Monthly Archives: March 2022

Putin’s New Russian Empire is Suddenly on the Rocks: How the War in Ukraine Threatens Russian Interests in Sudan

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AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.3

March 24, 2022

Andrew McGregor

Blue and yellow flags carried by anti-government protesters are a new and unusual sight in the streets of Khartoum. However, these banners are less a show of support for besieged Ukrainians than a rejection of a Sudanese military regime that continues to grow closer to Russia even as President Vladimir Putin’s army carries out widely condemned atrocities and war crimes in a sovereign state. At stake is not only Sudan’s own sovereignty, but the ability of its rulers to offer food security and a path to development.

With the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudan ended over a quarter-century of military-Islamist rule. Though promises were made that a joint civilian-military transitional government would lead to a new era of democratic civilian rule, a military coup in October 2021 ended that experiment and led to the severing of most economic and financial ties to the West, including $US 700 million of American aid.

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency)

The junta’s leader, General ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, is typical of the Islamist military officers who enjoyed great power during al-Bashir’s rule, but his ambitious deputy, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” represents a new and growing power in Sudan as commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Created from the remnants of the infamous Janjaweed, the RSF was intended to serve as a paramilitary focused on establishing security in Darfur under the guidance of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS – now rebranded as the General Intelligence Services – GIS) rather than the military. The RSF quickly developed a reputation for atrocities and war crimes in restive Darfur. [1] Since then, it has exploited its independence to grow vastly in strength while establishing its own economic base. Besides serving as revenue-producing rental troops in Libya and Yemen, the RSF now acts as a regime-defending internal security force in most Sudanese cities, including the capital of Khartoum, where the RSF was accused of rapes, murders and massacres after al-Bashir’s overthrow.

With Western nations and international institutions avoiding any interaction with Sudan’s military rulers, Russia has helped provide diplomatic support for the coup leaders at the UN and elsewhere. Russia has also provided direct and indirect support to the Sudanese military and the RSF in return for access to Sudanese resources, especially gold, and an agreement to permit the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Internally, however, Khartoum’s dalliance with Putin’s Russia and the activities of Russian “Wagner Group” mercenaries closely tied to the Kremlin have aggravated opposition to the regime rather than appease it. There have been continuous street protests since the coup, with scores killed by security forces. The participation of Russian mercenaries in repressing popular opposition and manipulating information sources has scandalized many Sudanese. [2]

Rather than back off from an unpopular association with Moscow, Hemetti chose to lead an ill-timed and ill-advised eight-day mission to Moscow only one day before the invasion of Ukraine. Hemetti’s request for supplies of Russian arms and military assistance in exchange for a Red Sea naval base at the same time Russian troops were slaughtering Ukrainian civilians and Sudanese citizens were going hungry was met with disbelief in many quarters.

Sudan, like many other African nations, is a major consumer of Russian and Ukrainian wheat, these sources providing 35% of Sudan’s supply in 2021 (BNNBloomberg, March 15, 2022). Soaring prices for grain are not helped by the retreat of international donors after the military coup, including those agencies that might be the most helpful in securing affordable and reliable supplies. Despite this, Hemetti’s primary focus remained on obtaining weapons rather than provisions.

Sudan abstained on the UN General Assembly motion to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demand Russia’s immediate withdrawal. Despite intense diplomatic pressure from the US and the EU to condemn Russia’s invasion, the military-dominated Sovereign Council that currently governs Sudan would go no further than calling for negotiations and a diplomatic solution.

Sudan’s civilian opposition coalition, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), has condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and rejects Russian interference in Sudanese affairs. The National Umma Party (NUP), one of Sudan’s largest, was specific, objecting that Hemetti’s visit to Moscow did not serve Sudanese interests while declaring the invasion was an “unjust war against a free people to force them to give up their sovereignty” (Radio Dabanga, March 1, 2022). Though Russia’s growing presence and influence in Sudan appears to threaten Sudan’s sovereignty as well, events in Ukraine may reverse this trend and even threaten the African nation’s governing structure.

Sudanese Support for Russia – At a Cost

Hemetti and a large Sudanese delegation arrived in Moscow for a week-long visit on February 23, 2022, the day before the attack on Ukraine was launched. It was not Hemetti’s first trip to Moscow; in 2019 he visited on an arms-shopping mission. Since 2017, Sudan has been a leading purchaser of Russian arms, which now represent 50% of Sudanese purchases. [3]

Patrushev and Hemetti, February 25, 2022 (Sudan Tribune)

Notably, the delegation did not include a representative of the Sudanese armed forces. In Sudan, it is Hemetti’s RSF that works closely with Russian mercenaries of the infamous Wagner Group, who have been deployed in support of the military regime. One of Hemetti’s main concerns was reported to involve obtaining Russian weapons for his RSF as well as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) (Sudan Tribune, February 25, 2022). Among the high-end items sought by Hemetti were S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and Sukhoi Su-35 jet-fighters at a time when tensions with Ethiopia are high. Other countries, such as Egypt and Indonesia, have recently backed out of deals for the purchase of Su-35s due to their second-rate radar systems and the possibility of US sanctions designed to prevent large weapons purchases from Russia (Forbes, January 11, 2022).

