Russia Considers Supplying Anti-Ship Missiles to Yemen’s Houthi Movement

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(121)

August 8, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Since the United States authorized Kyiv to use Western-provided weapons on Russian territory, Moscow has considered striking back on a new front by providing modern anti-ship missiles to Yemen’s Houthis (Ansarallah), who have been striking shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
  • Aside from the apparent threat to Western interests, Moscow’s sending of missiles to Yemen could present substantial risks to Russia and its relations with traditional partners in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.
  • Any attempt by Moscow to turn Ansarallah into a Russian auxiliary in its war on Ukraine will only encourage heavier strikes on Yemen by US aircraft without providing tangible benefits to the movement.

On August 2, a senior US official reported that members of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) are operating in the Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen in an advisory role to Yemen’s Houthi movement, Ansarallah. The report claims that GRU officers have been operating in Yemen for “several months” to assist the Houthis in targeting commercial shipping (Middle East Eye, August 2). Ansarallah has been striking shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden for over eight months in support of Gaza’s Hamas movement. Primarily using drones and missiles provided by Iran, the Houthi attacks are intended to interfere with the movement of Israeli ships or cargoes, as well as those of Israel’s main backers, the United States and the United Kingdom. The latter two powers also provide military aid and intelligence to Ukraine in its resistance to the Russian invasion. When the United States gave Kyiv permission to use new weapons provided by the US-led Western alliance to strike targets inside Russia, Moscow began to consider striking back on a new front by providing modern anti-ship missiles to Yemen’s Houthis (Middle East Eye, June 28). The provision of sophisticated arms for Houthi use against Western shipping would represent a dangerous expansion of the conflict in Ukraine that could not easily be reversed.

The weapons in question are believed to be P-800 Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. These sea-skimming missiles fly 10 to 15 meters (32 to 50 feet) above the water at a top speed of 1,860 miles per hour, making them extremely difficult to evade or intercept. In the absence of a Ukrainian fleet, Moscow may calculate it can put some of its anti-ship missiles to better use against Ukraine’s supporters on another front. Previously, the Kremlin had called on Ansarallah to abandon the practice of firing on international shipping in the Red Sea while condemning the US and UK counterstrikes as an “Anglo-Saxon perversion of UN Security Council resolutions” (The Moscow Times, January 12).

The Houthis currently rely on less than precise open-source intelligence to identify maritime targets, leading to strikes on vessels with ties to both Iran and Russia (Press TV [Tehran], July 20). In March, Russian and Chinese diplomats met with Houthi representatives in Oman, receiving assurances that their ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden could pass unmolested in return for diplomatic support in the United Nations (Bloomberg, March 21). While Chinese and Russian shipping continue to use the Red Sea passage, other transporters face surging insurance rates or additional costs posed by rounding the Cape of Good Hope as an alternative route.

Oil tanker Chios Lion, carrying Russian oil to China, is attacked by a Houthi missile on July 15, 2024 (Yemeni Military Media).

On July 18, Yemen’s “Leader of the Revolution” Sayyid ‘Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi claimed that the strikes on US and UK shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden were inflicting economic damage on those countries as well as Israel. He added that Yemen was seeking to spread its maritime operations to the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea (SABA [Yemen], July 18).

Aside from the apparent threat to Western interests, a Russian gift of missiles to Yemen could present unforeseen but substantial risks to Russia itself and its foreign relations:

  • The possibility is growing that new Russian anti-ship missiles could be used against Saudi shipping, reigniting hostilities in an unresolved war that began in 2015. Russia maintains close relations with Saudi Arabia as partners in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries “Plus” group (OPEC+). According to US intelligence sources, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has requested that Moscow not go through with the delivery of cruise missiles to Yemen (Middle East Eye, June 28; Press TV [Tehran], July 20).
  • Despite Russia’s alliance with Iran, Moscow has maintained cordial relations with Israel throughout the Gazan campaign. The July 19 Houthi drone strike on Tel Aviv, however, has turned the Yemeni threat on territorial Israel from potential to real. In its present combative state, frustrated by an inability to defeat a small and lightly armed militia in Gaza, Israel may seek to eliminate new threats to its territory as quickly as possible, as indicated by its retaliatory strike on Yemen’s Red Sea Port of Hudaydah. Russia’s closeness to Iran is an existing irritant in relations with Israel. Providing the Houthis with superior anti-ship missiles could mean a complete break with Israel. Washington is already pressuring Tel Aviv to ship eight older Patriot air defense systems (via the United States) to Ukraine for use against Russian missiles (Times of Israel, June 28).
  • The Kremlin runs the risk of creating friction with Tehran, which exerts a strong influence over the Houthi movement that it may not care to share with Moscow.
  • Moscow’s involvement at any level in attacks on Red Sea shipping will complicate Russian efforts to establish a permanent Red Sea presence in Sudan, which relies on its Red Sea port as the main commercial conduit to the outside world (see EDM, November 14, 2023).
  • Russian military trainers and advisors could become targets (intentional or not) of US and Israeli strikes to prevent the deployment of Russian missiles. This could easily lead to escalation and a danger of becoming embroiled in a wider Middle Eastern conflict. Yemen has already announced plans for closer cooperation with countries of the “Resistance” axis (Al Jazeera, June 26).

For all its threats to the West and its aggression in Ukraine, Moscow does not perceive itself as a rogue state. Providing anti-ship missiles to a military force that it does not fully control would endanger not only international shipping in one of the world’s most important shipping channels but Russia’s reputation as well.

Any attempt by Moscow to turn Ansarallah into a Russian auxiliary in its war on Ukraine will only encourage heavier strikes on Yemen by US aircraft and the specific targeting of Ansarallah leaders without providing tangible benefits to the movement. The Kremlin may also discover that becoming allies with the religiously inclined Houthi movement could prove difficult in practice. Previous (Soviet) Russian experience in Yemen was with socialist southerners whose successors in the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council continue to insist they form Yemen’s true government.

US diplomatic efforts through a third party to persuade Russia to back off from these deliveries are ongoing. Aware of the reports that Russia was considering the transfer of anti-ship missiles to Yemen, Russia’s UN representative declared on July 23 that Moscow “stands with the security and safety of global navigation in the Red Sea” (SABA [Yemen], July 25). Those remarks may indicate the Kremlin could be having second thoughts about a policy decision made quickly and emotionally.

Mercenaries, UN Peacekeepers, and Multilateral Forces May Not Be Enough to Protect the Congo from the M23 Movement

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

July 9, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to struggle to remove M23 rebels from its eastern provinces despite military aid and the assistance of UN troops and European mercenaries. The current UN peacekeeping mission is expected to withdraw by the end of 2024, likely ushering in a period of greater instability in the historically troubled state of Nord-Kivu.
  • Incompetence on the part of the DRC’s army has led to a renewed reliance on European mercenaries and multilateral military operations. This has also opened the door to greater Russian involvement, with Moscow signing a military cooperation agreement with the DRC in March.

Rarely paid, barely trained and poorly equipped, the army of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is struggling to drive M23 rebels from the eastern Congo despite the help of UN troops, European mercenaries and military assistance from neighboring states and even nations far from the fighting. The ongoing difficulties of this army, the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC), have raised local concerns of infiltration or even collaboration with M23 (Mouvement du 23 mars) (AFP, March 30). To revive FARDC’s faltering offensive spirit, Kinshasa has now reintroduced capital punishment sentences in its military courts. On May 3, eight soldiers, including five officers, were sentenced to death for cowardice and “running away from the enemy” (Agence de Presse Africaine, May 4).

M23 Troops Advance in Nord Kivu (VOA)

Formed in 2012 from ethnic Tutsi in the eastern state of Nord-Kivu, M23 receives support from Tutsi-ruled Rwanda as a means of fending off the Kinshasa-backed Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu-based Rwandan armed opposition movement promoting the lethal ideology behind the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda (Le Monde, March 20; Great Lakes Eye [Kigali], December 28, 2022).

General Sultani Emmanuel Makenga (right) (Arab News)

M23 made an earlier play for power over a decade ago under a Rwandan Tutsi, General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda (jailed for 30 years by the International Criminal Court in 2019 for war crimes and crimes against humanity). M23 took the Nord-Kivu capital of Goma, but were defeated in 2013, their fighters fleeing across the border to refuge in Uganda and Rwanda. The movement began to return to the DRC quietly in 2017 under military leader Brigadier General Sultani Emmanuel Makenga. A Congo-born member of the Mugogwe sub-group of the Tutsi, Makenga helped bring Laurent-Désiré Kabila to power in the DRC in 1997 before Tutsis were ordered to leave the Congo during a general expulsion of “foreign” troops the next year (New African, February 15, 2013).

