Afghan Taliban Condemn CIA for “Diabolic” Hacking of Their Official Website

Andrew McGregor

July 28, 2011

Various reports claiming the death of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar have emerged in the last year, all of them apparently false. The latest report of his death was the most unusual, as it appeared to originate with authentic Taliban spokesmen, the apparent victims of a concerted attempt to hack into their electronic communications devices in order to deliberately spread disinformation at a critical point in the struggle for Afghanistan. The Commission of Cultural Affairs of the Islamic Emirate [of Afghanistan, i.e. the Taliban] responded by issuing a “Statement of the Cultural Affairs Commission of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Recent Shameful Attempt by the Enemy” a day after the July 20 hacking effort (alemara1.com; July 21; ansar1.info, July 21).

Zabihullah Mujahid

In the early hours of July 20, text messages began to circulate from the mobile phones of veteran Taliban spokesmen Zabihullah Mujahid and Qari Yusuf Ahmadi saying: “Leadership council of IEA [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] announces that Amir al-Mumineen [Commander of the Faithful, i.e. Mullah Omar] has passed away. May mighty God bless him.” More detailed e-mails were also sent from the movement’s official website that claimed the Taliban leader had died of a heart attack. The notice was accompanied by a long obituary and the announcement that the Mullah had been succeeded by Gul Agha, a close aide (AFP, July 20).

A spokesman for Afghanistan’s National Directorate for Security (NDS) said his agency had received no reports of the death of the Taliban leader, who has remained in hiding since being forced from the Taliban capital of Kandahar in 2001. The NDS may have been hesitant to support the latest claims, having been embarrassed in May when it spread reports that Mullah Omar had gone missing from his Quetta hideout.  A more elaborate version of this story suggested that Mullah Omar had been killed by his Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) escort on May 21 while being transported from Quetta to a new hideout in North Waziristan in an operation directed by former ISI director General Hamid Gul (Tolo News [Kabul], May 23; Reuters, May 23). Both the Taliban and General Gul dismissed the report, the latter describing it as “rubbish.”

The Taliban statement on Mullah Omar’s latest “virtual death” blamed the hacking effort on the CIA, claiming the agency had hacked the Islamic Emirate’s official website alemara1.com by posting a fake announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in Pashto, English and Arabic. The announcement was also sent using the email addresses of spokesmen Zabibullah and Qari Yusuf. Text messages were sent from the spokesmen’s mobile phones through the Roshan and Afghan Wireless mobile communications companies. The work was done at night while the mobile phones of Taliban officials are usually powered off.

Qari Yusuf Ahmadi

The statement admitted that “the enemy” had already created many problems for the Taliban website, including the posting of false information. Nonetheless, “the colleagues working at the website of the Islamic Emirate have foiled all efforts of the enemy. When the enemy hackers managed to take control of the website, our technical managers… promptly retrieved from [the enemy hackers] control of the website.” The Taliban described the hacking as a “diabolic act,” though it noted: “We would like to say that in the world of technology, such pernicious attempts and fraudulent activities are not unusual things… But this incident was unusual in that the attempt had been made by a known party and still more at the level of a government. So it was a shameful and unusual action.” The movement urged the mobile phone companies, the Yahoo and Google web browsers and journalists whose reputation was harmed by circulating the false report to “raise their voice of protest.”

Last January, the Washington Post ran an article claiming Mullah Omar had suffered a heart attack on January 7 and had been treated for several days in a Karachi hospital. The report was based on information provided by The Eclipse Group, a “private intelligence” firm operated by former CIA agent Duane R. Clarridge (Washington Post, January 18). Clarridge was indicted in the Iran-Contra scandal but was later pardoned. In 2010, rumors that Mullah Omar had been arrested in Karachi by the ISI were spread by American thriller writer Brad Thor and “confirmed” by Colonel Oliver North, who was also indicted in the Iran-Contra affair.

This article was originally published in the July 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia: An Interview with the Islah Movement’s Abdurahman M. Abdullahi Baadiyow

Andrew McGregor

July 28, 2011

The Jamestown Foundation recently posed a series of questions in an online interview with Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow), an Islamic scholar and prominent leader of the Islah (Reform) movement in Somalia.  The interview was designed to shed light on the views of Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood (under the banner of the Islah movement and the incipient Justice and Unity Party) on a number of the political, religious and social issues facing Somalia today. Among the topics discussed are the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, the future of the embattled Transitional Federal Government, the influence of al-Qaeda on Somalia’s al-Shabaab movement, the introduction of Salafism to Somalia, the effect of American intervention in Somalia, the possibility of a popular uprising in the style of the “Arab Spring” and the roots of Islamic resistance in Somalia in the Dervish movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdulla h Hassan. [1]

 

Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

[Jamestown Foundation] Somalia’s Islah Movement is often described as Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood. How close is Islah to the ideology of Hassan al-Banna and the Egyptian Ikhwan? Does Islah maintain contacts with the international Muslim Brotherhood?

[Abdurahman M. Abdullahi]  Islah describes itself as an Islamic movement representing the Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia. It takes inspiration and understanding of Islam from the ideological guidelines laid down by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Its vision is based on looking Islam as a comprehensive way of life and a religion that, besides calling for worshipping one God (Allah), calls for adopting Islamic principles and values in the social, political and economic spheres.  The Islah Movement is part of the international network of Muslim Brotherhood organizations. These organizations are independent entities that are united in their peaceful and gradual approach in reforming their societies and promoting the concept of the universality of Islam and its peaceful coexistence with other worldly regions.  The international network of the Muslim Brotherhood plays a consultative role and is a forum to exchange ideas and share experiences among its members.

Can you describe the platform and goals of your new political formation, the Justice and Unity Party?

For the Somali state to recover, a pan-clan national civic movement is required that surpasses clan based organizations, a movement that invigorates the concepts of citizenship and democratic governance on the one side and accommodates Islam and the clan system in a new social contract on the other. Only through a national movement with multiple persuasions and organizations united in the strategic goal of restoring the Somali state and tolerance to each other, will capable and qualified leadership emerge and the state recover.

The Justice and Unity party is a new initiative of the Islah Movement which aims to mobilize Somali society through a national political party. The founders of the party will not be limited to the members of Islah, but will include many prominent personalities, both men and women. This party is in the process of formation and will be announced publicly when all the required steps are completed. It adopts the general guidelines and principles of Islamic moderation, consultation (shura), and democracy. Its main principles include safeguarding the dignity of all citizens, protecting universal human rights and realizing justice and unity in the war-torn Somalia. It also advocates and promotes peace and cooperation in particular amongst the peoples of the Horn of Africa. Moreover, it strives to transform Somali society from clan based partisan politics to a modern society where political affiliation and ideology plays a role in political competitions. Membership of the party will be open equally for all Somalis who are willing to join and adhere to its principles and policies. More details of this party and its leadership will be published after its public announcement.

