South Sudan’s Tribal “White Army” Part Two: Arms and the Overthrow of Traditional Order

Andrew McGregor

January 25, 2014

An unprecedented cattle raid by members of South Sudan’s Murle tribe on the Nuer “holy city” of Wec Deang on January 14, 2012 yielded some 4,000 cattle (with some 15 civilians killed by the raiders), but invited sure retaliation from the Nuer White Army. Wec Deang is without doubt the single most important historical and spiritual site in Nuerland as the burial place of the Prophet Ngungeng and the location of the Bie Dengkur, a massive sacred mound erected in the 1870s by thousands of Nuer under Ngundeng’s direction. The mound was partially destroyed by the British in the 1920s as a symbol of Nuer resistance but was left untouched by unspoken agreement of all sides in the Second Sudanese Civil War.

 

The Bie Dengkur at Wac Deang, c.1902


Reports that the Murle had attacked the mound itself during the January raid led Ngundeng’s grandson, Gai Lel Ngundeng, to issue a religious decree “ordering all Nuer in the world to fight [the] Murle tribe.” [1] A White Army statement said that “The Nuer youth were enraged after hearing [of] the attack of Wec Deang because it is an affront to all Nuer, including Nuer of Ethiopia, that the place of Ngundeng’s pyramid could be attacked by Murle. [White Army military leader] Bor Doang concluded that Murle deserters of the SPLA who did that must pay a price for insulting Prophet Ngundeng.” [2] Prior to the launch of the “Savannah Storm” operation against the Murle, Nuer White Army leaders travelled to Wec Deang to ritually slaughter bulls and receive blessings from Gai Lel Ngundeng. [3] Murle raiders also rely on the blessing of a local alaan ci meeri, or Red Chief, a religious figure who is believed to be in direct contact with the spirits.

The emergence of the White Army was simultaneous with an influx of small arms into eastern Upper Nile Province in the early 1990s and the 1991 split in the rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which left largely Nuer pro-Khartoum forces under Riek Machar (the SPLA Nasir-faction) fighting a civil war within a civil war with the largely Dinka-led SPLA-Torit faction under the late Colonel John Garang. While Machar’s main military support came from SPLA deserters and other pro-Khartoum tribal militias that feared Dinka domination of the South Sudan or preferred Southern separation to Garang’s vision of a “New Sudan,” the loosely organized White Army was raised from the Nuer cattle camps and was never absorbed into the formal hierarchy of any of these groups despite efforts to bring them under one command or another. Part of the problem was that there was no formal or even stable leadership to co-opt. Membership in the White Army was informal and based on availability, civilian status and possession of a modern firearm. [4]

It is likely that most of the arms that made their way into the hands of the White Army and other pro-Khartoum militias originated with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Possession of weapons allowed the Nuer youth to disregard and undermine the authority of traditional community leaders. The militia was formed on an ad hoc basis, usually in response to some real or perceived threat to the Nuer community, though many members clearly saw membership in the White Army as a means of acquiring arms cattle and wives. White Army columns typically coordinate their movements through the bush using Thuraya satellite telephones. These rapidly mobilized groups, consisting largely of Lou Nuer, are usually armed with a mixture of machetes, clubs and Kalashnikov assault rifles.

The absorption of pro-Khartoum militias into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba declaration and the SPLA’s simultaneous disarmament campaigns appeared to put an end to the White Army, at least temporarily. In many places, the disarmament campaign was supported by Nuer civilians who had tired of the arrogance and violence of the Nuer youth affiliated with the White Army. Many elements of the militia were not prepared to disband, however, and ignored Riek Machar’s orders to do so before being destroyed by the professional soldiers of the SPLA in 2006. [5]

Though the White Army is believed to be now operating in sympathy with Riek Machar, a 2012 statement from the militia acknowledged Riek Machar as the founder of the militia in 1992, but asserted that “we do not recognize Riek Machar as a Nuer leader. He is responsible for all the killings we experience today because it was he who armed [the] Murle tribe in 1997 when he signed [the] Khartoum Peace Agreement with Omar Bashir.” The statement, signed by military leader Bol Koang, went on to provide a succinct summary of the militia’s purpose: “We want to state, in no uncertain terms, that the Nuer White Army has no political objective. The primary objective of the White Army is to defend the Nuer livelihood from Murle who carried out attacks against the Nuer civilians.”

Tut Deang, a White Army spokesman, has explained that the militia is a youth organization that rejects the leadership of traditional chiefs (Sudan Tribune, January 6, 2011). However, the  influence of traditional Nuer “prophets” (sometimes styled as “magicians”) remains an important factor in the direction taken by Nuer militias and their blessing is vital before undertaking a campaign. The White Army was revitalized in 2011 when a Nuer prophet named Dak Kueth claimed to have been possessed by spiritual powers and began recruiting thousands of of Nuer youth under the military command of Bor Doang to repress the Murle, who were engaged in local cattle raids and abductions of children (Sudan Tribune, May 31, 2013). Dak Kueth urged Nuer youth to refuse to participate in the government’s disarmament campaign before he escaped the SPLA by fleeing to Nuer communities in neighboring Ethiopia.

Despite the White Army’s apparent focus on combatting the Murle, a late December statement allegedly issued by the militia informed that the White Army was now attempting to form an alliance with the Murle against the Dinka leadership in Juba, a development that reflects the growing political instability of South Sudan:

The problem of Nuer and Murle is now Dinka leadership in Bor and Juba. The Nuer and Murle have a common interest, that is, removal of Dinka government is the only solution to end cattle rustling which was introduced by Dinka… We therefore warn the UN that it is possible for genocide to take place in the coming weeks when we attack Bor town… The solution is for Murle and Nuer to unite to confront the Dinka who have an agenda against both the Nuer and Murle. From today onwards, the Nuer White Army will not fight Murle anymore. The focus is now to topple the Dinka government in Juba. [6]

Notes

  1. Gai L. Ngundeng, “The Grandson of Prophet Ngundeng Criticizes Attack on the ‘Holy City,’ Calls upon Nuer to Fight Murle and SPLA Defectors,” Decree No: 001/1/12, http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/the-grandson-of-prophet-ngundeng-criticizes-attack-on-the-holy-city-calls-upon-nuer-to-fight-murle-and-spla-defectors . For Nuer prophets, see: Douglas H. Johnson, Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997. For the Murle, see: Bazett A. Lewis, The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
  2. “Nuer and Dinka White Army to Launch ‘Operation Savannah Storm’ against Murle Armed Youth,” Leadership of the Nuer and Dinka White Army Media Release, Uror County, Jonglei State, South Sudan, February 4, 2012, http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/nuer-and-dinka-white-army-to-launch-operation-savannah-storm-against-murle-armed-youth
  3. Ibid
  4. Arild Skedsmo, Kwong Danhier and Hoth Gor Luak, “The Changing Meaning of Small Arms in Nuer Society,” African Security Review 12(4), 2003, pp. 57-67.
  5. John Young, The White Army: An Introduction and Overview, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, June 2007, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-05-White-Army.pdf
  6. “Both the Murle and Nuer White armies will work together to remove the Dinka regime,” December 27, 2013, http://ethiopianewsforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=68952

Tripoli Battles Shadowy Qaddafists while Tribal Rivals Fight over Southern Libya

Andrew McGregor

January 25, 2014

Despite living in the midst of some of the world’s most open and sparsely populated spaces, Libya’s southern tribes are engaged in a new round of bitter urban warfare, as snipers, gun-battles and mortar fire take a heavy toll on the civilian population. At stake are control over the abundant resources of the Libyan south, the heavy traffic of its trade routes (both licit and illicit) and the future of tribal and ethnic relations in a post-Qaddafist south. Simultaneous with these disputes, however, is the mysterious and oddly-timed emergence of “Qaddafist supporters” waving green flags (the symbol of the Qaddafist revolution) in several different Libyan centers, most notably in the southern oasis settlement of Sabha, where they were alleged to have seized an airbase.

Sabha CenterCentral Sabha

Sabha, the Strategic Hub of South-West Libya

Since late December, the strategic oasis city of Sabha has been the scene of deadly clashes between the Tubu, a tribe of indigenous Black African nomads ranging through the eastern Sahara, and the Awlad Sulayman, a traditionally nomadic Arab tribe of the Fezzan (southwestern Libya). Sabha, a city of 210,000 people about 400 miles south of Tripoli, is the site of an important military base and airfield. It also serves as a commercial and transportation hub for the Fezzan. Many of the residents are economic migrants from Niger, Chad and the Sudan, while the Qaddadfa (the tribe of Mu’ammar Qaddafi) and the Awlad Sulayman are among the more prominent Arab tribes found in Sabha. One of the last strongholds of the Qaddafi loyalists, Sabha was taken by revolutionary militias in September 2011. [1]

In March 2012, three days of vicious fighting in Sabha that began as a dispute between the Tubu and the Arab Abu Seif and morphed into a battle between the Tubu and the Awlad Sulayman left 40 Tubu and 30 Arabs dead. After a ceasefire ended the fighting by the end of the month, serious clashes erupted in Sabha once more on January 11. Tubu militants directed mortar fire into Sabha from the edge of town, targeting Awlad Sulayman neighborhoods. The street violence reached such a peak that the Sabha National Security Directorate admitted it no longer had the resources to even attempt to maintain law and order. The Sabha Local Council was forced to suspend operations in late December. On January 17, mortars struck the residence of Sabha’s military governor. The region is desperately short of medical supplies, a situation worsened by gunmen who stole part of an emergency shipment of medical supplies from the UAE and an attack on the Sabha hospital (Libya Herald, January 17; January 20).

