Russia Increasing Military Presence in Africa by Reviving Desert Airbase in the Libyan Sahara

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

April 17, 2025

Executive Summary: 

  • Russia’s rehabilitation of an abandoned airbase in the Libyan desert offers an opportunity to create a reliable line of supply to Russian forces operating in West Africa.
  • A Russian military presence close to the borders of Egypt, Sudan, and Chad could make Moscow a player in regional politics and security activities.
  • Moscow continues to feel its way through a complex system of regional rivalries and alliances that leaves it open to counter-moves by interested parties in the West.

One of former Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s greatest foreign policy failures was undoubtedly his 1980s attempt to use his Soviet-armed military to spread Libyan rule and influence in the African Sahel region. Now, Russia is focused on a similar effort in the Sahel, using the same remote airbase in south-eastern Libya that Qaddafi used to launch his offensive into neighboring Chad. The airbase at Matan al-Sarra is the latest addition to a network of Libyan bases hosting Russian military operations and arms shipments. These include al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, and al-Qardabiya (Middle East Eye, July 10, 2023; Libya Observer, January 15).

Matan al-Sarra Airbase

Matan al-Sarra is close to the historically strategic Kufra region, a series of small oases (see Terrorism Monitor, February 23, 2012, April 6, 2018; May 5, 2011). Today, Kufra is an important staging point for illegal African migrants making for the Mediterranean coast and ultimately Europe (Libyan News Agency, April 7).

Kufra and the rest of south-eastern Libya is now controlled by self-appointed “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar, commander of the so-called “Libyan National Army” (LNA, a.k.a. Libyan Arab Armed Forces). LNA is a composite force of militias, mercenaries, tribal groups, and more formal military formations supporting one of the two rival governments in Libya, the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (MENA Research Center, August 19, 2024; AIS Special Report, November 14, 2017).

Haftar’s 2020 Russian-backed attempt to seize Tripoli and bring Libya under his sole control with the aid of Wagner Group mercenaries was a failure, owing in part to the Government of National Accord’s​​ (GNA) effective use of Turkish drones (see EDM, June 11, 2020, March 12, 2024). Rather than drop his alliance with Russia, Haftar instead decided to intensify relations with Moscow in the hope of obtaining more advanced weapons and other military materiel. Permitting Russian use of the airbase in south-eastern Cyrenaïca is part of this process.

Mobile Chadian Troops in the Toyota War, 1988

Before receiving support from Moscow for his military campaigns in Libya, Haftar had a history of cooperating with the United States. In 1987, after losing a military campaign as the then-commander of Libyan forces in Chad, Haftar was captured and disowned by Qaddafi (Libya Tribune, October 29, 2022; al-Arabiya, May 24, 2014). Valuable specimens of Soviet aircraft and radar abandoned by the Libyans were recovered from the battlefield by a US Special Operations group, temporarily damaging Libyan relations with Moscow (ARSOF, March 2022). By 1990, Haftar had agreed to move to the United States with 300 other Libyan prisoners, where he became a U.S. citizen and alleged asset for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its efforts to overthrow Qaddafi, who continued to be backed by the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991 (Libya Tribune, October 31, 2022; France24.com, May 19, 2014; al-Arabiya, May 24, 2014). Haftar returned to Libya in 2011, where he established a power base in Cyrenaïca against the internationally recognized Tripoli-based GNA, which controls most of northwestern Libya (Tripolitania) with the military assistance of Türkiye.

US Chinook Slings an Abandoned Russian-Made Libyan Mi-24 Hind from the Chadian Desert, June 11, 1988

The new six square kilometer (2.3 square mile) base at Matan al-Sarra will provide a refueling stop for Russian aircraft heading into areas of West Africa where the Russian Africa Corps is active. It is located close to the Egyptian and Sudanese borders. Most importantly, the base lies just north of Libya’s border with Chad, the latest target for Russian influence since the recent withdrawal of French and U.S. military forces stationed there. Chad’s discontent with the West follows sustained Russian influence operations and the perceived inability of its Western allies to provide effective military aid in the struggle against regional Islamist insurgencies (see EDM, June 25, 2024). Kremlin objectives in Africa are furthered by an influence and propaganda campaign that uses regional influencers and social media to encourage belief in Russia as a viable and sympathetic alternative to the West for economic and security partnerships  (Le Monde, August 6, 2023; RUSI Europe, October 25, 2023; MLM, December 4, 2019).

Troops of the LNA’s Tariq bin Zayid Battalion

Russia began transferring Syrian troops and contractors to Matan al-Sarra last December, where they were engaged alongside Russian personnel in repair and reconstruction efforts at the long-neglected base (The New Arab, January 28). Once a means of projecting Libyan power south into Chad and Sudan, the base lost its raison d’être in 2011 and was abandoned when Qaddafi’s death ended Libyan designs on the African interior. The region around the base, the supply line from Tobruk, and the route to Sudan have been secured by the LNA’s Tariq bin Ziyad Battalion, under the command of one of Khalifa Haftar’s sons, Saddam Haftar (Libya Observer, January 15). With daily temperature highs of over 90 degrees Fahrenheit (32 degrees Celsius) for six months of the year and almost zero annual precipitation, service at the isolated base will likely be considered a hardship posting for Russian personnel.

Russian operatives have been in contact with local tribal communities in the region to form useful alliances (Libya Observer, January 15). The area around Matan al-Sarra is dominated by the Tubu, the so-called “Black nomads of the Sahara” (as described by French soldier and ethnologist Jean Chapelle in his 1958 work Nomades noirs du Sahara) who were displaced from Kufra in the 1840s by their Arab rivals, the Zuwaya. Russian personnel will likely attempt to curry the favor of both groups as aligning with one against the other would create unwanted turmoil and insecurity.

A Russian presence at Matan al-Sarra would provide Moscow with the ability to ship arms to Sudanese or Chadian territory quietly. Even though Moscow has shifted most of its support in the Sudan conflict from the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the rival Sudanese Armed Forces/Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF/TSC), its forces in Libya do not appear to be interfering with Khalifa Haftar’s supply of arms and vehicles to the RSF (Middle East Eye, January 25, 2024; Agenzia Nova [Rome], January 17). Moscow likely wishes to avoid alienating the RSF and lose an opportunity to establish influence in a possible RSF-ruled state in Darfur, the home of most RSF fighters (Sudan Tribune, March 4).

Moscow’s overtures to the Chadian military regime are complicated by Moscow’s attempt to play both sides of the Sudanese conflict (see EDM, July 8, 2024). In late March, the SAF command declared that Chadian airports at N’Djamena and Amdjarras are now “legitimate targets for the Sudanese Armed Forces” following allegations that Chad is using them to forward arms from the United Arab Emirates to RSF forces inside Sudan (Middle East Eye, January 25, 2024; AFP, March 24).

Russian contractors have been heavily involved in gold-mining operations across the border in Sudanese Darfur to help pay for its war against Ukraine and may seek to expand into the Tubu-controlled Kalanga region (450 kilometers (280 miles) south-west of Kufra) in the foothills of the Tibesti Mountains along the border with Chad (Agenzia Nova [Rome], January 23). Chadian forces carried out airstrikes in the region last summer against Chadian rebels gathering there after working as mercenaries in Libya (Libya Security Monitor, August 22, 2024). The strikes came at the same time as Major General Hassan Matuq al-Zama led the LNA’s 128th Reinforced Brigade in operations to secure the border with Niger and Chad and to displace armed groups in Kalanga involved in smuggling and gold mining (Libya Review, August 19, 2024; Atalyar [Madrid], August 21, 2024).

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (Libya Observer)

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been working in the last year to develop relations with Khalifa Haftar and encourage military unification in Libya to discourage Libyan partnerships with Russia. In late February, AFRICOM conducted training exercises in Libya involving U.S. B-52H Stratofortress bombers and Libyan military forces representing both rival Libyan governments designed to promote Libyan military unification while simultaneously slowing the growth of Russian influence (Libya Observer, March 4; Agenzia Nova, March 7). The exercise came amid regular contacts between Haftar and Russian deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (responsible for Russian African Corps operations) and a growing number of Russians stationed at the LNA-controlled Brak al-Shati airbase in central Libya (Defense News, March 14). 

Russian operations in Africa continue to be characterized by a certain diplomatic inconsistency that may be due in part to inexperience in the region and unfamiliarity with the motives and methods of their would-be partners. Besides trying to keep a foot in both camps in the Sudan conflict, Moscow continues to attempt to develop relations with the Tripoli-based GNA, which only encourages Khalifa Haftar to leave himself open to U.S. overtures. A failure to make firm and visible commitments makes Kremlin strategic policy in the region a work in progress, susceptible to local manipulation as well as countermoves by Russia’s global rivals.

What Motivated Islamic State’s Mosque Attack in Muscat?

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 23(1), Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

March 25, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Islamic State (IS) militants conducted a well-planned strike in Oman on a Shi’ite mosque on July 15, 2024. While early reports focused on the attack’s potential goal of inciting sectarian violence, it is more likely to have been meant as a warning to Muscat to cease diplomatic activities involving regional governments, Shi’ite groups, and/or the West.
  • Oman’s peace with regard to jihadism is deep-rooted in local Ibadi Muslim traditions. Muscat’s tolerance has enabled it to serve as a diplomatic hub, facilitating negotiations between the United States and Iran as well as Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Islamic State (IS) militants struck a Shi’ite mosque in Oman on July 15, 2024, scything down dozens of worshipers while hundreds of others stampeded in a desperate effort to evade an unexpected hail of bullets (see Terrorism Monitor, August 21, 2024). The attack on Muscat’s ‘Ali bin Abi Talib mosque puzzled many observers of the Middle East, as sectarian violence is nearly unknown in Oman, where most citizens, rather than being Sunni or Shi’ite, follow the relatively little-known and non-aggressive Ibadi school of Islam.

