Tag Archives: RSF

Rapid Support Forces Establish Rival Government as Sudan’s War Spirals

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Terrorism Monitor

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

November 20, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of al-Fashir, accompanied by exterminatory extrajudicial killings after an 18-month siege, represents the militia’s most significant territorial victory to date and accelerates the effective partition of Sudan.
  • With control over most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, the RSF is consolidating a parallel “Tasis State,” seeking external legitimacy despite its reliance on predatory militias and systematic abuses.
  • The Sudanese Armed Forces–Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF–TSC) coalition remains internally divided and constrained by Islamist-aligned networks, leaving both major coalitions dependent on abusive partners and limiting prospects for a negotiated national political settlement.

Until 2005, Sudan was Africa’s largest country by territory size. After 22 years of civil war, South Sudan separated, taking the nation’s oil wealth and roughly one-third of its territory with it. Today, after two-and-one-half years of a new civil war, the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) declared its intention on July 2 to form a new state, splitting the country once again. Though the RSF’s stated intention is to form a new government for all Sudan, it is in reality now focusing on consolidating its control of the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur, having been ejected from Khartoum and the central region of al-Jazirah by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its allies.

(Maprr)

The initiative is designed to provide legitimacy and access to aid and arms for a paramilitary accused of genocide, ethnic cleansing, looting, destruction of cultural institutions, sexual violence, war crimes and widespread atrocities.

The Battle for al-Fashir

RSF Fighter with Dead Civilians

Crucial to the establishment of a new RSF state based largely in western Sudan is the seizure and occupation of al-Fashir, the traditional capital of Darfur since its founding in the late 18th century as capital of the Fur Sultanate. After an 18-month siege, the city was taken by the RSF on October 27, when the movement overran the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division and elements of the Sudan Liberation Movement-MM led by Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minawi (now resident in Port Sudan). Taking al-Fashir frees up RSF forces for the ongoing battle for neighboring Kordofan region and solidifies its control of Darfur (Mada Masr, July 11).

Minni Arko Minawi, Governor of Darfur and Leader of the SLA-MM

The entry of RSF forces was followed by massacres largely targeting the non-Arab population of the city that have killed at least 1500 people, including 460 patients and health workers at the Saudi Maternity Hospital (Al-Jazeera, October 30). According to the Sudan Doctors’ Network, “Hospitals in El Fasher have been transformed into human slaughterhouses” (Radio Dabanga, October 30). The atrocities appear to exceed even the dark episodes that followed the taking of al-Fashir after a siege by Mahdist forces in 1883. RSF commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” acknowledged he had “observed abuses occurring in al-Fashir” and pledged to hold RSF personnel accountable for their crimes (Sudan Tribune, October 29).

During the siege RSF constructed 68 km of 3-meter-tall sand berms alongside 3-meter-deep ditches as wide as five meters around al-Fashir to prevent escape from the siege (Radio Dabanga, September 30; Mada Masr, September 5). [1] People fleeing al-Fashir along the so-called “Road of Death” to nearby cholera-stricken Tawila were routinely deprived of all their possessions before being killed or raped as suspected supporters of the SAF. Others were forced to provide blood for wounded RSF fighters; many of these died soon after (Sudan Tribune, September 6). Those remaining in al-Fashir were reduced to eating leaves or a diminishing supply of animal feed as supplies of food, medicine and other aid were interrupted by the RSF’s siege lines (Al-Jazeera, September 4).

Palace of Sultan ‘Ali Dinar, al-Fashir (TIKA)

Earlier this year, the RSF, having already looted the Sudan National Museum in Khartoum, bombed the historical al-Fashir palace of Fur Sultan ‘Ali Dinar (1898-1916), a revered national symbol of anti-colonial resistance, but one who campaigned constantly against the western Arab tribes that now dominate the RSF (Radio Dabanga, January 22; Darfur Network for Human Rights, January 17).

South of al-Fashir, there are indications that the RSF has turned the airbase at Nyala into a base for Iranian and Chinese-designed drones capable of striking any target within Sudan (Sudan Tribune, September 29). The RSF has also made major improvements in its air-defense systems through the use of Wagner Group-supplied surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the SAF’s Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci high-altitude, long-endurance drones, once expected to be a game-changing weapon in the struggle to relieve al-Fashir (Military Africa, September 28).

The Tasis State

A political charter to form a parallel “transitional peace government” was signed in February by the RSF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) and other armed groups (the “Tasis Alliance”) operating in western Sudan (al-Jazeera, July 28). The new state was declared on July 26 as the “Government of Peace and Unity,” but is more commonly known as “the Tasis State.” Though the new state insists it represents all parts of Sudan, in reality it can only govern those regions currently controlled in whole or part by the RSF and the SPLM-N (Darfur, parts of Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile State). For now, the Tasis capital is in Nyala (southern Darfur), but will likely be shifted to al-Fashir.

The Tasis (“Founding”) Alliance is formed from 24 armed and civil groups, including the RSF, the SPLM-N, the Beja Congress of eastern Sudan, the Rasha’ida Arab “Free Lions” of eastern Sudan, and factions of the National Umma Party (UP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the largely Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4; Sudan Tribune, January 22). To maintain a façade of ruling all Sudan, Tasis has appointed regional governors for Khartoum and the Eastern region, despite the RSF currently having no presence in these areas (Sudan Tribune, July 26; Arab Weekly, July 28).

The head of the presidential council is RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”; his deputy is SPLM-N leader ‘Abd al-Aziz Hilu (see MLM, June 2012). Both attended the swearing in of the presidential council in Nyala on August 30; the ceremony site was bombed several hours later by the SAF (Mada Masr, September 5).

Tasis Prime Minister Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi

As prime minister, the Darfur Arabs controlling the RSF have appointed Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi, a known ally of Hemetti. The appointment has significant symbolic value with reference to the rivalry between the Baqqara (cattle-herding) Arabs of Darfur and the riverain Arabs of northern Sudan in the time of the Mahdist State (1885-1898), when the northern Arab relatives of the Mahdi, the ashraf, were repressed by the Mahdi’s successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi, a member of Darfur’s Ta’aisha tribe. Sudan’s northern Arab minority has dominated Sudan since independence in 1956, and the appointment of a Ta’aishi as prime minister is a political signal understood by all Sudanese.

The RSF justifies its declaration of a new state by saying it is necessitated by an urgent need for identity documents, currency, security, medicine, healthcare and education identity documents (Mada Masr, August 16). One purpose of establishing the rival state is to establish legitimacy in talks hosted by outside parties such as the Quartet – the US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia (better known as “the Quad”). For now, only the UAE recognizes the RSF as a de facto authority (Mada Masr, September 28). Sudan’s government has complained to the UN about the UAE’s alleged involvement in supplying arms, logistical support and Colombian mercenaries to the RSF (AIS Special Report, June 13; Mada Masr, September 14).

The UN Security Council rejected the declaration of a rival state in Sudan, calling it “a direct threat to Sudan’s territorial integrity” (UN News, August 13). It has also been opposed by many Arab states, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (New Arab, March 6). Other opposition comes from the US and the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in 2021. Besides the UAE, supporters include Khalifa Haftar’s eastern Libya, Chad, Kenya, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

THE SAF/TSC Government

The Port Sudan-based SAF/Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government is making its own bid for legitimacy in the face of what it regards as exclusion from international peace efforts supported by the Quad, the UN and the AU. Declaring it will not negotiate without a declaration of its legitimacy, the SAF/TSC has also rejected all efforts to place the RSF on an equal footing and insists only a military resolution can bring peace to Sudan (Mada Masr, September 20).

Finance Minister and JEM leader Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (Akhbar al-Sudan/Facebook)

On May 19, Kamil al-Tayib Idris, with doctorates in international relations and international law, was appointed Sudan’s first civilian prime minister since 2022 by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, head of the SAF and chair of the TSC. Shortly afterward, the new PM tried to expel two powerful former rebel leaders from the TSC cabinet, JEM’s Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (minister of finance) and Darfur governor Minni Arko Minawi, but was quickly overruled by al- Burhan, who doubtless has no desire to see these leaders and their valuable troops depart the SAF-led coalition (Al-Jazeera, July 23). Many former rebel leaders and their subordinates gained their positions as TSC ministers under the terms of the 2020 Juba peace agreement (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, April 21, 2021).

Traditional Parties Divided

The National Umma Party (NUP) is the political arm of Sudan’s neo-Mahdist movement and has been a strong, western-based political force in Sudan since independence under the leadership of various descendants of its founder ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah, “the Mahdi” (1843-1885). The party is currently divided, with a faction led by acting head Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Douma backing the Port Sudan SAF/TSC government while a faction led by Fadlallah Burma Nasir supports the RSF and the creation of a parallel Sudanese state (Sudan Tribune, July 8). Fadlallah has accepted an appointment to be speaker of the Tasis government’s legislative council.

Khatmiyya Leader Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani

The NUP’s historical rival is the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Sayyid Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani, the 89-year-old leader of the historically pro-Egyptian Khatmiyya Sufi order and descendant of the order’s founder, ‘Ali al-Mirghani (1873-1968). The leadership of the DUP is in turmoil after decrees allegedly issued by Sayyid al-Mirghani on June 24 replaced the party leader’s son, Ja’afar al-Sadiq, as deputy leader with Ahmad Sa’ad Omar, a loyalist of deposed president Omar al-Bashir. Many DUP leaders allege the maneuver was the work of another of al-Mirghani’s sons, ‘Abd Allah al-Mahjub, who was taking advantage of the elderly Sufi leader, a resident of Cairo who is known for his publicly expressed support for the SAF but has little other political involvement (Sudan Tribune, June 25; Altaghyeer.info, July 8, 2024).

A faction under Ibrahim al-Mirghani, another descendant of Khatmiyya founder ‘Ali al-Mirghani, has come out in support of the RSF and the Tasis alliance. A DUP spokesman declared in February that “the presence of Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Mirghani does not represent the party in any way, and he only represents himself and the constituencies that entrusted him with the mission” (SUNA, February 20).

The Islamists Return

Much like the RSF-led Tasis coalition, the “official” SAF/TSC government and its armed supporters also constitute a tenuous alliance. Complicating its own search for legitimacy is the presence within the coalition of many Islamists, including veterans of the discredited military-Islamist government of Omar al-Bashir, who was deposed in 2019 and is currently wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, torture and genocide. Islamist militias under SAF command have played a major role in the fighting, most notably the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade, tied to the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP).

Commander of the Bara’a Bin Malik Brigade, al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha (Sudan Tribune)

The NCP, which ruled Sudan from 1998 to 2019, is currently led by Ahmad Harun (also wanted by the ICC on charges of war crimes and genocide in Darfur). Harun believes Western political models are inappropriate for Sudan and that there must be a political role for the army, but insists the Islamists will wait to seek power via the ballot box after the war’s conclusion  (Sudan Tribune, July 25; Arab Weekly, July 26).

The RSF is strongly opposed to a political return by the Islamists, blaming them for initiating the current conflict (Sudan Tribune, July 25). Tasis prime minister Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi explained in an interview that General al-Burhan has “benefited from the Islamists’ infiltration of the military establishment” and that he “became the general who served the Islamists most after the [2019] revolution” (Assayha, October 16). The Tasis alliance has declared they will dissolve all Islamist militias affiliated with the NCP after they take control of Sudan (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4).

Conclusion

The problem is that there are not two groups fighting for power in Sudan, but many, who have flocked to one or the other of the major coalitions (RSF and SAF) to further their own interests, even when that has meant splitting existing movements. In turn, the leaders of the major coalitions have become beholden to unreliable partners who have a track record of opportunism. In this situation, a victory by either side may mark not the end of the conflict, but only the starting point of a new one.

Most international support (however unenthusiastic) tends to line up behind the SAF/TSC as the default successor to the line of recognized Sudanese governments. However, the civilian leaders in the TSC are in thrall to the military members of the TSC, particularly TSC chairman General al-Burhan. While many civilian members reject a return to the political Islamism of the era of President Omar al-Bashir, they must contend with the fact that the northern Arab generals of the SAF are precisely those that survived the frequent purges of non-Islamist officers during the Bashir regime.

The RSF’s new Tasis State is not without its own international support, but these backers remain focused on what can be gained by supporting a paramilitary (led by Darfur Arabs) that has adopted a veneer of statehood to cloak the fact it is manifestly incapable of running anything resembling a 21st century administration with any other objective than the personal enrichment of its leadership. The inability of both RSF and SAF commanders to envision the possibility of a Sudanese nation led by a member of Sudan’s non-Arab majority guarantees further rounds of combat focused on the pursuit of ethnic-based power sharing.

On the battlefield, ongoing atrocities by both the SAF and the RSF mean there is little to choose between them in a humanitarian sense. Beyond the deliberate destruction of national infrastructure (much of which is the now ruined and irreplaceable legacy of the brief days of oil wealth before the separation of South Sudan), a recent UN report entitled “A War of Atrocities” found both side guilty of adopting a brutal approach to achieving their attainment of power: “Both sides have deliberately targeted civilians through attacks, summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and inhuman treatment in detention facilities, including denial of food, sanitation, and medical care. These are not accidental tragedies but deliberate strategies amounting to war crimes” (UN Human Rights Council, September 5). Ultimately, the division of Sudan into two dysfunctional states rather than one cannot offer the Sudanese people the prospect of stability or prosperity.

Note

  1. “Special Report: No Safe Haven: Bombardment of Abu Shouk IDP Camp and El-Fasher’s Increasing Berm Encirclement,” September 11, 2025, https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/e3d32307-89f9-4573-8c87-fc7d15239a9f

 

Battle for Jabal Arkenu: Controlling the Supply Lines in Sudan’s Civil War

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AIS Special Report

June 13, 2025

Andrew McGregor

Jabal Arkenu

The year was 1923, and Egyptian explorer Hassanein Bey was on a camel-borne search for two “lost oases” in the unknown depths of the Libyan Desert. Even the South Pole had been visited less than 12 years earlier, but this corner of the south-eastern Libyan Desert remained blank on most charts despite rumors of two mountains where water could be found in an otherwise barren, burning wasteland. Hassanein Bey and his small party of desert dwellers were 111 days out from his starting point in the Libyan port of Sollum when an amazing sight appeared:

We were having a hard time of it crossing the high steep sand-dunes when suddenly mountains rose before us like medieval castles half hidden in the mist. A few minutes later the sun was on them, turning the cold gray into warm rose and pink… I had found what I came to seek. These were the mountains of Arkenu. [1]

Though Jabal Arkenu defined remote isolation at the time, Hassanein believed that “Arkenu may conceivably prove to have strategic value at some future time.” The explorer was right; only days ago the desert round Arkenu was the scene of a battle with great implications for the future of Sudan.