A reorganized M23 retook the offensive in eastern Congo in October 2021 after Kinshasa launched a campaign to force all armed groups in its eastern provinces to disarm and demobilize. Under pressure from the rebels, President Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo declared in October 2022 that he would not give in to the “fashionable” trend of hiring mercenaries to combat rebellion in his country. Two months later, White mercenaries were spotted providing security around Goma airport (Great Lakes Eye [Kigali], January 19, 2023). These were the vanguard of Romanian private military company (PMC) Asociatia RALF-ROLE, composed mostly of former members of the French Foreign Legion. The mission was meant to focus on training and securing Goma’s international airport, but Romanian mercenaries have instead found themselves fighting at the front.

RALF-ROLE originally consisted of 400 fighters, but Rwanda claims there are now as many as 2,000 mercenaries from Eastern Europe in Nord-Kivu (New Times [Kigali], October 16, 2023). A 2022 decision to lift a long-standing arms embargo on the DRC allowed a free flow of arms for the mercenaries, who are paid $5000 per month (Observator [Bucharest], February 9). The local habit of referring to the Romanians as “Russians” initially created many false reports of a Wagner presence in Nord-Kivu. Unlike Wagner’s connections to the Kremlin, Romanian authorities have made it clear there is no state involvement with the Romanian mercenary group (Observator [Bucharest], February 9).

FARDC Defensive Position (AFP)

Nonetheless, there are indications that the Kremlin is seeking a military entry to the DRC; on March 5, Russia’s Defense Ministry signed a military cooperation agreement with Kinshasa. The pact provides for joint military exercises, military training and visits by warships and military aircraft (TASS, March 5; Digitalcongo.net, March 6). FARDC’s aging air assets are currently flown by Georgian and Belarussian pilots, while their maintenance is in the hands of Bulgarian PMC Agemira  (Deutsche Welle, January 17, 2023; Jeune Afrique, July 28, 2023).

Wazalendo Mayi Mayi (Congo Indépendant)

Corrupt and undisciplined, FARDC is supported not only by the Hutu FDLR and European mercenaries, but also Burundian troops and the Wazalendo (Kiswahili – “patriots”), a coalition of Mayi Mayi militias and other pro-government armed groups formed by FARDC in May 2023 (Africa Defense Forum, January 16). The Mayi Mayi are local Congolese militias ostensibly engaged in a struggle for indigenous rights, but better known for drug-fuelled rampages against villagers involving rape, looting and murder (see Terrorism Monitor, April 3, 2014).

EACRF Commander General Jeff Nyaga

The incompetence of FARDC forces Kinshasa to seek defenders abroad. The East African Community Regional Force (EACRF – Burundians, Ugandans, Kenyans and South Sudanese) deployed in Nord-Kivu in November 2022 during M23 advances, but withdrew its last troops in December 2023 after the DRC declined to renew its mandate (East African [Nairobi], December 21, 2023). Only months into their mission, EACRF faced threats in Goma from demonstrators who accused the force of failing to take the fight to M23, though their mandate called for an offensive only as a last resort (Great Lakes Eye [Kigali], March 21, 2023; DRC News, May 16, 2023). EACRF’s Kenyan commander, General Jeff Nyaga, resigned in April 2023, complaining of intimidation from “foreign mercenaries” (Kinshasa Times, April 28, 2023). Nyaga was accused by the Congolese of “peaceful cohabitation” with M23 and Rwandan troops in Kivu (Kinshasa Times, May 3, 2023). Dissatisfaction with EACRF’s performance may have motivated Tshisekedi to intensify his recruitment of mercenaries.

About 1,000 Tanzanian, Malawian and South African troops belonging to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) began to arrive as replacements for EACRF in December 2023, but deployment has been slow and six men have already been lost to M23 mortar fire (DRC News, April 3; Kinshasa Times, April 9). SAMIDRC is led by South Africa’s Major General Monwabisi Dyakopu, who fought M23 in 2013.

MONUSCO Patrol (PBS)

Also active in Nord-Kivu are UN peacekeepers of MONUSCO (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo), the UN’s largest and most-expensive peacekeeping mission. First deployed in 2000, MONUSCO now operates alongside FARDC to defend the Nord-Kivu cities of Saké and Goma (DRC News, March 13).

Though remote and impoverished, Nord-Kivu’s extraordinary mineral wealth continues to draw armed groups like moths to a flame. As with most long-term conflicts, many of the varied participants in the struggle for Nord-Kivu have found ways to profit from its extension rather than its resolution, discouraging any foreseeable improvements in security.

Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

July 8, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • The Kremlin has reconsidered its support for the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, throwing more weight behind the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Transitional Sovereignty Council.
  • The move serves to align Moscow’s position more closely with that of Iran, seeks to dampen the SAF’s cooperation with Ukraine, and highlights the ongoing interest in establishing a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.
  • Should Russia possess naval bases in both Libya and Sudan, it will have an opportunity to establish supply lines into the landlocked nations of the African interior that now host units of Moscow’s Africa Corps.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” (Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service)

The Kremlin is backing away from its support of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s ongoing internal war. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed Moscow’s gradual shift on April 29 during a visit to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, April 29). Russia once saw RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” as vital to establishing a Russian port on the Red Sea in Port Sudan (see EDM, November 14, 2023). The situation has since changed. Before his death, notorious Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin worked closely with the RSF, supplying arms in return for gold (see Terrorism Monitor, December 15, 2023). Simultaneously, however, the Kremlin maintained open channels with their opposition, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government. Moscow is now exploiting these openings.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov

Supporting the SAF and TSC, with control over Port Sudan, aligns Russian policy with Iran’s. For its part, Tehran has been supplying advanced drones to the SAF. The switch also helps sever the SAF’s relationship with Ukraine, which has been supplying drones and special forces assistance to General Abdel al-Fatah al-Burhan’s SAF since the summer of 2023 (Kyiv Independent, September 20, 2023; see EDM, November 14, 2023).

Bogdanov confirmed the Kremlin’s shift during his two-day visit to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, April 29). His military-heavy delegation offered Sudan “unrestricted qualitative military aid” while disapproving of Sudan’s military cooperation with Ukraine (Sudan Tribune, April 30). Bogdanov later clarified that Russia recognizes the TSC as the legitimate representative of the Sudanese people (Al-Mayadeen, May 31). The Russian official had met with Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Ali Bagheri Kani two days earlier in an apparent effort to align the Kremlin’s new approach with that of Tehran (Nour News, April 25).

Ukrainian Timur Unit Leaders

Some reports have claimed that operatives of the “Timur” unit of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) have been active in Sudan. While the leader of the unit neither confirms nor denies their presence, he declared, “Wherever there are soldiers, officers, or persons engaged by the special services of the Russian Federation, we catch up with them” (Ukrainska Pravda, February 13; New Arab, February 26). Ukrainian sources have reported months-long operations carried out in Sudan by Ukrainian special forces against “Russian mercenaries and their local terrorist partners” (Kyiv Post, January 30). Sources suggested that, during Bogdanov’s April visit, Sudan pledged to abandon military cooperation with the Ukrainians, while Russia agreed likewise to halt assistance to the RSF (Mada Madr, June 7).  The RSF has steadily become reliant on support from the United Arab Emirates in the face of diminishing Russian supplies since Prigozhin’s death.

Kyiv likely sought to interrupt the RSF-assisted flow of Sudanese gold that was helping Russia overcome international sanctions. In changing support from the RSF to the SAF, Moscow would temporarily forgo the gold shipments that have helped the Russian economy. The diminishing size of these shipments due to Sudan’s conflict, however, removes much of Russia’s incentive to continue supporting the RSF. Meanwhile, the Libyan port of Tobruk is effectively becoming a Russian naval base (see EDM, March 12). Should Russia possess naval bases in both Libya and Sudan, it will have an opportunity to establish supply lines into the landlocked nations of the African interior that now host units of Moscow’s Africa Corps.

Moscow is eager to implement a 2019 deal with Sudan to establish a Russian Red Sea naval base near Port Sudan capable of accommodating up to four ships at a time, including those with a nuclear power plant. Progress has been halted, however, due to the ongoing absence of a parliament or other legislative body in Sudan capable of ratifying the agreement (Military Review, February 13).

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (left) with General Yasir al-Atta (Sudans Post)

On May 25, Yasir al-Atta, a member of the Sovereignty Council and deputy commander of the army, declared that the TSC was ready to approve the deal, though the port was no longer described as a naval base. He stated, “Russia proposed military cooperation through a logistics supply center, not a full military base, in exchange for urgent supplies of weapons and ammunition” (Radio Dabanga, May 29; Mada Madr, June 7). While Atta said a partnership agreement with Russia was expected soon, he stressed that Sudan was open to similar agreements with countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Riyadh, which opposes the Russian port, has offered greater investment in Sudan if it drops the deal (Sudan Tribune, May 25).

