Bringing Down the West: Kémi Séba and the Pan-Africanist Revolution

Andrew McGregor

December 5, 2019

An unforeseen consequence of Western intervention against African terrorist groups has been the revitalization of pan-Africanism, an ideology that maintains indigenous and diaspora Africans share a common history and destiny as a unified people free of Western “domination.” Though pan-Africanism has been roundly criticized for its belief that the diverse peoples of Africa share a common race and culture, its proponents have taken leading positions in recent demonstrations in West Africa and the Sahel demanding the withdrawal of Western (especially French) troops and the creation of new monetary systems that are not tied to European or American economic systems.

Kémi Séba

Among the most prominent of these new pan-African leaders is the French-born activist Kémi Séba. Intellectually unpredictable and politically mercurial, Kémi Séba has dallied with or espoused a number of intellectual and philosophical trends that have played or continue to play a major role in shaping the security picture in Africa and Europe.

Early Life

Kémi Séba was born to Beninese parents in 1981 in Strasbourg, France, as Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi.

In his youth, Séba travelled to the United States, where he was influenced by Louis Farrakhan’s black supremacist Nation of Islam (NoI) (BBC, August 30). Founded by Wallace Fard Muhammad in Detroit in 1930, the NoI shares some beliefs with Sunni Islam, but differs on several essential theological points, leaving it generally unrecognized as a form of Islam by orthodox Muslims. In recent years, the NoI has grown closer to the Church of Scientology and its teachings.

Following his return to France, Séba joined the French branch of the NoI at age 18, though he did not appear to formally convert to Islam at this time. Séba was also influenced by the Marxist-based studies of decolonization produced by Martinican psychiatrist and political philosopher Frantz Fanon.

In an interview with the Nation of Islam’s Final Call newspaper, Séba stated that the “key to the resurrection of Black people throughout the world” is “the teachings of [the second NoI leader, 1934-1975] the Most Honorable Elijah Muhammad, today taught by the leader of us all, the Honorable Minister Louis Farrakhan” (Final Call [Chicago], March 7).

From Neo-Paganism to Islam

After visiting Egypt in his twenties, Séba became spokesman for the Parti Kemite, a movement formed in 2002 and based on Ancient Egyptian thought and religion.

Followers of Kemetism spend an inordinate amount of energy engaging in intellectual disputes with long-dead 19th century scholars whose works have long since been dropped from the curricula of respectable universities. The works of these earlier writers, some of whom suggested the Ancient Egyptians were “white Caucasians,” survive mainly due to the insistence of Kemetists, who maintain that they continue to represent the views of modern, scientifically trained Egyptologists. Rejecting scholarly approaches to Ancient Egyptian linguistics, history or archaeology, few Kemetists are familiar with contemporary Egyptological literature, which typically acknowledges the “African” and indigenous origins of Ancient Egypt (with the constant input of regional influences), but does not accept the popular Kemetic view that the Ancient Egyptians, Nubians, Carthaginians and other ethno-cultures of Northern Africa were related to or identical with the Bantu peoples of West Africa. In its extreme form, Kemetists claim that Egyptologists, who, in their view are exclusively “white,” deliberately mutilate or destroy evidence proving the “Black African” origin of Ancient Egypt.

Cheikh Anta Diop

Kemetists rely on a mix of Black nationalism, esoteric spiritualism and the works of revisionist historians such as Senegal’s Cheikh Anta Diop, British academic Martin Bernal and Khalid Abdul Muhammad (1948-2001), an American member of the NoI until his expulsion from the movement after a 1993 speech that referred to Pope John Paul II as “a no-good cracker,” labelled Jews as “bloodsuckers” and called for the murder of all white South Africans (Chicago Tribune, February 18, 2001). Despite Diop’s centrality to Kemetic thought, Séba has personally rejected his work as invalid due to the Senegalese scholar’s marriage to a white woman (Le Monde Afrique, September 1, 2017).

