The Perils of Gunboat Diplomacy: The German East Asia Squadron at Manila Bay, 1898

Andrew McGregor

AIS Historical Perspective

January 27, 2026

When America went to war with Spain in 1898, its focus was primarily on Cuba, and secondarily on the Caribbean as a whole. While a plan existed to take the war to the Spanish mainland, it was never implemented, having little to do with America’s ultimate war aims. 9700 miles away from the Cuban theater of the war, the Philippines, a Spanish colony for over three centuries, remained a strategic afterthought in Washington. Nonetheless, it was in the Philippines that the Americans won their first great battle of the war only days after declaring war on Spain. Commodore George Dewey achieved a decisive victory at Manila Bay when his squadron of modern warships destroyed a decrepit squadron of Spanish ships manned by untrained sailors. The sudden triumph outstripped American planning; with Washington still unsure of next steps. What happened after the battle is rarely remembered today, but involved the arrival at Manila of a superior German fleet whose behavior, intentional or not, was intimidating enough that it brought the United States and Imperial Germany to the brink of war.

The Early German Naval Presence in Asian Waters

After various wars of unification and intense diplomatic negotiations, the southern German states joined the North German Confederation in 1871 to form the new Prussian-led German Empire with Otto von Bismarck and the Hohenzollern royal family at the helm. Before this time, only Brandenburg and Prussia of the German states had made small and ultimately unsuccessful attempts at establishing foreign colonies. Bismarck opposed any shift to European-style overseas colonialism; Prussia had always relied on a powerful land-based military, but had only a weak and tiny navy. Nonetheless, the new empire required an international presence, and by the 1880s Germany was fielding a number of small warships in East Asia and the Pacific as part of the new Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy).

The most prominent of these was the steam frigate SMS Elisabeth, originally commissioned into the North German Federal Navy in 1868 (SMS stands for Seiner Majestät Schiff – German: His Majesty’s Ship). The Elisabeth arrived in the Far East in 1881, where it became the flagship of a naval squadron consisting of the corvettes Stosch, Stein and Leipzig, the gunboat Wolf and its sister-ship Iltis. The squadron was disbanded in 1885, leaving only the Iltis (1878), the gunboat Nautilus (1871) and the Elisabeth, which was transferred to eastern African waters in June 1881. The squadron was reformed as the East Asia Cruiser Squadron in January 1888, but was disbanded again in May as the larger ships were sent to East Africa to support colony building there. By late 1893, only the gunboats Wolf and Iltis remained in Asian waters.

The Iltis began East Asian service in 1880, fighting pirates near Taiwan and protecting German nationals during disturbances on the Chinese coast. The Iltis toured the Philippines, including the Sulu Archipelago, in March 1881. A ship of 490 metric tons, it was armed with two 4.9-inch guns. The Iltis was sent to Korea in 1894 to secure the German embassy at Inchon during the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1896). The gunboat was also present at the Japanese destruction of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of the Yalu River. In July 1896, the Iltis was ordered to Tsingtao to investigate the suitability of the northern Chinese port for a permanent German naval station, but a powerful storm broke the ship on a reef, with the loss of 71 members of its crew.

The German East Asia Cruiser Squadron in 1898

At the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the protected cruiser Irene was sent to Asia to become the flagship of the newly formed East Asia Cruiser Squadron (Kreuzerdivision in Ostasien) under Rear Admiral Paul Hoffman. In 1895, several older ships were sent home as the Iltis and Irene were joined by the Irene’s sister-ship Prinzess Wilhelm, the armored cruiser Kaiser (1874) and its sister-ship Deutschland (1874), the protected cruiser Kaiserin Augusta (1892) the unprotected cruiser Cormoran (1893), the gunboat Gefion (1893) and the steam corvette Arcona (1885).

Known to the German navy as “cruiser-corvettes,” the protected cruisers Irene and Prinzess Wilhelm were launched in 1887. The ships, at 4271 metric tons, were highly sea-worthy, but slow, with a typical cruising speed of only nine knots due to a design flaw. Each ship had fourteen Krupp 5.9-inch guns and three torpedo tubes. They were modernized in 1893 before the Irene was sent to East Asia in 1894, with the Prinzess Wilhelm following in 1895.

The British-built ironclad Kaiser’s rigging and sails were removed in 1883 and replaced by two heavy military masts. The ship was rebuilt in 1891-95 as an armored cruiser of 7645 metric tons. The Kaiser was armed with eight 10.2-inch guns in a central casemate battery (soon overtaken by the turret battery design used in later ships) and five torpedo tubes. Its sister-ship Deutschland, also a member of the East Asia squadron, was rebuilt at the same time. They were the last of Germany’s foreign-built capital ships.

SMS Kaiser, 1887

A protected cruiser of 6056 metric tons, the Kaiserin Augusta was launched in 1892. The only one of her class, this unique ship was designed for overseas duty (most German cruisers were designed for dual use overseas or with the home fleet). It joined the East Asia squadron in 1897, armed with 12 5.9-inch guns and five torpedo tubes after an 1896 upgrade. The cruiser’s bow was also reinforced for ramming. The Kaiserin Augusta was considered a fast ship, having crossed the Atlantic at an average speed of 21.5 knots (24.7 miles per hour).

The Gefion was an unprotected gunboat of 3746 metric tons at its launch in 1893. The ship was designed for colonial service or use as a commerce raider in times of war. Armed with ten 4.1inch guns and two torpedo tubes, the Gefion had the greatest range in the German fleet – 3500 knots (4000 miles). It joined the East Asia squadron in May, 1898.

The Cormoran was a Bussard-class unprotected cruiser of 1612 metric tons, independently stationed in the Pacific, but ready to join the East Asia squadron whenever needed. Like the Kaiserin Augusta, it was built solely for overseas duty. Launched in 1892, the ship carried a main battery of eight 10.5-centimeter (4.1 in) guns with two deck-mounted torpedo tubes.

SMS Arcona

The Arcona was a screw-corvette, one of six ships of the Carola-class equipped with steam and sail for overseas service. The 2662-ton Arcona carried ten 5.9-inch guns and two 3.4-inch guns. The corvette made two visits to the Philippines in 1895 and 1896 to help protect Europeans during local disturbances, landing German marines on its second visit.

Most of the early work of the squadron consisted of surveying, fighting pirates and protecting German nationals and interests in the Pacific and along the Chinese and Korean coasts. Visits to Nagasaki, Formosa, Port Arthur and Vladivostok were common, as well as occasional patrols of the Yangtze River.

Germany Contests Spanish Control of the Caroline Islands

The Caroline Island group is a Pacific Ocean archipelago of some 500 small coral islands. Beginning in 1525, Spain made sporadic attempts to establish sovereignty over the archipelago. When they renewed such attempts in 1885 by adding the region to the Spanish East Indies, German and British trade missions were already active on the islands. Spanish attempts to collect customs duties on German commercial activities saw the arrival of the gunboat Iltis to raise the German flag at Yap (four islands surrounded by a common coral reef) on August 2, 1885, despite the presence of two Spanish warships that ultimately did nothing. Spanish discretion proved the better part of valor; Pope Leo XIII was called on to mediate and conflict was averted when Germany accepted the Pope’s affirmation of Spanish sovereignty. This did not, however, end German interest in the archipelago.

A German Naval Base in China – 1897

The German squadron used Britain’s Hong Kong harbor as a base, but this arrangement was unsatisfactory for several reasons. Thus, a “German Hong Kong” was sought. Numerous ideas were advanced and rejected, including the Kaiser’s suggestion of a joint German/Japanese occupation of Taiwan (this would have proved interesting when the two nations became enemies in 1914). Another possibility was China’s Bay of Jiaozhou; the surrounding region of Shandong (where German missionaries were already active) was rich in coal and iron ore.

Tirpitz took over the East Asia Squadron in June 1896, tasked with finding a permanent base for his itinerant fleet on the Chinese coast. When China refused Germany’s request for a naval port, the Kaiser ordered plans to be made for a takeover of Jiaozhou Bay and the fishing village of Tsingtao (or Quindao, now a city of over 7 million people with a historical district of German colonial-era buildings). After Admiral Tirpitz returned to Germany to become the architect of the German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte), his successor, Rear Admiral Otto von Diederich (appointed June 1897) failed in his efforts to negotiate the German Navy’s use of China’s Kiaochou Bay in June 1897.

A pretext for occupation opened up in November 1897, when two German Catholic missionaries were publicly slaughtered in Shandong. Kaiser Wilhelm styled himself as the personal protector of the mission, and immediately ordered the East Asia Cruiser Squadron into action, against the advice of Tirpitz. The Kaiser, Prinzess Wilhelm and Cormoran took part in the capture of Kiaochou Bay on November 14, 1897 (Irene was in dry-dock at the time).

The German landing party took only two hours to seize Kiaochou and drive out its commander, General Chang, who was put under house arrest. An attempt organized by General Chang from his home to retake the port two weeks later was repulsed by the guns of the Kaiser and the Prinzess Wilhelm. Chang was sent under guard to the Prinzess Wilhelm. Marines of the Seebataillon arrived in January 1898 to consolidate control.

On March 6, 1898, Germany signed a 99-year lease with China for Shandong, without rent. The region came under the authority of the Imperial Navy rather than the usual colonial administration of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

German Interest in the Philippines

In the 1860s, Prussian merchants and gunrunners became involved with the Muslim sultan of the Sulu Archipelago, which was under blockade by the Spanish, who claimed the territory in the south Philippines. After German unification in 1871, Madrid feared the newly emergent German Empire intended to take the Sulu Archipelago or even the entire Philippines and began seizing German merchant ships headed to the archipelago, some of which carried cargoes of old muskets and ammunition destined for Muslim rebels. The result of this minor crisis was twofold: a growing interest in Filipino affairs in Berlin and a realization that a growing German presence in the Asia/Pacific region required greater naval support than just the old Prussian steam corvette Nymphe, a veteran of wars against Denmark and France and Germany’s lone ship in the vast Pacific. In 1873, the Nymphe visited the sultan of the Sulu Archipelago, who asked for his realm to become a protectorate of the German Empire to free Sulu from Spanish rule. When the request reached Berlin, it was rejected by Bismarck, who replied pragmatically that the German navy was still too weak for Berlin to become involved in such projects. Despite this, some in the German foreign office would remember the sultan’s appeal over twenty years later when it suddenly became of importance.

When the Philippine Revolution broke out in August 1896, the cruiser Arcona was sent to Manila to protect German residents and interests, provoking new suspicions that Germany had designs on the Spanish colony. The Arcona was relieved by the Irene on December 25. Days later, the Spanish executed José Rizal, a German-educated Filipino revolutionary with many German connections who the Spanish believed was in favor of a German takeover of the colony. Though his family pleaded for German intervention, Tirpitz declined and the Irene left on January 3, 1897. When other revolutionaries petitioned for a German protectorate, Wilhelm became convinced there was popular demand in the Philippines for German sovereignty. The Kaiser was alarmed in March 1898 when the German consul in Hong Kong reported American preparations for an assault on Manila, which Wilhelm had already decided should belong to Germany. This attitude on the part of the emperor himself might have contributed to the decision to send an oversized naval representation to Manila at the time of the American attack. Direct action in support of the Spanish was not favored due to differences in Berlin over the power of the Americans. Nonetheless, the Kaiser believed the Philippines should not come under the control of a foreign power without Germany receiving some form of compensation.

That the Germans were serious about expansion in the Asia/Pacific was demonstrated when it was decided to double the strength of the German naval deployment in the region. The Kaiser was delighted with his new acquisition in China and sent out a second division of the East Asia Cruiser Squadron under the command of his brother, Prince Heinrich. Consisting of the flagship Deutschland, the Kaiserin Augusta and the Gefion, the squadron left for China on December 15, 1897, with the Kaiser instructing them: “Should anyone seek to hinder you in the proper exercise of our legitimate rights, go for them with a mailed fist.” The squadron arrived in Tsingtau harbor on May 5, 1898.

The German consul in Manila believed the Filipino insurgents were open to the establishment of a kingdom, possibly with a German prince at its helm. Bernhard von Bülow, the aristocratic German foreign secretary, disputed the consul’s report and informed the Kaiser that this scenario was unlikely and could create conflict with both Britain and America, something the Kaiser did not want under any circumstances. German diplomats suggested to their American counterparts that an American takeover of the Philippines might require German compensation, possibly in the form of coaling stations or harbors in the Sulu archipelago, where Germany had longstanding interests. Possible sites for German bases in the archipelago included Port Dalrymple on Jolo Island and Isabela on Basilan Island. German diplomats tried but failed to persuade Washington that Sulu had been a Prussian protectorate since 1873.

Outbreak of the Spanish-American War

Spain, once the world’s greatest imperial power, was reduced by the late 19th century to minor possessions in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the most valuable of which were Cuba and the Philippines. Spain’s much-diminished army struggled to hold on in the face of rebellions in all its colonies, while its overseas fleet consisted mainly of outdated, poorly maintained ships capable of colonial duty but little else. During the three centuries of Spanish rule in the Philippines, military mutinies were a regular occurrence, usually happening in response to Spanish abuses of their own locally-raised troops or Filipino civilians.

Spanish Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón

In August 1896, a fractious nationalist group called Katipunan launched the Filipino Revolution. By 1897, the movement was still unsuccessful in its independence campaign, and the revolution’s leaders (including leader Emilio Aguinaldo) came to an arrangement with the Spanish; in exchange for amnesty and a monetary indemnity, they agreed to exile in Hong Kong. Future Spanish dictator Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Primo de Rivera went with them as hostage for the indemnity payment.

The Battle of Manila Bay                                                                                

Following the Maine incident in Havana and exaggerated claims of Spanish colonial atrocities repeated in the American press, Washington declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898. In a war largely engineered by imperially-minded political opportunists with the support of a jingoistic press, the United States embarked on a military campaign to seize Spain’s overseas possessions (with the exception of its African colonies).

The Battle of Manila Bay, by Ildefonso Sanz Doménech

Shortly after the declaration of war, the US Asiatic Squadron left Hong Kong for Manila to attack the Spanish squadron of decaying ships based there. The American squadron, commanded by US Civil War veteran Commodore George Dewey, had no permanent base in the East, frequenting Chinese and Japanese ports to supply itself.

The US Asiatic Squadron included four protected cruisers: the flagship Olympia (1892, 5870 tons, four 8-inch guns, 10 5-inch guns), the Baltimore (1888, 4600 tons, four 8-inch guns, six 6-inch guns), the Raleigh (1892, 3200 tons, one 6-inch gun, ten 5-inch guns) and the Boston (1884, 3200 tons, two 8-inch guns, six 6-inch guns). There were also two smaller gunboats, the Concord and Petrel, the McCulloch, a revenue cutter, and a collier and transport ship.

Spanish Cruiser Reina Cristina (1887)

The much weaker Spanish squadron was led by its flagship, the Reina Cristina (1887), an unprotected cruiser of 3,042 tons (smaller than all four American cruisers), with six 6.4-inch guns that became the main target of American fire when the battle began. The Reina Cristina was supported by the Castilla (1881), an unprotected cruiser of 3,289 tons, with a ram bow and four 5.9-inch and two 4.7-inch guns. Unfortunately, the Castilla was largely immobile due to problems with her propeller shaft and was forced to fight the battle while still at anchor until she was sunk. The Reina Cristina was destroyed by shellfire with heavy loss of life before being scuttled.

Other Spanish ships included:

  • The unprotected cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa (1887), 1152 tons, with only two 4.7-inch guns on the starboard side, the port side guns having been dismantled for use in shore batteries. The Don Antonio had been sent to the Caroline Islands in 1890 to fend off German cruisers. By 1898, however, her machinery was in bad repair and the ship was unable to move during the battle, allowing it to be completely destroyed by the American guns.
  • Don Juan de Austria (1897) was an unprotected cruiser of 1152 metric tons, equipped with four 4.7-inch guns. She was badly damaged by American fire before being scuttled. The ship was later raised to become the USS Don Juan de Austria.
  • The protected cruiser Isla de Cuba (1886) displaced 1053 metric tons and carried six 4.7-inch guns. She was scuttled to prevent capture during the battle after Admiral Montojo moved his flag to her after the destruction of the Reina Cristina. The cruiser was later raised and put back to work fighting Filipino rebels as the USS Isla de Cuba before being sold to the Venezuelan Navy, where she served until 1940. The Isla de Cuba’s sister-ship, the Isla de Luzón, suffered multiple hits in the battle and was likewise scuttled and refloated to join American service.
  • The Marques del Duero (1875), a gunboat/despatch ship of 492 metric tons, with one 6.4-inch and two 4.7-inch guns, was the oldest ship in the Spanish squadron. Badly damaged in the battle, it was scuttled before being raised for a short career as the USS P-17.

Three small Spanish gunboats in the area did not take part in the battle, while the guns of an unprotected cruiser, the Velasco, had already been moved to shore batteries that played little part in the battle, the American ships operating mostly out of range. Many of the Spanish ships had torpedo tubes, but there were no torpedoes available.

The seven-hour battle that followed the arrival of the US squadron was so one-sided that the Americans were able to take a break for breakfast half-way through before returning to the destruction of the Spanish ships. Damage to the American ships was extremely light and only one fatality was reported. The Spanish suffered 77 dead and over 270 wounded; by the end of the encounter not a single Spanish ship remained afloat of those that had taken part in the battle.

Despite the personal valor he displayed at the head of his decrepit fleet, the Spanish squadron’s commander, Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, was court-martialled, dismissed from the navy and briefly imprisoned on his return to Spain. A report from Admiral Dewey testifying to his gallantry in the unequal battle was of little help.

After the Battle of Manila Bay

The speed of the American naval victory in Manila had outstripped American planning, with the question of American intentions in the Philippines remaining unanswered while Dewey awaited further instructions. It was unclear what Washington intended for the Philippines – independence, American occupation, continued Spanish control with the payment of an indemnity, annexation, a US naval withdrawal, or the American sale of the islands to a third party (most likely Britain). Meanwhile, Filipino revolutionaries led by Aguinaldo continued their campaign against Spanish troops. In exile in Hong Kong since 1897, Aguinaldo had been returned by Dewey to Manila on the revenue cutter USS McCulloch on May 19. As Dewey awaited further orders, it seemed an opportune time for Germany to position naval assets to exploit this uncertainty and perhaps influence developments to Germany’s advantage. The SMS Irene and SMS Cormoran were the first German ships to arrive in Manila on May 6 and May 9, respectively.

The German consul in Manila reported that the Spanish governor general was willing to accept turning the city over to the commanders of the various European neutral warships that gathered in the harbor to observe the battle and protect their nationals and interests in the Philippines, but was unable to persuade Admiral Diederichs to take the lead in such an action without a directive from Berlin. Meanwhile, the German Foreign Office was following the Kaiser’s order to avoid unduly antagonizing the Americans and forcing them into an alliance with Britain.

The international ships at Manila were typical of the type generally used in observer situations. These included the HMS Immortalité (1887), an armored cruiser of little note, and HMS Linnet (1880), a gunboat also of little distinction despite being the sixth ship of its name in the Royal Navy. The French Bruix was an armored cruiser that would eventually be used against German forces in the Kamerun campaign of 1914-15. The Japanese Ituskushima was a French-built protected cruiser, a poorly designed ship with a single 12.6-inch gun whose recoil was too much for the vessel to handle with any ease. Despite her deficiencies, she fought in the 1894 Battle of the Yalu River against China and again in the world-changing 1905 Battle of Tsushima against the Russian fleet.

On June 2, 1898, the Kaiser issued Admiral Diederichs’ main order: “Sail to Manila [with the East Asia Squadron] in order to form a personal opinion about Spain’s situation there, the population’s mood, and the foreign influence on the political reorganization of the Philippines.” Tirpitz added that strict neutrality should be observed to protect German interests elsewhere in the Pacific. There was nothing to suggest that Diederichs was to support the Spanish, back the rebels or otherwise interfere in the American campaign, whose goals were still frustratingly unclear. Nonetheless, the presence of a strong German squadron would enable the Germans to exploit an American withdrawal should that happen.