It appears to have been fallout from this earlier struggle that sparked the latest clashes, as Tubu gunmen from Murzuk stormed a Traghen police station (140 kilometers south of Sabha) on January 9. The gunmen ignored a number of high value targets as they searched specifically for al-Haq Brigade leader Mansur al-Aswad, the deputy commander of the Sabha military zone. The brigade leader was eventually found and murdered, allegedly in retaliation for crimes committed by his Abu Seif militia during the 2012 clashes in Sabha (Libya Herald, January 10).

Both the Tubu and Zuwaya, rivals in Kufra, have communities in the coastal city of Ajdabiya, that city being the northern terminus of the trade routes that run through Kufra to the north. The conflict has traveled north through this route to Ajdabiya, where a Zuwaya unit under the command of the general staff has had deadly clashes with a Tubu unit under the command of the Defense Ministry (AFP, December 23, 2013).

Misrata’s 154 Battalion joined Libyan Army regulars heading to Sabha to restore order (Libya Herald, January 20). The Tubu arrived at reconciliation talks attended by several leading government ministers and a Zintani reconciliation committee with three demands they insisted be met before negotiations could continue:

  • Establishing exactly who the Tubu were fighting (an issue complicated by the tendency of imported Arab militias to ally themselves with local Arab groups);
  • The expulsion of Awlad Sulayman gunmen from local military compounds and the historic Elena castle (formerly known as Fortezza Margherita), an Italian colonial relic that still dominates Sabha;
  • The transfer of the castle, still used for military purposes and detentions, to the Ministry of Tourism (Libya Herald, January 22).

The Sabha “Castle” – an Italian-era fortress

According to Isa Abd al-Majid Mansour, leader of the Tubu Front for the Salvation of Libya, the violence in the south is designed to eliminate the Tubu presence in Libya: “This is not a tribal war… The Islamist militias aided by the Libyan government want to get rid of us. International bodies that come to investigate will see who are the victims, with what arms and in which conditions they were shot. They will know that innocent people are taken from their homes and shot by 14.5mm caliber [weapons]” (Paris Match, January 20). Isa Abd al-Majid insists that Sabha has become a headquarters for al-Qaeda forces drawn from Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. (Paris Match, January 20).

The Mysterious Qaddafists

A group of “Qaddafists” were reported to have seized Tamenhint Air-base (30 kilometers east of Sabha) on January 18, relinquishing it after sorties by Libyan jet-fighters on January 19 to redeploy “with a large convoy” on the road between Sabha and Barak Shati, according to a Zintani mediator (Libya Herald, January 19). According to the spokesman for the Libyan defense ministry, the occupiers were Qaddafi supporters (al-Arabiya, January 18).

After the Qaddafists left, the base was occupied by Tubu troops of the Murzuk Military Council, though these withdrew on January 20 before the arrival of the Misrata militia, allowing the Qaddafists to reoccupy the facility. Defence Ministry spokesman Abdul-Raziq al-Shabahi said: “The situation in the south … opened a chance for some criminals … loyal to the Gaddafi regime to exploit this and to attack the Tamahind air force base” (Reuters, January 20). Libyan government sources claim the violence in the south is being orchestrated by Saadi Qaddafi, a son of the late dictator who has taken refuge in neighboring Niger.

Other pro-Qaddafi elements were said to have taken to the streets in Ajilat, waving green flags and carrying portraits of the late dictator. The Zintan militia was called in when local authorities were unable to contain the demonstrations and five alleged Qaddafi supporters supposedly on their way to Ajilat were killed in nearby Sabratha. Though authorities claimed to have arrested seven Qaddafists, they refused to release any information about the suspects (Libya Herald, January 22).

Oddly, there was also a manifestation of green-flag waving “Qaddafists” who tried to attack the Italian section of a non-Muslim cemetery in Tripoli. The group was driven off by locals, but have apparently returned at night twice to damage graves, even killing the night-watchman in their second visit. West of Zahra, other alleged Qaddafists were reported to have raised the green flag (Libya Herald, January 20).

The identity of the alleged Qaddafists remains in question. In Sabha, citizens became alarmed when reports began to circulate that the Qaddafists were actually “foreign troops from Chad,” prompting a formal Libyan government denial (Libya Herald, January 21).

Tubu Militia MurzukTubu Militiamen, Murzuk (Karlos Zurutuza/IPS)

Tubu militias have occupied two other important military bases in Libya’s largely ungoverned southwest, a refuge for smugglers and terrorists. Al-Wigh airbase was occupied by Colonel Barka Warduko’s Murzuk Desert Shield militia and the military post at al-Tum was occupied by the Oum al-Aranib militia commanded by Sharfadeen Barka.

Qaddafists have also been blamed for the violence in the Ajilat region (on Libya’s northwest coast), where a militia from Zawiya has been fighting with the Warshefana tribe, which has regularly been accused of pro-Qaddafist tendencies.

The neighboring groups have been fighting sporadically since the overthrow of Qaddafi, deploying weapons as large as Grad rockets.  Misrati forces armed with Katyusha rockets and Zintani militia fighters were deployed to intervene in the fighting alongside armor belonging to the National Army (Libya Herald, January 21). The Misrata militia and and Tripoli militias were withdrawn on January 21 after 18 people died in clashes, with local authorities comparing the actions of the militias to those of the Italian colonial army (Libya Herald, January 22). The Warshefana are regularly accused of being pro-Qaddafi and held responsible for a wave of kidnappings and car-jackings around Tripoli.

The Killings in Kufra

A seemingly intractable conflict in Kufra Oasis between the Tubu and the Zuwaya Arabs (who seized the region from the Tubu in 1840) flared up again on January 20, as Arabs and Tubu shelled each other with mortars over the next few days. The struggle between the two tribes, both of whom would like to have full control of the smuggling/trade routes that run from the African interior through Kufra, has also been carried on by continuing tit-for-tat kidnappings of random members of rival communities.

However, Isa Abd al-Majid, leader of the Tubu fighters around Kufra, does not identify the Zuwaya as the real problem in the region: “We are fighting al-Qaeda. They want to eradicate us to occupy our land and control the frontiers with Chad and Niger, which will permit them to attack the French military base in Niger and kidnap Westerners” (Paris Match, January 20).

Government Response – Revival of the Militias

Libya’s ruling General National Council (GNC) declared a State of Emergency on January 18, citing the clashes in Sabha. Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan called on the revolutionary militias to rally to the south to expel the Qaddafists and restore order in the south and other security “hotspots” (Libya Herald, January 18). The government’s decision to recall the militias in the midst of efforts to demobilize them and integrate their members into the Libyan National Army has dismayed many Libyans who have become exasperated with the militias’ roadblocks and almost daily violence.  Prime Minister Zeidan said the Misrata militia had been “commissioned by the government to conduct a national task… to spread security stability in the region” (al-Arabiya, January 18). Tubu Colonel Barka Warduko, the head of the Murzuk Military Council, claimed that Ali Zeidan was provoking and exploiting tribal clashes in the south to create a security crisis that would prevent the replacement of his government (Libya Herald, January 21).

The GNC released a statement insisting it had not abandoned laws 27 and 53 (ordering the demobilization of the militias), but their recall was an effective admission that the government security forces are unable to restore security on their own, providing the militias with a reason for their continued existence. Many Libyans felt the militias had lost the justification for their existence after the Misrata Brigade opened fire on anti-militia demonstrators in Tripoli on November 15, 2013, killing 47 people. Though the GNC claims it has not reversed its policy on militia demobilization, it is now clearly saying one thing and doing another.

Tubu demonstrators blockaded the Sarir power station (near Jalu Oasis in eastern Libya) for several weeks in December and January to demand greater representation in Kufra’s municipal government and an extension of the power supply to the Tubu community at Rebyana.

Other Tubu have been integrated into the National Army, most notably the mostly Tubu 25th Brigade, charged with guarding the Sarir, Messla and al-Shula oil facilities in eastern Libya. Three soldiers of the 25th Brigade on a supply run from Sarir to the nearby Jalu Oasis were ambushed and killed in mid-January. The unit’s commander, Saleh Muhammad, speculated that the gunmen might have been the same as those responsible for a late December attack on a Sarir farm project, in which five attackers were killed but the project manager kidnapped (Libya Herald, January 18). Workers at the Sarir power station stopped work the next day due to security concerns, causing power shortages in Tripoli and Benghazi (Libya Herald, January 20).