The Islah Movement welcomed the decision of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) cabinet to implement Shari’a as Somalia’s new official legal code in 2009. Two years on, how would you assess the success of this change? Why do you think al-Shabaab, which demands Shari’a in Somalia, continues to reject the TFG’s effort to impose Shari’a?

Even though the Islah Movement welcomed this decision, it was well aware that the TFG cannot implement Shari’a because it is very corrupt and weak.  Moreover, it is our understanding that implementing Shari’a should not be equated with the application of some elements of hudud (criminal punishments) for offenses such as theft, fornication and the consumption of harmful drugs. Application of Shari’a is very wide concept and instead of focusing on the doable parts of Shari’a such as mercifulness, cooperation, caring for the weak, respecting other religions and good governance based on consultation (shura) or democracy, extremist elements focus on the punishment aspects of Shari’a. Welcoming the TFG’s decision was meant to support the right direction in accordance with Islah ideology.  On the other hand, even though al-Shabaab calls for the application of Shari’a, their understanding of Islam is a distorted, extremist approach departing from Islamic moderation and the gradual, transformational approach. They want to apply Islam violently without any legitimacy.  The only Shari’a they can accept is their way of Shari’a under their absolute leadership.

Al-Qaeda is often claimed to play an important part in the al-Shabaab insurgency. How would you assess al-Qaeda’s influence on the Islamist movement in Somalia?

First, let me address the wrong usage of the terminology “Islamist movemen”t to describe al-Shabaab. Islamist movements are not monolithic and include various organizations promoting, teaching, advocating for the application of Islamic principles and adhering to its values in the society and the state. Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab – its offshoot in Somalia – do not represent the Islamic movement and in doing so distorts the image of all Islamic movements. They could be described simply as armed Islamic movements. Historically, direct al-Qaeda involvement in Somalia started in 1991 when its members infiltrated the al-Itihad al-Islamiya movement in the early years of the civil war. Osama bin Laden during his stay in Sudan [1992-96] was interested in creating an al-Qaeda affiliated organization in Somalia and pushed al-Itihad, which was a neo-Salafist movement, towards armed conflict. However, when the leaders of al-Itihad abandoned armed struggle, a splinter group under the name of al-Shabaab appeared on the scene after al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on U.S. targets.  Al-Shabaab today is a formidable force and controls large swathes of southern Somalia though their ideological influence is dwindling.

Al-Shabaab’s destruction of Sufi shrines and tombs has led to the formation of a Sufi-based armed movement. How would you assess the role of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a in Somalia?

Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a is a new name which means “Sufi brotherhoods in Somalia” even though the name originally covered all Sunni branches of Islam and only excluded the Shi’a and  a number of other sects. Armed Sufis are not a new phenomenon in Somalia; a similar situation occurred during the first two decades of the 20th century when the Dervish movement under the leadership of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan led the armed Salihiyah Brotherhood against Britain and Ethiopia. Moreover, this movement also fought the Qadiriyah and Dandarawiyah brotherhoods that refused to accept the leadership of Sayid Mohamed. The new armed role of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a is a reaction to Shabaab’s destruction of the revered shrines. It will have serious consequence on the traditional peaceful approach of the Sufi brotherhoods even as they encounter spreading Wahhabism in Somalia.

The mandate of the Transitional Federal Government is about to expire. Do you view the attempt to renew this mandate as legitimate?

The original mandate of the TFG expires in August 2011, however, it was extended for an extra year in order to be able to complete transitional tasks such as adopting a new constitution, forming a new, smaller parliament, electing a president and forming a new government. Constitutionally, the extension is considered illegitimate; nevertheless, there is no alternative way for national institutions to be renewed. The unpopular agreement arrived at in Kampala under the leadership of the Ugandan president [the June 9 Kampala Accord] was finally approved by the parliament and a new government was formed under the leadership of a Somali-American professor [new Prime Minister Dr.Abdiweli Mohamed Ali]. Let us hope that things will change for the better during the next year.

Do you believe the TFG has the potential or ability to restore a functioning government to Somalia?

It is very difficult to predict the future performance of the TFG, which is under great pressure. There is no doubt that the capacity of the TFG in terms of leadership, human resources, finances and security institutions is very poor. However, it seems that a new educated elite is entering the political game, which gives us some hope. I am hopeful and see the light at the end of the tunnel. I see improvement day after day, better administration, and dedication of the new leaders.

What direction do you think is appropriate to replace the TFG?

There were many failed efforts at institution building in Somalia during the last 20 years in which Somalis had imposed upon them some sort of state building model that had failed. Indeed, there is a need for new and serious thinking on how to build a new Somalia. It requires new national vision, new approaches and new leadership.  The new vision should focus on peacefulness, justice and unity of the society. This approach should be Somali-driven, legitimate and supported by the external stakeholders. New political institutions will eventually produce new leadership beyond the civil war mentality.

Somali president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad is one of the most controversial figures in Somalia. What differences (if any) do you see between the Shaykh Sharif who was leader of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Shaykh Sharif who is the President of Somalia?

The difference is between his two locations of power. In the first place, he was leading armed opposition forces that fought against a warlord alliance believed to be funded by the CIA counter-terrorism task force in the Horn of Africa. The ICU included diverse groups which were united to topple President Abdullahi Yusif’s weak government and to fight the Ethiopians.  Currently, Shaykh Sharif is in the mantle of the President of Somalia under the protection of AMISOM forces. He is in a very difficult position in fighting his former colleagues. For sure, Sharif has gained more experience now than he had during his tenure as the leader of the Islamic Courts Union.

Do you see American military and financial support of the TFG as a positive or negative contribution to the Somali political process? How does your movement view U.S. drone attacks on al-Qaeda suspects within Somalia?

There is no doubt that U.S. counter–terrorism policy in the Horn of Africa has played a bigger role in fuelling extremism and strengthening al-Shabaab. On the other hand, I also think that without direct and indirect American support to the TFG, al-Shabaab could have taken over the rest of Mogadishu and Somalia. It requires a prudent and calibrated approach to cooperate without instigating further violence. With respect to drone attacks, we see them as negative in achieving the goal of eliminating terrorism.  New and more dedicated individuals will emerge to avenge their mentors and leaders.  The method of drone attack is not welcomed by my organization.

Of all the countries in Africa, Somalia would seem to have the greatest promise for unity. It shares a common language, a common ethnicity and a common religion, yet Somalia remains almost impossibly divided after two decades of political and social instability. Is this an internal phenomenon, or have external factors contributed to this development?

