Berber-Arab Clashes in Algeria’s Mzab Valley

Andrew McGregor

February 6, 2014

The ongoing Berber cultural revival in North Africa has gone hand-in-hand with a new political assertiveness. In nations such as Libya, Algeria and Mali, this has resulted at times in armed clashes and protests demanding linguistic rights and political recognition of Berber (Amazigh) communities. The latest of these confrontations is ongoing in the south Algerian oasis of Ghardaïa, where Chaamba Arabs have clashed repeatedly with the indigenous Mozabite Berbers, forcing Algiers to send security forces to restore law and order in the region.

Communal violence broke out in May, 2013 following an alleged attempt by Chaamba Arabs to use forged property records to take over a Mozabite cemetery (Algérie Presse Service, May 8, 2013). The dispute degenerated into sword-wielding youth gangs throwing petrol bombs at each other in the streets of Ghardaïa, the largest city in the M’Zab Valley. Shops were also burned in Berriane as the violence spread to the other cities of the M’Zab (El-Watan [Algiers], January 26).

For years, Berbers have accused the Algerian Gendarmerie Nationale of pro-Arab bias and of even encouraging Arab rioters, charges that seemed to have been confirmed when three officers were suspended after a video emerged showing their participation in violence that resulted in the death of a young Berber (AP, January 29). According to a local Mozabite activist, “We are Algerian citizens first. We want justice and the truth to be told about what happened in Ghardaïa and that crimes be punished. Those officers whose bias has been proven need to be punished. We say no to violence, no to impunity, yes to tolerance” (El-Watan [Algiers], January 26).

Violent clashes between the Arab and Berber communities in Berriane began in March 2008 and continued at lesser levels throughout that year until mass violence broke out again in April 2009 (El-Khabar [Algiers], May 20, 2008; Tout sur l’Algerie, April 17, 2009). Heated protests against endemic unemployment in the midst of an oil-producing region were common in the first half of 2013, reflecting growing tensions in the area. Much of the violence has been carried out by youth gangs from the Berber and Arab communities.

ghardaiaGhardaïa

The fighting pits the Chaamba Arabs, who follow the Maliki madhab (one of the four orthodox schools of Islamic jurisprudence) and the Mozabite Berbers, who follow the non-orthodox Ibadite form of Islam. Ibadite Islam is a more moderate offshoot of the early Islamic Kharijite movement, whose advocacy of jihad against rulers they deemed insufficiently Islamic led to nearly two centuries of conflict in the Islamic world. The Ibadite movement retained a socially conservative attitude with an emphasis on the Quran and a more tolerant attitude towards other forms of Islam. Most remaining Ibadites are found in Oman, but smaller communities can be found in isolated oases and islands in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Zanzibar. Mozabite conservatism is now under stress from both young Mozabites who have been educated elsewhere and from new non-Mozabite arrivals in the M’zab Valley. Despite the insularity of the Mozabite community, the Mozabites have nonetheless built a commercial network linking the M’zab with the cities of the Mediterranean coast.

The Berbers of the M’Zab can trace their lineage back to the regional Berber capital of Tiaret in northern Algeria. When Tiaret was taken by the Fatimid Shiites in 933, Ibadi Berbers began to move south, first to Ourgla Oasis, and finally on to M’Zab in the early 11th century.  They were followed by other Ibadi Berbers escaping pressure from new waves of Arab tribesmen arriving from the Arabian Peninsula (particularly the Banu Hillal). Ghardaïa, the largest city in the M’zab with over 90,000 residents, was first settled in 1097. The valley is now home to over 400,000 people. The traditionally nomadic Chaamba began settling in the M’Zab oases one hundred years ago, a process that has been accelerated in recent decades by the growth of the petroleum industry, loss of pastures and government discouragement of nomadic lifestyles. The two communities have never integrated in M’Zab. Whenever communal violence breaks out, both communities typically blame the other. However, despite the sectarian and ethnic differences between the Berbers and Arabs, many residents claim the fighting is actually being fuelled by rivalries between drug smuggling networks working in the area (AFP, January 30).

The M’zab consists of seven cities about 600 kilometers south of Algiers,, including a cluster of five in the south (the “pentapolis”); Ghardaïa, al-Atteuf, Melika, Bani Isguen and Bounoura, with two other more isolated communities, Berriane and Guerrara, lying further north. The strategic location of the M’zab Valley at the upper edge of the Sahara desert made it an important crossroads for various trans-Saharan trade routes. After the arrival of the French in Algeria in the mid-19th century the Mozabites paid a tribute in exchange for autonomy but the entire region was eventually annexed by France in 1882.

