The Battle for Kufra Oasis and the Ongoing War in Libya

Andrew McGregor

February 23, 2012

An escalating tribal conflict in the strategic Kufra Oasis has revealed once more that Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) is incapable of restoring order in a nation where political and tribal violence flares up on a regular basis, fueled by a wave of weapons liberated from Qaddafi’s armories. Though this is hardly the first clash between the African Tubu and the Arab Zuwaya tribe that took control of the oasis from the Tubu in 1840, it is certainly the first to be fought with heavy weapons such as RPGs and anti-aircraft guns, an innovation that is reflected in the various estimates of heavy casualties in the fighting.

Map illustrating the strategic position of Kufra (lower right)

Fighting began on February 12 and has continued to the present. Well over 100 people have been killed in less than two weeks, with many hundreds more wounded (Tripoli Post, February 22). Tensions had been running high between the Arab and Tubu communities throughout last year’s political turbulence and the current fighting appears to have been sparked by the alleged murder of an Arab by three dark-skinned men the Zuwaya believe to have been Tubu. The latter have also been affected by a canard promoted by Qaddafi that suggests the Tubu only arrived in southern Libya during the Italian occupation of Libya or later, an assertion that could easily lead to efforts to expel the Tubu from the region. A newly formed goup called the National Rally of Tubus has issued alarming warnings that the clashes in Kufra were part of an effort to cleanse the region of its traditional Tubu presence: “Kufra is a disaster area and what is happening in the town is genocide and the extermination of the Tubu” (AFP, February 15).

The Tubu fighters are led by Isa Abd al-Majid Mansur, who backed the rebel forces in last year’s revolution. Isa Abd al-Majid is head of the Tubu Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL), founded in June, 2007. The TFSL confronted Libyan security forces in a five-day battle at Kufra in 2008 during which the movement threatened to sabotage the important Sarir oil fields in southeast Libya (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 11, 2008). The Zuwaya claim that al-Majid is now supported by mercenaries from Chad and Darfur (Reuters, February 13). Despite playing an important role in the Libyan revolution, the Tubu have experienced little change since the Qaddafi regime, when the Tubu were subject to loss of their Libyan identity cards and were denied access to health and education facilities. Isa Abd al-Majid denies that the TFSL seek to divide Libya: “We are not seeking a separation; we are like all other Libyan opposition movements. We are calling for the restitution of our rights” (al-Alam TV [Tehran], August 15, 2007).

During the Libyan insurrection, the Tubu formed the rebel-allied “Desert Shield Brigade” under veteran Tubu militant Barka Wardougou, conducting long-range raids on Murzuk and al-Qatrun (Ennahar [Algiers], August 20, 2011; AFP, July 23, 2011). Wardagou is the former leader of the Niger-based Tubu movement Front armérevolutionnaire du Sahara (FARS).

Having already been active in armed opposition to the Libya government for some years prior to the 2011 revolution, Isa Abd al-Majid foresaw a time when the rest of the Libyan people would join the struggle against the Qaddafi regime: “We claimed our rights, but [Qaddafi] marginalized us and denied our rights. He even said [the Tubu] are all foreigners. Even when al-Qaddafi visited Qatrun, he said we should be distributed over Bengazhi and the coastal regions and we should leave the border areas [in southern Libya]” (al-Alam TV [Tehran], August 15, 2007). Today, most Tubu live in northern Chad, ranging through the deserts and seasonal pastures surrounding their headquarters in the Tibesti Mountains. Much smaller communities live in eastern Niger and southeastern Libya. Though the latter is a traditional part of the Teda Tubu homeland, some Chadian Tubu have arrived in recent decades and  live in shantytowns around Kufra.

In 1895 the leadership of the Sanussi Brotherhood relocated to the oasis to avoid entanglements with the Ottoman authorities in northern Libya. The Sanussis transformed the oasis into an anti-colonial bastion until its conquest by a massive column of heavily armed Italian troops in 1931. Kufra’s strategic importance and airstrip meant that Italian occupation was short as Free French colonial troops and British forces from the Long Range Desert Group took the oasis in 1941, transforming Kufra into a base for long range strikes across the desert on Italian and German forces in northern Libya. Though the Libyan garrison declared itself for the rebels early in last year’s revolution, loyalist forces retook the oasis at one point during its campaign to establish control over the all-important oil and water resources of Libya’s southern deserts (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, May 8, 2011). Some 40,000 people live in Kufra (roughly 10% of them Tubu), which dominates a number of trans-Saharan trade routes.

The Zuwaya claim the Tubu are being helped by hundreds of “mercenaries from Chad” – one local government official described 40 4X4 vehicles full of soldiers attacking the “May 5 military camp” at Kufra and warned that if military aid from Benghazi was not forthcoming, Kufra would be forced to declare independence (Reuters, February 13).

General Yusuf al-Mangush

TNC military chief General Yusuf al-Mangush has denied reports of foreign fighters in the region and urged elders from the Zuwaya and Tubu to meet (Reuters, February 18). TNC chairman Abd al-Jalil, a former Qaddafi loyalist, has claimed that the fighting in Kufra was started by Qaddafi regime loyalists who were “seeding sedition” (AFP, February 21). Sources within the Zuwaya have confirmed the TNC has been shipping arms and fighters to the Kufra Arabs to combat what a TNC spokesman described as “smugglers helped by foreign elements” (Daily Star [Beirut], February 15). A Zuwaya source confirmed that a plane carrying weapons and fighters had landed at Kufra airport on February 13 to aid the Arab fighters there (AFP, February 14).

The Libyan Defense Ministry has promised military intervention if the fighting does not end soon, but has otherwise taken no action to end the conflict so far (Reuters, February 20).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 23, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Desperate Measures: Somalia’s al-Shabaab Joining al-Qaeda

Andrew McGregor

February 23, 2012

In what he described as “good news” that would “annoy the Crusaders,” al-Qaeda leader Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the incorporation of Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants as an official new chapter of al-Qaeda on February 9. [1] Al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” appeared in the 15-minute videotape to pledge his movement’s obedience to al-Zawahiri and promised to follow “the road of jihad and martyrdom, in the footsteps that our martyr Osama bin Laden has drawn for us.”

The merger may be the first step in an al-Qaeda effort to ensure the survival of the movement by expanding into the larger Islamic world through the creation of official al-Qaeda affiliates without the so far apparent and unstated requirement for an Arab leadership.