It is true that Somalia’s peoples share the same language, adhere to the Islamic faith, and despite its numerous clans, belong mainly to one ethnic group.  These factors were thought to serve as vital ingredients in nation building in the developing world. However, the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s and the increasing intra-clan conflicts in many parts of the country poses a challenge to re-instituting state and nation-building. The collapse of the Somali state is the product of complex factors: original, operational and proximate causes that include external as well internal factors. In the final analysis however, responsibility of the collapse of the Somali state and the difficulty of its restoration lies primarily on the shoulders of the leadership of Somalia.  All nations have challenges, but their leaderships come up with solutions and save their nations. In that context, Somalia is not different and eventually leaders will emerge and end this protracted conflict.

Salafism appears to be a growing trend in Somalia, often displacing traditional Sufism. Do you see Salafism as compatible with the national and historical Somali character?  

No. Salafism, which is known in Somalia as Wahabism, is a new intruder in Somalia that is not tolerant to traditional Islamic practices. It is confrontational and fights against al-Shari’a theology, the Shafi’iyah school of jurisprudence and Sufism, which are the three components of traditional Islam in Somalia. All violent confrontations in the name of Islam are driven by some elements who claim to belong to the Salafia ideology. Al-Itihad and its offshoot al-Shabaab share the ideology of Salafism.

Al-Shabaab’s Shaykh Jama Abdusalam recently urged Somalis to “carry out Egyptian and Tunisian-style uprisings in Somalia.” Is there a possibility for this in Somalia? The response of the Brotherhood to the popular uprising in Egypt has seemed confused and contradictory at times. In the event of such an uprising in Somalia, what role would you foresee for your movement?

Frankly, I do not think there is the possibility of a popular uprising at this particular historical moment in Somalia. With respect to the role of Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian uprising, allow me to disagree that it was confused and contradictory. I have had the honor of visiting Egypt after the uprising and participated in the opening of the Muslim Brotherhood main office in Cairo. I have met and discussed the role of Muslim Brotherhood in the uprising with many of their leaders. They have affirmed that even though they did not initiate the uprising, they were nevertheless the most organized group to participate in it and maintain it.  Somalia had passed through a similar uprising in the late 1990s and the Libyan and Yemani scenarios are very close to what Somalia experienced 20 years ago. The Islah Movement is working to lead civic transformation in Somalia and strives to bring together a divided nation and to restore dignity and unity. This process is not through uprisings, but through planned programs that allow the participation of the majority of Somalia’s citizens.

Note

  1. For the Dervish Movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, see Andrew McGregor: “Expelling the Infidel: An Historical Look at Somali Resistance to Ethiopia,” Terrorism Monitor, February 21, 2007, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=1281

This article first appeared in the July 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Top Darfur Rebel Commander Captured in South Kordofan

Andrew McGregor

July 28, 2011

After several weeks of conflicting reports from Khartoum regarding the presence or absence of fighters from Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Sudanese state of South Kordofan, a military spokesman has announced the capture of a leading JEM commander, Brigadier General al-Tom Hamid Toto, in a battle between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and a combined force of JEM rebels and Nuba rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (for the war in South Kordofan, see Terrorism Monitor, July 1).

JEM Fighters: A Highly Mobile Force

SAF spokesman Colonel al-Sawarmi Khalid Sa’ad said the JEM commander would soon face trial in Khartoum. The official Sudan News Agency (SUNA) quoted the JEM Brigadier confirming his arrest, which he said happed after his vehicle was destroyed by shelling, during which he sustained a head injury. Toto added that his force had received logistical support from the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) during the JEM incursion into South Kordofan (SUNA, July 21).

A combined SPLA/JEM press release later confirmed the capture of three fighters, including two commanders, Brigadier Toto and Commander A. Zaki. The joint force reported overrunning the SAF garrison in al-Tais (25 km south of the state capital of Kadugli) in a battle that lasted from July 10 to July 17, killing 150 SAF troops and seizing large quantities of light and heavy machine guns, artillery, RPGs and anti-aircraft missiles. The statement also warned the prisoners must be treated as prisoners of war, a status Khartoum has routinely denied to JEM fighters [1] After earlier denials, the battle and the capture of Brigadier Toto led to an SAF admission that it was indeed fighting JEM units in South Kordofan, but said the rebel alliance would make little difference to the region’s balance of power (Sudan Tribune, July 18). The commander of the SAF’s 5th Brigade, Fadl al-Mula Muhammad Ahmad, claimed that government forces had “inflicted enormous losses of life and property” on the joint JEM/SPLA forces at al-Tais (Sudan Tribune, July 22).

Though Khartoum seemed reluctant to admit JEM was again operating in Kordofan, the chief of Sudan’s Joint General Staff, Lieutenant General Ismat Abdul Rahman Zain al-Abdin, claimed that the SAF had anticipated the revolt of the Nuba SPLA in June by learning of a plan to ally the Nuba fighters with a rebel faction from Darfur prior to announcing the confederation of South Kordofan with the new state in South Sudan (Sudanese Media Center, June 27).

JEM has lately been threatening to mount a new attack on the national capital of Khartoum. Elements of a massive 2008 long-distance desert raid reached the suburbs of Omdurman (Khartoum’s sister city on the west bank of the Nile), but fizzled out there under counter-attacks by local security forces before entering Khartoum proper (see Terrorism Monitor, May 15, 2008).

JEM has also made several raids from Darfur into Kordofan since 2006:

  • JEM forces joined other Darfur rebels in a raid on Hamrat al-Shaykh in Northern Kordofan in July 2006 (al-Sahafa [Khartoum], July 4, 2006).
  • On August 29, 2007, four columns of JEM fighters seized a Sudanese military base at Wad Banda (West Kordofan) for several hours, killing at least 41 SAF troops and taking large quantities of weapons and ammunition (SUNA, August 31, 2007, Sudan Tribune, August 31, 2007; see also Terrorism Focus, September 11, 2007).
  • In October, 2007 JEM seized Chinese-operated facilities at the Defra oil field in South Kordofan as a warning to China to cease its support for Khartoum (Reuters, October 25, 2007; October 29, 2007).
  • A JEM force attempted to take Chinese oil facilities at al-Rahaw (South Kordofan) in November 2007. JEM claimed to have taken al-Rahaw, but the SAF claimed they were driven off.
  • JEM officials said the local Arab Missiriya had joined them in a December, 2007 raid on the Heglig oil field in South Kordofan, the most important oil field in Sudan (Reuters, December 11, 2007).

Though Khartoum professes to be unworried, it is almost certain that there is major concern in the capital over a possible alignment between JEM and the Nuba SPLA or the GoSS, which now has one of the largest armies in Africa. Khartoum has hinted at such a development for years and was likely alarmed by the appearance of a high-level JEM delegation in Juba during the July 9 South Sudan independence celebrations. The JEM leaders held talks with SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – the political wing of the SPLA) leaders and conveyed a written message from JEM leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune, July 10).

