempted to assassinate Egyptian Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim on September 5 (Daily News Egypt, July 26, 2012).

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Mabrouk

In its claim of responsibility for the murder of Colonel Mabrouk, ABM maintained that it had targeted the senior investigator over the commitment to trial in Alexandria of 15 women and seven girls for participation in a violent pro-Mursi demonstration in Alexandria in October: “[Mabrouk] was one of the major tyrants of the state security apparatus and the assassination was a response to the arrest of free women by this malicious apparatus.” The statement ended by promising further attacks if the women were not freed. [1]Given Mabrouk’s peripheral connection with the Alexandria case, prosecutors suspected the ABM statement was intended to mislead their investigations and asked the Interior Ministry to investigate the declaration (al-Masry al-Youm, November 21).

Suspicion of complicity in the assassination has fallen on the Muslim Brotherhood, which condemned the attack on November 19 and assailed efforts by the media to associate them with the assassination (Daily News Egypt, November 20). The timing of Mabrouk’s murder is noteworthy, as it came shortly before his testimony in the Mursi trial and a week after submitting a CD supporting the charges of spying leveled against the ex-president. Judicial sources have indicated that the CD includes a recording of a phone call between Mursi and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri as well as another phone conversation in which Mursi admits providing Hamas with information on the security situation in the Sinai (al-Masry al-Youm, November 21). Colonel Mabrouk played a central role in taking down the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, arresting leading members such as Khayrat al-Shater, Essam al-Erian and Muhammad al-Beltagy. The spying charges actually predate Mursi’s removal as president; the case accusing Mursi and 13 other members of the Muslim Brotherhood of spying and illegal contacts with foreign entities was forwarded to prosecutors by the Ismailia Appeals Court on June 23 (al-Ahram Weekly, November 22).  Mabrouk was also expected to be the chief witness in a separate case regarding Mursi’s Hamas-assisted escape from Wadi al-Natrun prison five days after the January 25 Revolution.

According to the ABM statement, the killing was carried out by the Mu’tasim Bi-‘llah Battalion. This ABM faction is named for al-Mu’tasim Bi-‘llah, the eighth Abbasid caliph (795 – 842), known for his fighting skills and his campaigns against the Christian Byzantine Empire. As justification for the murder, the ABM statement cited an episode from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, in which the Prophet attacked and expelled the Jewish Banu Qaynuqa tribe after an incident in the market in which a Jewish goldsmith is said to have pinned the clothes of a Muslim woman so as to cause her to be stripped naked when she walked away. The Jewish merchant was immediately killed by a passing Muslim, who was in turn killed by a Jewish mob, leading to the Prophet’s eventual attack. [2] ABM asks, on the basis of this precedent, what alternative do Muslims have when faced with the detention and assault of hundreds of Muslim women?

Mabrouk’s funeral was attended by Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi, Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim and several other ministers and high officials. A three-day mourning period was announced by interim president Adli Mansour on November 20 (Egypt State Information Service, November 21). The Interior Ministry claims 152 “martyrs” have been lost to militant activities since Mursi’s June 30 overthrow.

Colonel Mabrouk was only the latest in a series of Interior Ministry personnel (many of whom conceal their identities and rarely work in the field) to be targeted by assassins. Revelations of the existence of “assassination lists” with the home addresses of intelligence officers involved in the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood are reported to have prompted a deadline of January for Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim to discover the leak in his Ministry (Ahram Online [Cairo], November 22; al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], November 22).

On November 21, police in the Delta town of Qaha raided an apartment in search of two suspected terrorists wanted in connection to the murder of Colonel Mabrouk, the attempted assassination of Interior Minister Ibrahim and an attack on a Coptic church. The two were arrested only after a gunfight that killed police Captain Ahmad Samir al-Kabir (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], November 21; November 22).

On the following day, the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior announced the arrest of the prime suspect in the Mabrouk assassination, Shady al-Manei, described as a leading member of Bayt al-Maqdis. Al-Manei was alleged to be a subordinate of Muslim Brotherhood deputy guide Muhammad Khayrat al-Shater (presently detained) and was previously imprisoned in connection with the 2005 Taba bombings before being released by ex-president Muhammad Mursi (Egypt State Information Service, November 23). Nabil Na’im, a fierce opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood and leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad from 1988 to 1992, has accused al-Shater, a prominent businessman, of funding ABM’s strikes on Egyptian security forces (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], September 9; for Khayrat al-Shater, see Militant Leadership Monitor, September 2013).

The Egyptian Army has not failed to respond to the ABM’s attacks on security personnel. On November 26, four black Army Humvees pursued and killed Shaykh Abu Munir (a.k.a. Muhammad Hussein Muhareb) and his son at al-Mehediya in the northeast Sinai. Abu Munir was an associate of ABM and a prime suspect in the brutal roadside murder of 25 police recruits dragged from their bus in August (Aswat Masriya [Cairo], November 26; Telegraph, November 26).

On November 20, ABM released the identity of the suicide bomber who attacked the South Sinai security directorate on October 7, killing five soldiers and wounding 50 others. The “martyr,” Muhammad Hamdan al-Sawarka (a.k.a. Abu Hajer), was a member of the Sawarka tribe, one of the Sinai’s largest. The ABM statement also criticized prominent Egyptian Salafist leaders for failing to resist the overthrow of Muhammad Mursi (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], November 20).

In his assessment of the Sinai campaign of the Egyptian security forces, Dr. Najih Ibrahim, a founding member of the extremist al-Gama’a al-Islamiya who has since renounced political violence, commented:

This campaign has largely succeeded. Without it, Egypt would have witnessed a long series of car bombings. We must admit that this military campaign prevented the arrival of this danger to the Nile Delta and to Cairo in a major way. Extremists in Sinai can equip a thousand booby-trapped cars and dispatch them to other areas in Egypt. The military campaign destroyed many mine and weapons stockpiles, and many of those who committed terrorist attacks were arrested. Many smuggling tunnels were closed and the sources of funding for these groups in the Sinai were controlled (As-Safir [Cairo], November 25).