Russian-made Sudanese Sukhoi Su-35 in Sudanese Colors (MilitaryWatchMagazine)

On arrival, Hemetti expressed his support for the independence of the two Russian-engineered republics in the Donbas regions and Russia’s military pressure on Ukraine, declaring: “The whole world must realize that [Russia] has the right to defend its people” (Sudan Tribune, February 24, 2022). Hemetti’s remarks seemed to echo Russian assertions that Putin is defending ethnic Russians from genocide at the hands of Ukrainian “Nazis.” Widely condemned almost immediately, Hemetti’s remarks created a diplomatic stir that Sudan’s Foreign Ministry addressed by stating: “We consider that publishing that statement in this manner is a deliberate distortion, taking the speech of the First Deputy out of context, and a cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters” (Sudan Tribune, February 24, 2022). Accused of war crimes himself in Darfur, Hemetti is unlikely to have any qualms about establishing closer ties to Putin’s Russia even as it commits war crimes in Ukraine.

An Arabic-language news-site based in London, al-Araby al-Jadid, claimed that al-Burhan told Egyptian authorities he suspected Hemetti and his RSF of planning a coup to replace him with another military figurehead (Sudan Tribune, February 26, 2022). Though al-Burhan is the senior figure in the junta that overthrew President Omar al-Bashir, Hemetti has emerged as the real power, as witnessed by his direct dealings with senior Russian officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, head of the Russian Federation Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin.

After Hemetti’s visit to Moscow, al-Burhan made a call to Saudi Arabia to talk to officials there about Red Sea security issues – in other words, a discussion of Hemetti’s views on allowing a Russian Red Sea naval base directly opposite the Saudi cities of Mecca and Jeddah.

Sudanese Gold, Russian Miners

In early March, an executive with a leading Sudanese gold company revealed to the Telegraph that Russia has been smuggling roughly 30 tonnes of gold from Sudan each year to build up its reserves and weaken the effect of sanctions imposed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Working in collusion with Hemetti and his RSF, Russian mining firm M-Invest (closely tied to the “Wagner Group”), through its local subsidiary Meroe Gold, has been smuggling gold in small planes from military airstrips (The Telegraph, March 3, 2022; Government.ru, November 24, 2017). In response to the allegations, Hemetti said the identity of the end buyers of smuggled Sudanese gold was unimportant; what mattered was who was selling the gold. The RSF chief claimed 40 individuals had already been arrested, but declined to provide any further information (VOA, March 10, 2022). Russian involvement in the Sudanese mining sector began in 2017 with the signing of several agreements between former president Omar al-Bashir and Vladimir Putin.

Sudan’s Minister of Minerals, Muhammad Bashir Abunmo, rejected the claims of Russian smuggling as “baseless accusations” devised to “justify the Western campaign against Russia.” The minister, a member of Minni Minnawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM), insisted that Meroe Gold produces only three tons of gold per year, and that much of that was retained by the Sudanese government (Sudan Tribune, March 12, 2022). The Sudanese acting ambassador to Russia, Onor Ahmad Onor, also rejected the claims: “I have nothing to say other than it is fake news and a story created from the imagination of the Telegraph reporter” (VOA, March 10, 2022). Moscow has also denied the allegations.

On Hemetti’s return, the opposition Forces for Freedom and Change, accused Russia of “stealing resources” and interfering in Sudanese affairs to support its role in “regional and international conflicts” (Middle East Monitor, March 3, 2022). Sudan desperately needs the gold to try to avert an economic collapse brought on by the military coup, so any losses due to smuggling will only contribute to the nation’s financial crisis.

Secret documents obtained by anti-corruption NGO Global Witness in 2020 revealed the complex financial network the RSF has established (including its own bank account in Abu Dhabi), allowing it to independently obtain 1,000 vehicles from Dubai suppliers, most of them Toyota 4x4s that can be converted to lightly armored, machine-gun mounted “technicals” of the type widely used in the Sahara and Sahel regions. Important parts of the network appear to be controlled by Hemetti’s younger brothers, Al-Goni Hamdan Daglo and ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daglo, the deputy head of the RSF. Much of the financing for this network comes from the al-Junaid gold company, which trades in the output of the RSF-controlled gold mines in the Jabal Amr region of Darfur, seized by the RSF in 2017. Al-Junaid is officially owned by ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daglo and his two sons (Global Witness, April 5, 2020).