Dewey’s ammunition was seriously depleted after the battle and the commodore’s nerves were on edge due to the intense summer heat and the absence of cable communications with his superiors – messages needed to be sent by ship to the telegraph station at Hong Kong, with the reply coming back the same way, a process of roughly one week.

The German troop transport Darmstadt arrived on June 6 with 1400 soldiers and a collier ship. The Americans, who would have no troops of their own in Manila for another six weeks, were duly shocked by what seemed a German intention to seize their prize. In reality, the German troops were headed to Tsingtau and the Darmstadt had only stopped at Manila to provide relief crews for the Irene and Cormoran. Dewey was greatly relieved when the transport left 72 hours after arriving, but alarms had once more been sounded by what appeared to be another effort to intimidate the victorious American squadron.

Rebuilt SMS Deutschland as armored cruiser in 1898 at Port Arthur. Compare with photo of sister-ship Kaiser before modernization. The Kaiser was modernized at the same time.  

The rest of the German squadron arrived on June 12, the same day Aguinaldo’s rebels declared the independence of the Philippines. By this time, there were five German warships gathered at Manila, the Prinzess Wilhelm, Kaiser, Irene, Kaiserin Augusta and Cormoran (the Deutschland, Gefion, and Arcona remained in Chinese waters). The size and power of this squadron was significantly out of proportion for what was required for observation purposes. Both the Kaiser and the Kaiserin Augusta were larger than any of Dewey’s ships and rumors in Manila maintained that Diederichs, who was senior in rank to Dewey (another oddity for an observer mission), had arrived to support the Spanish.

While the Americans fretted over the size of the German squadron and its forceful commander, Diederichs was, by June 25, actually sending official reports to Berlin suggesting his squadron was far too large and that a figure of his high rank should never have been sent to deal with Dewey, a mere commodore.

The actions of the German squadron seemed to tell a different story, however, and appear to have involved some degree of intimidation, with German ships ignoring the American blockade of the bay, coming and going at will during the night, flashing powerful searchlights at random and sending a steady stream of communications by signal lamp, keeping the American squadron constantly on edge. German sailors even seized a lighthouse and various Spanish onshore facilities without explanation.

Rear Admiral Otto von Diederichs

Most alarming to the Americans, however, was a visit by Diederichs to the Spanish governor general of the Philippines, Basilio Augustín y Dávila Augustín, and a return visit by the governor to the Kaiser. Though this unnerved Dewey, it emerged later that Diederichs used these talks to explain to the governor that he could not take any action in support of a Spanish proposal to mollify the rebels by establishing a looser Spanish protectorate over the Philippines guaranteed by Germany (perceived to be friendly to the Filipinos) without orders from Berlin. If Dewey had known the direction and tenor of the talks, he may have hosted them himself. Instead, Dewey called on Diederichs to have him explain the presence and activities of the German squadron, to which Diederichs replied: “I am here, sir, by order of the Kaiser.” Like many other exchanges with the Germans, this response seemed curt, unilluminating and slightly menacing.

Commodore George Dewey, USN

Diederichs also ordered the German consul and a flag-lieutenant to meet with the Filipino rebels. The admiral reported these talks in a top-secret message to Berlin. Feeling independence was near, the rebels initially informed the Germans they no longer had interest in a German protectorate. Diederichs, who believed in the inevitable collapse of a Filipino government, suggested patience until that time, while warning the rebels might be trying to play the Germans against the Americans. Further talks revealed that Aguinaldo was personally interested in close ties to Germany (possibly even as a protectorate) once independence had been achieved. The rebel government attempted to send an envoy, Antonio Regidor, to Berlin to enquire about a German protectorate, but the visit was suspended by Wilhelm until independence was achieved. However, the size of the German squadron at Manila also confused the revolutionaries, who believed it could only be there to support the Spanish occupation. Meanwhile, Admiral Diederichs was reporting that he could discern no reliable support in the Philippines for a German protectorate.

The US Revenue Cutter McCulloch

On June 27, an officer from the American revenue cutter McCulloch boarded the Irene in daytime, a provocative action that revealed Dewey’s anxiety about the German ships. Identification boardings at night when ships were difficult to identify were considered acceptable at the time, while daytime boardings were considered insulting and unnecessary. Despite this Diederichs at all times ordered his squadron to accept night-time boardings by American officers. The American press inflamed the incident by claiming the McCulloch had fired a shot across the Irene’s bows to force her to stop. Further dubious incidents involving shots being fired across the bows of German warships were cited in the American press, eventually finding their way into the historical record. Diederichs, however, reported to the Kaiser that no shots had been fired at German ships, describing such reports as inventions of the anti-German American press.

The New York Times (June 30, 1898) questioned the purpose of the oversize German squadron in Manila:

The apparatus she has provided is quite out of proportion to the object to be attained. There may be forty or fifty German subjects doing business in Manila. … A single man-of-war could accommodate the entire German population of Manila. Yet the provision that Germany has made is a squadron composed, at last accounts, of five vessels, and superior to the American squadron which destroyed the Spanish fleet and which now holds Manila under its guns. We should be very simple to believe that this force has been assembled merely to rescue German inhabitants from the fury of Auguinaldo.

There can be no doubt of the unofficial American view of the assemblage of a German squadron in Manila Bay. It is that that assemblage is unmannerly and provocative, and that it is meant not to protect existing German interests but to find new interests to protect.

German public opinion during the war was generally supportive of Spain, in contrast to the government’s official (but undeclared) neutrality. The German press began to weigh in against the Americans; these reports aggravated the situation when they were translated and reprinted in American newspapers.

SMS Irene in Chinese Waters

On July 5, the Irene was ordered south to Subic Bay (later an American naval base, but held at this time by Filipino revolutionaries) to explore its usefulness as a harbor and to evacuate noncombatants and severely wounded troops from a beleaguered Spanish garrison on Isla Grande. While off the island, the Irene encountered the Filipinas, a merchant steamer flying the insurgent flag and having every appearance of preparing to deliver an attack on Isla Grande. The Germans, who had not yet evacuated the noncombatants, ordered the insurgents to haul down their flag, still officially unrecognized by any state. After the Filipinas slipped away in the night, its captain reported to Aguinaldo and the still pro-rebel Americans that the Irene had interfered with their attack on the Spanish. Dewey, believing this to be a violation of neutrality, sent the Raleigh and Concord to investigate, but these arrived only in time to see the departure of the Irene. The German cruiser’s action, never explained to the Americans, was interpreted by the latter and by Aguinaldo’s rebel forces as naval support of the Spanish garrison.

Efforts to improve relations only made things worse. Dewey sent an officer to complain to Diederichs about blockade violations but the officer came away reassured by the admiral’s sincerity in stating his desire not to interfere with American operations. A July 10 return visit to Dewey by a German officer went well until the officer complained the Irene had been illegally stopped and boarded. Dewey exploded, threatening to stop every ship and fire at any that resisted, shouting “If Germany wants war, alright – we are ready!” When he continued in this vein, the German officer chose to leave and report to Diederichs. Though the German admiral decided not to make an issue of Dewey’s outburst, tensions between the two squadrons were now at a peak. With more anger than discretion, Dewey unwisely revealed plans to engage the German squadron to American reporters. The growing pressure was somewhat alleviated when the Americans learned Diederichs had ordered the Irene to leave the Philippines on July 9, leaving four German ships at Manila. A growing correspondence between Dewey and Diederichs also helped calm the standoff through July.

The Spanish Relief Fleet

Spain’s best ships were in its home fleet, and a plan was formed to have them steam to America and bombard cities on the US coast. As well as causing panic in the enemy’s homeland, it would also help relieve the American blockade of Cuba and allow the Spanish naval squadron trapped there to take to sea. The plan did not receive approval from the pro-American British, who regarded the Atlantic at the time as their own Mare Nostrum.

The bombardment of the American coast was abandoned and the squadron ordered on June 16 to steam to Manila to restore Spanish control of the Philippines. Known as “the Second Squadron,” the ships came under the command of Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Livermore, a veteran of the War of the Pacific (which pitted Spain against Peru and Chile, 1865-1866), the First Cuban War (1868-1878) and the First Rif War, fought in Spanish Morocco (1893-1894). Cámara knew the way to the Philippines, having led the “Black Squadron” of three Spanish warships to Manila in 1890.

Spanish Battleship Pelayo

Cámara’s relief squadron included the battleship Pelayo (1888, partially rebuilt just before deployment) with two 12.6-inch guns and two 11-inch guns, and the brand-new armored cruiser Emperador Carlos V, with 11-inch guns. With support ships, this squadron would bring into play far more powerful weapons than the 8-inch and 6-inch guns of the four protected cruisers of the American Asiatic Squadron. With America’s most powerful ships deployed in the more important Caribbean theater of the war, a desperate admiralty sent the US monitor Monterey (1891) with two 12-inch guns, two ten-inch guns and a ram to Manila from San Francisco on June 11. It was followed by the monitor USS Monadnock (1883), with four ten-inch guns on June 23. Though the monitors, with very low freeboards, were designed for use in coastal waters or rivers, they both survived harrowing two-month crossings of the Pacific. They would remain in the Philippines until 1899.

Spanish Cruiser Emperador Carlos V in the Suez Canal

The Spanish Second Squadron passed through the Suez Canal after several days of negotiations with British authorities and reached the Red Sea by July 7, but was ordered to return home following the American destruction of the Spanish Caribbean Squadron at Santiago, Cuba on July 3, 1898. Four Spanish cruisers had stood no chance against four American battleships and two armored cruisers. This created an opening for the US to implement plans to raid the Spanish coast with the battleships Iowa and Oregon and the cruiser Brooklyn. The American attack was called off once the powerful Spanish ships turned for home, where Cámara’s squadron was disbanded on July 25, 1898.

The End of Uncertainty

American intentions in the Philippines started to become clear when US troops began to arrive. The first American ground force of 2700 men landed on July 1, 1898. Further troopships arrived at Manila on July 17 and again on July 31. Instead of aggravating the situation, their arrival confirmed that the Americans planned a military occupation, a development that would leave little room for German expansion in the islands. By the end of July, the German foreign ministry informed Washington that their ships never intended to interfere with American operations and a large squadron had only been sent in response to public pressure in Germany to defend German interests in the Philippines.

USS Monterey Crossing the Pacific, 1898

The US monitor Monterey arrived on August 4; when the monitor Monadnock sailed into Manila Bay on August 16, the American squadron was finally stronger than their German counterparts.

There was, strangely, to be one more incident that was little noted at the time but later grew in stature into an almost legendary confrontation. A secret armistice was agreed upon by the Americans and the Spanish on August 12. A mock battle was arranged for the next day to allow the Spanish to save face and avoid a potential slaughter by the Filipino insurgents by surrendering to the Americans instead.

As the American ships moved from nearby Cavite to positions off Manila to shell the city on August 13, the two British cruisers moved into a position between the Americans and the four remaining German ships. Though no-one at the time thought it was anything other than the British ships moving into a better observation point (with little regard for the view of the Germans), it was later interpreted as the pro-American British preventing an imminent attack on the American flank by the German squadron. In fact, neither the British nor German ships were cleared for action and the only German movement was to shift the Kaiser slightly after the British ships blocked the German flagship’s view of the American bombardment. With the exception of one American ship, the US squadron followed Dewey’s order to fire only on low-value or uninhabited targets.

American infantry advanced into the city, with some commanders who had not been informed of the full plan surprised by the light resistance they encountered. Aguinaldo’s rebels had been warned by the Americans to stay out of Manila during American operations there, but joined the American advance instead, ignoring Spanish flags of truce and forcing the Spanish to resist in earnest for their own survival. As a result, 19 Americans and 49 Spaniards were dead by the end of the “mock battle.”

SMS Kaiserin Augusta

Following the shelling of the city, the Kaiserin Augusta sailed away with the Spanish Governor General, though the ship’s captain later claimed he did so with American permission. Diederichs departed Manila for Batavia on August 21 aboard the Kaiser. The rest of the German squadron left for Mariveles (Bataan Province), leaving only the Prinzess Wilhelm on station to protect German nationals.

Aftermath

Dewey appears to have been more alarmed by the presence of the German squadron at Manila than Washington. Though both the German and American press contributed to the belief that a confrontation was imminent, there was little appetite for such in both Washington and Berlin. The German presence was opportunistic and designed to exploit a possible collapse of the Philippines in concert with other “sea-powers” if such a course arose. When the Spanish-American armistice was signed on August 12, German interest in a Philippines protectorate evaporated and Diederichs was ordered to the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia) to celebrate the coronation of the Queen of the Netherlands. German attention quickly turned to obtaining Spain’s other possessions in the Pacific. American diplomats were informed that if the US did not object to this activity, Germany would abandon any claims to the Sulu Archipelago. This proved agreeable to both sides. Meanwhile, the December 10, 1898 Treaty of Paris forced Spain to sell the Philippines to the US for $20 million. On February 4, 1889, the US Senate voted for the full annexation of the Philippines.

Despite his rapprochement with Diederichs, Dewey appears to have remained angered by his confrontation with the Germans, telling an American correspondent during his trip home that America’s next war would be with Germany. He continued to express anti-German sentiments on his return, earning a reprimand from President Roosevelt. Dewey would later tell a French admiral that his biggest mistake at Manila was not sinking the German squadron, a feat that was likely beyond his ability. By April 1899, however, Dewey was ready to admit in a letter to Diederichs that their differences had been largely manufactured by the press. Diederichs was recalled to Berlin in 1899 to become the new chief of the admiralty staff.

Even after Washington betrayed the Filipino revolutionaries and decided to keep the entire Philippines as a colony, the German Colonial Society advocated a German occupation of the island of Mindoro, the seventh biggest island in the Philippines, just south of Luzon. Mindoro had fine harbors, but had never come under complete Spanish control. It took US troops over two years to crush local resistance on the island and the ambitions of the German Colonial Society eventually came to nothing.

The German Empire in the Pacific (Chrischerf).

Though Germany had missed out on the Philippines, it still benefited from the Spanish defeat through the German-Spanish Treaty of 1899, in which Spain sold the Pacific island chains of the Carolines, the Palau Islands and the Northern Marianas to Berlin for 25 million pesetas. These roughly 6000 islands were placed under the administration of German New Guinea, giving Germany vast, if relatively unproductive, holdings in the Pacific. The new gunboat SMS Jaguar was sent on a flag-raising tour of Germany’s new possessions.

After the Manila incident there would be many more operations by the German East Asian Squadron before its 1914 triumph over a British fleet at Colonel off the west coast of South America and its subsequent destruction by a second British fleet at the Battle of the Falklands. These operations included the Battle of the Taku Forts, the suppression of the Boxer Uprising and the crushing of rebellions against German rule in the Caroline Islands and German Samoa. After the outbreak of the Great War, the fleet’s German gunboats (including the Iltis and Jaguar) remained at Tsingtao to battle the 1914 Japanese/British offensive that finally expelled the Germans from China.

At a time when communications with home were impossibly slow even in tense situations that demanded immediate decisions, Diederichs had somehow managed to make a display of Germany’s new-found overseas power while at the same time showing just enough restraint and diplomatic acumen to avoid a war with the United States that no-one in Berlin wanted, despite the decision to send an entire German squadron to Manila when a lone gunboat might have sufficed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bailey, Thomas A: (1939) “Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay,” The American Historical Review 45(1), October 1939, pp. 59-81.

Blackley, Andrew K: (2024) “Neither Cruiser nor Gunboat: The USS Monterey,” Naval History 38(4), United States Naval Institute, August 2024.

Bönker, Dirk: (2013) “Global Politics and Germany’s Destiny ‘from an East Asian Perspective’: Alfred von Tirpitz and the Making of Wilhelmine Navalism,” Central European History 46(1), March 2013, pp. 61-96.

Dewey, George: (1913) Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.

Dodson, Aidan: (2016). The Kaiser’s Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871–1918. Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley.

Dodson, Aidan: (2017) “After the Kaiser: The Imperial German Navy’s Light Cruisers after 1918,” In John Jordan (ed.): Warship 2017, Conway, London, pp. 140–159.

Dodson, Aidan, and Dirk Nottelmann: (2021) The Kaiser’s Cruisers 1871–1918, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.

Ellicott, JM: (1955) “The Cold War Between Von Diederichs and Dewey in Manila Bay,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 85(11), November 1955, pp. 1236-1239.

Gardiner, Robert; Roger Chesneau and Eugene M Kolesnik (eds.): (1979) Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, Conway Maritime Press, Greenwich CT.

Gottschall, Terrell D: (2003) By Order of the Kaiser, Otto von Diederichs and the Rise of the Imperial German Navy 1865–1902, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.

Gröner, Erich: (1990). German Warships: 1815–1945 Vol. I: Major Surface Vessels, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.

Guerrero, Leon MA: (1961) “The Kaiser and the Philippines,” Philippine Studies 9(4), October 1961, pp. 584-600.

Herwig, Holger (1980): “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888–1918, Humanity Books, Amherst.

Hezel Francis, X: (2003). Strangers in Their Own Land: A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Hildebrand, Hans H, Albert Röhr and Hans-Otto Steinmetz: (1993) Die Deutschen Kriegsschiffe: Biographien – ein Spiegel der Marinegeschichte von 1815 bis zur Gegenwart Vol. 1, Mundus Verlag, Ratingen.

Nottelmann, Dirk & Sullivan, David M: (2023). From Ironclads to Dreadnoughts: The Development of the German Battleship, 1864–1918. Warwick: Helion & Company

Sargent, Commander Nathan (ed.): (1947) Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign, Naval Historical Foundation, Washington DC.

Schult, Volker: (2002) “Revolutionaries and Admirals: The German East Asia Squadron in Manila Bay,” Philippine Studies 50(4), pp. 496-511.

Schult, Volker, and Karl-Heinz Wionzek (eds.): (2017) The German and Austrian Navies in the Philippines, and Their Role in the Spanish-American War of 1898: A collection of original documents, National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP).

Shippee, Lester Burrell: (1925) “Germany and the Spanish-American War,” The American Historical Review 30(4), July 1925, pp. 754-777.

Sondhaus, Lawrence” (1997) Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power Before the Tirpitz Era. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press

Van Dijk, Kees: (2015) “The Scramble for China: The Bay of Jiaozhou and Port Arthur,” in: Tak-Wing Ngo (ed.): Pacific Strife, Amsterdam University Press, pp. 295-316.

Wionzek, Karl-Heinz (ed.): (2000) Germany, the Philippines and the Spanish-American War. Four Accounts by Officers of the Imperial German Navy, National Historical Institute, Manila.

A Marine on the Nile: George Bethune English and the Conquest of the Sudan, 1820-1821

Andrew McGregor

Military History 37(5), January 2021

After a month’s march through the sands, ruins and palm trees that line the Nubian Nile, an invading Egyptian army of cutthroats and mercenaries drawn from across the Ottoman Empire was about to encounter their first real resistance on November 4, 1820. The much-feared horsemen of the Arab Shayqiya tribe were determined the Egyptians would never take their lands. Screaming, they fell upon the army’s Arab scouts with sword and spear, wiping them out. It was a bad start for the Egyptian leader, 25-year-old Ismail Pasha, whose artillery was still being shipped south by boat.

Ismail brought his troops into line against the Shayqiya, who were led by a young girl on a richly decorated camel. It was she who gave the order to attack, a tradition celebrating a fearless 17th century female Shayqiya warrior. The Arabs’ horses pounded their way across the plain, smashing into the Egyptian infantry with such violence that the Egyptian line began to collapse. As disaster loomed, the Egyptians’ formidable second-in-command, the Albanian ‘Abdin Bey, led his horsemen in a series of desperate counter-charges. The Egyptian infantry rallied and began to pour fire into the Shayqiya. The invaders triumphed, only to begin what one of their number later described as “twelve months of misery and starvation.”