 

Al-Shabaab Rally Celebrates Merger with al-Qaeda in Wilayet, Lower Shabelle

Faced with increasing military opposition and severe blows to its revenue streams, al-Shabaab faces the options of gradual annihilation in the field or scaling back operations to a more asymmetric model based on a diminished interest in holding territory and a greater use of terrorist tactics in an expanded zone of operations that would certainly include Somalia’s neighbors and possibly reach to the foreign supporters of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The announcement was remarkably ill-timed, coming only days ahead of an international conference in London in which many Western countries were already expected to announce some increase in their levels of military and economic support for the TFG and AMISOM. The al-Qaeda merger will almost inevitably result in greater levels of support than donor nations may have originally intended. The timing of the announcement seems inexplicable, unless al-Qaeda has started to believe its own propaganda efforts and actually believes such an announcement will send the TFG’s international supporters reeling in fear and dismay. The timing of the merger is also unlikely to meet with universal approval from Shabaab commanders and will exacerbate existing fissures within the movement’s leadership. TFG minister of information Abdikadir Husayn Muhammad suggested the unification could be a good thing for Somalia: “When Ayman al-Zawahiri described the merger between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda as ‘good news,’ it is also ‘good news’ for us, and the time when al-Shabaab terror group used to disguise itself as a Somali Islamic organization has come to an end” (Jowhar.com, February 10).

The February 23 conference, hosted by the UK government, has been convenedto address political instability and piracy in Somalia. There have been claims in Somalia, particularly from al-Shabaab, that the conference will discuss the “re-colonization” of Somalia, but TFG officials have urged Somalis to wait for the outcome of the meeting (Shabelle Media Network, February 11). According to al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage: “It’s the imperious nature of the Brits that sees them meddling in Islamic affairs in the hope of reviving a hopeless dream of a British Empire” (AFP, February 14). In a recent speech in Mogadishu, TFG president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad insisted al-Qaeda were the colonialists and everyone in Somalia was required to do their part in “liberating” Somalia from their grasp (Shabelle Media Network, February 13). There is also speculation in Somalia that the African Union peacekeeping mission may be taken over by the UN following the London conference, possibly even in a mission led by Turkey (Dayniile Online, February 10).

Al-Shabaab ordered businesses and schools in areas under its control to close for a one-day celebration of their merger with al-Qaeda (Radio Simba [Mogadishu], February 13; Shabelle Media Network, February 13). At one such rally in Afgoye, Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage promised “mujahideen fighters worldwide” that “the unification is a sign of the return of the Islamic caliphate worldwide” (AFP, February 13).

The existing cooperation between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab over the last few years has yielded little for either group: al-Qaeda does not possess the weapons, funds or military assets to tip the conflict in al-Shabaab’s favor, while Somalia’s crumbling infrastructure, prevailing xenophobia and isolation provides a poor safe haven for terrorists operating in the global arena. Non-Somali jihadists generally find Somalia an unattractive theatre and unification is unlikely to change this. The merger will also endanger al-Shabaab’s diaspora fund-raisers, recruiters and volunteers who have had some success so far in meeting terrorism-related charges with claims they were inspired solely by nationalism and not the Salafist-inspired global jihad. U.S. drones operating out of Djibouti can be expected to increase surveillance missions and targeted attacks of al-Shabaab leaders within Somalia.

Kenya is scheduled to increase its Somali commitment from the existing 2,000 men deployed in southern Somalia to 4,700 men under AMISOM command in the Middle and Lower Juba regions of Somalia, though Kenyan authorities maintain the KDF must complete Operation Linda Nchi before Kenyan troops can join AMISOM (East African [Nairobi], February 14). Uganda and Burundi are also preparing to increase their deployment to a total of 12,000 troops from the current level of 9,500.

KDF spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna noted international anti-terrorist protocols can now be applied against al-Shabaab and claimed that al-Shabaab’s revenue stream has been “totally disrupted” since the Kenyan incursion into southern Somalia: “In our own assessment, 75% of revenue collection of al-Shabaab has been disrupted” (KTN Television [Nairobi], February 11; AFP, February 11).

Somalia may now be faced by more al-Shabaab terrorist attacks such as the Mogadishu suicide bombing on February 8 that killed 16 civilians and severely wounded 30 more (al-Andalus Radio [Afgoye] , February 8; Africa Review [Nairobi], February 8). Somali MP and former information minister Tahir Muhammad Gili speculated that the merger would result in al-Shabaab changing its tactics to “carry out more bombings and transfer battles outside Somalia, particularly to Somalia’s neighboring countries, since those countries have troops inside Somalia at the moment. (al-Jazeera, February 12).

Note

1. “Glad Tidings: Announcement of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen Officially Joining al-Qaeda,” As-Sahab Global Media Front, shamikh1.info, February 9.

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 23, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

The Strange Death of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and the Future of the Darfur Insurgency

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

Khartoum scored a major victory in its nearly nine-year-old conflict with Darfur rebels with the December 24 killing of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, leader of Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the best armed and most organized of the Darfur rebel groups. Khalil rose to the top of Sudan’s most-wanted list after his fighters made an audacious cross-country raid on Khartoum/Omdurman, bringing Sudan’s civil war to the national capital for the first time. Though the raid was repulsed in the streets of Omdurman, the bold attack and the military’s failure to rally to the regime left the government badly shaken. [1]

Rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The JEM leader’s death will most likely represent a major setback for the newly formed Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a broad-based armed opposition movement that includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A – N), the Beja Congress of east Sudan and three Darfur rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the largely Fur Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdel Wahid (SLM/A – AW), and the largely Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A – MM).

Who Killed Khalil Ibrahim?

Government sources reported Khalil was killed along with 30 of his men in the Wad Banda area of Northern Kordofan during a clash with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) The SAF claimed to have been chasing a JEM force of 300 fighters and 140 vehicles since December 19 (Sudan Vision, December 25, 2011; Sudan News Agency [SUNA], December 25, 2011).  SAF sources said the final clash was preceded by a battle at the village of Um Jar near the border between North Kordofan and North Darfur. JEM forces then passed through Wadi Hawar before engaging in fierce fighting with Kababish Arabs near Um Badir in northern Kordofan. Local officials claimed the surviving JEM forces were trying to southeastward to South Sudan through the Bahr al-Arab region (Sudanese Media Center [SMC], January 2).

However, ccording to senior JEM filed commander Sulayman Sandal Hagar, Khalil and a bodyguard were killed by a precision strike by three rockets while the JEM leader was sleeping in his vehicle (Sudan Vision, January 2). A leading JEM official, Mahmoud Suleiman, said the movement did not yet want to expose the parties behind the assassination, but were in possession of “threads of the plot and our knowledge of the countries involved in the conspiracy and the plane that shot the lethal missile” (Sudan Tribune, December 31, 2011). The one party that could be ruled out, according to Suleiman, was the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which did not have the technical capacity or capability of launching a jet-fighter missile strike of such precision. Suleiman also described reports of battles between the SAF and Khalil’s column of 140 vehicles just prior to his death as “novel lies,” insisting that no fighting had taken place before the assassination.  The JEM official suggested that JEM would take steps to open “a criminal case against those who participated in the planning and executing the plot,” leading to the “identification of the real perpetrators or those implicated and involved in the heinous crime.”