Notes

1. Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, “Declaring our responsibility for assassinating the criminal Muhammad Mabrouk,” November 19, 2013, http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=47326

2. The incident is related in Ibn Hisham’s (died c. 830) Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyah , an edited version of Ibn Ishaq’s biography of the Prophet Muhammad (now lost).

This article first appeared in the November 28 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Sinai Jihadists Respond to Egyptian Military Offensive with Statements and Suicide Bombs

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, September 19, 2013

As the Egyptian military intensifies its campaign against militants and terrorists in the volatile but strategic Sinai Peninsula, their jihadist opponents have responded with a series of messages claiming the Army was using excessive force, destroying property and killing civilians. These statements of defiance have been backed up by several suicide attacks designed to dissuade Egypt’s security forces from pursuing the complete elimination of the various Salafi-Jihadi groups operating in the Sinai.

Egyptian Police Capture Suspected Militants in the Sinai (Reuters)

In a statement released on September 4, al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya fi Sinai disputed the reported arrests of al-Qaeda leaders in the Sinai, calling such reports “lies and silly fabrications” designed to “cover up the acts of treachery and betrayal committed by the Egyptian army blatantly and the crimes committed against the people of Sinai.” [1]The Salafist movement accused Egyptian authorities of borrowing methods used by the Israelis on the Palestinian population and acting under Israeli direction in targeting homes and mosques in the Sinai as well as demolishing other homes to create a buffer zone at the Rafah border point. The statement condemns in particular the shelling of the Abi Munir mosque in al-Muqata’a village (near the town of Shaykh Zuwayid). The movement says Egyptian troops fire indiscriminately, killing and wounding innocent parties, acts which make the Egyptian military “an assaulting apostate sect which should be deterred and repelled and this is what the mujahideen are doing every day with operations that are burning and breaking their forces.

A September 11 statement by the Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis militant group said the stated goal of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai, the liquidation of criminal and terrorist elements, was only a screen for its real purpose – the creation of a buffer zone “to protect Jews from any threats from militants in the Sinai and to prevent any strikes of the mujahideen against the Jews.” [2] The statement goes on to accuse the Egyptian Army of mounting its own campaign of terrorism and intimidation in the region through random shelling, arson, the destruction of wells, looting, indiscriminate fire and the repeated targeting of mosques without justification. All these acts are committed with the intention of serving “the interests of the Jews and to preserve their security.” The Egyptian Army has thus aligned itself with “the enemies of God and the enemies of Islam.”

A second communiqué issued by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis on September 15 decried the “displacement and terrorism launched by the Egyptian Army on the people of the Sinai” and claimed that the Army had committed a massacre of seven named civilians (including four children under seven years-of-age) who were killed by shellfire or under the treads of one of the 30 tanks the movement says the Army used to attack their village on the morning of September 13. [3] The statement claims the attack’s objective was to prevent the mujahideen from attacking commercial centers in Israel from the Sinai and was carried out on the orders of the American Army. The movement promised a “painful response” to the Egyptian Army’s “criminality and apostacy.”

The Egyptian Army’s use of armor, Apache helicopters and 20,000 troops to strike alleged terrorist refuges in the Sinai marks the greatest Egyptian military concentration in the region since the 1973 Ramadan War with Israel. Though the campaign was initially stated to have the purpose of eliminating radical Salafist jihadi organizations in the Sinai, the Army has expanded its mandate to include daily raids on homes believed to belong to opponents of July’s military coup (Mubasher Misr, September 13). The campaign is expected to last six months.

In an unusual development, but one that reflects the growing security cooperation between Israel and the Egyptian military, a delegation of Israeli security officials arrived in Cairo on a private jet on September 11 to discuss security issues in the Sinai with their Egyptian counterparts (Arutz Sheva, September 12). A statement from the pro-Mursi National Alliance to Support Legitimacy said the meeting was intended to coordinate efforts with Israel to kill innocent civilians, destroy local agriculture, displace residents and demolish mosques, “just like the Israeli army in the occupied territories” (Egypt Independent, September 16).

The militants have attempted to fight back, offering armed resistance in the villages and a mix of car bombs and suicide bombs to disrupt the Army’s campaign. Roughly 50 soldiers and policemen have been killed in the Sinai since July.

  • In a September 5 “martyrdom operation,” a bomb went off in Nasr City as Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim’s convoy passed, though Ibrahim, the intended target, survived (Ahram Online [Cairo], September 13). The group apologized to “Muslims in general and the relatives of the martyrs in particular” for its failure to kill Ibrahim, but promised further attacks would follow until this objective was achieved. The statement explained that the group was “working to establish the religion of Allah on Earth” while refusing to “take the road of pagan democracy.”
  • On September 11, two car bombs targeted the military intelligence headquarters in Rafah and a nearby military checkpoint, killing six soldiers and the two suicide bombers. The attacks were claimed by Jund al-Islam (MENA/Ahram Online [Cairo], September 7; AFP, September 13).
  • On September 16 a bus carrying Central Security Force conscripts was hit by either a roadside bomb or an RPG, injuring seven conscripts (Ahram Online, September 16).

Egyptian Army spokesman Colonel Ahmad Ali recently said the army had been surprised by the “sudden escalation in terrorist attacks” after the army took control of the country, though he denied the jihadists’ accusations the army had used excessive force in the campaign, remarking that if that was the case, “we would have finished terrorism off in 24 hours” (Daily News Egypt, September 15).