The Egyptian expedition to Sudanese Nubia included three American mercenaries, including former US Marines officer George Bethune English, though illness kept him from the battlefield that day. The Massachusetts native, a convert to Islam, related his experiences as an artillery commander in Sudan in his 1822 memoir, A Narrative of the Expedition to Dongola and Sennar, yet 190 years after his death, English remains an enigma; was he mercenary, spy, or sincere convert to Islam?

English had taken degrees in law and divinity at Harvard College. After being exposed to a collection of 17th century documents that questioned important aspects of Christianity, English wrote a book critical of Christian doctrines in 1813. The work elicited howls of outrage in Protestant New England and English was turfed from Harvard and excommunicated from his church. His belief that Islam was a moral system drawn from the Old and New Testaments, “modified a little, and expressed in Arabic,” proved toxic to his reputation.

John Quincy Adams in 1818 (George Stuart)

US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams made an unexplained intervention on English’s behalf by commissioning him as a second lieutenant in the US Marines in 1815. English served in the Mediterranean in 1816-17 and was promoted to First Lieutenant. He resigned and moved to Constantinople shortly afterwards in mid-1817, but was still listed on the Naval Register until 1820. Was English acting as Adams’ secret agent in the Middle East?

By 1820, English was in Egypt, where he converted to Islam, changed his name to Muhammad Effendi and used the influence of British Consul Henry Salt to join the Egyptian army as a senior officer of artillery. He was joined by two American sailors who either deserted or were reassigned from the five warships in the US Mediterranean squadron. Known only by their adopted names, New Yorker Khalil Agha and the Swiss-born Ahmad Agha converted to Islam and acted as English’s servants. By the time English enlisted he was fluent in Arabic and Turkish, the languages of the Egyptian Army.

Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha (David Wilkie)

Expanding Egypt’s borders far south into Sudanese Nubia was part of a larger effort by Egyptian ruler Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha to build a family dynasty to rival the Ottomans in Constantinople. He and his sons would eventually seize Sudan, parts of the Red Sea coast, all of Syria and Palestine and the holy cities of Arabia.

Massacre of the Mamluks at the Cairo Citadel (Horace Vernet)

The second purpose of Muhammad ‘Ali’s expedition was to eliminate the Mamluks, a military slave-caste that ruled Egypt before being treacherously slaughtered by the Pasha. The survivors fled to Nubia, where they arrogantly forced Nubian farmers to grow their food in the blazing sun while they cooled themselves on a huge raft anchored in the middle of the Nile.

Mamluk Warrior

The third purpose involved the creation of a new Egyptian army of black slaves, something Napoleon had tried only a few years earlier. The Pasha decided to seize thousands of Sudanese to fight his own wars of conquest and those he was obliged to join on behalf of his suzerain, the Ottoman Sultan.

The Egyptian invasion force consisted of 4,000 men, with 120 artillerymen serving ten field pieces, two small howitzers and one mortar. The infantry included Turks, Kurds, Albanians, Circassians, Greeks, Syrians and 700 “Maghrabis” (mercenaries from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco). Turkish cavalry and some 700 camel-mounted ‘Abbadi Arabs completed the force.

Six cataracts lie between Aswan (where Nubia begins) and the intersection of the White and Blue Niles. Each cataract consists of a series of deadly rapids and waterfalls created by granite rock. Thousands of Nubians were forced to help haul the expedition’s boats over these obstacles.

The expedition left on October 3, 1820, with 120 boats carrying the expedition’s supplies and ammunition. Within days, English was struck with severe ophthalmia, an eye affliction which caused such pain that he was unable to sleep without doses of opium. Ismail’s army went on without him.

English joined a group of French army surgeons headed south to join Ismail, but they suffered badly at the Second Cataract, where crocodiles gathered to enjoy an unexpected feast of drowning sailors.

Shayqiya Warrior (Frédéric Cailliaud)

To continue south, the expedition had to defeat the Shayqiya, whom English described as a “singular aristocracy of brigands.” They had ruled the Dongola region from their cliff-top castles for over a century, forcing the Nubians to grow their food and serve as their infantry. In battle, they carried two spears, a German-made straight-sword, and a hippopotamus-hide shield. Haughty and dismissive of death, they were not overly concerned when Ismail demanded that they abandon their weapons and till the soil.

After the victory at Kurti, Ismail thought to please his father by offering a reward for every pair of enemy ears. Once his army had exhausted the supply attached to the dead and wounded, they spread through the villages, separating women and children alike of their ears. Bags full of these grisly trophies were shipped to Cairo, where an angry Muhammad ‘Ali reminded his son that such behavior was incompatible with the modern European-style army he was trying to build. English’s narrative says nothing of these atrocities.

The Shayqiya regrouped a month later at Jabal Daiqa to face Ismail a second time. The Nubian infantry was numerous, but the experienced men had been lost at Kurti. Their replacements were encouraged by holy men who sprayed them with magic dust to make them immune from death. The infantry advanced with reckless courage against Ismail’s field artillery, which had finally joined the army (English was still absent). As they reached the blazing guns, the foot-soldiers were blasted to pieces at point-blank range. The attack faltered, the Shayqiya left for the south and the Nubian infantry were left to be slaughtered by ‘Abdin Bey’s cavalry. Defeated, the Shayqiya proposed being taken into Egyptian service as irregular cavalry rather than be forced to take up the shameful occupation of farmer. The offer was accepted.

English described the Shayqiya leader Sha’us, reputed to be the greatest warrior on the Upper Nile, as “a large stout man, pleasing of physiognomy, though black…” The American was stunned by his ability to swim his entire cavalry force across the Nile.

Even as English recovered from his ophthalmia, he was struck with bloody dysentery that left him extremely weak. As his condition improved, English visited the little-known temples, castles and pyramids that lined the Nile. Khalil inscribed the name of “Henry Salt” on various ancient monuments along the way. This was a common method to establish a claim to a certain antiquity, which would be retrieved later for shipment to Europe. Meanwhile, many of the sailors used their shore-time to beat and rob local men and rape their women. The “insolence” of villagers who refused to turn over their grain angered English, who suggested that those soldiers who pillaged and murdered “were not much to blame.”

George Waddington (Richard Say)

Two Englishmen, George Waddington and Barnard Hanbury, received permission to join the army on its way south on November 26. English was eager to meet them, but Waddington made it clear he had no respect for a man who abandoned his religion. Waddington reported that the land behind the Egyptian army was strewn with the rotting bodies of beasts and men, some still with rope around their necks. The countryside was silent and the wells fouled by decaying corpses.

Waddington’s memoirs included scathing criticism of English and his religious pretensions and/or confusion. He described English as a pale and delicate-looking man who had taken on the grave and calm demeanor of the Turks. Waddington said he later learned English was a Protestant who had adopted various strains of Christianity before becoming a Jew and an orthodox Muslim in succession. He suggested English would soon turn Hindu in his “tour of the world and its religions” and would ultimately die an atheist. English claimed Waddington later gave him an apology, but the remarks stuck.

Muhammad ‘Ali ordered Ismail to march on the Blue Nile kingdom of Sennar and its fabled riches as quickly as possible. English joined the Egyptian force on a forced march across the Bayuda Desert to Berber, a means of shortening the distance covered by the great bend of the Nile, but one that left the New Englander with severe sunburn and re-aggravated ophthalmia.

The boats were left to make their way through the two worst cataracts – the 4th and 5th, a punishing trip of 57 days. Khalil and Ahmad were separated from English at this point and forced to accompany the boats. Both suspected the machinations of Ismail’s personal doctor (“the Protomedico”), a Smyrniot Greek and skilled poisoner, but their skills as sailors may have prompted the decision. Without intending to, Khalil became the first Westerner to travel the entire length of the Nile from the Mediterranean coast to Sennar.

Egyptian Troops at the Pyramids of Meroë (Frédéric Cailliaud)

Ahmad Agha died at the 4th Cataract. Khalil believed he was poisoned by the Protomedico after a quarrel. The most competent physician on the expedition, the Genoese Dr. Andrea Gentile, had already met the same fate when the Protomedico decided it was easier to poison him than repay a loan. The Protomedico had sold off the contents of the expedition’s medicine chest in Cairo cover his debts and surrounded himself with Greek villains. Other Europeans feared for their lives, including French geologist Frédéric Cailliaud, who used the expedition to record the legendary pyramids of Meroë: “Death seemed to want to claim all the gentlemen around me.” The Italian Domenico Frediani died as a “chained maniac” in Sennar after a dispute with the Protomedico. Ismail was aware of the doctor’s improprieties, but found him useful as a spy and henchman.

Eventually the army reached Berber, home to a hundred fugitive Mamluks. Most fled, but the rest submitted and accepted an offer to return home or serve as Ismail’s bodyguards. In Berber, female slaves were offered to the soldiers for a dollar a night. A chief’s wife gave English the opportunity to bed both her married daughters; English claimed his sunstroke saved him from temptation, but the daughters concluded English was rajil batal, a good-for-nothing man.

Rough handling of the transport animals led to their rapid loss; to save the artillery horses for battle, English ordered the guns to be pulled by camels. The army was now joined by Malik (king) Nimr of Shendi, “very dignified in his deportment and highly respectable for his morals” according to English.

To reach the south bank of the Blue Nile, Ismail spent over two days ferrying his army across the mile-wide White Nile by boat. The Shayqiya swam their horses across the river, as did the ‘Abbadis with their camels. A Turkish officer who decided he could do the same lost 70 horses and a number of men.

The march to Sennar lasted thirteen days, with the men on the move from 2 AM to 10 AM, at which point the heat became too intense. The only food was durra, a local grain requiring much preparation.

Sultan Bady of Sennar (Frédéric Cailliaud)

The 26-year-old Sultan Bady of Sennar (recently freed from 18 years of confinement) came out to greet Ismail and escort him into the legendary city. The magnificence of the trappings and garments of the royal entourage seemed a promising sign. The troops believed they would now reap the rewards due them after a brutal 1250-mile march from Cairo and approached the city with cries of joy and volleys of musket fire. Their delight was dashed when they realized the glory days of Sennar were over. The city was little more than a heap of broken ruins, its population inhabiting some 400 squalid huts. The only buildings of any substance were the half-ruined brick palace and mosque. Of gold and riches, there were none.

The Palace of Sennar (Frédéric Cailliaud)

With no pay for eight months and only durra to eat, the soldiers began to flog their uniforms to buy food or to pilfer supplies to sell in the market. Ismail’s worsening mood was reflected in the growing numbers of headless bodies dumped in the market. Soldiers impaled anyone who showed the slightest sign of resistance. English overheard some scandalized female observers declaring such punishments were fit only for Christians.

Flying columns raided the still-defiant hinterland. Egyptian firepower cut down hundreds of armored warriors and the army shipped thousands of men, women and children north to the Cairo slave markets. English, a native of abolitionist New England, acquired a slave of his own.

English did not accompany the raids; instead, he spent his time persuading Ismail to allow him to return to Cairo on health grounds before the miserable four-month rainy season began. He was not held back by the charms of the women of Sennar, whom he described as “the ugliest I ever beheld.”

Meanwhile, Ismail ordered two captured chiefs to be impaled; the first awaited his end by reciting the Muslim profession of faith; the second cursed and insulted his executioners. When he could no longer speak, he spat at them. Other chiefs addressed the Pasha with presumptuous questions; one asked whether Egypt was so short of food that it was necessary to come all that way to take theirs!

Henry Salt (John James Halls)

After a harrowing return trip to Cairo, English went to see Muhammad ‘Ali to collect the funds he was owed for his military service, but found him in a foul temper; he had just received word of the murder of his son Ismail in Nubia by Malik Nimr, who Ismail had grievously offended. Broke and desperate, English called on Henry Salt, who provided him with funds to return home in exchange for his narrative manuscript and various artifacts. Salt published the work, which English dedicated to him, “my fatherly friend in a foreign land.” Khalil composed his own unpublished account of the expedition, only recently discovered in Salt’s Papers at the British Library. He remained in Egypt, living as a Muslim and continuing to serve Muhammad ‘Ali.

Pliny Fisk (Hoagland)

Pliny Fisk, an evangelical missionary working in Egypt, met English after hearing he was ready to “return to his country and the religion of his Fathers.” The penalty for abandoning Islam or the army was death, but English found his way to Salt’s Consulate, where a network helped smuggle remorseful converts out of Egypt. English joined Fisk on a ship bound for Malta, playing the part of his servant. Fisk, who normally recorded everything, recorded nothing of the long shipboard conversations with English that appear to have shaken his own faith in Christianity. English, apparently, had not abandoned Islam entirely.

English’s account of his adventures in Sudan went largely unremarked. It had the preoccupation of an intelligence report with topography, but revealed nothing of its author, who freely admitted he missed the main engagements of the campaign. Considering his background, it is bizarre that no religious observations were made. English assured readers of the high regard in which he was held by Ismail, but his service record suggests otherwise – he missed the two main battles of the campaign, was typically behind the main force of the army, did not accompany the slave-raiding parties operating out of Sennar, and “demanded” a return to Cairo.

English’s father and friends tried to pave the way for his return to America by writing letters to the newspapers praising his “achievements” in Sudan while casting doubt on the sincerity of his conversion to Islam.

English did not live as a Muslim on his return, but published yet another work critical of Christianity against the objections of his remaining friends. Adams continued to act as his patron and sent English on a trade mission to Constantinople in 1822, where he appears to have resumed life as a Muslim.

As president, Adams continued finding employment for English; in July 1828 he engaged him as a carrier of secret dispatches to the US Navy in the Mediterranean. Two days later, however, English was driven off in disgrace. Typically, there is no record of what happened, only an entry in Adams’ journal referring to “mortifying” misconduct by English: “Notwithstanding his eccentricities, approaching to insanity, I have continued to favor him till now. I can no longer sustain him.”

Was English working for the British, the Americans, both, or neither? Was he sincere in his conversion to Islam (prepared with enormous intellectual effort), or was this merely a means to infiltrate Muhammad ‘Ali’s expedition to Sudan, a region of growing interest to Britain? Some American Muslims maintain that English was “America’s first Muslim” and kept true to his faith until his death.

English’s death only two months after his dismissal deepens the mystery. His obituary provides no clue as to how the 41-year-old perished; suicide or illness seem possible. His memoir shed no light on his motivations and his religious works passed into obscurity with him. No portrait seems to survive of the shadowy American mercenary – fitting for a man who took so many secrets with him to the grave.

Sudan: Aftermath of al-Fashir’s Fall to the Rapid Support Forces

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 24(1)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

January 15, 2026

Executive Summary:

  • The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured al-Fashir in late October after an 18-month siege, consolidating RSF control over western Sudan and providing a potential capital for a new state.
  • After entering al-Fashir, the RSF carried out mass looting, ethnic targeting, and killed 460 people at the al-Saudi maternity hospital in an attack that brought international outrage.
  • Parallel RSF sieges in Kordofan indicate a strategy to divide Sudan. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is struggling to maintain control, but still currently favors a military solution over diplomatic negotiations.

The capture of Khartoum by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the first months of its struggle with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) was possibly the most shocking moment of the ongoing civil war in Sudan. While the RSF has since been driven out of the capital, the RSF’s 18-month siege and capture of al-Fashir in late October is likely to have a greater long-term impact. The collapse of resistance in the North Darfur capital consolidates the paramilitary group’s hold over its power base in western Sudan while providing a potential capital for the new state the RSF and its commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” aim to create.

Al-Fashir’s Failed Defense

Al-Fashir was defended by the SAF’s 6th Division and its allies in the Joint Force, including former rebel movements that had signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). Many were veterans of various non-Arab Darfur militias who made common cause with the former SAF enemy and the ruling Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) to defeat the RSF, which succeeded the notorious Arab-supremacist Janjaweed. These militias include elements of two large majority-Zaghawa groups: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim; and the Sudanese Liberation Army–Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), led by Darfur governor Minni Arko Minawi (see Militant Leadership Monitor, December 7, 2017). Smaller groups include the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) under Brigadier General Mubarak Bakhit and the Sudanese Liberation Movement–Tambour (SLM-Tambour) led by Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambour, governor of central Darfur and target of repeated RSF assassination attempts.

Conflict between the western Arabs of the RSF and previously neutral JPA signatories began on April 13, 2024, after months of tensions between the armed groups, the final straw being a massive cattle raid by Zaghawa gunmen (Ayin Network, April 19, 2024). JEM, the SLA-MM, and part of the GSLF joined the SAF coalition just as the RSF began their siege of al-Fashir.

The RSF weakened resistance in al-Fashir with a siege that gradually starved the city’s 260,000 residents and the 6th Division garrison. Artillery and drones assaulted the city daily, and a roughly 45-mile sand berm was constructed to prevent escape except through narrow corridors where RSF personnel subjected those in flight to murder, robbery, and rape (Radio Dabanga, September 30, 2025). The city’s non-Arab residents were well aware of the atrocities that befell the Masalit ethnic group after the RSF seized the West Darfur city of Geneina in June 2023 (Terrorism Monitor, June 26, 2023). The RSF targeted the overcrowded refugee camps around al-Fashir, and the main place of refuge became the town of Tawila, 43 miles away and controlled by the Fur militia, SLA-‘Abd al-Wahid (SLA-AW).

Only days before the fall of the city, Darfur governor Minni Minawi claimed the RSF was using South Sudanese mercenaries in its assaults, having “exhausted its fighters” (Sudan Tribune, October 23, 2025). Colombian mercenaries supported by the UAE are also believed to have taken part in the RSF siege, operating drones and heavy weapons (Ayin Network, October 10, 2025). By October 21, only a third of al-Fashir’s 600,000 people remained, trapped in a city without food or medical supplies and where most water sources had been destroyed by shelling (Ayin Network, October 21, 2025).

The RSF Enters al-Fashir

On October 25, the RSF launched attacks from several directions on the SAF’s 6th Division headquarters. Tanks and drones drove off the initial attacks. The RSF resumed the assaults the next morning at dawn, however, with drones and ground units forcing their way through the base’s main gate. The RSF seized large quantities of military supplies and reported destroying “huge military vehicles” (Radio Tamazuj, October 26, 2025). Thousands of SAF troops and their allies withdrew to a strong-point at Daraja, northwest of al-Fashir, leaving behind many comrades taken prisoner or trapped inside the city by RSF fighters (Ayin Network, October 26, 2025).

Later on October 26, the RSF announced that its forces had “broken the backbone of the army and allied armed movements, inflicting heavy casualties on them, destroying massive military vehicles, and seizing all military equipment” (Ayin Network, October 26, 2025). A video of RSF fighters celebrating the capture of the 6th Division’s base in al-Fashir was posted to social media (X/@SudanTribune_EN, October 26, 2025). According to SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, the military command in al-Fashir “decided to withdraw due to the systematic destruction and killing of civilians” (Radio Dabanga, October 28, 2025).

Prior to the final assault on al-Fashir, ‘Abd al-Rahim Daglo, Hemetti’s brother and second-in-command, was filmed telling RSF fighters: “I declare it here … I don’t need any prisoners at all” (X/@Sudan_tweet, October 30, 2025). The entry of the RSF was marked by looting, arson, gang-rapes, the targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups for slaughter, and the summary execution of prisoners and those suspected of supporting the SAF and its affiliates (Radio Tamazuj, November 1, 2025).