Khalil’s interim successor, al-Tahir al-Faki also suggested that “all indications point to the act being non-Sudanese,” noting that at one point, a JEM group came under intensive fire from Sudan’s ancient Antonov bombers (actually Soviet-era cargo planes converted to carry crude bombs) for six weeks while suffering only a single minor injury (al-Hayat, December 30). Sudan’s small inventory of Chinese and Russian-made jet fighters is not known to operate at night. There is some evidence that Sudan operates a number of small Chinese and Iranian reconnaissance/surveillance drones, but does not operate tactical UAVs with weapons systems.

The purpose of the large movement of JEM fighters under Khalil’s personal command was not immediately clear. A London-based JEM spokesman, Jibril Adam Bilal, announced that the convoy was on its way to the capital to make another attempt to forcibly topple the regime led by President Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2011). While JEM claimed that Khalil was leading his forces in a strike on Khartoum at the time of his death, Khartoum claimed the JEM leader was actually leading his forces into South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2011).

SAF spokesmen stated on January 3 that the SAF had detected 79 JEM vehicles carrying 350 combatants crossing into South Sudan on December 28, a claim that brought denials from Juba (Sudan Vision, January 6). The JEM forces were allegedly allowed to set up a training camp in Bahr al-Ghazal while the South Sudanese provided treatment for their wounded (Sudan Tribune, January 3). Juba has denied all such reports and reiterated its position that no members of any rebel group fighting against the Khartoum government were on South Sudanese soil (Sudan Tribune, January 19). State-backed media sources claimed in mid-November, 2011 that 400 JEM rebels had arrived in South Sudan after receiving “intensive military training” in Israel but provided no evidence (Sudan Vision, November 13, 2011). Khartoum later charged Israel with supplying JEM with weapons and vehicles transferred to France and Chad (SMC, December 27, 2011). Khartoum perceives the deep involvement of many international Jewish organizations in Darfur “anti-genocide” campaigns to be orchestrated by Israel as part of an attempt to create insecurity in the Arab world.

JEM serves a political purpose for Khartoum as a tool in pressuring the newly independent South Sudan through complaints to the United Nations Security Council. Allegations that the SPLM is harboring JEM rebels provides some justification for Khartoum’s sponsorship of Southern dissident movements. Khartoum has also made two previous complaints to the Security Council against South Sudan for allegedly supporting military units of the SPLM/A-N, which operates in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

The Reaction

In Khartoum, government officials raised security levels and used teargas to drive away crowds of mourners who were gathering at the home of Khalil’s family in suburban Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, December 25).  The government also closed two newspapers, al-Wan and Rai al-Shabb, for publishing interviews with Khalil or Jibril Ibrahim or publishing statements of support for Khalil from members of Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP), where Khalil Ibrahim began his political career (Sudan Tribune, January 14). The PCP recently drew the attention of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) over its production of a document outlining various scenarios for regime change in Sudan, including the possibilities of a military coup or a nation-wide popular uprising  (Sudan Tribune, January 8).

Muhammad Bahr Hamdin

Always eager to promote internal dissension in the ranks of the rebels, government sources provided unconfirmed reports that prominent JEM members from the Masalit and Erenga tribes of West Darfur had been “liquidated” for expressing satisfaction at the death of Khalil Ibrahim while other commanders were arrested on charges of complicity with JEM dissident Muhammad Bahr Hamdin (SMC, January 7). Hamdin was dismissed as the deputy leader of JEM in September, 2011 after being charged with planning a coup against the JEM leadership (Radio Dabanga, September 25, 2011). Elements of JEM from the Masalit, Erenga, Meidob and Berti tribes were fiercely repressed in January 2008 after they took arms to protest the exclusion of members of these tribes from the JEM leadership dominated by members of the Kobe Zaghawa, particularly cousins and other relatives of Khalil Ibrahim.

Dr. Qutbi al-Mahdi, an official of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), said JEM was a “moribund” group after Khalil’s death and called on JEM members to abandon their arms and join the Doha peace agreement forged in July 2011 with a number of lesser rebel movements under the umbrella of Dr. Ibrahim al-Sisi’s Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) (Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2011; Sudan Vision, December 25, 2011). 

President Omar Hassan al-Bashir described Khalil’s death as “a divine punishment for the crimes he perpetrated against the country and the people, for insisting on war to terrorize the innocent civilians and for his rejection of negotiations to achieve peace,” noting that “parties driven by foreign agendas” did not understand the consequences of the important changes that had taken place in the region, including the normalization or relations between Sudan and Chad that eliminated JEM’s rear bases in Chad, the fall of the Qaddafi regime and the conclusion of the Doha peace agreement between Khartoum and a number of second-level insurgent groups in Darfur (SMC/Sudan Vision, January 2). 

The Succession

Despite Khalil’s sudden death, the mechanism for a JEM leadership change operated fairly smoothly, with the London-based head of the JEM legislative council, Dr. al-Tahir al-Faki, taking over as interim leader as specified in JEM’s protocols (Sudan Vision, January 2). Though al-Faki presented a public picture of unity, the fissures within the movement were already beginning to appear.

JEM announced in late January that a two-day congress in South Kordofan (scene of an SPLM/A-N insurgency against Khartoum) had selected Khalil Ibrahim’s brother Jibril as the new JEM leader over Ahmad Adam Bahkhit, an experienced field commander. Jibril, who has no military experience, had been teaching in London and serving as JEM’s foreign relations chief at the time of his selection (AFP, January 26; Khalil’s half-brother, Abd al-Aziz Nur Ushar, awaits execution in Khartoum after being captured in the May 2008 JEM assault on Omdurman). Officials in Khartoum claimed the congress was held, not in Kordofan, but in the South Sudan city of Bor (capital of Jonglei State), where it was attended by South Sudanese military and political officials. These sources also claimed that Jibril Ibrahim had reached Bor carrying a passport issued by the South Sudan (al-Hayat, January 27).

The JEM leadership followed Jibril’s appointment with a display of bravado, announcing the next day that the movement still intended to enter Khartoum and al-Bashir’s regime (al-Hayat, January 27).

Defections

Though the core leadership of JEM is largely limited to the Kobe branch of the non-Arab Zaghawa, a pastoral tribe straddling the Chad-Darfur border that has increasingly challenged Arab supremacy in Sudan, the movement is host to a range of factions and non-Zaghawa tribesmen that united under Dr. Khalil’s leadership. Unlike the other Darfur rebel groups, JEM has also presented itself as a pan-Sudanese opposition movement, even mounting hit-and-run guerrilla operations in east Sudan in cooperation with the Beja Congress.

Defections from JEM or any of the other Darfur insurgent groups are not unusual and JEM, like many of the other movements, has been able to survive the merry-go-round of field commanders who generally respond to any dispute with their leadership by forming their own movement or joining a rival group. Nevertheless, there has been a severe escalation in the number of prominent JEM members who have left the movement since Khalil’s death.

Some JEM members were reported to be ready to quit the movement and join the SLM/A-Democracy movement of former SLM/A-Unity and SLM/A-Minnawi  commander Ali Karbino in dissatisfaction with the interim leadership of al-Tahir al-Faki (who hails from Kordofan rather than Darfur and thus lacks tribal support) (SMC, January 8).