Notes

  1. Al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya fi Sinai, “Lying Agents,” Fursan al-Balagh Media, September 4, 2013, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46874
  2. Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, “The Egyptian Army – Criminality and Betrayal: Statement on the Extended Military Campaign against the People of the Sinai,” September 11, 2013, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46923
  3. Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, “Second Statement on the Extended Military Campaign against the People of the Sinai,” September 15, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46962
  4. Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, “Battle of Revenge for the Muslims of Egypt: Assassination Attempt of the Egyptian Interior Minister,” September 8, 2013, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46902

 

Sinai Insurgency Exploits Political Crisis in Egypt

Andrew McGregor

July 11, 2013

The growing confidence of Islamist militants operating in the volatile Sinai region of Egypt was displayed on July 10, when gunmen made an audacious attempt to assassinate General Ahmad Wasfy, the commander of Egypt’s Second Field Army (responsible for the Sinai) (Ahram Online [Cairo], July 10). While the causes of Sinai’s insecurity have many sources and levels of militancy began growing simultaneous with the collapse of Egypt’s security infrastructure that accompanied the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak two years ago, the Egyptian Army’s latest takeover of the country and arrest of Muslim Brotherhood political leader Muhammad al-Mursi has provided new opportunities for Salafist-Jihadist groups in the Sinai to exploit Egypt’s internal political crises in their own interests.

Dr. Muhammad Beltagy

On July 8, Dr. Muhammad Beltagy, a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood, told reporters that the Brotherhood “doesn’t control what is happening on the ground [in Sinai]… These attacks will stop the second [Defense Minister General Abd al-Fatah] al-Sisi retracts this coup, corrects the situation and when President Mursi returns to his authorities and duties” (Daily News Egypt, July 8). When opposition media used the statement to portray the Brotherhood as the engineers of the violence in Sinai, Beltagy issued a statement complaining that the media had been taken over by intelligence agencies who “cut-and-pasted” his words to make it appear he was the mastermind of the incidents in the Sinai (IkhwanWeb, July 10). In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood has never been able to establish a firm political base in the Sinai despite efforts to provide social services to the local population. Despite this, a  prominent North Sinai activist, Mosa’ad Abu Fajr, has accused individuals associated with Hamas and its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, of supporting the violence in Sinai with funds provided by the now detained deputy leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Khayrat al-Shater (Ahram Online, July 5).

Hamas and the Collapse of the Islamist Government in Egypt

Israeli sources claim that dozens of Hamas militants crossed into the Sinai and participated in a Muslim Brotherhood attack on the Egyptian Army post in al-Arish (Arutz Sheva [Tel Aviv], July 8). An earlier report that 30 militants had crossed into the Sinai in June was denied by the Gaza Interior Ministry, which described the report as “fabricated” and designed to add to “the chain of instigation against Gaza and its elected [Hamas] government” (Ikhwan Online [Cairo], June 17). However, a Palestinian-based news agency reported receiving confirmation of the infiltration from Egyptian security sources, who said the militants had set up fortified positions in the desert region around Jabal al-Halal in the central Sinai (Ma’an News Agency, June 17). Egyptian border guards encountered a further group of ten militants emerging from a tunnel from Gaza into the Sinai on July 7. The group, described as suspected Hamas fighters, managed to escape back into the tunnel but left behind seven boxes of bombs and munitions (al-Ahram [Cairo], July 7).

Hamas has been bitterly disappointed by the failure of the Islamist experiment in Egypt, which was expected to provide Hamas with diplomatic and financial support in its struggle with Israel. Instead, Hamas has encountered growing levels of popular opposition and media criticism in Egypt, with rumors sweeping the country that Hamas fighters are being smuggled into Egypt to restore the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, the Hamas premier of Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, tried to inject some optimism into a grim situation in a July 5 sermon: “Egypt is behind us, as are the Arab and Islamic countries… We believe good will emerge from this Arab Spring, these revolutions and this rebirth. We expect the Arab Spring cycle to continue until its objectives are attained, including our own cause” (AFP, July 6).

The Israeli Response to Deteriorating Security in the Sinai

Explosions were reported in the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba during the night of July 4, though investigations did not find direct evidence of a rocket attack. The alleged missile strike on Eilat was claimed in a statement issued the next day by the Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (the Group of Supporters of Jerusalem). [1] Eilat was last targeted by rockets fired from the Sinai by suspected Gaza militants in April. Former Israeli Defense Force chief-of-staff General Gabi Ashkenazi warned that even if Mursi’s overthrow did not present a direct threat to Israel, some risk could be generated from the Sinai where Islamists might use the opportunity to exploit the limited Egyptian military presence to strike Israel (Jerusalem Post, July 5).

For now, the IDF has adopted a policy of allowing Egyptian security forces to take care of armed individuals or groups spotted in the border region, taking action only if gunmen proceed to cross the border (Haaretz [Tel Aviv], July 7). According to the commander of the Israel Caracal Battalion, currently deployed along the Sinai border, Israeli forces are working “on the assumption that an attack will happen…  We’re preparing the soldiers for complex tasks, drilling extreme scenarios and doing all we can to give them the tools to deal with the situation. Terrorism in Sinai is growing stronger. We have to prepare” (Jerusalem Post, June 27). The Egyptian Army is well aware of the dangers posed by Sinai militants to Egypt’s current relationship with Israel and is reported to have moved quickly to make its position clear to Israel authorities by receiving an Israel representative for talks in Cairo with Egyptian security and intelligence officials only hours after Mursi’s overthrow (Yediot Aharonot [Tel Aviv], July 5). Nevertheless, suspicion and anxiety still permeate the post-overthrow climate, with Israel warning its nationals to avoid popular resorts in the Sinai and Egypt proceeding with the detention and trial of a number of individuals accused of spying for Israeli intelligence in the Sinai.

Jihadi Groups in the Sinai

Already well-populated with various jihadist groups incorporating both Gazan militants and Egyptian Islamists, Sinai has been targeted by two Salafi-Jihadist groups since the Mursi overthrow.