Fatah ‘Abd Allah Idris “Abu Lulu” (Ayin Network)

In the most appalling incident, incoming RSF fighters killed 460 patients, healthcare workers, and families at al-Saudi maternity hospital (Radio Tamazuj, October 29, 2025). Fighting continued in the western part of the city even after the RSF began house-to-house “combing operations” throughout the rest of al-Fashir. Besides the Saudi maternity hospital, gunmen targeted aid workers and anyone found in the university or Interior Ministry buildings. In addition, an ordinary soldier in the RSF, Fatah ‘Abd Allah Idris “Abu Lulu” discovered a murderous calling during the occupation, joyfully slaughtering civilians attempting to leave the city even as they begged for their lives. After social media videos of his activities attracted international attention, the RSF claimed to have arrested him and denied he was a formal member of the group (Ayin Network, November 10, 2025).

Hemetti’s Response

Hemetti deflected international condemnation of the atrocities, insisting that they were the work of individuals who would be investigated by an RSF committee and held responsible (Ayin Network, November 10, 2025). The atrocities captured the attention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), however, which is monitoring for evidence of war crimes (Radio Dabanga, November 3, 2025).

Sixth Division and Joint Force survivors, meanwhile, have attempted to regroup in the Wana Mountains (or Hills), northwest of al-Fashir. Without provisions, they will be forced to either regain territory formerly held by the SAF, surrender to the RSF, or attempt an escape to an uncertain welcome in Chad.

The storming of al-Fashir has been accompanied by simultaneous sieges of cities in neighboring Kordofan, part of the RSF’s strategy to form a western Sudanese state. The strategic city of Bara in North Kordofan fell to three waves of RSF attackers on October 25, followed by the now-typical door-to-door slaughter of its non-Arab civilian population and all those considered sympathetic to the SAF. The operation helps the RSF complete its encirclement of the North Kordofan capital, al-‘Ubayd (Mada Masr, October 27; Ayin Network, November 7, 2025).

In neighboring South Kordofan, the RSF has intensified its sieges of the cities of Kadugli and Dilling with the targeting of civilian homes by drones. The largely Nuba troops of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N), led by ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu, have joined the RSF in these sieges (see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 31, 2011). The capture of Kadugli, in particular, would aid the RSF effort to consolidate its control of western Sudan (Ayin Network, November 6, 2025).

Conclusion

The SAF is struggling to hold parts of Kordofan that it still controls and, at present, cannot muster the strength to push back the RSF, making a division of the country possible. For now, however, the SAF is still seeking a military rather than a diplomatic solution. Pressure to retake western Sudan coming from Darfur-origin Joint Forces allies who are now stranded in central and eastern Sudan will play an important part in the SAF’s near-term operational decisions.

 

Sidney Langford Hinde: A Note on a Forgotten Canadian in the Scramble for Africa

Dr. Andrew McGregor

Research Note, Royal Canadian Military Institute, January 2026.

Dr. Sidney Langford Hinde wearing his Congo decorations.

In the histories of the great 19th century “Scramble for Africa,” Canada is rarely, if ever, mentioned. The young nation had no colonial designs on Africa, but was still part of the British Empire, which was battling its European neighbours and African resistance movements for control of vast regions of the continent. It was inevitable, then, that some Canadians would become involved in this struggle, though not all worked in British interests.

Among those Canadians who distinguished themselves in British service in Africa were Toronto’s Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Charles Denison, who commanded the Canadian voyageurs on the Nile in 1884-1885; Montreal’s Lieutenant Raymond de Montmorency, who earned a VC at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 before his death at the Battle of Stormberg in South Africa two years later; and RMC graduate Sir Édouard Percy Cranwill Girouard, of Montreal, who built a military railway across the Sudanese desert that permitted the movement of the Egyptian and British armies south to Omdurman to defeat the Mahdist forces of Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi in 1898.

Others, however, found themselves part of the international group of mercenary officers serving King Leopold II of Belgium in the king’s private African possession, the Congo Free State (1885-1908). The task of these officers, mostly Belgian, was to expand and consolidate King Leopold’s massive estate, often at the expense of British competitors. The best known of the Canadians in Leopold’s employ was Halifax’s William Grant Stairs, an RMC graduate who traveled 5000 miles across Africa in Henry Morton Stanley’s Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (1887-1889). He then led his own expedition to mineral-rich Katanga (1891-1892), seizing this region for the Congo Free State by killing King Msiri, the local potentate.

A lesser known but important Canadian-born contributor to the establishment of the Congo Free State was Dr. Sidney Langford Hinde. Hinde was born somewhere in the Niagara region on July 23, 1863, the son of Irish surgeon Major-General George L. Hinde. Educated in France and Germany, Hinde followed his father’s medical career, working in London hospitals before taking service with Leopold’s Congo Free State in 1892. Fluent in French, Hinde was recommended by Irish physician and British Army officer Thomas Heazle Parke, doctor on Henry Morton Stanley’s Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (1887-1889).

When Hinde joined the Free State military, Arab-led Mahdists controlled the Sudan and were pressing south into the Congo region, while Omani-origin Arabs had turned Zanzibar into a base for expansion into east and central Africa. A Spectator article of 1897 portrayed a struggle between Whites and Arabs for Africa: “The White has been fighting the Arab at Dongola, on the Congo, on the Lakes, on the East Coast, and even at Zanzibar itself.”

Britain’s Royal Navy had been active in trying to suppress the shipment of slaves from the African coast to the Middle East since 1822, with varying levels of success. Arab clove plantations in Zanzibar relied on the labor of thousands of Black slaves. In 1873 the British forced Zanzibar’s Omani rulers to abandon the slave trade, though it continued on the mainland.

The most powerful of the slavers in eastern Africa was the Arab/Swahili Tippu Tip (Hamad bin Muhammad bin Juma bin Rajab al-Murjabi), who at one point maintained personal ownership of 10,000 slaves on his Zanzibar plantations. In the mid-1880s, Tippu Tip claimed the eastern Congo for himself and the Sultan of Zanzibar. It was Tippu’s son Sefu bin Hamad who led the Arab slavers at the time of Hinde’s service in the Congo during the Congo-Arab War (1892-1894). Sefu’s partner was Rumaliza (Muhammad bin Khalfan bin Khamis al-Barwani), a powerful Omani/Swahili trader in slaves and ivory. He was famous for inventing depraved tortures, too gruesome to be discussed here.

The conflict was touched off by a dispute between Belgians and Arabs over ivory, not slaves, but for political purposes it was quickly recast in Europe as a Christian anti-slavery crusade, though Free State columns usually included large numbers of slaves belonging to the African troops in the Force Publique (the Free State army). Force Publique regulars were mostly Zanzibaris and Hausas recruited in West Africa, and were accompanied on campaign by thousands of local “auxiliaries,” largely cannibals of fluid loyalty. Discipline was maintained through regular flogging.

Steady fighting through 1893 drove the Arabs east, resulting in the death of Sefu in October 1893. Rumaliza met defeat in the war’s final battle in January 1894, when a Belgian shell blew up his ammunition dump and set fire to his fort at Bena Kalunga. Rumaliza’s men were slaughtered as they tried to escape while 2,000 others were taken prisoner. The war shattered the power of the Arabs in eastern and central Africa, damaged the Arab trade in slaves and diverted the Congo’s trade from east African ports down the Congo River to Atlantic coast ports. Under heavy international pressure as news of the cruel nature of his rule in the Congo began to emerge, Leopold II transferred control of his personal estate in Africa to the Belgian government in 1908. Leopold never visited the land he had ruled for 23 years.

Hinde in Later Life

Hinde recounted his adventures in the Congo in The Fall of the Congo Arabs (London, 1897), translated into French the same year as La Chute de la domination des arabes du Congo (Brussels, 1897). Acting not only as a doctor, Hinde was personally involved in the vicious fighting that characterized the campaign. It should be noted that Hinde’s Congo service was nearly always in the field and there does not appear to be any evidence of his implication in the crimes for which the Free State became famous, only for his unwitting enablement of them.

Transferring to the British Foreign Office in 1895, Hinde became a provincial commissioner in the British East Africa Protectorate. While resident in Kenya, Hinde produced a second book, Last of the Masai (London, 1901), co-written by his wife, naturalist Hildegarde Beatrice Hinde. He died in Wales in 1930, age 67.

Hinde’s Grave in Pembrokeshire, Wales.

This note has its origins in the author’s search for confirmation that Hinde was indeed born in Canada, as many websites claim while failing to provide appropriate documentation. An 1891 census of England, however, records London resident Sidney Langford Hinde having been born in Canada, which would seem to confirm his Canadian origin through information he himself provided. Hinde’s Niagara origin is confirmed in the Biographie Coloniale Belge (Institut Royale Coloniale de Belge, T. 1, 1948 col. 509-513).

That Hinde and his Free State comrades have been consigned to historical obscurity is unsurprising. Their defeat of the Arab slavers might have been hailed as a triumph of Western civilization had Leopold and his henchmen not instituted their own savage form of forced labor and its trail of murder, torture and mutilation to meet the demands of the late 19th century rubber boom. The methods of the Free State mercenaries and foremen came to resemble those of the Arab slavers they had run out of the Congo.

1921 Brussels Monument to the Belgian Pioneers in the Congo. The references to “Arab” slavers have been chiseled out in recent times.(Sam Donvil)

Eventually, the role of Hinde and others came to be regarded as part of a shameful episode in European colonization, while well-funded campaigns by the Arab League have helped rehabilitate the image of the Arab slavers, portraying them as explorers and traders bringing Islam to the African interior. The appalling first-hand accounts of large-scale cannibalism by native fighters of both sides as described in detail by Hinde and others have also helped relegate memory of the Congo-Arab War to one of the darkest, least-examined corners of the “Scramble for Africa.”

Note: The careers of Canadian soldiers who served in British forces in 19th century West Africa are described in: Andrew B Godefroy, “Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts, 1885-1905,” Canadian Military History 17(1), 2008, pp. 21-36.

This Research Note appeared in the January 2026 issue of the Royal Canadian Military Institute’s Members’ Newshttps://files.constantcontact.com/e154b138001/cd18bb33-88e1-44c7-a729-d471cbfaa76f.pdf

 

The First Siege of al-Fashir, 1884: Prototype of a Modern Atrocity

Andrew McGregor

AIS Historical Background Report

December 3, 2025

Fighters of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entered the North Darfur capital of al-Fashir in late October, launching a wave of atrocities based on ethnic persecution of non-Arab tribal groups in Darfur. The 18-month siege of al-Fashir that preceded these terrible events bore many parallels to the first siege of the city in 1884, one in which many Arab ancestors of current RSF personnel participated as followers of the Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad. Then, as now, most of the besieged were non-Arab and faced a similar fate when their defenses were overrun.

Map of the Sultanate of Darfur, 1914 

With the encouragement of his Ta’ashi Arab deputy, ‘Abd Allahi, Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the expected Mahdi in 1881. The Mahdi as a messianic figure who appears at the end of time to restore justice in an oppressive world before the arrival of the Nabi Isa (the Prophet Jesus) figures prominently in both Sunni and Shi’ite eschatology (the study of final judgment and the last days of mankind).

Pious and charismatic, Muhammad Ahmad put himself at the head of a growing rebellion against the massively unpopular rule of Egypt’s Turko-Egyptian elite. The Turko-Egyptians invaded Sudan in 1821, replacing numerous chiefdoms and kingdoms with their own rule, one that was at once parsimonious, rapacious, grasping, incompetent and exploitative. Besides brutal methods of tax collection, the new elite angered many Sudanese by their interference in the slave trade, a thriving institution in Sudan. This interference was made more irksome by Egyptian Army officers who appeared publicly to be working to end slavery while making immense profits through their own covert involvement in the trade.

Muhammad Ahmad, the Sudanese Mahdi

A former Sufi, Muhammad Ahmad was a Dongolawi (one of three powerful groups of Arabized Nubians, including the Ja’alin and the Sha’iqiya) from northern Sudan. He began to attract followers, the so-called ansar (“supporters,” i.e., of religion), at his base on Aba Island in the White Nile. Forced from Aba by government troops, the Mahdi and his followers fled to the Nuba mountains of southern Kordofan and later into the plains of northern Kordofan, where they began besieging towns held by Turko-Egyptian troops, including local recruits, many of whom were Blacks taken as slaves by government-backed slaving expeditions. With Kordofan largely under Mahdist control, Muhammad Ahmad turned his attention west to the old sultanate of Darfur, a powerful Muslim kingdom since its foundation by the Fur people of Jabal Marra in the 17th century, but under Egyptian control since 1874. Al-Fashir, the sultanate’s capital, was established by Sultan ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1792 in the plains east of the mountainous Fur homeland of Jabal Marra. Formerly, the Fur sultans had maintained a peripatetic court, roaming the hills of Jabal Marra.

After many years of expansion, Darfur was nearly two-thirds non-Fur by the time of the 1884 siege. Intermarriage with non-Fur ethnic groups had been encouraged in the royal family as a means of consolidating political control, and by the latter half of the 19th century the royal family was probably as much Zaghawa by blood as Fur. Fur was still the court language, but Arabic was the language of official correspondence. A willingness to bring non-Fur into important administrative positions, a reliance on slave labor and a high tolerance for pre-Islamic religious practices helped maintain the Fur royalty. The main dissenters were the nomadic Baqqara (cattle-herding) Arabs of southern Darfur, who maintained their independence by retreating into the marshes along the border with the southern region of Bahr al-Ghazal whenever the sultan decided it was time to send out a punitive column to bring them in line. Repeated clashes grew into bitterness on both sides, a situation that only deteriorated under the rule of the Turko-Egyptians, leaving both the Baqqara tribes and their northern Abbala (camel-herding) Arab cousins ready to be led into full-scale revolt under a strong leader such as the Mahdi, who represented a local form of Islam that differed from that promoted by the Egyptian religious scholars who had followed the army into Sudan and set up their own government-allied form of Islam.

Zubayr Takes al-Fashir – 1874

In 1883, al-Fashir was a town of only 2650 people, including both Arabs and non-Arab groups such as the Fur, the Zaghawa, the Berti and others. By the time of the siege a year later, it had been ten years since the powerful slaver and freebooter Zubayr Mansur Pasha had roared north to conquer Darfur with an army of loyal Black slave-troops (bazinger-s) from his headquarters in Bahr al-Ghazal. [1]

Zubayr Mansur Pasha

Zubayr was a Nile Valley Ja’ali of modest background who had worked his way up through the ranks of the slavers busy depopulating parts of southern Sudan in the mid-19th century. He had become wealthy and powerful through his subjugation of the immense southern province of Bahr al-Ghazal before eying the riches of its independent northern neighbor, the sultanate of Darfur. After the defeat and death of Fur sultan Ibrahim Qarad bin Muhammad Husayn in a great battle at Manawashi in 1874, the way was open for Zubayr to enter al-Fashir without a fight on November 2, 1874. The Fur capital was thoroughly looted by Zubayr, who had sworn allegiance to the Egyptian khedive but acted mainly in his own interests. As Zubayr led his army west to conquer neighboring Wadai Sultanate, a weaker detachment of the Egyptian Army entered al-Fashir five days after Zubayr. These troops were led by Governor General Isma’il Ayub Pasha, who claimed Darfur for the growing Egyptian Empire in Africa and confiscated much of the loot Zubayr had left behind in al-Fashir. Isma’il Ayub claimed most of the credit for taking al-Fashir and was duly promoted, while Zubayr found himself cheated out of his anticipated khedive-approved rule of Darfur. Zubayr departed to protest in person in Cairo, where, being judged as overly ambitious and a threat to Egyptian sovereignty in Sudan, he was compelled to remain in comfortable but closely-watched exile. [2]

Opposite the sultan’s al-Fashir palace, Isma’il Ayub ordered the construction of a square fort with a deep trench and bank patrolled by sentries. Inside the fort was a house for the governor and barracks for the troops (Na’um Bey, 1913). A strong zariba (fence made of thorn bushes) surrounded the defenses. A gun at each angle was sufficient to control the town under normal circumstances.

Alexander Macomb Mason Bey

When F Sidney Ensor visited al-Fashir in the late 1870s during an Egyptian government railroad survey, he found the palace occupied by Colonel Alexander Macomb Mason Bey, a Confederate veteran of the Virginia State Navy. Mason was on the staff of the Egyptian khedive after a stint fighting Spain as a mercenary officer in the Chilean Navy. Improvements to the remains of the old palace were made by Egyptian troops to make it suitable for the accommodation of officers, including floors of Norway pine imported at great expense from England.

Slatin and the Loss of Darfur

Rudolf Slatin, a 27-year-old Austrian mercenary in the employ of the Khedive in Sudan, was with the Mahdist army at the time al-Fashir was taken, only seven days after he had surrendered. Slatin, despite only a brief employment by the Austro-Hungarian Army in the Balkans, arrived in Darfur in 1879 and was soon after appointed governor of Darfur in 1881 by Sudan’s governor general, Muhammad Rauf Pasha.

Rudolf Slatin in Mahdist Uniform

The young Austrian’s time was almost immediately consumed by military matters, fighting a series of battles, first against the displaced Fur royals, then against the Arabs who had rallied to the Mahdi. In a desperate move, he converted to Islam in 1883 in an unsuccessful attempt to rally his Muslim troops shortly before his surrender at Dara. Thus began Slatin’s 11-year residence in the camp of the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa (“successor”). His surrender was marred, however, by his surprising failure to first destroy the Dara garrison’s vast stocks of powder, ammunition and other war materiel that now fell into the eager hands of the Mahdists.

Mahdist Assault on al-Fashir

In early January, 1884, Amir Muhammad Bey Khalid “Zuqal” began marching on al-Fashir, which had already indicated its intention of surrendering after receiving letters from Slatin (now in the Mahdist camp) urging its commander to do so. In anticipation of surrender, the garrison had sent the keys to the treasury to Zuqal by courier and adopted the patched jibba-s (cotton outer garments) worn by the Mahdists. All seemed ready for a peaceful transfer of power; the Egyptian troops were expected to shift their allegiance to the Mahdi.

Zuqal, a Ja’ali Arab from the Nile Valley, had once been one of Slatin’s aides. As a trader and government official, Zuqal was a member of the Bahhara (“those of the river”), the Arab (or Arabo-Nubian) tribes of northern Sudan’s Nile region who had spread as traders throughout Sudan in the wake of the 19th century Turko-Egyptian expansion. A relative of the Mahdi, he was sent by Slatin to Kordofan to appeal to the Mahdi to refrain from raising a rebellion amongst the Arabs in Darfur. Zuqal instead transferred his loyalties to Muhammad Ahmad, being appointed Darfur’s new governor in turn after Slatin’s surrender on December 23, 1883. Many of the smaller Egyptian Army outposts in Darfur soon followed Slatin’s lead, especially after it became known that the Egyptian Army relief expedition led by General William Hicks Pasha (a veteran of the Indian Army) had been utterly destroyed by the Mahdi in Kordofan in November.

The commander of the Fashir garrison and governor of the city since 1879 was Sa’id Bey Juma’a, a native of Egypt’s Fayyum Oasis. Well known for his “rich vocabulary of bad language,” Sa’id Bey was not always popular with his fellow officers, but was known for his personal courage and devotion to Darfur (Hill,1967, p.325).

Sa’id Bey Juma’a in Mahdist Uniform

Sa’id Bey was a hard man, but not a stupid man. His small garrison was already weak before the Mahdist siege started. In August 1883, he had dispatched a large force from al-Fashir to clear the surrounding region of insurgents; only 99 men returned. Since then, the Mahdists had only grown in numbers, especially after the defeat of Hicks Pasha and the capture of thousands of Remington rifles. Sa’id Bey and the people of al-Fashir had already decided to submit to the Mahdi, but began to think twice when they heard of the atrocities that had followed the capitulation of Dara, Slatin Bey’s former headquarters (Slatin, p.248).

In the way that the flapping of a butterfly’s wings might be the first breath of a hurricane, one ill-advised admonition changed what was intended to be a peaceful transition of power into a bloody weeks-long confrontation followed by scenes of torture and murder. The courier between al-Fashir and Zuqal’s camp, a local fiki (rural holy man) named Khalifa ‘Abd al-Rahman, full of the religious fervor of the Mahdist revolution and its prohibitions on alcohol and tobacco, piously informed Sa’id Bey Juma’a that he must stop smoking cigarettes.