A group of JEM members led by Zakaria Musa Abbas “Dush” left the movement in mid-January to form yet another offshoot – the Justice and Equality Movement – Corrective Leadership (JEM – CL). The main grievance of the group is the dominance of Khalil Ibrahim’s family and the Kobe Zaghawa in the JEM leadership. According to their founding statement: “The movement has turned into a family company to oppress revolutionaries in neighboring countries to strengthen dictatorial regimes; in addition to silencing mouths calling for reform within the institutions of the Movement. A certain group from one family has dominated big decisions to consolidate narrow tribalism and racism” (Sudan Vision, January 14). Another member of the “corrective leadership,” Maulana Yusuf Issa Hamid Mukhair, said that JEM had alienated many members of the movement by arresting 12 members and imprisoning them in a Juba facility controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM – the ruling party in the new nation of South Sudan), further alleging that the prisoners had been tortured for three months. A JEM spokesman responded by acknowledging the movement was detaining 12 members who are being investigated regarding their possible collaboration with JEM’s former commander in Kordofan, Muhammad Bahr Hamdin, but denied all allegations of torture or the involvement of the SPLM, insisting that the men were being detained in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, January 13).  JEM-CL has indicated it is ready to sign on to the Doha Agreement.

Another member of the new group and a former JEM executive member, Omar Abdullah Karma, told a Khartoum press conference the JEM had fought for the Libyan regime of Mu’ammar Qaddafi (who was harboring Khalil Ibrahim after his expulsion from Chad) and lost many of its commanders there (Sudan Vision, January 18). Khartoum had insisted from the beginning of the Libyan revolution that JEM units were involved in the defense of the Qaddafi regime, though there is little evidence of the participation of large numbers of JEM fighters.

JEM military commander-in-chief General Bakhit Abd al-Karim Abdullah announced on January 2 that he had decided to leave JEM and sign on to the Doha agreement (SMC, January 5). On February 4 government sources reported that JEM fighters in the Jabal Marra region under the command of Al-Toum Ababkr had left the movement in protest against the “lack of justice and transparency” in the process used to select Jibril Ibrahim as the new JEM commander (SMC, February 4).

Conclusion

Sudanese defense minister General Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Husayn has promised the armed forces would go on the offensive to smash the remnants JEM and then eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance in Darfur (al-Sahafah [Khartoum], January 15). President Bashir would be happy to be relieved of the threat JEM poses to his regime as he tries to deal with unrest and insurgencies in other parts of the country. Even Sudan’s Islamists, a traditional power base for the military/Islamist government, are showing signs of dissatisfaction with the regime; a memo signed by one thousand former Islamist mujahideen (i.e. volunteers in the civil war against South Sudan) denounced the  ruling NCP’s corruption and poor governance (Sudan Tribune, January 17).

The change in leadership will undoubtedly send JEM in a different direction. Negotiation seems more congenial to Jibril’s temperament than the desperate cross-country raids perfected by Khalil Ibrahim’s columns of experienced desert fighters. A much weakened JEM may face a choice of joining the Doha Accords or suffering further defections. The choice of a foreign-based university lecturer as the new military and political commander of the movement appears to be a major mistake that will only reinforce the claims of JEM dissidents that the leadership is the monopoly of a single family that is unwilling to tolerate dissent within the movement. While JEM still has significant military assets, Jibril Ibrahim is unlikely to make good use of them before more JEM commander come to the conclusion that it is better to accept the amnesty and benefits offered by signing on to the Doha agreement than to remain in a movement that no longer has the personnel and resources to present a realistic challenge to Khartoum. The decline or collapse of JEM would likely result in potentially unendurable pressure on the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the other leading insurgent group in Darfur. The collapse of the resistance in Darfur would likely make the Sudanese Revolutionary Forces alliance yet another failed attempt to unite Sudan’s armed opposition. After years of warfare in Darfur, Khartoum (possibly through a mysterious benefactor) may have finally achieved its goals there with the death of one man. The question is whether the regime can survive other threats long enough to witness the breakdown of the Darfur insurgency and the success of Khartoum’s diplomatic and military efforts there despite international condemnation and indictments from the International Criminal Court.

Note

1. For a profile of the late JEM leader, see: Andrew McGregor, “Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, Darfur Rebel Challenges Sudan’s Power Structure” Militant Leadership Monitor, January 30, 2010, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2862

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Captured Boko Haram Spokesman Undergoes “Intense Interrogation”

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

After enduring strong criticism over the last two years for repeated intelligence failures in its struggle against Boko Haram militants, Nigeria’s State Security Service (SSS) appears to have scored a major intelligence coup with its capture of the Boko Haram spokesman, popularly known as “Abu Qaqa,” who is now said to be providing “very useful and verifiable information to his interrogators (Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Abu Qaqa

The 42-year-old Boko Haram spokesman was retrieved from under his bed and arrested in an early morning raid in the city of Kaduna on February 1 after security services began tracking his mobile phone. After his arrest, Abu Qaqa was flown to Abuja for questioning at the SSS headquarters (Punch [Lagos], February 2). Abu Qaqa is unlikely to have an easy time in SSS captivity after threatening to kidnap or kill family members of agency personnel shortly before his arrest (Nigerian Tribune, February 12).

Wary of announcing his capture before his identity could be confirmed, the SSS initially denied making the arrest, but announced their man was indeed Abu Qaqa after the detainee “buckled under intense interrogation,” according to a source in the security services (Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Some of the confusion appeared to have been caused by the wide number of aliases used by the Boko Haram spokesman, including Muhammad Shauibu, Muhammad Bello, Abu Tiamiya, and Abdulrahman Abdullahi. Reflecting Abu Qaqa’s success at covering his identity, interrogators also discovered that their suspect was actually a member of the Ebira tribe of Kogi State rather than an Igala as they had thought earlier.

A member of Boko Haram claiming to be Abu Qaqa confirmed that a leading member of the movement had been arrested, but insisted it was actually the group’s chief of “public enlightenment” Abu Dardaa. Security services are convinced that “Abu Dardaa” is simply one of Abu Qaqa’s many aliases (AFP, February 3; Nigerian Tribune, February 4).

Following confirmation of the spokesman’s arrest came bombings in Kano and Maiduguri, where units of Nigeria’s elite Joint Task Force (JTF) are engaged in bitter street battles with Boko Haram fighters (al-Jazeera, February 6; This Day [Lagos], February 7; Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Sources said to be close to the interrogation claim the Boko Haram spokesman has revealed ethnic divisions within the movement, with the Hausa-Fulani members observing that Kanuri members are rarely arrested in comparison to the large number of arrests of Hausa-Fulani members. Suspicion of betrayal by the Kanuris threatens to split the movement, according to Abu Qaqa: “Some of us, the non-Kanuri… were worried at the trend of arrests of our members. It is either that the security agents were so good at their job or some of our members were moles giving us out. The worrying aspect was that most of our key members arrested were non-Kanuri…” (This Day [Lagos], February 7; The Nation [Lagos], February 6).