JEM and the other major rebel movements in Darfur have abstained from the Doha peace talks, which Khartoum says will be the last opportunity for negotiations. The head of the government delegation at Doha, Dr. Amin Hassan Omar, claimed on July 22 that JEM leader Dr. Ibrahim Khalil had been arrested by Libyan intelligence (Radio Omdurman, July 22). Though this has not been confirmed, Khalil had been staying in Libya after being expelled from Chad when N’Djamena and Khartoum agreed to stop hosting each other’s rebel movements in January 2010 (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, January 21, 2010).  Last February, the movement appealed to the United Nations to rescue the JEM leader from Libya, saying his life was in danger as a result of Khartoum’s allegations that JEM fighters were acting as mercenaries in Qaddafi’s military (Reuters, February 28). [2]

Note

1. “Joint JEM/SPLA Forces defeat SAF in South Kordofan: A Military Statement,” http://www.sudanjem.com/2011/07/52292/

2. See Andrew McGregor: “Update on African Mercenaries: Have Darfur Rebels Joined Qaddafi’s Mercenary Defenders?” Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary, February 24, 2011,  https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=1082

This article was originally published in the July 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Burkina Faso Carries Out Mass Arrests of Military Mutineers

Andrew McGregor

July 21, 2011

In the wake of months of violent rioting by Burkina Faso’s military, police and civilians, the leaders of the West African nation’s military have announced the dismissal of 556 soldiers, 217 of whom will face charges ( L’Observateur Paalga [Ouagadougou], July 14; LeFaso.net, July 15). The move was announced at a press conference held by the Chief of General Staff of the Forces armées nationales (FAN), Brigadier General Naber Traoré and Brigadier General Diendéré Gilbert (FasoZine [Oougadougou], July 14).

General Nabéré Honoré Traoré (left) and General Gilbert Diendéré (right)

The Burkinabé armed forces have received extensive military assistance and training from the United States in recent years. Many officers have gone to the United States for additional training and the army is an important element in the U.S.-backed Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 4, 2010).

President Blaise Compaoré has angered many in the country by announcing his intention to run for yet another term in 2015 in defiance of Article 37 of the Burkinabé constitution, which forbids a president from seeking more than two terms (L’Observateur Paalga [Ouagadougou], July 7). Compaoré came to power in a 1987 coup that saw the murder of his predecessor, the charismatic Captain Thomas Sankara, who had himself taken power in a 1983 Libyan supported coup organized by Compaoré. Compaoré initially ruled alongside two long term allies and fellow Marxists, Captain Henri Zongo and Major Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani, but in 1989 he abandoned Marxism and had both men arrested, quickly tried and executed on charges of trying to overthrow the government. Since then he has been re-elected four times in disputed elections that saw him win vast majorities. Observers have cited the “Burkinabé Paradox,” referring to the nation’s steady economic growth over the past five years and the complete lack of impact this has had on the country’s stifling poverty (Jeune Afrique, June 26). Wealth distribution remains largely limited to the small national elite tied to President Campaoré.

The military protests occurring across Burkina Faso typically consist of troops taking to the streets, firing randomly or into the air, pillaging shops and destroying property. Incidents of rape have also been reported. Their grievances usually consist of demands for better pay, an end to cronyism and political bias in promotions and an end to corruption in the officer corps, which the troops say fails to represent their interests  (L’Observateur Paalga [Ouagadougou], July 7).

Civilian unrest began in the town of Koudougou (100 km west of Ouagadougou) on February 22, with demonstrators protesting the high cost of living and the culture of impunity and use of torture in the police that allegedly led to the death of a student in detention. The protests were received by tear gas and bullets and after two days of violence, six people were dead and the protests began to spread to other cities where police stations were burned and businesses looted (AFP, April 22). Strikes have spread to various economic sectors, including gold mines and the all-important cotton industry.

The military unrest began in late March when soldiers forcibly freed some colleagues from a prison in Fada N’Gourma who had been arrested for rape and other sex crimes (AFP, April 7).

On April 14 and 15, members of the Régiment de sécurité présidentielle (RSP – Presidential Guard) rioted until they received overdue wages and housing and food allowances they had been promised. During their rampage they looted the capital, stole cars and motorcycles and committed numerous acts of rape (AFP, April 20). The president fled the capital to his home town of Ziniaré. Army chief General Dominique Djindjéré, whose home was burned down by rioting RSP members, was replaced by Brigadier Honoré Naber Traoré on April 15 as part of sweeping changes in the military and police leadership (AFP, April 15). From Ouagadougou the unrest spread to the cities of Po, Tengkodogo and Kaya, where troops torched the home of a regimental commander and looted the home of the regional military chief (AFP, April 18).

On April 17, soldiers from the Po garrison near the Ghana border took over the town, looting, stealing vehicles and firing into the air in a three day rampage that also included a number of cases of rape (AFP, April 17).

Newly-appointed Prime Minister Luc Adolphe Tiao committed to subsidizing some essential goods and compensating victims of military and police mutinies in late April. Tiao, a journalist and former ambassador with no experience in governance, appointed a new cabinet in mid-April, but the 15 new ministers were all closely tied to the President (AFP, April 22). Campaoré himself became the new Defense Minister. All regional governors in Burkina Faso were later replaced on June 8, though three governors were simply transferred to different regions. Another three are active soldiers in the Burkinabé military (AFP, June 9).

On April 27 and 28, police officers in Ouagadougou defied a curfew and took to the streets, firing their weapons into the air to demand better pay and working conditions. Gunfire was also reported in Bobo Dioulasso (Burkina Faso’s second largest city), Dedougou, Gaoua and Banfora (Xinhua, April 28). Police agreed to end country-wide protests following two days of negotiations with the government. Large numbers of students gathered on April 20 to protest the police mutiny by setting fire to a police station, but were met with live fire from the police (AFP, April 29).  Soon after the police mutinies, national police chief Rasmane Ouangraoua was sacked and replaced by the former police commissioner in Ouagadougou (AFP, May 5).

National Gendarmerie officers from Camp Paspanga in Ouagadougou spent the night of May 23 firing their weapons into the air to demand bonuses similar to those granted to the Presidential Guard. Just as they returned to barracks in the morning, students took to the streets as part of a nation-wide protest in support of striking professors. At the same time, protesters in Koudougou burned down the mayor’s house to protest the closure of 40 businesses that had failed to pay taxes (AFP, April 28).

The looting and random gunfire of riotous troops that persisted throughout the night of June 2 in Bobo Dioulasso was followed the next day by tradesmen and businessmen attacking the city hall, customs office and several other government buildings. The city’s mayor, Salia Sanou, did not find their reaction surprising: “They have had enough. I understand them. We promised to compensate them yesterday [for an earlier episode of military looting]. They kept their calm and now they get looted again” (AFP, June 2).