Aside from the death of three Mozabites in the latest sectarian violence, the most shocking development was the Chaamba destruction of the tomb of Amir Moussa, a UNESCO designated world heritage site (Agence Kabyle d’Information, January 14). The Amir was a Mozabite leader of the 16th century who is ironically remembered for leading efforts to integrate the Arab nomads into the M’zab community in 1586 (AFP, January 30). The ancient Mozabite cemetery in Ghardaïa was also destroyed by marauding Arab youths.

On January 27, Mozabite activist Dr. Kameleddine Fekhar issued a statement purportedly speaking on behalf of the Mozabite community that demanded the departure of the Abd al-Malik Sellal government and urged a boycott of April’s upcoming presidential election. The statement complains of the “racist aggression” of police-supported militias armed with swords and knives that pillage and burn at will. Arrests followed by torture are determined solely on a racial basis, according to the statement (Siwel – Agence Kabyle d’Information, January 29). Prime Minister Sellal visited M’Zab in January when tensions seemed to be easing, but fighting erupted with new intensity only days after his departure.

This article first appeared in the February 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Berbers Seize Libyan Oil Terminal to Press Demand for Recognition

Andrew McGregor

November 14, 2013

The ongoing and economically crippling occupation of Libya’s Mellitah gas and oil terminal (63 miles west of Tripoli) by armed Berber protesters actually became worse on November 12, when workers at the terminal launched a 72-hour strike to protest the occupation, leaving open the possibility of major power cuts to Libyan coastal and mountain communities (Libya Herald, November 12).

The Mellitah oil terminal, which has a capacity of handling 160,000 barrels per day (bpd), is one of several major terminals in Libya suffering blockades by armed gunmen; others include the 340,000 bpd al-Sidr and the 220,000 bpd Ras Lanuf terminals (for the broader implications of the various blockades, see Terrorism Monitor, October 31). The Berber protests at the terminal began on October 26, when armed men gave the ruling General National Congress (GNC) energy committee a one-week ultimatum regarding language rights and increased representation on Libya’s constitutional committee before they would shut the terminal down.

Libya’s constitutional committee has allotted six seats of 60 to Libya’s minorities; two for the Berbers (the self-called Imazighen), two for the Tuareg and two for the Tubu of southern Libya. The method of assembling the committee has been a source of intense disagreement over whether members should be selected or elected directly, with the latter choice eventually prevailing, even though it has meant further delays in beginning the committee’s work. In the meantime, much of the country is at a standstill until the new Libyan state is defined and organized.  Berber representatives to the GNC resigned in July after failing to persuade the Congress to make Amazigh, the language of the Berbers, an official language of Libya.

Berber anger at the constitutional process has been building for several months. In mid-August, Berber protesters demanding recognition of minority rights forced their way into the Libyan parliament in Tripoli, smashing furniture and breaking windows (Reuters, August 14). In late September, Berber youth from the western Jabal Nafusa region cut off a gas pipeline to protest the absence of the Amazigh language from the proposed constitution (Middle East Online, September 30; AFP, October 1).

Prime Minister Ali Zeidan has warned of serious consequences if the oil blockades are not removed soon, including impediments to Libya’s ability to cover its budget expenditures, beginning in December. The GNC’s inability to pay nearly $100 million owed for earlier imports of wheat now threatens the ability of Libyan wheat importers to make further purchases for the heavily subsidized bread industry (Reuters, November 6). Zeidan specifically mentioned the blockage of the Mellitah terminal as having the potential of forcing Italy to seek its oil and gas elsewhere (Reuters, November 10). The Mellitah terminal is owned jointly by Italy’s Eni Petroleum and the Libyan state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC). According to Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni, the Berber occupiers are pressuring the company to cut gas supplies to Italy (Reuters, November 6). Eni is the largest foreign oil company operating in Libya and was responsible for producing some 270,000 bpd before the fall of Qaddafi.