Conclusion

By January 22, reconciliation talks had helped ease the intensity of the fighting in Sabha, though Sabha military commander Muhammad al-Ayat al-Busaif suggested there was still a problem with “Qaddafi loyalists, some of whom remain in the surrounding area, including the Tamenhint airbase” (Libya Herald, January 22). The Qaddafists remain shadowy, unidentified characters that provide the Tripoli government with a reason to reactivate its reliance on a more tangible threat, Libya’s unruly and independent militias.

The emergence of the elusive Qaddafists could, as suggested by some, to be part of an effort to create an external security crisis (as opposed to Libya’s internal security crisis) to preserve the Zeidan administration at a time when it is under strong criticism. While there is serious opposition to Zeidan’s government, there is no consensus on a replacement – considering Libya’s current state and the inability of the government to enforce its writ almost anywhere, it is questionable whether anyone would really want the job. Faced with the possibility of a non-confidence vote, Zeidan remarked: “I would be happy if the vote went through” (Middle East Online, January 20).

The Tubu are in the midst of a cultural revival (similar to that of the North African Berbers) as the tribe asserts its non-Arab status and demands recognition in the forthcoming Libyan constitution. They are unlikely to return quietly to the days when Qaddafi called them foreigners and withdrew their Libyan identity cards.

Regardless of who is responsible for starting or perpetuating each round of Tubu-Arab violence, there is no doubt that such violence encourages the incipient Tubu separatist movement, closely tied to the Tubu cultural revival. Though there is no proof of such intentions, it remains possible that some acts of Tubu violence may be committed by independence-minded militants with the intent of provoking further clashes to politicize the rest of the community. However, the growth of a Tubu separatist/independence movement in Libya would create immediate concerns in Chad and Niger, which also host Tubu populations with considerable military experience and expertise in modern desert fighting.

Note

  1. For previous clashes in Sabha, see “Arab-Tubu Clashes in Southern Libya’s Sabha Oasis,” Terrorism Monitor, April 5, 2012 and “Libya’s Sabha Oasis: Former Qaddafist Stronghold Becoming Regional Center of Insecurity,” Terrorism Monitor, April 19, 2013.

This article first appeared in the January 25, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

 

Political Violence and Islamist Militancy become Entwined in Maiduguri Bombing

Andrew McGregor

January 25, 2014

After four years of counter-terrorist operations and a state of emergency in Nigeria’s three northeast provinces since last May, Nigeria’s security forces appear to have made little progress in restoring security, though their efforts may be complicated by the ruthless political style of northern Nigeria as the nation approached general elections in 2015.

The deeper roots of political violence in northern Nigeria (of which Boko Haram is only a symptom) were well displayed in the January 14 suicide bombing in Maiduguri that killed 43 people (Daily Times Nigeria, January 15). The explosion occurred close to a JTF military post at mid-day on the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, when the city center was certain to be filled with people (Salafists reject observance of the mawlid, the Prophet’s birthday).

Soon after the blast, hundreds of youths wearing shirts and hats bearing the insignia of the All Progressives Congress (APC – a 2013 alliance of Nigeria’s four main opposition parties) armed with clubs and machetes began targeting vehicles believed to belong to supporters of the former state governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, and the current state deputy governor, Zannah Mustapha, both APC members (the vehicles were identified by the widespread use of political party stickers).. The rioters were on their way to the homes of Sheriff and Mustapha when they were intercepted by security forces. Sheriff was in the city for the first time in 11 months and left shortly after the blast. Others of the APC-clad youth actually tried to attack the local APC office while chanting: “We are going see the end of Ali Sheriff and his accomplice, Zannah Mustapha, who have brought this calamity to us. They are behind this bomb explosion” (Premium Times [Abuja], January 15). Sheriff helped the current governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, into office in 2011, but the two APC members are now engaged in a bitter rivalry, with Sheriff indicating he plans to campaign to take the office back in 2015.

Ali Modu Sheriff

There were reports that many of the rioting youth were actually members of the “Civilian JTF,” a local anti-Boko Haram vigilante group that also appears to be for hire in regional political disputes (Daily Post [Lagos], January 12; Sahara Reporters [Lagos], January 14).

The Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states of northeast Nigeria have been under a state of emergency since last May. The Borno state capital has not been targeted by bombings since the multi-service Joint Task Force (JTF) and other security forces established a security regime in the city last May. There was no claim of responsibility for the latest Maiduguri bombing, though the military blamed Boko Haram (PM News [Lagos], January 14). The bombing was the first in Maiduguri proper since the city’s market was attacked in March 2013.

A statement issued a day after the blast in the name of Sheriff’s campaign manager, Bako Bunu, claimed that the Maiduguri bombing was actually the work of “evil state government officials in Borno who are doing this in the name of scoring cheap and irresponsible political goals,” referring to Sheriff’s political opponents within the APC (Premium Times [Lagos], January 15). However, a week later Kolo said he was surprised to see his name on the statement, claiming he had been away in Chad and heard nothing of the matter until his return while adding he had denied making the statement without any external coercion (Premium Times [Lagos], January 21).

Borno State governor, Alhaji Kashim Shettima, was pelted with stones in Maiduguri in January 11 after word spread that he had intended to humiliate Sherrif by hiring “Civilian JTF” vigilantes, various thugs and elements of the security services to prevent Sherrif’s arrival in the city.  Sherrif revised his plans and arrived to a chorus of supporters chanting “‘The Leader is back, the leader is back, we don’t want Kashim Shettima’s style of leadership” (Daily Post [Lagos], January 12).

Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima

Four days after the Maiduguri blast, Boko Haram members attacked Banki, a town along the Cameroon border. The militants attacked the police station with RPGs first, driving away police before starting to go door-to-door slitting the throats of residents (Osun Defender, January 18). Two nights later, the Islamists struck Alau Ngawo village in northeastern Borno State, burning houses and killing 18 people in a two hour rampage before security forces arrived (Reuters, January 20).

Boko Haram was blamed for a January 8 attack on a mosque in the Kano State village of Kwankwaso, about 20 miles from Kano city. However, there were indications the attack was actually politically motivated by opponents of the state governor, Rabi’u Musa Kwankwaso, who hails from the village and defected to the opposition only a month before the attack (Reuters, January 8).

Boko Haram has shown little respect for Nigeria’s armed services, repeatedly attacking military installations rather than avoiding them. Hundreds of fighters stormed Maiduguri’s international airport and air-base on December 2, 2013, damaging two helicopters and three decommissioned military aircraft (al-Jazeera, January 14). It later developed that the attackers had badly damaged equipment belonging to the civil Nigerian Airspace Management Agency, forcing the cancellation of all civilian flights into the airport until next March (Osun Defender, December 31, 2013).Attacks on military targets in the last few months have allowed Boko Haram to build a considerable arsenal.

Residents of the three states under emergency rule have consistently complained of a casual attitude towards collateral damage and civilian casualties amongst the security forces deployed there. The issue came to national attention on January 12, when a Nigerian jet fighter targeted a convoy carrying Senator Muhammad Ali Ndume in the Gworza area of Borno state. Though the convoy was escorted by marked army and police vehicles, the pilot dropped four bombs, all of which landed on the nearby village of Pulka. The attack highlighted the Nigerian Air Force’s tendency to mount bombing runs without coordination with ground forces (Premium Times [Lagos], January 13).

With criticism of the military effort in the northeast spreading two days after the Maiduguri blast, President Goodluck Jonathan sacked Nigeria’s military leadership, appointing an air force officer from the northeast (Adamawa State), Air Marshal Alex Badeh, as the new chief-of-defense-staff. Brimming with confidence, Badeh has promised to finish counter-insurgency operations in the northeast by the time the state of emergency runs out in April: “I can only say that this thing is already won” (AFP, January 20).

In the current climate, political violence can be expected to increase over the next year in northern Nigeria, with attackers needing to do little more than yell “Allahu Akhbar” to have the incidents blamed on Boko Haram. At the same time, Boko Haram remains very active in the rural areas, particularly along the borders of the northeastern states. Cross-border security cooperation, especially with Cameroon, remains poor. Improved security in the urban areas of the region has inadvertently left the unemployed youth of the vigilante groups with little to do, creating a useful pool of recruits for political thuggery in the run-up to the 2015 elections.

This article first appeared in the January 25, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Commander of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mukhtar Militants Arrested

Andrew McGregor

January 10, 2014

Following attacks on a U.S.-supported Iranian dissident group based in Iraq and a Saudi border post and public threats to hit targets in Kuwait, Jaysh al-Mukhtar (Army of the Chosen) leader Wathiq al-Battat was arrested at a Baghdad checkpoint on January 2.