Hassanein Bey

The Spiral Sisters

The area around Jabal Arkenu and its larger sister mountain Jabal ‘Uwaynat (25 km south-east of Jabal Arkenu) now mark the intersection of the borders of Libya, Egypt and Sudan, with the north-eastern corner of Chad not far to the south. As such, the region is now known as the Triangle area (al-Muthalath). The region around Jabal ‘Uwaynat, once a path for the Ancient Egyptians into the African interior according to recently discovered inscriptions, has now become a pathway for smugglers, mercenaries, rebels, human traffickers and gold miners. [2] In an otherwise waterless region, the massive spiral mountains collect local rainfall in natural basins within the rocks, a fact long known to the indigenous Tubu desert dwellers who brought their camels there to graze and water.

Jabal Arkenu

The recent discovery of gold in the region has attracted artisanal gold miners who operate in the region with little regard to borders. Egypt and Libya are seeking to replace these miners with modern mining operations, while Sudan is satisfied to collect fees through the Sudanese Minerals Resources Company without providing any services (Radio Dabanga, November 8, 2024).

The Attack on the Triangle

One hundred and two years after Hassanein Bey rediscovered the lost mountain oases, war has arrived in al-Muthalath. Possession of the desert crossing that passes through the Triangle region has suddenly become a strategic imperative for Sudanese government forces (the Sudan Armed Forces – SAF) and their adversaries in Sudan’s civil war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” The latter group, once a government paramilitary before breaking with the SAF, has acquired the support of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and an Islamist militia belonging to the so-called Libyan National Army of “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar.

This militia, known as Subul al-Salam (“Ways of Peace”), crossed 3 km into Sudan near Jabal Arkenu on June 6 in support of RSF units (Sudan Tribune, June 11). The joint Libyan-RSF movement displaced the main Sudanese units controlling the border, the Central Reserve Forces (a police paramilitary) and the Darfur Joint Force (Atalyar, March 21; Sudan Tribune, March 22). The SAF presence consisted of only a small number of intelligence and security agents (Mada Masr, June 14). The Darfur Joint Force (a.k.a. Sudanese Joint Force, or Juba Peace Agreement Joint Forces) consists of rebel forces that were signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement and have since sided with the Port Sudan-based Sudan government. The main elements hail from Darfur’s powerful Zaghawa minority – the Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) and Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Some SLA fighters may be using Emirati-supplied weapons obtained when they were fighting as mercenaries on behalf of Khalifa Haftar before the signing of the Juba peace agreement (France24.com, April 20).

Fighting began on June 8. The RSF announced its takeover of the Triangle border region on June 11, claiming heavy SAF losses (AFP, June 11).  After a “defensive withdrawal” of government forces, the closest Sudanese army presence may now be 400 km from the Triangle region (Sudan Tribune, June 11).  According to the RSF, the region contains “rich natural resources, including oil, gas and minerals (Rapidsupportforce.com, June 12).

The SAF said its forces in the Triangle region were subject to a “surprise attack” by the RSF’s “terrorist militia” and Libya’s Subul al-Salam battalion (Libya Observer, June 11). Sudan’s military further declared the role of the Libyan militia was “a reprehensible and unprecedented gesture and a flagrant violation of international law… the direct intervention of Khalifa Haftar’s forces alongside the Rapid Support Forces in the war is a blatant aggression against Sudan, its land, and its people, and an extension of the international and regional conspiracy against our country…” (Darfur 24, June 10).

‘Abd al-Rahman Hasham al-Kilani

For his part, Subul al-Salam commander ‘Abd al-Rahman Hasham al-Kilani brushed over the encounter, claiming it was the result of a “misunderstanding” with the Darfur Joint Force, which believed the Libyan militia had crossed the border (Mada Masr, June 14). Haftar’s military command described allegations of participation by his forces as false and “a blatant attempt to export Sudan’s internal crisis” (Radio Dabanga, June 12).

Colombian mercenaries after their convoy was attacked in North Sudan, November 20, 2024 (La Silla Vacía)

Late last year, a battalion of at least 350 Colombian mercenaries began moving in stages from Abu Dhabi to Benghazi, through the desert to the Kufra district and then south across the border into northern Darfur using a crossing just south of the Triangle region. The mercenaries, combat-experienced veterans of the Colombian army, were recruited by Dubai-based Colonel Álvaro Quijano on the understanding they would be deployed as static defense for oil installations in the Middle East. Instead their passports were seized by Libyan soldiers in Benghazi who explained they were being sent south to fight alongside the RSF in Sudan.  Quijano, a Colombian, is an associate of a private security firm, the UAE-based Global Security Service Group. One convoy was ambushed by the Darfur Joint Force after crossing the border into Sudan, leading to the loss of three men. Once in Darfur, some of the Colombians have been sent into street-to-street fighting in the besieged North Darfur capital, al-Fashir, while others have been sent to train RSF fighters in Nyala, capital of South Darfur (La Silla Vacia [Bogota], November 26, 2024; March 2, 2025; March 3, 2025).

The Salafists of Kufra

The oasis of Kufra in south-eastern Libya, home of the Subul al-Salam brigade, was for centuries a major stage for trans-Saharan caravans and the shipment of slaves until its conquest by Italy in the 1930s. Kufra was dominated for centuries by indigenous Black semi-nomadic Tubu tribesmen until they were displaced by Zuwaya Arabs in 1840. Since the 2011 Libyan Revolution, Kufra has become an important stage for the transportation of sub-Saharan African migrants moving through the Triangle region to the Mediterranean coast, with numerous clashes occurring between the rival Zuwaya and Tubu communities (Libya Observer, March 5, 2018).

Libya

The brigade was formed by ‘Abd al-Rahman Hashim al-Kilani, a Madkhali Salafist, after Zuwaya clashes with the Tubu and their Darfuri allies in 2015. Salafism is a revivalist interpretation of Islam that believes Islam’s authentic form was found in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his first three successors (the Salaf). With the encouragement and funding of Saudi Arabia, Salafism has grown rapidly in recent decades, often displacing traditional and more flexible forms of Islam around the world. It has become associated in its most extreme form with political and religious violence (Salafi-Jihadism). Madkhalism is a form of Salafism developed by Saudi shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali that emphasizes a “quietist” approach to religion, avoiding overt political involvement while emphasizing obedience to authoritarian leaders. Madkhalism has found fertile ground in Libya, where its followers have formed powerful militias in Kufra, Tripoli and other regions. [3]

Salafists oppose Sufi approaches to Islam, rejecting their rites and rituals as bid’ah (religious innovation, i.e. practices that did not exist in the times of the Salaf). Libya has a strong Sufi tradition, with the powerful Sanusi order leading the resistance to Italian colonialism. Though Kufra was the traditional headquarters of the Sanusi Sufi order, the anti-Sufi Madkhalists destroyed the funerary shrine of Sanusi leader Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (1844-1902) and stole his remains in 2018 (Terrorism Monitor, April 6, 2018). Since then, the Madkhalist Salafis have held the upper hand in southeastern Libya.

After its formation, Subul al-Salam quickly aligned with the forces of General Khalifa al-Haftar (a leading military commander under Mu’ammar Qaddafi until his defeat by Chadian forces in the 1987 “Toyota War” and later an alleged anti-Qaddafi CIA asset after his exile to the United States), who supplied the Zuwaya fighters with 40 armored Toyota trucks (Libya Herald, October 20, 2016).

Libya is currently divided politically between two factions – the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) dominated by al-Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA – an alignment of various militias and other armed groups under al-Haftar’s command rather than a true “national army”) versus the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli. The latter controls western Libya (Tripolitania), while al-Haftar’s LNA controls the east (Cyrenaïca) and the south-west (Fezzan).

Tribal ties remain important in Libya; it is worth noting al-Haftar’s mother was from the Zuwaya, who have established a trading network from Kufra in the south to the Mediterranean coast in the north. Al-Haftar relies for weapons and other support from Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is also believed to supply weapons to the RSF. Prior to the Libyan offensive, satellite imagery revealed an increase in UAE cargo aircraft arriving at the Kufra airport, including three IL-76TD cargo planes present between May 21 and May 31 (X, June 10). After the Libyan/RSF takeover of the Triangle region, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry denounced the “dangerous escalation of the Abu Dhabi regime-sponsored external aggression against Sudan,” describing it as a “flagrant violation of international law” (Al-Monitor, June 11; Fes News, June 11). The ministry further condemned the “blatant aggression… supported by the United Arab Emirates and its militias in the region” (Radio Dabanga, June 12). Al-Haftar also has Egyptian backing and has been supported in the field by Russian military contractors, most notably in his failed 2019 campaign to take Tripoli and unite Libya under his rule.

The Subul al-Salam brigade has clashed with Sudanese fighters before, killing 13 members of the Darfuri Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2016. The members of JEM, a mainly Zaghawa rebel group, were operating as mercenaries near the oasis of Jaghbub at the time alongside a group of indigenous Black Tubu fighters.

Saddam al-Hafter – The Heir Apparent

Subul al-Salam comes under the direction of Khalifa Haftar’s son, Saddam, who is being groomed to succeed his 81-year-old father. At the same time the Russian-backed Khalifa is being supplied with heavy weapons, armored vehicles and Pantsir air defense systems by the Kremlin, Saddam has been holding quiet meetings in Washington with top state department and intelligence officials in the Trump administration (Militarnyi.com, May 26; MEE, June 12). Saddam is overseeing the Russian rehabilitation of a disused Qaddafi-era airbase (Matan al-Sarra) in southeastern Libya for use by Russia’s Africa Corps (EDM, April 17). Al-Haftar has already been accused of using Matan al-Sarra as a distribution point for arms headed to the RSF. (Sudan Tribune, June 11). When completed, Matan al-Sarra will join six other bases used by Russian forces in Haftar-controlled regions of Libya – al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, and al-Qardabiya

(MAPPR)

RSF Strategic Objectives

The RSF is looking to take the war into the Northern Province (home of the Arab-Nubian elites that have governed Sudan since independence), and notes that control of the Triangle region “is a significant step that will impact multiple combat front lines, particularly in the northern desert” (Rapidsupportforce.com, June 12). The RSF is dominated by Sudan’s western Arabs (residents of Kordofan and Darfur) who have been rivals of the more politically and economically successful northern Arabs since the days of the Mahdiyya (1881-1899).

As a step towards consolidating control of northern Sudan and supply lines from southern Libya, the RSF took al-Malha (a Meidobi town 210 km northeast of al-Fashir) in March, killing 40 people and burning down the market after looting it. Al-Malha connects northeast to the strategic Nile town of al-Dabba in Northern State via the Wadi al-Milk and east to the town of Hamrat al-Shaykh in North Kordofan, which the RSF hopes to incorporate into a new state together with Darfur, one independent of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government and the SAF in the temporary Sudanese capital in Port Sudan.

The RSF is increasingly concerned that it may lose its most important supply line for UAE arms and military materiel, which runs from an Emirati-built airbase in Um Jaras (or Amjarass, Ennedi province) east into West Darfur. SAF commander and TSC chairman General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan has demanded that Chad dismantle the Um Jaras base and close Chad’s border with Darfur to RSF-destined logistical convoys. Chad’s ruler, Mahamat Idris Déby Itno, like many of Chad’s ruling elite, is a member of the Zaghawa ethnic group, which straddles the Chad-Sudan border. However, the Darfur Zaghawa oppose the Arab-dominated RSF and sent a delegation of elders in February to meet with President Déby to urge an end to Chadian accommodation of the RSF (Mada Masr, March 7). Should Chad’s leadership decide to back away from the RSF, the establishment of a secure alternative supply route for UAE arms and supplies through Libya to northern Sudan will become imperative.

Notes

  1. AM Hassanein Bey: The Lost Oases, New York and London, 1925, pp. 210-217.
  2. Andrew McGregor, “Egyptian exploration of the African interior – Caravans to Yam,” Ancient History Magazine 15, April/May 2017, pp. 38-45. For Jabal ‘Uwaynat, see: “Jabal ‘Uwaynat: Mysterious Desert Mountain Becomes a Three-Border Security Flashpoint,” AIS Special Report, June 13, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=3930
  3. Andrew McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis: A Profile of Salafist Shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=5244

Drones Over the Nile: Unmanned Aerial Warfare and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report on Sudan

June 24, 2024

The growing importance of drones in modern warfare has been amply demonstrated in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though both states still possess manned military aircraft. In Africa, drones have been used extensively in the struggle between Libya’s rival governments, but the first broad use of drones by a “rebel” movement is taking place in Sudan. There, drones are in steady use by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a former state paramilitary that launched attacks on government institutions and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on April 15, 2023. Only days after the conflict began, the SAF and other state security institutions declared the RSF “a rebel entity” that was fighting the state and ordered its dissolution (Al-Jazeera, April 17, 2023). [1]

Both the RSF and SAF have used drones for surveillance and offensive purposes since the beginning of the conflict. The SAF is now receiving shipments of advanced Iranian drones, while the RSF relies on shipments of drones and other weapons from the anti-Iran, anti-Islamist United Arab Emirates (UAE). Sudan recalled its ambassador to Chad on June 25 over allegations that Chad is allowing the UAE to ferry military supplies to the RSF through its airports. The import of drones to Sudan violates a 2005 UN Security Council resolution that bans the supply of weapons to the Sudanese government and armed groups in Darfur.