The Berber gunmen are led by Adel al-Falu, a former Libyan army officer once tasked with protecting the Mellitah terminal. With oil exports from the terminal halted, al-Falu is now seeking to halt gas exports through trans-Mediterranean pipelines to Italy, with the objective of pressuring Italy and the European Union to force Libya’s GNC to recognize the Amazigh language (Reuters, November 8). Most of the 50 to 75 gunmen occupying Mellitah arrived from the nearby town of Zuwara in coast-guard boats the Berbers seized during the 2011 revolution. Many of the occupiers are veterans of the revolution. Zuwara has been in the midst of a revival of Berber culture and language since the launch of the revolution (Agence de Presse Kabyle, September 19, 2011). The Amazigh name for Zuwara incorporates the name of the Berber group that lives in the area, Tamurt n Wat Willul (Town of the Ait Willul) (for Berber communities in Libya, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, Pt. 1, May 5 2011; Pt. 2, May 12, 2011). Zuwara is the hometown of Nuri Abu Sahmain, the chairman of Libya’s ruling body, the Tripoli-based GNC. The largest concentration of Libya’s approximate 600,000 Berbers (roughly 10% of the population) reside around the western town of Jadu in the Jabal Nafusa region, the home of a Berber militia that played a vital role in the overthrow of the late Mu’ammar Qaddafi.

The International Berber Flag Flies outside the Mellitah Terminal (AFP)

The Libyan protests are part of a larger movement to revive the Berber language and its dialects in North Africa after centuries of official and unofficial repression designed to replace Amazigh with Arabic. The problem now, however, is finding qualified instructors of Amazigh. Few such exist in Libya, meaning that only one school in southern Libya will begin teaching Amazigh next year (The National [Abu Dhabi], November 5). In Zuwara, some primary schools have succeeded in hiring Amazigh language teachers from Algeria and Morocco (Reuters, November 8).

There is little consensus on the exact extent of the blockade at the Mellitah terminal, in terms of both oil and gas exports. Even as the Prime Minister warns of the long-term impact of the blockade, NOC spokesmen have maintained that the occupiers are limited to a small part of the terminal and that “the complex is working as normal,” with ships loading oil and gas continuing to flow through the Greenstream pipeline to Sicily. On the same day, however, Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni said the Mellitah terminal was “under attack” (Libya Herald, November 6). The Mellitah occupation does not appear to have affected gas flows to Italy through the Greenstream pipeline from the offshore al-Bouri field. The Berber occupiers announced on November 6 that they would cut off the Greenstream gas pipeline (AFP, November 6). On November 8, however, the militants said they would restore gas glows on November 10 as a “good-will gesture,” but with the warning that the pipeline would be cut if the number of seats allotted to the Berber community on the constitutional committee was not increased (Libya Herald, November 8).

Unable to enforce the writ of the central government anywhere in Libya without the cooperation of local armed militias, the Libyan Prime Minister has also warned recently of the possibility of foreign military intervention unless the nation rallies to eliminate the armed groups: “The international community cannot tolerate a state in the middle of the Mediterranean that is a source of violence, terrorism and murder” (al-Jazeera, November 10).

This article first appeared in the November 14, 2013 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Libya’s First Berber Leader Describes Security Situation in Libya

Andrew McGregor

July 11, 2013

Nuri Abu Sahmain, the new chairman of Libya’s ruling body, the General National Congress (GNC), is the first member of Libya’s minority Amazigh (or Berber) community to lead the nation. A surprise choice for the post, Abu Sahmain replaces Muhammad Yusuf al-Magarief, who fell victim to Libya’s controversial new “political isolation law,” which prohibits former members of the Qaddafi regime (including ex-diplomats like al-Magarief) from holding political office. Formally unaffiliated to any political party, Abu Sahmain sits as an independent in the GNC but is considered a member of a religiously conservative bloc within the GNC formed earlier this year under the banner of Loyalty to Martyrs’ Blood (North Africa Journal, February 21).

Nuri Abu Samhain

The new GNC leader hails from the largely Berber town of Zuwara (Tamurt n Wat Willul in Berber) in the coast region of western Libya. Natives of the town speak a dialect of Berber known as Zuwara Berber and are mainly (but not exclusively) members of the Ibadi sect of Islam, which many orthodox Arab Muslims regard as an unorthodox branch of the religion that developed as an offshoot of the much-despised and long-eliminated Kharijite Islamic movement. However, Abu Sahmain’s largest group of supporters in the vote for a new GNC chief came from the highly orthodox Muslim Brotherhood’s Hizb al-Adala wa’l-Bina (Justice and Development Party), leading to suspicion that Abu Sahmain was an ally, if not a member, of Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood. In response to these suspicions, Abu Sahmain has denied being a member of the Brotherhood, but notes that: “The ties that link me to all the parties, whether Muslim Brothers or others, are the constants of building this homeland. If such constants connect me to the Muslim Brothers or the National Forces Alliance or any other party, then I am honored to have such connections… I have never joined any party in my life” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 30).