On June 3, the once-more loyal Presidential Guard teamed up with a unit of para-commandos and local police to put down the Bobo Dioulasso mutiny. Six mutineers were killed (as well as a teenage girl caught in the crossfire) and 57 arrested. The use of force was authorized after state intelligence informed the president the looting mutineers were being joined by former soldiers, men from other camps and even some who had nothing to do with the military (Jeune Afrique, June 26).

The breakdown in security and military discipline in Burkina Faso is especially worrisome in a region where elements of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have been highly active in recent months.

This article was originally published in the July 21, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Hundreds of Egyptian Police Dismissed as Troops Riot in Alexandria

Andrew McGregor

July 21, 2011

As protesters return to the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities to try to force an acceleration in the pace of post-revolutionary political reform, Egypt’s Interior Ministry has dismissed 669 police officers, including many senior officials, as part of an effort to reform a police force that has come to be associated with torture, extrajudicial activities and a culture of impunity.

Interior Minister Mansur al-Essawy

The July 13 announcement by recently appointed Interior Minister Mansur al-Essawy came as demonstrators continue to demand justice for the deaths of nearly 900 protesters in the January 25 popular uprising. The Minister assured viewers on state TV that 37 of the dismissed officers would face charges related to the killings (Ittihad al-Idha’ah wa’l-Tilifizyun al-Misri [Egyptian Radio and Television Union – ERTU], July 13). [1]

Former Finance Minister Yusuf Boutros Ghali, who reportedly has dual Egyptian-American citizenship, has apparently fled Egyptian corruption charges by fleeing to New York via the UK after the U.S. ambassador to the UK interceded repeatedly to prevent his arrest and deportation to Egypt (Youm7.com, July 18; Bikya Masr, July 18). Several other ministers have received acquittals on corruption charges, angering many Egyptians.

In the current tense environment, it takes little to spark major incidents. On July 17, a soldier of the Alexandria garrison was struck by a superior officer for refusing to go on night duty. A rumor spread quickly that the soldier had been beaten to death, followed by angry soldiers taking to the streets, burning their mattresses and vehicles before gathering to clash with their officers. Security officials defused the situation by convincing the troops that their colleague was alive and receiving medical treatment. According to the official medical report, the soldier had fainted after suffering an epileptic fit, though the officer involved was suspended pending investigation (Bikya Masr, July 18; Ahram Online, July 18).

While most eyes were focused on the events in Cairo’s Tahrir square during the late January revolution, some of the worst police violence occurred in Suez, where 29 people were killed and nearly 1,000 others injured in the early days of the uprising. Though seven police officers, including the former police directorate chief, were charged in connection with the shooting of peaceful demonstrators, their release on bail on July 4 initiated a new series of angry demonstrations in the city’s al-Arbaein square that quickly spread to Port Tawfik. With the trial adjourned until September, local residents will commence a symbolic “peoples’ trial” of the officers in al-Arbaein square. Presiding over the trial will be the deputy head of the Court of Cassation, Mahmoud al-Khodairy, a well-known critic of the Mubarak regime (Daily News Egypt, July 17).

Many police officers have never returned to work after the revolution, some fearing retribution from an angry public. Some other members of the security forces, however, appear to still have faith in the pre-revolutionary culture of immunity.  On July 15, some members of the military police attempted to bypass a queue for fuel at a filling station in Qalyubiya Governorate. They were told to return to the end of the queue, but instead returned several hours later and abducted the staff,  taking them to a military post where they were stripped and beaten all night (al-Masry al-Youm, July 18). Similar cases of police abuses continue to be reported across Egypt.

Note

1. For the internal collapse of the Interior Ministry, see “Egypt’s Internal Security Service Collapses in a Storm of Charges and Revelations,” Terrorism Monitor, April 7, 2011.

This article was originally published in the July 21, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Taliban Hail End of Canadian Combat Mission in Afghanistan but Predict Disaster for New Training Mission

Andrew McGregor

July 14, 2011

The Afghan Taliban have released a statement on the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan following the scheduled withdrawal of Canadian troops from combat operations on July 7. Entitled “Remarks of the Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Withdrawal of the Canadian Invading Forces from Afghanistan,” the statement by Qari Mohammad Yusuf Ahmadi appeared on numerous jihadi website forums (Ansar1.info, July 8).

Leopard Tank of Lord Strathcona’s Horse in Kandahar Province

Since the arrival in Afghanistan of special operations forces in December 2001, the Canadian contingent has fought numerous battles against Taliban forces, losing 157 soldiers during their deployment, the majority to improvised explosive devices.  The current force of 2,850 soldiers will be replaced by a team of 950 troops assigned to train the Afghanistan National Army (ANA).

According to the Taliban spokesman, the Canadians “sustained heavy casualties in various attacks at the hands of mujahideen, compelling them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan… In addition to the life loss, the heavy economic burden of the war dawned on the people and members of the Parliament of Canada to press the ruling regime in Canada to withdraw their forces.”

Contrary to Qari Yusuf’s claims, there was majority support in Parliament for the mission, which started under a Liberal Party government and continued under the current Conservative Party government. Opposition did come from the separatist Bloc Québécois and the socialist New Democratic Party of Canada, which has called for immediate withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan since 2006.

Qari Yusuf suggests Canadians ask their government and military just what has been accomplished in Afghanistan other than immense loss of life and equipment. If a satisfactory answer cannot be provided, Canadians should intervene to prevent the deployment of the new training mission. The Taliban spokesman warns that “the new mission of Canada under the name of military training will bring in only losses and bitter outcome like the precedent of their war mission…”

Several days after the statement, the deputy commander of the new Canadian training mission, Colonel Peter Dawe, appeared to dampen expectations of the mission in an interview with Canadian state television: “I have concerns. Nobody in the mission is naive. We’re optimistic but not naive. …We’re not in the business of making guarantees. We certainly won’t guarantee success… Afghans don’t need to be taught how to fight. They just need to be given the critical enablers” (CBC, July 10).

JTF2Joint Task Force 2 (Ottawa Citizen)

The Canadian contribution to the Afghanistan campaign began with the deployment in October, 2001 of some 40 members of the highly secretive Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) special operations group as part of the American-led Task-Force KBAR. In 2004, the Canadian unit was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by the United States for its work in Afghanistan. It was the second time the award was given to a Canadian unit, having been won in the Korean War at the Battle of Kapyong by the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI).

Over the last ten years, the Canadian military has deployed artillery, armor, special operations units and (in rotation) all three infantry regiments of the regular army, supported by volunteers from Canada’s reserve units. The air arm of the Canadian military mission (Task Force Silver Dart) provided support with helicopters, Heron unmanned aerial vehicles and CC-130 Hercules tactical airlift transports.  In a deployment originally scheduled to last only until October 2003, Canadian troops were stationed at Kabul from 2002 until 2006, when they redeployed to the volatile Kandahar Province of Afghanistan. On July 7, command of their sector was handed over to the U.S. military.