On July 5, a group using the name Ansar al-Shari’a in the Land of Kinaanah (i.e. Egypt) issued a founding statement promising to respond to the “war against Islam in Egypt, a war waged by “secularists, atheists, Mubarak loyalists, Christians, security forces and the leaders of the Egyptian Army.” The statement describes democracy as “blasphemous” in its assumption of a prerogative of God and warns of impending “massacres of Muslims in Egypt” that could turn the country into “another Andalusia” (i.e. a nation in which all Muslims are expelled). [2]

North-East Sinai

A day later, a statement issued by al-Salafiya al-Jihadiyah fi’l-Sinai condemned the military for allegedly opening fire on demonstrators in al-Arish on July 5, warning that a return to the practices of the former regime was unacceptable. The statement went on to call for the “comprehensive and immediate application of Islamic law” and for Egyptians to abandon the concept of democracy and resist “the enemies of Islam in Egypt.” [3]

Christians are already being targeted by Islamist militants in the Sinai – on July 6 the priest of al-Arish’s Virgin Mary Church was murdered by motorcycle-riding gunmen and a Christian merchant in Shaykh Zuwayid was kidnapped (Middle East News Agency [Cairo], July 7). The militants are infuriated by the very public role Coptic Pope Tawadros II played in supporting Mursi’s overthrow by the military. The Coptic activist Maspero Youth Union claims churches have been attacked across Egypt since the Army’s takeover (al-Masry al-Youm/Reuters, July 6).

Jihadi Operations in the Sinai Post al-Mursi

The intensity, mobility, coordination and apparent planning of militant strikes in the Sinai since the military’s removal of President al-Mursi demonstrate a growing sophistication and organization that has so far kept Egyptian security forces off-balance:

  • Army checkpoints at Al-Arish airport were attacked with rocket-propelled grenades on July 4 (Reuters, July 4; MENA, July 5). Gunmen in a 4×4 vehicle attacked an army checkpoint on the ring-road south of al-Arish on the same day (MENA [Cairo], July 4).
  • Police stations and a military intelligence headquarters in Rafah (on the border with Gaza) have been attacked repeatedly by militants no doubt angered by Egyptian Army efforts to close more than forty major smuggling tunnels along the border. One soldier was killed and two police officers wounded in a July 4 attack on a Rafah police station and the Rafah border crossing was closed (Reuters, July 4). The next day, an Egyptian border guard was killed during a gunfight at the Ghornata checkpoint in North Sinai. A policeman was wounded by gunfire only hours later (Ahram Online, July 7).
  • On July 5, a well-coordinated series of attacks took place in a number of towns in the North Sinai, demonstrating a growing ability to unite the diverse militant formations in the region in a single purpose. Angry Mursi supporters launched an assault on the local administrative building in al-Arish on July 5, waving the black flag of jihad (al-rayat al-uqab – The Banner of the Eagle) used by al-Qaeda and related movements (AFP, July 7). Two police officers were shot and killed in front of a government building in al-Arish the same day, with the number of policemen killed rising to six by the end of the day (Ahram Online, July 5; July 7; Reuters, July 7; July 8).
  • Five security checkpoints were attacked simultaneously in Shaykh al-Zuwayid on July 5 (MENA, July 5). Four security checkpoints were again attacked simultaneously in the al-Zuhur neighborhood of Shaykh al-Zuwayid by militants in the evening of July 6-7, with gunfire being exchanged by security forces and gunmen in pickup trucks (Daily News Egypt, July 7; MENA, July 5; July 7).
  • Militants also revived their attacks on the pipeline carrying Egyptian natural gas to Jordan with two strikes south of al-Arish on July 7 after ten months without any pipeline attacks (MENA [Cairo], July 7). The attack resulted in the complete halt of natural gas supplies to Jordan, which is reliant on Egyptian energy sources (Petra [Amman], July 7).
  • A gunman riding a motorcycle shot a police officer outside an al-Arish police station on July 8 (MENA, July 8). It was only one of a series of attacks carried out by mobile gunmen that day on police stations and security checkpoints. Fourteen suspected militants were arrested later in the day, with 12 individuals described by the military as “dangerous terrorists” having been located by an unmanned drone (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem], July 8).
  • Islamist militants attacked a security checkpoint with RPGs and heavy machine guns at the village of Sadr al-Haytan on July 9 (Reuters, July 11).

Military Operations Planned for the Sinai

Egypt is currently coordinating a larger military presence in the Sinai with Israel. The size of the Egyptian military presence in different regions of the Sinai is closely regulated by the 1979 Camp David agreement and any unilateral deployment would create an immediate and heightened level of tension between the two countries. Annex 1 of the 1978 Camp David Accord divides the Sinai Peninsula into four zones running roughly north-south (Zones A to D), with the Egyptian security presence in each zone decreasing as they grow closer to the Israeli border. Any change to these deployments must be made with the agreement of the Israeli government, severely limiting Cairo’s ability to meet security challenges in the Sinai. The Egyptian military’s plan to deploy jet-fighters in the region to hunt terrorists and insurgents would be especially unacceptable to Israel without prior notice and approval. A July 2 statement released by the IDF said Egypt’s military efforts in the Sinai were being coordinated with the IDF and had been “authorized at the most senior levels in Israel” (Jerusalem Post, July 2).The expected Egyptian Army offensive in the Sinai is expected to be at least a month in length, with the military determined to eliminate the jihadist presence in the region (al-Shuruq al-Jadid [Cairo], July 6).

Conclusion

The volatility of the Sinai region and the danger of provocations leading to armed clashes between Egyptian and Israeli forces would be best dealt with by a stable state. Unfortunately, Egypt’s present instability provides ample opportunities for militants to exploit the political crisis for their own purposes. Militants can be expected to continue take advantage of the fragile state of Egypt’s police and Interior Ministry forces and the unpopularity of service in the Sinai. Coordinated attacks have effectively prevented security forces from coming to the aid of other posts under attack by militants and the possible infiltration of the region by foreign jihadist elements could easily precipitate a dangerous struggle for dominance in the peninsula.