Kemetism may be classed as a form of neo-paganism as it can involve the worship of Ancient Egyptian gods. There are disputes within the movement whether it can accept Black Christians or Muslims. According to Kémi Séba, “Three Semitic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, have cursed Blacks from the beginning, through the curse of Ham. These monotheisms have structured all thought in the broad sense by considering Blacks as inferior” (Le Figaro, October 1, 2007). [1]

Tribu Ka and Anti-Semitism

Séba’s critical view of Jews is largely influenced by a 1991 NoI publication entitled The Secret Relationship between Blacks and Jews. Though much derided for its highly selective use of sources, the work’s central thesis that Jews and Zionists gained financial power through investment in the Trans-Atlantic slave trade has gained traction in certain quarters.

In 2004, Séba formed the Tribu-Ka, a French version of Farrakhan’s NoI blended with elements of Kemetism, such as Séba’s leadership role as the guarantor of ma’at, the Ancient Egyptian conception of truth, order and justice.

Tribu Ka is a short form for the Atenian Tribe of Kemet, Aten being the image of the Ancient Egyptian sun god as a solar disk, later imposed (unsuccessfully) as the sole god of Egypt by King Akhenaten of the 18th Dynasty. Nonetheless, anti-Semitism proved to be the core dogma of the Tribu Ka.

Séba used the internet to post anti-Semitic messages, including some accusing Zionists of creating AIDS, leading to his arrest in September 2006 and calls from Jewish groups to ban his website (European Jewish Press, September 19, 2006).

When Tribu Ka was banned by the French Ministry of the Interior in July 2006, it was quickly replaced by a new formation known as Génération Kémi Séba (GKS). The move did not fool authorities, who banned the GKS and awarded Séba a one-year suspended sentence for his efforts. A further arrest followed in February 2007 for calling a public official “Zionist scum.” The result was five months imprisonment for criminal contempt. Undeterred, Séba formed yet another group called Jeunesse Kémi Séba, likewise banned in June 2009.

On May 27, 2008, Séba led some 50 followers armed with bats and other weapons to a heavily Jewish district of Paris to “defend the interests of Blacks.” The mob shouted anti-Jewish slogans and threatened bystanders, leading to an investigation of the group by the Ministry of Justice. Séba maintained that “It is not anti-Semitic to defend the interests of blacks. When a Jew breaks a fingernail, the whole state apparatus has a broken arm!” (Le Figaro, October 1, 2007).

Séba has accused international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO) of being controlled by Zionists “who impose on Africa and its diaspora living conditions so excremental that the concentration camp of Auschwitz can seem like a paradise on earth” (Causeur [Paris], July 6).

After his release from prison in July 2008, Séba announced his conversion to Islam and fled to Senegal. Séba also joined the newly-formed Mouvement des damnés de l’impérialisme (MDI – Movement of the Damned by Imperialism) as its secretary-general and later president. The MDI, self-described as anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist with a focus on internet activism, attracted Holocaust deniers and formed a sympathetic association with Lebanon’s Hezbollah (Le Monde, September 23, 2008). Séba eventually resigned as president of the MDI in July 2010.

Séba’s spiritual views, encompassing both Kemetic beliefs and Islam, are also strongly influenced by Guénonian Islam, also known as “Traditionalism.” Derived from the works of French convert to Islam René Guénon (1886-1951), Traditionalism combines Western esoteric traditions with Islamic Sufi philosophies. This unorthodox approach has found little resonance in the Islamic world but is popular with some Western intellectuals who have converted to Islam. [2]

Séba has written four books: Supra-négritude (2013), Black Nihilism (2014), Obscure Époque – fiction géopolitique (2016) and L’Afrique libre ou la mort (2018). Black Nihilism was described by a Senegalese reviewer as “a porridge of thought,” in which “activism is substituted for thought, virility for strength of argument,” while the author levels men and women on the sole pretext of a common skin color, an “inverted racist cliché” (SenePlus, May 8). Senegalese journalist Racine Assane Demba has denounced Séba’s works as expressions of black supremacism, particularly over white people (Le Monde Afrique, September 1, 2017). African critics of Séba’s ideas and intellectual approach are regularly derided by his supporters as puppets of Paris.