This was the last straw for Sa’id Bey, who was already alarmed by the brutality dealt out to the officers and leading citizens of Dara and Um Shanga after they had been guaranteed safety. The Bey issued orders for the imprudent fiki to be shot and for his men to discard their Mahdist jibba-s and re-don the uniforms of the Egyptian Army. The fiki somehow escaped his appearance before a firing squad and sent a message to Zuqal regarding Sa’id Bey’s change of heart, no doubt omitting his own role in that reversal. Sa’id Bey now prepared to meet Zuqal’s army with a garrison of 1,000 men, 10 guns and a hand-cranked Gatling gun. The city’s weak point was its wells, the only source of fresh water, which lay just outside the city walls. These could only be used during a siege by teams working under the protection of cover fire from the walls.

Zuqal launched three assaults on the town, each of which was repelled by the desperate garrison. Sa’id Bey in turn launched several unsuccessful sorties. The Mahdist Amir was compelled to send for reinforcements from Dara and Kabkabiya while recruiting local Arabs to help invest the city. An attempt to bombard the city into submission was made, using artillery captured from other units of the Egyptian Army. This too failed, as the experienced gunners of the Fashir garrison targeted and destroyed the Mahdist guns (Wingate, pp. 130-131).

Death of Hicks Pasha at the Battle of Shaykan

Amir Zuqal, who had taken up a position on the site of Sultan Ibrahim’s old palace now ordered his men to fill in the wells just under the city walls, which was carried out under heavy fire from above. The Amir also ordered the captured munitions brought up from Dara that Slatin had failed to destroy before his surrender. As thirst and hunger increased within the walls, Zuqal ordered Slatin (who had also been brought up from Dara for this purpose) to write Sa’id Bey, urging him to capitulate. With the Egyptian Army relief column having already been destroyed by the Mahdi at Shaykan (Kordofan) in November 1883, there was now no alternative to surrender after 15 days of siege. Sa’id Bey would later say that the garrison could have held out at al-Fashir, but for the ammunition stores that Slatin had turned over to the Mahdists (Neufeld, 1899, pp.319-320).

Occupation of al-Fashir

With the city having been so recently looted of its treasures in 1874 by Zubayr and the Egyptian Army (which confiscated some of Zubayr’s loot for transport to Cairo), the Mahdists turned to extreme measures to find wealth they were certain had been hidden by merchants and officers of the Egyptian garrison.

According to Slatin, who witnessed events from the Mahdist camp: “The horrible scenes at Dara were now re-enacted with even greater severity, and numbers of people were tortured in the most merciless manner” (Slatin, p. 149). Egyptian officers were targeted especially; Major Hamada Effendi was flogged daily for three days in an unsuccessful attempt to make him reveal where his money was hidden; after the flogging ceased each day, a mixture of salt-water and hot peppers was poured over his ragged flesh. Called a slave by one of his captors, another officer, Ibrahim Tagalawi, shot his wife, his brother and himself; Sa’id Agha Fula committed suicide rather than undergo the disgrace of flogging. The Mahdi’s army had need of professional soldiers, so Zuqal eventually ordered a halt to the floggings and beatings of the officers. Sa’id Bey Juma’a, the bristly nicotine-deprived governor, escaped death only through the intervention of Slatin and, after a term of imprisonment, became chief of the Mahdist artillery in the siege of Khartoum. Slatin became a closely-watched bodyguard and advisor to the Mahdi’s successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi al-Ta’aisha, before escaping from Omdurman in 1895.

Only days after the fall of al-Fashir, Slatin received a letter containing orders he could no longer carry out as a prisoner of the Mahdi. Khartoum had instructed him to concentrate all his men and supplies at al-Fashir and there await the arrival of Fur “sultan” ‘Abd al-Shakur ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Shattut, who would restore Fur rule in al-Fashir under Egyptian sovereignty. That was Governor General Gordon’s plan. In reality, ‘Abd al-Shakur, who had been plucked from the Fur royal exiles living in Cairo since 1874, made only a sluggish, alcohol-fogged procession up the Nile, failing to get much further than Dongola. Gordon pulled the plug on the whole operation and ‘Abd al-Shakur returned to the safety of obscurity.

Conqueror of al-Fashir

Zuqal crowned his conquest of the Fur capital by marrying the Iya Basi (Fur – “great sister”), a traditional pre-Islamic position in the Fur royal hierarchy assumed by a full sister of the sultan. The Iya Basi maintained her own palace, wealth and retinue of hundreds of slaves and servants. Now comfortably ensconced in al-Fashir, Zuqal began the dangerous practice of ignoring summonses from the Mahdi to join his forces in Kordofan.

At the time of the siege, Sultan Harun Dud Banga was in the ancestral Fur homeland, the mountains of Jabal Marra, where he had been fighting a guerrilla campaign against the Turko-Egyptians. With the Egyptian Army no longer a threat after their collapse in Darfur, the sultan was faced with a new and more dangerous enemy – the Mahdists, with their core of Arab tribesmen who had resisted Fur rule for many years. Zuqal assembled an army of captured Sudanese regulars who had served in the Egyptian Army and Black slave troops (bazinger-s), supplemented by as many as 20,000 Arabs. The Mahdist army marched into the hills of Jabal Marra, where they cornered Sultan Harun in a hill-top stronghold. The Mahdists suffered enormous losses storming the fortress, but eventually broke resistance after a two-month siege. Harun was enlisted in the Mahdi’s army and reported to have met his death a few years later fighting the Abyssinians at Gallabat in 1889, though another account claims he survived the Mahdiya and lived quietly at al-Qadarif in eastern Sudan until 1903. [3]

The Mahdi died soon after the conquest of Khartoum and the death of hir rival Gordon, but Zuqal remained at al-Fashir until March 1886, when he finally responded to a series of letters from the Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi summoning him to Omdurman. The main obstacle to ‘Abd Allahi’s efforts to consolidate his power as the Mahdi’s successor came from the Mahdi’s Nile Valley Arab relatives, the Ashraf; Zuqal, as a relative of the Mahdi, was now under suspicion. His departure for Omdurman with a large armed following only alarmed the Khalifa, who ordered Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to intercept Zuqal’s party. Zuqal quickly found himself under arrest at al-‘Ubayd in Kordofan, relieved of his soldiers and his wealth (Wingate, pp.291-292).

After the Ashraf ceased to be a threat to ‘Abd Allahi’s power, Zuqal found his way back into the Khalifa’s good graces and back out again. He was eventually exiled to Rajaf in southern Sudan but freed by Belgian forces in 1897. [4] He returned to Darfur only to be executed by ‘Ali Dinar, who had restored the Fur Sultanate in the days after the Battle of Omdurman (1898). Zuqal was taken into the hills of Jabal Marra, where he was “lowered into a well containing the bones of many former offenders, the rope cut, and left to die, with a guard posted to ensure no assistance” (Egyptian Army Military Intelligence Summary, 1902).

Aftermath

Many of the Black soldiers who served under Slatin before being absorbed into the Mahdist ranks mutinied in al-‘Ubayd in October 1885. Most of these troops came from the Nuba Hills of South Kordofan, and it was to that place that they marched, still in order and under arms. Such defiance could not be condoned by the Khalifa, and Mahdist troops spent months exterminating the mutineers in the hills.

Egyptian Troops in Action in Sudan, 1879

Sa’id Bey died in his home oasis of Fayyum in 1912, having sought a quiet life there since his experiences in the Mahdiya.

When Sultan ‘Ali Dinar revived the Fur Sultanate in 1898, he began repairing the damage and neglect of the city by ordering the construction of a vast new palace compound (hosh) and mosque, as well as a qubba-style (beehive-shaped) memorial to his father, Zakariya. Despite the ever-present risk of a raid by the restless Arab Baqqara (especially the Rizayqat of Musa Madibbo), al-Fashir grew in importance and prosperity under Sultan ‘Ali Dinar until 1916, when it was occupied once more by the Egyptian Army, this time under British leadership and direction.

Notes

  1. Egyptian ranks and titles used in this paper include Agha, Bey, Effendi, Khedive and Pasha. All were part of the Turkish nomenclature for political and military titles, Turkish still being the working language of the Egyptian Army in the 19th Definitions below (with the exception of khedive) are those relevant to military usage.

Agha: An honorific for officers below the rank of Kaimakam (roughly ‘colonel’), it also tended to indicate the officer was non-literate.

Bey: An honorific for senior officers below the level of Pasha, available in several grades.

Effendi: Like Agha, an honorific for officers below the rank of Kaimakam, but implying literacy and education.

Khedive: “Viceroy,” i.e. of the Ottoman sultan. Originally from the Persian khediv. Though first used by Muhammad ‘Ali in 1805, its use was only recognized officially by the Ottoman sultan from 1867 to 1914.

Pasha: Another Turkish term with Persian origins, Pasha was the highest title, available in four grades for military officers.

  1. For the consequent collusion between Zubayr in Cairo and his ill-fated son Sulayman in Bahr al-Ghazal, see: “Romolo Gessi Pasha: Early Counter-Insurgency Lessons from an Italian Soldier of Fortune’s Campaign in Central Africa,” Military History Online/AIS, August 21, 2016, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=3696
  2. For Gallabat, see Hill (1967), p.4 and Wingate (1891), p.325; for al-Qadarif, see Sudan Archives Durham SAD 731/6/68 and HHS Morant: “Recent History of Darfur” (Sudan Military Intelligence Report no.104).
  3. Rajaf, a town in Central Equatoria (now part of the state of South Sudan), was near the southernmost extent of the Mahdist state and used as a place of exile for those who offended the Khalifa. The Mahdists were expelled from the town in February 1897 by Congo Free State forces led by Louis-Napoléon Chaltin, a veteran of the 1882-1884 Congo Free State war with Zanzibari Arab merchants and slavers.

Bibliography

Egyptian Army Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) no. 93, April 1902, Sudan Archives Durham, SAD 735/3/1-27.

Ensor, F. Sidney: Incidents on a Journey through Nubia to Darfoor, WH Allen, London, 1881.

Farwell, Byron: Prisoners of the Mahdi, Harper and Row, New York, 1967.

Haim Shaked: The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi: A Historical Study of Kitab sa’adat al-mustahdi bi-sirat al-Imam al-Mahdi by Isma’il b. ‘Abd al-Qadir, Transaction Books, New Brunswick N.J., 1978.

Hill, Richard: A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan, 2nd Ed., Frank Cass & Co., London, 1967.

Holt, PM: The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A study of its origins, development and overthrow, (2nd ed.), Oxford, 1970.

Lampen, GD: “History of Darfur,” Sudan Notes and Records 31(2), 1950, pp. 177-209.

Mamdani, Mahmood: Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, Pantheon Books, New York, 2009.

McGregor, Andrew: “American Civil War Veterans and the Egyptian Empire in Africa,” A lecture given at the Royal Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, March 28, 2018, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4264

Na’um Bey Shuqair: “The Masalit and Tama Sultanates: Are they within Darfur or Wadai Sultanate,” Typescript, February 2, 1913, Sudan Archives Durham, SAD 731/6/109.

Neufeld, Charles: A Prisoner of the Khaleefa. Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman, Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London, 1899.

Report on the Egyptian Provinces of the Sûdan, Red Sea, and Equator, Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards, War Office, HM Stationary Office, London, 1883.

Slatin Pasha, Colonel Sir Rudolf: Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895, Edwin Arnold, London, 1897.

Theobald, AB: The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1951.

Wingate, Major FR: Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, MacMillan and Co., London, 1891.

 

Rapid Support Forces Establish Rival Government as Sudan’s War Spirals

Terrorism Monitor

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

November 20, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of al-Fashir, accompanied by exterminatory extrajudicial killings after an 18-month siege, represents the militia’s most significant territorial victory to date and accelerates the effective partition of Sudan.
  • With control over most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, the RSF is consolidating a parallel “Tasis State,” seeking external legitimacy despite its reliance on predatory militias and systematic abuses.
  • The Sudanese Armed Forces–Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF–TSC) coalition remains internally divided and constrained by Islamist-aligned networks, leaving both major coalitions dependent on abusive partners and limiting prospects for a negotiated national political settlement.

Until 2005, Sudan was Africa’s largest country by territory size. After 22 years of civil war, South Sudan separated, taking the nation’s oil wealth and roughly one-third of its territory with it. Today, after two-and-one-half years of a new civil war, the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) declared its intention on July 2 to form a new state, splitting the country once again. Though the RSF’s stated intention is to form a new government for all Sudan, it is in reality now focusing on consolidating its control of the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur, having been ejected from Khartoum and the central region of al-Jazirah by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its allies.

(Maprr)

The initiative is designed to provide legitimacy and access to aid and arms for a paramilitary accused of genocide, ethnic cleansing, looting, destruction of cultural institutions, sexual violence, war crimes and widespread atrocities.

The Battle for al-Fashir

RSF Fighter with Dead Civilians

Crucial to the establishment of a new RSF state based largely in western Sudan is the seizure and occupation of al-Fashir, the traditional capital of Darfur since its founding in the late 18th century as capital of the Fur Sultanate. After an 18-month siege, the city was taken by the RSF on October 27, when the movement overran the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division and elements of the Sudan Liberation Movement-MM led by Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minawi (now resident in Port Sudan). Taking al-Fashir frees up RSF forces for the ongoing battle for neighboring Kordofan region and solidifies its control of Darfur (Mada Masr, July 11).

Minni Arko Minawi, Governor of Darfur and Leader of the SLA-MM

The entry of RSF forces was followed by massacres largely targeting the non-Arab population of the city that have killed at least 1500 people, including 460 patients and health workers at the Saudi Maternity Hospital (Al-Jazeera, October 30). According to the Sudan Doctors’ Network, “Hospitals in El Fasher have been transformed into human slaughterhouses” (Radio Dabanga, October 30). The atrocities appear to exceed even the dark episodes that followed the taking of al-Fashir after a siege by Mahdist forces in 1883. RSF commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” acknowledged he had “observed abuses occurring in al-Fashir” and pledged to hold RSF personnel accountable for their crimes (Sudan Tribune, October 29).

During the siege RSF constructed 68 km of 3-meter-tall sand berms alongside 3-meter-deep ditches as wide as five meters around al-Fashir to prevent escape from the siege (Radio Dabanga, September 30; Mada Masr, September 5). [1] People fleeing al-Fashir along the so-called “Road of Death” to nearby cholera-stricken Tawila were routinely deprived of all their possessions before being killed or raped as suspected supporters of the SAF. Others were forced to provide blood for wounded RSF fighters; many of these died soon after (Sudan Tribune, September 6). Those remaining in al-Fashir were reduced to eating leaves or a diminishing supply of animal feed as supplies of food, medicine and other aid were interrupted by the RSF’s siege lines (Al-Jazeera, September 4).

Palace of Sultan ‘Ali Dinar, al-Fashir (TIKA)

Earlier this year, the RSF, having already looted the Sudan National Museum in Khartoum, bombed the historical al-Fashir palace of Fur Sultan ‘Ali Dinar (1898-1916), a revered national symbol of anti-colonial resistance, but one who campaigned constantly against the western Arab tribes that now dominate the RSF (Radio Dabanga, January 22; Darfur Network for Human Rights, January 17).

South of al-Fashir, there are indications that the RSF has turned the airbase at Nyala into a base for Iranian and Chinese-designed drones capable of striking any target within Sudan (Sudan Tribune, September 29). The RSF has also made major improvements in its air-defense systems through the use of Wagner Group-supplied surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the SAF’s Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci high-altitude, long-endurance drones, once expected to be a game-changing weapon in the struggle to relieve al-Fashir (Military Africa, September 28).

The Tasis State

A political charter to form a parallel “transitional peace government” was signed in February by the RSF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) and other armed groups (the “Tasis Alliance”) operating in western Sudan (al-Jazeera, July 28). The new state was declared on July 26 as the “Government of Peace and Unity,” but is more commonly known as “the Tasis State.” Though the new state insists it represents all parts of Sudan, in reality it can only govern those regions currently controlled in whole or part by the RSF and the SPLM-N (Darfur, parts of Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile State). For now, the Tasis capital is in Nyala (southern Darfur), but will likely be shifted to al-Fashir.

The Tasis (“Founding”) Alliance is formed from 24 armed and civil groups, including the RSF, the SPLM-N, the Beja Congress of eastern Sudan, the Rasha’ida Arab “Free Lions” of eastern Sudan, and factions of the National Umma Party (UP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the largely Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4; Sudan Tribune, January 22). To maintain a façade of ruling all Sudan, Tasis has appointed regional governors for Khartoum and the Eastern region, despite the RSF currently having no presence in these areas (Sudan Tribune, July 26; Arab Weekly, July 28).

The head of the presidential council is RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”; his deputy is SPLM-N leader ‘Abd al-Aziz Hilu (see MLM, June 2012). Both attended the swearing in of the presidential council in Nyala on August 30; the ceremony site was bombed several hours later by the SAF (Mada Masr, September 5).

Tasis Prime Minister Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi

As prime minister, the Darfur Arabs controlling the RSF have appointed Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi, a known ally of Hemetti. The appointment has significant symbolic value with reference to the rivalry between the Baqqara (cattle-herding) Arabs of Darfur and the riverain Arabs of northern Sudan in the time of the Mahdist State (1885-1898), when the northern Arab relatives of the Mahdi, the ashraf, were repressed by the Mahdi’s successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi, a member of Darfur’s Ta’aisha tribe. Sudan’s northern Arab minority has dominated Sudan since independence in 1956, and the appointment of a Ta’aishi as prime minister is a political signal understood by all Sudanese.

The RSF justifies its declaration of a new state by saying it is necessitated by an urgent need for identity documents, currency, security, medicine, healthcare and education identity documents (Mada Masr, August 16). One purpose of establishing the rival state is to establish legitimacy in talks hosted by outside parties such as the Quartet – the US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia (better known as “the Quad”). For now, only the UAE recognizes the RSF as a de facto authority (Mada Masr, September 28). Sudan’s government has complained to the UN about the UAE’s alleged involvement in supplying arms, logistical support and Colombian mercenaries to the RSF (AIS Special Report, June 13; Mada Masr, September 14).

The UN Security Council rejected the declaration of a rival state in Sudan, calling it “a direct threat to Sudan’s territorial integrity” (UN News, August 13). It has also been opposed by many Arab states, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (New Arab, March 6). Other opposition comes from the US and the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in 2021. Besides the UAE, supporters include Khalifa Haftar’s eastern Libya, Chad, Kenya, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

THE SAF/TSC Government

The Port Sudan-based SAF/Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government is making its own bid for legitimacy in the face of what it regards as exclusion from international peace efforts supported by the Quad, the UN and the AU. Declaring it will not negotiate without a declaration of its legitimacy, the SAF/TSC has also rejected all efforts to place the RSF on an equal footing and insists only a military resolution can bring peace to Sudan (Mada Masr, September 20).

Finance Minister and JEM leader Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (Akhbar al-Sudan/Facebook)

On May 19, Kamil al-Tayib Idris, with doctorates in international relations and international law, was appointed Sudan’s first civilian prime minister since 2022 by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, head of the SAF and chair of the TSC. Shortly afterward, the new PM tried to expel two powerful former rebel leaders from the TSC cabinet, JEM’s Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (minister of finance) and Darfur governor Minni Arko Minawi, but was quickly overruled by al- Burhan, who doubtless has no desire to see these leaders and their valuable troops depart the SAF-led coalition (Al-Jazeera, July 23). Many former rebel leaders and their subordinates gained their positions as TSC ministers under the terms of the 2020 Juba peace agreement (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, April 21, 2021).