Omdurman Market (Sky News)

The precision-guided munitions of Iranian Mohajer-6 drones played a decisive factor in the SAF’s March offensive that retook old Omdurman and the National Radio and Television Corporation from the RSF (Radio Dabanga, March 17, 2024). The Mohajer-6 UAVs are, however, vulnerable to the RSF’s limited anti-aircraft weapons, mostly man-portable (MANPAD) systems that are less effective against small “suicide” drones. Earlier this year, RSF forces in Omdurman released photos of a downed Iranian Mohajer-6 drone operated by the SAF and “its extremist backers from the former regime” (a reference to Islamist groups formerly allied to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir). The RSF claimed it was the third such SAF drone to have been brought down (Radio Dabanga, January 29, 2024).

Captured RSF Quadcopter Drone

The SAF began using FPV (first-person view) quadcopter loitering munitions (a.k.a. “suicide” drones) in September 2023. With an ability to hover for long periods before the user finds a target and drives the drone and its warhead into it, loitering munitions provide a cheap and useful tool in urban warfare of the type being practiced in Khartoum and Omdurman. Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation produces its own Kamin-25 loitering munitions (Military Africa, September 15, 2023).

The SAF uses several Chinese drone types, most notably the Rainbow CH-3 (used for reconnaissance, surveillance and attacks) and the enhanced Rainbow CH-4, which uses precision-guided munitions and has a range of up to 5,000 km (Military Africa, April 20, 2023). Most SAF drones operate out of Wadi Sayidna airbase north of Omdurman. On June 7, SAF air defense systems shot down two drones targeting the base (Radio Dabanga, June 7, 2024; Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024). SAF-held airbases are a common target of RSF drones.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones

The RSF also operates Chinese-made Sunflower-200 “suicide drones,” an improved version of the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition drone. These have been deployed with the alleged assistance of Russian PMC Wagner personnel (Military Africa, April 27, 2024; Defense Express, August 16, 2023). Russia is a major purchaser of the Shahed-136, which it uses in Ukraine in a modified form known as the Geran-2. The RSF also operates UAE-supplied, Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) drones, modified to drop two 120mm mortar rounds on its target (Military Africa, February 12, 2024).

RSF drone brought down by the SAF in Shendi, April 23, 2024. (ST)

Recently, the RSF has used Chinese-made drones to bring the war to the previously safe cities of Upper Nubia, home of the riverine Arabs who have dominated Sudan’s politics and military since independence. The SAF’s Third Infantry Division was attacked by drones in Shendi (150 km north of Khartoum) on April 23, while an earlier attack in Atbara targeted the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade of Islamist fighters on March 2 (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 23, 2024). The Brigade is a hardline Islamist militia fighting alongside the SAF as part of the “popular mobilization” strategy that has brought both former rebel movements and ex-members of Omar al-Bashir’s military/Islamist regime on side with the SAF (Al-Taghyeer, April 3, 2024).

General Shams al-Din Kabbashi

Brigadier Tibieg Mustafa, identified as an advisor to the RSF leader, insisted that the RSF had no part in the drone attacks on Shendi or Atbara: “What happened reflects internal disputes between the Army and the Islamic Brigades of Al-Barra’a bin Malik, which fight alongside the Army” (Radio Tamazuj, April 25, 2024). There appear to be differences in the SAF’s senior command over the role of the Islamic Brigades; General Shams al-Din Kabbashi, the army’s deputy commander, believes their inclusion is dangerous, while General Yasir al-Atta, a member of the sovereignty council, insists the SAF is open to all Sudanese, including Islamists (Middle East Eye, April 4, 2024). Despite Brigadier Tibieg’s claim, there seems little reason at this time to believe the SAF is attacking its allies with drones.

General Yasir al-Atta (ST)

On April 24, three reconnaissance drones were spotted flying over the Nubian town of Hambukol (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 25, 2024).  Shendi was attacked again on June 9, when five “suicide” drones were shot down by the Third Infantry Division. No damage or casualties were reported but widespread panic was reported in the town (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024).

On June 7, the SAF’s 18th Infantry Division shot down two RSF drones targeting the Kenana airbase in White Nile State and the division headquarters in Kosti (White Nile State). The attacks came a day after SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan arrived in Kosti (Sudan Tribune, June 7, 2024).

RSF advances east of the Nile have brought previously safe cities within range of RSF aerial attacks. In early April, two or three RSF drones panicked the eastern city of al-Qadarif when they struck the local headquarters of the General Intelligence Service and a judiciary building (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 9, 2024; Asharq al-Awsat, April 10, 2024).

Unlike the SAF, the RSF has no air force, but drones have provided an available and low-cost alternative that allows the paramilitary to spread terror in SAF-held cities well behind the lines and attack SAF facilities, airbases in particular.

NOTE

  1. The description of the RSF as “rebels” is somewhat contentious; see for example a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), that insists the RSF is “not a ‘rebel’ group – it’s recognized by law and was developed, tolerated and sustained as an instrument of state power…” (USIP, April 20, 2023).

 

Assessing the War in Sudan: Is an RSF Victory in Sight?

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 21(24)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

December 15, 2023

After eight months of brutal warfare, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now appear to have the upper hand against the better-armed Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” the RSF has conducted a highly mobile campaign against the SAF’s reactive and defensive posture, allowing the group to take the initiative in all regions of the conflict. With the Sudanese capital of Khartoum now a devastated battlefield, the ineffective government, led by SAF commander-in-chief General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, operates from a temporary base in Port Sudan, which suffers from power shortages and a chronic lack of fresh water.

Peace talks in Jeddah between the two military factions, assisted by Saudi, American, and African Union mediators, were indefinitely suspended earlier this month after both sides failed to meet commitments agreed upon in earlier negotiations (al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], December 4; Africa News, December 5). The animosity between the factions is severe and historically based in the rivalry between the poor Arab tribesmen of western Sudan (the RSF) and the Arab elites of the Nile region who have controlled Sudan and its military since the country gained independence in 1956.

RSF Commander General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”

Resistance to the RSF onslaught is weakening at all levels, placing Sudan’s diverse population at risk of rule by Arab supremacists with a record of savage conduct and a general ignorance of the means of development, administrative techniques, economic theory, and international relations.

The Impending RSF Conquest of Darfur

Four of Darfur’s five states, comprising nearly 80 percent of the western province, are now in RSF hands. North Darfur state and its capital, al-Fashir, may be the RSF’s next target. Al-Fashir is strategically and symbolically important as the former capital of the once powerful Fur Sultanate (c.1650-1916). Security in North Darfur is provided largely by the Joint Protection Force (JPF), an alliance of five non-Arab armed movements that has been busy recruiting in the region in anticipation of an RSF offensive. The RSF has also been recruiting from the region’s Arab population, setting the stage for a vicious ethnic conflict that will inevitably result in the mass slaughter and displacement of many of North Darfur’s civilians. Convoys bringing supplies to North Darfur from central Sudan have stopped, creating shortages of food, fuel, and medicines (Sudan Tribune, December 7).

JEM Leader Jibril Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune)

Two major armed movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), abandoned their self-declared neutrality on November 16 to announce their support for the SAF. Both groups also declared their willingness “to participate in military operations on all fronts without hesitation” (Radio Dabanga, November 17). JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim also condemned the RSF’s use of Arab mercenaries from Chad and Niger who have been promised the right to settle on land cleared of its non-Arab residents. The declaration followed months of murder and rape inflicted by the RSF on the non-Arab Black population of Darfur. The most notable atrocity involved the murder of some 1,300 civilians (mostly Masalit, an ethnic group in western Sudan and eastern Chad) in a camp for displaced people in West Darfur. The RSF attack began on November 2 and only ended three days later (Al Jazeera, November 10). The non-Arab Masalit have been targeted by the RSF and Arab militias since the start of the war in what appears to be an effort to ethnically cleanse the region of its indigenous Black population (see Terrorism Monitor, June 26).

Zaghawa Nomads (X)

Despite their small numbers, the ambitious Black African Zaghawa ethnic group plays a leading role in Darfur’s anti-government opposition. SLA-MM leader Minni Minawi, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim, and al-Tahir Hajar, leader of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), are all Zaghawa. During the fighting for Nyala, RSF gunmen were accused of assassinating prominent members of the Zaghawa community (Sudan Tribune, September 16).

Darfur Governor and SLA-MM Leader Minni Minawi (AFP)

Minni Minawi, governor of Darfur since August 2021, remains wary of the SAF, which continues to be commanded by members of Sudan’s riverine Arab elite. The rank-and-file troops are composed of conscripts from other regions, including many non-Arabs. Without substantial reforms to the composition of the SAF, Minawi notes its victory might only mean a return to an oppressive status quo (Sudan War Monitor, December 4).

RSF’s Series of Conquests

Under pressure from the RSF, garrisons across Darfur have fallen like dominos. Nyala, Sudan’s second-largest city, is the capital of South Darfur and an important military strongpoint. It fell after a long siege followed by a four-day assault that ended on October 26, killing hundreds of civilians during the shelling of the city (Asharq al-Awsat, October 29).

Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur, was lost after the SAF’s 21st Infantry Division fled on October 31, allowing the RSF to walk in. Al-Geneina, capital of West Darfur, was taken by the RSF on November 4 after most of the 15th Division garrison fled, leaving hundreds of troops and weapons behind. Masalit civilians and captured troops were abused, whipped, and forced to run barefoot through the rubble (Sudan War Monitor, November 6). Gathering smaller garrisons along the way, the remaining defenders fled to Chad, where they were disarmed and interned. Elsewhere in South Darfur, officers have changed into civilian clothes and made for the border with South Sudan (Sudan War Monitor, November 27).

SAF Leader General al-Burhan (BBC)

As it consolidates control of Darfur, the RSF is now poised to begin operations against al-Ubayd, the capital of neighboring North Kordofan. The RSF has already driven away the SAF’s garrison in the western Kordofan town of al-Mojalid and the nearby Balila oilfield (a joint Sudanese-Chinese project), despite intensive airstrikes by the SAF (Asharq al-Awsat, October 31; al-Taghayeer [Khartoum], November 27).

Where Do Armed Opposition Movements Stand?

The war of the generals has finally shattered the hard-won 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), which promised a new era of peace in Sudan by reconciling the government with the nation’s leading rebel movements. However, two of the most powerful movements rejected the process entirely. In practice, the JPA has been described as “a mechanism to disburse political patronage to a few key rebel leaders.” [1]

One of the principal armed movements in Darfur is the largely Fur-based Sudan Liberation Army of Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (SLA-AW). The group helped launch the 2003 rebel attacks on the SAF that sparked nearly two decades of war in Darfur (Darfur means “abode of the Fur”). The movement was not a signatory to the JPA and is not part of North Darfur’s Joint Protection Force. Nonetheless, General Yusuf Karjakula led a group of SLA-AW fighters from its Jabal Marra stronghold to al-Fashir in late November where they deployed to protect IDP camps from RSF assaults (Sudan Tribune, December 3). The general also met with SAF and JPF commanders, suggesting the SLA-AW may be considering joint operations to defend al-Fashir despite long-standing distrust of the SAF.

Many of the armed opposition movements have begun to split internally over the issue of alignment with the RSF or the SAF (for the rebel movements, see Terrorism Monitor, August 8). Even Minni Minawi’s faction of the SLA is experiencing divisions between its SAF-supporting leader and its military commander, General Juma Haggar, who supports the RSF (Sudan War Monitor, December 4). The Sudan Liberation Army-Transitional Council (SLA-TC), led by Al-Hadi Idris Yahya Farajallah, is considered close to the RSF, though the movement’s vice-president, Salah al-Din Abdel-Rahman al-Ma’rouf “Salah Rasas,” is considered to be a supporter of the SAF (Sudan War Monitor, December 4). A new faction of JEM under Sulayman Sandal Haggar split from the movement in August 2023 after some JEM members charged leader Jibril Ibrahim with backing the SAF (Darfur24, August 30).

Some rebel leaders are attempting to remain neutral, like Al-Tahir Abu Bakr Hajar, leader of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), though some of his men were reported among the defenders of Nyala (Sudan War Monitor, October 26).

Foreign Intervention in the Sudan Conflict

There are allegations of foreign interference in the conflict, notably support for the RSF from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia’s Wagner Group, as well as Ukrainian support for General al-Burhan’s SAF.

Alleged Ukrainian Sniper on Ridge Northwest of Omdurman (Bellingcat)

Al-Burhan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met in Ireland on September 23 to discuss responses to the pro-RSF activities of the Russian Wagner Group in Sudan (Kyiv Independent, September 23; Sudan Tribune, September 23). The meeting came days after the release of videos alleged to show Ukrainian drone attacks on RSF forces in the Sudanese capital (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 14). Since then, videos have emerged of Ukrainian snipers operating in the hills northwest of Omdurman, as geolocated by independent investigative collective Bellingcat (Bellingcat.com, October 7). There have also been videos released on November 6, allegedly showing personnel of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate of Intelligence engaging with RSF fighters, Wagner personnel, and members of Russia’s special forces in the Sudanese city of Omdurman (Kyiv Post, November 6; Sudan War Monitor, November 10).

Journalists seeking confirmation or denial of these activities have been referred to the words of Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence service HUR MOU (Holovne upravlinnja rozvidky Ministerstva oborony Ukrajiny), who stated last May that “we have killed Russians and will continue to kill Russians anywhere in the world, until the complete victory of Ukraine” (New Voice of Ukraine, May 17). RSF leader Hemetti has expressed his support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and his paramilitary force is alleged to have engaged in gold smuggling with Wagner operatives in exchange for arms and advisors.

Small operations of the type allegedly engaged in by Ukraine in Sudan ultimately have little influence on the outcome of the war. However, they do diminish the local reputation of Wagner operatives who have helped finance Russia’s war in Ukraine by smuggling gold from regions of western Sudan under RSF control.

General Yassir al-Atta

General Yassir al-Atta (deputy to al-Burhan) stated that military intelligence and diplomatic sources had confirmed that the UAE was shipping supplies to the RSF through neighboring countries, including Chad. The allegation was denied by authorities in the UAE (Radio Tamazuj [Juba], November 29). The UAE is Sudan’s main trading partner, has been a major investor in Sudan in recent years, and is the primary destination for gold smuggled out of western Sudan. Al-Atta’s description of the UAE as a “mafia-state” led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between the two countries (Radio Dabanga, December 11).

