{"id":5206,"date":"2024-12-11T20:00:59","date_gmt":"2024-12-12T01:00:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/?p=5206"},"modified":"2025-04-19T20:23:37","modified_gmt":"2025-04-20T00:23:37","slug":"irans-red-sea-strategy-amid-the-rsf-saf-fratricidal-war-in-sudan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/?p=5206","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Red Sea Strategy Amid the RSF\u2013SAF Fratricidal War in Sudan"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Andrew McGregor<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Terrorism Monitor 22(11), Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>December 11, 2024 <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><u>Executive Summary:<\/u><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Iran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with drones and other weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Hamdan Daglo \u201cHemetti.\u201d This has given rise to concerns that Tehran desires to establish a naval facility in Sudan.<\/li>\n<li>In combination with the Iran-friendly Houthi movement in Yemen, such a base would offer a point from which Iran could further threaten Red Sea shipping as well as the main maritime entry point for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.<\/li>\n<li>Iran\u2013Sudan relations have fluctuated over the last several decades, especially since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir. In particular, tensions stemming from Sudan\u2019s Sunni-majority population and Iran\u2019s promotion of Shi\u2019ism tend to place a limit on Tehran\u2013Khartoum ties.<\/li>\n<li>Despite official denials, Iran is suspected of either attempting to establish a naval facility on Sudan\u2019s Red Sea coast or gain access to preexisting ports there given the strategic advantages offered by doing so. Doing so may represent a bridge too far for U.S.\u2013Sudan relations, which Khartoum has spent years working to improve.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>A supporter of the Palestinian cause since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has adopted an aggressive stance in response to Israel\u2019s offensive on Gaza. As part of a strategy to assert itself regionally, Tehran has taken advantage of its proximity to the Red Sea, one of the world\u2019s most important trade conduits, to apply pressure on Israel and its Western backers. With the Iran-friendly Houthi movement in Yemen installed near the narrow Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, Iran is taking a new interest in Sudan and its 465-mile Red Sea coastline. To this end, Tehran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with potentially game-changing weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Hamdan Daglo \u201cHemetti.\u201d This raises two questions: What does Tehran want in return? And is it likely to get it?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sudan\u2019s Relations with Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In the 1990s, Iran enjoyed a close relationship with the Islamist military regime of President Omar al-Bashir. He welcomed Iranian technical and diplomatic support in his effort to create a more Islamic state and defeat South Sudanese separatists. Many of the Islamists who were ejected from power after al-Bashir\u2019s overthrow in 2019 now support General al-Burhan\u2019s SAF.<\/p>\n<p>Relations with Iran were cut in January 2016 when Khartoum sided with Saudi Arabia after a mob attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran in reaction to the execution of top Saudi Shi\u2019ite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr and 46 others on January 2, 2016 (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.presstv.ir\/Detail\/2024\/02\/05\/719530\/Iran-Sudan-Amir-Abdollahian-Ali-al-Sadiq-relations-cooperation-meeting-Tehran\"><em>Press TV<\/em><\/a> [Tehran], February 5). Al-Bashir\u2019s government then turned to Iran\u2019s Arab rivals in the Gulf states for support. During this time, Sudanese troops (mostly RSF) fought alongside Saudi forces against the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5207\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1094\" height=\"676\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen.jpg 1094w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen-300x185.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen-1024x633.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen-768x475.