Traditional Parties Divided

The National Umma Party (NUP) is the political arm of Sudan’s neo-Mahdist movement and has been a strong, western-based political force in Sudan since independence under the leadership of various descendants of its founder ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah, “the Mahdi” (1843-1885). The party is currently divided, with a faction led by acting head Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Douma backing the Port Sudan SAF/TSC government while a faction led by Fadlallah Burma Nasir supports the RSF and the creation of a parallel Sudanese state (Sudan Tribune, July 8). Fadlallah has accepted an appointment to be speaker of the Tasis government’s legislative council.

Khatmiyya Leader Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani

The NUP’s historical rival is the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Sayyid Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani, the 89-year-old leader of the historically pro-Egyptian Khatmiyya Sufi order and descendant of the order’s founder, ‘Ali al-Mirghani (1873-1968). The leadership of the DUP is in turmoil after decrees allegedly issued by Sayyid al-Mirghani on June 24 replaced the party leader’s son, Ja’afar al-Sadiq, as deputy leader with Ahmad Sa’ad Omar, a loyalist of deposed president Omar al-Bashir. Many DUP leaders allege the maneuver was the work of another of al-Mirghani’s sons, ‘Abd Allah al-Mahjub, who was taking advantage of the elderly Sufi leader, a resident of Cairo who is known for his publicly expressed support for the SAF but has little other political involvement (Sudan Tribune, June 25; Altaghyeer.info, July 8, 2024).

A faction under Ibrahim al-Mirghani, another descendant of Khatmiyya founder ‘Ali al-Mirghani, has come out in support of the RSF and the Tasis alliance. A DUP spokesman declared in February that “the presence of Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Mirghani does not represent the party in any way, and he only represents himself and the constituencies that entrusted him with the mission” (SUNA, February 20).

The Islamists Return

Much like the RSF-led Tasis coalition, the “official” SAF/TSC government and its armed supporters also constitute a tenuous alliance. Complicating its own search for legitimacy is the presence within the coalition of many Islamists, including veterans of the discredited military-Islamist government of Omar al-Bashir, who was deposed in 2019 and is currently wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, torture and genocide. Islamist militias under SAF command have played a major role in the fighting, most notably the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade, tied to the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP).

Commander of the Bara’a Bin Malik Brigade, al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha (Sudan Tribune)

The NCP, which ruled Sudan from 1998 to 2019, is currently led by Ahmad Harun (also wanted by the ICC on charges of war crimes and genocide in Darfur). Harun believes Western political models are inappropriate for Sudan and that there must be a political role for the army, but insists the Islamists will wait to seek power via the ballot box after the war’s conclusion  (Sudan Tribune, July 25; Arab Weekly, July 26).

The RSF is strongly opposed to a political return by the Islamists, blaming them for initiating the current conflict (Sudan Tribune, July 25). Tasis prime minister Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi explained in an interview that General al-Burhan has “benefited from the Islamists’ infiltration of the military establishment” and that he “became the general who served the Islamists most after the [2019] revolution” (Assayha, October 16). The Tasis alliance has declared they will dissolve all Islamist militias affiliated with the NCP after they take control of Sudan (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4).

Conclusion

The problem is that there are not two groups fighting for power in Sudan, but many, who have flocked to one or the other of the major coalitions (RSF and SAF) to further their own interests, even when that has meant splitting existing movements. In turn, the leaders of the major coalitions have become beholden to unreliable partners who have a track record of opportunism. In this situation, a victory by either side may mark not the end of the conflict, but only the starting point of a new one.

Most international support (however unenthusiastic) tends to line up behind the SAF/TSC as the default successor to the line of recognized Sudanese governments. However, the civilian leaders in the TSC are in thrall to the military members of the TSC, particularly TSC chairman General al-Burhan. While many civilian members reject a return to the political Islamism of the era of President Omar al-Bashir, they must contend with the fact that the northern Arab generals of the SAF are precisely those that survived the frequent purges of non-Islamist officers during the Bashir regime.

The RSF’s new Tasis State is not without its own international support, but these backers remain focused on what can be gained by supporting a paramilitary (led by Darfur Arabs) that has adopted a veneer of statehood to cloak the fact it is manifestly incapable of running anything resembling a 21st century administration with any other objective than the personal enrichment of its leadership. The inability of both RSF and SAF commanders to envision the possibility of a Sudanese nation led by a member of Sudan’s non-Arab majority guarantees further rounds of combat focused on the pursuit of ethnic-based power sharing.

On the battlefield, ongoing atrocities by both the SAF and the RSF mean there is little to choose between them in a humanitarian sense. Beyond the deliberate destruction of national infrastructure (much of which is the now ruined and irreplaceable legacy of the brief days of oil wealth before the separation of South Sudan), a recent UN report entitled “A War of Atrocities” found both side guilty of adopting a brutal approach to achieving their attainment of power: “Both sides have deliberately targeted civilians through attacks, summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and inhuman treatment in detention facilities, including denial of food, sanitation, and medical care. These are not accidental tragedies but deliberate strategies amounting to war crimes” (UN Human Rights Council, September 5). Ultimately, the division of Sudan into two dysfunctional states rather than one cannot offer the Sudanese people the prospect of stability or prosperity.

Note

  1. “Special Report: No Safe Haven: Bombardment of Abu Shouk IDP Camp and El-Fasher’s Increasing Berm Encirclement,” September 11, 2025, https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/e3d32307-89f9-4573-8c87-fc7d15239a9f

 

Wild Boars and Black Tigers: The French Commandos of North Vietnam, 1951-54

Andrew McGregor

AIS Military History

October 12, 2025

Sampans glide silently in the darkness over an inland waterway in north Vietnam’s Red River delta. Five Frenchmen and 120 Vietnamese commandos are on their way to make a deep behind-the-lines raid on Ho Chi Minh’s communist Viet Minh guerrillas. Their mission involves intelligence collection, seizing prisoners for interrogation and sowing confusion behind enemy lines. Among these nocturnal predators are many former Viet Minh prisoners; the lone French officer and his NCOs operate in the knowledge they may be killed by their own men at any time. This is life in the “Commandos of North Vietnam” (1951-54), a French precursor to the American Green Berets.

When General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny became commander-in-chief of the French Far East Expeditionary Corps in December 1950, French forces had been struggling for nearly six years to re-establish control over the Indochina colonies. Japanese forces destroyed the French occupation army in 1945, leaving a post-war power void exploited by Ho Chi Minh’s communist Viet Minh. The arrival of de Lattre, a legendary French soldier known to his men as “King Jean,” reinvigorates the badly demoralized Expeditionary Corps.

De Lattre, realizing the futility of following the old rules of combat, clears out incompetent officers and introduces new ideas, weapons and tactics, including a plan to create a series of new commando groups for use in northern Vietnam (“Tonkin”). These units, composed almost entirely of Vietnamese troops with a few French officers or NCOs in command, take the war to the Viet Minh using their own methods and intimate knowledge of the terrain. It is a war of no quarter, fought almost exclusively at night by men disguised as the enemy, men with a special gift for killing in the dark.

Origins

Even before the liberation of Paris, Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle was planning to re-establish French control of the Indochina colonies of Laos, Cambodia and the three regions of Vietnam – Cochin China in the south, the central region of Annam and the northern region of Tonkin. In 1944, the first Free French commando groups, officially the Corps Léger d’Intervention (C.L.I.), but better known as Gaurs (wild buffalo), are dropped into Japanese-occupied Laos. Torture is inevitable if captured and cyanide pills are regular issue. [1] Some of the commandos are highly trained veterans of the Free French companies of the British Special Air Service (SAS) and continue to wear the regiment’s green berets.

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese Army depose the French Vichy government in Indochina, slaughtering entire garrisons in surprise attacks. Two French Gaur groups are dropped into Tonkin by British planes to assist the fighting withdrawal to China of a column of starving and bloodied French colonial troops. Few of the Gaurs survive, most dying in suicidal attempts to delay the Japanese.

These early commandos are reliant on British training, transport and equipment, as the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS – predecessor to the CIA) initially supports Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist guerrillas over the French. This preference is in line with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s vision of a post-war world where national self-determination will replace European imperialism.

Battle of the Day River

After years of bitter fighting in Vietnam’s jungles and mountains, it is the performance of mixed groups of French and Vietnamese commandos at the Battle of the Day River (May 28-June 18, 1951) that convinces General de Lattre to make the commandos a formal part of the French Expeditionary Corps.

The Limestone Crags at Ninh Binh

When the Viet Minh’s 320th Division launches an offensive along the Day River, they are opposed by small French units holding two limestone crags at Ninh Binh. One of the peaks is held by “King Jean’s” son, Bernard de Lattre, who is following his father’s order to hold the French position at all costs. A mostly Vietnamese commando led by a massive young French NCO, Roger Vandenberghe, is called upon to reinforce the young lieutenant by climbing the crag under heavy fire. Machine-gun fire sends climbers plummeting down the cliff, and eventually finds Vandenberghe. Wounded, he signals his second-in-command, Sergeant Tran Dinh Vy, to finish the assault. The slight but formidable sergeant is a former seminarian who has become a master of guerrilla tactics.

During the attack, the bleeding Vandenberghe retrieves the body of his friend, Bernard, a victim of Viet mortar fire. The recovery ingratiates Vandenberghe to General de Lattre, who is deeply disturbed by the loss of his only child. [2] From this point, de Lattre acts as a patron to Vandenberghe, whose savage way of war is bringing him close to dismissal by French commanders alarmed by his methods. “King Jean,” who will declare Vandenberghe “the greatest soldier in Indochina,” authorizes the creation of formal French Army commando units on July 2, 1951.

Elsewhere at Ninh Binh, two battalions of Viet Minh, the lead elements of Giap’s offensive, run into a naval commando unit on May 28, 1951, the 76-man Commando François led by Lieutenant Albert Labbens. Cornered in an abandoned church, the commandos hold off an overwhelming communist force for 24 hours, allowing the French to rush forces to the area and stop the offensive. The end of Commando François comes when 29 mostly wounded survivors make a sally from the church after running out of ammunition. To honor their sacrifice, the commando was never reconstituted. [3]

The Battle of the Day River ends three weeks later as a disaster for Giap, who leaves 12,000 dead behind. It is a tactical lesson for the communist general, but cements the reputation of the French commandos.

Training

Responsibility for organizing the commandos is handed to Louis Fourcade, commander of the 1st Battalion of Colonial Paratroopers. Fourcade spent WWII as an officer in the Vichy colonial army in Indochina, with secret contacts to Free French agents working across the border in China. He was involved in the desperate fighting against the Japanese in the last months of the war.

Louis Fourcade

The new commando units normally include 120 Vietnamese under a European officer or, more commonly, a senior NCO, aided by four other NCOs and at least one European radio operator. Viet Minh prisoners are given the chance to avoid heavy labor by volunteering to join the new commando groups. This is a highly dangerous practice; while it brings on board men who are intimately familiar with the enemy and his methods, it also hands arms to men who might wait months before suddenly turning on their leaders. Sleeping becomes as precarious for the commando leaders as a fire-fight with the enemy. To let one’s guard down for a minute is to invite death.

Yvan Tommasi

Training is carried out at the Vat Chay commando school by SAS veteran Captain Michel Legrand. Later training of the commandos is undertaken by one of the hardest men in the French Army – Yvan Tommasi, an Algerian-born officer of the Colonial Paratroops and a Free French veteran of fighting in Africa and Europe. In 1950, he loses his right hand while seizing a bomb from the hands of a trainee who had mistakenly set it to explode. Rather than retire, Tommasi continues to jump and is appointed trainer of the commandos in February 1952. Captured leading a raid in January 1953, Tommasi spends six months in a Viet Minh prison camp. There, he is singled out by French communist and turncoat Georges Boudarel, who tries to break him by forcing him to dig all the graves for the camp with his left arm and the stump of the right. Tommasi is kept busy; 85% of the prisoners in Camp 113 die from torture and mistreatment while being forced to sing the praises of Ho Chi Minh. [4] Tommasi survives and continues to serve in the colonial paratroops in Africa until 1966. [5] Amazingly, the unrepentant Boudarel is hired as a professor by a Paris university after the war.

The commandos are taught to fight at night. As Captain Delayen of Commando 13 recalled:

After having overcome the visceral fear of the night, and the completion of special training requiring the greatest discipline, the [Vietnamese] auxiliaries were convinced that, lightly armed as they were, only night action could allow them to dominate an adversary unaccustomed to not be the only ones operating at night. [6]

Internal cohesion is achieved by recovering commando families living in Viet Minh-occupied zones, building schools, pagodas and married quarters beside the commando base, and forming the atmosphere of “a big family” through the cultivation of vegetables and the raising of chickens and pigs.

Operations

The commandos do not perform normal military duties such as routine patrols or guarding military posts. When necessary, they operate in conjunction with regular troops on larger military operations. [7] The commandos use weapons supplied by the English and Chinese weapons captured from the Viets, including Thompson machine-guns and WWII-era Sten guns. Grenade launchers and small 50- or 60-mm mortars complete the light armament of these highly mobile units. Many wear the black cotton uniform of the Viet Minh, complete with sneakers, palm helmets and a Red Star insignia.

To gather intelligence, the commandos venture deep into enemy territory to observe movements, take prisoners and disrupt communist political networks. Attendees at Viet Minh meetings live in fear of French commandos bursting in, firing their Thompson machine-guns from the waist. The commandos are taught to aim at the feet of their targets in close combat, as the Thompsons tend to jump up when fired.

In his memoir, Sergeant Bernard Gaudin of 25 Commando describes a night ambush during a deep raid on the Viet Minh. Ambushes mean hours of silent misery, uniforms soaked by an endless drizzle. Nerves are on a razor edge as eyes strain to detect movement in the inky darkness. The torment of mosquitoes is unrelenting but must be endured noiselessly:

Canh, my faithful corporal, whispers in my ear: “Chief, there are a lot of Viets.” (…) Here we go, all the Commandos who are waiting for this break loose. We can finally cough, yell – it’s recommended. The bursts and explosions of grenades tear the night apart. Immediately, there is a pack of Viets on the mat. We hear them shouting orders to try a maneuver but we shoot at everything that moves. [8]

With prisoners taken and the Viet Minh column destroyed, Gaudin leads his men back by a different route. The waiting Viet Minh begin to rain down grenades as they cross a rice paddy. Two of his men are killed before fire rakes the Commando from sharpshooters in the trees. A Dinassaut (armored landing craft) makes a welcome appearance on the river and lays down heavy fire until the shooting stops. The Commando returns to camp, where a blazing fire enables the start of “Operation Leech,” as the men burn off blood-engorged parasites with a cigarette, dropping them to sizzle in the flames. [9] Gaudin’s raid yields a treasure-trove of intelligence documents, including the cipher to the Viet Minh code. At other times, it is the commandos who are the victims; when Commando 34 operates in Laos in support of the besieged French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, Sergent-Chef Müller leads it into a devastating ambush, losing 68 of its 107 men, including Müller.

Dinassaut with a Mixed French/Viet Crew

The Dinassaut are surplus American shallow-draft LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanized), modified to bring heavy firepower to support infantry and commando operations in the shallow waterways of the Red River Delta. For this, the Dinassaut deploy heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars and even tank turrets welded onto the crafts. They save more than one commando group and are effective enough to serve as a model for later American river operations in the south.

The physical challenges alone are daunting on operations and exacerbated by a shortage of medicines and medical personnel. In the infernal heat, unbearable prickly heat is enough to drive a man mad. Clothing is little better than a curse; damp clothes and web gear rubbing on skin creates raw patches that quickly become infected before the flesh begins to rot. Boils, warts and the festering lumps provided by stinging and biting insects complete the assault on the skin. Internally, the body is host to large worms that have a disconcerting habit of popping out through the mouth as well as the anus; externally, the body sustains legions of leeches, mindless and ubiquitous creatures devoted to bleeding a man dry. Eye diseases that deprive a man of sight are rife; malaria and a multitude of tropical ailments make delirious fever an almost normal condition. Amoebic dysentery, endemic in the polluted rice paddies and streams that double as toilets for the locals, provides a slow and demoralizing death.

Despite these challenges, it is necessary for the leaders of the commandos to continually demonstrate physical and mental strength or risk losing the men under them. For officers of the French regular army, this dirty, stressful and highly dangerous work is commonly viewed as more likely to lead to an early death than promotion. Leadership roles are thus opened to audacious NCOs who may not have graduated the French St. Cyr military academy, but are capable of innovation, independent action and, most of all, killing Viet Minh. Contrary to expectations, the experience of the surviving commando leaders propels them rapidly through the ranks after the French withdrawal from Indochina. Men who understood the “new warfare” developed in Indochina would be needed in Algeria.

In response to the pressure of the commandos, the ever-adaptive Viet Minh create a counter-commando force, the Dich Van. This covert unit is assigned the task of infiltrating native troop formations aligned with the French Expeditionary Corps, often by intimidating the families of pro-French fighters. [10]  Dich Van propaganda teams recruit Foreign Legion deserters to persuade French Expeditionary Corps prisoners in French, German and other European languages to adopt Marxist ideology and take up arms against their former comrades.

The Wild Boar

Several French commanders achieve fame in this highly unconventional form of fighting, one fought with knives as much as sub-machine guns. One of these is a solid, thick-set Corsican lieutenant, Charles Alphonse Rusconi. For his ferocious fighting style, the Corsican is known as Le Sanglier, “the wild boar.”

Fanion of Commando 24

Rusconi begins his military career in 1936 by joining the Colonial Army’s 10th Regiment of Senegalese Tirailleurs (riflemen). He leads several daring commando raids behind German lines in 1940 before being wounded and captured. Escaping only two months later, he joins the French forces in Indochina in 1948, forming Commando 24 from Viet Minh prisoners and Black Colonial Army troops from Mali. The latter, mostly large men, say their commander is “small, but cunning.” Through unrelenting attacks that shatter Viet Minh morale, his group forces a significant decline in communist activity in his zone of operations.

The 33-year-old Rusconi, survivor of four wounds, is killed in February 1952 when one of his commandos, a former Viet Minh officer influenced by the Dich Van, opens a way into the camp for a company of Viet Minh. Rusconi and most of his command fall in vicious hand-to-hand fighting, knives, fists and boots flailing to the last.

The Black Tigers

Childhood for Roger Vandenberghe and his brother Albert is extremely difficult. Born in a Paris slum, their father dies from tuberculosis in 1939. Their mother, a Spanish Jew, is sent by Vichy authorities to a Nazi death camp. With little education, the boys join the French Resistance as mere teenagers, followed by service as commandos in General de Lattre’s First French Army in Alsace and Germany.  After the war, Vandenberghe and his brother arrive in Vietnam as part of the 6th Colonial Infantry regiment. Roger is immediately taken with the country, a place far different from the crowded tenements of Paris. Already decorated with the Croix de Guerre for his Resistance work, Vandenberghe quickly makes sergeant in command of a unit of Vietnamese auxiliaries that becomes Commando 24, “The Black Tigers.”

Roger Vanderberghe

Vandenberghe’s nemesis in Vietnam is Chapuis, a former French paratrooper who deserted to the communists. In June 1948, Chapuis kills Vandenberghe’s younger brother, his only family in the world. The deserter is captured by Vandenberghe in 1951 and sent to the French post at Nam Dinh, where he escapes and returns to the Viet Minh.