Séba takes inspiration from revolutionary leaders such as Burkina Faso’s late president, Thomas Sankara (Facebook)

Séba has spoken approvingly of the dictatorships of the late Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso) and Mu’ammar Qaddafi and their refusal to relinquish power before both were killed, explaining: “As long as you fight for your country so that your country can access a certain number of things, [dictatorship] does not bother me” (BeninWebTV, April 8).

Séba and the New Black Panthers

After his time with the MDI, Séba was appointed head of the French branch of the New Black Panther Party (NBPP) by Malik Zulu Shabazz (a.k.a. Paris Lewis), chairman of the NBPP from 2001 (after taking over from founder Khalid Abdul Mohammed) to 2013. Shabazz, best known for his extreme and often crudely expressed hatred for Jews and Zionists, gave Séba a new name, Kemiour Aarim Shabazz. Most surviving members of the original Black Panther Party reject the NBPP’s claim to be a successor to their movement.

Fighting Françafrique

Séba moved to Senegal in 2011, where his ideas and rhetoric found resonance in academic and media circles. In Europe, however, Séba was coming to be regarded as a toxic presence, beginning with his expulsion from Switzerland in 2012 for inciting violence.

Séba was arrested during a Paris visit in September 2014 after making a public appearance at a theater commonly used by his friend, controversial anti-Jewish comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala. The activist was detained for violating the terms of a 2009 suspended sentence (AFP, September 1, 2014).  Séba has also worked with Dieudonné’s associate, right-wing ideologue and filmmaker Alain Soral, who has been convicted on charges of anti-Semitism (Causeur [Paris], July 6).

In 2016, Séba launched a new NGO, Urgences panafricanistes (Panafrican Emergencies), with himself as chairman. According to Séba: “We are neither communists nor nationalists nor liberals. We are Pan-Africanists. We are developing a new path, that of traditionalism mixed with an understanding of geopolitics” (BeninWebTV, December 13, 2017).

Séba claims Urgences panafricanistes is financed by soccer players, including French-Martinican Nicolas Anelka (a friend of Dieudonné who was cited for making anti-Semitic gestures on the field), French-Senegalese Demba Ba and “many African footballers who are friends” but cannot allow their commitment to be known (Le Monde, October 30, 2017).

One of the main ambitions of the group is the elimination of the Communauté Financière Africaine franc (CFA franc), a currency used by 14 former French African colonies. The CFA franc was created after World War Two for use in France’s African colonies. Today, it is the last colonial-era currency in use in Africa, though it is now pegged to the Euro and backed by the French treasury, where member nations must deposit half their foreign exchange reserves. The 14 countries that use it benefit from monetary stability and protection from inflation.

In March, Séba identified several reasons for his struggle against the CFA franc; according to him, the currency is far too strong for local economies, destroying competitiveness. “When you are told that you are independent and that the representatives of the Bank of France have the right of veto in your banks… the adage says that the one who controls you economically, will control you politically” ( [Abidjan], March 28). Similar points have been made by prominent Senegalese anti-French activist Guy Marius Sagna.

Kémi Séba burns a CFA Banknote in Dakar (Jeune Afrique)

On August 25, 2017, Séba was arrested on a complaint from the Central Bank of West African States after publicly burning a bank-note for 5,000 CFA francs ($8.39) six days earlier in Dakar, Senegal. Though acquitted ten days later on a technicality (the relevant law cited destruction of “banknotes” rather than “a banknote”), he was deported to France on September 6 after being declared “a serious threat to public order” (Le Monde, September 6; Senego, October 16).