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Sudan-Troops-in-Yemen-486x300.jpg 486w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1094px) 100vw, 1094px\" \/><\/a><em><strong>Sudanese Troops in Yemen<\/strong><\/em> (AFP)<\/p>\n<p>The centuries-old Sunni\u2013Shi\u2019ite religious divide complicates relations between Sunni Sudan and Shi\u2019ite Iran. After al-Bashir downgraded relations with Iran in 2014, he made it clear the move was made in reaction to alleged attempts by Iranian diplomats to spread Shi\u2019ism in Sudan: \u201cWe do not know Shi\u2019ite Islam. We are Sunnis. We have enough problems and conflicts and we do not accept introducing a new element of conflict in Sudanese society\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article56230\/\"><em>Sudan Tribune<\/em><\/a>, January 31, 2016).<\/p>\n<p>A March 2023 Saudi\u2013Iranian rapprochement brokered by Beijing allowed Khartoum to make its own move to renew relations with Tehran. The shift was welcomed at the time by Hemetti, who had risen from a minor member of the notorious <em>Janjaweed<\/em> militia to commander of the RSF paramilitary (<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/GeneralDagllo\/status\/1634315902811357184\">X\/@Generaldagllo<\/a>, March 10, 2023). When the renewal of diplomatic relations was made official in October 2023, one of Tehran\u2019s most immediate concerns was Sudan\u2019s growing relationship with Israel through the U.S.-backed Abraham Accords (<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article278174\/\"><em>Sudan Tribune<\/em><\/a>, October 9, 2023).<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Israel Issue in Sudan\u2013Iran Relations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u2018Ali al-Sadiq \u2018Ali, Sudan\u2019s acting minister of foreign affairs, met Iran\u2019s late president, Ebrahim Raisi, in Tehran on February 5 to discuss their countries\u2019 improved relationship. During the meeting, Raisi emphasized that the \u201ccriminal Zionist regime\u201d could never be a friend to Islamic countries. Without mentioning Sudan by name, he condemned those Islamic nations that chose to pursue normalization of relations with Israel (<a href=\"https:\/\/en.mehrnews.com\/news\/211719\/Tehran-welcomes-Khartoum-s-request-to-restore-ties\"><em>Mehr News<\/em><\/a> [Tehran], February 5).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5208\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1200\" height=\"800\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali.jpg 1200w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Ali-al-Sadiq-Ali-450x300.jpg 450w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1200px) 100vw, 1200px\" \/><\/a><strong><em>Sudanese Foreign Minister \u2018Ali al-Sadiq \u2018Ali<\/em><\/strong> (Osman Bak\u0131r \u2013 Anadolu Agency)<\/p>\n<p>Following a law implemented in 1958, Sudanese leaders were forbidden from normalizing relations with Israel. The upheavals that followed the overthrow of President al-Bashir in 2019 provided an opening for the United States to bring Sudan into the Abraham Accords in exchange for a long-desired removal of American sanctions on Sudan. A member of Sudan\u2019s ruling Sovereign Council, Admiral Ibrahim Jaber, rejected suggestions that relations with Iran spelled an end to the Accord, claiming that renewed relations with Iran would not affect diplomatic normalization with Israel: \u201cWe will pursue normalization when it benefits us and refrain from it otherwise\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article283689\/\"><em>Sudan Tribune<\/em><\/a>, March 24).<\/p>\n<p>On February 2, 2023, Sudan and Israel finalized a deal to normalize relations. Israel hoped the deal would facilitate the deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers, but the outbreak of hostilities in Sudan in mid-April 2023 put further developments in this area on hold (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.haaretz.com\/israel-news\/2020-02-04\/ty-article\/.premium\/alongside-netanyahu-ugandan-president-says-hes-considering-embassy-in-jerusalem\/0000017f-e99b-dc91-a17f-fd9f0ec10000\"><em>Haaretz<\/em><\/a>, February 3, 2020). If Sudan grows closer to Iran, its commitment to the Abraham Accords\u2014which were half-hearted at best, even before the Gaza offensive\u2014is likely to wither on the vine.