This article was originally published in the July 14, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Chadian Regime and Rebels Alike Welcome Talk of Ending French Military Presence

Andrew McGregor

July 14, 2011

Indications from Paris that France may be ready to bring an end to Opération Épervier, its 25-year-old military mission in Chad, have been welcomed by both the government of President Idriss Déby and General Mahamat Nouri, commander of one of Chad’s leading rebel movements. The French mission has both a land and air component and is based in two places; the airport at the capital of N’Djamena in the west and Abéché (former capital of the Sultanate of Wadai) in the east. Three Mirage 2000 jet fighters form part of the mission as do roughly 1,000 troops, mostly of the French Foreign Legion.

French Foreign Legion Unit in Chad

During talks with Chad in Paris on July 5, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe suggested that there was no longer any reason for France to continue keeping roughly 1,000 French troops in Chad. A senior official of the Chadian Foreign Ministry said N’Djamena had no objections: “Chad is prepared to begin negotiations with French authorities as early as next week… Épervier has been in Chad for 25 years. It is time to review this structure to adapt to the current context” (AFP, July 6).

General Mahamat Nouri, the leader of the rebel Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique (ANCD) said he was “very pleased” with the remarks of the French Foreign Minister, acknowledging that the rebels “would probably be in power were it not for the French troops.” The general also hailed what he described as the French “determination to pursue a transparent, credible foreign policy in line with its historical and cultural values” (AFP, July 6). Nouri, along with other Chadian rebel leaders living in Sudan, was expelled to Doha last year after the rapprochement between N’Djamena and Khartoum.

Chad was formed as a territory of France after the conquest of a number of small sultanates and the expulsion of the Libyan Sanusis in the early years of the 20th century. The territory eventually gained independence in 1960, though economic and security ties with France remained strong.

  1. Foreign Legion BiltineOperation Épervier: 2e régiment étranger de parachutistes ( 2e REP) at Biltine, Chad

Opération Épervier (Sparrowhawk) began in 1986 to supply French military assistance to the regime of Hissène Habré when the Libyan army tried to seize the uranium-rich Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. When General Déby overthrew the increasingly brutal Habré in 1990 the French mission did not interfere. Habré fled to Senegal where he remained safe since Senegal had no law regarding “crimes against humanity” on its books and also wanted to avoid the considerable cost involved in trying a former head-of-state for the murders of over 40,000 individuals. Senegal recently decided to extradite Habré to Chad but reversed itself at the urging of UN human rights chief Navi Pillay, who warned  Habré could be tortured if returned to Chad. Belgium has now offered to try Habré under its “universal competence” law (Reuters, July 11; AFP, July 11).

Much has changed in Chad since 2008, when Déby and his loyalists fought off a Sudanese-supported rebel invasion in the streets of N’Djamena with intelligence and logistical assistance from the French military. Deby’s new confidence no doubt arises from the pact he signed with Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, in which both sides pledged to end their proxy war along the Chad-Sudan border. Though such pacts have collapsed in the past, this time Sudan is likely to be consumed by its own internal problems for a considerable time following the independence of South Sudan. Déby has also worked to fortify N’Djamena to prevent a repeat of the 2008 rebel assault. A three-meter deep trench has been built around the city to force all traffic to enter through fortified gateways. Many of N’Djamena’s trees have also been cut down to prevent rebels from using them to block roads (Reuters, March 3, 2008; BBC, March 4, 2008).

During last August’s celebration of 50 years of Chadian independence, Déby suggested it was time to begin charging France for maintaining a military presence in Chad. According to the President, Operation Epervier no longer played a role in Chad aside from “providing some healthcare for the sick and logistical support in case of an attack somewhere… We have no defense accord with France. And the presence of Épervier has nothing to do with our independence or our sovereignty. Épervier is not here to help or support a government or a regime.” (Le Figaro, August 26, 2010).

Déby may face new security challenges in northern Chad, where a trade system based on supplies from Libya has broken down, causing severe shortages of many commodities in the region (Le Monde, July 7). There are some 70,000 Chadian workers who have been expelled from Libya due to the civil war as well as fears of arms reaching Chadian insurgents and criminals from uncontrolled weapons depots in Libya.

There is also speculation that Déby is seeking to replace the historical relationship with France with a less intrusive economic partnership with China. Ties with China have been steadily increasing since 2006 and the China National Petroleum Corporation has just started operations at a joint venture oil refinery outside of N’Djamena (Xinhua, July 1).

In a related development, a French court has found four men guilty of “robbery leading to death without intention to kill” in the death of Déby’s son, Brahim Déby. A resident of Paris with previous convictions for drugs and weapons possession, Brahim Déby was attacked with a taser gun and covered in fire extinguisher foam in a 2007 robbery that prosecutors said had no political connection (Le Monde, July 7; Radio France Internationale, July 8).

This article was originally published in the July 14, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Uganda Reorganizes Military to Press War against Somalia’s al-Shabaab

Andrew McGregor

July 7, 2011

Even as Somalia’s fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG) threatens to collapse, Uganda is shaking up its military structure in order to sustain what it sees as some hard-won momentum in its struggle with al-Shabaab militants in Mogadishu. Uganda is the driving force behind the African Union’s “peace-enforcement” effort in Somalia – the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The AU’s military presence in Somalia began with a lone contingent from the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in 2007. Despite pledges of assistance from several African nations, Uganda continues to supply roughly two-thirds of the 9,000 strong AMISOM force, the remainder consisting of a contingent of Burundian troops. Ugandan officers tend to dominate AMISOM’s highest posts.

Acting Lieutenant Colonel Paddy Ankunda

In the wake of a devastating attack by al-Shabaab that killed Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Sibihwa and 12 other Ugandan soldiers in Mogadishu on June 3, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni made a secret visit to the Somali capital to assess the situation and raise the morale of Ugandan troops (Observer [Kampala], June 16). Sibihwa was the first high-ranking AMISOM officer to be killed in the fighting and was a 27 year veteran of the UPDF (New Vision, June 12). The death in the Ugandan military hospital from incompetent medical care of seven soldiers injured in the attack has led to an inquiry concerning the possibility some military doctors are working with forged academic qualifications to take advantage of the generous compensation and captain’s rank offered to medical school graduates to serve in the UPDF (Observer [Kampala], July 3).

While Museveni, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, made sweeping changes in the officer corps, there were important changes in the leadership of the Ugandan AMISOM contingent. Three majors working in Mogadishu, Chris Ogumiraki, Joab Ndahura (1st battalion commander) and Paddy Ankunda were promoted to acting lieutenant colonels (Observer [Kampala], June 29). Ankunda is the public face of AMISOM, acting as its communications director and spokesman.