Port Sudan – Red Sea Gateway to Africa

The Sudanese ambassador to Russia has assured Moscow that Sudan is not backing away from its commitment to construct a Russian naval base. Yet, Bogdanov confirmed on June 12 that while discussions on the port continued, “there are no firm agreements at this time” (Sputnik, June 1; Sudan Tribune, June 12). Many civilian leaders in Sudan question the TSC and the SAF’s right to implement an agreement with sovereignty implications. They also fear that the arrival of Russian military aid might only prolong the devastating conflict (Mada Madr, June 7).

Sudan may be looking to the Djibouti for-profit model of hosting naval bases for various countries. Jibril Ibrahim, Sudan’s finance minister (also the leader of Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement, now allied to the SAF), recently characterized the proposed Russian facility as “not a large base, but rather a service center for Russian ships to obtain supplies.” He added that Sudan’s Red Sea coast could “accommodate everyone if the United States wants to buy a similar port” (Asharq al-Awsat, June 8).  

Transitional Sovereignty Council leaders in Port Sudan may be using the extended negotiations with the Kremlin as a means of focusing Western attention on the conflict and the need to interrupt the supply of weapons and personnel to the RSF. Sudan routinely says its cooperation with Russia and Iran is unavoidable without Western support (Sudan Tribune, May 3). Otherwise, the degree of military cooperation between Sudan and Russia will depend greatly on how badly the politicians and generals in Port Sudan seek potentially game-changing Russian arms.

 

Can Russia Displace French Influence in Chad?

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(6)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

June 25, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Mahamat Idriss Déby, Chad’s new president, has voiced interest in increasing cooperation with Moscow amid creeping Russian influence throughout the Sahel.
  • Any move by the young president toward replacing French influence with a Russian presence will likely be met with strong resistance from Chad’s military leaders, who have not expressed a preference for Russia.
  • Suspicions that Russian troops have already entered the country may have been misplaced, as the troops arriving in April were an official Hungarian contingent with no clear connections to the Kremlin.

Mahamat Idriss Déby and Vladimir Putin (Kremlin.ru)

Surrounded by countries with a growing Russian presence, Chad’s new president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, appears to be entertaining Moscow’s overtures at the expense of long-established ties to former colonial power, France. The question is whether Chad is merely diversifying its partners or moving directly into the Kremlin’s orbit. Much has changed since 2021, when then-Foreign Minister Chérif Mahamat Zene said the presence of Russian mercenaries in Africa posed “a very serious problem for the stability and security of my country” (France24/AFP, September 24, 2021). More recently, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in January in Moscow, Déby remarked, “This is a history-making visit. Chad and Russia maintain long-time relations. … We hope that this visit will allow us to enhance our bilateral relations and to strengthen our relations” (Kremlin.ru, January 24).

Chad’s Military: In the French Tradition (NYT)

The French military helped drive the Soviet-supported Libyans out of Chad during the Toyota War in 1987. French forces then intervened to preserve the rule of Mahamat’s father, Idriss Déby Itno, in 2006, 2008, and 2019. Even the 2021 rebel offensive, in which Idriss was killed after ruling Chad for 30 years, was repulsed with the help of French aerial and satellite intelligence (AFP, March 15).

Chad’s relations with France deteriorated quickly after Mahamat became the country’s transitional ruler on April 20, 2021, heading a junta of 15 generals. France sought quick elections, while Mahamat insisted on an 18-month transition that eventually stretched out to three years before he was elected president in May. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed satisfaction with the “final stage of the transition process” and a desire to strengthen relations with Chad (TASS, May 11).

General Ahmet Kogri (TchadOne)

Franco-Chadian General Ahmet Kogri (aka Serge Pinault), director of Chad’s internal security agency, l’Agence Nationale de Sécurité de l’Etat (ANSE), was accused of playing a leading role in repression of the 2022 demonstrations. The protests opposed the extension of the transitional period through a special unit tasked with the interrogation, torture, and eventual murder of demonstrators in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital (TchadOne, January 3). Kogri was replaced in February, a move that has been interpreted as part of a separation from French influence and a means of bringing the ANSE under tight presidential control (TchadInfos, February 21; Jeune Afrique, February 22). The French military still has three bases in Chad, with roughly 1,000 troops.

General Amine Idriss (al-Wihda)

The US presence in Chad has also been compromised in recent months. In April, French-trained General Amine Idriss, Chadian Air Force chief of staff, ordered the immediate suspension of US activities at the Adji Kosseï air base, citing Washington’s inability to justify its continued presence there (Al-Wihda, April 25). On May 1, 75 members of the US 20th Special Forces Group withdrew from Chad to Germany.

Initially, the order was thought to be related to pre-election tensions between the United States and Mahamat over alleged US support for the leading opposition candidate. Some sources suggested, however, that the move was intended to force a new, more profitable deal involving Washington’s rental of the air base (TchadOne, April 20). Others argued that France was behind the Chadian demand based on worries that US troops withdrawing from neighboring Niger might end up in N’Djamena (Al-Wihda, April 25). On June 10, some 1,100 US troops in Niger began their withdrawal (see EDM, April 11).

Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby (Sputnik)

Only days before the presidential elections, a report described the arrival of 130 Russian troops at the N’Djamena airport. The soldiers were reportedly processed by Chadian intelligence agents and escorted into the city (X.com/TchadOne, April 28). The troops themselves were Hungarian, however, part of a mission approved on November 7, 2023.

The Hungarian mission has three stated aims: deterring illegal migration to Europe, aiding counter-terrorism efforts, and providing a secure base for economic and humanitarian assistance (Defence.hu, October 30, 2023). While the Hungarian government under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has adopted a stance sympathetic to Moscow, there has been no indication that the Hungarian deployment has any connection to Russian activities in Chad. Budapest’s objectives in Chad may actually clash with those of the Kremlin, which is believed to be intent on increasing the flow of migrants to Europe through Libya (Libya Observer, March 7).

Chad is unlikely to make a sudden leap into the Russian camp. The late Idriss Déby Itno routinely played off one potential partner after another, always returning to the French after they had been reminded Chad’s allegiance was neither automatic nor unconditional. Moreover, Chad has not undergone a drastic change of regime seen in other Sahel states. It remains in the hands of the late president’s son and a cabal of Zaghawa relatives that occupy senior posts in the army and the administration. The Zaghawa ethnic group represents less than 3 percent of the population (Al Jazeera, December 26, 2023, February 29). Asked whether he intended to switch Chad’s military alliance from France to Russia, Mahamat replied, “Chad is an independent, free, and sovereign country. We are not like a slave who wants to change masters” (RFI, April 15). He added that economic cooperation was more important to the country than defense cooperation. France is a major trade partner for Chad, while trade with Russia is nearly nonexistent (Russia Today, January 28).

Chad remains desperately poor, other than the oil revenues that never seem to trickle down to the masses. The country needs the trade that France offers but Russia cannot. The regime, composed of a tiny ethnic minority, needs little instruction on Russian techniques of political repression. The sudden dalliance with Moscow, so closely aligned with an election intended to restore permanent Déby clan rule, was a reminder to the West that calls for democracy are not the key to a military alliance. As proof of this approach’s effectiveness, on March 7, the French president’s personal envoy to Africa stated that the French army would remain in Chad to support its “independence,” apparently without preconditions (AFP, March 15).

Mahamat himself has created divisions within the ruling Zaghawa elite by retiring many Zaghawa generals close to his father while promoting members of the Arab and Gura’an (Tubu) minorities (Mahamat’s mother is from the Gura’an) (Al-Masry al-Youm, May 18). The Zaghawa of Chad have close ties to the Zaghawa of Darfur in Sudan who have suffered from the rampages of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Mahamat’s decision to allow the United Arab Emirates to supply the RSF with arms and other supplies through Chadian territory has created further rifts within the country’s Zaghawa community.

Any move by Chad’s young president toward replacing the steady French partnership with an unpredictable Russian presence would likely be met with strong resistance from the armed forces. Unlike their counterparts in other countries of the Sahel, Chadian military leaders have not shown a public preference for Russia.

Drones Over the Nile: Unmanned Aerial Warfare and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report on Sudan

June 24, 2024

The growing importance of drones in modern warfare has been amply demonstrated in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though both states still possess manned military aircraft. In Africa, drones have been used extensively in the struggle between Libya’s rival governments, but the first broad use of drones by a “rebel” movement is taking place in Sudan. There, drones are in steady use by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a former state paramilitary that launched attacks on government institutions and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on April 15, 2023. Only days after the conflict began, the SAF and other state security institutions declared the RSF “a rebel entity” that was fighting the state and ordered its dissolution (Al-Jazeera, April 17, 2023). [1]

Both the RSF and SAF have used drones for surveillance and offensive purposes since the beginning of the conflict. The SAF is now receiving shipments of advanced Iranian drones, while the RSF relies on shipments of drones and other weapons from the anti-Iran, anti-Islamist United Arab Emirates (UAE). Sudan recalled its ambassador to Chad on June 25 over allegations that Chad is allowing the UAE to ferry military supplies to the RSF through its airports. The import of drones to Sudan violates a 2005 UN Security Council resolution that bans the supply of weapons to the Sudanese government and armed groups in Darfur.