RSF operations in Yemen provide another revenue stream, courtesy of financing provided by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to Hemetti: “People ask where do we get this money from? We have the salaries of our troops fighting abroad and our gold investments, money from gold and other investments” (Global Witness, December 9, 2019).

A Russian Naval Base on the Red Sea?

After extensive discussions, a 25-year agreement allowing the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s east coast was signed in 2017 by al-Bashir and Putin, though it was not immediately implemented. [4] The agreement, renewable for further ten-year terms with the consent of both parties, came as al-Bashir complained he needed Russian support to fend off alleged American aggression against Sudan. Under its conditions, Russia will be able to use the base and install 300 Russian personnel to support up to four Russian naval ships (including those powered by nuclear energy) operating in the Red Sea. In return, Sudan would receive Russian arms and other military equipment.

After President Putin authorized his Defense Ministry to establish the Russian base in November 2020, Prime Minister Mikhael Mishustin emphasized that the facility would be “defensive and not aimed against other countries” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 20, 2020). Russia describes the planned base as a “material-technical support facility.”

The agreement was suspended after Sudanese officials had second thoughts about certain clauses in 2021. Many civil and military leaders were less than enthusiastic about the project. Armed Forces chief-of-staff and former Sudanese point-man on the project, General Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Hussein, described the pact as including “clauses that were somewhat harmful to the country,” forcing a general review (AFP, June 2, 2021). Last September, Khartoum was reported to be seeking a modification of the terms surrounding the new Russian base to include not only arms as compensation, but also badly-needed economic assistance. The Sudanese also floated the idea of replacing the 25-year agreement with one covering only five years, with the potential of renewing the agreement up to a 25-year period (The Arab Weekly, September 16, 2021).

The stalled agreement was a focus of Hemetti’s visit to Moscow as the two parties moved towards implementation. On March 3, Hemetti declared: “We have 730 kilometres along the Red Sea. If any country wants to open a base and it is in our interests and doesn’t threaten our national security we have no problem in dealing with anyone, Russian or otherwise” (Reuters, March 3, 2022; AfricaNews, March 2, 2022). Hemetti, however, insisted that the decision was ultimately that of the defense minister, “so it is not my responsibility. But if there is any benefit from the base, in addition to its commitment to community responsibility, for the people of eastern Sudan, we do not object to its establishment” (Sudan Tribune, March 2, 2022).

Hemetti added that he was perplexed by the opposition to a Russian base in Sudan, pointing out that many African countries hosted military bases belonging to foreign powers. Authorities in Cairo were reported to be surprised and angered by Hemetti’s remarks, having no desire to see Russian naval ships patrolling off Egypt’s Red Sea coast near the entrance to the Suez Canal. A demand for clarification was issued almost immediately (Middle East Monitor, March 7, 2022). Egypt abandoned its initial neutral stance on the conflict in Ukraine to vote in favor of the UN General Assembly’s denunciation of the Russian invasion. The change came partly because of diplomatic pressure applied by Ukrainian and American representatives despite demands from the Russian ambassador that Egypt support the invasion.

The location of a Russian Red Sea base remains up in the air, however. Sudan’s Red Sea Coast is little developed, largely due to a lack of suitable ports and an extreme shortage of fresh water that limits population concentrations. Coastal navigation is complicated by numerous shoals, rocky islands and a massive coral reef running parallel to the coast that limits the number of approaches. Russia appears to have been under the impression they could build their naval facilities near Port Sudan, which has rail and road connections to Khartoum, or at the historical port of Suakin, some 50 km south of Port Sudan with access to the same transportation network. Both ports are located near passages through the reef. Suakin was replaced by Port Sudan during the British occupation in 1909 when it proved unable to accommodate seagoing warships and freighters with a deep draft, though modern dredging has helped improve access. The Sudanese coastal navy operates out of Flamingo Bay, just north of the commercial docks in Port Sudan.

Beja Tribesmen Protesting in Port Sudan – The Flag is that of the Beja Congress (al-Arabiya)

Port Sudan is located in Sudan’s unsettled Red Sea Province, where power struggles between the Hadendowa and Bani Amer branches of the Beja people have resulted in blockades of the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway and the closure of port terminals by protesters (Sudan Tribune, February 23, 2022). When Hemetti travelled to Port Sudan after his return from Moscow, he was met by large street protests partly inspired by local fears of a Russian takeover (Al-Jazeera, March 18, 2022).