Atta’s remarks also incensed Chadian authorities. On December 11, they demanded an official Sudanese apology for claiming the UAE had been allowed to ship weapons and munitions to the RSF through Chad. N’Djamena promised to take “measures” if the apology did not come within three days (Sudan Tribune, December 11). Darfur governor Minni Minawi had already accused Chadian authorities of allowing the passage of arms and mercenaries through Chad to the RSF in mid-November (Radio Dabanga, November 17).

There are further allegations that the Zaghawa generals who control Chad’s powerful military are annoyed by the UAE’s support of the mainly-Arab RSF and are providing clandestine support to their Zaghawa kinsmen in JEM and the SLA-MM (Sudan Tribune, December 7).

Destruction of Khartoum

Little remains in SAF hands in Khartoum other than the much-battered army headquarters and a small patch of Khartoum North (Bahri) connected by the SAF-controlled Blue Nile rail bridge. Khartoum’s al-Jaili refinery, the largest fuel production facility in Sudan, was destroyed in a bombing on December 6, the fourth such bombing of that location since the war began. Both the RSF and the SAF accuse the other of being responsible for the destruction (Sudan Tribune, December 6). RSF posts are dispersed throughout Khartoum; in the SAF’s attempt to find and destroy them, large parts of the city have been smashed by airstrikes and artillery, including many of its most notable buildings.

The RSF now controls all of Khartoum State, with the exception of the SAF-controlled pockets in Khartoum and northern Omdurman. RSF patrols have been spotted recently in eastern Sudan, possibly preparing the way for an occupation of that region. Twenty-five miles south of Khartoum, the strategic Jabal Awliya military base and airport fell on November 20 after a siege and two-day assault, removing a major obstacle to a RSF incursion into White Nile State (Radio Dabanga, November 21).

Conclusion

The SAF is highly demoralized and suffers from high rates of desertion and defection. Resistance to the RSF is collapsing in many parts of the country, diminishing hopes for a negotiated settlement. There are thousands of dead, soldiers and civilians alike. The country’s GDP is expected to decline by 18 percent this year due to the war (Africa News, October 12), with over half the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Six million Sudanese are displaced and cut off from normal avenues of support. As famine approaches, the only trade activity that still works is the import and distribution of arms, despite an international embargo.

Civilian groups that had previously discovered the power of the people when overthrowing President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 have now discovered that they have zero influence in the current military power struggle. Most alarming is the emergence of patterns of ethnic and tribal violence that have ways of resisting political settlement while perpetuating grievances both new and traditional. Focused on self-enrichment, the RSF’s barely literate leadership has no rational plan for reviving the state. There is little chance that the RSF’s military success can translate into a brighter future for Sudan’s 46 million people.

Note:

[1] Amar Jamal, “Key Actors in the Juba Peace Agreement: Roles, Impacts and Lessons,” Rift Valley Institute Research Report, September 14, 2023, p.16, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/RVI%202023.09.14%20Key%20Actors%20in%20the%20JPA.pdf

“There Will Be No Dar Masalit, Only Dar Arab”: Sudan’s Ethnic Divisions Destroy West Darfur

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, Washington DC

June 26, 2023

Arab Tribesman and RSF vehicle, West Darfur, June 2022 (AP)

The conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Sudan started on April 15. However, parts of Darfur were already experiencing ethnic and political violence, much of it dating back to the 1990s. While the clashes in Khartoum dominate international media attention, fighting in the more remote Darfur region has exploded in intensity and bloodshed, particularly in one of the region’s five states—West Darfur.

West Darfur is home to the Masalit people, Black Africans claiming ancestral origins in Tunisia. Historically, the region is known as “Dar Masalit” (dar meaning “abode of” or “home of”). Based in the historically volatile border region between western Darfur and eastern Chad, the Masalit took advantage of political upheavals in the region to establish an independent border sultanate in the late 19th century. The young sultanate, however, immediately faced invasion by Sudanese Mahdists and attacks from the Sultan of Darfur, who considered the sultanate his property.

Range of the Masalit People (Joshua Project)

Famed for their fierceness in battle, the Masalit also fought two major battles against the French in 1910, halting the eastward expansion of the French colonialists and the absorption of Dar Masalit into French-ruled Chad. The Anglo-Egyptian army that occupied Darfur in 1916 continued west into Dar Masalit, leading to its eventual formal absorption in 1922 into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (and later independent Sudan) following a border treaty between Britain and France. To this day, however, the Masalit and other tribes of the region have closer relations with their kinsmen in Chad than Sudan’s ruling Nile Valley Arabs. Al-Geneina (a.k.a. al-Junaynah), the capital of West Darfur, is 745 miles from Khartoum, but only 17 miles from Chad.

In all its turbulent history, the escalating conflict in West Darfur now represents the greatest threat in many years to the existence of the Masalit homeland.

Arabism vs. Traditional Society

As the Khartoum regime began to promote an Arab supremacist/Islamist ideology in the 1990s, it replaced the traditional administrative structure of the Masalit with appointees from the military and the Rizayqat Arabs of North Darfur. Persecution of Masalit community leaders followed, and soon Arab militias began to attack Masalit villages and burn their crops to force them into out-migration. By 1997-1999, the Masalit were suffering thousands of civilian casualties as government-armed Arab militias ran wild under the direction of national intelligence units. Khartoum staunched local resistance by disarming the Masalit and conscripting their young men to fight the rebels in South Sudan.

Sudan Minister of National Defense ‘Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn

In 1999, then Sudanese Interior Minister ‘Abd al-Rahim Muhammed Husayn declared the Masalit to be outlaws and enemies of the regime, falsely claiming they had murdered all the Arab leaders in Dar Masalit. [1] Promoted to Minister of National Defense, ‘Abd al-Rahim found himself facing an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant in March 2012 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. [2] Fighting between the Masalit and Arabs broke out again in January 2020 and again in April 2021, leaving 452 dead and over 500 wounded (Darfur24, July 21, 2021).

Sudanese Army Recruitment in Darfur

More recently, the Sudanese Army launched an intensive recruitment effort in Darfur a month before hostilities between the army and the RSF, which is composed mainly of Darfur Arabs, broke out in mid-April. The recruitment campaign targeted Arab tribesmen, focusing on the Mahamid clan of the Rizayqat Arabs. The chief of the Mahamid is Musa Hilal, the former leader of the infamous Janjaweed and a main rival of his cousin and former protegé, RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” a member of the Mahariya branch of the Rizayqat.

Musa Hilal (Sudan Tribune)

Some Arab leaders suspect the military focused on recruiting followers of Musa Hilal in order to create a new border force that would rival Hemetti’s RSF (al-Jazeera, May 3). The new force could incorporate Musa loyalists returning from work as mercenaries in Libya. Mahmud Madibbo, who is the nazir (paramount chief) of the Rizayqat, declared “our total rejection of the campaigns of recruitment of tribal youth by intelligence agencies working to mobilize the tribes for more war and prolong the tribal conflict that has claimed a number of innocent lives” (Sudan Tribune, March 16). The latest in a long line of powerful Rizayqat chiefs, Mahmud is a supporter of Hemetti and vowed last year to protect him.

Rizayqat elders met in 2020 with leaders of the RSF, but were unsuccessful in working out the differences between Musa Hilal and Hemetti. Relations between their respective branches of the Rizayqat, the Mahamid and the Mahariya, became tense after the violent 2017 clashes between Musa’s Mahamid supporters and the RSF, in which Hemetti’s brother, Brigadier ‘Abd al-Rahim Juma’a Daglo, was killed. Musa Hilal served four years in prison after being charged with attacking government forces, although he was pardoned and released by the post-revolution transitional government in March 2021.

The Destruction of al-Geneina

Al-Geneina, the capital of West Darfur state, is home to nearly half a million people. Escalating violence, much of it ethnic-based, forced the West Darfur governor to declare a State of Emergency and a 7AM to 7PM curfew on April 10, five days before the conflict between the RSF and SAF broke out. Arab gunmen on motorcycles and camels were reportedly attacking the eastern part of al-Geneina, burning houses and shooting randomly at people. Security forces were conspicuously absent from the streets (Sudan Tribune, April 10).

Al-Geneina in Peacetime (UN News)

By late April, the police and much of the regular army had fled as armed Arab tribesmen began to pour into al-Geneina from north and central Darfur. Indiscriminate fire killed many, camps for displaced people were overrun and medical facilities, including the Red Crescent headquarters, were looted and burned, destroying blood banks and valuable medical equipment (Sudan Tribune, April 27). All dialysis patients in al-Geneina died after equipment and medicines were looted (Darfur24, June 10). Al-Geneina airport has since closed, which prevented the arrival of humanitarian assistance.

Al-Geneina Now (Mail and Guardian)

Doctors and other health workers have fallen victim to snipers and the generators needed to power emergency clinics have been stolen by gunmen. Markets, government buildings, schools and aid agencies remain closed after being looted and the water system, communications and power grid have been disabled (Middle East Monitor, May 26). Many private homes have been destroyed. Areas where residents have taken refuge in large numbers have come under attack by RSF forces firing RPGs (Radio Dabanga, June 14). Other African groups besides the Masalit are also being attacked in al-Geneina by Arab militias backed by RSF forces under the command of ‘Abd al-Rahman Juma’a. Hundreds of bodies lie in the streets as snipers prevent anyone from going outside. Rape, arson and armed robbery have become common (Darfur24, June 10). According to West Darfur’s deputy governor, al-Bukhari ‘Abd Allah, “The magnitude of suffering is inconceivable in El Geneina” (Radio Dabanga, June 8).

Masalit and RSF Responses

In the first days of May, Masalit residents were reported to have seized 7,000 weapons from an abandoned police armory in al-Geneina, though a Masalit leader denied responsibility (Sudan Tribune, May 2). Weapons are plentiful and arrive regularly from Chad. However, they are expensive, and only wealthy residents can afford the $1300 it costs to purchase a Kalashnikov (France24.com, May 19).

RSF Patrol, West Darfur (AP)

The RSF has attempted to obscure its part in the violence by insisting, as it has in Khartoum, that men were impersonating RSF personnel during attacks on civilians. The RSF used social media to condemn a May 14 SAF attack in al-Geneina using tanks and heavy artillery that allegedly killed 20 civilians and damaged the Nassim mosque (RSF Twitter, May 14). The paramilitary has also called for an independent investigation into the violence in al-Geneina, and is no doubt confident that no such inquiry can proceed under the current conditions.

Despite the RSF’s role in the fighting, Hemetti issued a message in late May calling on the people of al-Geneina to “reject regionalism and tribalism. Stop fighting amongst yourselves immediately” (Middle East Monitor, May 26). Nevertheless, by June 15, there were over 1,000 dead in al-Geneina, including women and children, with thousands more wounded and unable to receive treatment. Over 100,000 residents have fled across the border to Chad or other parts of Darfur (al-Hadath TV [Dubai], June 15; Darfur24, June 10).

The Murder of West Darfur’s Governor

Governor Khamis ‘Abd Allah Abkar

The governor of West Darfur, Khamis ‘Abd Allah Abkar, was murdered on June 14, only two hours after receiving an interview form al-Hadath TV. During the interview, Khamis denounced the killing of civilians by the RSF and Arab militants in West Darfur: “There is an ongoing genocide in the region and therefore we need international intervention to protect the remaining population of the region” (Sudan Tribune, June 14). Khamis led Masalit self-defense militias during the Arab attacks of the 1990s. Arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison, Khamis nonetheless escaped in 2003. He then joined the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel movement but eventually left to form his own breakaway movement, the SLA-Khamis Abakr (SLA-KA) (Small Arms Survey, July 2010). In time, this became the largely Masalit Sudanese Alliance Forces. Khamis was appointed governor of West Darfur after this new group joined four other rebel groups in signing the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA).

Khamis’ arrest by RSF forces followed his interview, with a short video clip appearing on social media showing the governor being unloaded from a vehicle by armed men, one of whom appears to have tried to attack him with a chair as he was being led into a room (Twitter, June 14). A second video then appeared on social media showing the governor’s bloody body, while unseen individuals celebrate offscreen (Sudan Tribune, June 14). SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan accused the RSF of the killing, noting “the dead man had nothing to do with the conflict” (al-Hadath TV [Dubai], June 15). The RSF condemned the murder of the governor. However, an RSF spokesman did not affirm or deny responsibility for the murder, stating only that, “We are in a state of war and there is no safe place in West Darfur” (The New Arab, June 15; Channels Television [Lagos], June 16; SUNA, June 14).

Masalit Sultan Sa’ad ‘Abd al-Rahman Bahr al-Din

West Darfur’s traditional leadership has been challenged as well as its political leadership. After Rizayqat gunmen carried out three major massacres of Masalit civilians between 2019 and 2022, killing a total of 378 people, the Sultan of Dar Masalit, Sa’ad ‘Abd al-Rahman Bahar al-Din, complained of the growth of government-sponsored “Arabism,” accompanied by the disarmament of the Masalit and the arming of Arab militias. As sultan (a largely symbolic but influential position), Sa’ad hinted in 2021 that it might be time to re-examine the Gilani Agreement of 1919, which saw Dar Masalit absorbed by Anglo-Egyptian Sudan rather than French-ruled Chad (Darfur24, May 14, 2021). The sultan later complained it would have been better for Dar Masalit to have been absorbed by Chad, which despite being one of the world’s poorest nations, “has a strong security apparatus.” (BBC, May 31, 2022). Masalit tribal leaders have been targeted in the fighting; among the victims is the Sultan’s brother, Amir Tariq. The sultan’s palace overlooking the city was looted and partly destroyed and an Arab fighter was filmed outside the damaged building declaring “There will be no Dar Masalit again, only Dar Arab” (Sudan Tribune, June 13).