Abu Qaqa is also reported to have told interrogators that internal criticism of Boko Haram attacks on civilians was ruthlessly repressed by the movement’s leader: “Before I was arrested, some of us had already shown signs of tiredness. Most of us were tired of fighting but we couldn’t come out to say so because of fear of reprisal from the leader, Imam Shekau, on dissenting members. Several of our members that denounced the violent struggle were slaughtered in front of their wives and children. Seven were killed recently” (Nigerian Tribune, February 7; This Day [Lagos], February 7).

Abu Qaqa is best known for announcing Boko Haram’s responsibility for the brutal Christmas Day, 2011 bombing that killed 37 people and a series of attacks in Kano in January that resulted in the deaths of 186 people (Reuters, February 1). Qaqa recently told the Guardian in an exclusive interview that Boko Haram members were spiritual followers of al-Qaeda and the late Osama bin Laden. The spokesman further said that Boko Haram leader Muhammad Abubakr Shekau had met al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August and was able to obtain from al-Qaeda whatever financial and technical support the movement needed. Recruits from Chad, Cameroon and Niger had joined Boko Haram, according to its spokesman, who also promised that all Nigerians would need to follow the group’s inflexible version of Shari’a should the movement take power: “There are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you don’t abide by Shari’a, we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you.” (Guardian, January 27).

Nigerian reports suggest several Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, are now assisting in the hunt for the fugitive Boko Haram leader, Imam Muhammad Abubakr Shekau, who is believed to be hiding in a village in Cameroon, close to the Nigerian border, after having abandoned an earlier refuge in a village in Niger. After Abu Qaqa’s arrest, Shekau is said to be relying solely on trusted couriers to remain in communication with his movement (Nigerian Tribune, February 6).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Sinai Bedouin Reject Egypt’s “Military-Islamist Alliance”

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

The Sinai’s well-armed but marginalized Bedouin community has accused Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of “treason” and has threatened a general insurgency if SCAF continues to ignore their quest for greater political representation, return or compensation of land expropriated for tourist developments and the liberation of hundreds of Bedouin men who were arrested without charge in 2004-2007, Bedouin representatives have suggested that Egypt’s new Islamist-dominated parliament is designed to serve the military that created it. According to Ahmed Hussein, a leader of the Qararsha tribe of South Sinai, the Bedouin will not recognize a parliament without Bedouin representation and will reject the “alliance between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and a certain Islamic party [i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood]” (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 17).

Tribal Map of the Sinai

The Sinai’s Bedouin community has been at odds with government security forces following the latter’s heavy-handed response to a series of bombings in Sinai tourist resorts between 2004 and 2006. Thousands of young Bedouin men were arrested and tortured, with many remaining in Egyptian prisons today without trial or even charges having been laid. Though there were expectations this situation would be rectified after the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the military government has done nothing to date.

On February 5, a blast in North Sinai severed the pipeline carrying Egyptian natural gas to Israel and Jordan. The pipeline has come under attack at least 12 times since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February 2011 (Reuters, February 5). The pipeline has become a symbol of the corruption of the Mubarak regime, with many Egyptians believing the unusually low price of the gas provided to Israel in a 20 year deal was the result of behind-the-scenes payoffs to the Mubarak family and their business associates. The Egyptian loss on the deal is estimated at $714 million.

Jordan has been forced to raise electricity prices this month to cover the cost of imported fuel needed to replace the interrupted Egyptian gas supply. Jordan agreed last October to a substantial increase in payments and Israel may soon be asked to do the same (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 5). The pipeline currently provides 40% of Israel’s gas requirements. Most electricity in Israel is now generated by natural gas and the loss of gas supplies means more expensive diesel and fuel oil must be substituted at an additional cost of nearly $3 million per day (Ahram Online, January 24).

Most of the pipeline bombings appear to be the work of Islamist militant groups operating in the northern Sinai. One such group, Ansar al-Jihad, claimed responsibility for the latest attack, describing it as retaliation for the death in prison of their leader, Muhammad Eid Musleh Hamad (a.k.a. Muhammad Tihi). Hamad was arrested on November 13 in connection to previous pipeline bombings (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem]/Reuters, February 5).

Ansar al-Jihad announced its formation on December 20, 2011, pledging to carry out the work begun by the late Osama bin Laden (Sinam al-Islam, December 20, 2011). The group further proclaimed its full support in January of current al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a veteran Egyptian jihadist (Sinam al-Islam, January 24; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 26).

The latest pipeline attack was only one of a series of incidents in the last few weeks that indicate a growing unrest in the Sinai region and a greater willingness on the part of the Bedouin community to resort to arms to achieve their aims:

  • On January 24, dozens of Bedouin gunmen seized the Aqua Sun, a Red Sea hotel, as part of an effort to reclaim traditional lands lost in the 1990s when the Egyptian government sold coastal properties to private developers. Well-armed with automatic weapons, the gunmen demanded that the hotel owners either return the land or buy it from the Bedouin. Egyptian military authorities did not respond to the hotel management’s pleas for action to retake the property and release the employees held hostage by the gunmen, saying they could not undertake military operations in the area without Israeli approval (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 24).
  • On January 26 masked gunmen in two 4X4 vehicles tried to plant explosives on a North Sinai natural gas plant. Their arrival appears to have been known beforehand to soldiers and local guards at the site, who engaged the attackers in a gun battle (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 26).
  • A wave of bank robberies in the Sinai by well-armed Bedouin has shocked many in Egypt, where such crimes have been extremely rare.  In one such incident on January 28, two Egyptians and one French tourist were killed in the gunfire that followed a police ambush on a band of armed Bedouin that had just robbed a bank in Sharm al-Sheikh of L.E. 2 million. With a further two tourists injured in the crossfire, the robbery struck a further blow to Egypt’s faltering tourism industry.
  • On January 31, a group of armed Bedouin seized 25 Chinese workers from a Sinai cement factory with the intention of holding the group hostage until the Egyptian government released five relatives of the gunmen who were originally detained in 2004 after an attack on the tourist resort of Taba (AFP, February 1). The abducted Chinese workers were released within 15 hours, suggesting concessions were made by the military government, though details of what prompted the release remain scarce (Xinhua, February 1; Bikya Masr [Cairo], February 1). One of the demands made for the release of the 25 Chinese workers called for a halt to gas exports to Israel (al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], February 2-8).
  • On February 3, two American women were abducted by Bedouin gunmen on their way from St. Catherine’s monastery in the south Sinai to the resort of Sharm al-Sheikh. The gunmen, apparently members of the Qararsha tribe of South Sinai, were seeking the release of two detained relatives whom police described as drug dealers apprehended in a violent arrest on January 28 which saw three police officers wounded and one Bedouin killed. The women, who reported they were well treated during a brief captivity, were released after several hours when police promised to review the case of the two Bedouin detainees (Reuters, February 3; AP, February 4).