The Shi’ite mosque, on the fringe of Muscat, the Omani capital, has a mainly Pakistani congregation. Oman is a nation of four million people, of whom 40 percent are expatriate workers, mostly from South Asia. Though 400,000 of these are Pakistanis, Pakistan’s ambassador to Oman declared the attack was not “a Pakistan-targeted operation” (Times of Oman, July 17, 2024).

When the shooting began in the evening, nearly 500 people were assembled in the courtyard. Most worshipers were able to rush inside the mosque before a policeman gave his life closing the doors. Five other people were killed, including four Pakistanis and one Indian national. At least three of the dead died trying to shield children from the gunfire with their bodies (The National [Abu Dhabi], July 23, 2024). Some 30 were wounded, including emergency services personnel (Muscat Daily, July 16, 2024).

‘Ali bin Abi Talib Mosque in Muscat (Agenzia Nova)

Many survivors credited the action of the Royal Oman Police in preventing a massacre: “If not for the counter-firing by security officials stationed around the mosque, the tragedy would have been unimaginable” (Times of Oman, July 16, 2024). Most of the mosque attendees had been rescued by 2:15 AM, but a firefight between the attackers and security services continued well into the morning.

IS timed the attack to occur on Ashura, the Shi’ite day of mourning for Husayn bin ‘Ali. He was the grandson of Muhammad who refused to recognize the Umayyad succession to the Caliphate in the seventh century and was consequently killed at the Battle of Karbala. Hatred of the Shi’a was likely only a means of inciting the attackers as a geopolitical strategy was unlikely to inspire the kind of fanaticism necessary to slaughter innocents. The timing of the attack thus inflicted religious insult while provoking a maximum emotional impact on the targeted worshipers.

Islamic State’s Attackers in Oman

On July 18, 2024, IS released a three-minute video through its Amaq news agency of the three self-styled “soldiers of the Islamic State” who carried out the attack. The three native Omani brothers were, according to the Royal Oman Police, “influenced by others and had misguided ideas” (Times of Oman, July 18, 2024; Al-Watan [Muscat], July 18, 2024). The brothers are likely to have had ties to the Islamic State in Yemen Province (ISYP), whose homeland in Yemen borders Oman.

The Islamic State Attackers (Amaq)

The video was filmed outdoors in front of an apparently homemade, spray-painted IS black flag. After calling on young Arab Muslims to combat “apostates” and “tyrants,” the speaker declared their attack would avenge both Sunni jihadists held in various Shi’a prisons and the reputation of Aisha, who is “the mother of believers” and the Prophet Muhammad’s third wife. [1] 

The Omani perpetrators, who were likely Salafist Sunnis, made reference to Ibadism as a sectarian form of Islam in their video. Sunni militants condemn the Shi’a as rawafidh (“rejectionists,” i.e., of the first three caliphs, the successors of Muhammad). Most of the Sunni Muslims of southern Oman belong to the moderate Shafi’i madhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence), considered to be relatively infertile ground for religious extremism. Aside from their evident loathing for Oman’s long-accepted Shi’ite community, the attackers have thus also demonstrated an intolerance uncommon to Oman’s dominant Sunni faith.

Given the bloodshed in Gaza, the gunmen further explained that jihad did not need to only target Jews on behalf of “Palestine,” but must also strike at “polytheists” (a derogatory Salafist term for Shi’ites). The video concluded with the militants pledging allegiance to Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the fifth caliph (since August 2023) of IS’s so-called Islamic caliphate.

Islamic State “Caliph” Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quraishi

The attack showed a significant degree of planning, with the assailants taking positions behind floodlights on the roof of a neighboring building. This provided a full view of their targets while preventing a precise location of their shifting positions. Chanting “You non-believers, this is your end,” they engaged Omani police and soldiers for ten hours before their deaths (The National [Abu Dhabi], July 17, 2024).

Background to Tolerance

The empire-building Portuguese arrived in Oman in 1507, unleashing seamen recruited from the prisons of Lisbon on Muscat and other ports. Using extreme brutality to make up for inferior numbers, the Portuguese burned the mosques and mutilated or killed those Arabs who resisted. [2] However, under nearly 150 years of Portuguese rule, Oman became a regional trading center, attracting migration from India, Iran, and other points. In this way, Oman emerged as a multi-faith, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural bastion once the despised Portuguese were run out by the Ibadi Imams with Dutch and British naval assistance.

“Al-Jalali,” Portuguese Fort, Muscat (Andries Oudshoorn)

Oman’s commanding position on the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea, with the latter’s connections to the Indian Ocean, has provided historical ties through seafaring traders and merchants to many parts of Asia, east Africa, and the Middle East. The result is that, despite its isolationist reputation, Oman is home to a variety of languages, ethnicities, and faiths, including Islam and Hinduism. Oman’s majority Muslim population is roughly split between Ibadis and Sunnis, with the Shi’a forming a smaller community representing some 5 percent of the population.

This exposure to other cultures and intellectual trends, combined with the moderate nature of Ibadi Islam, created in Oman a tolerant and diverse society that has largely escaped the religious and ethnic fissures that have so troubled its neighbors in recent decades.

Who Are the Ibadis?

The Ibadis are believed to be an offshoot of the early Islamic Kharijite movement, which fought a long war against Muslim rulers they accused of violating Islamic law. A focus on asceticism and egalitarianism brought many followers to the Kharijite ranks from the nomadic Bedouin and the mawali, who are non-Arab converts to Islam (including many Berbers). In 692, ‘Abd Allah bin Ibad created a more moderate but socially conservative breakaway version of the inflexible Khawarij movement that was prepared to live in harmony with other Muslims. This movement came to be known as Ibadism after its founder.

Oman’s Ibadi Muslims generally do not pursue the spread of their madhab. For example, during the long period of direct Omani rule over Zanzibar (1698–1861), little if any effort was made to convert East Africans to Ibadi Islam. [3] Ibadis do not seek the establishment of a global caliphate nor the territorial expansion of Islam.

Outside of Oman, Ibadis are found in smaller numbers in the Tunisian island of Djerba, in the Berber community of Libya’s Nafusa Mountains, and in the Berber Mzab Valley region of Algeria, where the Ibadis played a major role in facilitating the trans-Saharan African slave trade. The Omanis also had a long presence in Zanzibar and East Africa as merchants and slave traders, creating over the years a new class of Afro–Omanis whose most prominent member was the slaver and explorer Tippu Tib (1837–1905).

The Omani Reaction

Expressing his shock that Omanis carried out the attack in IS’s name, Oman’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili, insisted that: “The norm in this good country is that Omani education rejects, by nature, any aggression against a citizen or expatriate due to an intellectual or sectarian disagreement” (IQNA [Tehran], July 19, 2024).

In contrast, one leading Omani commentator suggested responsibility for the attack lay with the United States, claiming that IS was created and directed in Washington, D.C. (Oman Daily, July 21). [4] Suspicion of American and Israeli direction of IS is common in the Middle East, especially due to IS’s focus on attacking fellow Muslims and its reluctance or inability to target Israel or Israeli interests. In Oman, a familiar but bitter joke made the rounds after the mosque massacre: Q. “When will Islamic State attack the Israelis?” A. “As soon as they convert to Islam.”

Another Omani commentator warned of the complacency created by popular belief in an “imagined Omani… tolerant, peaceful, innocent, a silent citizen…” a vision that ignores Omani society’s “many molds related to religious and political beliefs, ideas, and visions” (Oman Daily, July 22, 2024). Others, meanwhile, questioned why individuals “who have received qualitative education, hold high-level academic degrees from prestigious universities and hold lucrative jobs slip into such dangerous pitfalls” (Oman Daily, July 21, 2024). Only a handful of Omanis are known to have participated in jihadist movements since the 1990s.

The Jihadist Response

An editorial published in IS’s official magazine al-Naba condemned Oman for its good relations with Iran and called for the states of the Arabian Peninsula to expel all Shi’a to end their “cancerous infiltration.” The editorial further accused Oman’s “apostate” government of “throwing open the doors” of Oman to the Shi’a, despite their centuries-long presence there. [5] Al-Naba further accused Oman’s government of creating, through toleration, an equivalency between Sunnis and Ibadis as well as Shi’a and pagans.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Jordanian Salafist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading jihadist theorist, unfavorably contrasted the IS’s attack on a “remote and marginal” Shi’a mosque in Oman with the successful and strategic efforts of Shi’a groups like Hezbollah and the Yemen-based Houthis against the “Jews and Crusaders.” He mentioned the July 19, 2024, Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv, in particular. According to al-Maqdisi, “only a mentally ill person” would prioritize attacks on Shi’a non-combatants over strikes on Jews and Christians. [6] 

Conclusion 

To understand the attack on the ‘Ali bin Abi Talib mosque in Muscat, it is necessary to recognize what caused this IS cell to be activated at this time. Though it is entirely possible for cells, like lone wolf terrorists, to self-activate, it seems unlikely in this case. The Middle East (and even Oman) abounds with more valuable targets than an obscure mosque frequented by Pakistani expats. The slaughter of a handful of worshippers by a dedicated team of jihadists willing to give their lives will not drive the Shi’a from Oman, nor is it likely to encourage other Omanis to take up the cause of IS. Hatred of the Shi’a was likely only a means of inciting the attackers, as geopolitical strategy was unlikely to inspire the kind of fanaticism necessary to slaughter innocents.

Though Oman has been described as a mediator in Middle East conflicts, its role is better described as facilitation, offering a discrete venue for antagonists to pass messages or engage in direct talks without Omani involvement. Conducted out of sight of the media, these back-channel negotiations often yield positive results.