Omdurman Market (Sky News)

The precision-guided munitions of Iranian Mohajer-6 drones played a decisive factor in the SAF’s March offensive that retook old Omdurman and the National Radio and Television Corporation from the RSF (Radio Dabanga, March 17, 2024). The Mohajer-6 UAVs are, however, vulnerable to the RSF’s limited anti-aircraft weapons, mostly man-portable (MANPAD) systems that are less effective against small “suicide” drones. Earlier this year, RSF forces in Omdurman released photos of a downed Iranian Mohajer-6 drone operated by the SAF and “its extremist backers from the former regime” (a reference to Islamist groups formerly allied to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir). The RSF claimed it was the third such SAF drone to have been brought down (Radio Dabanga, January 29, 2024).

Captured RSF Quadcopter Drone

The SAF began using FPV (first-person view) quadcopter loitering munitions (a.k.a. “suicide” drones) in September 2023. With an ability to hover for long periods before the user finds a target and drives the drone and its warhead into it, loitering munitions provide a cheap and useful tool in urban warfare of the type being practiced in Khartoum and Omdurman. Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation produces its own Kamin-25 loitering munitions (Military Africa, September 15, 2023).

The SAF uses several Chinese drone types, most notably the Rainbow CH-3 (used for reconnaissance, surveillance and attacks) and the enhanced Rainbow CH-4, which uses precision-guided munitions and has a range of up to 5,000 km (Military Africa, April 20, 2023). Most SAF drones operate out of Wadi Sayidna airbase north of Omdurman. On June 7, SAF air defense systems shot down two drones targeting the base (Radio Dabanga, June 7, 2024; Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024). SAF-held airbases are a common target of RSF drones.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones

The RSF also operates Chinese-made Sunflower-200 “suicide drones,” an improved version of the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition drone. These have been deployed with the alleged assistance of Russian PMC Wagner personnel (Military Africa, April 27, 2024; Defense Express, August 16, 2023). Russia is a major purchaser of the Shahed-136, which it uses in Ukraine in a modified form known as the Geran-2. The RSF also operates UAE-supplied, Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) drones, modified to drop two 120mm mortar rounds on its target (Military Africa, February 12, 2024).

RSF drone brought down by the SAF in Shendi, April 23, 2024. (ST)

Recently, the RSF has used Chinese-made drones to bring the war to the previously safe cities of Upper Nubia, home of the riverine Arabs who have dominated Sudan’s politics and military since independence. The SAF’s Third Infantry Division was attacked by drones in Shendi (150 km north of Khartoum) on April 23, while an earlier attack in Atbara targeted the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade of Islamist fighters on March 2 (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 23, 2024). The Brigade is a hardline Islamist militia fighting alongside the SAF as part of the “popular mobilization” strategy that has brought both former rebel movements and ex-members of Omar al-Bashir’s military/Islamist regime on side with the SAF (Al-Taghyeer, April 3, 2024).

General Shams al-Din Kabbashi

Brigadier Tibieg Mustafa, identified as an advisor to the RSF leader, insisted that the RSF had no part in the drone attacks on Shendi or Atbara: “What happened reflects internal disputes between the Army and the Islamic Brigades of Al-Barra’a bin Malik, which fight alongside the Army” (Radio Tamazuj, April 25, 2024). There appear to be differences in the SAF’s senior command over the role of the Islamic Brigades; General Shams al-Din Kabbashi, the army’s deputy commander, believes their inclusion is dangerous, while General Yasir al-Atta, a member of the sovereignty council, insists the SAF is open to all Sudanese, including Islamists (Middle East Eye, April 4, 2024). Despite Brigadier Tibieg’s claim, there seems little reason at this time to believe the SAF is attacking its allies with drones.

General Yasir al-Atta (ST)

On April 24, three reconnaissance drones were spotted flying over the Nubian town of Hambukol (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 25, 2024).  Shendi was attacked again on June 9, when five “suicide” drones were shot down by the Third Infantry Division. No damage or casualties were reported but widespread panic was reported in the town (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024).

On June 7, the SAF’s 18th Infantry Division shot down two RSF drones targeting the Kenana airbase in White Nile State and the division headquarters in Kosti (White Nile State). The attacks came a day after SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan arrived in Kosti (Sudan Tribune, June 7, 2024).

RSF advances east of the Nile have brought previously safe cities within range of RSF aerial attacks. In early April, two or three RSF drones panicked the eastern city of al-Qadarif when they struck the local headquarters of the General Intelligence Service and a judiciary building (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 9, 2024; Asharq al-Awsat, April 10, 2024).

Unlike the SAF, the RSF has no air force, but drones have provided an available and low-cost alternative that allows the paramilitary to spread terror in SAF-held cities well behind the lines and attack SAF facilities, airbases in particular.

NOTE

  1. The description of the RSF as “rebels” is somewhat contentious; see for example a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), that insists the RSF is “not a ‘rebel’ group – it’s recognized by law and was developed, tolerated and sustained as an instrument of state power…” (USIP, April 20, 2023).

 

Russia in Niger – A Military Junta Walks Away from the West

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21 (56), April 11, 2024

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

Executive Summary

  • Russia is actively expanding ties with Niger’s military junta to consolidate control over resource-rich assets and to push out Western influence.
  • Moscow has now signed multiple agreements to provide security guarantees to Abdourahamane Tchiani and potentially take over the rights to several Nigerien gold mines.
  • Kremlin propaganda relies on “anti-colonial” narratives that have played a role in pushing the French and US military presence out of the country.

Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown by his own Garde Présidentielle on July 26, 2023. The Army backed the coup a day later, enabling former Garde leader Brigadier General Abdourahamane Tchiani to proclaim himself Niger’s new head-of-state. Bazoum was detained and coup supporters flooded the streets of the capital, Niamey, many of them waving Russian flags. The display raised suspicions of Russian/Wagner involvement in the coup.

Brigadier General Abdourahamane Tchiani (Reuters)

President Bazoum was known for his support of Ukraine at the UN and joined a diplomatic initiative to return rule of Crimea to Ukraine, though there were other factors at work in the coup besides pro-Russian sentiment in the military, including Bazoum’s Arab ethnicity in a Hausa-majority country (Arabs form less than 1% of the population) (AfricaNews, February 19, 2021). A stagnant economy, growing insecurity and the presence of Western troops were other factors, but the spark for the coup appears to have been Bazoum’s intention to shake up the ineffective military leadership. Like many other regional coup leaders, General Tchiani (a Hausa) and his armed forces chief-of-staff General Moussa Salaou Barmou received American military training.

Ukraine insisted Russia was behind the coup as part of its “scenario for provoking instability to undermine the global security order”​​​​​​​ (Anadolu Agency, August 1, 2023). Perhaps putting a damper on the idea that Russia had orchestrated the coup was Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s initial condemnation of the putsch as “an anti-constitutional undertaking” (Vedomosti, January 17).

Protesters in Niger’s capital Niamey hold a Russian flag and banner with images of coup leaders in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea (AFP)

Moscow nonetheless came to the defense of the junta when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) indicated it was planning a military intervention to restore President Bazoum (BBC, August 11, 2023). The military dictatorships of Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea (all ECOWAS members) signalled their intent to oppose any ECOWAS action against Niger and its new rulers, the Conseil Supérieur pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP – National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland).

With 1500 French troops in Niger, the French military was the junta’s first target with the cancellation on August 3, 2023 of all five military cooperation agreements with France (signed between 1977 and 2020). The French force was assisting in the struggle against Islamic State militants and jihadists of al-Qaeda-related Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimeen (JNIM) but was no longer having the impact it once did, providing fertile ground for anti-French Russian media manipulation. As ordered by the junta, French troops began evacuating Niger on October 10 (RIA Novosti, October 10, 2023). The last French troops left on December 22. Several weeks after their departure, Niger Defense Minister General Salifu Modi said the evacuations had already provided a “positive impact on our fight against terrorism” (RIA Novosti, January 17).

There were initial concerns that the coup in Niger might interrupt the flow of uranium to French nuclear reactors, but these concerns appear to have been overstated. Shortly after the coup, France’s Ministry of Energy Transition insisted: “The situation in Niger does not present any risk to France’s security of supply of natural uranium” (TV5Monde/AFP, July 31, 2023).. Niger is one of France’s top three uranium suppliers, supplying 20% of French needs  (TV5Monde/AFP, July 31, 2023). France maintains a strategic stockpile of strategic uranium equal to a two-year supply and is actively seeking to diversify its supply, including a long-term deal with Mongolia in October 2023 and the construction of a uranium recycling plant (Portail de l’IE [Paris], January 9; La Tribune [Paris], January 9).