Vandenberghe’s most famous exploit comes when one of his turned commandos reveals the location of a Viet Minh command post. Vandenberghe allows himself to be bound as a prisoner and carried along by his men in Viet Minh uniform, passing through checkpoints by insisting they are going to collect the reward on Vandenberghe’s head.  Once inside the command post, Vandenberghe is released; he and his men slaughter everyone there, seizing a treasure trove of documents and weapons. [11]

Vanderberghe Meets an Astonished General De Lattre at Phu Ly

This fearsome NCO has little use for the officers of the French army, but is impressed by the leadership of General De Lattre, his former commander in France. He leads his men 12 miles through enemy territory to see the general at a gathering in Phu Ly. The general is astonished to see this towering European in a Viet Minh uniform and helmet. Vandenberghe explains his appearance as necessary while operating almost exclusively behind enemy lines. De Lattre is taken by this odd but unforgettable warrior, remarking a few days later: “It’s a bit as if a tiger, in addition to its fangs and claws, received a hunting license…” [12]

The French commandos fight brutal, no-quarter battles in a tropical darkness where the normal conventions of war hold no sway. Even in these conditions, Vandenberghe stands out for waging a vicious and pitiless war using methods the French command find disturbing. He drives his men hard; complaints are met with a reminder that, without him, his turncoat troops “would be in jail or eaten by maggots.” [13] Desertions are frequent and Vandenberghe is shot in the back by one of his own men in 1949. After returning from medical treatment in France he becomes even more unrestrained, his NCOs struggling to keep him in check, especially in his dealings with the civilian population.  Vandenberghe pays little heed to the criticism of his methods by French officers, insisting that war was about killing, so they were best to leave him to it. [14]

Vanderberghe and Rusconi in Hanoi, February 7, 1952

Paratrooper Phillipe de Pirey recalled a parade held in honor of General de Lattre that featured the Vandenberghe and Rusconi commandos, “most striking” in Viet Minh-style black shorts and shirts, topped with Latanier (palm) helmets with red stars on a yellow background. Beside their Sten-guns with fifty round magazines, numerous knives and grenades hung from their belts. Once onlookers managed to overcome the shock of witnessing these former Viet Minh warriors parading in the streets of Hanoi in the uniforms of the enemy, it was possible for de Pirey to admit “the men in these units looked rather splendid.” [15]

Tran Dinh Vy – Tiger and Legionnaire

On January 6, 1952, at a time when most of Commando 24 is on leave, Vietnamese sentries who had managed to infiltrate the unit allow a Viet Minh team that may include the deserter Chapuis to enter the camp. The assassins move silently and Vandenberghe is butchered in his sleep by a former Viet Minh officer under his command. Ten others are killed; the few wounded who survive include Sergeant Tran Dinh Vy, who goes on to serve in the army of South Vietnam.  Arriving in France after the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, this exceptional soldier joins the French Foreign Legion, attaining the rank of colonel.

Commando 24 in Viet Minh Uniforms

Wounded seven times by bullets, grenades and mines before his death, Vandenberghe becomes the most highly decorated French NCO of the 20th century. An obituary in a leading Paris newspaper notes that the war enabled Vandenberghe to “find in the combats of the jungle the blossoming of his barbaric personality.” [16] Five days after Vandenberghe’s death, General de Lattre dies of cancer in Paris and is laid to rest alongside his son, Bernard, marking the end of the short but eventful relationship between the king, his prince and the tiger who served them.

End of the North Vietnam Commandos

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the French command decides to evacuate the southern half of the Red River Delta. Hundreds of Vietnamese begin to desert the French forces. Two sections of Commando 35 murder their French commander, Lieutenant Nedelec, and two French NCOs before joining the enemy in July 1954. [17]

Général Salan and the Commando Yatagan in Algeria

With the French war over, the native remnants of the commando groups assemble at Haiphong and are sent to South Vietnam to form the 1st Battalion de Marche des Commandos (BMC). Their French officers and NCOs find themselves in demand and are sent to Algeria to continue French experiments in counter-insurgency. Commando 13’s Captain Jean-Louis Delayen forms the Yatagan Commando in Algeria, a French-led unit of Algerian Muslims operating along the lines established by the North Vietnam commandos. A second-generation member of the French colonial infantry, Delayen finishes his career in 1978 as one of the most decorated soldiers in the French army.

Tomb of Roger Vanderberghe, Pau, France (Joel Herbez)

Vandenberghe’s remains are repatriated to France from the Nam Dinh cemetery in 1989, where they are interred in a monument honoring the “Black Tiger” at the National NCO Academy in Pau.

By the end of the war in 1954, Viet Minh losses to the Nord Viet-Nam commandos include 3,664 dead, 481 wounded and 4,649 taken prisoner. European commando losses include 73 dead, 25 wounded and 6 missing. Losses of Vietnamese commandos in French service appear not to have been recorded but could only be described as substantial. [18]

Louis Fourcade, who had organized the commandos, honors them after the war: “Thanks to their ardor, their contempt for danger, the initiative of their leaders, the courage and undeniable devotion of their men, the North Vietnam commandos acquired and deserved their reputation of being always into the breach.” [19]

NOTES

 [1] Jean le Morillon, p.134.

[2] Bernard Fall, p. 45.

[3] Groizeleau.

[4] Yves Beigbeder, p. 73.

[5] Denizot.

[6] Captain Delayen (later General Delayen), quoted in Pissardy, p.251.

[7] LeBreton.

[8] Gaudin, Reprinted in Pissardy, p.266.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Colonel Michel Reeb.

[11] LeBreton.

[12] Forum La Guerre d’Indochine.

[13] Bergot, 1997.

[14] Favrel, 1952.

[15]  De Pirey, p.159.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Pissardy, p.51.

[18] LeBreton

[19] Reeb

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beigbeder, Yves: Judging War Crimes and Torture: French Justice and International Criminal Tribunals and Commissions,  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.

Bergot, Erwan: Commando Vandenberghe, Pygmalion, Paris, 1997.

Denizot, Jean-Jacques: L’épopée des trois Capitaines. Jean Claveranne – Henri Morin – Yvan Tommasi. Trois vies, un destin, 2000, https://www.monsieur-legionnaire.org/images/epopee-des-trois-capitaines.pdf

Fall, Bernard: Street Without Joy, Pall Mall Press, London, 1961.

Favrel, Charles: “La Mort d’un Baroudeur,” Le Monde, January 9, 1952, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1952/01/09/la-mort-d-un-baroudeur_1993178_1819218.html

Forum La Guerre d’Indochine: “L’Adjutant-Chef Roger Vandenberghe,” April 9, 2009, https://laguerreenindochine.forumactif.org/t541p1-l-adjudant-chef-roger-vandenberghe

Gaudin, Bernard, Commando 25, Paris, 1990.

Groizeleau, Vincent: “Un ancien du commando François arrive en P-51 sur la BAN d’Hyères,”
Mer et Marine, June 16, 2014, https://www-meretmarine-com.translate.goog/fr/defense/un-ancien-du-commando-francois-arrive-en-p-51-sur-la-ban-d-hyeres?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=op,sc

Kennedy, Paul J.: Dinassaut Operations in Indochina: 1946-1954, Unpublished MA Thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico VA, 2001.

LeBreton, A.: “Commandos Nord Vietnam,” Versailles, July 31, 2007, http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.acuf.fr%2FArticle%2FCommandos%2520Nord%2520Vietnam.htm

Le Morillon, Jean: Un Breton en Indochine, Paris, 2000.

de Pirey, Philippe, Operation Waste, Arco, London, 1954.

Pissardy, Jean-Pierre: Commandos Nord-Vietnam, 1951-1954, Indo Éditions, Paris, 1999.

Reeb, Colonel Michel: “Commando Nord Viet-Nam,” La Charte, December 2003.

 

Russian Military Presence in Mali Contributes to State Collapse

Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 22(129), Washington DC

September 30, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • The presence of Russian military personnel in Mali has failed to prevent the expansion of the jihadist insurgency into the once-safe central and western regions of the country.
  • Fissures have erupted in Mali’s ruling military junta over issues related to operational cooperation with Russian military personnel who tend to operate independently of Mali’s command structure and are accused of human-rights abuses.
  • Russian forces are unhappy with difficulties related to their entry into Mali’s lucrative minerals sector and the arrival of Turkish military contractors assigned to train the president’s security staff.

Four years into the Russian military deployment that began with the arrival of Wagner personnel, Mali has become less secure and the jihadists have grown stronger, more numerous, wider ranging, and more daring attacks on urban centers and military bases (see EDM, September 6, 2023, March 12, 2024; see Terrorism Monitor, June 26, 2020, December 11, 2024). Three months after Wagner withdrew in June and Russia’s Africa Corps began its Malian deployment, the Russian military presence is not only failing to quell Mali’s 13-year-old Islamist and separatist insurgency, but is now adding to Mali’s political turmoil (see EDM, July 9). Russian forces have both failed to retake the jihadist homeland in northern Mali and to prevent a large-scale infiltration of Islamist gunmen into the once-safe central and western regions of the country. The inability of foreign forces, such as the recently expelled French military, to repress the insurgency is beginning to create fissures in Mali’s five-year-old military junta.

JNIM celebrate after the ambush of a Russian convoy near Ténenkou, August 1, 2025

Recently, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM) movement scored a victory over Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) and the allied Russian Africa Corps when it ambushed a Russian convoy near Ténenkou in the central Malian region of Mopti on August 1. An estimated 14 Russians and over 35 Malian soldiers died (France24, August 13). The bodies of three white combatants were shown in the video, including one wounded soldier who was executed with a shot to the head. A second video showed JNIM fighters rummaging through a damaged Russian Ural-4320 truck (X/@Permafr95699535, August 1). The scene was reminiscent of the Wagner/FAMa defeat at Tinzawatène at the hands of JNIM and Tuareg separatists of the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA) on July 25, 2024 (see EDM, September 11, 2024).

JNIM fighters inspect damaged Russian truck at Ténenkou

The region around Ténenkou is dominated by the Fulani, cattle-herding Muslims whose regular clashes with farming communities have led to reprisals by government forces and local militias. This leads to recruitment by Fulani-dominated jihadist groups such as the al-Qaeda-aligned Katiba Macina (MLF) (CTC, February 2017). Fulani fighters from the Katiba Macina were at the forefront of a September 17, 2024, raid on Russian and Malian military personnel in Mali’s capital, Bamako (see EDM, October 9, 2024). MLF leader Amadou Koufa stated that the raid was a response to civilian massacres by FAMa and their Russian allies (X/SaladinAlDronni, September 17, 2024).

The Russian military presence has failed to prevent the expansion of jihadist operations into parts of Mali that were previously unaffected by such. JNIM’s June to September offensive in western Mali climaxed with the September 3 announcement of a JNIM blockade of imports from neighboring Senegal and Mauritania (Africa Report, September 7). The blockade of the Kayes and Nioro regions is intended to prevent the import of fuel and other goods to landlocked Mali and Bamako, where fuel is already in short supply, affecting both military and commercial flights (Anadolu Ajansı, July 10). Mali’s regime responded with airstrikes in Kayes on September 8 after jihadists stopped and emptied fuel tankers from Senegal (TRT Global, September 8).

The regime’s inability to restore security to Mali, even with the aid of Russian troops, has created an atmosphere of distrust in the highest levels of the military. An unauthorized early August meeting of senior officers to discuss issues related to cooperation with the Russian Africa Corps led to a wave of arrests of front-line officers and other ranks that began on August 10 and continued for days. At least 55 soldiers were arrested, including two popular generals, on charges they were preparing a coup against the junta with the help of “foreign states” (Africa News, August 11; Al-Jazeera, August 15; L’Essor, August 19).

General Sadio Camara meets with Russian defense officials in Moscow, including Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) (Russian Defense Ministry)

One junta leader who escaped arrest was Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs Lieutenant General Sadio Camara, the individual responsible for arranging the arrival of Russian contractors in Mali. Camara has acted as the point man for the junta’s dealings with both the Wagner Group and its successor, the Africa Corps, which operates under the direction of Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Camara, however, has come under suspicion after the mass arrests of suspect officers, most of whom belong to Mali’s Garde Nationale, known as the “Brown Berets” (RFI, August 10). The Garde and its leaders are closely tied to Camara, who founded the force. Disagreements between junta leader General Assimi Goïta and Camara over the allocation of Malian mines to Russian interests may have contributed to the growing rivalry between the two men (The Sentry, August 2025). Camara is seeing much of his network of supporters dismantled, leaving him in a precarious position regarding his former ally, Goïta. While Goïta still approves of the Russian presence and has even authorized its expansion through recent talks in Moscow, he is wary of allowing a transfer of resources and national authority to the Russians, as has occurred in the Central African Republic.

Mali’s Garde Nationale – The “Brown Berets” (Bamada.net)

Only days after the purge of many of his followers, Camara represented Mali in Moscow during a meeting of defense ministers of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) and their Russian counterpart, Andrei Belousov, as well as Africa Corps leader Yunus Bek Yevkurov (see MLM, April 18, 2024; The Moscow Times, August 14; Bamada.net, August 15). During the proceedings, Camara declared his support for Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine (APA, August 14). In Mali, Camara has the support of Modibo Koné, the powerful pro-Russian leader of the Agence Nationale de Sécurité de l’État (ANSE) and a product of Camara’s Garde Nationale (Bamada.net, March 24).

SADAT mercenaries with President Erdoğan of Turkiye (North Africa Post)

Complicating the Russian relationship with the regime is the arrival in Bamako of SADAT, a self-proclaimed Turkish private military company providing “military training and defense consulting” (Sadat.com.tr, accessed September 28). SADAT’s main role in Mali appears to be the provision of training to Goïta’s security detail, though there are reports of Syrian SADAT members finding themselves on the front lines of the war against the Islamists (Le Monde, June 7, 2024). SADAT relies heavily on recruitment from Syrian fighters of the Syrian National Army (SNA, a coalition of Turkish-aligned Syrian rebels) and Turkmen from Syria’s Sultan Murad Division (NATO Defense Foundation, April 9). The organization was founded in 2012 by Erdoğan’s former military advisor, Brigadier General Adnan Tanrıverdi, and is believed to still enjoy Erdoğan’s patronage (Medya News, June 25, 2023; Le Monde, June 7, 2024; Gazete Duvar, December 27, 2024). Türkiye’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (leader of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), stated in June that “Russia’s Wagner is Türkiye’s SADAT Inc” (Duvar, June 24). SADAT’s role in protecting the junta leader suggests Goïta has some degree of suspicion regarding the ultimate intentions of the Russians or their supporters in Mali.

SADAT founder Adnan Tanriverdi (CNN Türk)

The junta appears to have been under the impression that Russian forces might enable it to escape the neo-colonialism inherent in the French and UN military presence in Mali. Instead, they have found a new partner set on accessing Mali’s natural resources, and that is even more selective in choosing which operations or actions it should carry out than the French.

The Russians so far appear to be disappointed by the lack of access to Mali’s lucrative mining sector, with the expected lucrative mining licenses failing to materialize for the most part (The Sentry, August 2025). One-half of Mali’s tax revenues derive from its gold mining industry (Reuters, July 19, 2023). Russia looks toward gold revenues from its activities in Africa to help fund its ongoing and costly war against Ukraine (see EDM, July 16).

The replacement of Wagner with the Africa Corps has not meant a wholesale replacement of Russian troops. Some 80 percent of Mali’s Africa Corps consists of Wagner personnel who chose to transfer into the new Russian Ministry of Defense unit rather than return to Russia, where they would likely find themselves on the front lines of the war against Ukraine (Africa Business Insider, August 28). There is growing friction between FAMa and the Russian troops, who tend to operate outside the Malian chain of command, appropriating resources, weapons, and transport for their operations. The Russian contractors are disliked for selectively intervening in support of FAMa.

As Mali endures economic, political, and military crises, the country’s ruling junta is seeking scapegoats. As ruptures appear in the ruling junta, it may only be a matter of time before the largely unproductive experiment with Russian security assistance offers Mali’s inept military rulers a new target for blame.

Western Sahara’s Polisario Movement: Manufacturing a Threat to Global Security

Western Sahara’s Polisario Movement: Manufacturing a Threat to Global Security

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 23(5)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

September 10, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Founded in 1973, the Polisario Front remains a UN-recognized secular liberation movement seeking independence from Moroccan rule. U.S. legislators are considering labeling the Sahrawi independence movement a terrorist group, fueled by allegations of ties to Iran, Hezbollah, and global jihadist networks, despite a lack of credible evidence. Accusations against the group appear to largely be intended to delegitimize the movement and reinforce Morocco’s ties with the United States and Israel.
  • The recent move against the group in the West is based on claims of Iranian training, rocket attacks with Iranian weapons, and a Polisario presence in Syria that appears largely fabricated or exaggerated through Moroccan, Israeli, and Western media outlets. Credible sources and intelligence officials reject a meaningful connection.

Polisario Fighters (Rue 20)

Recent media claims have put a lightly-armed group of independence-seeking desert fighters from Western Sahara, an obscure former Spanish colony, at the heart of an Iranian-backed terrorist network with designs on Morocco, Israel, Europe, and even the United States. U.S. legislators are now preparing to designate the 52-year-old Polisario movement as an international terrorist group and a general threat to world order (U.S. House of Representatives, June 24). This would represent the culmination of a massive and often contradictory campaign of misinformation and disinformation by promoters of Moroccan interests in the region, and promote closer ties between Morocco, Israel, and the United States.

The Polisario’s Progression

The Polisario (derived from the Spanish Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) was formed in 1973 with Algerian assistance to battle Spanish occupation. The Sahrawis who dwell in what is now known as Western Sahara were traditionally free-ranging nomads of Sanhaja Berber and Arab (of the Bani Hassan tribe) descent. They are Sunni Muslims of the Maliki school common to northwest Africa, and their society is tribal, with the Reguibat (who once provided native troops for the Spanish colony) forming the dominant group. The United Nations recognizes the Polisario Front as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people.

As the Polisario emerged in the 1970s, it adopted the Marxist and African socialist liberation ideology favored by independence movements across the continent at the time. However, the movement abandoned Marxism at a 1991 movement congress, a move partly inspired by the collapse of the Soviet Union that year (Guardian, February 11, 1999). When Spain relinquished its Saharan colony in 1975, the Polisario Front proclaimed the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic with its capital at Laayoune.

Its independence, however, was immediately challenged by both Mauritania and Morocco, igniting a 16-year war for independence that stopped after Mauritania relinquished its claims, and a ceasefire was achieved with Morocco in 1991. By this time, Morocco had taken control of 80 percent of Western Sahara, which it consolidated through the construction of a 1700-mile fortified berm (a sand wall, or “the wall of shame and humiliation” in Sahrawi parlance). Today, at least 90,000 Sahrawi refugees live across the Algerian border in camps in Tindouf, which forms the base of the Polisario and its military wing, the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

Sahrawis in Tindouf (Dikó Betancourt)

The ceasefire has been monitored since 1991 by UN peacekeepers, the Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Organización de un Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental (MINURSO). The 1991 agreement called for a referendum of Sahrawis to decide on union with Morocco or independence. The referendum was never held, leaving the conflict in a state of paralysis. As disputes over voter eligibility rage on, the number of Moroccans encouraged to settle in the territory grows by the day, bringing an inevitable conclusion in favor of Rabat. Morocco has offered the Sahrawi autonomy, but is inflexible in insisting that Western Sahara should be rightfully understood as a traditional territory under the sovereignty of the Moroccan king.

In 2020, the Guerguerat incident led to the Polisario’s withdrawal from the 1991 ceasefire. Guerguerat is an important border post between Mauritania and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, where a Moroccan military operation against Sahrawi protesters led to clashes with Polisario fighters (Al Jazeera, November 13, 2020). The incident ignited other clashes, as the Polisario rejected the ceasefire and returned to a state of war. This unilateral move cost the Polisario badly needed international support.

Polisario’s Unwitting Entry into the Arab–Israeli Conflict

The Sahrawis have no history of engagement in hostilities against Israel. In contrast, Morocco sent a 5,500-man expeditionary force to fight alongside Arab forces in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Jeune Afrique, November 7, 2013). Since then, Morocco, which has the Arab world’s largest Jewish population, has moved toward rehabilitating its relationship with Israel.