The new GNC leader will also have to face accusations from Libya’s largely Arab or Arabized society that he will use his appointment to “Berberize” Libya. Sahmain has sought to ward off such suspicions while being clear he will not miss this chance to restore the Berber language and ethnicity that were targeted for extinction by Mu’ammar Qaddafi, who once described claims that Berbers even existed in Libya as “colonialist propaganda” (Jana [Tripoli], June 2, 2010). According to Sahmain:

If the Amazigh language is one of the tools to unify this homeland, we are proud of this culture and language… However, the rumors that are being spread by some that it is one way of planting an ethnic culture is not in the culture of our magnanimous people… Libya is united in Islam and the homeland; it is united in the Amazigh and Arab cultures…  The Amazigh language was fought [against] in this country and marginalized by the [Qaddafi] regime. It would be our national duty if we find a way to enable those who wish to learn it or to help the state in spreading this culture (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 30).

GNC First Deputy Speaker Dr. Jum’ah Atiqah described concerns surrounding the selection of a Berber for GNC chairman as being “absolutely baseless, and this selection is considered as an indicator of positive change in Libya” (Gnc.gov.ly, June 25).

While acknowledging ongoing security difficulties within Libya, Abu Sahmain remains optimistic the situation can be reversed and points out that the existing problems do not pose an existential threat to the Libyan state: “Surprises may occur in a specific area once in a while. Things may happen in Tripoli or Benghazi or in the south. However, they are all under the control of the state. They have not caused us insecurity at the level of national security.” The new GNC chairman claims to travel back and forth from Zuwarra to Tripoli in his own vehicle and without bodyguards (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 30).

Though many observers might describe lawless armed militias, Islamist terrorists or tribal rivalries as the greatest security threats in Libya, Abu Sahmain maintains that the real threat to Libya comes from supporters of the deposed Qaddafi regime operating both within the country and in foreign refuges: “They are trying to spread chaos and lack of public reassurance. They are trying to gain positions or make some citizens feel that Libya is not calm.” Pressed by a skeptical reporter to provide names of such plotters (given that most major members of the former regime are dead or under detention), Abu Sahmain declined to give names, but suggested somewhat vaguely that: “We have intelligence information; in fact, we have specific names. The information we have has led to the arrest of several groups in several towns; they are under investigation” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 30).

One of Abu Sahmain’s most important tasks will be to oversee the drafting of a new Libyan constitution, a process necessary for the nation’s political evolution, but one that will be the subject of numerous disputes between religious and political factions. Libya’s largest political coalition, Mahmoud Jibril’s National Forces Alliance (NFA), declared on July 4 that it was boycotting GNC sessions to protest the delays in forming a new constitution, a task that is to be completed by 60 delegates yet to be elected by Libyan voters (Ammun News [Amman], July 5). Libya’s Rafd (Rejection) movement, which claims a mass following, has promised Egyptian-style mass protests to topple the GNC if it fails to make significant progress by October 30 (al-Jadidah [Tripoli], July 4). Abu Sahmain has already suggested postponing the vote until 2014, claiming that “Public opinion accepts what is necessitated by the national duty” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 30).

Abu Sahmain will inherit another set of headaches in his new role as official commander-in-chief of Libya’s nascent armed forces, which are still struggling to create a professional national army from the raw material of highly-politicized and well-armed militias that typically take direction from the government when it suits them and besiege government buildings when it does not. Sahmain’s election comes at a time when acting Libyan chief-of-staff General Salim al-Qinaydi is feuding with Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, accusing the government of interfering in military affairs and threatening to bring the army into the streets if the government does not expand the Defense Ministry’s budget (al-Jadidah [Tripoli], June 25; June 27).

Libyan Berbers Defy Regime that Denies Their Existence (Part Two)

Andrew McGregor

May 12, 2011

Under increasing pressure from Qaddafi loyalists, the Berbers of the Western Mountains of Libya continue to defy military odds in their resistance to a regime that has denied their very existence.

Berbers NalutAnti-Qaddafi Berbers at Nalut (Derek Henry Flood)

According to one Berber from the mountain town of Nalut: “We have 80 per cent unemployment in Nalut, there are no good roads, no healthcare and the education system is very poor. We are fighting because for 42 years we have been oppressed” (Irish Times, April 28). Sixty miles east of Nalut is Zintan, which is currently experiencing bombardment by Grad rockets prior to an expected government advance on the town. A massive flight of Berber civilians to Tunisia is under way, with some 30,000 people having crossed the border at the small crossing point of Dehiba (UNHCR, April 29). Government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim said the regime had proof the refugee crisis was the result of a Qatar-financed campaign to have Berber rebels force family members across the border to prompt NATO air attacks on loyalist forces.