A speaker believed to be Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin used a Wagner-associated Telegram channel to make a pitch to Niger’s new rulers to engage Wagner while employing the anti-colonial rhetoric now pervasive in West Africa: “What happened in Niger is nothing other than the struggle of the people of Niger with their [French and American] colonizers… who are trying to foist their rules of life on them,,, and keep them in the state that Africa was in hundreds of years ago” (Meduza, July 28, 2023; al-Jazeera, July 31, 2023).

Following Prigozhin’s death last August and the subsequent reformation of the Wagner Group, Nigerien minister of state for defense Lieutenant General Salifou Modi joined Russian deputy minister of defense Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov in signing an agreement on December 4, 2023 providing for the deployment of Russia’s new GRU-directed Africa Corps in Niger (Izvestia, March 13).

Generals Yevkurov and Modi Sign a Defense Agreement (ANP)

According to General Modi, the cost would be significant: “A large part of our military budget will be allocated directly to our Russian partner.” Niger’s minister of mines added that some gold mines might be ceded to the Russians as well (Agence Nigérienne de Presse, December 4, 2023). In an interview a few days later, General Tchiani thanked Russia’s soldiers and mercenaries, but noted “we are paying them very dearly… Certainly, the security guarantees provided by Moscow have a high price and will require significant sacrifices, but it is a reliable partner” (Agence Nigérienne de Presse, December 10, 2023).

The tempo of reciprocal visits and meetings increased after this agreement, culminating in a March 26 phone call with President Putin in which General Tchiani expressed his gratitude for Moscow’s support and discussed stronger security cooperation (AFP, March 26).

A diplomatically disastrous visit to Niger by American officials in mid-March convinced the junta to cancel its “status of forces” agreement with the US on March 17 (ActuNiger, March 16; Al-Jazeera, March 17). The move forces the closure of a $100 million American drone facility and a separate CIA drone facility.

In another post-coup development, the junta repealed 2015 legislation outlawing migrant trafficking through Niger, claiming it had been implemented “under the influence of certain foreign powers” (AFP, January 23). Imprisoned traffickers were released and military escorts provided for migrant convoys. These measures were applauded both by traffickers and NGOs. The move raises the possibility of Russian manipulation of migrant flows to Europe.

Russia alone is unlikely to be able to provide all the assistance Niger needs in the economic, technical and financial fields. For these, Niger must be open to regional and international partnerships that might be jeopardized by an armed Russian presence following its own agenda. Niger has missed four debt payments in a row and is now $519 million in default (al-Jazeera, February 19).  With foreign aid accounting for half its budget, Niger can hardly afford to abandon all other partners in favor of Russia.

The junta will be taking a gamble with a relatively unknown partner like Russia, which has had few dealings with Niger since the Soviet era. On the other hand, Niger’s army has suffered numerous setbacks in trying to contain the jihadist insurgency and will require a new partner to replace the French.

This article was first published as “Niger Cozies Up to Russia and Walks Away From the West,” EDM, April 11, 2024.

Russian Military Intelligence Takes Over Wagner Operations in Libya

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

March 12, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Moscow is consolidating the Wagner Group’s operations in Libya under the direct control of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) and instituting the African Corps, run by Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister.
  • “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar of the Libyan National Army is building connections with Russia to gain special forces training in exchange for further Russian presence in Libya while being warned against this by the United States.
  • Russia’s GRU is preparing important strategic plays in Libya through military operations that might shift the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

Libya’s broken government has offered a pathway to Russian influence in the oil-rich nation since 2018. With the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, Moscow is consolidating the Wagner Group’s operations in Libya under the direct control of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). It is a move with political as well as military implications. There are currently at least 800 Russian contractors in Libya, supported when necessary by up to 1000 Syrian militiamen based in Benghazi (Arab News, November 15, 2023; Al-Jazeera, February 25; Soufan Center Intel Brief, March 6).

Eastern Libya (Cyrenaïca) and southwest Libya (Fezzan) are currently under the authority of Libya’s parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR). The Tobruk-based HoR is dominated by “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA), which is more a collection of militias and mercenaries than a “national army.” Haftar, an American citizen and former CIA asset, is supported by Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt (though Egypt’s support is ebbing due to Haftar’s backing of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces). Opposed to the HoR and the LNA is the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli with the support of Qatar, Italy, and Türkiye. In the continuing absence of a national president, the functions of the head of state are carried out by the allied High Council of State.

Wagner backed Haftar’s failed 2020 attempt to take Tripoli. Many of the Wagner fighters were inexperienced and performed poorly on the front lines, creating tensions with LNA commanders and Haftar, who delayed payment to the group (Libya Observer, May 14, 2020). An October 2020 ceasefire allowed the redeployment of some Wagner personnel, including Syrian mercenaries, to Mali and Ukraine (Libya Observer, March 22, 2022).

Following the collapse of the LNA/Wagner offensive, Moscow informed Tripoli’s GNU that it now supports UN efforts to promote fair elections for a unity government (Libya al-Ahrar, December 7, 2023). Russia’s newly reopened embassy in Tripoli is headed by Ambassador Aydar Rashidovich Aganin, a Muslim Tatar (Libya Observer, February 22). A Russian consulate scheduled to open in Benghazi before the end of the year has been meeting GNU opposition (Libya al-Ahrar, February 10; Agenzia Nova, February 23).

General Yevkurov Greets Field Marshal Haftar in Moscow (AFP)

Though he was previously warned off by an American delegation that cited a Russian risk to public security, Haftar held talks in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in September 2023 (Asharq Al-Awsat, May 13, 2019; Sputnik, September 29, 2023; Libya Al-Ahrar, September 30, 2023). Unverified reports suggested that Hafter was seeking air-defense systems, pilot training, and special forces training in exchange for upgrades to airbases previously used by Wagner so they would be better suited for use by Russian military personnel (Libya Security Monitor, November 5, 2023; Libya Observer, November 11, 2023).

Docking rights for Russian warships at a Libyan port were also considered, though a source close to Haftar denied these were part of the talks (New Arab, October 9, 2023; Asharq al-Awsat, November 7, 2023). The most likely location for a Russian naval base would be the deep-water port of Tobruk, a significant improvement on Russia’s modest Mediterranean naval facilities at Tartus and Latakia in Syria (Libya Observer, January 31).

Haftar continues to meet with American military and state officials, even though this may only provide him leverage in his dealings with the Russians, who do not appear to oppose his plan to establish his family as a ruling dynasty. The meetings with American officials, however, may also raise suspicions in the Russian camp, which finds Haftar useful but not irreplaceable.

Russian military operations in Libya are being handed over to its new African Corps (AK) under the supervision of Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense and former head of Ingushetia (2008-2019), Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (Vedomosti, December 22, 2023). Yevkurov is best known for leading the Russian task force that marched 300 miles from Bosnia to seize Kosovo’s Pristina International Airport ahead of NATO forces in 1999, a signal to the West that post-Soviet Russia was still a force in Europe.

Yevkurov and GRU General Andrei Averyanov have been visiting all their new partners in Africa, including Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and the Central African Republic (CAR) (African Defense Forum, January 16). General Averyanov is the former head of the GRU’s Unit 29155, which was responsible for assassinations, sabotage, and destabilization operations. Yevkurov has made four visits to Libya in the last six months, the most recent in late January.

General Yevkurov with Russian and Libyan Officers in Benghazi (Libya al-Ahrar)

The Russian Ministry of Defense is offering former Wagner fighters new AK contracts (Vedomosti, December 22, 2023). In the pattern of colonial armies, African volunteers may be incorporated into the AK to bring it up to a projected 20,000 men under Russian command. Wagner’s security protection work is likely to be farmed out to other Russian private military companies (PMCs), like Redut and Convoy (Ukrainska Pravda, January 30; for a detailed analysis of Russian PMCs, see EDM, March 3).

Al-Jufra, Sirte, and Brak al-Shati airbases have already been integrated into a Russian air-supply route from Latakia to Bangui and the Sahel. Russian aircraft do not use Libyan bases with impunity. Two Ilyushin military transports were destroyed by drones of uncertain origin last year at al-Khadim and al-Jufra airbases (Libya al-Ahrar, December 21, 2023).

When the deployment of the AK is finished this summer, Libya will be an important staging post for Russian operations in Sudan, the CAR, and the new military Alliance of Sahel States, consisting of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

The GRU takeover of Russian forces in Libya raises several questions:

  • Wagner forces have been far from invincible on Libyan and African battlefields; if units of the new GRU-run AK run into trouble, will the GRU’s Spetsnaz (special forces) brigades intervene?
  • What role will GRU-controlled land forces and ships play in a hybrid-warfare manipulation of migrant flows through Libya to Europe?
  • The GRU was not intended to manage business operations. Will Wagner’s existing operations (including those of no strategic value, such as breweries) be absorbed to finance the GRU’s Africa Corps or hived of to other Russian interests (African Defense Forum, April 4, 2023)?
  • Russian nuclear submarines returned to the Mediterranean for the first time in 23 years with the 2022 visit of the K-560 Severodvinsk (Yasen class) and the K-157 Vepr (Akula-II class). There have been visits since by Kilo-class submarines, but durations are typically short due to a lack of suitable maintenance facilities (The Barents Observer, October 30, 2016; Majorca Daily Bulletin, October 18, 2023). Will a Russian naval base in Libya host a permanent Russian nuclear submarine force with its attendant atomic threat to Europe’s southern flank?