Wathiq al-Battat, leader of Jaysh al-Mukhtar

The stated intention of Jaysh al-Mukhtar at its founding was to protect Iraq’s Shi’a population and aid the national government in fighting Sunni extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al-Battat told AP in February 2013 that Jaysh al-Islam was armed by Iran, though Iranian authorities have strongly denied such claims (AP, February 26, 2013). Ahmad Abu Risha, leader of the Sunni Awakening National Council in Iraq, has accused the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government of sponsoring and protecting Jaysh al-Mukhtar (al-Arabiya, February 27, 2013). Prior to forming Jaysh al-Mukhtar in February 2013, al-Battat was a senior figure in Iraq’s Hezbollah Brigades. Al-Battat claims to operate with the approval of all the senior Shi’i religious authorities in the holy city of Najaf and regards Iranian Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei as the leader of Jaysh al-Mukhtar (al-Hayat, February 24, 2013).

Jaysh al-Mukhtar claimed responsibility for firing 20 Katyusha rockets and several mortar rounds at the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK – People’s Mujahideen Organization of Iran) compound in the former U.S. “Camp Liberty” (re-named Camp Hurriya) in Baghdad on December 26, 2013, killing three MeK members and wounding several others Al-Battat justified the attack by saying his movement had repeatedly asked the Iraqi government to expel the MeK, “but they are still here.” The MeK saw the hand of the Maliki government behind the attack, while the United States called for the perpetrators to be found and held accountable (Reuters, December 27, 2013). The MeK is a former Marxist group best known for its terrorist attacks against the Iranian regime and an often bizarre personality cult built around its Paris-based leaders that enforces isolation from the outside world and a ban on personal relationships between its male and female members.

Once closely allied to Saddam Hussein, the MeK was a U.S. and EU designated terrorist group until both these bodies abandoned the designation following a well-funded lobbying campaign that fortuitously coincided with a Western desire to pressure Iran in the confrontation over the Islamic State’s nuclear ambitions. The turnabout ignored widespread reports of the movement’s cult-like activities under the leadership of Maryam and Massoud Rajavi (the latter has not been seen in public since 2003). The U.S. Department of State revoked the terrorist designation in September 2012, allowing the group access to frozen assets, but also noted that “the Department [of State] does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and an attack on U.S. soil [against the Iranian UN Mission in New York] in 1992. The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members.” [1] Both Iraq and Iran continue to designate the MeK as a terrorist group despite its renunciation of violence in 2001.

Al-Battat may have felt he had a free hand to act against the MeK at Camp Hurriya after 52 members of the MeK were slain in a September 1, 2013 raid by Iraqi security forces against another MeK compound at Camp Ashraf, north of Baghdad (BBC, September 1, 2013). The raid was just one of many clashes between Iraqi security forces and the MeK since 2009, including a July 29, 2009 raid that killed 11 members of the MeK and injured over 500 others at Camp Ashraf.

Al-Battat’s group had previously launched rockets and mortar rounds at the MeK compound in Camp Hurriyah on February 9, 2013, killing eight and wounding nearly 100 without any serious government response despite calls from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for his arrest. Shortly after the first strike on Camp Hurriyah, al-Battat vowed to target the camp again, saying his movement regarded “striking and killing [MeK members] as an honor as well as a religious and moral duty” (al-Hayat, February 24, 2013).

Jaysh al-Mukhtar also claimed responsibility for a November 2013 mortar attack on an uninhabited area near a Saudi Arabian border post, which al-Battat described as a warning to the kingdom to end its involvement in Iraqi affairs (Reuters, November 21, 2013). Reflecting the strength of Shi’i eschatological beliefs, al-Battat has sworn to “annihilate the infidel, atheist Saudi regime” and all the regimes that support Israel and America by marching on Saudi Arabia with the Hidden Imam upon the latter’s return (Sharqiya TV, February 5, 2013). Twelver Shi’a Muslims believe the 12th Imam (Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Mahdi) has been in hiding in a cave underneath a Samarra mosque since the late 9th century and will return to battle the forces of evil shortly before the Day of Judgment. When it briefly appeared a U.S.-led strike on Syria was imminent in September 2013, al-Battat promised to “cut the West’s economic artery” by attacking Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities and ports in retaliation (Fars News Agency [Tehran], September 11, 2013). Al-Battat’s threats to Kuwait, however, were based on the latter’s decision to build a new port that would compete with the nearby Iraqi port of Umm Qasr (al-Siyasah [Kuwait], February 25, 2013; al-Arabiya, February 27, 2013).

Note

1. “Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq,” U.S. Department of State Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington D.C., September 28, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198443.htm

This article was originally published in the January 10, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

South Sudan’s Tribal “White Army” Part One: Cattle Raids and Tribal Rivalries

Andrew McGregor

January 10, 2014

One of the most important developments in the ongoing political and tribal violence in South Sudan is the apparent re-emergence of a largely Nuer militia known as “the White Army.” More of an ad hoc assembly of tribal warriors than an organization, the White Army has a checkered history involving ethnic-based massacres of civilians and has played an important role in the breakdown of traditional order in South Sudan.

White Army Fighters (IBTimes)

The current crisis in South Sudan began as a dispute between President Salva Kiir Mayardit (a member of the dominant Dinka tribe) and his vice-president, Riek Machar (a member of the Nuer, South Sudan’s second-largest tribe). With rumors flying of a failed coup-attempt by Machar, clashes began breaking out in mid-December in Juba, the South Sudan capital, between Dinka members of the presidential guard and members of the largely Nuer Tiger Division Special Forces unit. Over 1,000 people have been killed over the following weeks in the ongoing violence.

In late December, a UN surveillance aircraft reported large numbers of armed men marching on Bor, the capital of Jonglei state. Bor had been seized earlier by Nuer fighters but had been driven out by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA – the former rebel movement now turned national army) after several days of heavy fighting. The SPLA then took up defensive positions in expectation of the arrival of 20,000 or more armed members of the White Army (Radio Miraya [Juba], December 30, 2013). The predominantly Dinka population of Bor was thrown into panic by news of the approaching White Army – the militia had joined members of Riek Machar’s SPLA-Nasir faction in a massacre of over 2,000 Dinka civilians in Bor in 1991. The destruction of the local cattle-based economy in the raid led to the deaths of thousands more from starvation in the following weeks and months. An SPLA spokesman claimed the White Army’s current march on Bor was being directed by Riek Machar (VOA, December 28).

On December 29, 2013, South Sudan’s Minister of Information said that Nuer elders in Jonglei had persuaded the bulk of the White Army to disband and return home (AP, December 29, 2013). However, on the same day, a spokesman for President Kiir denied these reports, saying the White Army had ignored the pleas of the Nuer elders and had clashed with government forces: “They seem to be adamant because they think that if they don’t come and fight, then the pride of their tribe has been put in great insult” (BBC, December 29, 2013). SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer said the army had used helicopter gunships to disperse the militia (al-Jazeera, December 29, 2013).

A spokesman for Riek Machar’s forces said that they “co-ordinated” with the White Army, but as the White Army is a civilian force, they did not have command over it: “We are not controlling the White Army. We are controlling our forces, Division 8, the SPLA that’s whom we know [the SPLA’s Jonglei-based Division 8 has supplied most of the military defectors to Machar’s cause]” (Radio Tamazuj, December 29, 2013).

Due to its decentralized structure and ad hoc formation, there are few documents describing the White Army’s ideology or political approach and those that do exist are often contradictory. One such statement was issued in May 2006 by the largely Nuer South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) and its political wing, the South Sudan United Democratic Alliance (SSUDA). [1] Apparently acting as a spokesman for the militia, the statement was written by SSDF member Professor David de Chand (an American-educated Nuer). De Chand accused the SPLA’s political wing of using “Nuer oil revenue to kill Nuer” and accused its leadership of harboring a “hidden agenda of superimposing the Dinka power elite’s hegemonic tendencies.” According to the statement:

The strategic goal of the Dinka power elite is to disarm every non-Dinka in the South, starting with the Nuer nation that is the backbone of anti-Dinka power elite forces… The second plan will be to attack eastern Upper Nile (Jikany Nuer) [followed by the] rest of the Nuer areas… Once the Nuer final solution is achieved, others that would follow are the Murle, the Toposa, the Dingdinga, the Anyuak, the Latoka, the Mundari then the Fertit including any groups suspected of exhibiting anti-SPLM/A domination in South Sudan.

However, there are reasons to question the legitimacy of this document as an authentic statement of White Army beliefs. The pro-Khartoum SSDF had at times acted as a sponsor of the White Army, but though the SSDF obrained some influence over its activities, the White Army never came under its direct command. De Chand was better known at the time as a Khartoum-based politician firmly in the camp of the ruling Omar al-Bashir regime than a Nuer militia leader. Even as the statement was issued, most of the SSDF, including its leader Paulino Matip Nhial, was being integrated into the SPLA in accordance with the 2006 Juba Declaration that called for former pro-Khartoum militias to be integrated into a broader SPLA that would represent all of South Sudan’s tribal groups. De Chand remained with a rump SSDF faction that continued to oppose Juba.  This statement and its accusations of planned genocide by the Dinkas must be viewed in the light of Khartoum’s campaign to spread political dissension in advance of the 2011 referendum on South Sudanese independence.