Arakiyai – Port in the Middle of Nowhere (Map by Abdul-Razak M. Mohamed)

Last year, Sudanese military authorities, eager for Russian arms and training but wary of a permanent Russian military presence in Sudan, instead suggested a Russian base at Arakiyai, a tiny fishing village with no infrastructure well north of Port Sudan and served only by a minor coastal road from the south (Radio Dabanga, December 7, 2021). The village is rarely even marked on maps. Constructing a new and isolated Russian base at Arakiyai from scratch would be far more difficult and expensive than incorporating existing infrastructure at Port Sudan. Ultimately, it would mean a delay of several years before the base could become operational.

The presence of a Russian nuclear-powered fleet in the Red Sea would ultimately be unacceptable to the West, which relies on free access to the Suez Canal at the sea’s northern end for shipments of oil, resources and commercial products bound for Europe and beyond. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations, wary of a Russian-Iranian axis in the region, also object to a Russian naval base on the Sudanese coast.

Outlook

It seems difficult to believe that the Sudanese junta would have mounted their coup without some kind of understanding from Russia that they would step in to replace the economic support Sudan was receiving from the West. Even in better times, however, it was never realistic to expect that Russian investments could make up for the billions of dollars of financial support suspended by the EU, the US and the IMF/World Bank after the military coup. Regardless of the outcome of the Ukraine conflict, Russia’s economy is shattered for years to come and their arms stocks are being drained by the fighting. There will be no largesse, military or financial, from Moscow’s direction for some years to come. Hemetti, with a nation of hungry and impoverished citizens looking for leadership, may discover his Russian gambit to avoid troublesome “Western interference” will be his downfall. Until a democratic civilian government is soon installed in Khartoum, Sudan will be hard pressed to find financial assistance unless it turns to China, another authoritarian state that will seek major concessions in return for economic and military support.

Hemetti, with his third-grade education and no background in economics or international relations, is playing a dangerous game by allying the junta with Russia and committing to the establishment of a Russian naval base in the strategically sensitive Red Sea. Moscow cares nothing for the quality of life in Sudan; the Wagner Group even less. Though Hemetti can count on the support of the paramilitary RSF, he does not necessarily have the backing of the officer corps of the Sudanese army, including the chief of the ruling Sovereign Council, General ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan. Hemetti has essentially usurped the functions of Sudan’s foreign relations ministry, dealing with other nations on his own authority.

After Hemetti’s Moscow call, al-Burhan made a separate visit to his patrons in the United Arab Emirates, perhaps to shore up support in the event of a confrontation with Hemetti, who appears to be edging Sudan’s formal military leadership to the side. Hemetti’s rise and the inclusion of former Darfuri rebels in the Sudanese cabinet are indicators the growing political strength of Darfur’s Arab and indigenous African tribes in what has traditionally been the private reserve of the three great riverain Arab groups who live along the Nile north of Khartoum – the Ja’alin, the Danagla and the Sha’iqiya. Years of tribal manipulation and ruthless repression in Darfur (the source of most of the Sudanese Army’s manpower and most members of the RSF) are now coming back to haunt the riverain tribes who historically regard the peoples of Darfur as unsophisticated, uneducated and undeserving of political power.

The establishment of a naval base in the Red Sea was part of a greater Putin-inspired project to create an overseas presence as part of the foundation of a neo-Soviet Empire. However, Russia’s economic, diplomatic and military setbacks in its still unresolved conflict with Ukraine are almost certain to postpone, if not cancel, Russia’s imperial ambitions. In Sudan, Hemetti has succeeded in creating an independently financed security machine, but for the 44 million Sudanese who do not benefit from being part of the RSF, external relief and assistance is needed now. With almost daily demonstrations against military rule in Sudan, it is unlikely that brute force alone, even if aided by Russian mercenaries, will be enough to secure and sustain the military government.

Notes

  1. See: “Khartoum Struggles to Control its Controversial ‘Rapid Support Forces’,” Terrorism Monitor, May 30, 2014, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=852
  2. The Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny – SBU) claimed in 2019 to have copies of the personal documents of 149 Wagner Group mercenaries who travelled to Sudan on Russian Ministry of Defense airliners to suppress pro-democracy protests in 2019 (info, Gordonua.com, January 28). See: “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, February 6, 2019, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4356
  3. See: “Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One, Eurasian Daily Monitor, February 11, 2009, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2593 ; Part Two, Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 12, 2009, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2596
  4. See: “Will Khartoum’s Appeal to Putin for Arms and Protection Bring Russian Naval Bases to the Red Sea?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 6, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4081

Jihad in Ukraine: Putin’s Chechen Legion and the Ghosts of WWII

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AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.2

March 10, 2022

Andrew McGregor

Packing Boxcars with Chechen Deportees, February 1944

The day before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began was the 78th anniversary of the Russian deportation of the Muslim Chechen and Ingush peoples of the North Caucasus. Carried out in 1944 with the utmost brutality, American trucks supplied for the Russian war effort transported the related ethnic groups to railyards where they were packed onto freight cars in scenes similar to the German transport of Jews to concentration camps. Thousands died on their way to internal exile in Central Asia, where hundreds of thousands more died of cold and starvation. Their crime? Joseph Stalin’s never substantiated allegations of Chechen cooperation with invading Nazis. The most bitter irony was that the deportations were only possible since most Chechen and Ingush men of military age were serving on the front-lines of the Red Army’s struggle with Nazi Germany. At war’s end, these men were decorated and deported to join their dead or dying families in exile.