Despite pressure from its Sunni neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula, Oman has maintained good relations with Shi’ite Iran and acted as a facilitator in Iranian contacts with Saudi Arabia and the United States. On May 19, 2024, the Iranian mission to the UN confirmed that Oman was hosting ongoing indirect talks between the United States and Iran (Iran International, May 19, 2024). Oman has similarly facilitated talks between the Iran-backed Houthi movement and its Saudi antagonists (Al Jazeera, July 24). On July 19, 2024, IS condemned all these communications, claiming the “infidel” powers were encouraged by Oman to unite in a war against it. [7] 

If IS wished to warn off Oman from further facilitation of negotiations benefitting Shi’ite Iran and the Zaydi Shi’ite Houthi movement, the apparently pointless targeting of a Shi’a mosque in Muscat begins to make sense. Rather than being an attempt to sow sectarian discord, the attack on the ‘Ali bin Abi Talib mosque can more reasonably be interpreted as a warning to Oman to cease diplomatic activities involving Iran and its so-called proxies.

Notes: 

[1] This extraordinarily long quarrel dates back to the lifetime of Aisha bint Abu Bakr (614–678), the Prophet Muhammad’s third wife. The daughter of Abu Bakr, first of the Rashidun (rightly guided) caliphs (the first four successors of Muhammad), she gained the eternal ire of the Shi’a for opposing the succession of ‘Ali, the last of the Rashidun and the first Imam of the Shi’a. In Shi’a discourse, she is condemned for her political involvement as a female and her alleged dislike of the Ahl al-Bayt (family of the Prophet).

[2] Roger Crowley, Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire, London, 2015, pp. 196–198.

[3] Ahmed al-Ismaili: “Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Pluralism in Oman: The Link with Political Stability, Al Muntaqa 1(3), December 2018, pp. 58–73. After Oman ended direct rule in 1856, Zanzibar continued to be ruled by local Omani Arabs as the Sultanate of Zanzibar until it was made a British protectorate in 1890. Sovereign Arab rule was restored when the British terminated the protectorate in 1963, but massacres of Arabs and Indians during the leftist 1964 Zanzibar Revolution brought a final end to Omani rule.

[4] On August 11, 2016, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump insisted: “ISIS is honoring President Obama. He is the founder of ISIS. He’s the founder of ISIS, OK? He’s the founder. He founded ISIS. And I would say, the co-founder would be crooked Hillary Clinton” (CBS, August 11, 2016). The following day the candidate was given numerous opportunities by a friendly interviewer to walk back a literal interpretation of his statement, but chose instead to double down: “No, I meant [President Obama] is the founder of ISIS. I do… No, it’s no mistake” (hughhewitt.com, August 12, 2016).

[5] Al-Naba no. 452, July 19, 2024

[6] Telegram, via BBCM, July 20, 2024

[7] Al-Naba no. 452, July 19, 2024

Credibility of Russia’s Red Sea Naval Facility Agreement with Sudan

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Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 22, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Moscow is pursuing the construction of a naval port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, reflected in the finalization of an agreement between Russia and Sudan in February.
  • The deal appears to be part of the Kremlin’s efforts to create new strategic assets in Africa following the loss of air and naval bases in Syria.
  • The elected government of Sudan’s inability to ratify the agreement reflects the salience of domestic and international opposition to a changed security situation on this vital maritime trade route.

Russia and the leading faction in Sudan’s ongoing civil war have reportedly finalized an agreement to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast. Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, there may be no more strategically important body of water in the world than the Red Sea. Access to the sea, which carries 10 to 12 percent of global trade on its waters, is gained only through the Egyptian-controlled canal to the north and the narrow Bab al-Mandab strait to the south (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed March 4). So far, no state outside of the region has established a naval base between the canal and Bab al-Mandab since the departure of the British from Sudan’s primary Red Sea port, Port Sudan, in 1956. That appeared to change on February 12 with the announcement that an agreement had been reached to construct a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.

The announcement was made by Dr. ‘Ali Yusuf Sharif, appointed in November 2024 as nominal foreign minister by Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, whose faction controls most of Sudan. During a televised press conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, Sharif said “This is an easy question, there are no obstacles, we are in complete agreement” (Izvestiya, February 12; Al Arabiya; Atalayar, February 13). After the meeting, Lavrov expressed his appreciation for the “balanced and constructive position” taken by Sudan on the situation in Ukraine (TASS, February 12). There has been no confirmation from Moscow of the official signing of this deal.

‘Ali Yusuf Sharif and Sergei Lavrov

Since 2017, Moscow and Khartoum, represented by the since-deposed Sudanese president, ‘Omar al-Bashir, have discussed the creation of a Russian naval base in Sudan (See EDM, December 6, 2017). A preliminary agreement, forming the basis for the current pact, was developed in 2020 but never implemented. This original agreement includes a 25-year lease with a possible ten-year extension (Uz Daily, November 15, 2020).

Moscow holds a vested interest in establishing a naval base in this region, especially as the future of its naval base in Tartus, Syria remains uncertain (Military Review, December 11, 2024; Izvestiya, January 22). The primary function of Russia’s new “logistical base,” as it is described by Moscow, is to repair and replenish up to four Russian naval craft at a time, including nuclear-powered vessels. The base will house up to 300 personnel, with an option to increase this number with Sudan’s permission (TASS, February 12; Sudan Tribune, February 12). Russia will be responsible for air defense and internal security, while Sudan will provide external security in tandem with temporary Russian defensive positions outside the base. Russia will be at liberty to import and export weapons, munitions, and military material to and from the base (Vreme, February 13).

Sukhoi Su—25 Aircraft (Military Africa)

The completion of the deal may open the possibility for Sudan to purchase Russian-built SU-30 and SU-35 fighter jets, which it has sought since 2017 (Sudan Tribune, July 16, 2024). The sale has been complicated by an inability to finalize the port offer, U.S. sanctions on Russian manufacturers, and Sudan’s difficulty in making payments. Oil-rich Algeria, by comparison, has just completed a deal to obtain 14 fifth-generation Russian SU-57 stealth fighters (Janes.com, February 14).

Cooperation with Russia is also attractive to Sudan given Khartoum’s need to secure oil exports on its coast. Port Sudan serves as the export point for Sudan’s troubled oil industry, now operating at only slightly more than 40 percent of pre-war production. Sudan’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MOP) is currently discussing a new partnership with Russia related to exploration, financing, and technical assistance (Sudan Tribune, January 25). In November 2024, MOP Minister Dr. Muhyaddin Na’im Muhammad Sa’id met with his Russian counterpart in Moscow to discuss prospects for joint projects and attractive areas for Russian companies to invest in oil and gas exploration (Sudan News Agency, November 16, 2024). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formerly Sudan’s main energy partner. According to one Sudanese economic expert, “the [civil] war has changed this equation” in favor of gaining expertise, especially related to oil extraction, from Russia (Sudan Tribune, January 25).

Sudan Began to Run Out of Fuel, Medicines and Wheat When Beja Protests Closed Port Sudan in 2021 (AFP)

For Russia, there is a risk in initiating the construction of an expensive naval facility during a period of continued instability in Sudan. There is also the question of overland supply from Khartoum to Port Sudan, which essentially follows a single highway that has been blocked in the past by Beja protestors (New Arab, October 27, 2021; see EDM, November 14, 2023). To mitigate such risks, Sudan appears to be trying to follow the “Djibouti approach” to hosting foreign military bases. Djibouti currently hosts separate French, Chinese, U.S., Italian, and Japanese military facilities while U.K. forces are hosted at the U.S. facility (see EDM, July 8, 2024). According to Sharif, the new Russian base in Sudan, like those in Djibouti, will not pose a threat to the sovereignty of its neighbors nor Sudan itself (Anadolu Ajansi, February 13).

There are, however, major and ongoing differences between the military and civil components of the de facto government in Port Sudan that could sideline Russian ambitions in the Red Sea. Sharif’s claim that there were “no obstacles” to implementing the agreement is not necessarily correct. There is broad opposition to the unelected leaders of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) making a deal with major implications for Sudanese sovereignty (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, 2023). As the deal cannot presently be ratified by any elected body in Sudan, there is a strong possibility that a future government (elected or otherwise) might reject the deal entirely as having no legal legitimacy. The January 20 cancellation of Russia’s 2017 49-year lease on the port of Tartus by the new Syrian regime provides an exemplary lesson on such a danger (Maritime Executive, January 21).

Another approach the Sudanese leadership may use to mitigate security risks, and in turn, may increase Russia’s attraction to creating a naval base in the country, is via deliberate changes in government representation. The de facto leader of Sudan is Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, chair of the unelected Transitional Sovereignty Council and commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Al-Burhan’s government is now located in Port Sudan rather than war-torn Khartoum. Al-Burhan differs from previous leaders, as he has attempted to garner support from eastern Sudan, a traditionally impoverished area with little influence or representation in the central government. Most of the rebellions, coups, and civil conflicts that have plagued Sudan since independence and effectively prevented its successful development have been sparked by the inequality, domination, and monopolization of power. Since eastern Sudan has been dominated since independence by the Arab Nubian elites of northern and central Sudan, al-Burhan’s emphasis on involving eastern Sudan in his government represents a measure to prevent future coups or conflict. One of the figures who will likely be involved in establishing a Russian naval base in Sudan is ‘Umar Banfir, the new trade minister. Banfir is the former director of Sudan’s Sea Ports Authority and is expected to represent eastern interests to the government (Jordan Times, November 4, 2024).

Sanctions imposed by the United States on the SAF and al-Burhan personally in the last days of the Biden Administration appear correlated with al-Burhan’s renewed interest in securing the naval base deal with Russia (US Treasury Department, October 24, 2024; US Department of State, January 16; US Treasury Department, January 25).

Meanwhile, there is little evidence to suggest that the new Trump administration will impose additional sanctions or attempt to restrict Sudan’s pursuit of a new deal with Russia given the previous removal of sanctions under the first Trump administration (Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2017). Nearby Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain firmly opposed to the deal (Sudan Tribune, July 16, 2024).