Under Qaddafi’s rule, Berber language instruction in schools was banned, as were many forms of Berber cultural expression. Activists have been subject to detention, disappearance, or public execution. According to the regime, the non-Semitic Berber language is nothing but a dialect of Semitic Arabic. In June 2010 Qaddafi told a gathering of journalists and intellectuals that the Berbers were ancient North African tribes that no longer existed and it was therefore “pointless to use the language of these tribes which have disappeared.” Claims to the contrary were nothing but “colonialist propaganda” (Jana [Tripoli], June 2, 2010).

A 2008 Libyan diplomatic note to the U.S. mission in Tripoli presented the regime’s viewpoint on the Berber question, together with a rather dubious linguistic explanation of why these “early Arabs” had come to be known as “Berbers”:

In Great Jamahiriya, there is nothing called Berber community, and the use of this term denotes lack of true knowledge of the history of the region in general and Libya in particular, and does not reflect the reality and nature of the homogeneous Libyan society.  All Libyans come from Arab origins; they came from the Arab Peninsula by land (barr) and that’s why some tribes that had arrived earlier in Libya are called “Barbar” (or Berber). [1]

Most Libyan Berbers are members of the Ibadite sect of Islam rather than the Sunni Malikite school of Islamic jurisprudence dominant elsewhere in Libya. Though many Ibadites reject the connection, the sect is largely believed to be a more moderate form of the early Islamic Kharijite movement, whose strict interpretation of Islam and advocacy of jihad to overthrow Muslim rulers accused of ignoring Islamic law led to two centuries of bitter conflict in the Islamic world. The movement’s emphasis on asceticism and egalitarianism attracted both the Bedouin and the Mawali (non-Arab converts to Islam who found themselves oppressed by Arab Muslims who considered themselves superior due to the Arab origin of Islam). However, the Kharijite injunction to rebel against any ruler who fell short of religious expectations coupled with the tendency of individuals to decide for themselves when a ruler had failed to meet these expectations was not a recipe for political stability.

While the Kharijites (“Those who Secede”) were eventually eliminated and their name turned into a pejorative term for non-Orthodox Muslims, a breakaway group known as the Ibadites (for their founder Abd Allah ibn Ibad) maintained many of the core beliefs of the Kharijites while adopting a greater willingness to live in harmony with other Islamic groups. Today, Ibadites are estimated to number 1.5 million and are found mostly in Oman (1.2 million), with smaller communities in Libya, Zanzibar, the Djerba Island of Tunisia and the Mzab oases in Algeria.

Note

1. U.S. Embassy Tripoli cable 08TRIPOLI530, July 3, 2008, published by the Telegraph, January 31, 2011.

This article first appeared in the May 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Libyan Berbers Defy Regime That Denies Their Existence (Part One)

Andrew McGregor

May 5, 2011

In the remote mountains that range along Libya’s western border with Tunisia, North Africa’s indigenous Berber tribes are locked in a life-and-death struggle with Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s Arab-supremacist regime. Though they were among the first to rebel against Qaddafi’s government, the Berbers are poorly armed and severely short of food and fuel with loyalist forces in the plains cutting off supply routes. Direct military intervention by NATO warplanes appears to the Berbers to be the only way of repelling advancing loyalist troops.

Berbers 1Heavily tattooed ancient Libu as depicted in a 19th Dynasty Egyptian Tomb Painting

There are an estimated 25 million Berbers (as defined by use of Berber languages) spread across North Africa. The Berbers call themselves Imazighen (“Free Men”) and their ancestors were known to their ancient Egyptian neighbors as the Libu, the Meshwesh, the Tjehenu and the Tamahu.

Libya’s Berbers do not form a single group; a division between Eastern and Western Berbers dates back to ancient times and the desert-dwelling ethnic-Berber Tuareg developed their own independent culture centuries ago. As a result, there are three main groups of ethnic-Berbers in Libya with only minimal interrelation:

• The Western Berbers consist of two main groups.

1) The tribes of the Ait Willul live in the coastal city of Zuwara, known in Berber as Tamurt n Wat Willul (Town of the Ait Willul). Zuwara rose in revolt in February, but government forces suppressed the rebellion there a month later.

2) The Nafusa tribes live in the Western Mountains (al-Jabal al-Gharbi), better known as the Nafusa Mountains after the region’s Berber name, Adrar n Infusen. The Nafusa Berbers retreated there from the coast to isolate themselves from the mass Arabization of the Libyans after the arrival of two large Arab tribes in the 11th century, the Banu Hilal and the Banu Salim. The Nafusa declared against Qaddafi in the earliest days of the rebellion despite having little ability to defend their communities. With the government having managed to consolidate itself in other parts of western Libya, loyalist forces have now turned their attention to the mountain rebels.