Conclusion

With local support from Darfur’s Arab tribes (and across the board support is not guaranteed), the RSF could make Darfur a stronghold in the event that the paramilitary is driven from Khartoum and other Sudanese cities. Mustafa Tambour, leader of the breakaway Sudan Liberation Movement-Tambour (SLM-T), recently reported that goods, vehicles, and cash looted by the RSF in Khartoum are being shipped to parts of central and western Darfur (Radio Dabanga, June 13).

On the other hand, the assassination of Governor Khamis, as leader of one of the five Darfur rebel movements to sign the JPA, has the potential to draw the other rebel leaders into the conflict, especially as violence has spread across the rest of Darfur, where the joint patrols of the JPA signatories have helped, if not maintain security, at least prevent insecurity from becoming much worse. Such joint operations have had less success in West Darfur. When Darfur Governor Minni Minnawi tried on May 24 to deploy a joint force of former rebel groups to escort a commercial convoy into al-Geneina and stop the violence against civilians, for example, his forces were ambushed outside the city by RSF troops supported by armed Arabs (Sudan Tribune, May 24). For the moment, there appears to be little to prevent the further displacement of the Masalit from their traditional homeland.

NOTES

  1. Daowd Ibrahim Salih, Mohamed Adam Yahya, Abdul Hafiz Omar Sharief and Osman Abbakorah (Masalit Community in Exile): “The Hidden Slaughter and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Sudan: An Open Letter to the International Community,” Damanga.org, April 8, 1999.
  2. “Situation in Darfur, Sudan,” Case Information Sheet, The Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12, May 1, 2012, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CaseInformationSheets/HusseinEng.pdf

This article first appeared in the June 26, 2023 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Sudan’s Fratricidal Conflict: An Assessment of SAF and RSF Strategies and Tactics

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor

May 27, 2023

Khartoum, May 2023 (Reuters)

The ongoing conflict in Sudan pits two very different wings of the Sudanese military in a struggle to control a population that would largely prefer democratic civilian rule over domination by either force after decades of political and economic stagnation under military rule. Differences in ethnic composition, training, and weapons have compelled the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF, led by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan) and the rival Rapid Support Forces paramilitary (RSF, led by General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” ) to adopt different strategies and tactics in their search for victory (Terrorism Monitor, April 28). Although Sudan is the third-largest nation in Africa, with an area of nearly 720,000 square miles, the main battleground between SAF and RSF is the tri-city area of Khartoum, Omdurman, and industrial Khartoum North (or Bahri), which poses a problem for the combatants.

Troublesome Terrain

Neither the SAF nor the RSF have much experience in urban warfare. Sudanese warfare is combat in the desert, the bush, and the mountains. The last sieges of Sudanese cities occurred in the Mahdist campaigns of 1881-1885. Since then, the only fighting carried out in Khartoum consists of a couple of very brief mutinies during Anglo-Egyptian rule, a failed 1976 Libyan-backed coup attempt that killed 800 people, and a day of combat (mostly in northern Omdurman) when Darfuri rebels stormed the city in 2008 (Sudan Tribune, June 20, 2008).

Initially intended to operate in the great open spaces of Sudan and remote borders of strategic significance, the RSF’s main operational equipment consists of so-called “technicals,” which are open-bed 4x4s (the Toyota Hilux is preferred) armed with a 50-caliber machine gun. Though intended for use in the desert, the technicals are nimbler in urban warfare than the SAF’s armor. The RSF began with no armor of its own, but has captured much since, including Ukrainian-made tanks, though it does not have the trained crews needed to operate this armor. [1]

Map of important targets in the Tri-City Capital area (Torchlight.ai)

Rapid strikes on SAF bases allowed the RSF to seize large quantities of weapons and ammunition at the outset of the conflict and overcome the paramilitary’s usual reliance on government supplies. The RSF has continued to depend on quick hit-and-run strikes on military and civilian infrastructure rather than holding and defending territory, tactics more familiar to the regular army. Any RSF success is immediately documented on social media, a conflict forum in which the SAF appears to be lagging behind.

RSF in Khartoum

The RSF is able to pull in most of its forces to the capital as it currently assumes no responsibility for national security. The SAF, on the other hand, continues to be responsible for the borders (previously the responsibility of the RSF) and for containing rebel movements in South Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile State. The RSF’s strategy is to disperse its forces in civilian areas of the tri-city to negate the SAF’s advantages in armor, aircraft and artillery, while applying maximum political pressure on the SAF by depriving the civilian population of basic needs and services. The RSF is using the SAF’s aerial advantage against it; damage to residential areas and infrastructure from bombing alienates the SAF from the population. The RSF obtained anti-aircraft missile systems during its deployment in Yemen and may have seized more in the opening days of the conflict; it has since claimed to have downed several SAF aircraft (Arab News, October 10, 2022).

Saudi aircraft destroyed at Khartoum Airport (SamChui.com)

With no air power of its own, the RSF targeted airbases throughout Sudan in the first days of the conflict, many of which appear to have been unprepared for the RSF assault. Air facilities that have suffered heavy RSF attacks include the Geneina, Nyala and al-Fashir airbases in Darfur, Merowe airport in Northern State, Wadi Sayyidna north of Omdurman and the Jabal Awliya airbase 40 km south of Khartoum. The intention is not to hold these airbases or capture warplanes, but to damage runways and aircraft that subsequently cannot be used by the RSF. Lingering too long can invite devastating counter-attacks, such as the RSF suffered at Merowe when a fleeing convoy was struck by SAF warplanes (SAF/Facebook, April 20). Pro-Islamist media claim that hundreds of those killed at Merowe were foreign fighters recruited by the RSF (Tayba TV [Khartoum], May 1).

Map showing military airfields struck by the RSF (Middle East Eye)

Khartoum International Airport, which also hosts military aircraft, has been badly damaged in RSF attacks, though SAF Sukhoi and MiG aircraft continue attacks on various neighborhoods of the tri-city area believed to host concentrations of RSF fighters. SAF air superiority in Khartoum is ultimately of limited value, however, unless it chooses to obliterate large parts of the city of five million people in pursuit of mobile RSF units. With the army taking little apparent notice of gradual RSF deployments in the capital region in the weeks prior to the outbreak of fighting, the paramilitary struck fast to take the General Command headquarters and seize the SAF leadership. In this, they were only partly successful, with SAF leader, General Abdelfattah al-Burhan, escaping even though his home was occupied by RSF fighters. Many of his bodyguards were killed in the attack and the Inspector General of the SAF (number three in the command) and 130 others were captured (Al-Arabiya, May 10). Both sides have attempted to strike a decisive blow by taking out the other side’s leader. Neither have succeeded, with both the RSF and SAF leaders being forced to maintain low profiles to avoid assassins.

SAF Responses to RSF

To help address RSF tactics in Khartoum, the SAF command has brought in the Central Reserve Police (CRP, popularly known as Abu Tira). Similarly armed to the RSF, the CRP is accused of committing crimes and human rights violations in Darfur and in Khartoum during the 2019 anti-‘Umar al-Bashir protests (Sudan Tribune, April 29). The roughly 80,000 strong CRP is trained as a highly maneuverable paramilitary, whose main task will be to consolidate areas once the SAF has cleared them of RSF fighters. They will also assist in blocking RSF supply lines, especially in south Khartoum, where supplies by land do not have to deal with crossing the White or Blue Niles, which are controlled by the SAF.

Central Reserve Police on patrol in the south of Khartoum on 29 April 2023

The RSF claims that both the CRP and SAF regulars wear RSF uniforms to commit crimes in Khartoum, attack the headquarters of opposition politicians, and mislead the public (RSF/Twitter, May 16; RSF/Twitter, May 17). The RSF’s repeated accusations that their opponents commit grave crimes while wearing RSF gear predates the current struggle. For example, in January the RSF commander “Hemedti” denied reports of RSF involvement in a coup attempt in neighboring Central African Republic (CAR), claiming that “large quantities of RSF uniforms are being smuggled across the border” (Middle East Eye, January 18, 2023).

The SAF has also been accused of reviving the infamous Katayib al-Zili (Shadow Brigades), which are armed Islamist civilians associated with former president al-Bashir and the now-banned Islamist National Congress Party (NCP). During the 2019 revolution against al-Bashir, his vice-president, veteran Islamist ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, threatened protesters with the notorious “Shadow Brigades,” which are known for running illegal detention facilities called “ghost houses,” where torture and murder were routine practices (Asharq al-Awsat, January 16, 2020). On May 16, the RSF claimed to have overrun SAF camps in Bahri used for training Shadow Brigades while capturing more than 700 individuals (RSF Twitter, May 16, 2023).

Conclusion

Beside troop concentrations and obvious military targets, government buildings, markets, bridges, factories, hospitals and places of worship have all been targeted in the urban fighting. Two-thirds of the nation’s hospitals have ceased functioning (much of Khartoum North’s East Nile Hospital was destroyed by an SAF bombing strike), with some even being converted into military bases (Asharq al-Awsat, May 19). The RSF has been accused of stealing ambulances and medical supplies while terrorizing patients (Radio Dabanga, May 15).

RSF Troops after Taking the State Broadcaster in Omdurman (RSF/Twitter)

Though the RSF claims to have no religious motivation and to even have Christians in its ranks, it appears to have attacked and looted Coptic, Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, turning some of the well-built structures into military bases (RSF/witter, May 14; Radio Dabanga, May 15; Religionnews.com, May 15; Radio Dabanga, May 17). Both the Azhari and Bur’i al-Dereisa mosques in Khartoum were bombed in mid-May, apparently by SAF aircraft (RSF Twitter, May 13; Radio Dabanga, May 15).  Warehouses and factories in industrial Khartoum North have also been looted with economic consequences for Sudan. There is a serious danger of important state heritage institutions, such as the National Archives or the National Museum, becoming subject to looting, aerial bombing or accidental destruction.

The RSF, with a long reputation for using mass rapes as a tactic to break resistance in Darfur, has been accused of raping women in the capital, though the paramilitary insists the culprits are impersonating RSF personnel. Rights activists have also made unverified claims of rape by SAF personnel (Radio Dabanga, May 16).

The differing capabilities of the two antagonists in the Battle of Khartoum and their shared inexperience in urban warfare make it difficult for them to come fully to grips with each other. With a decisive military decision unlikely and negotiations complicated by tribal rivalries and the re-emergence of Sudan’s long-dominant Islamists, short-term prospects of a return to peace are growing ever more distant.

Note:

[1] On May 1, the RSF released a video to prove their seizure of all the armored vehicles of the Army’s 1st Infantry Brigade (RSF/Twitter, May 1).

This article first appeared in the May 27, 2023 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan

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Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9

Andrew McGregor

April 28, 2023

Sudan Air Force Warplane Strikes Targets in Khartoum

Sudan ended over a quarter-century of Islamist-military rule with the 2019 overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir, whose rule was based on Islamism, Arab supremacy, and the ruthless application of military power. A joint civilian-military government was formed to lead the transition to a civilian-led democracy. However, an October 2021 coup led by Sudan’s military and security forces ended all progress toward civilian rule, severing at the same time most of Sudan’s economic and financial ties to the West.

The UN and international diplomats have been trying to guide negotiations for a democratic transition between the military and the civilian Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. The final version of the Framework Agreement on transition was to be signed on April 6. However, the deadline passed when the security forces indicated they were not prepared to sign due to the inability of two competing elements of the military to agree on integration and military reform provisions.

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (Reuters)

The Framework Agreement called for the integration of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, or al-Quwwat al-Musallaha al-Sudaniya) and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF, or al-Quwat al-Da’m al-Sari). The SAF is led by Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, who is Sudan’s de facto leader as Chair of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), while the RSF is a 30,000-strong paramilitary led by the number two figure in Sudan, TSC Deputy Chair Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti.” The Framework Agreement was intended to lead Sudan to civilian rule. The SAF, however, is highly politicized, and many of its senior officers adhere to an Islamist ideology that rejects the idea of secular government. Rather than unifying the security forces, the Framework Agreement ultimately brought their differences to a head. Supporters of the former president in the SAF are seemingly using the dispute to create a state of political insecurity favorable for a return to Islamist-military rule. Nation-wide fighting finally broke out on April 15 between the two factions.

The RSF, which was loyal to al-Bashir until his overthrow, has sought international support by accusing the army of mounting a “coup d’état” and seeking “to repeat the failed experiences of the rule of the Islamic Movement that conquered our country and destroyed the dreams of our people for thirty years” (Facebook/RSFCommand, April 16). The paramilitary now refers to their former military partners as “fascist military leaders” supported by “a crowd of corrupt Islamic people thirsty for the blood of the Sudanese people” (Facebook/RSFCommand, April 17). In a February 19 televised speech, Hemeti described the 2019 military coup as a “mistake” that has become “a gateway for the return of the former regime” and warned of efforts by Islamists to restore the Bashir regime (Radio Dabanga, February 21; BBC, February 20).

RSF Commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti”

The RSF, much feared within Sudan, is a close-knit operation—the second-in-command is Hemeti’s brother, ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daqlo, while Hemeti’s commanders are all from his own Mahariya clan of the Rizayqat Arabs. The paramilitary has participated in UAE-funded operations in Yemen and in counter-insurgency operations in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile State. It is especially active along the borders with Libya and the Central African Republic, and its brutal response to anti-regime demonstrations in Khartoum and elsewhere has made it widely unpopular. [1]

Ethnic Dimensions of the Conflict

Many Darfur Arabs, who comprise the RSF’s base, dislike the Khartoum ruling class, which consists mostly of members of Sudan’s powerful northern Nile-based Arab tribes, who have controlled the country since independence in 1956: the Ja’alin, the Danagla, and the Sha’iqiya (al-Bashir is Ja’alin, al-Burhan is Sha’iqiya). The riverine Arabs, in turn, regard the Darfur Arabs as backwards and “Africanized.” Like many Darfur Arabs, Hemeti, with nothing more than a Quranic school education, is likely to believe he will never be accepted by the riverine military and political elite. Al-Burhan, on the other hand, is regarded in Darfur as the prime architect of a genocide of non-Arab Muslims and is well-remembered for his threats to exterminate the Fur people, who were the former rulers of Darfur.