Domestic political opposition, foreign objections, tribal unrest, and local fears that a Russian base might attract attacks from rivals, which in turn could damage or shut down Sudan’s most important port, remain considerable threats to the construction of a Russian naval facility in Port Sudan. These considerations also threaten Russian attempts to reinvigorate Sudan’s oil production, which has been declining for years due to a lack of investment and civil conflict. While the Russian naval base deal in Sudan holds strategic potential for Moscow, its success hinges on overcoming these political, domestic, and regional challenges.

Iran’s Red Sea Strategy Amid the RSF–SAF Fratricidal War in Sudan

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 22(11), Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

December 11, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Iran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with drones and other weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” This has given rise to concerns that Tehran desires to establish a naval facility in Sudan.
  • In combination with the Iran-friendly Houthi movement in Yemen, such a base would offer a point from which Iran could further threaten Red Sea shipping as well as the main maritime entry point for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.
  • Iran–Sudan relations have fluctuated over the last several decades, especially since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir. In particular, tensions stemming from Sudan’s Sunni-majority population and Iran’s promotion of Shi’ism tend to place a limit on Tehran–Khartoum ties.
  • Despite official denials, Iran is suspected of either attempting to establish a naval facility on Sudan’s Red Sea coast or gain access to preexisting ports there given the strategic advantages offered by doing so. Doing so may represent a bridge too far for U.S.–Sudan relations, which Khartoum has spent years working to improve.

A supporter of the Palestinian cause since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has adopted an aggressive stance in response to Israel’s offensive on Gaza. As part of a strategy to assert itself regionally, Tehran has taken advantage of its proximity to the Red Sea, one of the world’s most important trade conduits, to apply pressure on Israel and its Western backers. With the Iran-friendly Houthi movement in Yemen installed near the narrow Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, Iran is taking a new interest in Sudan and its 465-mile Red Sea coastline. To this end, Tehran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with potentially game-changing weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” This raises two questions: What does Tehran want in return? And is it likely to get it?

Sudan’s Relations with Iran

In the 1990s, Iran enjoyed a close relationship with the Islamist military regime of President Omar al-Bashir. He welcomed Iranian technical and diplomatic support in his effort to create a more Islamic state and defeat South Sudanese separatists. Many of the Islamists who were ejected from power after al-Bashir’s overthrow in 2019 now support General al-Burhan’s SAF.

Relations with Iran were cut in January 2016 when Khartoum sided with Saudi Arabia after a mob attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran in reaction to the execution of top Saudi Shi’ite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr and 46 others on January 2, 2016 (Press TV [Tehran], February 5). Al-Bashir’s government then turned to Iran’s Arab rivals in the Gulf states for support. During this time, Sudanese troops (mostly RSF) fought alongside Saudi forces against the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen.

Sudanese Troops in Yemen (AFP)

The centuries-old Sunni–Shi’ite religious divide complicates relations between Sunni Sudan and Shi’ite Iran. After al-Bashir downgraded relations with Iran in 2014, he made it clear the move was made in reaction to alleged attempts by Iranian diplomats to spread Shi’ism in Sudan: “We do not know Shi’ite Islam. We are Sunnis. We have enough problems and conflicts and we do not accept introducing a new element of conflict in Sudanese society” (Sudan Tribune, January 31, 2016).

A March 2023 Saudi–Iranian rapprochement brokered by Beijing allowed Khartoum to make its own move to renew relations with Tehran. The shift was welcomed at the time by Hemetti, who had risen from a minor member of the notorious Janjaweed militia to commander of the RSF paramilitary (X/@Generaldagllo, March 10, 2023). When the renewal of diplomatic relations was made official in October 2023, one of Tehran’s most immediate concerns was Sudan’s growing relationship with Israel through the U.S.-backed Abraham Accords (Sudan Tribune, October 9, 2023).

The Israel Issue in Sudan–Iran Relations

‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali, Sudan’s acting minister of foreign affairs, met Iran’s late president, Ebrahim Raisi, in Tehran on February 5 to discuss their countries’ improved relationship. During the meeting, Raisi emphasized that the “criminal Zionist regime” could never be a friend to Islamic countries. Without mentioning Sudan by name, he condemned those Islamic nations that chose to pursue normalization of relations with Israel (Mehr News [Tehran], February 5).

Sudanese Foreign Minister ‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali (Osman Bakır – Anadolu Agency)

Following a law implemented in 1958, Sudanese leaders were forbidden from normalizing relations with Israel. The upheavals that followed the overthrow of President al-Bashir in 2019 provided an opening for the United States to bring Sudan into the Abraham Accords in exchange for a long-desired removal of American sanctions on Sudan. A member of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council, Admiral Ibrahim Jaber, rejected suggestions that relations with Iran spelled an end to the Accord, claiming that renewed relations with Iran would not affect diplomatic normalization with Israel: “We will pursue normalization when it benefits us and refrain from it otherwise” (Sudan Tribune, March 24).

On February 2, 2023, Sudan and Israel finalized a deal to normalize relations. Israel hoped the deal would facilitate the deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers, but the outbreak of hostilities in Sudan in mid-April 2023 put further developments in this area on hold (Haaretz, February 3, 2020). If Sudan grows closer to Iran, its commitment to the Abraham Accords—which were half-hearted at best, even before the Gaza offensive—is likely to wither on the vine.

Iran and al-Burhan

Iran’s support for al-Burhan and the SAF is assisted by the Sudanese army’s solidly Islamist officer corps (the result of repeated purges) and the backing of Islamist militias and leaders from the al-Bashir regime connected to the SAF. Despite the Sunni–Shi’a divide, Sudan’s Islamists have a long record of cooperation with Tehran. These ties in the past included Iranian military training for Sudan’s Popular Defense Forces. [1]

In return for arms, Iran will likely demand that Sudan cut its already damaged ties with Israel and abandon the Abraham Accords entirely. Israel has a long history of encouraging and arming conflicts within Sudan as a response to the opposition of successive regimes in Khartoum. In this tradition, acting foreign minister ‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali blamed Israel for encouraging the RSF during a January visit to Tehran (Press TV [Tehran], January 20). Sudanese officials have also suggested that Washington step in to halt the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) military support for the RSF before criticizing the SAF’s ties to Iran (Sudan Tribune, February 3).

Though relations between the UAE and Iran have shown signs of improvement over the last year, the issue of Sudan remains a point of contention, with the UAE being accused of providing weapons and financial support to the RSF. [2]

Iranian Drones and the Resurgence of the SAF

Wad al-Bashir Bridge, Omdurman (Sudan Tribune)

In March, coordinated tactics using drones, artillery, and infantry enabled the SAF to retake the old city area of Omdurman, the national radio and television headquarters, and the Wad al-Bashir Bridge, which is a vital supply link for the RSF. The success of this offensive is believed to be partly due to the arrival of modern Iranian drones (Al Jazeera, March 12; Radio Dabanga, March 17). The drones, which are also used to direct artillery strikes, operate out of the Wadi Sayidna base north of Omdurman. The RSF claims that the SAF receives air deliveries of Iranian drones twice a week out of Port Sudan (Reuters, April 10).

Iran began supplying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Sudan in 2008. This allowed the SAF to build a small arsenal of Ababil-3 drones, which have capabilities useful in the type of urban warfare common to the ongoing Sudanese conflict. Sudan also produces its own copy of the Ababil-3, known as the Zagil-3. Iranian Mohajer-class drones are also used by the SAF, with the latest in the series, the Mohajer-6, providing game-changing capabilities, including an arms payload of up to 150 kg (Military Africa, April 20, 2023).

Sudanese Zagil-3 Drone – variant of the Iranian Ababil-3 (Skyscrapercity.com)

First produced in 2018, the Mohajer-6 has a relatively low ceiling of 3.4 miles, which makes it vulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses. The drone has seen extensive use by Russia in its latest war against Ukraine. In mid-January, the RSF claimed to have shot down a Mohajer-6 drone in Khartoum State using a man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) (Military Africa, January 15). The RSF released photos of another downed Mohajer-6 in Omdurman on January 28 (X/@RSFSudan, January 28; Asharq al-Awsat, January 29; Radio Dabanga, January 29). Despite these public losses, the new Iranian drones have played an important role in restoring the SAF’s military credibility.

A Red Sea Port for Iran

Citing Ahmad Hassan Muhammad, “a senior Sudanese intelligence official” and alleged advisor to General al-Burhan, the Wall Street Journal reported on March 3 that Iran had unsuccessfully pressed Sudan for permission to establish an Iranian naval port on the Red Sea in exchange for advanced weapons, drones, and a seagoing helicopter carrier (Wall Street Journal, March 3). Former Sudanese foreign minister ‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali responded quickly and described the report as “incorrect,” saying “Iran has never asked Sudan to build an Iranian base. I recently visited Iran, and this was not discussed” (Sputnik [Moscow], March 4).

Other sources in Sudanese military intelligence suggested such an offer was likely never made, and its disclosure may have been a means for al-Burhan to express dissatisfaction with the lack of support the SAF has received from the international community (Asharq al-Awsat, March 4). An Iranian foreign ministry spokesman described the report as “baseless and politically motivated” (Radio Dabanga, March 5). SAF spokesman Brigadier General Nabil ‘Abd Allah refuted the claim as “absolutely untrue” and denied there was any advisor to al-Burhan bearing the name Ahmad Hassan Muhammad (Sudan Tribune, March 4).

Iranian Frigate IRIS Alborz

Despite the strong denials, it would be odd if Iran had not brought up the possibility of using a port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast behind closed doors, even if Iran had not asked to build a military base. An Iranian military base or port access on the western coast of the Red Sea—combined with Iran-friendly Houthis on the eastern side of the Red Sea—would make it easier for Tehran to have an armed presence along one of the world’s most important maritime routes. Iran has also recently operated three ships in and around the Red Sea. The first, operating in the Red Sea, is the IRIS Alborz, an Alvand-class British-built frigate launched in 1969 that has since been modernized. It is accompanied by the IRIS Beshehr, a Bandar Abbas-class replenishment vessel. The third is the MV Behshad, a cargo vessel believed to operate as a spy ship for Iran in the Gulf of Aden since 2021. The Behshad was alleged to have supplied information to Houthi missile groups from the Gulf of Aden but appears to have returned to Iran in April, simultaneous with a severe drop in Houthi missile attacks (Radio Dabanga, March 5; Alma Research and Education Center [Israel], April 24).