In light of the growing unrest in the region, Israel is intent on accomplishing three goals along the Sinai border: 1) Seal off the tunnel network used to smuggle goods and arms into Gaza, 2) Prevent further infiltration of the border by African refugees and drug traffickers, and 3) Insulate Israel from the growing insecurity in the Sinai without having to approve the deployment of larger numbers of Egyptian troops in the region, as required by the Camp David Accords. To accomplish these goals, Israel is constructing a massive border fence and a secondary defense line several kilometers back. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is awaiting financial approval to deploy remote control gun systems in a series of pillboxes along this line. Reservists normally deployed on border security duties have been replace by Israeli regulars (YNet News, February 6).

On the other side of the border, Egyptian police have adopted a hardline “shoot first” policy to prevent Africans from attempting to cross into Israel. Two Africans killed at the border on January 21 were among dozens killed by Egyptian border guards in the last few years (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 21).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Revolutionary Roadshow: Libyan Arms and Fighters Bring Instability to North and West Africa: Part Two: Libyan Arms Enable New Tactics and Strategies

Andrew McGregor

February 9, 2012

Some observers have noted a change in Tuareg tactics in the current rebellion in a switch from their usual adherence to guerrilla methods to attacks in strength and attempts to seize and hold settlements in northern Mali. The effort to carve out a new Azawad nation may well be fuelled by the rebels’ possession of superior weaponry obtained during the Libyan collapse (Le Republicain [Bamako], January 30). The assaults on small towns in the north may be a means of testing the strength of the Malian army before the Tuareg rebels mount attacks on larger centers like Gao and Timbuktu.

However, not all Mali’s Tuareg fighters have joined the insurrection. Malian military operations in the north are currently under the command of Colonel al-Hajj Gamou, a loyal Tuareg officer who has served in the Malian army since 1992. A loyalist unit of Tuareg in Kidal Region led by Muhammad ag Bachir has also backed government security forces by arresting a number of individuals suspected of supporting the MNLA, including Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga, a veteran Tuareg rebel leader who had threatened to restart the Tuareg insurgency if Bamako did not fulfill the conditions laid out in the 2008 Algiers Accord (Jeune Afrique, January 24; El Khabar [Algiers], July 15, 2010; see also Terrorism Monitor, September 2, 2010).  Other former Tuareg members of the Libyan military resettled at Menaka were reported to have joined in efforts to repulse the MNLA attack of January 17 (Jeune Afrique, January 24).

The rekindling of the Tuareg insurrection in Mali appears to be provoking a resurrection of the notorious Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso militias, loosely organized self-defense units formed from the black African communities (primarily Songhai and Fulani) in the largely Tuareg and Arab northern provinces of Mali, a development that threatens to turn the northern conflict into a more general civil war. The Bérabiche Arabs of northern Mali are also reforming their militias, which have cooperated with government offensives against Tuareg rebels in the past (Le Combat [Bamako], January 31).

The Response from Algiers

Algeria responded to the Tuareg attacks in Mali by raising its security alert to the highest level. Algiers has long been unhappy with Mali’s failure to secure its northern regions, which now provide bases for the Saharan offshoot of the Algerian-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Ilaf.com, January 20; al-Quds al-Arabi, January 20). Le Pouvoir, the Algerian political/military/business elite that controls most aspects of Algerian life, fears instability above all else and has tried to shut down any effort within Algeria to emulate the revolutionary unrest in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. A series of so-far uncoordinated riots in Algerian cities has no doubt alarmed Algeria’s elite. Algiers fears that this wave of unrest is intended to pave the way for foreign intervention in North Africa, but many Algerians worry that the government’s inability to extinguish AQIM’s low-level insurgency is a means of justifying Le Pouvoir’s tight grip on Algerian politics and maintaining high levels of spending in the military and security services.

Unable to rein in AQIM, Algiers has chosen to fight AQIM’s shadow, sentencing the commander of AQIM”s Sahara/Sahel branch, Abd al-Hamid Abu Zeid (a.k.a. Muhammad Ghidr) to life in prison, a sentence applied in absentia. Abu Zeid is the leader of the Tariq Ibn Ziyad unit of AQIM, which uses kidnappings and murder as their main tactics. Another Algerian court is still hearing the in absentia case against AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar for the deaths of two Algerian soldiers (NOW Lebanon, January 22).

Algeria, which played an important part in resolving previous Tuareg insurrections in Mali, has indicated that it views AQIM and the MNLA rebellion as “two different issues” and has undertaken mediation efforts between the rebels and Bamako. Prior to the outbreak of the latest Tuareg rebellion, Algeria attempted to aid Malian counterterrorism efforts by sending a small group of military trainers to provide instruction in anti-terrorist techniques (L’Aube [Bamako], December 22). However, the recent withdrawal of Algerian military trainers from Mali and a freeze on further shipments of military equipment was intended by Algiers to force a political settlement to the current conflict (El Khabar [Algiers], January 28). An MNLA spokesman said that the Tuareg attack on Tessalit came only after Algerian military personnel were withdrawn as the attackers did not wish to involve Algeria in the fighting (Reuters, January 27). Algeria is also aware of other less obvious threats to Mali’s security and recently shipped 3,100 metric tonnes of food to address Mali’s increasing difficulty in feeding its population (L’Independant [Bamako], January 31). 

Algeria is facing parliamentary elections in May in which Algerian Islamists are expected to do well as an alternative to the existing power structure under which unemployment and housing shortages have flourished (Reuters, January 31).

The Response from Bamako

With presidential elections on their way in April, President Amadou Toumani Touré appears to be ready to apply the military option to the Tuareg problem, particularly since he must now deal with the Tuareg insurgents without recourse to the mediation of the late Colonel Qaddafi. Bamako also appears prepared to take extraordinary measures to save the situation in the north. Mohamed Ould Awainatt, a member of northern Mali’s Arab community and one of the main suspects on trial in the notorious 2009 Boeing 727 shipment of cocaine to northern Mali that ended with the traffickers torching the aircraft, was suddenly and quietly released from detention on January 19. His release in a case that severely embarrassed Mali was reportedly obtained as the result of a demand from a group of young Arabs the government of Mali was trying to enlist in the fight against their Tuareg neighbors (22 Septembre [Bamako], January 23; AFP, January 23).

Timbuktu MapIn Timbuktu there are constant rumors of an imminent attack on the city and widespread fear of a Tuareg attack on the city’s Arab community (L’Independent [Bamako], January 24; Le Pretoire [Bamako], January 30). In the capital of Bamako there is talk of Western conspiracies, French “hatred” of independent Mali, malicious plots devised by Mauritanian generals and the alleged operations of foreign spies working hand-in-hand with al-Qaeda to divide Mali. Some Malian media sources have suggested that France and possibly other Western nations had persuaded many Tuareg fighters to abandon Qaddafi’s forces during the Libyan uprising with promises of support for an independent Azawad (Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako], January 24; L’Aube [Bamako], December 22, 2011). Local media is almost unanimous in its calls for a hardline approach to the latest Tuareg rebellion, with one columnist even advocating the use of nuclear weapons in Mali’s barren north (Le Pretoire [Bamako], January 30; L’Aube [Bamako], January 30; Le Potentiel [Bamako], January 31).