Major General Nathan Mugisha

In the most important move, Major General Nathan Mugisha was replaced as AMISOM chief by Ugandan chief of artillery and air defense Brigadier Fred Mugisha (no known relation). The appointment takes effect in September, when AMISOM is expected to make its final push to seize Mogadishu’s Bakara Market, an al-Shabaab stronghold. Brigadier Mugisha has been promoted to Major General while Nathan Mugisha will remain in Mogadishu as the deputy Ugandan ambassador. The new AMISOM chief has taken courses in intelligence and counterterrorism in the former Soviet Union (1987-1989) and the United States (Daily Monitor, June 15). The change in overall command follows an earlier change of the commander of the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM. Colonel Michael Ondoga was promoted to Brigadier and sent for studies in the United States and replaced by Colonel Paul Lokech (New Vision [Kampala], June 15). Service in AMISOM is seen as a prestigious posting and an important factor in promotion for Ugandan and Burundian officers (Daily Nation [Nairobi], June 20).

AMISOM will also be supplied with four drone aircraft as part of $45 million worth of military aid going to Uganda and Burundi. The package includes communications equipment, body armor, night vision equipment, generators, surveillance systems and heavy construction equipment. Training will also be made available (AP, June 26).

The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) supplied to AMISOM are small hand-launched aircraft designed for day or night aerial surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance. With a wing-span of 4.5 feet and a weight just over four pounds, the AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven has a flight time of 60 to 90 minutes in an operational radius of 6.2 miles. The drones should provide enhanced intelligence collection in Mogadishu’s urban warfare environment.

The U.S. announcement came six weeks after U.S. Africa Command chief General Carter Ham held talks in Uganda with President Yoweri Museveni regarding the situation in Somalia. According to an official at the U.S. mission in Kampala, the United States has “and will continue to provide equipment, training and some logistical support to Ugandan and Burundian soldiers” (Daily Monitor [Kampala], July 4). In March, Uganda and Burundi pledged to supply another 4,000 troops to the AU mission in Somalia (SunaTimes, July 2; Raxanreeb Radio, July 2).

The increased U.S. support for AMISOM coincides with a new campaign of strikes on al-Qaeda suspects in Somalia by American Predator UAVs. While TFG officials do not appear to be informed prior to U.S. drone attacks, Defense Minister Abdulhakim Haji Faqi has encouraged further strikes: “We welcome it … We urge the U.S. to continue its strikes against al-Shabaab, because if it keeps those strikes up, it will be easier for us to defeat al-Shabaab” (al-Arabiya, July 4).

According to the commander of the Ugandan contingent of AMISOM, Colonel Paul Lokech, the Ugandan military has had to develop new skills in fighting a modern urban counterinsurgency in terrain very unlike that of Uganda:

We are involved in urban-warfare, which is majorly counter-terrorism in an urban terrain. Therefore, the tactics and the way you maneuver here is slightly different from the way you maneuver in an open savannah land. In the savannah, you can move faster. In a built up area like Mogadishu, you must restrict the pace of your movement. Therefore, you have to move very slowly. You must move consciously to minimize casualties (Daily Monitor [Kampala], June 25).

Al-Shabaab has reinforced its positions in Mogadishu with deep trenches, tunnels connecting buildings and barriers made from shipping containers. According to Colongel Paul Lokech, the militants have borrowed their defensive plans from the Chechen defense of Grozny in 1999-2000 (Daily Nation [Nairobi], June 22). UPDF chief General Aronda Nyakairima recently noted: “In Mogadishu even taking half a street takes a lot of planning. We need more soldiers to add to what we have from Burundi and Uganda, more boats to control the ocean, more helicopters” (Daily Nation [Nairobi], June 20). AMISOM has been much criticized in Somalia for indiscriminate fire in civilian neighborhoods, but tries to win popularity through the provision of free medical care and the supply of much needed food and water to the long-suffering residents of Mogadishu.

Ugandan journalists have noted the absence of TFG troops from the frontlines, where Ugandan and Burundian troops are often involved in intense firefights with al-Shabaab militants. Ugandan officers have noted the poor organization of the TFG fighters and their tendency to favor clan above national or other loyalties (Daily Monitor, June 25).

Museveni has also been busy on the diplomatic front in Somalia, mediating the Kampala Accord, designed to break the political deadlock between Somali president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad and Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Shaykh Aden. The accord calls for the resignation of Prime Minister Muhammad Abdullahi Muhammad “Farmajo,” a move that appears to have only made things worse, with the popular prime minister refusing to resign and his supporters filling the streets in protest. The transitional government’s mandate expires on August 23. With the TFG’s existence relying mostly on Ugandan support, Yoweri Museveni is increasingly seen as the most powerful individual in determining the future of Somalia.

This article was originally published in the July 7, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Mali and Mauritania Conduct Joint Operations against al-Qaeda Base

Andrew McGregor

July 7, 2011

Fighting continues along the Mali-Mauritania border as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) mounted a July 5 raid on the Mauritanian military base at Bassiknou, in the southeast corner of the country. Mauritanian security sources claim as many as 20 AQIM fighters were slain in the attack, which was repulsed after a half hour of heavy fighting. An AQIM statement claimed only two fighters were killed in the “well prepared” operation that was “carried out with top mujahideen leaders” (Agence Nouakchott d’Information, July 6). Mauritanian air and ground forces were pursuing the raiders to the Malian border. The AQIM assault appears to have been in retaliation for the destruction of an AQIA base in Mali on June 24.

Malian Troops in Training

Joint Malian-Mauritanian military operations in western Mali led to the discovery and destruction of the AQIM base roughly 70 km from the border with Mauritania. The camp was found in the Wagadu Forest in the Nara cercle (subdivision) of the Kouikoro region of western Mali.

Joint operations in the area involving hundreds of soldiers began on June 21 after reports emerged that suspected AQIM members were planting mines in the area around a new AQIM camp. Suspicions were confirmed on June 22, when a camel was blown up after stepping on a mine (AFP, June 24).

The AQIM camp was discovered and destroyed in a June 24 attack. Two Mauritanian soldiers were killed when their vehicle struck a mine at the entrance to the camp, but otherwise AQIM took the worst of it in the heavy fighting that followed the surprise strike. Some 15 AQIM fighters were killed and the rest fled into the bush. Locals reported seeing some fugitives heading north toward the Sahara (AFP, June 26; June 28). It was possibly some of these fighters who regrouped to help mount the attack on the Bassiknou military base.

Mauritanian military sources said the AQIM camp had housed anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that posed a threat to national security. The origin of the weapons was unclear – there are concerns that AQIM has procured weapons from Libyan stockpiles during the ongoing rebellion in that country.