An Iranian presence would be discouraged by Egypt, which backs the SAF and has four naval ports of its own on the Red Sea. Russia, which has long sought a naval base on Sudan’s coast, would no doubt be displeased to see its Iranian ally take precedence. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran remain tense, and the Saudis would not be happy to see an Iranian naval base opposite its port of Jeddah, the main maritime entry point for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Sudan has its own concerns. As with a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, an Iranian base could attract unwanted military attention from other powers. Sudan cannot afford to have its only modern sea-based port and main inlet for trade damaged or destroyed through military action. The United States, believed to have carried out a crippling cyber-attack on the Behshad in February, would be almost certain to reimpose sanctions on Sudan should it provide a naval port to Iran.

Conclusion

Though its need for military support against the RSF is serious, Sudan’s government is likely to take a measured approach toward improving its relations with Iran. The SAF has no more public support than the RSF and is seen by many Sudanese as too deeply involved with the Islamists who wielded power in Sudan during the three decades of Omar al-Bashir’s unpopular regime. Sudan’s Islamists, proud Sunnis who are tightly tied to the transitional government, are poor candidates to become puppets of Shi’ite Iran. Sudan’s army (commanded by Sunni Islamists) is also unlikely to commit itself militarily to the pursuit of Iranian objectives. There is, of course, the possibility of an RSF victory in the ongoing struggle, but for now, the RSF has no presence in eastern Sudan and no ties to Iran.

Sudan has no interest in seeing damaging U.S. sanctions restored after spending years trying to convince Washington it is not a state sponsor of terrorism. Once the current conflict ends, Sudan will need help, not hindrance, in its reconstruction, and will need to look further than Iran for assistance. All these factors speak against the establishment of an Iranian naval facility in Sudan or a formal alliance. If, however, Iranian assistance brings about an SAF triumph, Tehran is certain to come calling for payment in some form.

Notes:

[1] Jago Salmon: A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2007, pp.17-18.

[2] Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, S/2024/65, January 15, 2024, pp. 14–15, 51–52.

Ukraine Targets Russian Forces in Sahel

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(169)

Washington DC, November 19, 2024

Executive summary:

  • Ukraine is alleged to be providing military equipment and training to the Tuareg separatist coalition CSP-DPA in its armed struggle against Russian-backed Malian government forces.
  • This support is framed as a strategic move by Ukraine to counter Russian influence in Africa, particularly targeting Russian forces and mercenaries in Mali.
  • This commitment reflects Kyiv’s growing interest in subversive tactics to distract and weaken Moscow as Ukraine engages in a worldwide manhunt for Russian forces.

A mid-October investigative article that appeared in the French daily Le Monde alleged Ukraine is supplying military drones to Tuareg rebels operating in northern Mali. This support was described as “discreet but decisive” (Le Monde, October 13). The recipient of these drones is said to be the Tuareg separatist coalition known as CSP-DPA (Cadre Stratégique pour la Défense du Peuple de l’Azawad). Ukraine’s foreign ministry rejected the article’s accusations on October 14 as “false narratives of… the aggressor state Russia,” after allegedly asking the French government to prevent its publication (Le Pays [Ouagadougou], October 20; Kyiv Independent, October 15). The report also claimed, citing a source close to Ukrainian intelligence, that some Tuareg have been trained in Ukraine while a number of Ukrainian specialists have trained rebels in the Sahel. Never known for presenting a unified stand, Mali’s Tuareg remain divided between separatist, Islamist-Jihadist and pro-government militias.

Calling out Ukraine for its alleged support of “international terrorist organizations,” Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova declared that Ukrainian support for Malian separatists was “interference in the internal affairs of African countries” (Le Pays [Ouagadougou], October 20).

According to Le Monde, light quadcopter drones were used in September and October to drop explosives on Russian camps at Goundam (twice) and Léré, creating casualties before returning to base (Le Monde, October 13). Mali’s army, with likely assistance from their Russian advisors, is also deploying drone warfare. On the night of October 5-6, Malian drones struck what was described by the army as a column of vehicles bearing “terrorists” in CSP-DPA territory. Local sources reported the strike hit a convoy of civilian vehicles carrying Nigérien gold miners (Kyiv Post, October 9).

FAMa Chinese-made Norinco MRAP VP11 Destroyed by Tuareg Militants (Militarnyi)

In a September interview, CSP-DPA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane emphasized the efforts of his group to establish relations with external partners, citing in particular a common cause between the peoples of “Azawad” (the name used by separatists for northern Mali) and Ukraine against Russian mercenaries: “Ukraine sees enemies where the Wagners are and we, in Azawad, are [also] facing this organization that is the cause of misfortune and destruction in many countries, in Libya, Syria, the Central African Republic, Sudan and of course in Ukraine” (Contre-Poison, September 9).

Describing cooperation with Ukraine as being “in its first phase,” the CSP-DPA spokesman requested arms and military training from Ukraine, placing the struggle of the Azawad separatists in the context of a greater war against Russian imperialism, describing this as “a global fight because Russia is a threat to the entire world… the entire international community must get behind us and help us put an end to this Malian and Russian occupation of our territory” (Contre-Poison, September 9).

Though Russian troops in Africa continue to be called “Wagner” in common parlance, Prigozhin’s mercenary forces in Africa were reorganized as the “Africa Corps” after his death, coming under the direct command of the Russian Defense Ministry. Accusing the Russians of participation in extrajudicial executions of civilians, population displacement, theft of all-important livestock and the destruction of infrastructure, the rebel spokesman warned that the changing status of Russian troops in Mali would have “legal consequences”: “It should be noted that since Wagner’s mercenaries have been dependent on the Russian Ministry of Defense, Moscow is directly and legally responsible for their actions, unlike when Prigozhin was alive” (Contre-Poison, September 9).

Colonel Hamad-Rhissa Ag Hamad-Assalah (Contre-Poison)

Colonel Hamad-Rhissa Ag Hamad-Assalah, who led CSP-DPA fighters in the successful attack on Malian regulars and Russian mercenaries at Tinzawatène, has been more reticent on the issue of Ukrainian military assistance, stating: “We are not aware of any assistance from Ukraine in terms of intelligence and drone support.” The colonel has, however, called for help from France, which, at the time of independence in 1960, imposed Azawad’s narrow link to southern Mali and its much larger population, culturally and linguistically very different from the pastoral and semi-nomadic communities of Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani (a.k.a. Peul) and Songhay (a.k.a. Ayneha) in the arid north:

“If there is one African country whose sovereignty must be recognized by France, it is Azawad. It is France that brought us together with Mali in the past and today, it is France that must separate us from Mali” (Contre-Poison, August 16).

Some Malians see a reciprocal connection between French support for Ukraine and Ukrainian intervention in the former French colonies, or, alternatively, an effort by NATO to punitively destabilize West Africa after a recent decline in Western influence (Burkina24.com, October 19). These and other views are actively promoted by Russian influence experts active in the Sahel.

Tuareg Fighters on an Exercise (Apostrophe.UA)

A peacetime Russia could find the troops and weapons needed to support a greater effort in Mali’s desert warfare, but it is not peacetime and North Korean drones and troops are being fed into the front lines to help a manpower-starved Russian military combat Ukraine’s Kursk incursion.  As promised, the Ukrainians have internationalized the war on Russia’s official or unofficial militaries wherever they are deployed, including Syria, Sudan and Mali (Kyiv Post, October 9). Ironically, it is the Malian junta’s invitation to the Russians that has brought the Tuareg separatists the aerial power in the form of drones that they need to defeat government forces and their allies on the battlefield.

However, diplomatic support for “Azawad” from a Western nation would ultimately be more valuable than military assistance from Ukraine. To this point, the separatists are saying all the right things, offering strategic advantages in return for European support, potentially acting as “border guards” along the Sahel, capable of controlling the flow of migrants to Europe and stemming drug trafficking through the region (Contre-Poison, September 9). There is a strong possibility that Ukraine’s over-taxed military intelligence force may be forced to divert resources from distant Mali to interfere with the more immediate threat created by the flow of North Korean troops to the Ukraine front.

Al-Qaeda Attack on Russians in Bamako Latest Setback for Russia’s Africa Corps

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(146)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, October 9, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Over the past months, Russia’s “Africa Corps,” partly made up of former Wagnerites, has faced numerous blows from jihadist groups in Africa’s Sahel states.
  • These defeats have begun to raise questions about the future of Russian military forces in the region following the eviction of French and US forces, replaced by Russian mercenaries whose massacres fuel rebel anger and desire for revenge.
  • Having seized power unlawfully on the pretext of needing to evict the Western military presence, Sahelian coup leaders’ credibility rests on Russian-backed military success against the jihadists and separatists who challenge them.

Al-Qaeda has come hunting for Russian troops in the Sahel, scoring another blow against Moscow’s “Africa Corps” in the Malian capital of Bamako on September 17. The attack on Russian and Malian military facilities came a month after a devastating joint strike by al-Qaeda and Tuareg separatists on a Russian/Malian column at Tinzwatène, near the Algerian border. Recent defeats of Russian-backed government forces in Niger, the sudden departure of recently-arrived Russian paramilitaries for urgent deployment on the Kursk Front and the instability of military regimes in three Sahel states belonging to the pro-Russian Alliance des États du Sahel group (AES -Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) are beginning to raise questions about the future of Russian forces in the region.