During a March “Security and Military Reform Workshop” in Khartoum, the RSF hinted at the longstanding rivalry between the Arab tribes of western Sudan and those of the Nile region (New Arab, April 17). Referring to the SAF as “an army composed of a specific militia belonging to certain tribes,” the RSF reminded those present of a struggle that dates back to the days of Mahdist rule (1885-1899). At that time, western Arabs, particularly the Ta’aisha, took power after the early death of the Mahdi in 1885 and the subsequent sidelining of his riverine relatives by the Mahdi’s Ta’aishi successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi.

Violence returned to Darfur in the modern era with the growing influence of the Arab Gathering (Tajamu al-Arabi), an Arab supremacist group following an ideology developed by Mu’ammar Qaddafi and spread by the leaders of Libya’s Islamic Legion (Failaq al-Islamiya) in the 1980s. Clashes over land developed between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslim tribes of Darfur, particularly the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masalit. The latter groups united in outright rebellion in 2003, while the Bashir government responded by unleashing Janjaweed (a Sudanese Arab militia) gunmen and bandits on the non-Arab civilian population under military direction. The leader of the Janjaweed was Shaykh Musa Hilal ‘Abd Allah, the nazir (chief) of the Um Jalul clan of the Mahamid Arabs, a branch of the northern Rizayqat of Darfur. One of his deputies during the 2003-2005 period of the worst Janjaweed abuses (murder, rape, torture, arson) was Hemeti, who is a cousin from the Awlad Mansur clan of the Mahariya branch of the Northern Rizayqat. [2]

When the crimes of the Janjaweed began to attract unwanted international attention in 2005, the government integrated the gunmen into the Border Guards (Haras al-Hudud), a small camel-mounted unit. Integration into official security structures shielded the Janjaweed from prosecution and brought them under tighter government control. This formation would evolve by 2013 into the RSF, which was conceived as a counter-insurgency force composed mostly of former Janjaweed. The RSF came under the direct authority of the National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS, or Jihaz al-Amn al-Watani wa’l-Mukhabarat) rather than the army and became notorious for their human rights abuses and lack of discipline. Even at this early stage, the RSF became known for clashes with the SAF.

Factions Fail to Integrate

Since becoming Sudan’s de facto ruler in 2019, al-Burhan has displayed an inability to rein in the RSF. He has allowed it to become, as some suggest, a “state-within-a-state.” The RSF, with its young leadership, has for some time offered better training and greater opportunities to make money than enlistment in the SAF.

The SAF wants the RSF to be integrated with the army within a year or two at most. However, the RSF prefers a ten-year timeline (in other words, no real integration at all). UN mediators suggested a five-year compromise, which was swiftly rejected by both parties (New Arab, April 17).

SAF Soldiers at Khartoum Airport (Dabanga)

Hemeti’s power and influence will disappear if the RSF comes under the command of the SAF’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The RSF leader has thus demanded his paramilitary report directly to a civilian government. This essentially preserved the RSF’s autonomy while allowing Hemeti to maintain a major political role.

Al-Burhan dissolved the RSF on April 17 and labelled it a “rebel” movement, adding that the matter is an internal one that does not require interference from the international community. There are, however, questions regarding al-Burhan’s legal authority to dissolve the RSF (Radio Dabanga, April 18). As noted by Dr. Jebril El-Abidi, it was a mistake to try to integrate the RSF into the national military as a complete unit, encouraging continued loyalty to RSF leaders rather than the general command (Asharq al-Awsat, April 20).

When Gold Makes Things Worse

Sudan is now the third-largest gold producer in Africa. However, as much as 80 percent of production is smuggled out of the country, and much of it to Russia. This contributes nothing in the way to state revenues that are already badly diminished by the separation of oil-rich South Sudan.

Joining existing US sanctions, EU sanctions were imposed in March on M-Invest and its subsidiary Sudan Meroe Gold, mining companies tied to Russia’s Wagner Group, for illegally trading in gold “looted by force from local traders” (Sudan Tribune, March 2). In March 2022, an executive with a Sudanese gold mine informed The Telegraph that Russia was smuggling 30 tonnes of gold from Sudan every year to build its reserves and weaken the effects of sanctions imposed on Russia for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The gold is transported in small planes from military airports not subject to customs inspections (The Telegraph, March 3, 2022). Sudan’s Minerals Minister, an ally of the RSF, described the allegations as “baseless” (Sudan Tribune, March 11, 2022).

Remote mines operated by Meroe Gold were guarded by Wagner Group personnel who were also involved in training the RSF (Sudan Tribune, March 21, 2022). It is unclear if Wagner continues in these roles; Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin insists there has been no Wagner presence in Sudan for two years. US authorities have claimed the Wagner Group is now providing weapons to the RSF through bases in Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) (The New Arab, April 22).

Documents obtained by an anti-corruption NGO revealed the RSF has its own bank account in Abu Dhabi that it has used to obtain vehicles suitable for conversion to machine-gun mounted “technicals.” Financing comes from al-Junaid Gold Company, which is officially owned by ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daglo and his two sons (Global Witness, April 5, 2020). Al-Junaid has since diversified into numerous other economic activities, its revenues providing independence for the RSF.

In Darfur, gold was discovered in 2012 at Jabal Amer (northwest of Kabkabiya). In July 2015, Musa Hilal and his Mahamid followers took control of Jabal Amer after slaughtering hundreds of Bani Hussayn Arabs working the artisanal mines. This reaped enormous profits until Musa’s arrest in November 2017, at which point control of the mines was transferred to Hemeti and the RSF. The SAF in turn seized control of Jabal Amer in October 2020.

Smuggled gold is typically exported through the Wagner Group-occupied CAR or by air to the Russian base in Latakia, Syria. Wagner elements have been accused of attacks on artisanal gold miners close to the border with the CAR (Radio Dabanga, August 1, 2022). Moscow has little interest in a return to civilian rule in Sudan as one of the first tasks of a new government would be to take control of gold exports to ensure revenues wind up in the public treasury instead of private hands.

“Admiral Grigorovich” Frigate, Port Sudan, 2021 (al-Arabiya)

Beyond gold, a deal was reached in February between Russia and Sudan’s military rulers for the establishment of a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast in return for arms and military equipment, although it awaits ratification by a new civilian government (al-Arabiya, February 11; Sudan Tribune, February 11). The 25-year deal, with automatic 10-year extensions if neither side objects, would allow a base of 300 Russian military personnel capable of accommodating four Russian ships at a time, including nuclear-powered vessels. [3] Egypt and Saudi Arabia are both unhappy about the deal, which would see a long-term Russian naval presence in the strategic Red Sea. French, American, British, and Norwegian diplomats have all expressed concerns about the growing involvement of Wagner Group companies and personnel in Sudan, much of it facilitated through the RSF. [4]

Islamism in the Regular Army

The RSF has accused the army’s “fascist military leaders” of “religious mania” (Facebook, April 17; Facebook, April 18). Many Islamist al-Bashir loyalists, known as keizan, are prominent in the high ranks of the army. Loyalists of al-Bashir and the banned Islamist National Congress Party (NCP, now operating under the name “Islamist Movement”) have stepped up activity in recent weeks, calling for the assassination of UN envoy Volker Perthes and attacking pro-democracy demonstrators in Khartoum North (Reuters, April 11). The Islamists describe pro-democracy activists as secularists intent on attacking Sudan’s traditional Islamic faith (Middle East Monitor, April 9, 2019).

Airstrike Damage, Khartoum (NBC)

Before the current fighting broke out, the FFC and its partners warned of NCP efforts to provoke a confrontation between the army and the RSF that would create conditions favorable to a return to Islamist rule. Leading Islamists and NCP members (including those held on human rights violations) began leaving detention facilities and returning to government posts (especially Military Intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) after the 2021 military coup, while al-Burhan dissolved a committee looking into corrupt arrangements between the NCP government and the army. General Ahmad Ibrahim Mufaddal, an NCP loyalist, was appointed last November to lead the General Intelligence Service (GIS, or Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma), successor to the powerful NISS that held an iron grip on political dissent during the Bashir regime. The RSF, seen as traitors for their failure to prevent the overthrow of al-Bashir, is especially disliked by the Islamists.

In recent days, prisons across the country have been emptied of thousands of criminal and political inmates, either through release or escape. Among those to have walked out of the notorious Kober prison are Ahmad Haroun, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court, and leading Islamists of the al-Bashir regime, including former vice-president ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, Awad al-Jaz, and Nafi al-Nafi. Both the FFC and the RSF allege an army plan to restore leading Islamists to power. Al-Bashir himself is still believed to be in a military prison hospital (Darfur 24, April 25; Darfur 24, April 26; Al Jazeera, April 26; Radio Dabanga, April 26).

Map produced by Thomas van Linge showing territory held by the Army (red), the RSF (mustard yellow) and rebel movements (green).

Conclusion

Fighting is underway in most parts of Sudan, but is especially intense in Darfur, the home of Hemeti’s power base but also the source of much of the SAF’s rank-and-file. Long-standing tribal clashes in West Darfur have intensified with the breakdown of security. Khartoum has experienced looting, street-fighting, and aerial bombing.

A SAF victory would likely allow an entrenchment of Islamist military rule, while an RSF victory might find room for a civilian government, but only under RSF influence. The paramilitary would still absorb the arms and facilities of the SAF and become the sole security organization in Sudan. The ambitious Hemeti is likely to seek a leading role in any new government, possibly as head of state.

Any war in Sudan has a high chance of spilling over into its unstable neighbors, such as Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya and South Sudan. The Wagner Group is already involved in the last three of these nations.

Hemeti is having trouble selling his new image as a champion of democracy as he attempts to portray al-Burhan as the figurehead of a radical Islamist movement and uses slogans like “power belongs to the people” and “what is happening now is the price of democracy.” Hemeti has even tried to claim the RSF are fighting al-Burhan “and his Islamist gang” (the keizan) within the SAF, and not the army itself (Radio Dabanga, April 17). Al-Burhan has similarly suggested he was prepared to negotiate only with “parties within the RSF” seeking dialogue, and not the current RSF leaders (Sudan Tribune, April 20).

If the Framework Agreement is signed and free elections follow, the Islamist faction will lose any chance of retaking control of Sudan, short of mounting yet another coup, one that, in the current environment, would meet with massive resistance in the streets as well as in the international arena. Despite their rhetoric, Hemeti and his private army will not provide a road to a democratic transition and civilian rule. For the Islamists, therefore, this may be their last chance to seize power.

Notes 

[1] See “Army for Sale: Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and the Battle for Libya,” AIS Special Report, August 4, 2019.

[2] The northern Rizayqat Abbala (camel-breeding Arabs) include the Mahamid, Mahariya, and Irayqat groups. The core of the Janjaweed was from the Mahamid and Mahariya branches of the northern Rizayqat. The southern Baqqara Rizayqat (cattle-breeding Arabs), had little to do with the Janjaweed. The meaning of the term Janjaweed is disputed, but is commonly given as “Devils on Horseback.” The term was not used by the Arab militias themselves or by the government.

[3] For Russian mercenaries in Sudan and Moscow’s search for a naval base on the Sudanese Red Sea coast, see: “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 6, 2019.

[4] For details, see “Putin’s New Russian Empire is Suddenly on the Rocks: How the War in Ukraine Threatens Russian Interests in Sudan,” AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.3, March 24, 2022.

This article first appeared in the April 28, 2023 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, Washington, DC.

Army for Sale: Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and the Battle for Libya

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report, August 4, 2019

RSF Patrol (al-Jazeera)

With their barely literate leader General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” in full control of Sudan (though nominally only number two in the ruling military council), Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary has attracted international attention through its brutal repression of civilian demonstrators seeking civilian rule. [1] Now an estimated 30,000 strong, the RSF is deployed in the cities of Sudan, the goldfields of Darfur, the northern borders with Libya and Egypt, the battlefields of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State and even in Yemen, where they serve as part of the Saudi-led coalition battling Houthi rebels.

Good Days for African Warlords: General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”

Though Sudan has little interest in the internal struggle for control of Yemen, the RSF’s deployment of as many as 10,000 men since 2015 was clearly made in return for Saudi and Emirati cash badly needed to prop up the flailing regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir. Following the coup that overthrew al-Bashir, Sudan’s ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) has accessed $500 million from the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with pledges of another $2.5 billion in commodities to follow. Both nations see military rule as an effective way of keeping Muslim Brotherhood members (known as “Ikhwan” in Sudan) out of the Sudanese government.

Mercenaries for Sale

The TMC and its new civilian partners are in need of Saudi funds to keep new waves of economic protests from breaking out. Thus, the deployment to Yemen continues, but with the precedent of soldiers-for-dollars already set, the TMC is looking for new revenue streams as well as ways to keep Darfur’s Arabs of military age busy abroad rather than pursuing grievances against Khartoum at home.

The answer? A May 17 $6 million contract between the TMC and Dickens & Madson, a Montreal-based firm run by former Israeli intelligence agent Ari Ben-Menashe. Among other things, the contract stated Dickens & Madson would counter unfavorable media coverage of the TMC and (presumably) the RSF, arrange a meeting between President Trump and TMC leaders, and, most ambitiously, create a union with South Sudan and a joint oil project “within three months.”  With only days to go before three months are over, no such union or joint project has emerged.

Dickens & Madson also pledged to obtain financing for the TMC from the United States, the Russian Federation and other countries, including “funding and equipment for the Sudanese military.” Most importantly for the cash-strapped TMC, was the intent to “obtain funding for your Council [TMC] from the Eastern Libyan Military Command in exchange for your military help to the Libyan National Army (LNA).” [2]

The New Qaddafi? Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (Reuters)

One thousand RSF members began arriving in eastern Libya in the last days of July, the beginning of a Libyan deployment that might eventually reach as many as 4,000 fighters. Their new employer is Libyan warlord “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar, whose self-styled “Libyan National Army” (a loosely disciplined collection of militias) has spent the last few months in a so-far frustrated attempt to seize the Libyan capital of Tripoli from the UN-recognized Presidency Council/Government of National Accord (PC/GNA).