Séba was now becoming an undesirable in much of West Africa. In March 2018, he was expelled from Guinea, where he had hoped to address a conference. In August of the same year he was ejected from Togo. Séba was expelled from Côte d’Ivoire to Benin in March 2019 after expressing harsh criticism of President Alassane Ouattara’s defense of the CFA franc (including a description of the president as a “voluntary slave”) and attempts to hold a conference against “French colonialism” that authorities said posed a potential risk of unrest (Jeune Afrique, March 27; SeneNews, April 8; Le Monde, March 29). The activist was arrested once his plane touched down in Cotonou, Benin, and interrogated regarding potential connections to Russia, China and Venezuela, questions that had already been asked by the security forces of Côte d’Ivoire. Séba took to Facebook in response: “You put me in prison, I come out stronger. You expel me from a country, I come out stronger” (Jeune Afrique, March 27).

Allesandro Di Battista tears up a fake 10,000 CFA franc banknote on Italian television.

On January 20, 2019, Allesandro Di Battista, one of the leaders of Italy’s populist Five-Star Movement (M5S), tore up a fake 10,000 CFA franc banknote on Italian television while denouncing French “neo-imperialism.” On the same day, M5S president Luigi Di Maio accused France of “preventing development” in countries using the CFA currency, adding that French policies are contributing to massive migrant flows across the Mediterranean. Following a diplomatic scandal, Kémi Séba emerged on Facebook days later to reveal “a well-kept secret,” namely that he had visited Five-Star leaders in Rome in September 2018, where he provided them with documents concerning Françafrique (the French sphere of influence in Africa) and the CFA franc. Séba claimed that this visit was the origin of the Five-Star attacks on France, predicting that: “What African leaders are unable to do, other non-African leaders will do, under our urging, until we ourselves take power in our countries.”  The M5S would only confirm that a “frank exchange of views on Europe and Africa” had occurred with Séba (La Nouvelle Tribune, January 22; RFI, February 2; Le Figaro, February 4).

In the face of moves by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to develop its own currency (the Eco), French Minister of the Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire announced in mid-October that France was open to “an ambitious reform” of the CFA franc. [3] Séba denounced the statement, saying Le Maire was “spitting once again in the face of African youth” (BeninWebTV, October 16).

Relations with Russia

Alexander Dugin

Séba was invited to Moscow in December 2017 by controversial Neo-Eurasian ideologue Alexander Dugin, one of the most important influences on Kremlin policy in Putin’s Russia and the target of U.S. sanctions related to the Russian occupation of eastern Ukraine. Taking its inspiration from the Eurasian political philosophy developed by Russians of the 1920s, Neo-Eurasianism, in its most reductionist form, advocates the development of a Russia-centered Eurasian empire based on traditional values, anti-modernism and opposition to Western liberalism. As such, proponents of Neo-Eurasianism are prepared to seek common ground with anti-Western Pan-Africanists such as Kémi Séba. Neo-Eurasianism also incorporates elements of Slavic neo-paganism (rodnovery), similar to Séba’s Afro-centric embrace of Egyptian neo-paganism.

Séba described Dugin as “the most important theoretician and political advisor in Russia” and said their discussion “focused on metaphysics and geopolitics. We shared our view that neither communism nor liberalism nor nationalism can bring salvation to our respective peoples” (BeninWebTV, December 13, 2017).

Moscow is fully aware of Séba’s importance to African anti-colonial and anti-French movements and invited him to attend the October 23-24 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, where Séba continued his denouncements of France (YouTube, October 24). In the lead-up to the summit, Séba expressed his preference for a Russian presence in Africa: “Russia will never be our messiah; the only messiah of Africa is the African people themselves. But because we cannot live in autarky for the moment, Russia is better as a partner than France…” (BeninWebTV, October 2). Russia is believed to have an interest in playing a part in the development of a new ECOWAS currency intended to replace the CFA franc.


Based on an intellectual fallacy, namely the common identity and goals of all Africa peoples whether in Africa or the diaspora, pan-Africanism is vulnerable to entanglement with other ideologies, some of which are based on similarly shaky foundations. In the Soviet era, pan-Africanism became closely identified with Marxist thought and socialist politics. Currently engaged in a broad effort to renew Russian influence in Africa, Moscow will undoubtedly use pan-Africanism or any other useful ideology to achieve its goals. A recent statement from Kémi Séba demonstrates the growth of a radical rejection of the West among pan-African ideologues:

Dear Neocolonialist French, you live your last hours. The New African generation is ready to stop your plundering of our motherland. We stand in solidarity with the French Proletariat… but against its oligarchy that plunders us (Facebook, September 14, 2019).