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Iran and al-Burhan<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Iran\u2019s support for al-Burhan and the SAF is assisted by the Sudanese army\u2019s solidly Islamist officer corps (the result of repeated purges) and the backing of Islamist militias and leaders from the al-Bashir regime connected to the SAF. Despite the Sunni\u2013Shi\u2019a divide, Sudan\u2019s Islamists have a long record of cooperation with Tehran. These ties in the past included Iranian military training for Sudan\u2019s Popular Defense Forces. <strong>[1]<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In return for arms, Iran will likely demand that Sudan cut its already damaged ties with Israel and abandon the Abraham Accords entirely. Israel has a long history of encouraging and arming conflicts within Sudan as a response to the opposition of successive regimes in Khartoum. In this tradition, acting foreign minister \u2018Ali al-Sadiq \u2018Ali blamed Israel for encouraging the RSF during a January visit to Tehran (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.presstv.ir\/Detail\/2024\/01\/20\/718573\/Iran-Sudan-Mokhber-acting-Foreign-Minister-Ali-al-Sadiq-relations-Israel-unrest-Palestine-Gaza-\"><em>Press TV<\/em><\/a> [Tehran], January 20). Sudanese officials have also suggested that Washington step in to halt the United Arab Emirates\u2019 (UAE) military support for the RSF before criticizing the SAF\u2019s ties to Iran (<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article282831\/\"><em>Sudan Tribune<\/em><\/a>, February 3).<\/p>\n<p>Though relations between the UAE and Iran have shown signs of improvement over the last year, the issue of Sudan remains a point of contention, with the UAE being accused of providing weapons and financial support to the RSF. <strong>[2]<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Iranian Drones and the Resurgence of the SAF<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Wad-al-Bashir-Bridge.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5209\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Wad-al-Bashir-Bridge.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"566\" height=\"366\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Wad-al-Bashir-Bridge.png 566w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Wad-al-Bashir-Bridge-300x194.png 300w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Wad-al-Bashir-Bridge-464x300.png 464w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 566px) 100vw, 566px\" \/><\/a><strong><em>Wad al-Bashir Bridge, Omdurman<\/em><\/strong> (Sudan Tribune)<\/p>\n<p>In March, coordinated tactics using drones, artillery, and infantry enabled the SAF to retake the old city area of Omdurman, the national radio and television headquarters, and the Wad al-Bashir Bridge, which is a vital supply link for the RSF. The success of this offensive is believed to be partly due to the arrival of modern Iranian drones (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/3\/12\/sudan-army-regains-control-of-national-radio-and-television-headquarters\"><em>Al Jazeera<\/em><\/a>, March 12; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dabangasudan.org\/en\/all-news\/article\/sudan-war-iranian-drones-played-decisive-role-in-omdurman-battle\"><em>Radio Dabanga<\/em><\/a>, March 17). The drones, which are also used to direct artillery strikes, operate out of the Wadi Sayidna base north of Omdurman. The RSF claims that the SAF receives air deliveries of Iranian drones twice a week out of Port Sudan (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/are-iranian-drones-turning-tide-sudans-civil-war-2024-04-10\/\"><em>Reuters<\/em><\/a>, April 10).<\/p>\n<p>Iran began supplying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Sudan in 2008. This allowed the SAF to build a small arsenal of Ababil-3 drones, which have capabilities useful in the type of urban warfare common to the ongoing Sudanese conflict. Sudan also produces its own copy of the Ababil-3, known as the Zagil-3. Iranian Mohajer-class drones are also used by the SAF, with the latest in the series, the Mohajer-6, providing game-changing capabilities, including an arms payload of up to 150 kg (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.military.africa\/2023\/04\/sudans-small-but-deadly-drone-fleet-could-turn-the-tide-of-war\/\"><em>Military Africa<\/em><\/a>, April 20, 2023).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Zagil-3.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5210\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Zagil-3.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1000\" height=\"750\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Zagil-3.jpg 1000w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Zagil-3-300x225.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Zagil-3-768x576.