According to al-Jazeera, leaked documents revealed that the UAE began picking up Sudanese military personnel in military aircraft from Khartoum in May. The agency further claimed that Hemetti had recruited 450 additional Arab mercenaries from Darfur, Chad and Niger. According to a source, Hemetti specified they should be “light-skinned and speak Arabic” (al-Jazeera, July 24, 2019). Hemetti would have had connections with the Arab tribes in these lands from his days in the Janjaweed, when Khartoum invited regional Arabs to fill areas where indigenous African Muslims had been displaced by state-sponsored violence. The UAE is one of Haftar’s major backers, providing military air support from their eastern Libyan base in al-Khadim.

The RSF is expected to provide security for the Libyan oil facilities that are expected to provide the funds needed to buy the RSF’s services, enabling Haftar to concentrate his forces for a final push to take Tripoli from the collection of militias that have aligned themselves with the PC/GNA.

The Montreal Connection

Ari Ben-Menashe, who arranged the rental of the RSF, is an arms dealer with a checkered business career and a controversial claim to have played a central role in the Iran-Contra affair. Ben-Menashe served a year in an American prison for his role in supplying arms to Iran before being acquitted on the grounds that he was working under orders from Israel. After failing to obtain refugee status in Australia, Ben-Menashe moved to Montreal in 1993, where he obtained Canadian citizenship and set up the Dickens & Madson consulting agency, though his American partner was deported in 2008 to the United States, where he was wanted on multiple racketeering and fraud charges in two states.

While secretly working for Zimbabwean despot Robert Mugabe in 2002, Ben-Menashe helped implicate Mugabe’s main political rival in charges of treason. There are allegations that Ben-Menashe was paid for his services by a Zimbabwean drug lord who wished to maintain his cozy relationship with Mugabe. In 2014, Ben-Menashe signed a $2 million deal with Libyan warlord Ibrahim Jadhran to promote the latter’s attempt to create an autonomous Cyrenaïcan state in eastern Libya. As in other deals Ben-Menashe had with Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, the former intelligence agent pledged to work towards obtaining economic and military support from Russia. The fixer thus encouraged an existing trend to greater Sudanese-Russian cooperation that began with a January 2019 draft military agreement between the two countries that could lead to “a Russian naval base on the Red Sea” (Sputnik, January 12, 2019; Sudan Tribune, January 13, 2019). [3]

Ben-Menashe moved on to another Libyan warlord in 2015, signing a $6 million contract with Khalifa Haftar. Besides promising to improve Western media coverage of Haftar’s campaign against Libya’s UN-recognized government, Ben-Menashe again agreed to seek grants from the Russian Federation “for security equipment and technical support.” Haftar’s campaign received a huge boost in April when Haftar discussed “ongoing counterterrorism efforts” with President Trump by phone. The White House followed up with a statement recognizing “Field Marshal Haftar’s significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources” (Reuters, April 19, 2019). Despite multiple accusations of war crimes and human rights violations including summary executions of opponents and the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets such as hospitals, refugee centers and residential housing, Haftar has already received covert military and open diplomatic support from Russia, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. [4]

Hemetti’s Revenue Streams

Renting out young Darfuri fighters is a proven revenue source for Hemetti. Musa Hilal, Hemetti’s former mentor and Janjaweed commander, opposed the deployment to Yemen and encouraged Arab tribesmen in Darfur not to volunteer. Hilal also accused Hemetti and his patron, former Second Vice President Hasabo Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman (like Hemetti, a member of the Mahariya Branch of the Rizayqat Arabs), of siphoning off millions of dollars donated to Sudan by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in exchange for the use of the RSF in Yemen (al-Jazeera, September 10, 2017).  Hemetti was reported to have been paid directly, and told a press conference he deposited $350 million in Sudan’s Central Bank, but was not clear on how much he may have kept for personal or political uses (African Arguments, August 1, 2019).

An RSF Column in the Desert (AFP)

An April 2018 New York Times investigation of the traffic in migrants through Sudan, based on separate and confidential interviews with known smugglers, suggested that the RSF was, according to the smugglers’ testimony, the main organizer of the cross-border trade, supplying vehicles and sharing in ransom revenues obtained from the detention of the migrants in Libya (NYT, April 22, 2019).

Hemetti’s control of much of Sudan’s newly discovered gold reserves (some of it wrested from Musa Hilal by force) provides him with the financial clout needed to make the former camel trader a candidate for Sudan’s presidency. Darfur, Sudan’s “Wild West,” is already producing enough gold to make it Africa’s third-largest producer, though a remarkable 70% is believed to be smuggled of the country via remote air strips.

Notes:

  1. For RSF commander Hemetti, see: “Snatching the Sudanese Revolution: A Profile of General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo ‘Hemetti’,” Militant Leadership Monitor, June 30, 2019, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4455
  2. The contents of the contract were revealed under the requirements of the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The document can be seen in full at: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6200-Exhibit-AB-20190617-8.pdf
  3. For Russian mercenaries in Sudan and Russia’s search for a naval base on the Sudanese Red Sea coast, see: “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 6, 2019, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4356
  4. For LNA war crimes, see: “Libya’s Video Executioner: A Profile of LNA Special Forces Commander Mahmud al-Warfali, Militant Leadership Monitor, July 6, 2018, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4214

“Old Wine in Old Bottles?” A Security Q and A on Post-Coup Sudan

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

April 19, 2019 Yasir Arman (Reuters)

Veteran opposition politician Yasir Arman called the April 11 military coup in Sudan nothing more than “old wine in old bottles.” Arman suggested it had preserved “the political and economic structures of the old system,” the military-Islamist alliance that has ruled Sudan since an Islamist-backed military coup brought Brigadier Omar al-Bashir to power in 1989 (Sudan Tribune, April 12). Al-Bashir’s regime was based on three pillars: Islamism, military governance and Arab supremacy.

Despite the coup, demonstrations and sit-ins continue at military facilities beyond the capital, in places such as Port Sudan, al-Gedaref, Kadugli, al-Obeid, and camps for the internally displaced in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, April 16).

Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (Daily Nation)

The coup leaders have formed a Transitional Military Council (TMC) under Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, who commanded Sudanese forces in Yemen, where he formed ties to the Saudi military and its Gulf allies. Most recently he was Inspector General of the Sudanese Army. Al-Burhan replaced the first leader of the TMC, Lieutenant General Muhammad Ahmad Awad ibn Awf, who lasted less than 24 hours. Ibn Awf is a prominent Islamist and al-Bashir loyalist who has worked closely with Darfur’s Janjaweed militias (al-Jazeera, April 20). Under U.S. sanctions for his activities in Darfur, Ibn Awf was unacceptable to both Washington and the protesters. The former chief of Sudan’s Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Kamal ‘Abd al-Maruf al-Mahi (a leading Islamist suspected of having political ambitions), was relieved of his post as deputy chief of the TMC at the same time General Ibn Awf was replaced. [1]

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), a leading force in the demonstrations, is demanding nothing less than a civilian government (Asharq al-Aswat, April 13). The SPA is part of the Alliance for Freedom and Change, which includes the leftist National Consensus Forces and Nidea Sudan, a Paris-based group including opposition politicians and the leaders of armed movements (Middle East Online, April 16). The army is unlikely to clean house, which will continue to frustrate those demanding significant change.

What is al-Bashir’s fate?

Al-Bashir and his two brothers have been moved to the notorious Khobar Prison in Khartoum North (al-Jazeera, April 17). The military council has stated it will prosecute al-Bashir inside Sudan (APA News, April 12). The military has been repeatedly purged until the officer corps consists mostly of men whose fortunes and views are closely aligned with the ex-president’s. These officers may seek to send al-Bashir to a safe haven outside Sudan and avoid a nasty and public prosecution of regime misdoings. Uganda has said it is willing to consider offering asylum to al-Bashir (Monitor [Kampala], April 16).

Al-Bashir still faces two ICC arrest warrants for “massive human rights violations” including war crimes and genocide. However, the ICC lacks the means to detain the former president, and 33 nations (including China and Russia) have ignored the warrants by allowing al-Bashir to make visits to their countries. The ICC is demanding that the new government in Khartoum must surrender al-Bashir as well as four other individuals wanted on charges related to the Darfur conflict, including NCP leader Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Janjaweed leader ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rahman (aka ‘Ali Kushayb), former minister of defense Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussayn and Darfur rebel ‘Abdallah Banda Abakr Nourain (Al-Ahram [Cairo], April 12; for Harun, see AIS Special Report, March 3 ). The military council will not take action on these demands and it would require a massive and unprecedented power shift in Sudan for a future civilian government to surrender these individuals for ICC prosecutions.

What happens to the National Congress Party (NCP)?

Recognizing the hold the ruling NCP had over the Sudanese political system, the SPA has demanded its dissolution and the arrest of its leaders. The TMC has said NCP representatives will not be part of the transitional government (Sudan Tribune, April 15).

What happens to the Rapid Support Force (RSF)?

The RSF (Quwat al-Da’m al-Seri), was created by the NISS in 2013 to absorb Janjaweed gunmen into a more manageable unit with a central control (Terrorism Monitor, May 30 2014). The intent was to deploy the RSF as a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism force composed mostly of Darfur Arabs. The unit is led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti” a member of the Mahariya branch of the Northern Rizayqat Arabs of Darfur. Daglo is now the deputy chief of the TMC.

Ahmad al-Harun, Omar al-Bashir and Muhammad Daglo Hamdan

Though reviled by many Sudanese for its methods, the RSF has had some success in counter-insurgency operations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. It operates in large numbers along the border with Libya, where it hunts Darfuri rebels and interrupts the flow of illegal migrants from east Africa through Sudan to Libya and on into Europe. It has also been deployed in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, where Daglo served under al-Burhan, who may now rely on the RSF’s support.

There have been calls in Sudan to disband the RSF since its creation and its use of violence in the streets of Khartoum to repress the anti-regime demonstrations has not made it any more popular.

The appointment of Hamdan as deputy leader of the TMC does not indicate major change in the power structure and will anger the Darfur rebel movements who accuse him of ordering atrocities. Nonetheless, Daglo has been meeting with US and UK diplomats as the TMC’s representative (Anadolou Agency [Ankara], April 14).

What happens to the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)?

The SPA and many demonstrators have called for the dissolution of the much-feared NISS (Jihaz al-Amn al-Watani wa’l-Mukhabarat) and the regime’s paramilitaries, such as the RSF, the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Haras al-Hudud (Border Guards) (Reuters, April 16). NISS director Salah ‘Abdallah Muhammad Salah (Salah Gosh) resigned on April 13 but was not detained. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Abu Bakr Mustafa, putting the intelligence agency under military control for now. (Reuters, April 14; AFP/France24, April 14).

Ex-NISS Director Salah Gosh (al-Arabiya)

Gosh was NISS director from 2004 to 2009 but was suspected of plotting against al-Bashir in 2012. He was brought back into the fold in February 2018, when he was once again made chief of the NISS to subdue dissent. The NISS used rubber bullets, tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators (Al-Jazeera, April 8). Roving squads of agents in pick-up trucks seized individuals and took them away to “ghost houses” where their unrecorded detention usually included torture. The NISS announced the release of all political prisoners on April 11, but there are reports that many protesters remain in detention (Radio Dabanga, April 16).

The snipers who continually took shots at demonstrators from buildings outside the army’s compound in Khartoum were believed to be NISS agents who defied the army by engaging in firefights with soldiers (Middle East Monitor, April 9). The clashes were indicative of the serious differences the NISS has with the military. The NISS was given extraordinary and extrajudicial powers to act as al-Bashir’s personal protection and enforcement unit. The opportunities for enrichment presented by NISS membership created a sore point with the poorly paid military.

There is no consensus in the opposition as to what should be done with the NISS. The Islamist Popular Congress Party (PCP), led by Dr. ‘Ali al-Haj, is calling for the dissolution of the NISS and the transfer of its responsibilities to the police (Radio Dabanga, April 16). However, the Umma Party of two-time Sudanese prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the center-left Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) of Omar Yusuf al-Digair have called for only a change in the NISS leadership (Sudan Tribune, April 16).

The U.S. will watch Salah Gosh’s fate carefully – the notorious NISS director cooperated closely with the CIA on counter-terrorism issues and was even welcomed in Washington.

Will armed opposition continue?

Since independence, Sudan has been dominated by three powerful riverine tribes from Sudan’s north, the Ja’alin, Danagla and Sha’iqiya (al-Bashir is Ja’alin). This has created enormous internal tensions as Khartoum tries to control restive non-Arab ethnic groups in guerrilla-friendly regions such as Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. While a host of armed opposition groups operate in Darfur, the armed opposition in Blue Nile State and South Kordofan consists of two factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Malik Agar and ‘Abd al- Aziz al-Hilu respectively (for al-Hilu, see MLM, July 2011).

Most of the major rebel movements have refused to engage with the regime for years and appear ready to wait for a new civilian government to renew negotiations, likely under AU mediation.

Malik Agar, leader of the rebellion in Blue Nile State (Sudan Tribune)

Al-Burhan’s appointment as head of the TMC has angered many in Darfur, who accuse him of being “the architect of the genocide” in Darfur and regard his new role as “a play of the Islamists to retain power” (Radio Dabanga, April 15). Burhan is well known in Darfur for his threats to exterminate the Fur people. A leading Darfur rebel, ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (Fur), said that the Sudan “we dream of, cannot come through these racists like ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, Awad Ibn Awf, Omar al-Bashir and their ilk” (Sudan Tribune, April 16).

‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu, leader of the rebellion in South Kordofan (Nuba Reports)

The South Kordofan and Blue Nile factions of the SPLM/A-N declared a unilateral three-month ceasefire on April 17 to give the military “a chance for a peaceful and quick transfer of power to civilians” (al-Jazeera, April 17). Nonetheless, there are reports of escalating violence in Darfur, where hundreds of thousands of displaced indigenous Africans see an opportunity to take revenge on regime associates and reclaim land seized by the regime and given to Arab settlers, many from outside Sudan (al-Jazeera, April 17).

Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has demanded the release of all war-related detainees from Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile State, saying that a refusal to release them “Is a call for the continuation of the war” (Radio Dabanga, April 15).

What about the Army?

The Army has invited the opposition groups to nominate a new civilian prime minister, but the question is whether the PM would serve under or above the TMC, which is unlikely to relinquish control until arrangements have been made for leading military and security figures to make a post-coup “soft-landing.”

During the demonstrations outside military headquarters in Khartoum, low-ranking troops and junior officers emerged at times from the military headquarters to interact with the demonstrators or offer refuge from NISS snipers. Al-Burhan listened to the demonstrators, but he and other officers will view their ongoing role as preventing the disintegration of the country, by whatever means necessary.

The military says it is only interested in holding the defense and interior ministries, which could remove the security sector from civilian oversight and bring the police and intelligence services under military control (Africanews, April 15).

Can the Islamists use the coup to their advantage?

Much of the Islamist political elite has been put under arrest, including al-Bashir loyalist and former prime minister Muhammad Tahir Ayala, leading NCP member Awad al-Jaz and two former vice-presidents, Berri Hassan Saleh and ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, the latter a powerful Islamist who can call on his own supporters for political muscle. It should be recalled, however, that such arrests are often for show – the Islamist behind al-Bashir’s 1989 coup, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, was sent to prison for several months after al-Bashir’s coup 1989 to disguise the Islamist nature of the new regime.

‘Ali al-Hajj, leader of the Islamist Popular Congress Party (PCP) (Alleastafrica)

The military has excluded Islamist parties from talks on Sudan’s political future. Islamists and supporters of the old regime are painting the demonstrators as secularists intent on attacking Sudan’s traditional Islamic faith. (Middle East Monitor, April 9). The dissolution of the NCP would weaken the Islamist grip on Sudan, but the movement has proved to be highly resilient in the face of setbacks.

Besides hosting Osama bin Laden and his followers in the 1990s (they were eventually expelled), religious extremists outside of Khartoum’s control were kept largely in check through most of al-Bashir’s rule. Neighboring states fear a new regime might allow extremists to operate in Sudan, whether deliberately or through negligence. According to an Egyptian government source, Cairo “cannot afford a leadership emerging in Libya or Sudan that tolerates, or even worse condones, militant Islamic activity. This is why we… are keeping a close eye on any possible transition of power in Sudan” (Al-Ahram [Cairo], April 10).

What of the Economic Crisis?

The security situation in Sudan cannot be eased until the uncertainty created by the ongoing economic crisis is resolved. The problems are many, and include a declining currency, raging inflation, massive unemployment, inability to replace oil revenues lost with the separation of South Sudan and the cost of fighting endless rebellions in the provinces.

If the general staff possesses any economic skills, they have yet to be revealed. Unfortunately, most of the TMC’s attention will be drawn to carefully watching their colleagues and rivals for signs of a counter-coup, a persistent danger in these conditions. The generals will also be concerned for their own future; as indicated by their demand for the defense and interior ministry portfolios in a future civilian government, they will work hard to ease their own safe transition into a new regime.

Note

1.The TMC, as announced by General al-Burhan, consists of:

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, President

Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti,” Vice President

Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabbashi Ibrahim Shanto, member and spokesman

General Omar Zine al-‘Abdin Muhammad al-Shaykh, member

General Jalal al-Din al-Shaykh al-Tayib, member

General Mustafa Muhammad Mustafa Ahmad, member

General Yassir ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Atta, member

Airforce General Salah ‘Abd al-Khalig Said ‘Ali, member

Police General al-Tayib Babikir ‘Ali Fadl, memberRear

Admiral Engineer Ibrahim Jabir Ibrahim, member (Sudan Tribune, April 16).

This article first appeared in the April 22, 2019 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Musa Hilal: Darfur’s Most Wanted Man Loses Game of Dare with Khartoum… For Now

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report, December 12, 2017

Khartoum is using an Arab paramilitary under the direct command of President Omar al-Bashir to clean up resistance to its rule amongst Darfur’s northern Rizayqat Arabs, once the core of the notorious Janajaweed militias that wreaked havoc on the region’s non-Arab population in the 2000s.

Shaykh Musa Hilal (Sudan Tribune)

The campaign has included the violent arrest of Shaykh Musa Hilal Abdalla, a member of the Um Jalul clan of the Mahamid Arabs. Hilal is the nazir (chief) of the Mahamid, a branch of the northern Rizayqat tribal group (the northern Rizayqat includes the Mahamid, Mahariya, and Ireiqat groups). Once the leader of the Janjaweed, Hilal was arrested on November 26, 2017 by the government’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF – al-Quwat al-Da’m al-Sari) after spending the last few years building a fiefdom in northern Darfur funded by illegal gold mining. Hilal remains subject to travel and financial sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 2006 in connection to his leadership of the Janjaweed.

Also arrested in the RSF raid were Hilal’s sons Habib, Fathi and Abd al-Basit, three brothers and a number of aides. At the time of the RSF’s arrival in his hometown of Mistiriyha, Hilal was still receiving condolences from visitors after the death of his mother (Radio Dabanga, November 27, 2017).

RSF Commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” (Anadolu Agency)

Commanding the RSF forces was Hilal’s cousin, Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” a member of the Mahariya branch of the northern Rizayqat and Hilal’s former Janjaweed deputy. Daglo is leading the government’s six-month disarmament campaign in Darfur, intended to confiscate weapons held by civilians, rebel groups and government-controlled militias such as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Central Reserve Police (CRP).

The clashes began when a RSF disarmament unit was ambushed near Mistiriyha, killing nine. Hilal’s men then attacked and killed RSF Brigadier Abd al-Rahim Gumma when he arrived to investigate the ambush (Sudan Tribune, November 27, 2017). The RSF has deployed 10,000 men and an armored regiment in North Darfur to deal with the threat posed by Hilal and his followers (Sudan Tribune, November 5, 2017).

Terrible conditions were described in Mistiriyha after the raid, with mass arrests of male residents, the flight of women and children to barren hills nearby without water or food and bodies left to decompose in the streets (Sudan Tribune, November 29, 2017). Government sources admitted the loss of between nine-to thirteen men with 35 others wounded (Sudan Tribune, November 29). Reports of heavy civilian losses were denied by General ‘Ali Muhammad Salim, who claimed only a single child was hit by a stray bullet (Sudan News Agency, November 29, 2017).

The list of weapons seized from Hilal’s forces included 25 “technicals” (Land Cruisers mounted with heavy machine guns), a SAM-9 anti-aircraft system and a variety of “Dushkas” (the Russian-made DShK 108mm machine gun) and other automatic weapons commonly found in the region (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2017).

Daglo insisted the arrest of an Algerian with “sophisticated communications equipment” and several other foreign nationals at Mistiriyha confirmed “the participation of foreign parties in destabilizing the security [of] Darfur” (Radio Dabanga, November 27, 2017; November 30, 2017; AFP, November 27, 2017).

Hilal was the official commander of the government’s Border Guard Force (BGF), once a small camel-mounted unit that was greatly expanded as a means of absorbing former Janjaweed into more tightly controlled government structures. Hilal spent several years in Khartoum as a senior government advisor before a dispute with the regime led to his return to Darfur in 2014. To further his own personal and tribal agenda, Hilal began to transform the BGF into the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening (Sahwa) Council (SRAC). Composed largely of members of Hilal’s Mahamid clan, SRAC began to drive over-stretched government forces from northwest Darfur and established administrations in the region’s major centers and at the artisanal gold fields of Jabal Amer.

RSF Officers after a Raid on the Gold Mines at Jabal Amer (Radio Dabanga)

The Defense Ministry announced its intention to integrate the BGF into the RSF under Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) command in July 2017. The decision was immediately opposed by Hilal, who had no intention of serving under his former Janjaweed lieutenant and tribal inferior, General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” [1]

A major quarrel broke out between Hilal and what he described as “these Nile Valley Arabs,” the Ja’ailin, Danagla and Sha’iqiya tribes that have controlled Sudan since independence. Hilal announced his refusal to cooperate with the government’s disarmament campaign and accused Daglo and his patron, Vice-President Hasabo Abd al-Rahman, of siphoning off millions of dollars intended for the Sudanese treasury in return for the deployment of RSF fighters in Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen (al-Jazeera, September 10, 2017). [2]

As commander of the Border Guards (part of the SAF), Musa Hilal was flown to Khartoum for questioning by military intelligence, to be followed by a military trial for turning Mistiriyha “into a hideout for fugitives and outlaws,” according to Minister of State for Defense General ‘Ali Muhammad Salim (AFP, November 29, 2017). Fifty Border Guards were taken prisoner, with 30 sent immediately to Khartoum and the remainder to follow (Sudan Tribune, November 30, 2017).

The Northern Rizayqat – Defections and More Arrests

Hilal’s detention followed the arrest earlier in November of former Border Guards Lieutenant Colonel ‘Ali Abdullah Rizqallah “Savanna.” Rizqallah (Mahamid clan of the Rizayqat) split from the Border Guards in August to form his own Sudan Army Movement – Revolutionary Forces (SAM-RF) after Khartoum declared its intention to merge the Border Guards into the RSF. The commander was arrested after two days of clashes with the RSF around Korma (12 km west of al-Fashir) and in the area south of Kutum (Radio Dabanga, November 10, 2017). Rizqallah was removed to Khartoum for questioning and may face charges carrying the death penalty (Anadolu Agency, November 12, 2017).

Lieutenant Colonel ‘Ali Abdullah Rizqallah “Savana” after his capture (Radio Dabanga)

The RSF claimed a week earlier that it had absorbed some 300 SAM-RF fighters after they defected from Rizqallah’s movement with their weapons and vehicles (Sudan Tribune, November 4, 2017; November 12, 2017; Radio Dabanga, November 5, 2017). Rizqallah is reported to have feuded with General Daglo’s Mahariya clan, responding to a 2016 ambush by Mahariya gunmen with an attack on the home of a Mahariya National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS) colonel and governor of East Darfur that killed two NISS agents. [3] More recently, the RSF claimed to have repelled a SAM-RF attack on the North Darfur city of Kutum (Sudan Tribune, November 4, 2017).

Three days after the RSF assault on Mistiriyha, Adam Khatir Yusuf, leader of the Awlad Eid clan of the Rizayqat, died in a medical facility belonging to Sudan’s security services. The tribal leader was wounded while in Mistiriyha to offer condolences to Musa Hilal and was seen in a poor and bloodied condition being taken off a plane in Khartoum. His family claimed that Adam Khatir died while undergoing torture by military intelligence (Radio Dabanga, November 29, 2017). RSF commander Daglo claimed Adam Khatir had deceived them regarding the possibility of acting as a mediator between the RSF and Hilal: “We thought he [could] serve as a good-faith mediator, but unfortunately we were surprised to see him carrying a gun and fighting with Musa Hilal” (Sudan Tribune, November 29, 2017).

On November 26, the RSF announced the capture of SRAC spokesman Harun Mahmud Madikheir south of Mistiriyha where he was reported to be on his way to Chad with his bodyguards (Radio Dabanga, November 27, 2017).

Government security forces have also raided camps for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur as part of the disarmament campaign. President al-Bashir (a Ja’alin Arab) has declared his intent to empty the camps over the objections of the UN and the African Union and Darfuri rebel groups claim the disarmament efforts are just a pretext to clear them of IDPs (AFP, November 21, 2017; Sudan Tribune, September 24, 2017).

Conclusion

Khartoum must still deal carefully with Hilal; there are many members of his Mahamid clan in the RSF who could turn against the government and he can describe the exact type and level of involvement of many leading Sudanese politicians and officials in the ethnic cleansing of Darfur. Al-Bashir himself is subject to International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants issued for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. Hilal has been in contact with rebel movements looking to integrate Arab groups into the ongoing rebellion. The former Janjaweed leader may also be able to call on powerful friends beyond Darfur’s borders – Khartoum believes he has been in contact with the commander of Libya’s “Libyan National Army (LNA),” Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Hilal is as well the father-in-law of Chad’s Zaghawa president Idriss Déby Itno, a former foe of al-Bashir.

SLM/A-MM Rebel Commander Minni Minawi (Radio Dabanga)

Hilal’s arrest has also met with internal opposition. Old enemy Minni Minawi, leader of a largely Zaghawa rebel movement and current chairman of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel coalition, denounced the government’s disarmament campaign for inciting a new round of violence in Darfur and called for the immediate release of Hilal and his sons.  He further described the alleged RSF killings of women and children in Mistiriyha as “a crime against humanity” (Sudan Tribune, November 29, 2017). The disarmament campaign has also been condemned as nothing but a new war in the name of disarmament by the Islamist opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP) and the still-influential Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) (Radio Dabanga, November 29, 2017).

In Sudan, prosecutions and detentions depend a great deal upon the importance of the individual to the regime’s tribal relations, his own connections to leading members of the regime, or his future value to the regime. Hilal was previously imprisoned in 2002 on charges of inciting ethnic violence, but was released the next year when the regime needed a leader for an Arab supremacist militia that would punish Darfur’s non-Arabs for their resistance to the government – the Janjaweed. With few political cards to play in Darfur and influence with the region’s Arab tribes in a state of decline, Khartoum is likely to hang on to Hilal as a potential future asset, however uncomfortable his stay may be made in the meantime.

NOTES

  1. For a detailed account of Musa Hilal’s resistance to the disarmament campaign and conflict with the RSF, see: Andrew McGregor, “Why the Janjaweed Legacy Prevents Khartoum from Disarming Darfur,” AIS Special Report, October 15, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4027
  2. For the RSF’s campaign in Yemen, see: Nicholas A. Heras, “Sudan’s Controversial Rapid Support Forces Bolster Saudi Efforts in Yemen,” Terrorism Monitor, October 27, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/sudans-controversial-rapid-support-forces-bolsters-saudi-efforts-yemen/
  3. Jérôme Tubiana, “Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and Pro-Government Militias,” Small Arms Survey, May 4, 2017, http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/571cdc5a-4b5b-417e-bd22-edb0e3050428