Today, after two ultimately unsuccessful wars for independence from Russia that killed 100 to 200 thousand Chechen civilians between 1994 and 2000, we now see the incongruous sight of thousands of armed followers of Ramzan Kadyrov, Vladimir Putin’s coarse and violent appointee as Chechen leader, engaged in fighting in Ukraine to eliminate the “Nazis” Putin claims are running that country. One of Kadyrov’s first steps in expressing his appreciation of Putin’s sponsorship was the dismantling of the national memorial to the victims of the 1944 deportation in the Chechen capital, Grozny. The memorial was constructed from the scattered and broken tombstones of generations of Chechens; in their quest to eliminate the Chechens, Stalin’s men had not ignored the dead.

Perhaps the most hardline of all Putin’s acolytes, Kadyrov favors a Russian annexation of all Ukraine, achieved through extreme measures against the Ukrainian people, even suggesting the Russian army was “coddling” Ukrainians: “We need to change our tactics in order to convince them… Putin must give the appropriate order so we can finish with these Nazis” (Newlinesmag.com, March 3, 2022).

The Kadyrovtsy

Kadyrov’s armed followers, known as the “Kadyrovtsy,” are members of the Russian National Guard. The Rosgvardyia, as it is known, was formed in 2016 as an internal security establishment separate from the armed forces and reporting directly to the president. Viktor Zolotov, Putin’s former bodyguard and martial arts sparring partner, was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Guard at its formation. Zolotov is working closely with Kadyrov on the deployment of Chechen guardsmen in Ukraine. Ten thousand Chechen guardsmen, many of whom have combat experience in the long-running Donbas and Luhansk conflict in eastern Ukraine, are believed to already be operating in Ukraine, with the possibility of further deployments.

Muslim Kadyrovtsy at Prayer in the Ukrainian Forest

On March 3, a seemingly over-enthusiastic Kadyrov announced a pro-Putin “jihad” as he threatened the “shaytan-s [devils]” from Ukraine’s “nationalist battalions,” claiming the Chechens had their addresses and those of their families: “Nazis know this. Like jackals, they are hiding behind the backs of the military men.” The Chechen leader urged Ukraine’s military to turn on the nationalists or leave them to the Chechen special forces: “We won’t stop. We have an order, we have jihad!” (Pravda, March 4, 2022).

By March 5th, Kadyrov was falsely claiming President Zelensky had fled Ukraine: “He ran away so fast that no one could even see his clean pair of heels.” Kadyrov advised the Ukrainian president to turn the country over to former president Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian politician who was deposed by a popular rising in 2014 and since sentenced in absentia to 13 years in prison for treason. Kadyrov told Zelensky: “There is still time to return to Kyiv, accept Russia’s demands and ask for forgiveness… But don’t push your luck too much” (Pravda, March 5, 2022).

Kadyrov also warned that Ukrainians were planning aggressive action against Russia that had only been halted by the actions of President Putin, “a far-sighted strategist.” Again echoing Putin’s WWII-influenced rhetoric, Kadyrov declared nine days of “special military operations” had made it “obvious that we are not just dealing with Banderites, but with ruthless killers who do not disdain any methods. They and their fanatics plunged the whole of Ukraine into complete darkness… [the special operation] must be carried out to the complete defeat of Bandera’s followers” (Sputnik News, March 4, 2022). Kadyrov’s characterization of the Ukrainians as “Banderites” is a reference to Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), a controversial Ukrainian nationalist leader who initially cooperated with Nazi Germany against the Russians in WWII in the belief Germany would recognize an independent Ukraine. Disabused of this notion, he spent much of the war in a German concentration camp. He returned to his violent brand of nationalism after the war, but was killed with cyanide by a KGB assassin in 1959.

Bandera’s legacy is often invoked by Ukrainian nationalists as a symbol of anti-Russian resistance, while Russia’s leaders invoke it as proof of Ukraine’s ongoing allegiance to fascism; when Russia annexed Crimea in February-March 2014, Vladimir Putin declared he was saving Crimeans from Ukrainian leaders who were the “ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II” (Washington Post, March 25, 2014).