• The Eastern Berbers live in the oasis towns of Jalu and Awjilah, about 250km southeast of the battlefront at Ajdabiya. Rebel sources reported a new loyalist offensive by troops in trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns and Grad rockets against the settlements this week, part of a government effort to cut off rebel-held northern Cyrenaica from the oil and water-rich Libyan interior.  The loyalist column of 45 vehicles was destroyed in a NATO airstrike on May 1 after the column attacked Jalu and Awjilah (Reuters, May 1; Upstream Online, May 2).

• The Tuareg live in communities focused on the oases of southwestern Libya. Though ethnically Berber, the Tuareg developed their own culture and version of the Berber language (Tamasheq or Tamahaq) after their ancestors migrated deep into the African interior roughly 1600 years ago. Despite insisting the Tuareg are actually Arabs, Qaddafi has also sought their favor at times due to their reputation as skilled desert fighters he could use in his efforts to expand his influence in the Sahara and Sahel regions. Qaddafi’s occasional efforts to champion the Tuareg cause and arm Tuareg rebel movements outside Libya appear to have brought large numbers of Tuareg from Mali and Niger to Libya to join the loyalist forces, though this recruitment has been achieved more through cash payments than personal loyalty to Qaddafi. [1] Libya’s own Tuareg appear divided on whether to support Qaddafi, though few, if any, appear to have joined the armed rebellion.

Berbers 2Modern Libyan Berbers Demanding Language Rights

Qaddafi has always regarded the existence of the Berbers as an annoying reminder of the Berber origins of his own Arabized tribe and hence an impediment to his efforts to become leader of the pan-Arab community. An apparent softening of the regime’s approach to the Berber minority led by Sa’if al-Islam Qaddafi in 2007 (which included lifting the ban on Berber names) was reversed by Mu’ammar Qaddafi less than a year later when the Libyan leader travelled to the Western mountains to warn Berbers; “You can call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes – Berbers, Children of Satan, whatever – but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes” [2]

Notes:

1. See Andrew McGregor, “Libyan Loyalists and Dissidents Vie for Tuareg Fighters,” Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 10, 2011.
2. U.S. Embassy Tripoli cable 08TRIPOLI530, July 3, 2008, published by the Telegraph, January 31, 2011. See also AFP, August 24, 2007.

This article first appeared in the May 5, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Algeria: The Arab-Berber Conflict Today

Dr. Andrew McGregor, CIIA

Shout Monthly, Toronto, August 2002

New developments in the ancient Berber-Arab conflict in Algeria have seen disaffected Arabs making common cause with the Berber minority against the Algerian government. While the Berbers have enjoyed important victories, their struggle with the Algerian government continues. Meanwhile, the Berbers – like most of the Islamic world, non-Arabs who do not necessarily share the goals of Arab Islamists – face violent opposition from the Islamic insurgents. Dr. Andrew McGregor explores recent events.

Wild street celebrations in the towns of the Kabyle mountains of Algeria welcomed the pardon and release of dozens of Berber activists from Algerian prisons on August 5.  President ‘Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s concession to Berber demands for a presidential amnesty gave the appearance that the struggle between the ethnic Berber minority and the Algerian government and security forces has taken a turn in favour of the Berbers. This struggle is often depicted as part of the old rivalry between Arabs and native Berbers in northern Africa, but last summer the Berber opposition became dangerous to the government when Berber protests began to pull disaffected Algerian Arabs in behind them. Berber militants have demonstrated an ability to embarrass le Pouvoir, the cabal of business leaders and generals that run Algeria behind a democratic façade. The mobilized Berber opposition is especially disturbing at a time when the government is seeking to privatize Algeria’s corruption-ridden oil industry while promoting supposed democratic reforms.

Protesters in Algiers Wave a Berber Flag (Asharq al-Awsat)

As the indigenous people of North Africa, once occupying a swath of territory stretching from the Canary Islands to the Nile Valley, the Berbers endured Carthaginian and Roman rule before Muslim Arabs began to spread west in the late seventh century, eventually overpowering the native culture. The struggle between Arabs and Berbers for North Africa became part of several great Arabic-language poetic epics still told in north African coffee-shops today.  Since then, the Berbers have declined in numbers and territory, though large numbers may still be found in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco (40% of the total population) as well as the mountains of Algerian Kabylia, where their 7 million people make up roughly 25% of the national population.  Other groups are found in Tunisia (35% of the population), Libya, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Egypt.