Fueling this conflict is a steady flow of arms through the Sinai, some intended for use in the region with the rest destined for Gaza. Though some shipments are intercepted, there are indications that many of these cargoes continue to elude Egyptian police. On June 29, Egyptian security forces pursued two vehicles near Rafah. One vehicle escaped after an exchange of fire, but the second was found to be carrying five Grad rockets and an assortment of land mines, grenades and machine guns. Hours later, the North Sinai Security Inspector, Muhammad Hani, was pursued and killed by gunmen in a truck (MENA, June 29). In another incident, attackers in a July 5 assault on a Central Security Forces camp in Rafah were said to be using mortars, RPGs and Grinov heavy machine guns, the latter being a Soviet-era 7.62mm weapon likely obtained from Libya’s immense stocks of Soviet-made arms (MENA, July 5). Snipers using advanced firearms have also begun to take a deadly toll on exposed members of the security forces (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem], July 8). The current access to previously unattainable levels of firepower and their ability to find refuge in the Sinai’s mountains and deserts have emboldened the Sinai-based militants and will enable them to contest a time-constrained and militarily limited Egyptian military offensive designed to wipe them out.

Notes

  1. “Firing Grad Rockets at the Occupied City of Umm Rishrash [Eilat],” Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, July 5, 2013, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46329
  2. “The Starting Statement: Ansar al-Shari’a in the Land of Kinaanah,” July 5, 2013, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46317.
  3. “Statement regarding the crime of Army personnel against the protestors in al-Arish,” al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya fi’l-Sinai, July 6, 2013, http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=46328.

This article first appeared in the July 11, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

 

Thirtieth Anniversary of Sinai’s Liberation Marked by Libyan Arms, Bedouin Militancy and a Growing Rift with Israel

Andrew McGregor

May 18, 2012

Though Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has just marked its 30th anniversary of liberation from Israeli occupation, the region is perhaps less integrated with the rest of the Egyptian state now than at any time since the Camp David Accords returned sovereignty of the Sinai to Cairo. An influx of arms from Libya and elsewhere is fuelling a growing insurgency amongst an alienated and disenfranchised population and deteriorating relations between Egypt and Israel are threatening to once more make the Sinai borderlands a battleground between these regional rivals.

The Sinai: Northern Deserts and Southern Mountains

Egyptian security authorities blame most of the scores of attacks on police since the January 25, 2011 Egyptian uprising on Gaza-based Palestinian militant groups such as Jaljalat, Jaysh al-Islam, Izz al-Din alQassam and the local al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt Independent, May 1).  [1] However, while radical Islamism and close ties to Palestinian militants in Gaza play an important role in the unrest, there is little question that the core of the Sinai insurgency consists of armed Bedouin who exist largely on the fringes of Egypt’s Nile and Delta-based society.

Law enforcement has declined in the Sinai to the point that the police exist mainly to protect police installations that increasingly resemble improvised fortresses protected by large sand berms and steel walls to repel RPG attacks. The security situation is not helped by continuing protests against the military government by disgruntled police across Egypt, including in the towns of the northern Sinai. The Bedouin tribesmen have little fear of government authorities – security checkpoints are routinely attacked and security men and soldiers assassinated.

The Bedouin Factor

Tribal chiefs have issued demands for the establishment of a free trade zone and open passage for trade between Gaza and the Sinai, a move that would provide much needed employment and opportunity for local tribesmen, but which is unlikely to ever receive the necessary approval of Israel (MENA, April 21). It is estimated that 90% of the Bedouin population is unemployed and prevented by law from seeking employment in either the security services or the resorts of southern Sinai. The Bedouin are demanding the right to participate in the local security apparatus, but the idea has met resistance in Cairo where lingering questions about Bedouin loyalty to the state have deterred providing the Bedouin with modern arms and training. The release of Bedouin prisoners seized before last year’s Egyptian Revolution and the right to own land are also high on the Bedouin agenda.

The military government used the Liberation Day holiday to announce the commitment of $66 million to development projects in the northern Sinai, the largest project involving an upgrade to the port at al-Arish (Ahram Online, April 25). Further agreements to initiate a labor-intensive extension of water supply lines in north and south Sinai were signed the next day (Bikya Masr [Cairo], April 26). However, there is little chance of significant progress being made until after Egypt’s presidential elections, a multi-staged process which will begin on May 23.

The Sinai as Election Issue

As the elections approach, it has become clear that local issues in the Sinai have become irretrievably interwoven with Egypt’s changing relationship with Israel, as revealed by an examination of the platforms of several leading candidates:

  • Moderate Islamist candidate Muhammad Salim al-Awa has called for negotiations with Israel to amend the Camp David treaty in areas “that go against Egypt’s interests, like dividing the Sinai into three demilitarized zones, allowing Israelis into the Sinai without visas and other privileges given to Israel that should stop immediately” (Al-Ahram Weekly, May 10-16).
  • Amr Moussa, a secular candidate and former chairman of the Arab League, has called for a new agreement with Israel for the export of Egyptian natural gas across the Sinai based on current global market prices, adding that Israel must abandon its “policy of intransigence, threatening, [development of] settlements, occupation and [allow] the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state” (Business Today Egypt, May 8).  Moussa has promised to restore stability in the peninsula, end the marginalization of the Bedouin tribes and overturn the prohibition against Bedouin owning land in the Sinai (Ahram Online, April 21).
  • Neo-Nasserist candidate Hamdeen Sabahi (Karame Party) has promised to create a new local police force that is in tune with the rights and traditions of the Bedouin as part of an effort to turn the Sinai into “a paradise.” Nonetheless, his recent visit to the peninsula was cut short after receiving threats on his life from a Salafist group in the northern Sinai town of Shaykh Zuwayid despite promising to release all Bedouin political prisoners and suspected militants without conditions if elected (Ahram Online, April 21; April 29)
  • Muhammad Mursi, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, has called for urban development in the Sinai and the resettlement of millions of Egyptians in the sparsely inhabited region as Egypt’s population surges towards the 90 million mark, far more than can be comfortably supported in the Delta region and the slim fertile strip along the Nile (Ahram Online, April 29). A message from Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Badi on April 26 said that the Mubarak regime had persecuted the Bedouin as criminals when they were, in fact “patriotic citizens.” Badi added that a mass transfer of Egyptians to the Sinai from other parts of Egypt would “frustrate Zionist ambitions to seize Sinai once again” (EgyptWindow.net, April 27).