Recruiting Posters for the SS Division Galicia

Another troubling legacy of the war is the ongoing historical dispute over the activities of the SS Division Galicia (Galicia is a name for western Ukraine), a mostly volunteer Ukrainian Waffen SS unit active between 1943 and 1945. Recruiting for European Waffen SS units focused on the destruction of Russian communism and the overthrow of Joseph Stalin, which appealed strongly to many Ukrainians who had fresh memories of the Holodomor, Stalin’s man-made 1932-33 famine in Ukraine that killed at least four million people, possibly many more. [1] Though small numerically in comparison with the millions of Ukrainians who served in the Red Army, the intent of the division’s volunteers remains divisive, with some hailing them as anti-communist heroes, while others accuse them of anti-Semitism and war crimes.

The Kadyrovtsy at Hostomel

When the Russian airborne assault on Hostomel Airport turned into a debacle on the first day of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russian mechanized forces were moved up to try and take the airport and rescue surviving paratroopers in the woods outside Hostomel. [2]

Ukrainian sources claimed that a Chechen National Guard column was crushed outside Hostomel Airport on February 26, with the destruction of 56 Chechen/Russian tanks and the death of hundreds of Kadyrovtsy. Though these precise claims are likely exaggerated and are impossible to confirm in current conditions, there does seem little doubt that a mechanized Chechen column was ambushed and halted outside of Hostomel. Turkish-designed TB-2 Bayraktar UAVs, now made in Ukraine under license, may have been used in the attack on the Chechens. The successful use of these attack drones has been reported against other Russian convoys in Ukraine. The office of the Ukrainian president confirmed the destruction of “a convoy of Chechen special forces” near Hostomel on February 26 (Kyiv Independent, February 27, 2022).

General Magomed Tushayev with Ramzan Kadyrov

Also reported was the death during the clash of the commander of the Chechen forces in Ukraine, General Magomed Tushayev of the National Guard’s 141st motorized regiment (Ukrinform, February 27, 2022; Interfax-Ukraine, February 27, 2022). The claim was quickly dismissed by Kadyrov, who said he had spoken to Tushayev by phone and posted what he said were recent photos and a video of the general in the northern suburbs of Kiev.

Chechen Battalions Fighting for Ukraine

The opportunity to fight Russians continues to attract Chechen fighters who reject the rule of Kadyrov and Putin. Some have been active against pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukraine since 2014; others continue to arrive on the battlefields from Europe, the Caucasus and Syria. The leading Chechen-led formations include:

The Dzhokar Dudayev Battalion: The battalion was initially formed by Chechens in exile in Europe to join the fighting against Russians and pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukraine in 2014. The unit became less active after the death in combat of its capable leader, Isa Munayev, while fighting pro-Russian separatists at the Battle of Debaltseve in 2015. Munayev had been the military commander of Chechen forces during the 1999-2000 battle for Grozny, the Chechen capital, where he became known for his expertise in urban warfare tactics. The battalion was revived after the Russian offensive on Ukraine was launched in February, with a reported 300 volunteers, mostly from various republics of the Caucasus. Adam Osmayev, who succeeded Munayev, remains the battalion commander. His wife, fellow fighter Amina Okueva, was killed in an ambush that also wounded Osmayev in October 2017.

Adam Osmayev (Radio Svoboda)

In 2012, Osmayev was accused of plotting to assassinate Vladimir Putin and was arrested in Odessa by special forces agents and tortured. He spent two-and-a-half years in a Ukrainian prison but successfully fought off extradition attempts and was eventually acquitted on all charges and released (BBC, October 31, 2017; The Sun [London], October 7, 2021). After Kadyrov announced the presence of his loyalists in Ukraine on February 26, Osmayev took to video to confirm “real Chechens” continued to oppose Russia: “I want to assure Ukrainians that real Chechens are defending Ukraine today… These puppets fighting for Russia are a shame to our whole nation — we consider them only traitors” (Newlinesmag.com, March 3, 2022). The battalion is named for Dzhokar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force general who became Chechnya’s first president from 1991 until his death in 1996 when a satellite call he was making was intercepted by Russian aircraft, giving them the coordinates for a laser-guided missile strike. His six successors were all killed in action or assassinated by Russian agents, the latest in 2015.

Georgian, Ukrainian and Chechen fighters in Eastern Ukraine (Adam Osmayev)

The Shaykh Mansur Battalion: Another formation of volunteers from Chechnya and other Caucasus republics heavily involved the 2015-15 fighting in eastern Ukraine, this unit has similarly been revived. While its total strength is unknown, it includes both Chechens and Crimean Tatars, another Muslim minority that has suffered significantly under Russian rule, including its wholesale deportation to Central Asia in 1944. This unit has a more Islamist orientation than the Dzhokar Dudayev Battalion. The battalion is named for Shaykh Mansur, an 18th century Chechen military commander and religious leader who battled the Russian armies of Catherine the Great in the North Caucasus.