Attacker Sets Fire to an Aircraft (Jeune Afrique)

The attack was carried out by militants of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM), led by a veteran Malian Tuareg jihadist, Iyad ag Ghali. JNIM was formed in 2017 as a coalition of smaller jihadist groups drawn from the Tuareg, Arab and Fulani communities. They pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda almost immediately, and were accepted into the movement. This by no means indicates a general support for al-Qaeda amongst these minority ethnic groups, who are targeted daily in Malian and Russian counterinsurgency operations.

Location of Bamako Attacks (BBCM)

A small number of members of the mostly Fulani Katiba Macina (katiba = battalion) struck two military installations south of the Niger River in the morning of September 17. The leader of the attack on the first target, Senou Air Base 101, a launch point for drone operations against militants in northern Mali, was ‘Abd al-Salam al-Fulani (Chirpwire, September 17, 2024, via BBCM).

The second attack on a gendarmerie school in nearby Faladié was led by Salman “Abu Hudhaifa” al-Bambari, a member of the Muslim Bambara ethnic group. As the dominant ethnic group in the Malian military and government, the Bambara have more often been the target of the jihadists than their allies. The school also serves as a dormitory for Russian troops, who came under attack. Fulani preacher Amadou Koufa, leader of the Katiba Macina, said the operation was in response to massacres of civilians committed by government troops and their Russian allies (al-Zallaqa, September 20, via BBCM).

On the day of the attacks, JNIM issued an inflated claim of heavy losses of “hundreds of Wagner” personnel (Chirpwire, September 17, via BBCM). A more accurate figure is 77 dead and 200 wounded, Malians and Russians combined. Although the GRU (Russian military intelligence) has assumed command of the former Wagner fighters in Africa, former Wagner personnel (who still form about half of the force) are still allowed to wear Wagner insignia, leading many Sahelians to still refer to Russians as “Wagner” (Reuters, September 11).  A short video released the day of the Bamako attack purports to show Russian mercenaries who had just killed several militants near the airport (X, September 17). Russian embassy officials deplored the loss of Malian troops, but said nothing about Russian losses (X, September 20).

Young Fulani Men Were Rounded Up in Bamako After the Attack as Suspects: None Wear the Camo-pattern Uniforms Worn by the Attackers (ORTM)

A week after the attack on Bamako, Tuareg separatists of the same group that worked with JNIM in the deadly Tinzwatène ambush (the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad – CSP-DPA), destroyed a Russian command post in Mali’s northern Timbuktu region with a bomb-carrying drone (X APMA, September 25; X Wamaps, September 26).

Fellow AES state Burkina Faso is far from stable, even with Russian support. Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s military regime has survived four coup attempts since it took power in September 2022 and began to evict French and American forces in favor of Russian mercenaries. In the worst terrorist attack in Burkina Faso’s history, JNIM militants killed as many as 400 people at Barsalogho on August 24, including government troops, militia members and civilians (Bamada.net [Bamako], September 17).

A week later, 100 Russian troops of the “Bear Brigade” were withdrawn from Burkina Faso to fight on the Kursk front in Russia after a short three-month deployment. The unit (officially the 81st Bear Special Forces Volunteer Brigade) is a Russian PMC composed of special forces veterans supplied with arms and equipment by the Russian Defense Ministry (L’Indépendent/AFP, August 31). Its members have signed contracts with the GRU (AFP, August 30).

Captain Ibrahim Traoré with Bear Brigade Commander Viktor Yermolaev (Le Monde)

Led by commander Viktor Yermolaev (a.k.a. “Jedi”), one hundred members of the brigade arrived in Burkina Faso in late May to provide security for junta leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré; they were later joined by up to 200 more members. In what might be interpreted as unsettling news for AES junta leaders dependent on Russian military support, Yermolaev announced that “When the enemy arrives on our territory, all Russian soldiers forget about internal problems and unite against a common enemy” (Le Monde, August 29). However, he did promise that his Russian troops would return once their mission in Russia was complete (RFI, August 29).

Niger, the third AES member, is also facing an upsurge in attacks by religious extremists since replacing French and American forces with GRU “mercenaries.” Two days before the strike on Bamako, JNIM’s Katiba Hanifa raided a military post in Niakatire, Niger, killing at least 27 members of a special forces battalion (Chirpwire, September 20, via BBCM; Wamaps, September 15). Katiba Hanifa is a branch of the JNIM/al-Qaeda network led by Abu Hanifa, (A.K.A. Oumarou), a Malian Fulani.

Russia’s strong-handed tactics have not restored order to the post-coup Sahel nations; on the contrary, civilian and military deaths have sky-rocketed. Civilian fatalities are reported to have risen by 65% over the previous year, with both sides bearing responsibility (Reuters, September 11). Nearly half the territory of Sahel Alliance nations is now under rebel or separatist control. Rebel anger and desire for revenge is fuelled by Russian massacres large and small. The Sahelian coup leaders cannot acknowledge the reality of a Russian failure; having seized power unlawfully on the pretext of needing to evict the Western military presence, their credibility rests on Russian-backed military success against the jihadists and separatists who challenge them.

Ukraine’s African Campaign Against Russia Prompts International Backlash

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(130)

Washington DC, September 11, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • The July attack by Tuareg rebels in Mali that killed Malian government troops and Wagner Group mercenaries has been connected to Ukraine, causing substantial international backlash for Kyiv.
  • The death of multiple members of Mali’s army in the attack would mean Ukraine was involved in the killing of regular army members of a sovereign state unengaged in any hostilities with Ukraine, past or present.
  • If Ukraine were involved in the clash at Tinzawatène, it would find little in international law to support its intervention, which could risk international support for Kyiv.

During fighting that took place on July 25, 26 and 27 around the north Malian border town of Tinzawatène, Tuareg rebels launched a devastating ambush that killed scores of Malian government troops and their Russian Africa Corps allies. Reports later emerged that the Tuareg fighters had received substantial aid and training from Ukraine, quickly sparking an international backlash.

The Tuareg forces involved in the battle hailed from a coalition of armed separatist groups, the Cadre Stratégique pour la Défense du Peuple de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA), and the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM). It is Ukraine’s alleged involvement with the latter that has contributed most to creating an international incident.

After the ambush, a photo was posted in Kyiv Post showing victorious Tuareg fighters holding a Ukrainian flag. Sources in Ukraine’s defence and security forces confirmed the photo’s authenticity, asserting that Ukraine fully supports any forces in the various parts of Africa that are fighting against Wagner terrorists. (Kyiv Post, July 29; Ukrainska Pravda, July 29).

Russia’s foreign ministry seized the opportunity to declare that Kiev’s support for al-Qaeda-affiliated  terrorist groups was “not surprising at all,” citing Ukraine’s alleged “terrorist methods on the territory of the Russian Federation, committing sabotage, political assassinations and regularly bombing civilian targets” (Agence de Presse Africaine [Dakar], August 7). 

Malian media described the ambush as a “secret project” of the Ukrainian GUR (Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine), including the training of “terrorists in combat techniques and supplying equipment, drones and weapons” for destabilization operations (Maliweb, August 17). The alleged director of this project is GUR Lieutenant Colonel Andrii Romanenko, though the source of this information appears to be Anatoly Chari, a controversial Ukrainian journalist and politician (Maliweb, August 16). Chari is generally viewed as pro-Russian (though he denies this), and was charged with High Treason by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) in 2021.

The first cohort of Tuareg fighters is reported to have started combat training under Ukrainian direction in early 2024 (LeFaso.net [Bamako], August 15). An investigation by Malian authorities is reported to have established the training was carried out in Mauritania, where local authorities have launched their own investigation at Bamako’s request (LeFaso.net [Bamako], August 5). It has also been reported that some members of the Tuareg alliance were sent to Ukraine for intensive training (Le Monde, August 7).

Andrii Yusov, spokesman for Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (GUR), told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne TV that the rebel fighters had received from Ukraine “useful information, and not just that, which allowed them to carry out a successful military operation against Russian war criminals”  (Kyiv Independent, August 5). Despite this, a CSP-DPA spokesman downplayed any special ties to Ukraine’s intelligence services: “We have links with the Ukrainians, but just as we have with everyone else, the French, Americans and others” (Le Monde, August 2).

Mali’s transitional government announced it had learned “with deep shock” of Yusov’s admission that Ukraine was involved “in a cowardly, treacherous and barbaric attack by armed terrorist groups.” These actions had not only violated Mali’s sovereignty, but constituted “a clear aggression against Mali and support for international terrorism, in flagrant violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations” (Maliweb [Bamako], August 4). Yusov later issued a retraction of his remarks, claiming he was not speaking of the involvement of Ukrainian intelligence services (Maliweb, August 17).

Matters were worsened when Yurii Pyvovarov, Ukraine’s Dakar-based ambassador to Senegal, published a Facebook video which Senegalese authorities described as providing  “unequivocal and unqualified support for the terrorist attack” in Mali.(al-Jazeera, August 7). While the post was deleted within 24 hours, Pyvovarov was summoned by Senegalese authorities to account for it, while the pro-Russian Alliance des États du Sahel (AES – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) encouraged Senegal to break diplomatic relations with Ukraine (Sputnik, August 5; Maliweb, August 10).  Mali severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine on August 4, referring to the “neo-Nazi and villainous nature” of Ukrainian authorities (Maliweb [Bamako], August 4). Niger followed suit on August 6 (Le Monde/AFP, August 6).

Ukraine’s foreign ministry described Mali’s break as “unfriendly… short-sighted and hasty,” adding that Bamako had failed to provide “any evidence of Ukraine’s involvement” in the ambush. The ministry further denied Ukrainian support for terrorism and reiterated its commitment to international law and “the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries” (Kyiv Independent, August 5).

On August 19, the foreign ministers of the AES states sent a joint letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) denouncing Ukraine’s alleged support for international terrorism and calling upon the Council to take appropriate measures against Ukraine (L’Essor [Bamako], August 22; Asharq al-Awsat, August 22).   As the UNSC does not have a mandate to address conflicts between member states, the letter could be a preliminary step to bringing the matter before international courts (RFI, August 22).