However, these pledges have had only limited resonance with the Sinai Bedouin.  As North Sinai Bedouin writer Ashraf Ayoub put it, “Sinai doesn’t need promises – what it really needs is reconciliation between the locals of Sinai and the rest of Egypt which looks at them like foreigners who plot against the country. We are more than a group of people who live in a strategic location” (Ahram Online, April 29).

In the meantime there is growing evidence that Libya’s looted armories are now being used to equip militants in the Sinai much as they have provided modern weaponry to militants in parts of North and West Africa. Egyptian security forces reported the seizure on May 10 of a large quantity of weapons being transferred to the Sinai for use against Egyptian security forces by a convoy heading east from the Mediterranean port city of Mersa Matruh. Among the weapons were 50 surface-to-surface rockets, 17 grenade-launchers, seven assault rifles, a mortar and a large quantity of ammunition. The three smugglers arrested were reported to be Sinai Bedouin (Daily Star [Beirut], May 10; AP, May 10).

Israeli authorities announced on April 5 that one or two rockets possibly of Libyan origin had been fired at the Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat from the Egyptian Sinai, though Egyptian spokesmen claimed Israel was only “spreading rumors” (Al-Quds al-Arabi, April 7; NOW Lebanon, April 10; AP, May 10). Israel is preparing to link Eilat to an early-warning system in anticipation of further rocket attacks from Egypt.

Israel sees the hand of Shiite Iran behind the turmoil in the Sunni Sinai. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “The Sinai is turning into a kind of “Wild West” which … terror groups from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda, with the aid of Iran, are using to smuggle arms, to bring in arms, to mount attacks against Israel” (Voice of Israel Network B, April 24). Egyptian security sources are reported to have expressed their own suspicions of Iranian funding for weapons transfers from Libya to Sinai, though Iran has denied any such activities (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 8). Egypt and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since Egypt’s recognition of Israel in 1980, though efforts have been underway to re-establish relations since the overthrow of Mubarak.

Severing Israel’s Natural Gas Supply

A persistent irritant in Egyptian-Israeli relations are the long-term contracts for the supply of Egyptian natural gas to Israel at below market rates negotiated by corrupt businessmen within the inner circle of former president Hosni Mubarak. With the pipeline to Israel having been blown by Sinai-based militants 14 times since Mubarak was deposed in January 2011, Egypt finally announced on April 23 that the natural gas agreement had been scrapped. The pipeline, which has not been operational since March 5, was last bombed on April 9 when militants mistakenly believed it had been returned to use after noting the Interior Ministry had sent some 2,000 Special Forces officers to guard it (Ma’an News Agency, April 9; April 15). A dispute over missing payments appears to have been the main cause for the termination of the contract.

An official in Egypt’s oil ministry commented: “It was a popular demand to call off this treaty, as we export gas to [Israel] cheaper than market prices… Their error was not to pay on time, and we have taken the opportunity to stop this shameful deal” (Bikya Masr [Cairo], April 23).

According to an official of the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG), Egypt has the right “to cancel its contract with the company as… [Israel] has not paid its commitments for several months…” (al-Hayat, April 29). EMG was founded by fugitive financier Hussein Salim, a former crony of Mubarak. However, international shareholders in the EMG are trying to paint the cancellation as a political move as the basis for an $8 billion lawsuit (Ahram Online, May 3). A statement from the shareholders claims that the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (ENGH) failed to protect the pipeline, though the latter describes the repeated bombings of the pipeline as a force majeure situation and insists that it was non-payment for gas received that led to the cancellation of further shipments in line with the terms of the contract (al-Hayat, April 27).

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tried to downplay suggestions that Egypt’s cancellation was a form of aggression against Israel by confirming the decision was part of a “legal-commercial dispute” that would not have long-lasting effects due to the development of natural gas resources in the Mediterranean that would make Israel “a major exporter of natural gas in the world” (Voice of Israel Network B, April 24).

A Greater Threat to Israel than Iran?

Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman recently described Egypt as “more troubling than the Iranian issue” and advised Prime Minister Netanyahu to move three to four divisions up to the Sinai border, complaining that the seven Egyptian battalions currently operating in the Sinai “aren’t carrying out real antiterrorism activities” (Ma’ariv [Tel Aviv], April 22). Though offered several opportunities to do so, Lieberman has not backed away from his assessment that Egypt will commit a major violation of the 1979 peace treaty after the upcoming presidential election in order to unite the nation around a common enemy.

The publication of Lieberman’s remarks was followed by an immediate request by Egypt’s foreign minister Muhammad Kamel Amr for “clarification” on their accuracy (Ahram Online, April 24). Lieberman’sassertion was also challenged by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak: “The Iranian threat is a threat with existential potential. At the moment this is not the case [with Egypt]…” (Globes Online [Rishon Le-Zion], April 25).

Israel’s Counterterrorism Bureau  issued a warning on April 21 for all Israelis in the Sinai to leave the region and return to Israel after it claimed to have determined that terrorists were planning an attack against resorts in the southern Sinai that are highly popular with Israeli tourists (Ahram Online, April 21). However, the warnings appear to have had little resonance with Israeli holiday-makers in search of a cheap vacation, with border authorities reporting more Israelis entering Egypt than leaving and resort owners in South Sinai reporting that most hotels were fully booked (Jerusalem Post, April 23). South Sinai Governor Major General Khalid Fouda suggested that Israel spread rumors of imminent terrorist attacks whenever Egypt’s tourism industry showed signs of recovery from the low point reached during the 2011 revolution (Ahram Online, April 21).