When Rabat signed on to the Abraham Accords (normalizing relations between Israel and Arab states) on December 10, 2020, the Trump administration rewarded Morocco by recognizing its sovereignty over Western Sahara. The idea of U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara in exchange for participation in the Abraham Accords came from an Israeli group led by former Mossad deputy director and Knesset member Ram Ben Barak. The concept was then pursued by Trump senior adviser Jared Kushner and special envoy Avi Berkowitz for two years before its realization in 2020 (Axios, December 11, 2020). Morocco, Africa’s second-largest arms importer (rival Algeria is first), has in recent years turned to Israel as a major supplier of weapons, drones, and military reconnaissance satellites (The New Arab, April 16, 2024; Le Monde, May 9, 2024; Defense Post, August 15, 2024).

Since the 2020 U.S. recognition of Moroccan rule in the Western Sahara, only the Polisario has remained to be dealt with. A broad campaign emerged from sources in Israeli media, Moroccan media, and U.S. think-tanks that accused the Sahrawi separatists of jihadist terrorism and, most potently, of being willing tools of Iran’s ayatollahs. The small and once obscure movement is now alleged to be part of a “Tindouf–Tehran connection that threatens Africa’s sovereignty and security” (Atalyar [Madrid], June 2). The movement has, in addition, been accused by various groups of trafficking refugees, narcotics, and humanitarian and medical aid, as well as engaging in forced conscription and illegal detentions (Times of Israel, July 3).

The Polisario: An Iranian Proxy?

Morocco severed ties with Iran in 2018 after Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita accused Algeria of providing operational support for Iranian and Hezbollah military and logistical aid to the Polisario (Al Jazeera, May 13, 2018; Morocco World News, June 30). The move helped align Morocco with the anti-Iran lobby in Washington. The Polisario, meanwhile, now faces U.S. bipartisan congressional legislation in the form of the “Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act,” sponsored by Republican Representative Joe Wilson and Democratic Representative Jimmy Panetta, both vocal supporters of Israeli military action against Gaza and coordinated U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran. Wilson maintains that the Polisario “is a Marxist militia” backed by Iran, Hezbollah, Cuba, and Russia, which is “providing Iran a strategic outpost in Africa” while destabilizing West Africa and the Kingdom of Morocco (X/@RepJoeWilson, January 15, June 26).

The Polisario rejects the proposed designation, in part, on the grounds that the designation requires threats to U.S. national security or U.S. citizens. The group asserts that “The Polisario Front has never attacked U.S. civilians or citizens. Its operations are directed exclusively against Moroccan military forces within the framework of a UN-recognized armed conflict” (ECSaharaui, June 27). If the legislation passes, it will make Algeria, the Polisario’s principal military, financial, and diplomatic supporter, a potential sponsor of terrorism. [1]

Polisario Patrol (SPS)

Alarming coverage in some British media has warned that the Polisario, “a Marxist militia backed by Iran [and] Hezbollah” (notably omitting Algeria), had plans to attack British and Israeli interests “as part of the group’s increasing terror alliance with Iran and their other proxies” (The Telegraph, July 1). Israeli sources similarly have claimed that the Polisario are “Iran-backed mercenaries operating from Algerian soil, funded by Tehran’s Quds Force, trained by Hezbollah operatives, and increasingly useful to Moscow … As Morocco deepens ties with Israel and the U.S., the Iran–Hezbollah axis sees the Western Sahara as the perfect place to retaliate…” (Ynet, April 19). The Polisario insists that “the ‘Iran–Hezbollah–Polisario axis’ narrative is entirely fabricated: a geopolitical propaganda tactic intended to associate the Polisario Front with U.S. regional adversaries, despite the lack of credible intelligence or official confirmation from U.S. security agencies” (ECSaharaui, June 27).

Shi’ite Iran’s efforts to create political and military relationships in the Sunni-majority Arab world have always been complicated by suspicion that it secretly intends to expand Shi’a religious influence. In 2022, Morocco’s foreign minister, Nasser Bourita, warned that “Iran plans to enter West Africa and to spread the Shi’a doctrine in the region” (New Arab, January 27, 2022). The Polisario, composed exclusively of Sunni Muslims, seems an unlikely tool if Iran’s involvement is religiously motivated.

The Polisario in Syria?

A document published on X by Moroccan former deputy Lahcen Haddad in December 2024 claimed that 120 Polisario fighters were sent to Syria in 2011 to receive military training from Syrians and Algerians. This was said to be done with “collaboration” from Hezbollah. The post saw wide distribution across the platform in 2025. The document offered alleged proof of the long-suspected “Iranian connection” to the Polisario. Despite claims that the file was found in “boxes of documents abandoned” by Bashar al-Assad during his December 2024 flight from Syria, it appears to have originated on a Moroccan Facebook page in April 2023 (X/Lahcenhaddad, December 10, 2024; Le360, April 21; African Digital Democracy Observatory, June 27).

Recent assertions of an armed Polisario presence in Syria include a 2024 article written by Fahad al-Masri, president of the National Salvation Front of Syria and a Paris-based Syrian expatriate dedicated to creating a Syrian–Moroccan partnership. Al-Masri claimed, based on anonymous but “reliable military sources on the ground in Syria,” that 200 Polisario fighters had been deployed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to a Syrian base close to the Israeli border. There, they allegedly received Iranian training for the past three years (Ynet, November 23, 2024; African Digital Democracy Observatory, June 27).

In December 2024, the Algerian ambassador to Syria, Kamel Bouchama, made an innocent remark to the effect that some 500 Algerians or individuals of Algerian descent lived in Aleppo, Syria, including some families who had resided in the area for hundreds of years. In the hands of various Moroccan sources, the statement transformed into an assertion that 500 Polisario fighters carrying Algerian passports were under IRGC command in Aleppo. Though the ambassador clarified that the presence of these fighters was “purely imaginary,” references to the “500,” now supposedly detained and awaiting trial in Syria, continue to infect coverage of the “Iranian-controlled Polisario threat” despite no evidence of their existence (Arab Weekly, April 13; Watan News, April 25; African Digital Democracy Observatory, June 27).

The story of the “500” Iranian-trained Polisario in Syrian detention was later picked up by the Washington Post. It appeared in paragraph 30 of a lengthy piece dealing with Syrian efforts to shut down an Iranian arms smuggling route used to supply Hezbollah fighters (Washington Post, April 12). The Post article was immediately cited as U.S. “confirmation” of Iran–Algeria–Polisario connections in pan-Arab and Moroccan sources (Arab Weekly, April 13; Morocco World News, April 13).

The Post published a correction on April 24 in which the movement denied any connection with Iran. The statement offered that: “suggesting that Polisario fighters would abandon their decades-long struggle against Moroccan occupation to take part in distant conflicts is not only implausible but also an insult to the dignity and determination of a people fighting for their freedom” (Watan News, April 25). Months after the correction was published, Moroccan and Israeli sources continue to cite the Post’s report. They claim it is proof of Iran’s military training of Polisario fighters, with the Times of Israel calling it “explosive” and “irrefutable” (Morocco World News, June 11; Times of Israel, July 3).

The Attack on Smara and Potential Turn to Jihadism

As international pressure grows, the Polisario has stepped up its still modest military operations in response. The SPLA fired four rockets at the West Saharan town of Smara (known in Spanish as Esmara) on June 27, 220 km (140 miles) east of Laayoune (El Pais [Madrid], July 2; Sahara Press Service, June 27). The Polisario claimed it had targeted “enemy military positions.” However, an inspection by MINURSO peacekeepers indicated that the rockets had hit only uninhabited areas without causing any casualties or damage (Hespress [Rabat], June 28).

Attack on Smara – June 27, 2025

Moroccan sources reported the four rockets were Iranian-made and targeted an “educational institution” (Aldar, June 27). According to Moroccan military analyst Abderrahmane Mekkaoui, the rockets fired by the Polisario were samples of obsolete 1960s Soviet weaponry, the BM-21 122 mm Grad rocket. Mekkaoui states that the rockets came not from Iran, but from old Libyan stockpiles of the Gaddafi era, long-since seized by Algeria and passed on to the Polisario. The Polisario’s efforts to increase the range of the rockets reduced their accuracy, which Mekkaoui interprets as indicating an ideological shift to terrorism by abandoning precision guidance (in the notoriously inaccurate Grads) that could reduce civilian casualties (Hespress, June 30).

Spain’s national intelligence center (the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, or CNI) monitors North Africa for potential threats to Spain. A recent CNI report noted that several individuals from Tindouf had acquired senior positions in Group for the Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State–West Africa Province (IS–WAP) (Hespress, June 8; Rue20 [Rabat], June 8; La Vanguardia [Barcelona], June 8). Most notable of these was Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, who spent very little time in the Polisario movement before joining a series of Salafi–Jihadi movements, ultimately becoming the leader of Islamic State–Greater Sahara (IS–GS) before his death at the hands of French forces in 2021.

Polisario Troops Fire Rockets at Morocco, 2021 (AP/ Bernat Armangue

Moroccan media hailed the report as proof of the Polisario’s “involvement in terrorist activities,” with the one-time separatist movement now “an incubator of terrorism” (Rue20 [Rabat], June 11). Conversely, a CNI counter-terrorism officer who spoke recently at a Madrid conference on the jihadist threat to Spain pointed out that there were not more than 25 to 30 Sahrawis among the 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in IS–GS. While some may have attained leadership positions, it was important to note that they commanded units drawn from other peoples of the Sahelo–Sahara region. He concluded that “there is by no means a link between the Saharawi movement or the Polisario Front with jihadism” and insisted that the presence of a small number of Sahrawi fighters in IS–GS should not “stigmatize” the Sahrawi community (ECSaharaui, June 30; La Vanguardia [Barcelona], June 30). Many Sahrawis, moreover, belong to the Qadiri and Tijani Sufi orders despised by Salafi–Jihadists.

It is clear that, by joining the jihadists, this handful of Sahrawis was abandoning the secular Sahrawi independence movement rather than transitioning it into yet another group of Sunni religious extremists. To believe that the Sahrawis are Sunni Salafi–Jihadists in thrall to Iranian Shi’ite extremists (Shi’ites being a primary target of Salafi–Jihadists) is to suggest an obviously contradictory and logically impossible ideological base for the Polisario movement. If the rump Sahrawi state decided to abandon its secular ideology to become the Taliban of northwest Africa, it would meet its first opposition from the Polisario’s sole sponsor, Algeria, which fought a long and especially bitter civil war (1992–2002) against native Islamist insurgents—something Algiers has no interest in repeating.

(Global Security.org)

Conclusion

The charges against the Polisario are as numerous as they are contradictory. According to its antagonists, today’s Polisario is a Marxist, jihadist, secular, separatist, terrorist, and atheist movement of Shiite and Sunni extremists and/or mercenaries trained, armed, and manipulated by the Russians, Iranians, Algerians, Cubans, Kurdish separatists, Chinese communists, and Lebanese Shiites to combat the forces of Morocco, Syrian rebels, Israel, and America. This is the cumulative result of an information war fought with greater intensity than anything the Polisario is involved with on the ground.

Evidence that Iran is supplying military equipment to the Polisario’s camps (which can only be done through Algeria) is dubious at best. Algeria, which suspected Iran of meddling in its civil war on behalf of the Islamist opposition, pursues a resolutely independent course in international affairs. It is difficult to believe Tehran would now be allowed direct access to the Sahrawi camps to arm and recruit local fighters to pursue the interests of Shiite Iran at Algeria’s expense.

Rather than posing a threat to Europe, America, the Middle East, and North Africa, the Polisario movement dwells in a perpetual state of political, diplomatic, and military weakness. The movement has never had a charismatic leader, and there is little internationally attractive about the movement’s isolated, militarized society, confined to barren refugee camps dependent on UN and Algerian aid as well as whatever else can be eked out from corruption. The alleged Polisario shift from a focus on local independence to an ambitious international agenda seems utterly perplexing, especially when it has failed to achieve any of its more modest local goals over five decades of struggle.

Note:

[1] At the time of publishing, the bill remains with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on the Judiciary.

Wagner Withdrawal Signals Potential Change in Russian Approach to Mali

Andrew McGregor

July 9, 2025

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Washington DC

Executive Summary

  • Russia’s Wagner Group is being withdrawn from Mali after a three-and-a-half-year deployment with a mixed record of battlefield successes that have come at enormous civilian cost.
  • Wagner’s replacement with the Russian Defense Ministry’s Africa Corps may signal a change in tactics, but a military buildup suggests expanded military operations against insurgent and terrorist groups are on their way.
  • Security-related shifts are being accompanied by new Russian-Malian partnerships in the energy and mining sectors.

Mali’s relationship with Russia is entering a new stage with the withdrawal of the last members of the Wagner Group and the signing of new bilateral agreements on trade, development and the launch of a plan to build a Russian-designed low-power nuclear plant in Mali (TASS, June 23; Business Insider Africa, June 23). The agreements came during the second visit to Moscow of Mali’s president, General Assimi Goïta (Maliweb, June 17).

General Assimi Goïta (Idrissa Diakité/EFE/Newscom/MaxPPP)

Mali’s military government has also announced a partnership with Russian firm Yadran Group to build a gold refinery near the capital of Bamako. The move is in line with a declaration by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov that Russia intends to focus with African countries “primarily on economic and investment interaction… This also corresponds to and extends to such sensitive areas as defence and security” (al-Jazeera, June 9).

The Malian junta is currently consolidating state control over the gold industry, recently taking over the operations of Canadian giant Barrick Mining. It is envisioned that the new refinery will be a regional center for processing gold (Afrinz.ru, May 30). Most African gold is currently refined outside Africa in China, Canada and Switzerland; Mali has two existing refineries but neither meet international standards (fr.africannews.com, November 24, 2023; Business Insider Africa, June 23). Mali is Africa’s second-largest gold producer; neighboring Burkina Faso, which has also welcomed Russia’s Africa Corps, is fourth. Most of the gold found in northern Mali is obtained through artisanal mining exploited by Wagner personnel.

Artisanal Gold Mining in Mali (Sebastien Rieussec/AFP)

On the security front, the question is what changes will come as Russia’s Africa Corps, under the direction of Russia’s ministry of defense, replaces the private military contractors (PMCs) of the Wagner Group. Mali is struggling with insurgencies in northern Mali carried out by Tuareg separatists and rival al-Qaeda and Islamic State bands of Salafi-Jihadists drawn from the Arab, Tuareg and Fulani communities. The separatists and jihadists are known to cooperate on major operations such as the devastating July 2024 strike at Tinzawatène that killed scores of Wagner fighters and regular troops of the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) (see EDM, July 31, 2024; EDM, September 11, 2024).

Wagner personnel arrived in Mali in the fall of 2021 and announced the end of their mission on June 6, stating they had combated terrorism and “accomplished the main task – all regional capitals returned to the control of the legitimate authorities. The mission is complete. PMC Wagner is returning home” (Novaya Gazeta, June 5; Lenta.ru, June 6). Wagner personnel in Mali were responsible for training FAMa, combating terrorists and protecting high-ranking officials. The Russian contractors replaced long-standing French and UN missions that were unable to secure Mali despite a decade of effort. Even as Wagner was announcing a successful end to their mission, al-Qaeda associated insurgents of the Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM) were driving a FAMa garrison from their base at Boulkessi (central Mali) in a two-day attack (RFI, June 8).

Boulkessi (France24)

While the transition from Wagner to Africa Corps went smoothly in most parts of Africa with a Russian military presence, there was a degree of resistance among some Wagner personnel in Mali against coming under formal control of the Russian defense ministry. Most Wagnerites have been absorbed into the Africa Corps, while those unwilling to sign new contracts will likely be returned to Russia (Al-Jazeera, June 16).

During its three and a half years in Mali, the PMC claimed to have eliminated “four leaders of terrorist organizations, thousands of militants and 11 of their strongholds… leaving behind a stable and safe environment” (Kommersant, June 6).  According to pro-Kremlin media: “Thousands of terrorists have been neutralized. Bases and strongholds of radical gangs have been destroyed. The remnants of the groups have been pushed back into the desert, where they are deprived of infrastructure and resources” (Lenta.ru, June 6).

In reality, Wagner/FAMA forces have suffered repeated ambushes over the last year and attacks have begun to spread into central and even heavily-populated southern Mali (Militarnyi, June 16).  The junta blames the increasing tempo of anti-government attacks on alleged French sponsorship of terrorists and separatists. On June 17, Malian spokesman Colonel-Major Souleymane Dembélé referred obliquely to the former colonial power when he stated: “Remember this statement by a Chief of Staff of a former partner country who said they would return in another form… Those who have financed terrorism for years are revealing themselves today, mobilizing, rearming, and financing armed groups to sow terror and discredit our forces” (Le Matin [Bamako], June 19). The officers that took power in 2021 believe the Tuareg of northern Mali gained too much autonomy in a 2015 peace agreement and became too close to French military forces operating against Islamist terrorists in the region.

Russian Military Equipment Arrives in Bamako (DefenceWeb)

Russia’s defense ministry appears to be preparing for larger military operations in Mali. A large shipment of armored vehicles and other materiel arrived in Bamako in January after being shipped through the Guinean port of Conakry. Among the vehicles were BMD infantry fighting vehicles, T-72B3 tanks, BTR-80/82A armored personnel carriers (APCs), Lens armored cars, Spartak armored vehicles and Tigr armored vehicles (Militarnyi, January 18). Further weaponry arrived on May 31 for Africa Corps use, including 122mm and 152mm howitzers, a BTR electronic warfare APC, more Spartak armored vehicles, tanker trucks and transport trucks (Kanal 13/Youtube, June 10; RFI, June 20).

Crash of the SU-24M

Mali is proving a challenging setting for Russian military aviation. An Africa Corps SU-24M bomber made an emergency landing in the Niger River on June 14, allegedly due to the effects of a sandstorm, though it was also reported to have taken fire from insurgents (MaliActu, June 14; IntelliNews, June 18). In October 2022, a newly-delivered SU-25 fighter crashed near Gao on its return from a mission, killing its Russian pilot (Defenceweb, October 5, 2022). Its replacement also crashed near Gao in September 2023, possibly after being fired on by insurgents who had attacked the Gao airport the day before (Military Africa, September 11, 2023). Malian fixed-wing air assets have now been reduced to four L-39 jet trainers supplied in August 2022 (IntelliNews, June 18; Defenceweb, October 5, 2022).

Wagner and FAMa have been accused of brutality and massacres of civilians in their conduct of the counter-insurgency. A broad investigation carried out by a European journalist collective revealed a pattern of abuse by Wagner personnel that included “kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, no contact with the outside world, and systematic torture—sometimes to the point of death.” At least six Wagner-operated detention centers were identified, all located within FAMa bases (France24, June 12). [1]  Stills and video of atrocities and potential war crimes by Wagner and FAMa personnel have been shared on social media channels, leading to requests for an International Criminal Court investigation (Euronews, June 23).

The replacement of Wagner with the Africa Corps will be closely watched to see if it is accompanied by a change in methods and tactics, though it should be noted that most Africa Corps personnel are Wagner veterans. Atrocities and other abuses will now be the responsibility of the Russian Defense Ministry, with the deniability of Wagner now gone. There has been speculation that the shift to Africa Corps from Wagner might mean a shift from the latter’s use of extreme violence, but the methods used by Russian Defense Ministry troops in Ukraine do not encourage this belief.

In the pattern of cyclical rebellions everywhere, a rebellious people become increasingly open to more extreme ideology, in this case the adoption of Salafi-Jihadism by a people for whom such concepts were until recently unthinkable. The methods of Russian contractors and FAMa troops encourage recruitment by religious extremists and seem part of an effort to secure a realistically unattainable military solution to the latest round of rebellions that have consumed northern Mali since independence from France in 1960.

Though the Africa Corps may prefer to focus on a training mission, the current pace of attacks on FAMa and Russian targets may compel further and even larger combat missions. The influx of Russian arms and armor seems to indicate that preparation for this scenario is underway.

Note

  1. The Viktoriia Project is a collective named in memory of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who died in Russian captivity in 2024 after investigating the illegal detention of civilians in Russian-occupied Ukraine.