  1. The Curse of Ham (son of Noah) refers to a biblical passage, Genesis 9:20-27, that is often used to explain the existence of black people (though the passage makes no reference to race or skin color) and the reason for their servitude to the descendants of the other sons of Noah. It was later used to provide justification for the existence of slavery.
  2. ISIM Newsletter, 7/01, International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, n.d.,

This article first appeared in the November issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor.

Operation Bayard and the Death of Ansar al-Islam Leader Malam Ibrahim Dicko

Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report, July 18, 2017

The death of Malam Ibrahim Dicko, the radical Islamist leader of Burkina Faso’s Ansar al-Islam movement, marks a major success for combined French-Burkinabé security operations in the volatile region alongside the northern border with Mali. Dicko’s movement, composed largely of Muslim Fulani and Rimaïbe tribesmen, had created havoc in the area with several fierce assaults on military and police bases in the region in December 2016 and February 2017. [1]

French Mirage 2000 Jets during Operation Bayard  (© Emmanuel Huberdeau)

Dicko’s death appears to be a direct consequence of Frances’s “Operation Bayard.” This operation used intelligence gathered in late March 2017’s “Operation Panga,” a joint French- Burkinabé effort to clear the region of the border with Mali in Soum Province of Islamist militants. Operation Bayard began on April 29 with strikes by French Mirage 2000 jet fighters on suspected Ansar al-Islam bases along the border in the Foulsaré Forest.

Tigre HAD (Hélicoptère Appui Destruction – Helicopter Support Destruction) attack helicopters armed with Hellfire AGM-114 missiles secured the perimeter to inhibit the militants’ escape before French commandos were inserted by NH90 Caïman helicopters. Over April 29-30 the initial team was joined by French para-commandos and combat engineers to defuse the mines the militants were in the habit of deploying to prevent infiltration of their bases (a French military engineer was killed by a mine during Operation Panga). The commandos killed 20 militants and wounded many more before seizing twenty motorcycles (an important element in Ansar al-Islam’s surprise attacks), two vehicles, and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, computer gear and bomb components.

Malam Ibrahim Dicko and his bodyguard were reported to have come under attack from one of the Tigre helicopters before the surviving militants scattered to escape the French commandos (Jeune Afrique, July 12, 2017). Unable to settle in one place for long due to constant pressure from pursuing security forces, Dicko is believed to have died sometime in June from complications due to diabetes.

French Tigre HAD Attack Helicopter

A vague posting on Ansar al-Islam’s little-used Facebook page (no longer available) suggested that Dicko’s “grave circumstances” had led to his replacement as Ansar al-Islam leader by his brother, Jafar Dicko, the “new commander of the believers and guide of Ansar al-Islam” (, June 28, 2017).

The expiry of the charismatic Ibrahim Dicko and the death of 20 of his fighters (with many more incapacitated out of roughly 150 members) in Operation Bayard may deal a death blow to Ansar al-Islam, which is less than a year old. The group has already lost two of Dicko’s most valued lieutenants. One, Amadou Boly, was assassinated on Dicko’s orders when he objected to the growing extremism of the movement; the other, Harouna Dicko (Dicko is a very common name in the area), was killed in late March by the Burkinabé Groupement des forces anti-terroristes (GFAT), a joint army/gendarmerie anti-terrorist formation. Jafar Dicko, an unknown quantity, will be hard-pressed to revive the movement as an independent military threat. Surviving members are more likely to join one of the other militant groups operating in the region with similar aims, such as Amadou Koufa Diallo’s largely Fulani Force de libération du Macina, now part of the larger Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM – Group for the Defense of Islam and Muslims) led by Iyad ag Ghali.