Members of the largely Bedouin “Sinai Revolutionaries Movement” attempted to strike a symbolic blow against Israel on Liberation Day by planning to paint an Israeli memorial in the Sinai to ten Israeli soldiers killed in a helicopter crash during the Israeli occupation with the Egyptian colors (al-Youm al-Saba’a [Cairo], April 25).  The effort was prevented by Egyptian security forces who are obliged to protect the memorial under the terms of the Camp David agreement. Israel in turn maintains a memorial to fallen Egyptian troops in the Negev Desert. A spokesman for the northern Sinai tribes, Abd al-Mun’im al-Rifa’i, said the people of the Sinai reject this provision of the treaty and cited a “need to demolish the rock [i.e. the memorial in the form of a large rock] because it stands as a provocation” to the Sinai tribes who “do not want any memorial for the Zionist entity on their land” (al-Hayat, April 27). The movement cites Israel’s reluctance to agree to a greater Egyptian security presence in the Sinai as a principal cause of the region’s instability (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem], April 12). Annex 1 of the Camp David Accords divides the Sinai Peninsula into four zones running roughly north-south (“Zones A to D”), with the Egyptian security presence in each zone decreasing as they grow closer to the Israeli border. Any change to these deployments must be made with the agreement of the Israeli government, severely limiting Cairo’s ability to meet security challenges in the Sinai.

A state-controlled Egyptian media source suggested it was time to “change the rules of the game” imposed on Egypt by the Camp David agreement:

It is no longer acceptable to tolerate tipping the balances of power in favor of the Israeli enemy. It is no longer possible to submit to conditions of capitulation that undermine Egypt’s sovereignty or allow its resources to be stolen. It is no longer possible to be tolerant with Israel’s conspiracies against Egypt’s interests in the waters of the Nile (al-Akhbar, April 29).

In an effort to permanently cut off Hamas-governed Gaza from Egypt, Israel is constructing a new security barrier along its border with Sinai that is expected to be finished later this year. The new fence will be five meters high, covered in barbed wire and augmented by dozens of radar installations. 120 km have been finished so far, with work continuing on a further 100 km (Jerusalem Post, April 25). After five failed attempts, the new fence was successfully breached by Bedouin smugglers using hydraulic tools in early May, though the infiltrators were quickly caught by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) (Arutz Sheva [Tel Aviv], May 2; Times of Israel, May 2).

Israel is also increasing its military presence along the border. The IDF’s 80th “Edom” Division has experienced significant upgrades since it was redeployed along the Sinai border following cross-border attacks last August (Ma’ariv [Tel Aviv], April 6). In addition, the IDF announced call up orders for an additional six battalions to man the Sinai and Syrian borders on May 3 (Arutz Sheva [Tel Aviv], May 3).

Last month, Egypt’s Second Army commenced Nasr-7, one of the largest live-fire exercises carried out in years in the Sinai. The commander of the Second Army, Major General Muhammad Farid Hijazi, announced that the Egyptian military was fully capable of defending the Sinai against attacks from any quarter (MENA, April 23). Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, the head of Egypt’s military government, adopted a belligerent tone during the exercise, telling troops of the Second Army: “We will break the legs of anyone who dares to come near to the borders” (Ahram Online, April 23).

International Peacekeepers under Pressure

Attempting to ensure that the security provisions of the Camp David agreement are maintained is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), consisting of some 1400 soldiers and civilians from 12 nations, including 800 Americans operating as a sub-unit known as “Task Force Sinai.”

With the parties of the 1978 peace treaty having failed to obtain backing for a UN peacekeeping force, the MFO was created in 1981 as an alternative, equipped with a mandate to supervise the security provisions of the treaty and to use its influence to prevent treaty violations. Financing for the force is divided three ways between the United States, Israel and Egypt.The MFO deployment began on April 25, 1982, as Israel withdrew from the Sinai and returned sovereignty to Egypt. Increasingly, however, the MFO is finding its ability to carry out its mission restricted by growing levels of militancy in the Sinai.

In mid-March, some 300 Bedouin armed with automatic rifles surrounded a MFO base holding hundreds of U.S., Colombian and Uruguayan troops to pressure Cairo to release five tribesmen facing possible sentences of death or life in prison for their alleged role in the 2005 bombings of the Sharm al-Shaykh resort in southern Sinai (Ahram Online, March 15). On May 7, ten Fijian soldiers belonging to the MFO were kidnapped along the Auja-Arish highway in northern Sinai by Bedouin demanding the release of several tribesmen from prison. The Fijians were released later that day following negotiations with Egyptian authorities in which the kidnappers were assure their demands would be met (Ahram Online [Cairo], May 7; AFP, May 7).

Conclusion

While Egyptian relations with Israel continue to cool, the interim military government in Cairo has no wish to become involved at this point in a military confrontation with Israel sparked by the activities of militant groups in the Sinai. While Field Marshal Tantawi talks tough about defending Egypt’s borders, he and the rest of the military command are aware that even defensive clashes with the IDF could jeopardize ongoing U.S. funding of the Egyptian military, particularly in a sensitive election year in the United States. At the same time, Israeli demands for greater security in the peninsula cannot be met without revisions to those parts of the Camp David treaty governing the number of troops and types of military equipment that can be deployed there. Most important, however, is the need to address the long-standing grievances of the indigenous Bedouin population who find themselves unhappily trapped on a traditional Egyptian-Israeli battleground while held in suspicion by both parties. In the absence of meaningful efforts to resolve their economic and social issues, the Bedouin will continue to find themselves attracted to militancy, a situation that has the potential of igniting a new Middle Eastern conflict.