A more legitimate media statement released in 2012 under the name of the “Nuer and Dinka White Army“ asked for Dinka cooperation against cattle raiders of the Murle tribe and emphasized the membership of the Twic Dinka (a Dinka clan traditionally allied with its Nuer neighbors that has also suffered from Murle cattle raids) in the White Army, along with elements of the Lou, Jikany and Gawaar Nuer. The group was meeting at the time with Nuer groups living in south-west Ethiopia that had also been subject to Murle cattle raids. [2] In December 2011, a Nuer Youth/White Army statement claimed the movement had decided the only way to guarantee the security of Nuer cattle was to “wipe out the entire Murle tribe on the face of the earth” (Upper Nile Times, December 26, 2011).

The militia has support and fundraisers amongst the Nuer diaspora community in the United States, which is centered on Seattle. The White Army’s U.S. fundraising wing is called the Nuer Youth in North America, headed by a Seattle-based Nuer refugee, Gai Bol Thong. The Nuer Youth runs a fundraising network extending to other cities in the United States and Canada hosting Nuer communities. Gai Bol came under criticism in early 2012 when he told a reporter: “We mean what we say. We kill everybody. We are tired of [the Murle]” (New York Times, January 12, 2012). The fundraiser toned down his remarks the following day, saying that “killing everybody” did not include children (Seattle Weekly, January 13, 2012).

Notes

1. David de Chand, “White Army declares protracted confrontation against SPLM/A,” South Sudan United Democratic Alliance/ South Sudan Defense Force Press Release, May 23, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article15813

2. “Nuer and Dinka White Army to Launch ‘Operation Savannah Storm’ against Murle Armed Youth,”  Leadership of the Nuer and Dinka White Army Media Release, Uror County, Jonglei State, South Sudan, February 4, 2012, http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/nuer-and-dinka-white-army-to-launch-operation-savannah-storm-against-murle-armed-youth

This article first appeared in the January 10, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Syria’s Army of the Muhajirin Pledges Allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Andrew McGregor

December 12, 2013

On December 2, the Islamist Army of Muhajirin and Ansar in Bilad al-Sham issued a statement announcing it had declared its baya’a (oath of allegiance) to the Amir al-Muminin (commander of the faithful) Abu Bakr al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, leader of the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). [1] According to the document, the decision to come under ISIS command came after the Muhajirin (“emigrants”) and ISIS had conducted a number of joint operations. The statement was signed by the “former Amir of the Army of the Muhajirin and Ansar, Omar al-Shishani” and the “former Shari’a judge of the Amir of the Muhajirin and Ansar, Abu Jafar al-Hattab.”

Omar al-Shishani

The Muhajirin are dominated by fighters from the Northern Caucasus, led by Abu Omar, an ethnic-Chechen from Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge who has established a reputation for honesty as well as fighting skills due to his rejection of abuses by foreign fighters against Syrian civilians (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 9).  Besides Chechens (estimated to form at least half of the Muhajirin), the group includes a reported large number of Daghestanis and ethnic Tatars and Bashkirs from the Middle Volga region (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 25). Those components of the Ansar al-Muhajirin listed as giving their approval of the baya’a include the Arab mujahideen, the Turkish mujahideen, the mujahideen from the Caucasus, the European mujahideen, the heavy arms detachment, the commando detachment and the administrative council.

Muhajirin in Training

The statement appeared to be an elaboration of an earlier and much shorter announcement issued on November 21 in which the Muhajirin Brigade swore allegiance to the leader of ISIS, except for “those brothers from the Caucasus Emirate who had already sworn their oath to Emirate leader Dokku Umarov. The announcement provided few other details besides citing several hadith supporting the idea that only members of the Quraysh tribe (as al-Baghdadi is alleged to be) are suitable for ruling the Caliphate (a notion disputed by many Islamic scholars who claim the hadiths refer only to conditions in the first era of Islam). [2]

According to the group’s media officer, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the group believes that:

Secularism with its different banners and various schools like nationalism, communism and Ba’athism is an obvious kufr [disbelief] that contradicts Islam… The kufr of apostasy is greater by unanimity from the original kufr, and that is why fighting the apostates has more priority to us [than] fighting the original kufr… so our jihad is with the sword and spear and with argument and clarification, and who called for another religion than Islam or slandered the religion or fought us, then he is a combatant to us. [3]

Abu Hamza also referred to the apocalyptic predictions of Islamic eschatology that are set in al-Shams (the land of the Levant, including Syria) involving the arrival of the Mahdi (the expected one), the return of the Nabi Issa (Prophet Jesus) and their battle on the day of resurrection with al-Dajjal (“the false Messiah,” roughly in the role of the Anti-Christ of Christian eschatology):

Jihad will continue to the Day of Judgment. The development of events on the land of Sham will bring what no one expected because the land of Sham is guaranteed by Allah Almighty and the angels are spreading their wings over al-Sham. This is not Afghanistan or Bosnia or Chechnya, this is the land of al-Sham, Issa, peace be upon him, will come down here, and al-Dajjal will come out here, it is the land of epics and the land of resurrection… [4]

The Muhajirin recently completed Operation Fatih in the southwestern part of Aleppo governorate, claiming to have seized seven apartment towers and two villages as well as T-72 tanks and an anti-aircraft gun. The group claims their victory brings them closer to the road connecting Aleppo with the south. [5]

Notes

1. “Statement of the Baya’a of the Army of Muhajirin and Ansar to the ISIS,” December 2, 2013,http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=47411.

2. “Umar al-Shisani Swears an Oath to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” November 21, 2013, http://fisyria.com/?p=1586. 

3. Islamic News Agency Haq: |Muhajirin Battalion in a comprehensive interview:  “Our goal is to liberate Syria from the Assad regime and establish the Islamic state,” April 14, 2013,http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=45493

4. Ibid

5. “Operation Fatih,” http://fisyria.com/?p=1630

This article first appeared in the December 12, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

THE CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM: THE CASE OF AFRICA

Part One

Judith Van Der Merwe, January 2, 2014

ABSTRACT

It is well recognized  that the bane of organized crime and terrorism have materialized as one of the foremost challenges which threaten peace, security, the development of democracy, human rights and the financially viable progress of countries across the globe. This dissertation examined the nexus/relationship that exists among transnational organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups, particularly in Africa.  This particular exploration was initiated from the hypothesis that there is substantiation sustaining the premise that terrorist groups and transnational organized crime syndicates function in a symbiotic correlation that is advantageous to both antagonists. Additionally, questions were posed as to which degree terrorist groups are predisposed by financial gains to continue or even expand their association with organized crime groups, what is the principal rationale for terrorist groups to become involved in crime, how does the connection with international crime groups influence the capability of terrorist groups to continue their operations, and what is the repercussions of said relationship for security, peace, democracy, human rights, economic development, good governance, building state capacity, maintaining the rule of law and inter-state relations? In conclusion, potential counter-measures and recommendations were briefly highlighted so as to indicate how the nexus amongst terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates can mostly effectively be limited or perhaps fully eradicated.

KEYWORDS:  terrorism, organized crime, crime syndicates, transnational crime, nexus, counter-measures, drug smuggling.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates should no longer be seen in the 21st century as two dissimilar and isolated entities. In the early 1990’s law enforcement agencies noted an escalating level of cooperation between terrorist groups and organized crime networks. Both criminal organizations and terrorist groups all over the globe are increasingly cooperating for the mutual benefit of each antagonist. Whereas, initially terrorist groups were motivated by ideological, political, religious or ethnic objectives, and organized crime syndicates were induced by, for the most part, economic/financial and territorial aspirations, the situation has changed significantly since the 21st century into a situation where most terrorist groups are now involved in some or other form of criminal activity, and organized crime syndicates are increasingly becoming involved in political violence. This growing symbiosis between the two groups have made both more influential, in that terrorist groups have been able to expand their area of operations, augment their financial resources, acquired sophisticated weaponry/equipment, enhanced their intelligence/technological capacities, and organized crime groups, on the other hand, have started to utilize terror tactics such as assassinations, political violence and bombings to terrorize society and governments.

Definitions of Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime

In order to clarify the term of terrorism, it should be taken into account that numerous definitions for terrorism exist.  Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the definition as per the Africa Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating on Terrorism (1999) shall be applied.  The aforementioned Convention defines terrorism as:

Acts which violate the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and are calculated or intended to intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adapt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles, or disrupt any public service, the delivery of essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a State.

Organized crime refers to crimes committed by national and international criminal organizations, and according to Article 3 (2) of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, a transnational criminal offense is regarded as such if the following conditions are associated with it:

  •    It is committed in more than one State,
  •   It is committed in  one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State,
  •   It is committed in one State, but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
  •   It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State

Relationship between terrorist groups and transnational crime syndicates

However, the link between terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates is not a new phenomenon. As early as the 1980’s, terrorist groups in Latin America turned to drug smuggling to subsidize their activities.  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) grew substantially, in terms of its terror capacity and financial influence, when it began to traffic cocaine.  Since then, the FARC has diversified its primary cocaine trade from the United States to Europe by the way of West Africa.  In 1985, the Medellin drug cartel in Columbia joined forces with the 19th of April Movement (M19) terrorist group to help them in bomb-making techniques, which the Medellin group later used to murder judges, policemen, drug enforcement agents and border police members.1   However, most analysts agree that the 1990’s was the time-period in which the nexus between organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups was consolidated.2   Where, beforehand, terrorist groups were perceived as having political, ideological, religious and ethnic goals, today most terrorist groups are engaged in organized crime for financial gain, and some criminal syndicates are engaged in political violence through their inter-relationship with terrorist groups.