Libyan Arms Flow in All Directions

The availability of looted Libyan arms may allow new armed groups to form in West Africa with greater ease than usual. One such group may be the Jamaat Tawhid wa’l-Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa – MUJWA), led by Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (a.k.a. Abu Qumqum) and dedicated to the spread of Shari’a throughout West Africa. According to a video released by the movement, MUJWA broke away from AQIM due to the domination of the movement’s leadership by Arab militants from Mauritania and Mali. MUJWA appears to be a black African Muslim reaction to the traditional domination of all al-Qaeda branches by Arab Muslims, and their video has a specifically African character by using Hausa and English as well as Arabic to praise a number of important West African Muslim empire builders of the 19th century (AFP, December 22). In a video released in early January, Kheirou said his movement had declared “war on France, which is hostile to the interests of Islam” (AFP/NOW Lebanon, January 3). Though the group has only carried out one kidnapping operation so far, the spread of Salafi-Jihadist militancy into relatively unaffected West African Muslim communities would be an alarming development. Just by kidnapping European aid workers from a Polisario camp of West Saharan refugees in Algeria, MOJWA has helped inflame the difficult security situation in the region. Polisario operatives are now searching for Kheirou and his three European hostages.

In light of the tense political situation in Egypt, news that Egyptian border guards had prevented smugglers from bringing a shipment of machine guns, sniper rifles and ammunition into Egypt through the Libyan Desert was an disturbing development in Egypt’s unfinished revolution (MENA [Cairo], January 24; January 18).

Conclusion

The West’s poorly considered support of a spontaneous Libyan rebellion lacking common aims, ideology or even basic organization has secured the present reality. Clearly, the restoration of security in Libya is an essential first step in stabilizing the region. Unfortunately, the ability of Libya’s Transitional National Council to either project force or promote conciliation seems to be diminishing rather than increasing. If Libya is unable to make progress on disarmament and unification issues, the stage may be set for the emergence of a strongman ready to enforce his will on Libya, perhaps in the form of an ambitious young colonel with fresh ideas about remaking the Libyan state….  but then we’ve already been down that road. Nonetheless, both the West and Africa must now confront the security fallout from the rash decisions made a year ago.

This article first appeared as a Jamestown Foundation “Hot Topic” Special Commentary, February 9, 2012.

Revolutionary Roadshow: Libyan Arms and Fighters Bring Instability to North and West Africa: Part One: The Libyan Pandemonium

Andrew McGregor

February 8, 2012

A year after the eruption of Libya’s spontaneous revolution, there are few signs of progress towards establishing internal security or a democratic government. Real power lies in the hands of well-armed militias with little inclination to disarm or demobilize and the ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) has been reduced to holding its meetings in secret to avoid bottle-throwing, grenade-hurling demonstrators. Amidst this turmoil come increasingly louder demands for a Shari’a regime as the old regime’s looted armories and former soldiers fuel new insurrections in the Sahel/Sahara region. Even as neighboring Mali descends into a new round of rebellion that threatens to become an all-out civil war, Niger and Algeria are struggling to find ways to break the wave of violence at their borders.

The alarming developments on the Libyan periphery inspired a special two-day meeting of foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs from Mali, Algeria Mauritania and Niger in Nouakchott in late January. These officials also invited their counterparts from Nigeria and Burkina Faso to discuss the rising “terrorist threat” in the Sahel/Sahara region and the possibility of ties between AQIM and Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants (AFP, January 23; PANA, January 24; Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], January 24). 

Libya’s Political Chaos

In some ways it is proving difficult to distinguish between the new and old regimes in Libya as reports emerge of widespread torture and consequent deaths in detention centers run by the new military security agency and various militias. The UN estimates some 8,500 Libyans are held in militia-run prisons in and around Benghazi that have no external supervision (Telegraph, January 26). Libyan and UN authorities admit that they do not even know where all the detention centers are in Libya (AFP, January 25).

The ruling TNC has been forced to meet in secret after their Benghazi offices were stormed by protesters who tossed home-made grenades, set part of the building on fire and pelted TNC chairman Mustafa Abd al-Jalil with empty bottles (NOW Lebanon, January 22; al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 25). Only days earlier, the TNC deputy leader, Abd al-Hafiz Ghoga, was verbally abused and manhandled by protesters who questioned the sincerity of his defection from the Qaddafi regime (NOW Lebanon, January19). Ghoga’s subsequent resignation was rejected by the TNC (AFP, January 30). The fact that these incidents occurred in Benghazi, the TNC’s supposed stronghold, do not auger will for the future success of the interim government. The TNC already acknowledges it has little control over most of the country, which continues to be largely administered by well-armed militias. A campaign on Libyan social media seeks to undermine the transitional government with calls on Facebook and Twitter for the overthrow of the TNC, which is described in the messages as working for the return of the Qaddafi dictatorship (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 25). 

Libya’s Muslim Brothers have already demonstrated their political savvy in the creation of the new Libyan government by successfully demanding that two-thirds of the new assembly’s seats be reserved for candidates from political movements, a regulation that virtually guarantees the Muslim Brotherhood a dominant role in the new government as one of Libya’s only well-organized political movements (AFP, January 28). Restrictions on the participation of former members of the government in the electoral process automatically eliminate much of the Brotherhood’s opposition in contesting seats for the assembly. Thousands of Libyans have joined street demonstrations in Benghazi demanding the immediate implementation of Shari’a and its incorporation into a new Libyan constitution (AFP/NOW Lebanon, January 21).

Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib has recently warned of the danger posed by Qaddafi loyalists who had escaped the Libyan revolutionaries: “This is a threat for us, for neighboring countries and our shared relations” (Reuters, January 20). However, recent reports that pro-Qaddafi fighters had attacked a militia occupying the southern city of Bani Walid reveal how easily these fears can be manipulated to repress political opposition.

Though militia statements indicated the Bani Walid fighters were Qaddafi loyalists, the violence was in reality the result of anger over thefts and arbitrary arrests committed by May 28 Brigade members that boiled over when a number of armed Bani Walid residents arrived at the Brigade’s base to demand the release of a local arrested by the militia. The Warfallah tribe, Libya’s largest and the dominant group in Bani Walid, demanded that the Brigade be disarmed and brought under Defense Ministry control (AFP, January 27). Though various militias had gathered around Bani Walid for a major assault on the city’s alleged “pro-Qaddafi” elements, the TNC declined to open a new round of fighting and instead sent Defense Minister Osama al-Juwali (himself a commander in the Zintan Brigade militia) to negotiate a settlement (Jordan Times, January 26). Libyan Interior Minister Fawzi Abdelali later clarified the situation by denying the uprising against the thwar (Libyan revolutionaries) was the work of pro-Qaddafi militants (NOW Lebanon, January 23).  The talks led to TNC recognition of a tribal-based local government in Bani Walid, which should set an interesting precedent for decentralized government as the TNC attempts to extend its influence in post-revolutionary Libya.