  1. For Dicko’s biography, see Andrew McGregor, “Islamist Insurgency in Burkina Faso: A Profile of Malam Ibrahim Dicko,” Militant Leadership Monitor, April 30, 2017,

‘The Spielberg of French Islamism’: A Profile of Omar Diaby (a.k.a. Omar Omsen)

Andrew McGregor

July 30, 2016

The Islamic State-inspired Bastille Day atrocity in Nice that killed 84 people and injured over 300 more has brought new awareness of a strain of radical Islam that thrives behind the lights and glamour of life on the French Riviera. Nurtured in hidden mosques in an alienated and unassimilated Muslim community, Islamist extremism has produced scores of jihadists from the Nice region, most of whom have traveled to Syria to take up arms in al-Qaeda or Islamic State combat groups. Most prominent of the recruiters responsible for this flow of French residents to the battlefields of the Middle East is Omar Diaby (a.k.a. Omar Omsen), a Senegalese-born extremist who eventually left for Syria himself to take command of a group of Francophone jihadists.

Diaby 1Omar Diaby: Cyber-Jihadist (CNN)

Early Life

Born in Dakar in 1976, Diaby arrived in the Nice region of France at the age of five. Nice is home to a large Muslim community, many of whom are Tunisian in origin. Though many have poor employment prospects and depend on state assistance, there is also a growing Muslim middle class. Nonetheless, radical preachers find an interested audience for their views in the Islam du caves, mosques that operate out of sight in underground parking garages in heavily-Muslim banlieus (suburbs) like Ariane and St. Roch.

Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigration Front National and right-wing French nationalism are particularly strong in the Nice region, partly as a legacy of French pieds noirs settlers expelled from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia settling there after those nations reached independence. Their proximity to Islamists in the Ariane and Saint Roch districts perpetuates a certain amount of inter-communal tension (Guardian, July 18). Jihadist recruiters exploit these tensions to convince young Muslims to abandon their mundane lives in France to take up a more glorious existence as jihadis and martyrs in Syria and elsewhere.

Nice has taken steps to address the problem, providing teams of social workers and psychologists to persuade would-be jihadists to abandon their plans. The city also provides counseling programs to reintegrate returned jihadis (, July 15). The threat from returnees is serious; in February 2014 one such returnee from the Syrian jihad, an Algerian native who had received bomb-making training in Syria, was arrested after planning to detonate bombs during Nice’s popular carnival (, July 15).

Diaby was known in the Riviera region as a violent gangster, imprisoned for a 1995 gang-related murder (Diaby deliberately ran the victim down with a car) and again for the 2002-2003 armed robberies of two jewelers in Monaco. In prison, that great incubator of jihadists, Diaby became fascinated with radical Islamist ideology and took the new name Omar Omsen. After his release, Diaby took up preaching and the production of Islamic-themed videos until he joined a group of Salafi extremists using the name Fursan Alizza (The Knights of Pride), a move that brought him new attention from French counter-terrorism forces (Fursan Alizza is now a banned organization in France after a wave of arrests in 2012) (Dakar Actu, June 13). Diaby was again detained in 2011 after a French investigation suggested the recruiter was planning to join the jihad in Afghanistan via Tunisia and Libya (Le Nouvel Observateur, August 10, 2015).

In Nice, Diaby operated a snack bar and football club, which brought him into contact with young men to whom he could distribute jihadist literature and videos (Independent, July 17). Diaby is believed to be responsible for sending as many as 40 Nice residents to Syria before his own departure. Diaby appealed to young men by asserting they would never succeed in France and must go to a Muslim country to thrive. He also justified assault and robbery of non-Muslims in France, “a land of unbelievers,” thus providing religious sanction to petty criminals (BBC, July 16).

Former jihadists recruited by Diaby have described his recruiting methods during their trials in France. Whether early contacts were made in person or by internet, Diaby and fellow recruiters like Fares Mourad would begin by speaking of the importance of making hijra (emigration to Muslim lands), followed by discussions of religious points and end-times prophecies, but jihad was rarely if ever discussed in these initial contacts. Only later did the recruits realize Diaby, a self-styled “preacher,” could not read the Koran in Arabic or even lead his followers in prayer (Le Point, April 6).