Today, in the midst of a Berber cultural revival, many Kabyle Berber leaders represent the Arabs as the latest in a series of colonizers (There are smaller groups of Algerian Berbers in the Aures mountains and the Ouarseni Massif, but the Kabylians are the most politically active). It is a mistake to regard Berbers as an excluded minority, however. Berbers can be found in the highest levels of Algerian military, political, business and intellectual circles.

The Berbers have always been difficult subjects when ruled by other peoples. Roman Christianity and Arab Islam alike were faced with a Berber affinity for heretical movements. After the Arab conquest the Berbers learned to use Islamic identities and institutions to reassert control over their communities, eventually building three great empires in North Africa and Spain between the 11th and 15th centuries; the Almoravids, the Almohads and the Maranids. Berbers bristled at Arab airs of superiority due to their intimate connection to Islam’s homeland. In response several hadith-s (traditions) were fabricated which described the conversion of the Berbers by the Prophet Muhammad himself well before the Arab conquest. The Moroccan Bargawatiyya movement translated the Koran into Berber in the 10th century, but Sunni Muslim reformists destroyed their kingdom and burnt the offensive Berber Koran.

Horace Vernet Painting of the First French Mass in Kabylia, 1837

The French, who finished their conquest of Kabylia in 1857, attempted to divide the Berbers from their Arab neighbours. The use of Berber customary law (qanun) rather than Islamic shari’a law was approved for Kabylia. The French also attempted to ‘re-convert’ the Kabyle Berbers to Christianity in an attempt to gain colonial allies in Algeria. While the French produced endless studies ‘proving’ a Christian legacy in Kabylia, there is little evidence that Christianity ever spread beyond a small number of culturally assimilated coastal Berbers in the later days of the Roman Empire. Though Berber conversion to Islam was widespread, their interpretation of Islamic law has always been tempered by the maintenance of pre-Islamic custom. Women are particularly important in the preservation of ancient customs and have been in the forefront of recent demonstrations.

French attempts to split Arabs from Berbers were ultimately a failure. During the struggle for Algerian independence, the Berbers stood solidly behind the revolutionary FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), providing much of the movement’s internal leadership. The post-independence government, mostly composed of returned Arab political exiles, soon found itself fighting armed Kabyle groups after Ben Bella declared Algeria an Arab state in 1962. Kabylian Berbers had a high literacy rate in French, with Arabic often a third language at best. Post-independence Arabization policies marginalized many Berbers accustomed to privileged access to government positions in the previously French-speaking government. The confusion over language and the wretched state of Algerian schools has led some Kabyle Berbers to describe their people, with bitter humour, as “trilingual illiterates.”

Mouloud Mammeri, 1917-1989 (Le Matin d’Algerie)

The Berber language, which now flourishes as much in Paris as in the Kabyles, is at the heart of Berber/Arab tensions. The latest round of confrontation began in 1980 when Professor Mouloud Mammeri attempted to give a lecture on ancient Berber poetry. The Algerian government showed its insecurity by canceling the lecture, leading to widespread demonstrations. Then-president Chadli Benjedid responded by declaring: “We are Arabs whether we like it or not. We belong to the Arab-Islamic civilization and there is no other identity for the Algerian citizen.” Since independence, both Berber language and culture had been dying a natural and almost unnoticed death, but a combination of forced Arabization and repression sparked a Berber renewal. According to the late Berber poet, Kateb Yacine, “They want to depict us as a minority within an Arab people, when in fact it is the Arabs who are a minute minority within us, but they dominate us through religion…”. This has become a common refrain among Berber militants, who like to remind Algeria’s Arabs that most of them are part of an Arabized Berber majority.

A major victory for the Berbers was achieved in March, when the President reversed the long-held Arabization policy to make the modern Berber language, Tamazight, a national language, declaring that ‘When we speak about Tamazight, we mean the identity of the entire Algerian people.’  A modified Latin script is now used to write Tamazight. The ancient Libyans, Berber contemporaries of the Ancient Egyptians, had used a phonetic script to transcribe their language. Preserved in slightly modified form in the Tifinagh characters used by the Saharan Tuareg, this script is now being promoted as an authentic means of recording Tamazight. It is but one example of today’s Berbers reaching to the past for forms of expression and identity. The ongoing publication in France of the Encyclopédie Bérbére is another vital development in creating a Berber cultural base. A new Berber-language translation of the Koran is also in publication.