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-Zagil-3-400x300.jpg 400w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><\/a><strong><em>Sudanese Zagil-3 Drone \u2013 variant of the Iranian Ababil-3<\/em><\/strong> (Skyscrapercity.com)<\/p>\n<p>First produced in 2018, the Mohajer-6 has a relatively low ceiling of 3.4 miles, which makes it vulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses. The drone has seen extensive use by Russia in its latest war against Ukraine. In mid-January, the RSF claimed to have shot down a Mohajer-6 drone in Khartoum State using a man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.military.africa\/2024\/01\/rsf-shoot-down-sudans-army-mohajer-drone\/\"><em>Military Africa<\/em><\/a>, January 15). The RSF released photos of another downed Mohajer-6 in Omdurman on January 28 (<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/RSFSudan\/status\/1751726305576394803\">X\/@RSFSudan<\/a>, January 28; <a href=\"https:\/\/english.aawsat.com\/arab-world\/4820061-sudans-rsf-downs-iranian-made-drone-omdurman\"><em>Asharq al-Awsat<\/em><\/a>, January 29; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dabangasudan.org\/en\/all-news\/article\/rsf-down-iranian-made-drone-in-sudan-capital\"><em>Radio Dabanga<\/em><\/a>, January 29). Despite these public losses, the new Iranian drones have played an important role in restoring the SAF\u2019s military credibility.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A Red Sea Port for Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Citing Ahmad Hassan Muhammad, \u201ca senior Sudanese intelligence official\u201d and alleged advisor to General al-Burhan, the <em>Wall Street Journal<\/em> reported on March 3 that Iran had unsuccessfully pressed Sudan for permission to establish an Iranian naval port on the Red Sea in exchange for advanced weapons, drones, and a seagoing helicopter carrier (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/middle-east\/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922\"><em>Wall Street Journal<\/em><\/a>, March 3). Former Sudanese foreign minister \u2018Ali al-Sadiq \u2018Ali responded quickly and described the report as \u201cincorrect,\u201d saying \u201cIran has never asked Sudan to build an Iranian base. I recently visited Iran, and this was not discussed\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/sputnikglobe.com\/20240304\/sudan-denies-receiving-request-from-iran-to-build-naval-base-in-country---foreign-minister-1117117028.html\"><em>Sputnik<\/em><\/a> [Moscow], March 4).<\/p>\n<p>Other sources in Sudanese military intelligence suggested such an offer was likely never made, and its disclosure may have been a means for al-Burhan to express dissatisfaction with the lack of support the SAF has received from the international community (<a href=\"https:\/\/english.aawsat.com\/world\/4891051-reports-about-iran%E2%80%99s-bid-naval-base-sudan-sparks-controversy\"><em>Asharq al-Awsat<\/em><\/a>, March 4). An Iranian foreign ministry spokesman described the report as \u201cbaseless and politically motivated\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dabangasudan.org\/en\/all-news\/article\/sudan-and-iran-dismiss-talk-of-red-sea-naval-base-as-scuttlebutt\"><em>Radio Dabanga<\/em><\/a>, March 5). SAF spokesman Brigadier General Nabil \u2018Abd Allah refuted the claim as \u201cabsolutely untrue\u201d and denied there was any advisor to al-Burhan bearing the name Ahmad Hassan Muhammad (<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article282884\/\"><em>Sudan Tribune<\/em><\/a>, March 4).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-IRIS-Alborz.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5211\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-IRIS-Alborz.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1021\" height=\"576\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-IRIS-Alborz.jpg 1021w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-IRIS-Alborz-300x169.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-IRIS-Alborz-768x433.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/TM-\u2013-Iran-Red-Sea-Strategy-\u2013-IRIS-Alborz-500x282.jpg 500w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1021px) 100vw, 1021px\" \/><\/a><strong><em>Iranian Frigate IRIS Alborz<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Despite the strong denials, it would be odd if Iran had not brought up the possibility of using a port on Sudan\u2019s Red Sea coast behind closed doors, even if Iran had not asked to build a military base. An Iranian military base or port access on the western coast of the Red Sea\u2014combined with Iran-friendly Houthis on the eastern side of the Red Sea\u2014would make it easier for Tehran to have an armed presence along one of the world\u2019s most important maritime routes. Iran has also recently operated three ships in and around the Red Sea. The first, operating in the Red Sea, is the IRIS <em>Alborz<\/em>, an Alvand-class British-built frigate launched in 1969 that has since been modernized. It is accompanied by the IRIS <em>Beshehr<\/em>, a Bandar Abbas-class replenishment vessel. The third is the