Accusations of Ukrainian support for terrorism will be welcomed by Putin-admiring Western politicians seeking to defund Western support for Ukraine’s defense. The death of multiple members of Mali’s army in the attack would mean Ukraine was involved in the killing of regular army members of a sovereign nation (albeit a military dictatorship), unengaged in any hostilities with Ukraine, past or present.

Mali has the right to partner with another country (e.g. Russia) for defensive purposes, but this does not give the right to a nation belligerent with that partner to combat its enemy on Mali’s sovereign territory. In May 2023, GUR director General Kyrylo Budanov famously declared “we’ve been killing Russians and we will keep killing Russians anywhere on the face of this world until the complete victory of Ukraine” (Yahoo!News, May 5, 2023). However, if Ukraine was involved in any way in the clash at Tinzawatène, it will find little in international law to support its intervention. Kiev’s decision to expand its war against Russia may prove to have been a serious misstep.

Russia Considers Supplying Anti-Ship Missiles to Yemen’s Houthi Movement

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor 21(121)

August 8, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Since the United States authorized Kyiv to use Western-provided weapons on Russian territory, Moscow has considered striking back on a new front by providing modern anti-ship missiles to Yemen’s Houthis (Ansarallah), who have been striking shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
  • Aside from the apparent threat to Western interests, Moscow’s sending of missiles to Yemen could present substantial risks to Russia and its relations with traditional partners in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.
  • Any attempt by Moscow to turn Ansarallah into a Russian auxiliary in its war on Ukraine will only encourage heavier strikes on Yemen by US aircraft without providing tangible benefits to the movement.

On August 2, a senior US official reported that members of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) are operating in the Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen in an advisory role to Yemen’s Houthi movement, Ansarallah. The report claims that GRU officers have been operating in Yemen for “several months” to assist the Houthis in targeting commercial shipping (Middle East Eye, August 2). Ansarallah has been striking shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden for over eight months in support of Gaza’s Hamas movement. Primarily using drones and missiles provided by Iran, the Houthi attacks are intended to interfere with the movement of Israeli ships or cargoes, as well as those of Israel’s main backers, the United States and the United Kingdom. The latter two powers also provide military aid and intelligence to Ukraine in its resistance to the Russian invasion. When the United States gave Kyiv permission to use new weapons provided by the US-led Western alliance to strike targets inside Russia, Moscow began to consider striking back on a new front by providing modern anti-ship missiles to Yemen’s Houthis (Middle East Eye, June 28). The provision of sophisticated arms for Houthi use against Western shipping would represent a dangerous expansion of the conflict in Ukraine that could not easily be reversed.

The weapons in question are believed to be P-800 Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. These sea-skimming missiles fly 10 to 15 meters (32 to 50 feet) above the water at a top speed of 1,860 miles per hour, making them extremely difficult to evade or intercept. In the absence of a Ukrainian fleet, Moscow may calculate it can put some of its anti-ship missiles to better use against Ukraine’s supporters on another front. Previously, the Kremlin had called on Ansarallah to abandon the practice of firing on international shipping in the Red Sea while condemning the US and UK counterstrikes as an “Anglo-Saxon perversion of UN Security Council resolutions” (The Moscow Times, January 12).

The Houthis currently rely on less than precise open-source intelligence to identify maritime targets, leading to strikes on vessels with ties to both Iran and Russia (Press TV [Tehran], July 20). In March, Russian and Chinese diplomats met with Houthi representatives in Oman, receiving assurances that their ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden could pass unmolested in return for diplomatic support in the United Nations (Bloomberg, March 21). While Chinese and Russian shipping continue to use the Red Sea passage, other transporters face surging insurance rates or additional costs posed by rounding the Cape of Good Hope as an alternative route.

Oil tanker Chios Lion, carrying Russian oil to China, is attacked by a Houthi missile on July 15, 2024 (Yemeni Military Media).

On July 18, Yemen’s “Leader of the Revolution” Sayyid ‘Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi claimed that the strikes on US and UK shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden were inflicting economic damage on those countries as well as Israel. He added that Yemen was seeking to spread its maritime operations to the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea (SABA [Yemen], July 18).

Aside from the apparent threat to Western interests, a Russian gift of missiles to Yemen could present unforeseen but substantial risks to Russia itself and its foreign relations:

  • The possibility is growing that new Russian anti-ship missiles could be used against Saudi shipping, reigniting hostilities in an unresolved war that began in 2015. Russia maintains close relations with Saudi Arabia as partners in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries “Plus” group (OPEC+). According to US intelligence sources, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has requested that Moscow not go through with the delivery of cruise missiles to Yemen (Middle East Eye, June 28; Press TV [Tehran], July 20).
  • Despite Russia’s alliance with Iran, Moscow has maintained cordial relations with Israel throughout the Gazan campaign. The July 19 Houthi drone strike on Tel Aviv, however, has turned the Yemeni threat on territorial Israel from potential to real. In its present combative state, frustrated by an inability to defeat a small and lightly armed militia in Gaza, Israel may seek to eliminate new threats to its territory as quickly as possible, as indicated by its retaliatory strike on Yemen’s Red Sea Port of Hudaydah. Russia’s closeness to Iran is an existing irritant in relations with Israel. Providing the Houthis with superior anti-ship missiles could mean a complete break with Israel. Washington is already pressuring Tel Aviv to ship eight older Patriot air defense systems (via the United States) to Ukraine for use against Russian missiles (Times of Israel, June 28).
  • The Kremlin runs the risk of creating friction with Tehran, which exerts a strong influence over the Houthi movement that it may not care to share with Moscow.
  • Moscow’s involvement at any level in attacks on Red Sea shipping will complicate Russian efforts to establish a permanent Red Sea presence in Sudan, which relies on its Red Sea port as the main commercial conduit to the outside world (see EDM, November 14, 2023).
  • Russian military trainers and advisors could become targets (intentional or not) of US and Israeli strikes to prevent the deployment of Russian missiles. This could easily lead to escalation and a danger of becoming embroiled in a wider Middle Eastern conflict. Yemen has already announced plans for closer cooperation with countries of the “Resistance” axis (Al Jazeera, June 26).

For all its threats to the West and its aggression in Ukraine, Moscow does not perceive itself as a rogue state. Providing anti-ship missiles to a military force that it does not fully control would endanger not only international shipping in one of the world’s most important shipping channels but Russia’s reputation as well.

Any attempt by Moscow to turn Ansarallah into a Russian auxiliary in its war on Ukraine will only encourage heavier strikes on Yemen by US aircraft and the specific targeting of Ansarallah leaders without providing tangible benefits to the movement. The Kremlin may also discover that becoming allies with the religiously inclined Houthi movement could prove difficult in practice. Previous (Soviet) Russian experience in Yemen was with socialist southerners whose successors in the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council continue to insist they form Yemen’s true government.

US diplomatic efforts through a third party to persuade Russia to back off from these deliveries are ongoing. Aware of the reports that Russia was considering the transfer of anti-ship missiles to Yemen, Russia’s UN representative declared on July 23 that Moscow “stands with the security and safety of global navigation in the Red Sea” (SABA [Yemen], July 25). Those remarks may indicate the Kremlin could be having second thoughts about a policy decision made quickly and emotionally.

Mercenaries, UN Peacekeepers, and Multilateral Forces May Not Be Enough to Protect the Congo from the M23 Movement

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

July 9, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to struggle to remove M23 rebels from its eastern provinces despite military aid and the assistance of UN troops and European mercenaries. The current UN peacekeeping mission is expected to withdraw by the end of 2024, likely ushering in a period of greater instability in the historically troubled state of Nord-Kivu.
  • Incompetence on the part of the DRC’s army has led to a renewed reliance on European mercenaries and multilateral military operations. This has also opened the door to greater Russian involvement, with Moscow signing a military cooperation agreement with the DRC in March.

Rarely paid, barely trained and poorly equipped, the army of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is struggling to drive M23 rebels from the eastern Congo despite the help of UN troops, European mercenaries and military assistance from neighboring states and even nations far from the fighting. The ongoing difficulties of this army, the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC), have raised local concerns of infiltration or even collaboration with M23 (Mouvement du 23 mars) (AFP, March 30). To revive FARDC’s faltering offensive spirit, Kinshasa has now reintroduced capital punishment sentences in its military courts. On May 3, eight soldiers, including five officers, were sentenced to death for cowardice and “running away from the enemy” (Agence de Presse Africaine, May 4).

M23 Troops Advance in Nord Kivu (VOA)

Formed in 2012 from ethnic Tutsi in the eastern state of Nord-Kivu, M23 receives support from Tutsi-ruled Rwanda as a means of fending off the Kinshasa-backed Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu-based Rwandan armed opposition movement promoting the lethal ideology behind the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda (Le Monde, March 20; Great Lakes Eye [Kigali], December 28, 2022).

General Sultani Emmanuel Makenga (right) (Arab News)

M23 made an earlier play for power over a decade ago under a Rwandan Tutsi, General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda (jailed for 30 years by the International Criminal Court in 2019 for war crimes and crimes against humanity). M23 took the Nord-Kivu capital of Goma, but were defeated in 2013, their fighters fleeing across the border to refuge in Uganda and Rwanda. The movement began to return to the DRC quietly in 2017 under military leader Brigadier General Sultani Emmanuel Makenga. A Congo-born member of the Mugogwe sub-group of the Tutsi, Makenga helped bring Laurent-Désiré Kabila to power in the DRC in 1997 before Tutsis were ordered to leave the Congo during a general expulsion of “foreign” troops the next year (New African, February 15, 2013).

A reorganized M23 retook the offensive in eastern Congo in October 2021 after Kinshasa launched a campaign to force all armed groups in its eastern provinces to disarm and demobilize. Under pressure from the rebels, President Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo declared in October 2022 that he would not give in to the “fashionable” trend of hiring mercenaries to combat rebellion in his country. Two months later, White mercenaries were spotted providing security around Goma airport (Great Lakes Eye [Kigali], January 19, 2023). These were the vanguard of Romanian private military company (PMC) Asociatia RALF-ROLE, composed mostly of former members of the French Foreign Legion. The mission was meant to focus on training and securing Goma’s international airport, but Romanian mercenaries have instead found themselves fighting at the front.