Osmayev and the Shaytanov Affair

Among the units facing the Chechen column outside Hostomel was Ukraine’s “Alpha” special forces group. Normally occupied with counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism tasks, the formation reports to the Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny – SBU) rather than the Ministry of Defense.

Arrest of Major-General Valeriy Shaytanov, October 2020

As part of its counter-intelligence work, the SBU arrested its own chief, Major General Valeriy Shaytanov, in 2020 on charges of high treason and terrorism related to plotting the assassinations of Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov and Commander Adam Osmayev (Radio Svoboda, October 8, 2020; Radio Svoboda, October 19, 2020). Osmayev claimed to have been part of the operation that captured Shaytanov by allowing loyal Ukrainian SBU agents to fake his death in a scheme designed to trap the traitor (The Sun [London], October 7, 2021). The SBU general was allegedly turned by a colonel of the Russian Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti – FSB) in 2014 while they worked on a joint anti-terrorism project (Interfax Ukraine, April 15, 2020; RFERL, April 17, 2020).

Outlook

Coverage of the ongoing war in Ukraine tends to ignore the ghosts of the USSR and their role in the ideology behind the invasion of Ukraine. World War Two is a settled issue in most parts of the world, but less so in some of the former states of the Soviet Union, where it continues to inspire and even define certain conflicts. What can sound like crude propaganda, such as Putin calling the Zelensky government a cabal of “Nazis,” may even reflect sincere convictions, regardless of their accuracy. In Ukraine, the ghost of Stepan Bandera still stalks the steppes and cities, a divisive figure from the past that inspires some and incenses others. Many Chechens continue to frame their relations with Russia through the experience of Stalin’s genocidal campaign against their people. Some have made their peace with Russia and see a way forward through allegiance to the pro-Putin Kadyrov regime; others will never forget the deportations or Putin’s ruthless repression of Chechen independence in 1999-2000.

Unfortunately for Moscow, the deployment of the Kadyrovtsy could lead to the resurrection of the Chechen independence struggle, especially if Russia’s military offensive falters and Putin’s war in Ukraine begins to work against him. Weakness is spotted quickly in the North Caucasus, and Kadyrov’s early bluster may be replaced by the realization that many of his best-armed supporters are now fighting and dying far from Grozny.

Note

  1. Remarkably, Stalin and his methods still have supporters, even in the West. In 2019, Dougal MacDonald, a University of Alberta lecturer and candidate for the Marxist-Leninist Party, used Holodomor commemoration week to claim that “in Canada, former Nazi collaborators and their spawn have long led the phony [sic] Holodomor campaign.” The “educator” was supported by 43 fellow academics after many calls came for his dismissal (National Post, December 6, 2019).
  2. See “Russian Airborne Disaster at Hostomel Airport,” AIS Special Report on Ukraine, March 8, 2022, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4812.

Russian Airborne Disaster at Hostomel Airport

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AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.1

March 8, 2022

Andrew McGregor

Overconfidence has been the enemy in many military operations. A belief in the superiority of Russian arms and special forces appears to have undermined a bold Russian attempt to end its ongoing “special military operation” in Ukraine on the first day of the conflict.

Russian Airborne Assault on Hostomel Airport, February 24, 2022

Just a few miles northwest of Kiev is Hostomel Airport (a.k.a. Gostomel, a.k.a. Antonov Airport), a busy facility built in 1959 and now used primarily for cargo flights and tests of Antonov aircraft. Seizing Hostomel on the first day of Russia’s “special military operation” was part of a plan designed to use the skills of the Russian Special Forces and Russian airlift capability to strike a quick and fatal blow to Ukrainian resistance. Once the special forces overcame the airport’s guards, Russian troops, armor, artillery, ammunition and other materiel could be airlifted to the airport where they could be easily launched into Kiev to depose the Ukrainian government.

The task of seizing Hostomel was entrusted to the Russian Airborne Forces (Vozdushno-desantnye voyska Rossii – VDV). The Russian paratroopers who landed at Hostomel appeared to belong to the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, a unit with extensive combat experience in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and the “separatist” Ukrainian Donbas region.