MV <em>Behshad<\/em>, a cargo vessel believed to operate as a spy ship for Iran in the Gulf of Aden since 2021. The <em>Behshad<\/em> was alleged to have supplied information to Houthi missile groups from the Gulf of Aden but appears to have returned to Iran in April, simultaneous with a severe drop in Houthi missile attacks (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dabangasudan.org\/en\/all-news\/article\/sudan-and-iran-dismiss-talk-of-red-sea-naval-base-as-scuttlebutt\"><em>Radio Dabanga<\/em><\/a>, March 5; <a href=\"https:\/\/israel-alma.org\/2024\/04\/24\/how-did-the-return-of-the-behshad-to-iran-influence-the-houthi-attacks-against-ships-in-the-red-sea\/\">Alma Research and Education Center<\/a> [Israel], April 24).<\/p>\n<p>An Iranian presence would be discouraged by Egypt, which backs the SAF and has four naval ports of its own on the Red Sea. Russia, which has long sought a naval base on Sudan\u2019s coast, would no doubt be displeased to see its Iranian ally take precedence. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran remain tense, and the Saudis would not be happy to see an Iranian naval base opposite its port of Jeddah, the main maritime entry point for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Sudan has its own concerns. As with a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, an Iranian base could attract unwanted military attention from other powers. Sudan cannot afford to have its only modern sea-based port and main inlet for trade damaged or destroyed through military action. The United States, believed to have carried out a crippling cyber-attack on the <em>Behshad<\/em> in February, would be almost certain to reimpose sanctions on Sudan should it provide a naval port to Iran.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Though its need for military support against the RSF is serious, Sudan\u2019s government is likely to take a measured approach toward improving its relations with Iran. The SAF has no more public support than the RSF and is seen by many Sudanese as too deeply involved with the Islamists who wielded power in Sudan during the three decades of Omar al-Bashir\u2019s unpopular regime. Sudan\u2019s Islamists, proud Sunnis who are tightly tied to the transitional government, are poor candidates to become puppets of Shi\u2019ite Iran. Sudan\u2019s army (commanded by Sunni Islamists) is also unlikely to commit itself militarily to the pursuit of Iranian objectives. There is, of course, the possibility of an RSF victory in the ongoing struggle, but for now, the RSF has no presence in eastern Sudan and no ties to Iran.<\/p>\n<p>Sudan has no interest in seeing damaging U.S. sanctions restored after spending years trying to convince Washington it is not a state sponsor of terrorism. Once the current conflict ends, Sudan will need help, not hindrance, in its reconstruction, and will need to look further than Iran for assistance. All these factors speak against the establishment of an Iranian naval facility in Sudan or a formal alliance. If, however, Iranian assistance brings about an SAF triumph, Tehran is certain to come calling for payment in some form.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Notes: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>[1]<\/strong> Jago Salmon: <em>A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces<\/em>, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2007, pp.17-18.<\/p>\n<p><strong>[2]<\/strong> Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, S\/2024\/65, January 15, 2024, pp. 14\u201315, 51\u201352.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Andrew McGregor Terrorism Monitor 22(11), Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC December 11, 2024 Executive Summary: Iran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with drones and other weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/?p=5206\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[117,7,13],"tags":[502,252],"class_list":["post-5206","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-drones","category-iran","category-sudan","tag-hamdan-daglo-hemetti","tag-red-sea"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5206","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5206"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5206\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5212,"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5206\/revisions\/5212"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5206"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5206"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aberfoylesecurity.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5206"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}