Jordan is trying to alleviate the problem of rogue militias by undertaking the training in Jordan of some 10,000 thwar as preparation for their integration into Libya’s new military and security services (Jordan Times, January 20). However, it may prove difficult to convince the gunmen to abandon their new powerbases at a time when their armed presence will guarantee them a share in the considerable revenues of a new, oil-rich administration. Alternatively, Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, has offered to help Libya disarm its militias and integrate them into the new national police and military units (BBC, January 8). Al-Bashir received a warm welcome from the TNC in a mid-January visit to Libya, despite being wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in neighboring Darfur (Le Monde, January 19).

Pro-Qaddafi Tuareg Fighters in Libya

A New Tuareg Rebellion

The overthrow of the Qaddafi regime has had an enormous impact on Libya’s southern neighbors, most notably in Mali. Much has changed in Mali’s arid north since the leading Tuareg rebel, Ibrahim ag Bahanga, was killed in mysterious circumstances on August 26, 2011 (see Terrorism Monitor, September 16, 2011). [1] A prominent opponent of the political and military domination of Mali by the Bambara (one of the largest Mandé ethnic groups in West Africa), Ag Bahanga had been harbored by Qaddafi’s Libya after his defeat by Malian forces aided by Arab and Tuareg militias in 2009 (see Terrorism Focus, February 25, 2009). At the time of his death, it was widely believed in Mali that Ag Bahanga was preparing a new rebellion with weapons obtained from Libyan armories (Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako], August 17, 2011; Ennahar [Algiers] August 27, 2011). Ag Bahanga publicly opposed the “intolerance preached by the Salafists” of AQIM and at one point even proposed that his men be used as a mobile counterterrorist strike force (El Watan [Algiers], August 29, 2011; see also Terrorism Monitor, November 4, 2010). Ag Bahanga was an active recruiter for Qaddafi’s loyalist forces but later described the Libyan strongman’s death as an opportunity to advance Tuareg efforts to create a new state, Azawad, composed of the three northern territories of Mali; Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.  

Since Ag Bahanga’s death, a new Tuareg independence movement has been formed from a mixture of veteran rebels, defectors from the Malian Army and the recently returned Tuareg veterans of the Libyan Army who arrived in northern Mali in several heavily-armed convoys. The military commander of the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA – National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) is Colonel Muhammad ag Najim, a Malian Tuareg formerly of the Libyan Army (Proces-Verbal [Bamako], January 30). According to one report, each of the three major MNLA units is commanded by a pair of officers, one a veteran of the Libyan army, the other a defector from the Malian army (Jeune Afrique, January 24).

The military base at Aguel Hoc (Kidal Region) was attacked by the MNLA on January 18 and again on January 24 (L’Essor [Bamako], January 26). Unlike the raids that characterized past Tuareg rebellions, the intent this time was to take and hold the town. As the MNLA poured reinforcements into the fighting the government forces ran out of ammunition, forcing a complete withdrawal from the town on January 27 (Reuters, January 27). Similar attacks occurred simultaneously at Menaka and Tessalit. According to a Malian military source, the assailants in Menaka were equipped with Katyusha rockets, courtesy of the looted Libyan armories (AFP, January 19).

The MNLA appears to be conducting joint operations with a new Tuareg Islamist movement. Iyad ag Ghali, one of the leaders of the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s has formed a movement demanding the institution of Shari’a in Mali (Info Matin [Bamako], January 12; 22 Septembre [Bamako], January 12). By doing so, Ag Ghali, who remains powerful in Kidal Region, has introduced an Islamist element to the traditional ethnic-nationalism that has fueled past Tuareg uprisings. Ag Ghali claimed it was his new Islamist movement, Harakat Ansar al-Din, that was most responsible for the January 18 seizure of Aguel Hoc (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January 19).

It may have been Ag Ghali’s group that  Mali’s Defense Ministry was referring to when it claimed units of AQIM jihadis had joined the MNLA in the assault on Aguel Hoc (AFP, January 26; al-Jazeera, January 27). By the end of January, Bamako was claiming the attack on Aguel Hoc was the combined work of AQIM, the MNLA and “a group linked to religious fundamentalists” (most likely Ag Ghali’s Ansar ad-Din) (L’Essor [Bamako], January 30). A Paris-based representative of the MNLA, Moussa ag Acharatoumane, told journalists that he rejected the government’s claim his movement had been joined by AQIM jihadis: “We’ve heard all this before. Every time Mali finds itself unable to battle our fighters, the Malian government tries to link us to terrorists. We reject all forms of terrorism. Our intention is to get rid of the drug traffickers and AQIM from our soil” (AP, January 27; Reuters, January 27).

A Malian army counterattack directed from the Gao headquarters of General Gabriel Poudiougou succeeded in briefly driving off the Tuareg occupying Aguel Hoc and Tessalit, with the reported loss of 45 to 50 insurgents including Colonel Assalat ag Habbi, a deserter from the Malian military, to the loss of two dead government soldiers (L’Essor, January 23; Maliba Info [Bamako], January 19). [2] However, the army’s success was short-lived, as it was not long before MNLA fighers returned to the towns, inflicting heavy losses on government forces.

The Tuareg widened the rebellion on January 26 by attacking tow ouposts more than 500 miles apart; Anderamboukane in the east and Lere in Mali’s northwest, taking the latter without a fight after a small government garrison was withdrawn (AP, January 26; Reuters, January 27). Reeling from Tuareg attacks, the Malian military withdrew to Niafunke, which was then promptly attacked and taken by the MNLA (Le Combat [Bamako], January 31).

With thousands of Tuareg and Arab refugees crossing into neighboring Niger, there is alarm in the Nigérien capital of Niamey that the rebellion in Mali may spread to the Tuareg community of northern Niger, which has a similar volatile mix of well-armed, disaffected Tuareg returnees from the conflict in Libya. Niger’s president, Issifou Mahamadou, appealed for an end to the ethnic divisions that have plagued the Sahara/Sahel region: “Let us cease shooting each other in the foot; let us stop stabbing one another. Let us stop dividing ourselves, taking recourse to our ethnic groups, to our region” (Tele Sahel [Niamey], January 24).

Note

1. For a profile of Ibrahim ag Bahanga, see Andrew McGregor, “Rebel Leader Turned Counter-Terrorist?: Tuareg’s Ag Bahanga,” Militant Leadership Monitor,  March 30, 2010.

2. Both the MNLA and the Malian Army issue reports of massive losses to their opponents while reporting only minimal or no casualties to their own forces.

This article first appeared as a Jamestown Foundation “Hot Topic” Special Commentary, February 8, 2012.