A Downed Russian Ka-52 Helicopter Gunship (Efrem Lukatsky/AP)

The attack began when roughly 30 Russian Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, flying low to evade radar, began launching guided missiles and firing 30mm cannons at the airport’s defenses. Despite strong resistance from Ukrainian ground units that brought down several helicopters, the attack continued for three hours, with Russian Sukhoi Su-25 “Frogfoot” jet fighters joining in. The Ukrainians claimed to have downed as many as five to seven Russian helicopters during the assault, whether by missile fire or attacks by Ukrainian MiG-29s. One Ka-52 “Alligator” was recorded crashing into the Dnieper River (19fortyfive.com, February 28, 2022). Another victim of the assault was the six-engine Antonov An-225 Mriya transport, the world’s largest aircraft, destroyed in its hanger by Russian fire.  

When the Russian command decided it had suppressed most of the defensive fire, a wave of Mi-8 “Hip” assault transport helicopters arrived carrying airborne troops. Once on the ground they fanned out, dispersing the small unit of Ukrainian National Guard defenders while preparing for the arrival of at least 18 Ilyushin Il-76 air-transports already in the air. For a brief time, it appeared that the audacious Russian plan was working and Kiev would be theirs in a matter of hours..

Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky

However, the Russians had failed to clear the region around the airport, and soon found themselves under fire from special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, the 3rd “Prince Svyatoslav” Special Forces Regiment, and local partisan fighters (Ukrinform.net, March 4, 2022). During the fighting, a sniper inflicted a serious loss to the Russian command by killing Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the chief-of-staff of the Russian Airborne (Pravda, March 3, 2022). The general was a veteran of combat in Chechnya, Abkhazia, Crimea and Syria; his presence on the frontline suggests how deeply important this attack was to Moscow’s Ukraine strategy.

The critical moment in the battle appeared to come when the Ukrainian National Guard’s well-trained 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade counterattacked with air support from a pair of Ukrainian Sukhoi Su-24M attack aircraft. Ukrainian Mi-24P “Hind” helicopter gunships and MiG-29s were also deployed to eliminate Russian paratroopers who had fled into the forest or the nearby village of Hostomel. Russia’s main battlefield asset, its artillery, appeared to play little role in preventing the arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements. Unable to land, the Ilyushin transports with their troops and armor were turned back in mid-air.

Ukrainian National Guard 4th Brigade Troops with a Ukrainian Flag Damaged During the Fighting at Hostomel

Ukraine reported it had retaken the airport by the evening of February 24, though Moscow insisted Russians were still in control (Anadolu Agency, February  25, 2022). Russian ground attacks by mechanized troops intended to relieve the paratroopers were ambushed with anti-tank missiles, halting their advance. Nonetheless, the next day the Russian ministry of defense claimed the recapture of Hostomel Airport and the death of 200 Ukrainian “nationalists” during the first day of battle. Fighting around the airport continued for days, until Ukraine announced it had again retaken the airport on the evening of March 3, with the destruction of all Russian paratroopers in the area. Russia had lost the element of surprise on the first day; the extensive damage the airport received in days of heavy fighting and the deliberate damage inflicted on the airstrip by Ukrainian forces to prevent its use rendered the airport non-operational and incapable of receiving Russian transports.

Russian airborne troops were also deployed in an attack on the Vasylkiv airbase (central Ukraine) on February 25. Success was again elusive in what appeared to be an over-ambitious operation. Ukrainian airmen of the 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade drove off the attackers and fighting spread to neighboring villages. A troop-carrying Ilyushin Il-76 transport carrying as many as 100 men was reported to have been shot down by Ukrainian aircraft during the fighting for Vasylkiv (Unian.ua, February 25, 2022). A second transport was reported to have been downed the next day near Bila Tserkva (AP, February 26, 2022).

Outlook

The assault on Hostomel was burdened by an intelligence failure on the part of the Russians, who failed to account for the presence of significant first-line Ukrainian forces within easy reach of the airport. A failure to secure the skies over the drop zone and a consequent inability to delay the arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements combined to doom the paratroopers’ mission from the start. The entire operation seems to have foundered on the fatal belief that only token Ukrainian resistance would stand in the way of the airport’s occupation and the sudden airlift of thousands of Russian troops, artillery and vehicles to a point just outside the suburbs of Kiev. The airborne force that landed at Hostomel was far too small to take and hold the airport, especially when resupply by air became impossible. The three-hour aerial attack intended to drive defenders away prior to the paratroopers’ arrival instead attracted the attention of all Ukrainian units in the area, which began to move on the airport.

The failure to seize the airfields at Hostomel and Vasylkiv presented a devastating setback to Russian intentions, and with no apparent “Plan B” to end the campaign quickly, the Russian offensive remains bogged down north of the Ukrainian capital (though progress is being made in the south). Russia’s inability to establish air superiority over Ukraine has hurt their campaign; this problem will only be exacerbated if Russian-designed jet fighters are transferred to Ukraine from East European NATO members.