Since the 1990’s some transnational organized crime groups have become smaller, more loosely organized entities that have become more ideologically radicalized and now actively pursue business in the interest of politics as well as to support the goals of terrorist groups if it is to the benefit of the former.3.  In this relationship both groups are involved in drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, cigarette smuggling, smuggling in narcotics and psychotropic substances, the sale of expired food products, the manufacture and sale of counterfeit medicines, manufacturing and sale of intellectual property, fraud, contraband smuggling, illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), advance fee fraud/419, stolen vehicles, corruption, forced labor, corruption, trafficking of wildlife products, trade in rare metals, diamonds, gold, precious stones, extortion, identity theft, cybercrime, counterfeit computer software, music piracy, forged documents, counterfeit currency, sea piracy, oil bunkering and kidnap for ransom.

The symbiosis between organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups are making both groups more powerful and more capable.  Terrorist groups are benefitting from the revenue of criminal activities to perpetuate their terror activities and expand their theatre of operations, whilst organized crime syndicates are using the established smuggling routes of terrorist groups to expand their illicit markets, to increase their profit and to use the tactics of terrorist groups to gain political power.  Terrorist groups have  become more willing to partner up with organized crime, including the sharing of smuggling routes, profits, corruptive influence, operational and organizational modus operandi and sharing of expertise.  This symbiotic relationship is challenging the locale of global and national security by weakening democracy, abating state institutions, damaging the credibility of financial institutions, being harmful to the social fabric of society, and infiltrating the formal economy.

The closer collaboration amid terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates in the 21st century was for the most part brought on by four major developments:

  • Globalization, which brought about free trade flow across international borders, a vast reduction of trade barriers between countries and an augmentation in global travel;
  • The communication revolution, through the wider use of the internet – both organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups are progressively using the internet and cyberspace for recruitment, planning, propaganda, logistics, funding, video/music piracy, credit card/banking fraud, identity theft, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, sharing of intelligence, creation of fraudulent documents, conception of new markets for their illegal activities, and money laundering.  It has also brought closer cooperation due to expanded  access to cyberspace for business, and the spreading out of the global financial systems,  which enables both terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates to expand their criminal/terror activities.  Through their close collaboration with organized crime syndicates, terrorist groups have augmented their competence to exploit the internet and cyberspace.  The knowledge terrorist groups have gained from organized crime groups in this area has enabled the former to activate encryption devices and to use software tools to locate open ports and overcome password tools to steal identities, commit credit card fraud, launder money and extort banking/business institutions for millions of dollars;
  • The end of the Cold War and the diminishing of funds from the Persian Gulf, charities and other non-governmental fronts have compelled terrorist groups to adapt and further diversify their funding sources. Due to the fact that terrorist groups need funding for recruitment, monthly stipends, accommodation, food, fuel, weapons, training, administrative expenses, medical costs, payments to the families of deceased members, travel, communication/surveillance equipment, the maintenance of internet sites, explosives/bomb-making material, these groups found a ready partner in organized crime groups to maintain their terror war.4.  Furthermore, by building an affiliation with organized crime, terrorist groups now have access to specialist skills such as the forging of travel documents, new bomb-making techniques, access to expertise in the illegal transfer and laundering of money.  Consequently, “traditional” criminal activities like drug smuggling, robbery, piracy, forgery, counterfeiting, arms trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, fraud, extortion, traffic in precious stones, rare metals, smuggling of wildlife products, money laundering, and other forms of violent crime, rapidly became the main source of terrorism funding;
  • The intensified “War on Terror” after 9/11 led to increased global cooperation on counter terrorism which led to a further decline in state-sponsored terrorism.5

Effect of Organised Crime on Africa

As in the rest of the international community, organized crime has had a detrimental effect on Africa in terms of economic development, building of state institutions, democratization and and security. Since the 20th century, organized crime has become a multi-billion dollar industry with an intrinsic disadvantageous consequence in all the countries in which it has established itself.

Moreover, in 2009, the World Bank’s World development Report estimated the value of revenue accruing to organized crime to be in the region of $1.3 trillion.6   The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) global figures suggest that Africa was in some way linked to 7-10 per cent of illicit trade.7 

Thus, while African trade accounts for only 3 per cent of global trade in goods and services and only 2.4 per cent of global GDP in the licit economy, if we look at the same scale of illicit flows it becomes clear that while Africa has benefitted disproportionately from legitimate growth, the same is also true of illicit economic activity8.  In the same vein, it can be assumed that the impact organized crime has had on stability and economic development in Africa has been profound.  Some examples clearly illustrate this point:

  •  West Africa has emerged as a major transit and repackaging hub for cocaine flowing from Latin American cocaine-producing areas to European markets.  About 13 per cent of cocaine trafficked to Europe is transited via Guinea-Bissau,9 which amounts to at least 25 tons per year with a minimum market value of $4.29billion.10  Large seizures of illicit drugs were made in and along the coast of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Togo, Liberia, Benin, Senegal and Nigeria, proving that these countries are correspondingly being used as transit routes for drug trafficking.  It is estimated that up to 30 tons of heroin from Afghanistan is trafficked into East Africa by drug smuggling cartels.  The heroin reaches East Africa primarily through Somalia. The drug is then smuggled by the terrorist group al-Shabaab via local crime syndicates to Mombasa (Kenya) and South Africa, from where it is smuggled to the lucrative end-user market in Europe.
  •  Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon are ranked among the top countries in the world where cybercrime is most prevalent, contributing to a global flow of $600 million per year.11
  •  Somali piracy cost the global economy financial losses of between $6.6-6.9 billion in 2011.12
  • A recent report by the United States State Department on money laundering claims that Kenya’s financial system may be laundering more than $100 million per year.13
  • Illicit trafficking in ivory, diamonds, gold, tin, tantalum, cobalt, coltan (a very important and rare mineral used as a semi-conductor in the growing mobile and computer technology industry) and natural resources out of Central Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), is facilitating sustained insecurity caused by armed groups and is contributing to illicit flows estimated at over $1.2 billion per year.14 Armed groups, particularly in the eastern and northern DRC, still play a significant role in perpetuating instability and violence in order to protect vested interests in mineral and other resources.  It is estimated there are still between 6500 -13,000 active members of armed groups who are benefiting from criminal activity and their relationship with organized crime groups.15
  • In Somalia, al-Shabaab was enabled by the illegal export of charcoal from Kismaayo port to organized crime groups to continue their armed conflict against the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia and the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  Since its expulsion from Kismaayo in 2012, Al Shabaab has found alternative means of finance by importing drugs (heroin from Afghanistan, amphetamines, mandrax and ecstasy from India, Pakistan and South-East Asia) through smaller ports in Somalia (including the Puntland port of Bosaso) and smuggling the drugs into Kenya, from which point they are smuggled by local crime groups to markets in South Africa and Europe.
  • Illicit trade in gold, copper, diamonds, tanzanite, timber, ivory and rhino horn between organized crime syndicates and armed groups/terrorist groups/armed militia eventually spread east and southwards towards Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda and South Africa.  The Sahel countries of Mali, Mauritania and Niger are showing increasingly volatility and insecurity, caused by increased drug trafficking from the south and instability to the north, most notably in Libya, resulting in a dangerous intersection of crime, terrorism and insurgency.16  There is evidence that AQIM has links with Latin American drug cartels, where the former provide protection for cocaine shipments through the Sahel en route to Europe.  The same can be said of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), where this group has accepted in-kind cocaine payment from Latin American drug traffickers.  The new relationship between these groups has afforded the drug cartels new smuggling routes for their product through territory controlled by terrorist groups, and for the terrorist groups the working relationship with organized crime syndicates provides them with funds to expand their operational/technical capabilities, acquire sophisticated equipment/weaponry and spread their violent activities beyond their traditional areas of operation.17

In fact, when other illicit flows of capital due to a variety of forms of smuggling, trade in contraband, violations of intellectual property rights, human trafficking, the sex trade, and other illegal activities is included, a report by Global Financial Integrity estimates that cross-border flow of money from Africa increases considerably from $854 billion to about $1.8 trillion over the last four decades,18 with earnings generated through drug trafficking, racketeering and counterfeiting adding about 30-35 per cent to the total, and the proceeds of bribery, theft and corruption by government officials a further 3 percent.19

Drug Trafficking in Africa

Primarily due to decreased demand for cocaine in the United States and improved drug enforcement strategies in that country, drug smuggling cartels in Latin America switched their attention in the 1990’s to the burgeoning cocaine market in Europe.  Realizing that a direct smuggling route from Latin America to Europe was a high risk (due to enhanced drug enforcement capacities in the European Union and the United Kingdom), the drug smuggling syndicates saw Africa as a low risk/high yield smuggling route.  Consequently, the drug cartels developed business relationships with terrorist groups and local organized crime groups in Africa to smuggle cocaine through the continent onto the European markets.