Using the multiple diversions presented by a US presidential election year and conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, Russia’s GRU is busy preparing important strategic plays in Libya that might shift the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

Wagner’s Influence in Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene

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Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(19)

February 7, 2024

Andrew McGregor

Executive Summary:

  • President Faustin-Archange Touadéra (nicknamed “President Wagner”) of the Central African Republic (CAR) welcomed the Wagner Group in 2018 but is now in the process of diversifying the CAR’s relations.
  • Wagner’s influence in the CAR has waned following the Prigozhin mutiny despite assurances from Russian authorities of continued support. For example, Touadéra’s government last year approved a US competitor to Wagner to operate in the country.
  • The situation in the CAR and other countries where Russian private military companies operate is a test of Moscow’s ability to focus on any foreign issue beyond the Ukraine War.

_________________________________________________________________________

Landlocked, desperately impoverished and development-free, the Central African Republic (CAR) hardly seems like a strategic prize, but it may soon be the focus of a new “Cold War” struggle for Africa and its resources. Like other former French colonies in Africa, the CAR has endured security challenges as French military forces withdrew and Russian “mercenaries” flowed in to replace them.

CAR President Faustin Archange Touadéra

Russia’s Wagner Group was initially welcomed to the CAR in 2018 by President Faustin Archange Touadéra, who carried out a January reshuffle of the government in which important posts were reallocated to cronies, militia leaders and mistresses of the president (Corbeau News [Bangui], January 14).

Last December, the CAR’s presidential spokesman announced that the nation, so closely intertwined with the Wagner Group, was now “in the process of diversifying its relations,” especially in the area of strengthening its armed units. Potential partners named included Russia, but not the United States, though the spokesman noted the president was fond of saying: “I have my arms open to work with everyone” (RFI, December 24, 2023).

“Everyone” appears to include Bancroft Global Development (BGD), an American NGO reputed to be a private military contractor (PMC). The Washington-based BGD claims a presence in Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Libya, delivering “permanent solutions to the economic, environmental and societal harm cause by armed conflict and the hazardous remnants of war” (Bancroft Global Development website).

Since its arrival, Wagner has become deeply involved in the CAR’s diamond and gold sectors, timber extraction and alcohol production. Wagner also inserted advisors at top government levels and launched intensive propaganda efforts in Sango, the local lingua franca. Russian is taught at the local university, a Bangui restaurant serves Russian cuisine and the construction of a Russian Orthodox church is Bangui is accompanied by a drive to encourage conversions from the nation’s Roman Catholic majority (Izvestia, May 29, 2023). Russian arms and training have turned elements of the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) into armed auxiliaries of the Wagner Group.

Colonel Denis Pavlov, SVR (Alleyesonwagner)

After Wagner’s failed June 2023 mutiny and the subsequent death of Wagner strongman Prigozhin, some 450 to one thousand Wagner personnel left CAR without replacement (Radio Ndeke Luka [Bangui], July 7, 2023; AFP, July 7, 2023). Russian authorities traveled to Bangui last September to assure CAR officials that the Russian mission there would continue, but under the authority of the Russian Defense Ministry. Denis Vladimirovich Pavlov replaced Vitaly Perfilev (a former French Foreign Legionnaire) as security director, while Dmitry Sytii (victim of a 2022 parcel-bomb attack that both Prigozhin and the CAR blamed on France) was replaced as Maison Russe director but remained on to manage Wagner business interests (RFI, December 18, 2023). Pavlov is not a Wagner man, but is instead from the SVR, Russia’s external intelligence agency (Alleyesonwagner.org./RFE/RFL, December 7, 2023; Radio Ndeke Luka [Bangui], December 17, 2022; Izvestia, May 29, 2023).

Last May, the CAR ambassador to Russia mentioned Bangui’s intention to establish a Russian military base “where there could be from five to ten thousand soldiers. Moreover, they could be used in other countries if necessary” (Izvestia, May 29, 2023). On January 26, Russian ambassador to the CAR Alexander Bikantov said that the size and location of the planned base had yet to be determined (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 26).

“Russia, the CAR is with you” (al-Jazeera)

Washington is alleged to have first broached the idea of American military training and humanitarian aid in exchange for a Wagner withdrawal within 12 months in a memo passed to the CAR president at the December 2022 United States-Africa conference. The existence of this memo was denied by the CAR’s foreign minister, though she did admit to the establishment of a “cooperative relationship” with the US (Radio Ndeke Luka [Bangui], March 3, 2023).

Rumors of the existence of the US memorandum led to protests against the departure of Wagner and a supposed American assault on CAR sovereignty Radio Ndeke Luka [Bangui], March 3, 2023; Corbeau News [Bangui], January 25). Russian reports echoed earlier French claims that BGD employees were seeking land near the capital for the operation of surveillance drones and the training of a CAR military unit that would protect American mining concessions (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 23, 2023; RFI, December 18, 2023). One newly formed pro-Russian civil society group described the “deployment of Bancroft mercenaries” as an “official declaration of war on the Central African people (RFI, January 26). Wagner’s propaganda machine in Bangui has warned of American plans to assassinate President Toudéra (RFI, December 18, 2023).

Michael Stock in Somalia (WSJ)

BGD founder, Michael Stock, and Franco-South African Richard Rouget, a former associate of French mercenary Bob Denard, visited the CAR last September. Contacts with BGD are reported to be handled by two close advisors to President Touadéra (RFI, December 18, 2023). Though BGD has been tight-lipped regarding its association with the CAR, confirmation of a deal with BGD was issued by a presidential spokesman on December 22 (Radio Ndeke Luka [Bangui], December 23, 2023).

Richard Rouget, a.k.a. “Colonel Sanders”

Perhaps sensing fissures in the regime’s stability, Touadera’s rule has been challenged in recent days by two former prime-ministers, Martin Ziguélé (2001-2003) and Henri-Marie Dondra (2021-2022) (Jeune Afrique, December 20, 2023; Jeune Afrique, January 5). They, like most other CAR opposition figures, must operate in exile following detentions and intimidation efforts by Wagner personnel. Nonetheless, most opposition leaders see the arrival of Bancroft as a means of preserving the power of the regime rather than the security of the people (Radio Ndeke Luka [Bangui], December 30, 2023).

There has been much talk of the CAR’s new “security diversification strategy,” though it is unrealistic to imagine Russian and American military personnel happily running parallel security and training operations in Bangui; there are limits to diversity. What will be tested in the coming days is the Russian Defense Ministry’s commitment to foreign adventures initiated by Prighozin’s free-booting Wagner Group.

Israeli End Goals in Gaza: A Palestinian Expulsion?

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Terrorism Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 2

Andrew McGregor

January 31, 2024

(NPR)

Executive Summary

  • Nearly all of Gaza’s 2.2 million people have been displaced by the current conflict, with Israel potentially considering “voluntary” resettlement plans for the Gazan population.
  • Various Israeli officials have proposed several such plans for the removal of Gazans to other nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Egypt, which they have justified by declaring that Gazans’ main desire at this point is to destroy Israel.
  • Egypt has firmly rejected Israeli proposals to resettle Gazans in its country, equating any “voluntary” resettlement to illegal forced displacement. In particular, relocating the Gazan population to the Sinai is felt by Cairo to risk peace between Egypt and Israel.

In January 2008, Hamas fighters blasted holes through the border wall separating Gaza and Egypt to allow hundreds of thousands of starving Palestinians to access food and fuel supplies in Egypt. The incursion occurred five days after Israel imposed a complete blockade on Gaza, following a series of Hamas rocket attacks. Egyptian security forces backed off to alleviate the growing humanitarian crisis, but forced the Gazans back across the border several days later (Al Jazeera, January 24, 2008).

Now, sixteen years later, Israel may be seeking a more permanent repetition of this incident by forcing nearly all of Gaza’s 2.2 million people into the Egyptian Sinai. Some 1.9 million Gazans are now displaced, with little or nothing to return to when the bombing stops (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 4). In this context, high-level Israeli discussions regarding the “voluntary” resettlement of Gaza’s Palestinian population have become an indicator of the Israeli government’s war objectives.

Israeli Plans for Transferring Gazans to Sinai and Beyond

Schemes to transfer Gaza’s population to Sinai have appeared repeatedly since the 1950s, but the Sinai is not the only place to have been considered as a destination for Gaza’s Arabs. Israel’s Likud government is reported to be engaged in secret negotiations with several nations to accept displaced Gazans, most notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a nation beset by environmental crises, humanitarian challenges, political instability, and ceaseless internal warfare (Times of Israel, January 3).

