{"id":4723,"date":"2021-02-21T19:43:24","date_gmt":"2021-02-22T00:43:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/?p=4723"},"modified":"2021-02-21T19:43:24","modified_gmt":"2021-02-22T00:43:24","slug":"is-the-curtain-dropping-on-africas-oldest-conflict-senegals-offensive-in-the-casamance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/?p=4723","title":{"rendered":"Is the Curtain Dropping on Africa\u2019s Oldest Conflict? Senegal\u2019s Offensive in the Casamance"},"content":{"rendered":"

Andrew McGregor<\/strong><\/p>\n

AIS Special Report, February 21, 2021<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>(Seneweb)<\/p>\n

Thirty-nine years<\/strong> of insecurity in Senegal\u2019s southern Casamance region may be coming to an end after a Senegalese army offensive against the most intransigent elements of a heavily factionalized armed separatist movement, the Mouvement des forces d\u00e9mocratiques de Casamance<\/em> (MFDC – Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance). Launched on January 26, the offensive used superior firepower to overwhelm the rebels, some of whom fled across the border to Guinea-Bissau, though they were unlikely to find a warm welcome there. For decades the MFDC took advantage of friction between Senegal and its neighbors, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to find support and refuge when under pressure from Senegal\u2019s army. Conditions have changed, however, with new leaders in both states friendly towards current Senegalese president Macky Sall (Pulaar [Fulani]\/Serer) and less sympathetic to Casamance\u2019s separatist movement.<\/p>\n

The Jola (or Diola) people (4% of Senegal\u2019s population) dominate the MFDC and its armed wing, Atika, though Jola support is far from unanimous. The Jola are also found in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, but they are a minority among the 1.9 million people of Casamance, where they live alongside groups of Mandinka (Mandingo), Mankanya, Pulaar (Fulani), Manjak, Balanta, Papel, Ba\u00efnuk, and a small number of Wolof. The latter are the largest of Senegal\u2019s ethnic groups, comprising roughly 43% of the population, nearly all found north of the Gambia. Resentment against the Muslim Wolof, who dominate the government, is common even among those residents of Casamance who oppose separation.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Many Jola and other Casamance groups see the prolonged existence of the MFDC as a barrier to development and the resettlement of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in the region. Religious differences exist as well, though they do not appear to be a large irritant in relations between the Christian and animist Casamance and Senegal\u2019s majority Muslim population (92%).<\/p>\n

Former Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade promised to bring an end to the long-standing conflict in just 100 days in 2000; his successor, Macky Sall, promised to bring a swift end to the conflict in 2012 and repeated his pledge after re-election in 2018.<\/p>\n

Background<\/strong><\/p>\n

A movement for regional autonomy in Casamance began under French occupation in 1947 and continued through independence in 1960. Efforts to consolidate various movements into a single body resulted in the founding of the MFDC in 1982 under the leadership of Abb\u00e9 Augustin Diamacoune Senghor (Jola, 1928-2007). The armed wing of the MFDC, Atika, was formed three years later. The discovery of significant oil and gas reserves off the coast of Casamance in 1992 led to an intensification of the struggle for control over the region.<\/p>\n

When Abb\u00e9 Augustin died in Paris in 2007, the MFDC split into several factions, most of which now favor the negotiation of a final peace accord (Senego.com<\/a> [Dakar], February 24, 2020). Even the movement\u2019s hard-line factions have observed a unilateral ceasefire since 2014, though incidents of violence have occurred and the forests of Casamance remain a dangerous place.<\/p>\n

The Changing Roles of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the Casamance<\/strong><\/p>\n

The MFDC used to receive substantial assistance from Gambian president Yahya Jammeh, a Jola Muslim who took power in a 1994 coup d\u2019\u00e9tat <\/em>and maintained it through the deployment of death squads and the systematic use of torture. Jammeh\u2019s depraved rule ended when he lost the 2016 presidential elections to Adama Barrow, and was followed by his flight to Equatorial Guinea in January 2017. Adama Barrow, by contrast, is considered to be politically close to Macky Sall.<\/p>\n

Revelations about Jammeh\u2019s rule presented to Gambia\u2019s ongoing Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) have shocked Gambians. Gambia\u2019s strange situation as an Anglophone nation bordered on all sides (save the coast) by Francophone Senegal dates back to its former status as a British colony. Casamance was itself a Portuguese territory until 1888, when it was transferred by treaty to the French colonial administration of Senegal.<\/p>\n

For Dakar, another promising development arrived last year when Umaro Sissoco Embal\u00f3 became president of Guinea-Bissau in a disputed election. Embal\u00f3\u2019s predecessors were generally supportive of the MFDC but the \u201celection\u201d of Embal\u00f3, another ally of Macky Sall, has allowed a new spirit of cooperation with Dakar.<\/p>\n

Last November, a delegation from the Bissau-Guinean armed forces visited Ziguinchor to hammer out terms for a series of bilateral agreements designed to address security issues in the border region, including drug trafficking, illegal resource extraction, organized crime and cattle theft (SenePlus<\/a> [Dakar], February 5, 2021). These meetings helped set the stage for the current offensive.<\/p>\n

On February 4, the Maquis Casaman\u00e7ais<\/em> warned Guinea-Bissau that if it allowed Senegalese troops to use its territory to attack the MFDC, the movement\u2019s fighters would \u201cgrant themselves all the rights of pursuit of the Senegalese soldiers, wherever they are, into the interior of Guinea-Bissau\u201d (Journal du Pays<\/a>, February 4, 2021).<\/p>\n

The shelling of areas close to the border with Guinea-Bissau carries some risk for bilateral relations; MFDC militants reported the shelling of the Bissau-Guinean village of Mankamounkou on January 27 by Senegalese artillery, leading them to speculate on the possibility of war between the two nations (Journal du Pays<\/a>, January 29, 2021). Though this would be favorable to the militants (but ultimately devastating to Casamance), there seems little chance errant shelling will provoke such a conflict.<\/p>\n

When President Embal\u00f3 returned from a visit to Dakar on February 13, he announced the discovery of a plot to assassinate him, his Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defense. No further details or evidence were presented or made available from the ministries involved, suggesting the announcement was part of an effort to eliminate rivals to his still-contested presidency and consolidate power (E-global not\u00edcias em Portugu\u00eas<\/a>, February 17, 2021; Journal du Pays<\/a>, February 16, 2021).<\/p>\n

The New Offensive<\/strong><\/p>\n

With no signs of a settlement in sight despite years of negotiation, Senegal\u2019s military launched a new offensive in the Casamance on January 26 in its latest attempt to secure the region and return displaced communities. The offensive followed only days after 80-year-old MFDC leader Edmond Borra demanded new negotiations on the anniversary of the death of Abb\u00e9 Diamacoune on January 20, though he acknowledged the difficulty of arranging talks while the MFDC remained divided.\u00a0 (Sud Quotidien<\/em><\/a> [Dakar], January 21, 2021). Borra appeared to oppose the continuance of armed resistance when the offensive began, saying: “We can’t continue to shoot each other without negotiating for 40 years” (AFP<\/a>, February 11, 2021).<\/p>\n

A statement from a Senegalese army spokesman described the operation\u2019s objectives:<\/p>\n