“The Spielberg of French Islamism”

To create the right conditions for recruitment, Diaby drew on his talents as a graphics designer and video editor in creating a series of slick, professional looking video productions designed to encourage young Muslims to pursue a more militant response to the West’s alleged persecution of Islam (RFI, August 9, 2015). These videos were part of a project named “19HH” which stands for the 19 terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks, with the ‘HH’ acting as a symbol for the twin towers of the World Trade Center.

Diaby’s French-language video productions include “The Truth about Islam” and the three-hour “The Truth about the death of bin Laden,” [1] but it was an April 2013 release that would become famous in jihadi recruitment circles and bring him a reputation as “the Spielberg of French Islamism.” “Histoire de l’Humanité,” as its name suggests, is a broad examination of several themes, including millenarian prophecies, accusations of Christian and Jewish persecution of innocent Muslims, charges of media control, 9/11 conspiracy theories and a defence of Salafism and Takfir (the practice of one Muslim condemning another for apostasy, a basic element in Salafi-Jihadist ideology). The video stitches together various French-language news accounts, movie excerpts and found footage through the use of sophisticated special effects and graphics, the whole overlain with Arabic religious singing. [2]

Diaby uses the video to claim the U.S. government fakes criminal charges to “liquidate [American Muslims] and get them out of the scene,” giving two examples:

  • Imam Jamil Amin (the former H. Rap Brown), a Black-American nationalist militant serving a life sentence for shooting two Black-American police officers in 2000, killing one. Amin converted to Islam while serving an earlier prison sentence in the 1970s for armed robbery, eventually becoming an important figure in the American Muslim community. Famous for once saying “Violence is as American as apple pie,” the evidence in the murder case that brought him a life sentence was overwhelming despite Amin’s claims of a “government conspiracy.”
  • Humeidan al-Turki, a Saudi national living in Denver, was convicted in 2006 of the repeated rape and four-year captivity of a young female Muslim Indonesian house-servant. Sentenced to 28 years (later reduced to eight after Saudi intervention), al-Turki’s defense that he was the victim of American bias against Arab and Muslim cultural norms did nothing to save him from prison, but the charges gained some traction overseas, particularly in Saudi Arabia, where the case became an irritant in U.S.-Saudi relations. At the time he was charged, al-Turki was being investigated at the same time by the FBI in an unrelated terrorism case.

Diaby also uses extensive footage of a 2012 speech by then-French presidential candidate François Asselineau, a veteran politician who indulges in U.S. conspiracy theories while demanding a French exit from the EU and NATO together with a military withdrawal from Syria and Iraq. Asselineau’s claim that Europe is not really menaced by Islam is followed by footage of “European terrorists” from the Basque and Corsican communities.

The moral decay of the West is defined by toleration of incest and homosexuality before praise for the “Minhaj Salafiya,” a discussion of Quranic creationism and suggestions that 9/11 was an American false-flag operation that included a cover-up requiring the death of Osama bin Laden. Most importantly, it makes the claim (over footage of maimed and bleeding children) that “defensive jihad” is fard ayn (individually mandatory) for all Muslims. The video concludes with a display of Diaby’s personal email address for those wishing to obtain further information or subscribe to Diaby’s newsletter.