The lack of equipment, shortage of trained drug enforcement officials, poor inter-agency cooperation, insufficient donor coordination, restricted budgets, poverty, large ungoverned land mass and inability to effectively patrol territorial waters made coastal states in West Africa particularly vulnerable to drug traffickers. In the Sahel and North Africa, the cooperation between the drug smuggling cartels and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has benefitted both parties.  Through their collaboration with cocaine and heroin drug smuggling cartels, AQIM has significantly enriched itself, enabling the organization to continue its terror campaign.  It is partly due to the increase in revenue that AQIM has been able to acquire sophisticated weapons from arsenals in Libya, which has exponentially led to greater instability in the region.

It can clearly be established that the drug trafficking cartels of Latin America (particularly those situated in Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), as well as the drug smuggling syndicates in Afghanistan, Pakistan and south-East Asia, are increasingly using Africa as a transit point for cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, and amphetamines to Europe and southern Africa. Most cocaine powder, cocaine hydrochloride, is manufactured in Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile, and is then trans-shipped by maritime and air routes to West Africa, where cocaine powder is refined into cocaine hydrochloride, repackaged in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and then smuggled by terrorist groups and local crime groups through the Sahel to the large ports of the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy and the UK.  Multi-ton shipments of illicit drugs travel by sea and air to Africa, mainly passing through countries along the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel and Sahara regions. There are vast unpatrolled areas along the coast of West Africa and in the Sahel where the ships dock and the airplanes land to offload cargo.  Both organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups in Africa and Latin America share a part of the estimated billion dollar cocaine industry, while terrorist groups in Africa and the South –East Asian drug cartels share in the $30 billion global heroin market.20

In addition, hashish trafficking from Morocco is estimated at $12.5 billion.  Hashish was the major source of funding for three major terrorist attacks:  the aborted attack on a US Navy vessel in Gibraltar in 2002, the bombing of several sites in Casablanca in May 2003 and the March 2004attack in Madrid.21

22

In the map above, it can be seen that Africa (specifically West Africa, the Sahel, East and Southern Africa), is used as a major transit route for Cocaine originating in Latin America (green arrows) and Opiates from Afghanistan (red arrows).

23

Most of the illegal drugs from Latin America are transshipped by cargo/container ship and airplanes (Gulfstream jets and Boeing 727s) to West Africa (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Benin, Ghana, the Casamance region of Senegal, the Bisagos Archipelago (south-west of Guinea-Bissau with its 88 sparsely populated islands), South Africa and the Sahel, from where terrorist groups, particularly AQIM and MUJAO,  and local crime groups (when the drugs are shipped via South Africa) smuggle it across land and by commercial or private air to Europe. A portion of the cocaine smuggled along this route in Africa also gets smuggled to Europe via air routes by using the airports of Cameroon, Senegal, Benin and Ghana. In most cases, local crime syndicates use so-called “drug mules,” individuals who are paid a fee to transport the drugs in their luggage, on their person or by swallowing small bags of cocaine. With the organized crime syndicates being intimately involved in human trafficking, these individuals may also be used to smuggle illegal drugs within their bodies.

NOTES

         1,  David O’Regan, “Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,” Africa Security Brief Volume 5, July 2010.

      2. Lee Shelley & J. Picarelli, “Methods and Motives: Exploring links between transnational organized crime and terrorism” Global Crime 6(1), February 2004.

           3.  J. Rollins & l. Sun-Wyler, “International terrorism and transnational crime: security threats and US policy and considerations for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, March 2010,  p.5.

         4. Charles Goredema, “Organised crime and terrorism: Observations from South Africa,” ISS Paper, no.101, March 2005, p.4.

         5. Christina Schori Liang, “Shadow Networks: The growing nexus of terrorism and organized crime,” GCSP Policy Paper, no.20, September 2011, p.2.

      6. World Bank, World development report 2009: reshaping economic geography, Washington, DC, 2009.

        7. Ibid, p. 11.

           8. UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime), “The transatlantic cocaine market: a research paper, Vienna, April 2011, p.2.

            9. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, Vienna, p.242.

      10. UNODC, The globalization of crime, 2010, Vienna, p.11.

            11.  Oceans beyond piracy, The economic costs of piracy 2011, One Earth Foundation, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf.

     12. Peter Gastrow, “Termites at work: transnational organized crime and state erosion in Kenya”, International Peace Institute, New York, September 2011, p.7.

      13. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, Vienna, p.242.

          14.  Mark Shaw & Tuesday Reitano, “The evolution of organized crime in Africa: towards a new response”, Institute for Security Studies, Paper 244, April 2013, p.7.

     15. Geoffrey York, “Coup in Guinea-Bissau shines light on powerful West African drug trade”, The Globe and Mail, 13 April 2012.

     16. Global Financial Index (GFI), “Illicit financial flows from Africa”, p.11.

          17.  ACSRT/CAERT (African Union), “Threat of Terrorism and Linkages to Transnational Organized Crime. 2010. p. 6.

      18. Foreign Policy, “We have no idea if Africa is rising”, 28 January 2013, http//www.foreign policy.com/articles/2013/01/28/we_have-no_idea_if_africa_is_rising.

         19. Global Financial Index (GFI), “Illicit financial flows from Africa”, p.11.

     20. Christina Schori Liang, “Shadow networks: the growing nexus between terrorism and organized crime”, GCSP Policy Paper, No. 20, September 2011, p.2.

          21. Ibid, p.2.

      22. Drug Enforcement Joint Task Force (DEA) 2011, p.17.

      23. http://www.worldreview.info/content/…saving– south- American- drug-barons.

 Judith Van der Merwe  Is a Specialist (Alert and Prevention) at the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers, Algeria.  Her field of study encompasses the Horn of Africa (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea), East Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda) and southern Africa (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Angola, Madagascar).  She is primarily involved in analyzing terrorist incidents/terrorist trends in the regions mentioned.  Additionally she is also involved in research on the impact of organized crime in the region.

 The preceding article is a guest contribution to the Aberfoyle International Security website and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Aberfoyle International Security.

D

 

THE CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM: THE CASE OF AFRICA

Part Two

Judith Van Der Merwe, January 2, 2014

1. www.STATT.net/2013.

Horn of Africa: Terrorism and Organised Crime

Apart from West Africa and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa is also increasingly used as transshipment route for heroin from Afghanistan. The terrorist group al-Shabaab is involved in smuggling the heroin to ports in East Africa from where it is smuggled to Europe.  Al-Shabaab resells the heroin to organized crime gangs in Nigeria who smuggle it to Europe.  This has enabled al-Shabaab to augment their monetary capabilities, which in turn permit the group to get hold of sophisticated weapons, communications equipment, achieve influence in local communities, get new recruits and expand their terror campaign beyond the borders of Somalia.

Using their links with al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabaab is regularly provided with weapons, ammunition, medicine, communication equipment, grenades, surveillance equipment, mortar bombs, explosives, and other bomb-making components. In turn, al-Shabaab has identified the opportunity to establish collaboration with local crime networks in Kenya and south Sudan.  In this alliance with crime networks, the terrorist group has smuggled weapons, ammunition, hand grenades and explosives into Kenya.  In return the local crime networks use the weapons and explosives they buy from al-Shabaab to commit crimes against the government of Kenya and civilians. Correspondingly, al-Shabaab frequently sells weapons and explosives to local crime factions in South Sudan.  The finance accrued in this manner by al-Shabaab is then utilized to expand the capacities of the terror group, to recruit new members from largely impoverished communities, to infiltrate operatives into countries beyond Somalia, to gain influence among local tribal leaders and to sustain their armed conflict against AMISOM and the national armed forces of Somalia.

AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGREB (AQIM) /CRIMINAL NEXUS IN THE SAHEL

As with other terrorist groups in Africa, AQIM has had to look for alternate sources of funding since the 1990’s. A restrictive counterterrorism environment enforced in Algeria since 2009, paired with a limited ability to establish operational cells in the Maghreb or to conduct attacks in Western Europe, has forced AQIM to shift its focus towards the Sahel region and rely heavily on criminal activities such as drug smuggling.  Originally, the relationship between AQIM and organized drug smuggling cartels started out with AQIM offering protection to the cartels against the payment of right-of-passage taxes along the long-established smuggling routes in the vast, lightly-occupied Sahel region. Since the 1990’s cocaine trafficking has become a significant source of funding for AQIM, enabling the group to expand their operational capabilities and continue to perpetrate violence against governments in the region. The discovery of the wreckage of a Boeing 727 allegedly containing up to 10 tons of cocaine in northeastern Mali in late 2009 further suggested ties between AQIM and Latin American drug trafficking cartels. 2

3.