General Alfredo Stroessner, Dictator of Paraguay

A secret 1969 plan to encourage Gazans to migrate to Paraguay was only revealed in 2020. Negotiated by Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency with Paraguayan dictator and Nazi sympathizer Alfredo Stroessner, the deal called for 60,000 Palestinians to move to the South American nation. However, ultimately, only 30 Palestinians did so, two of whom stormed the Israeli Embassy and killed the ambassador’s secretary (Jerusalem Post, August 12, 2020).

Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel (X)

On January 2, Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel outlined a post-war plan to take control of the Egypt–Gaza border. She noted that by war’s end, there will be no municipal authorities in Gaza, no source of work, a 60 percent decline in agricultural land, and a complete dependency on humanitarian aid. All these conditions encouraged “voluntary emigration” (Times of Israel, January 3).

Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich (Israel Hayom)

Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich (of the Religious Zionist Party), National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir (of the Otzma Yehudit Party) and numerous members of the Likud Party have also advocated the external resettlement of Gazans and their replacement with Israeli settlers. Smotrich justified the “voluntary” emigration by claiming “two million [Gazans] wake up every morning with a desire to destroy the State of Israel and to slaughter, rape, and murder Jews” (Jerusalem Post, January 3). However, these calls do not have universal support in the Israeli government, with two Likud ministers describing them as “unrealistic” and damaging to Israel’s international reputation (Times of Israel, January 4).

“An Integral Part of Israel” – Israel’s Projected New Western Border

In mid-December, extremist Rabbi Uzi Sharbaf, a founding member of banned Israeli terrorist group “The Jewish Underground” (HaMakhteret HaYehudit), told a Tel Aviv conference attended by Knesset members that Jewish settlements must return to Gaza as part of an historic opportunity to “liberate” biblical lands from the Sinai up to the Nile River (Jordan News, December 15, 2023; Al-Ahram [Cairo], December 14, 2023). This “unique and rare opportunity to evacuate the entire Gaza Strip” was also cited in an October 17 paper released by former senior defense and intelligence officials of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy. Rather than the Sinai, the plan called for the resettlement of Gazans in existing housing in the Cairo satellite cities of “6 October” and “10 Ramadan” that would be purchased by Israel at a cost of $8 billion. [1]

General Giora Eiland (Jerusalem Post)

Giora Eiland, an influential retired IDF major-general and former head of the Israeli National Security Council who has compared Gaza to Nazi Germany, declared at the beginning of the current conflict that: “Israel needs to create a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, compelling tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Egypt or the Gulf… Gaza will become a place where no human being can exist” (Ynetnews, October 12, 2023; Yedioth Ahronoth, November 19, 2023). Eiland has promoted a population transfer from Gaza to Sinai since 2004.

Egyptian Reactions

A leaked document from Israel’s Intelligence Ministry dated October 13 called for a permanent relocation of Gazans to Sinai, initially to tent cities, and then to more stable accommodation in the Sinai Peninsula, with a buffer zone along the border preventing their return to Gaza. The first step would consist of shifting the population to Gaza’s south. Egypt’s minister of foreign affairs, Sameh Shoukry, described the leaked document as “a ludicrous proposition,” noting that displacement was itself “an illegal activity” (Asharq Al-Awsat, November 4, 2023). Shoukry later denounced calls for a “voluntary” displacement as a “full-fledged war crime” (Al-Ahram [Cairo], November 21, 2023).

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry (Daily News Egypt)

Israeli sources report that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested the World Bank write off Egypt’s considerable foreign debt (an estimated $165 billion) in return for accepting Gaza’s population (Yedioth Ahronoth, October 31, 2023). Some financial aid from the rich Gulf states might be included, but Egyptian authorities have loudly proclaimed their rejection of the deal (Egypt Independent, November 1, 2023). Egyptian prime minister Mustafa Madbouli has noted his government’s own plans to settle eight million Egyptians in the Sinai by 2050 (Al-Ahram [Cairo], November 23, 2023). [2]

Egypt fears that discontented and resentful Gazans might use Sinai as a base for attacks on Israel in contravention of the peace agreement between the two nations. President Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi has instead suggested that Israel transport the two million Gazans to Israel’s Negev Desert in the south of the country until they can be returned after the defeat of Hamas (Egypt Today, November 22, 2023).

Conclusion

Bitter divisions are already emerging in Israel’s war cabinet over the post-war destiny of Gaza’s people. The implications for Israel of a forced depopulation of Gaza are many, including international isolation, the collapse of the Abraham Accords, and even a renewal of hostilities with Egypt. So long as both Egypt and the Palestinians of Gaza reject the idea of resettlement, the scheme cannot be fulfilled without dangerous consequences for Israel’s future.

Notes:

[1] “A Plan for resettlement and final rehabilitation in Egypt of the entire population of Gaza: economic aspects,” Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, October 17, 2023. The paper was taken down from the web after an international backlash. See Middle East Eye, October 26, 2023.

[2] Cairo’s full plan for development in Sinai can be found here: “The New Republic Implements Comprehensive National Plan to Change Life in Sinai: The Land of Turquoise,” State Information Service, April 26, 2022, https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/165520/Mega-Projects-on-every-inch-of-Sinai?lang=en-us

Assessing the War in Sudan: Is an RSF Victory in Sight?

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 21(24)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

December 15, 2023

After eight months of brutal warfare, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now appear to have the upper hand against the better-armed Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” the RSF has conducted a highly mobile campaign against the SAF’s reactive and defensive posture, allowing the group to take the initiative in all regions of the conflict. With the Sudanese capital of Khartoum now a devastated battlefield, the ineffective government, led by SAF commander-in-chief General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, operates from a temporary base in Port Sudan, which suffers from power shortages and a chronic lack of fresh water.

Peace talks in Jeddah between the two military factions, assisted by Saudi, American, and African Union mediators, were indefinitely suspended earlier this month after both sides failed to meet commitments agreed upon in earlier negotiations (al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], December 4; Africa News, December 5). The animosity between the factions is severe and historically based in the rivalry between the poor Arab tribesmen of western Sudan (the RSF) and the Arab elites of the Nile region who have controlled Sudan and its military since the country gained independence in 1956.

RSF Commander General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”

Resistance to the RSF onslaught is weakening at all levels, placing Sudan’s diverse population at risk of rule by Arab supremacists with a record of savage conduct and a general ignorance of the means of development, administrative techniques, economic theory, and international relations.

The Impending RSF Conquest of Darfur

Four of Darfur’s five states, comprising nearly 80 percent of the western province, are now in RSF hands. North Darfur state and its capital, al-Fashir, may be the RSF’s next target. Al-Fashir is strategically and symbolically important as the former capital of the once powerful Fur Sultanate (c.1650-1916). Security in North Darfur is provided largely by the Joint Protection Force (JPF), an alliance of five non-Arab armed movements that has been busy recruiting in the region in anticipation of an RSF offensive. The RSF has also been recruiting from the region’s Arab population, setting the stage for a vicious ethnic conflict that will inevitably result in the mass slaughter and displacement of many of North Darfur’s civilians. Convoys bringing supplies to North Darfur from central Sudan have stopped, creating shortages of food, fuel, and medicines (Sudan Tribune, December 7).

JEM Leader Jibril Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune)

Two major armed movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), abandoned their self-declared neutrality on November 16 to announce their support for the SAF. Both groups also declared their willingness “to participate in military operations on all fronts without hesitation” (Radio Dabanga, November 17). JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim also condemned the RSF’s use of Arab mercenaries from Chad and Niger who have been promised the right to settle on land cleared of its non-Arab residents. The declaration followed months of murder and rape inflicted by the RSF on the non-Arab Black population of Darfur. The most notable atrocity involved the murder of some 1,300 civilians (mostly Masalit, an ethnic group in western Sudan and eastern Chad) in a camp for displaced people in West Darfur. The RSF attack began on November 2 and only ended three days later (Al Jazeera, November 10). The non-Arab Masalit have been targeted by the RSF and Arab militias since the start of the war in what appears to be an effort to ethnically cleanse the region of its indigenous Black population (see Terrorism Monitor, June 26).

Zaghawa Nomads (X)

Despite their small numbers, the ambitious Black African Zaghawa ethnic group plays a leading role in Darfur’s anti-government opposition. SLA-MM leader Minni Minawi, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim, and al-Tahir Hajar, leader of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), are all Zaghawa. During the fighting for Nyala, RSF gunmen were accused of assassinating prominent members of the Zaghawa community (Sudan Tribune, September 16).

Darfur Governor and SLA-MM Leader Minni Minawi (AFP)

Minni Minawi, governor of Darfur since August 2021, remains wary of the SAF, which continues to be commanded by members of Sudan’s riverine Arab elite. The rank-and-file troops are composed of conscripts from other regions, including many non-Arabs. Without substantial reforms to the composition of the SAF, Minawi notes its victory might only mean a return to an oppressive status quo (Sudan War Monitor, December 4).