Note

1. For al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, see Andrew McGregor, Jamestown Foundation Hot Issue, “Has al-Qaeda Opened a New Chapter in the Sinai Peninsula?,” August 17, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38332

This article first appeared in the May 18, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Sinai Bedouin Reject Egypt’s “Military-Islamist Alliance”

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

The Sinai’s well-armed but marginalized Bedouin community has accused Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of “treason” and has threatened a general insurgency if SCAF continues to ignore their quest for greater political representation, return or compensation of land expropriated for tourist developments and the liberation of hundreds of Bedouin men who were arrested without charge in 2004-2007, Bedouin representatives have suggested that Egypt’s new Islamist-dominated parliament is designed to serve the military that created it. According to Ahmed Hussein, a leader of the Qararsha tribe of South Sinai, the Bedouin will not recognize a parliament without Bedouin representation and will reject the “alliance between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and a certain Islamic party [i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood]” (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 17).

Tribal Map of the Sinai

The Sinai’s Bedouin community has been at odds with government security forces following the latter’s heavy-handed response to a series of bombings in Sinai tourist resorts between 2004 and 2006. Thousands of young Bedouin men were arrested and tortured, with many remaining in Egyptian prisons today without trial or even charges having been laid. Though there were expectations this situation would be rectified after the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the military government has done nothing to date.

On February 5, a blast in North Sinai severed the pipeline carrying Egyptian natural gas to Israel and Jordan. The pipeline has come under attack at least 12 times since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February 2011 (Reuters, February 5). The pipeline has become a symbol of the corruption of the Mubarak regime, with many Egyptians believing the unusually low price of the gas provided to Israel in a 20 year deal was the result of behind-the-scenes payoffs to the Mubarak family and their business associates. The Egyptian loss on the deal is estimated at $714 million.

Jordan has been forced to raise electricity prices this month to cover the cost of imported fuel needed to replace the interrupted Egyptian gas supply. Jordan agreed last October to a substantial increase in payments and Israel may soon be asked to do the same (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 5). The pipeline currently provides 40% of Israel’s gas requirements. Most electricity in Israel is now generated by natural gas and the loss of gas supplies means more expensive diesel and fuel oil must be substituted at an additional cost of nearly $3 million per day (Ahram Online, January 24).

Most of the pipeline bombings appear to be the work of Islamist militant groups operating in the northern Sinai. One such group, Ansar al-Jihad, claimed responsibility for the latest attack, describing it as retaliation for the death in prison of their leader, Muhammad Eid Musleh Hamad (a.k.a. Muhammad Tihi). Hamad was arrested on November 13 in connection to previous pipeline bombings (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem]/Reuters, February 5).

Ansar al-Jihad announced its formation on December 20, 2011, pledging to carry out the work begun by the late Osama bin Laden (Sinam al-Islam, December 20, 2011). The group further proclaimed its full support in January of current al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a veteran Egyptian jihadist (Sinam al-Islam, January 24; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 26).

The latest pipeline attack was only one of a series of incidents in the last few weeks that indicate a growing unrest in the Sinai region and a greater willingness on the part of the Bedouin community to resort to arms to achieve their aims:

  • On January 24, dozens of Bedouin gunmen seized the Aqua Sun, a Red Sea hotel, as part of an effort to reclaim traditional lands lost in the 1990s when the Egyptian government sold coastal properties to private developers. Well-armed with automatic weapons, the gunmen demanded that the hotel owners either return the land or buy it from the Bedouin. Egyptian military authorities did not respond to the hotel management’s pleas for action to retake the property and release the employees held hostage by the gunmen, saying they could not undertake military operations in the area without Israeli approval (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 24).
  • On January 26 masked gunmen in two 4X4 vehicles tried to plant explosives on a North Sinai natural gas plant. Their arrival appears to have been known beforehand to soldiers and local guards at the site, who engaged the attackers in a gun battle (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 26).
  • A wave of bank robberies in the Sinai by well-armed Bedouin has shocked many in Egypt, where such crimes have been extremely rare.  In one such incident on January 28, two Egyptians and one French tourist were killed in the gunfire that followed a police ambush on a band of armed Bedouin that had just robbed a bank in Sharm al-Sheikh of L.E. 2 million. With a further two tourists injured in the crossfire, the robbery struck a further blow to Egypt’s faltering tourism industry.
  • On January 31, a group of armed Bedouin seized 25 Chinese workers from a Sinai cement factory with the intention of holding the group hostage until the Egyptian government released five relatives of the gunmen who were originally detained in 2004 after an attack on the tourist resort of Taba (AFP, February 1). The abducted Chinese workers were released within 15 hours, suggesting concessions were made by the military government, though details of what prompted the release remain scarce (Xinhua, February 1; Bikya Masr [Cairo], February 1). One of the demands made for the release of the 25 Chinese workers called for a halt to gas exports to Israel (al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], February 2-8).
  • On February 3, two American women were abducted by Bedouin gunmen on their way from St. Catherine’s monastery in the south Sinai to the resort of Sharm al-Sheikh. The gunmen, apparently members of the Qararsha tribe of South Sinai, were seeking the release of two detained relatives whom police described as drug dealers apprehended in a violent arrest on January 28 which saw three police officers wounded and one Bedouin killed. The women, who reported they were well treated during a brief captivity, were released after several hours when police promised to review the case of the two Bedouin detainees (Reuters, February 3; AP, February 4).

In light of the growing unrest in the region, Israel is intent on accomplishing three goals along the Sinai border: 1) Seal off the tunnel network used to smuggle goods and arms into Gaza, 2) Prevent further infiltration of the border by African refugees and drug traffickers, and 3) Insulate Israel from the growing insecurity in the Sinai without having to approve the deployment of larger numbers of Egyptian troops in the region, as required by the Camp David Accords. To accomplish these goals, Israel is constructing a massive border fence and a secondary defense line several kilometers back. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is awaiting financial approval to deploy remote control gun systems in a series of pillboxes along this line. Reservists normally deployed on border security duties have been replace by Israeli regulars (YNet News, February 6).

On the other side of the border, Egyptian police have adopted a hardline “shoot first” policy to prevent Africans from attempting to cross into Israel. Two Africans killed at the border on January 21 were among dozens killed by Egyptian border guards in the last few years (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 21).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.