The continued cooperation between AQIM and the drug smuggling cartels in Latin America has enabled AQIM to evolve into an even greater security threat in an area which is potentially strategically important to the global economy for the reason that large deposits of uranium, oil, and gas can be found in the Sahel.  The enhanced financial capacities of AQIM can enable the terrorist group to further undermine already fragile states that face widespread discontent, restive nomadic populations, extreme poverty and an influx of jihadist ideology.4

Nevertheless, the correlation between AQIM and drug trafficking syndicates rapidly expanded into supplementary forms of criminal activity, such as the smuggling of weapons, cigarettes, humans and vehicles.  AQIM cells, particularly the Belmokthar katibah (brigade), are actively involved in weapons and stolen vehicle smuggling.5 AQIM is additionally involved (either directly or through “taxation”) in the smuggling of tobacco and other commodities across the Sahara to Europe.  AQIM smuggling cells are assisted with geographical assistance and protection by some communities in the Sahel and Sahara.

The conflict in Libya has made the region even more dangerous with a growth in available weapons and material – some of which have been sold in exchange for a variety of contraband items including drugs. There are indications that AQIM, through its links with the cocaine smuggling cartels, has transferred weapons from the arsenals of Libya to some of the drug cartels in Latin America.

It is, nonetheless, in the criminal activity of Kidnap for Ransom (KFR) that AQIM accumulated the greater component of their funds since the beginning of 2000. Given the limited range of Western “soft” targets in the Sahel, KFR became the natural preference for AQIM to augment their financial resources. For the 2008-2012 periods, AQIM’s kidnappings have targeted aid workers, tourists, diplomats (Algerian diplomats), and expatriate workers in for the most part in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Tunisia. 6 Hostages have included a range of nationals from France, Spain, Italy, Canada, Togo, Madagascar, Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland.  In most cases the required ransom was paid and prisoners were released.  In fact, during the perios of 2008-2012, the practice of KFR by AQIM reportedly generated almost $50 million for the terrorist group.  It has been reported that the average ransom payment for the release of a hostage taken by AQIM between 2008 and 2009 was $6.5 million.7

Apart from the monetary advantage AQIM garners from KFR, it is furthermore a significant bargaining instrument for the terrorist group and its most efficient means of reaching Western targets in the Sahel.  Given that the restrictive counterterrorism environment in Algeria is likely to continue (particularly after the In Aménas incident), it is most probable that the threat posed by AQIM will continue in the form of the kidnapping for ransom of foreign nationals who are employed in the energy/mining sectors in the region.  Furthermore, AQIM delegated the assignment of kidnapping to local criminal groups when it spread the message in the Sahel that it was prepared to pay up to 70,000 Euros for each Western kidnapping victim sold to AQIM.  This has led to a state of affairs where local crime groups have established links with AQIM and even resulted in the emergence of a kidnapping industry in Mali.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE

The impact of increased revenue flows to terrorist groups from organized crime in some regions of Africa that are already experiencing conflict and insecurity is for the most part considerable, in that it has facilitated the pursuit of violent insurgencies and jihadist extremist movements. This has in turn worsened the socio-economic tribulations of these regions (the Sahel, West Africa, the Horn of Africa), as weakened the rule of law institutions, undermined the state-building process and destabilized fragile states.  In addition, the increasing nexus between organized crime and terrorist groups in Africa is a principal cause of human insecurity, economic disparity, lost government revenues, diminished GDP (Gross Domestic Product), prevention of human development, reduction in tourism, loss of legal business revenues, illegal trade, protracted wars, overcrowded prisons, overburdened courts and rising defense/police expenditures.

As terrorist groups increasingly take on the distinctiveness of organized crime and vice versa, a multifaceted approach will be required to deal with this escalating menace.  It will necessitate a focused, feasible, result-oriented and synchronized response from all counterterrorism institutions and agencies on the continent and the international community.  National, regional, and international responses will need to incorporate more of the effective tools used by law enforcement to combat organized crime. In addition to strengthening national capacity, regional capacities must be promoted, and international partners need to assist governments in Africa in improving their operational response to this scourge.8

On the national/domestic level,  operational capacities need to be enhanced by closer cooperation with other  police and counterterrorism agencies and financial regulatory agencies,  the expansion of internal expertise through training programs and improved access to new technologies (specifically in the area of cybercrime).  Moreover, collaboration with national foreign policy and international relations agencies needs to be expanded.  Military and intelligence expertise should be enhanced through training, technical assistance programs, bolstering of special staff capabilities and the improvement of intelligence sharing operations.  The police and legal system should also train all officials in international law, human rights and the prosecution of terrorism cases.

On a regional and international level, existing cooperative agreements with foreign police, security organizations, UN agencies and AU agencies need to be strengthened.  This can include measures such as building liaison networks, personnel exchanges, foreign training programs, joint operations, intelligence sharing operations and capacity building programs. Police, prosecutors and courts need training to successfully investigate, prosecute and incarcerate transnational criminals and terrorist organizations.  Moreover, aid programs to build capacity in countries that are potential sources of organized crime and terrorism should be expanded with increased international funding and sharing of expertise. For example, programs are necessary to increase maritime awareness and the maritime security capacity of states on the coasts of West and East Africa.

The creation of national and regional fusion centers aimed at the eradication of terrorism/organized crime need to be established.9 These centers should focus on the exchange of relevant information, resource sharing and conducting joint counterterrorism/counter-crime operations.  Embedded in these fusion centers should be financial intelligence units that can monitor financial intelligence sharing among the respective States.10 Safe havens in the financial world and in cyberspace need to be addressed by strengthening the capacity of states to stop financial flows between collaborating terror and crime groups. International legislation on money laundering and counterterrorist financing needs to be harmonized as well. As a matter of urgency, African states need to enact comprehensive cyber-infrastructure legislation to prevent terrorist and organized crime groups from illegal access to the computer networks of financial institutions.

Furthermore, increased border control capacities need to be developed, given the vast, porous and inadequately monitored borders in many areas on the continent.  Border management agencies need to be assisted by international partners in enhancing their capabilities by the provision of effective communication, word/data processing and surveillance equipment.  Mobile border control units in sensitive areas need to be financed and set up to stop terrorist groups and organized crime groups from exploiting inadequately monitored borders.  Improved training for border management officials and customs officials is required and the recruitment of more officials for border management is crucial. This need can mostly be met by new bilateral and multilateral agreements on operational cooperation, information sharing and the supply of logistics and equipment.

Conditions of poverty, economic marginalization, alienation, unresolved conflicts, ethnic and religious discrimination, violation of human rights and the lack of good governance render a large percentage of the population in Africa vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates.  Consequently, de-radicalization programs (specifically aimed at the youth and prisons) need to be developed.  The most effective long-term way to do this is to develop the economies of African countries so as to create job opportunities, move people away from poverty and subsequently build resilience in communities in order for them to resist the lure of terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates.11  To reach this goal there is an urgent need for the international community to assist by investing more resources in terms of crime prevention, peace-building processes, economic growth, development of local business infrastructure, increased investment in the continent, state-building, and enhancing access to the global economy.

In summation, it has been established, in this research, that a definitive relationship exists between terrorist groups and transnational crime syndicates with obvious negative effects on world peace and security. The symbiotic relationship between the two groups is growing and will continue to grow in future, due to the fact that both antagonists benefit from the relationship. Thus, for the sake of world peace, stability, societal development and global economic growth, the nexus between terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates can best be broken with significant investment of resources and increased national/international cooperation. However, failure to act consistently and for the long-term will only increase the costs in financial and human terms for all involved.  Thus every effort must be made to rid the continent of the scourge of terrorism and organized crime.

Notes

1      European Response to organized crime. STATT.net. 2013, p.2.

2      Reuters, “Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation network”, January 13, 2010.

3      http://www.drugtraffickingroutes/maps.com.

4      James M Dorsey, “West Africa: a Drug Smuggling and Terrorism Hub?” 2010.

5      INTERPOL, “GSPC Terrorist activity in southern Algeria and on the borders of   Mali, Mauritania and Niger”, Specialized Crime and Analysis Directorate, INTERPOL General Secretariat, October 2003, p7.

6     INTERPOL, “The AQ organization in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb and its activity in the Sahel region”, Specialized Crime and Analysis Directorate, INTERPOL Analytic Report, March 2011, p.13.

7     Ibid, p.14.

8     ACSRT/CAERT (African Union), “Threat of Terrorism and Linkages to Transnational Organized Crime. 2010, p.10.

9     Ibid, p.11.

10   Ibid, p.11.

11   Ibid, p.11.

Judith Van der Merwe  Is a Specialist (Alert and Prevention) at the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers, Algeria.  Her field of study encompasses the Horn of Africa (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea), East Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda) and southern Africa (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Angola, Madagascar).  She is primarily involved in analyzing terrorist incidents/terrorist trends in the regions mentioned.  Additionally she is also involved in research on the impact of organized crime in the region.

The preceding article is a guest contribution to the Aberfoyle International Security website and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Aberfoyle International Security.