RSF’s Series of Conquests

Under pressure from the RSF, garrisons across Darfur have fallen like dominos. Nyala, Sudan’s second-largest city, is the capital of South Darfur and an important military strongpoint. It fell after a long siege followed by a four-day assault that ended on October 26, killing hundreds of civilians during the shelling of the city (Asharq al-Awsat, October 29).

Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur, was lost after the SAF’s 21st Infantry Division fled on October 31, allowing the RSF to walk in. Al-Geneina, capital of West Darfur, was taken by the RSF on November 4 after most of the 15th Division garrison fled, leaving hundreds of troops and weapons behind. Masalit civilians and captured troops were abused, whipped, and forced to run barefoot through the rubble (Sudan War Monitor, November 6). Gathering smaller garrisons along the way, the remaining defenders fled to Chad, where they were disarmed and interned. Elsewhere in South Darfur, officers have changed into civilian clothes and made for the border with South Sudan (Sudan War Monitor, November 27).

SAF Leader General al-Burhan (BBC)

As it consolidates control of Darfur, the RSF is now poised to begin operations against al-Ubayd, the capital of neighboring North Kordofan. The RSF has already driven away the SAF’s garrison in the western Kordofan town of al-Mojalid and the nearby Balila oilfield (a joint Sudanese-Chinese project), despite intensive airstrikes by the SAF (Asharq al-Awsat, October 31; al-Taghayeer [Khartoum], November 27).

Where Do Armed Opposition Movements Stand?

The war of the generals has finally shattered the hard-won 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), which promised a new era of peace in Sudan by reconciling the government with the nation’s leading rebel movements. However, two of the most powerful movements rejected the process entirely. In practice, the JPA has been described as “a mechanism to disburse political patronage to a few key rebel leaders.” [1]

One of the principal armed movements in Darfur is the largely Fur-based Sudan Liberation Army of Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (SLA-AW). The group helped launch the 2003 rebel attacks on the SAF that sparked nearly two decades of war in Darfur (Darfur means “abode of the Fur”). The movement was not a signatory to the JPA and is not part of North Darfur’s Joint Protection Force. Nonetheless, General Yusuf Karjakula led a group of SLA-AW fighters from its Jabal Marra stronghold to al-Fashir in late November where they deployed to protect IDP camps from RSF assaults (Sudan Tribune, December 3). The general also met with SAF and JPF commanders, suggesting the SLA-AW may be considering joint operations to defend al-Fashir despite long-standing distrust of the SAF.

Many of the armed opposition movements have begun to split internally over the issue of alignment with the RSF or the SAF (for the rebel movements, see Terrorism Monitor, August 8). Even Minni Minawi’s faction of the SLA is experiencing divisions between its SAF-supporting leader and its military commander, General Juma Haggar, who supports the RSF (Sudan War Monitor, December 4). The Sudan Liberation Army-Transitional Council (SLA-TC), led by Al-Hadi Idris Yahya Farajallah, is considered close to the RSF, though the movement’s vice-president, Salah al-Din Abdel-Rahman al-Ma’rouf “Salah Rasas,” is considered to be a supporter of the SAF (Sudan War Monitor, December 4). A new faction of JEM under Sulayman Sandal Haggar split from the movement in August 2023 after some JEM members charged leader Jibril Ibrahim with backing the SAF (Darfur24, August 30).

Some rebel leaders are attempting to remain neutral, like Al-Tahir Abu Bakr Hajar, leader of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), though some of his men were reported among the defenders of Nyala (Sudan War Monitor, October 26).

Foreign Intervention in the Sudan Conflict

There are allegations of foreign interference in the conflict, notably support for the RSF from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia’s Wagner Group, as well as Ukrainian support for General al-Burhan’s SAF.

Alleged Ukrainian Sniper on Ridge Northwest of Omdurman (Bellingcat)

Al-Burhan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met in Ireland on September 23 to discuss responses to the pro-RSF activities of the Russian Wagner Group in Sudan (Kyiv Independent, September 23; Sudan Tribune, September 23). The meeting came days after the release of videos alleged to show Ukrainian drone attacks on RSF forces in the Sudanese capital (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 14). Since then, videos have emerged of Ukrainian snipers operating in the hills northwest of Omdurman, as geolocated by independent investigative collective Bellingcat (Bellingcat.com, October 7). There have also been videos released on November 6, allegedly showing personnel of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate of Intelligence engaging with RSF fighters, Wagner personnel, and members of Russia’s special forces in the Sudanese city of Omdurman (Kyiv Post, November 6; Sudan War Monitor, November 10).

Journalists seeking confirmation or denial of these activities have been referred to the words of Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence service HUR MOU (Holovne upravlinnja rozvidky Ministerstva oborony Ukrajiny), who stated last May that “we have killed Russians and will continue to kill Russians anywhere in the world, until the complete victory of Ukraine” (New Voice of Ukraine, May 17). RSF leader Hemetti has expressed his support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and his paramilitary force is alleged to have engaged in gold smuggling with Wagner operatives in exchange for arms and advisors.

Small operations of the type allegedly engaged in by Ukraine in Sudan ultimately have little influence on the outcome of the war. However, they do diminish the local reputation of Wagner operatives who have helped finance Russia’s war in Ukraine by smuggling gold from regions of western Sudan under RSF control.

General Yassir al-Atta

General Yassir al-Atta (deputy to al-Burhan) stated that military intelligence and diplomatic sources had confirmed that the UAE was shipping supplies to the RSF through neighboring countries, including Chad. The allegation was denied by authorities in the UAE (Radio Tamazuj [Juba], November 29). The UAE is Sudan’s main trading partner, has been a major investor in Sudan in recent years, and is the primary destination for gold smuggled out of western Sudan. Al-Atta’s description of the UAE as a “mafia-state” led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between the two countries (Radio Dabanga, December 11).

Atta’s remarks also incensed Chadian authorities. On December 11, they demanded an official Sudanese apology for claiming the UAE had been allowed to ship weapons and munitions to the RSF through Chad. N’Djamena promised to take “measures” if the apology did not come within three days (Sudan Tribune, December 11). Darfur governor Minni Minawi had already accused Chadian authorities of allowing the passage of arms and mercenaries through Chad to the RSF in mid-November (Radio Dabanga, November 17).

There are further allegations that the Zaghawa generals who control Chad’s powerful military are annoyed by the UAE’s support of the mainly-Arab RSF and are providing clandestine support to their Zaghawa kinsmen in JEM and the SLA-MM (Sudan Tribune, December 7).

Destruction of Khartoum

Little remains in SAF hands in Khartoum other than the much-battered army headquarters and a small patch of Khartoum North (Bahri) connected by the SAF-controlled Blue Nile rail bridge. Khartoum’s al-Jaili refinery, the largest fuel production facility in Sudan, was destroyed in a bombing on December 6, the fourth such bombing of that location since the war began. Both the RSF and the SAF accuse the other of being responsible for the destruction (Sudan Tribune, December 6). RSF posts are dispersed throughout Khartoum; in the SAF’s attempt to find and destroy them, large parts of the city have been smashed by airstrikes and artillery, including many of its most notable buildings.

The RSF now controls all of Khartoum State, with the exception of the SAF-controlled pockets in Khartoum and northern Omdurman. RSF patrols have been spotted recently in eastern Sudan, possibly preparing the way for an occupation of that region. Twenty-five miles south of Khartoum, the strategic Jabal Awliya military base and airport fell on November 20 after a siege and two-day assault, removing a major obstacle to a RSF incursion into White Nile State (Radio Dabanga, November 21).

Conclusion

The SAF is highly demoralized and suffers from high rates of desertion and defection. Resistance to the RSF is collapsing in many parts of the country, diminishing hopes for a negotiated settlement. There are thousands of dead, soldiers and civilians alike. The country’s GDP is expected to decline by 18 percent this year due to the war (Africa News, October 12), with over half the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Six million Sudanese are displaced and cut off from normal avenues of support. As famine approaches, the only trade activity that still works is the import and distribution of arms, despite an international embargo.

Civilian groups that had previously discovered the power of the people when overthrowing President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 have now discovered that they have zero influence in the current military power struggle. Most alarming is the emergence of patterns of ethnic and tribal violence that have ways of resisting political settlement while perpetuating grievances both new and traditional. Focused on self-enrichment, the RSF’s barely literate leadership has no rational plan for reviving the state. There is little chance that the RSF’s military success can translate into a brighter future for Sudan’s 46 million people.

Note:

[1] Amar Jamal, “Key Actors in the Juba Peace Agreement: Roles, Impacts and Lessons,” Rift Valley Institute Research Report, September 14, 2023, p.16, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/RVI%202023.09.14%20Key%20Actors%20in%20the%20JPA.pdf