RALF-ROLE originally consisted of 400 fighters, but Rwanda claims there are now as many as 2,000 mercenaries from Eastern Europe in Nord-Kivu (New Times [Kigali], October 16, 2023). A 2022 decision to lift a long-standing arms embargo on the DRC allowed a free flow of arms for the mercenaries, who are paid $5000 per month (Observator [Bucharest], February 9). The local habit of referring to the Romanians as “Russians” initially created many false reports of a Wagner presence in Nord-Kivu. Unlike Wagner’s connections to the Kremlin, Romanian authorities have made it clear there is no state involvement with the Romanian mercenary group (Observator [Bucharest], February 9).

FARDC Defensive Position (AFP)

Nonetheless, there are indications that the Kremlin is seeking a military entry to the DRC; on March 5, Russia’s Defense Ministry signed a military cooperation agreement with Kinshasa. The pact provides for joint military exercises, military training and visits by warships and military aircraft (TASS, March 5; Digitalcongo.net, March 6). FARDC’s aging air assets are currently flown by Georgian and Belarussian pilots, while their maintenance is in the hands of Bulgarian PMC Agemira  (Deutsche Welle, January 17, 2023; Jeune Afrique, July 28, 2023).

Wazalendo Mayi Mayi (Congo Indépendant)

Corrupt and undisciplined, FARDC is supported not only by the Hutu FDLR and European mercenaries, but also Burundian troops and the Wazalendo (Kiswahili – “patriots”), a coalition of Mayi Mayi militias and other pro-government armed groups formed by FARDC in May 2023 (Africa Defense Forum, January 16). The Mayi Mayi are local Congolese militias ostensibly engaged in a struggle for indigenous rights, but better known for drug-fuelled rampages against villagers involving rape, looting and murder (see Terrorism Monitor, April 3, 2014).

EACRF Commander General Jeff Nyaga

The incompetence of FARDC forces Kinshasa to seek defenders abroad. The East African Community Regional Force (EACRF – Burundians, Ugandans, Kenyans and South Sudanese) deployed in Nord-Kivu in November 2022 during M23 advances, but withdrew its last troops in December 2023 after the DRC declined to renew its mandate (East African [Nairobi], December 21, 2023). Only months into their mission, EACRF faced threats in Goma from demonstrators who accused the force of failing to take the fight to M23, though their mandate called for an offensive only as a last resort (Great Lakes Eye [Kigali], March 21, 2023; DRC News, May 16, 2023). EACRF’s Kenyan commander, General Jeff Nyaga, resigned in April 2023, complaining of intimidation from “foreign mercenaries” (Kinshasa Times, April 28, 2023). Nyaga was accused by the Congolese of “peaceful cohabitation” with M23 and Rwandan troops in Kivu (Kinshasa Times, May 3, 2023). Dissatisfaction with EACRF’s performance may have motivated Tshisekedi to intensify his recruitment of mercenaries.

About 1,000 Tanzanian, Malawian and South African troops belonging to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) began to arrive as replacements for EACRF in December 2023, but deployment has been slow and six men have already been lost to M23 mortar fire (DRC News, April 3; Kinshasa Times, April 9). SAMIDRC is led by South Africa’s Major General Monwabisi Dyakopu, who fought M23 in 2013.

MONUSCO Patrol (PBS)

Also active in Nord-Kivu are UN peacekeepers of MONUSCO (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo), the UN’s largest and most-expensive peacekeeping mission. First deployed in 2000, MONUSCO now operates alongside FARDC to defend the Nord-Kivu cities of Saké and Goma (DRC News, March 13).

Though remote and impoverished, Nord-Kivu’s extraordinary mineral wealth continues to draw armed groups like moths to a flame. As with most long-term conflicts, many of the varied participants in the struggle for Nord-Kivu have found ways to profit from its extension rather than its resolution, discouraging any foreseeable improvements in security.

Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

July 8, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • The Kremlin has reconsidered its support for the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, throwing more weight behind the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Transitional Sovereignty Council.
  • The move serves to align Moscow’s position more closely with that of Iran, seeks to dampen the SAF’s cooperation with Ukraine, and highlights the ongoing interest in establishing a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.
  • Should Russia possess naval bases in both Libya and Sudan, it will have an opportunity to establish supply lines into the landlocked nations of the African interior that now host units of Moscow’s Africa Corps.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” (Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service)

The Kremlin is backing away from its support of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s ongoing internal war. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed Moscow’s gradual shift on April 29 during a visit to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, April 29). Russia once saw RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” as vital to establishing a Russian port on the Red Sea in Port Sudan (see EDM, November 14, 2023). The situation has since changed. Before his death, notorious Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin worked closely with the RSF, supplying arms in return for gold (see Terrorism Monitor, December 15, 2023). Simultaneously, however, the Kremlin maintained open channels with their opposition, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government. Moscow is now exploiting these openings.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov

Supporting the SAF and TSC, with control over Port Sudan, aligns Russian policy with Iran’s. For its part, Tehran has been supplying advanced drones to the SAF. The switch also helps sever the SAF’s relationship with Ukraine, which has been supplying drones and special forces assistance to General Abdel al-Fatah al-Burhan’s SAF since the summer of 2023 (Kyiv Independent, September 20, 2023; see EDM, November 14, 2023).

Bogdanov confirmed the Kremlin’s shift during his two-day visit to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, April 29). His military-heavy delegation offered Sudan “unrestricted qualitative military aid” while disapproving of Sudan’s military cooperation with Ukraine (Sudan Tribune, April 30). Bogdanov later clarified that Russia recognizes the TSC as the legitimate representative of the Sudanese people (Al-Mayadeen, May 31). The Russian official had met with Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Ali Bagheri Kani two days earlier in an apparent effort to align the Kremlin’s new approach with that of Tehran (Nour News, April 25).

Ukrainian Timur Unit Leaders

Some reports have claimed that operatives of the “Timur” unit of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) have been active in Sudan. While the leader of the unit neither confirms nor denies their presence, he declared, “Wherever there are soldiers, officers, or persons engaged by the special services of the Russian Federation, we catch up with them” (Ukrainska Pravda, February 13; New Arab, February 26). Ukrainian sources have reported months-long operations carried out in Sudan by Ukrainian special forces against “Russian mercenaries and their local terrorist partners” (Kyiv Post, January 30). Sources suggested that, during Bogdanov’s April visit, Sudan pledged to abandon military cooperation with the Ukrainians, while Russia agreed likewise to halt assistance to the RSF (Mada Madr, June 7).  The RSF has steadily become reliant on support from the United Arab Emirates in the face of diminishing Russian supplies since Prigozhin’s death.

Kyiv likely sought to interrupt the RSF-assisted flow of Sudanese gold that was helping Russia overcome international sanctions. In changing support from the RSF to the SAF, Moscow would temporarily forgo the gold shipments that have helped the Russian economy. The diminishing size of these shipments due to Sudan’s conflict, however, removes much of Russia’s incentive to continue supporting the RSF. Meanwhile, the Libyan port of Tobruk is effectively becoming a Russian naval base (see EDM, March 12). Should Russia possess naval bases in both Libya and Sudan, it will have an opportunity to establish supply lines into the landlocked nations of the African interior that now host units of Moscow’s Africa Corps.

Moscow is eager to implement a 2019 deal with Sudan to establish a Russian Red Sea naval base near Port Sudan capable of accommodating up to four ships at a time, including those with a nuclear power plant. Progress has been halted, however, due to the ongoing absence of a parliament or other legislative body in Sudan capable of ratifying the agreement (Military Review, February 13).

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (left) with General Yasir al-Atta (Sudans Post)

On May 25, Yasir al-Atta, a member of the Sovereignty Council and deputy commander of the army, declared that the TSC was ready to approve the deal, though the port was no longer described as a naval base. He stated, “Russia proposed military cooperation through a logistics supply center, not a full military base, in exchange for urgent supplies of weapons and ammunition” (Radio Dabanga, May 29; Mada Madr, June 7). While Atta said a partnership agreement with Russia was expected soon, he stressed that Sudan was open to similar agreements with countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Riyadh, which opposes the Russian port, has offered greater investment in Sudan if it drops the deal (Sudan Tribune, May 25).

Port Sudan – Red Sea Gateway to Africa

The Sudanese ambassador to Russia has assured Moscow that Sudan is not backing away from its commitment to construct a Russian naval base. Yet, Bogdanov confirmed on June 12 that while discussions on the port continued, “there are no firm agreements at this time” (Sputnik, June 1; Sudan Tribune, June 12). Many civilian leaders in Sudan question the TSC and the SAF’s right to implement an agreement with sovereignty implications. They also fear that the arrival of Russian military aid might only prolong the devastating conflict (Mada Madr, June 7).

Sudan may be looking to the Djibouti for-profit model of hosting naval bases for various countries. Jibril Ibrahim, Sudan’s finance minister (also the leader of Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement, now allied to the SAF), recently characterized the proposed Russian facility as “not a large base, but rather a service center for Russian ships to obtain supplies.” He added that Sudan’s Red Sea coast could “accommodate everyone if the United States wants to buy a similar port” (Asharq al-Awsat, June 8).  

Transitional Sovereignty Council leaders in Port Sudan may be using the extended negotiations with the Kremlin as a means of focusing Western attention on the conflict and the need to interrupt the supply of weapons and personnel to the RSF. Sudan routinely says its cooperation with Russia and Iran is unavoidable without Western support (Sudan Tribune, May 3). Otherwise, the degree of military cooperation between Sudan and Russia will depend greatly on how badly the politicians and generals in Port Sudan seek potentially game-changing Russian arms.