At the forefront of Berber resistance is the Mouvement Cultural Bérbére (MCB), a group that found itself in the 1990s fighting not only government Arabization, but also attacks from radical Islamists who find fault with Berber (and most Algerian Arab) forms of Islamic worship. The Front Islamique du Salut  (FIS) called for the total Arabization and Islamization of the Kabylians, and introduced the pattern of brutal murders and rural massacres that have characterized the rest of the Algerian civil war. Berber-language singers were special targets of FIS assassination squads, sometimes having their throats cut after being killed in order to make the point. As if to rub salt into an open wound, the Algerian government passed a law enforcing the use of Arabic only days after the assassination of the highly popular Berber singer Lounes Matoub in 1998. In Algeria, as in Morocco, government authorities refused to register Berber names for newborns, and legal proceedings are conducted entirely in Arabic.

(al-Jazeera)

Faced with government intolerance, the Kabyle Berbers must also cope with Islamists who regard them as secularists or even heretics.  While the FIS has come to terms with the government, the violence has been sustained by the activities of the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC). Both groups have prominent places on the US State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, and are linked to al-Qa’idah.  Recently the government (with American backing) has finally scored major victories against both groups, raising hopes of a so-far elusive military solution to the Islamist insurrection. The government’s credibility, however, is threatened by renewed accusations of involvement in civilian massacres ultimately blamed on the Islamists. So long as the Algerian general staff remain the power behind the civilian government there is unlikely to be any investigation or resolution of these claims. In the meantime, the political violence continues, claiming 150 lives last month alone.

The Algerian Berbers are represented by two political parties, the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), and the smaller Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD). The RCD joined Bouteflika’s government, but has suffered in reputation as a result. Berber political activity has lately been moving away from the largely discredited political parties to the local community councils (jama’a), the traditional method of self-governance in the Kabyles.  Many feel that the amnesty for Berber activists was part of an effort to avoid a Berber boycott of local elections in October. A militant-led campaign for ‘zero-balloting’ in Kabyle resulted in only a 2% turnout in parliamentary elections earlier this year. The official turnout nation-wide was set at 47%, a figure many Algerians claim is far too high. Though the opposition parties that were expected to do so well in the elections barely registered in the final tally, the results were characterized by the US State Department as ‘progress in Algeria for greater democracy’.

President Bouteflika has had little success in dealing with a morbid economy, housing shortages, severe inequities in the distribution of Algeria’s oil wealth, continuing Islamist violence and an unemployment rate of over 30% (higher in Kabylia). For Bouteflika, last summer’s Berber-generated unrest provided a convenient scapegoat for his own failures; according to the president, the unrest came just as Algeria “was about to regain its real place on the national stage, rebuild and launch an economic revival programme.” Bouteflika has also relied on the well-worn suggestion of  ‘external sources’ behind the unrest. More than 60% of Algeria’s population is now under 30 years of age, and prospects are increasingly bleak. Last summer young Arab demonstrators shouted “Nous sommes tous des Kabyles!” in what the government must have found a bizarre challenge to official policy.

Unlike their Tuareg cousins to the south, who have engaged in separatist revolts in Mali and Niger, the Berbers of Kabyle are not engaged in a separatist movement. No one seriously believes that the mountains can sustain an independent country. The Berbers are engaged in a cultural and linguistic struggle based on a strong tradition of independence within a greater state. The World Amazigh Congress has concluded that:

The Algerian state cannot continue suppressing the country’s age-old language and culture. It must be the state of everyone and not only that of the citizens of the Muslim faith or Arabic speakers. It must become the state of all Algerians without discrimination on the basis of language or faith. For this reason, it must inject in the country’s constitution political, linguistic and religious pluralism.

Similar demands were made in a “Berber Manifesto” released by Moroccan Berber activists two years ago.

Algeria’s continuing instability delays the resumption of much needed foreign investment as the Algerian government lurches from crisis to crisis. For now, international reaction is mixed; Libya has expressed grave concerns about the prospect of destabilization in the Maghrab as a result of Berber/Arab conflict, France has been loudly rebuked by the Algerian government for interference after complaining of gendarmarie tactics, and Morocco, with its large Berber minority, continues to watch developments carefully. Berber demands for the removal of the heavy-handed Algerian gendarmarie from the Kabyles and more equitable distribution of energy-sector revenues continue to be sore-points.  Aware of their millennia-old presence in North Africa, the Algerian Berbers appear ready to resist assimilation and to preserve an independent African and Muslim identity despite the opposition of national leaders and Islamists alike.