AQIM released a statement on July 4 claiming the raid had been “a crushing defeat” for the Mauritanian military, which it suggested had lost 20 soldiers and 12 army vehicles in the attack, to a loss of only two AQIM members. The statement accused Mauritania’s leaders of carrying out a “proxy war on behalf of France” and said the AQIM unit was under the command of veteran Mauritanian militant Khalid al-Shanqiti (a.k.a. Mahfouz Ould al-Walid) (AFP, July 4). Algerian AQIM commander Yahya Abou Hamam has also been reported to be active in the Wagadou Forest area with the largely Mauritanian “al-Mourabitun Battalion” (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], June 25).

The successful operation nonetheless incurred the ire of the Mauritanian opposition on the grounds it had endangered the lives of soldiers and civilians without consulting parliament (PANA Online [Dakar], June 30). Others suggested the operation would only have a “negative impact” on counter-terrorism efforts and asked why Mauritanian troops were alone in the fight and without the assistance of their counter-terrorism partners, Algeria, Mali and Niger (Sahara Media, June 27). Questions have also been raised about the state of Mali’s sovereignty as Mauritanian troops carry out their third military operation in Mali (Le Republicain [Bamako], June 24).

Malian troops apparently did not take part in the actual attack on the AQIM camp, but were involved along with Mauritanian troops and aircraft in searching for AQIM elements that had escaped the raid (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], June 25). The searchers were forced to proceed with caution, fearing both mines and ambushes in the rough bush country. Mine-clearing teams went to work in the area but were unable to prevent three civilians being killed by a mine on June 28 (Le Combat [Bamako], June 27; AFP, June 28).

Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré made extensive changes in early June to the leadership of the armed forces involved in combatting al-Qaeda, removing a number of officers suspected of collaboration with local criminals assisting bandits and terrorists (Le Politicien [Bamako], June 23).

Mauritania has serious concerns over repeated AQIM raids and infiltrations carried out across the border with Mali. Last February, three vehicles from Mali containing suspected AQIM operatives were intercepted by Mauritanian security forces outside the capital of Nouakchott. It was believed the suspects intended to kill Mauritanian president Muhammad Ould Abdel Aziz with a powerful car bomb, which was detonated by a mortar shell during the fighting, leaving three terrorists dead, nine soldiers wounded and a bomb crater eight meters deep (see Terrorism Monitor Briefs, February 10). Mauritanian security forces were searching Nouakchott in late June for three armed AQIM suspects believed to have infiltrated from Mali to carry out a suicide bombing (Sahara Media, June 22).

This article was originally published in the July 7, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Nigerian Salafists Follow “Martyrdom Operation” with Call for Jihad

Andrew McGregor

July 1, 2011

nigerian salafistsAftermath of the Police Headquarters Bombing

Styling themselves as the Muwahiddin [Unitarians], a common self-appellation for Wahhabists and Salafists, Nigeria’s Islamist extremists have shared a number of their goals and aims in a statement carried on jihadist websites entitled “Demands of the Muwahiddin to the Tawaghit [those who rule without recourse to the Shari’a] and their Allies in Nigeria” (ansar1.info, June 21). The statement is allegedly penned by “Abu Muwahid” for the Brigades of Tawhid [Oneness of God] Publications.

The statement claims that the June 16 car bombing of the national police headquarters in Abuja (described here as a “martyrdom” or suicide bombing) had thrown the Nigerian tawaghit into a state of confusion and panic, leading them to seek negotiations with the Islamist militants (or Boko Haram, though the movement is not mentioned by name in the statement; For the bombing, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 23). However, the Islamists indicate that they have no interest in pursuing talks with the government: “One major thing they forgot in their consideration of negotiation is that our millah [religion], the millah of Ibrahim, forbids negotiating with all those who have rejected the supremacy of Allah’s Shari’a and all those who have taken themselves as lords besides Allah.”

Reacting to suggestions that a combination of incentives and amnesty might bring Boko Haram to the negotiating table much as it did southern Nigeria’s Movement to Emancipate the Niger Delta (MEND), the Salafists responded: “They initially thought that our ideology could be bought off with materialism like the MEND Militants of the Niger Delta region. Our ideology is far from materialism; it is an ideology that abhors shirk [polytheism] and kufr [disbelief] and seeks to eradicate the tawaghit and all their allies in the whole universe, such that the earth will become purified and all ibadah [worship] will then be directed solely to Allah.”

In addressing Nigeria’s Islamic scholars, the Muwahiddin raise the issue of colonialism, asking the scholars if they have “forgotten the pains of your fathers in the hands of the white monkeys?,” while reminding them it would be treacherous to be seen in the forefront of the grandchildren of former Nigerian colonial governors such as “Lugard, Richard, MacPherson and other white criminals whose hegemony still reigns over our head after 108 years.” [1]

With the first claimed suicide bombing in Nigeria, there are fears that others will follow, leaving Nigeria destitute of new foreign investment. As a statement from the Nigerian political party Action Congress of Nigeria (ANC) noted: “No foreign investor will wait for a travel advisory from his/her government before deciding not to visit a country where security is not guaranteed, where a drink in a pub can fetch one a bomb” (The Nation [Lagos], June 20). Meanwhile, the Nigerian police have backed away from their earlier belief that the bombing was a suicide attack, now stating instead that the evidence is inconclusive (Nigerian Tribune, June 23).

Much of the response of Nigeria’s many security services to the security crisis has consisted of trying to blame each other for the “intelligence failure” that President Goodluck Jonathan has identified as the cause of the ongoing violence in Borno and Bauchi states and its spread to the capital city of Abuja (Vanguard, June 26). Nigeria’s security services tend towards competition rather than cooperation, and intelligence sharing is a low priority.

The militants’ statement affirmed the loyalty of the Nigerian muwahiddin to the new al-Qaeda leader, “the Amir of our caravan, Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.” The Nigerian Salafists also expressed their appreciation for the work of leading Jordanian Salafi-Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, once the mentor of the late al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Salafist message also alludes to the arrival of foreign jihadists in Nigeria, who will “surely make Nigeria ungovernable the same way our brothers in Somalia have made the country ungovernable for the apostate stooge [Somali president Shaykh] Sharif [Shaykh] Ahmad.”

Even after the attempt to destroy the leadership and the Abuja headquarters of Nigeria’s national police, Boko Haram violence continues unabated in northern Nigeria. Twenty-five people were killed in Maiduguri on June 26 when motorcycle-riding militants threw bombs at local outdoor beer parlors (Vanguard, June 27).

Note:

1. Sir Frederick Lugard, Governor General of Nigeria, 1914-1919; Sir Arthur Richards, Governor of Nigeria, 1943-1948; Sir John Stuart MacPherson, Governor of Nigeria, 1948-1954, Governor General of Nigeria, 1954–1955.

This article first appeared in the July 1, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor