June 28, 2012<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Despite a recent flurry of contradictory reports, it appears that a detachment composed of ships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet and possibly the Baltic Fleet is preparing for deployment to the Russian naval port at Tartus, Syria. The date for their departure has not been finalized and appears to be dependent on developments in the Syrian insurgency, but the ships are reported to be ready to leave on four hours\u2019 notice (Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, June 20). <\/span>Preparations appeared to intensify following an unannounced visit to Moscow on June 14 by the Syrian Defense Minister, Brigadier Dawud Rajihah (al-Quds al-Arabi<\/i>, June 19). <\/span><\/p>\n The Russian Defense Ministry had earlier described American reports that the large amphibious warfare ship (LAWS) Kaliningrad<\/i> of the Baltic Fleet was being sent to Syria as \u201cdisinformation\u2026 aimed at further escalating the situation in Syria\u2026\u201d adding that \u201cthe only true piece of information in these reports is that the LAWS Kaliningrad<\/i> is indeed part of the Baltic Fleet\u201d (RIA Novosti, June 19). Nevertheless, a source in the Russian Navy headquarters told Interfax-AVN the same day that the Kaliningrad<\/i> would depart for Tartus \u201cin a few days\u201d (Interfax-AVN, June 19). The Russian Defense Ministry had also denied reports carried by American media sources to the effect that Russian ships had already departed for Syria by June 15 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, June 18). <\/span><\/span>Pentagon reports that U.S. satellite imagery revealed the BDK <\/i><\/b>(Bolshoy Desantny Korabl<\/span> \u2013 large amphibious landing ship) Nikolay Filchenkov<\/i> was heading for Tartus earlier this month appear to have been incorrect, at least so far as timing is concerned. Loaded with military hardware, the ship left the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol (on lease to Russia) on June 21 bound for the Black Sea port of <\/span>Novorossiysk rather than Tartus, but was due back in Sevastopol on June 25 (CNN, June 16; RIA-Novosti, June 21). <\/b><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n BDK Nikolay Filchenkov<\/i><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Despite the denials, a Russian media source specializing in defense issues claimed its sources had confirmed that the large landing ships Nikolai Filchenkov <\/i>and Tzar Kunikov<\/i> and the SB-15 rescue tugboat of the Black Sea Fleet together with units of a Russian Marine brigade were prepared to leave for Tartus once the Nikolai Filchenkov<\/i> returned to Sevastopol (Interfax-AVN, June 20; June 19). Aerial protection of the ships has been guaranteed by Major General Vladimir Gradusov, deputy commander of the Russian Air Force (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, June 19). <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n The Tartus facility was established in 1971 at a time when the Soviet Union had similar facilities in the Syrian port of Latakia and the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Mersa Matruh. Today, only the facility at Tartus remains.<\/span> Officially, Russia does not call the Tartus a naval base, but rather a \u201cNavy Sustainment Center\u201d (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 19). Under the official name of the <\/span><\/span>Russian Federation Navy 720th Logistic-Support Station, the strategically important Tartus facility provides repair, refueling and re-provisioning services for Russian naval vessels operating in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Following a dredging program that began in 2009, the floating maintenance station (the PM-138), floating docks and workshops at Tartus can handle even the Russian Fleet\u2019s largest ships, such as the Soviet-era aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov<\/i>, which visited Tartus in January. [1] <\/b>The station is leased from Syria at a cost of $2 million per year, with payments made in both cash and arms (Komsomolskaya Pravda Online, June 15). <\/span>Tartus is also said to act as the receiving port for Russian arms shipments, like that allegedly delivered by the MV Professor Katsman<\/i> in sealed containers on May 26 (Interfax, June 4). <\/span><\/p>\n If Moscow remains committed to its opposition to foreign military intervention in the Syrian crisis, any Russian military mission would likely be limited to a primary task of evacuating Russian citizens and personnel, with the option of a secondary task of defending Russian installations at Tartus. The floating PM-138 can actually be moved offshore if threatened.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Kaliningrad<\/i><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has estimated there are approximately 100,000 Russian citizens in Syria, many with Syrian wives and families <\/b>(Vedomosti Online, June 22). With such numbers, it is certain that a naval evacuation would prioritize diplomatic and military personnel in its calculations.<\/span> The number of Russian stationed at the Tartus naval facility is estimated at no more than 100 (Vedomosti Online, June 22).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Though a website sympathetic to the Syrian insurrection had announced the Free Syrian Army (FSA \u2013 the main armed opposition group) intended to attack Tartus and had already infiltrated troops for this purpose, the FSA\u2019s Colonel Malik al-Kurdi described such speculation as \u201cirresponsible talk\u201d (al-Sharq al-Awsat<\/i>, June 18). <\/span><\/p>\n Units of Russia\u2019s Naval Infantry (Morskoy Pekhoty<\/i> \u2013 colloquially known as \u201cMarines\u201d) under the command of Hero of Russia Colonel Vladimir Belyavskiy are reported to be ready to board all three Baltic Fleet ships on the receipt of orders (Interfax-AVN, June 19).\u00a0 <\/span>Colonel Belyavskiy received his award for commanding Russian Marines of the Black Sea Fleet in a desperate engagement with Chechen mujahidin at the Tezen-Kale Gorge in February, 1995. [2]<\/span><\/p>\n The Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the missile cruiser Moskva,<\/i> was scheduled to visit Tartus earlier this month, but its voyage was cancelled for reasons apparently related to the Syrian crisis (Interfax-AVN, May 23). The Soviet-era destroyer Smetlivy<\/i>, which was to be relieved by the Moskva<\/i>, was instead ordered to extend its cruise in the Mediterranean (Interfax, May 18). A Black Sea Fleet spokesman reported that security for the Smetlivy<\/i> was provided in Tartus by a counterterrorism unit of Russian marines (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, June 19). <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n While a unilateral intervention by Russia in Syria appears to be out of the question for now, the possibility of Russian participation in a UN-authorized multinational force remains open. There is also speculation that a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO \u2013 a military alliance of seven former Soviet states, including Russia) might have a role in Syria. Various elite Russian military formations are reported to be receiving training for such an eventuality, including the 15th<\/sup> Combined Arms Brigade in Samara and the Pskov 75th<\/sup> Air Assault Division, which has previous experience with peacekeeping in Kosovo and in combat operations in Chechnya and Georgia. Also mentioned as likely participants in such a force are the Chechen Vostok and Zapad battalions of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which participated in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and more active operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, June 15). [3] <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n The view of Tartus as strategically vital to Russia\u2019s defense is not unanimous, however. A new report from the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (described as having close ties to the Russian defense community) downplayed the strategic importance of the Syrian naval facility, suggesting that Tartus was \u201cmore of a symbolic rather than practical value to the Russian navy,\u201d whose loss \u201cwould have no significant effect on Russia\u2019s naval capabilities\u201d (Financial Times<\/i>, June 26). <\/span><\/p>\n Notes<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n 1. <\/span>The Russian designation for ships of this type is <\/span>T<\/span><\/i>yazholyy avianesushchiy raketnyy kreyser<\/span><\/i>, \u201cheavy aircraft-carrying missile cruiser.\u201d\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n 2. <\/span>See <\/span>http:\/\/rusnavy.com\/history\/branches\/bv\/belyavskiy.htm<\/span><\/a>. <\/b><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n 3. For Vostok and Zapad activities outside Chechnya, see Andrew McGregor, <\/span>\u201cChechen Troops Accompany Russian Soldiers in Lebanon,\u201d Chechnya Weekly<\/span>, October 26, 2006, <\/span>http:\/\/www.jamestown.org\/publications_details.php?volume_id=416&issue_id=3902&article_id=2371588<\/span><\/a>, and <\/span>\u201cPeacekeepers or Provocateurs? Kremlin-Backed Chechen Troops Raise Tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,\u201d <\/b>North Caucasus Weekly, December 6, 2007, <\/span>http:\/\/www.jamestown.org\/chechnya_weekly\/article.php?articleid=2373839<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n This article first appeared in the June 28, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation\u2019s Terrorism Monitor. <\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Andrew McGregor June 28, 2012 Despite a recent flurry of contradictory reports, it appears that a detachment composed of ships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet and possibly the Baltic Fleet is preparing for deployment to the Russian naval port … Continue reading <\/p>\n
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