Diaby 2Omar Diaby: Jihad in Syria (Le Monde)

The Syrian Hijra

Fearing further arrest, Diaby slipped away to Dakar. After arrival in Senegal, Diaby was arrested by the Division des investigations criminelles (DIC), who after a hearing, released him and returned his passport. With ten others, Diaby then travelled via Mauritania and Tunis to Turkey and on to the Aleppo region of Syria. (DakarActu, June 13)

The former recruiter now turned Amir and formed his own katiba (brigade) in the Latakia governorate of Syria, a group composed of some 80 to 100 jihadis of French origin (many from Nice) allied with the Islamist Nusra Front, eventually a rival to the Islamic State organization. After arriving in Syria, Diaby was able to being eight members of his family to Syria from Senegal (Diaby is married and the father of two children) (DakarActu, June 13)

It was not until February 2014 that Diaby finally appeared in a video in person. In footage aired by al-Jazeera, the black-clad jihadist, Kalashnikov at his side, claimed that the Caliphate would be established in Damascus “as the Prophet said” (Le Monde, February 12, 2014). [3] According to Diaby, Muslim armies will use the Syrian capital as a base for operations in other countries. Diaby added that his group was “for the time being” allied with neither the Islamic State or the Nusra Front due to questions regarding their assaults on Muslim civilians: “We have learnt our religion and know that the Prophet warned us against any Muslim killing his Muslim brother. This is a very serious offense as they will both go to hell.” Nonetheless, Dibay insists that hijra is compulsory: “If someone comes to see me to tell me that he wants to go back [to France], I am going to tell him that going back to infidel land is forbidden, that God forbids it. What’s going to happen to them if they go back? They’re going to be arrested.”

Death and Resurrection

Twitter reports from Diaby’s family claimed that the jihadist had been shot and mortally wounded on July 29, 2015 during an attack on Aleppo, with Diaby succumbing to his injuries after a week-long coma (Dakar Echo, August 8, 2015). According to Diaby, the rumors of his death had been spread to allow him to leave Syria for four months of medical treatment in an un-named Arab country he entered under a false identity (L’Express, June 27). Nothing was heard from the jihadist until April 2016, when, after hearing from his cousin that journalist Romain Boutilly was preparing a video feature on jihadi recruiters in France, Diaby contacted Boutilly to announce he was still alive and would like to be included in the France2 documentary broadcast on June 2. [4] A Syrian cameraman was hired to shoot the footage, consisting of an interview with Diaby and views of his katiba’s camp. Once shooting began, Diaby exercised tight control on who and what was shown. (, June 2).

Relations with the Islamic State

Diaby appears to view al-Qaeda (and the related Nusra Front) as a more serious, intellectually-based movement than the Islamic State organization, whose fighters he characterizes as “ignorant youths without serious religious training [much like Diaby himself] whose deviant behavior springs forth as soon as you put weapons in their hands” (Le Nouvel Observateur, August 10 2015). He also objects to their methods of occupation:”Their understanding of Shari’a is different from ours” (Le Monde, May 29). Despite Diaby’s criticism of the Islamic State, there are indications that the movement is draining off jihadis from Diaby’s katiba to new Francophone Islamic State units (Libération [Paris], August 9, 2015).

Diaby derides the Islamic State’s videos of graphic cruelty as targeting “a reactionary, impulsive audience” through “five-minute clips that merely inspire rage” (, June 1). Nonetheless, Diaby justified the Islamic State’s November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris (which included the mass shooting at the Bataclan Theatre): “They were made in retaliation for French strikes on women and children… therefore we cannot condemn them, because Allah said “transgress for equal transgression” (Le Monde, May 29).

Al-Qaeda’s January 2015 Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris also met with Diaby’s approval:

If defending his Prophet is terrorism, then all Muslims who know their religion are terrorists. Those who insult the Prophet are to be executed, it is Islamic law. The fact that Kouachi brothers [Saïd and Chérif] applied this law does not make them terrorists, but real Muslims… Those who insulted the Prophet were executed. I wish I’d been chosen to do that” (Le Monde, May 31; AFP, May 29).


Breaking new ground in the use of video as a recruitment tool, Omar Diaby bears a large share of responsibility for the recent terrorist outrages in France as well as the emigration of scores of young French Muslims to Syria’s battlefields, from which many will never return. Diaby’s propaganda efforts have fostered a climate of fear and resentment amongst French Muslims, some of whom have become convinced that powerful forces in the Western world are determined to eliminate Islam and slaughter its followers, a belief that can have only one response – jihad against the infidels.


  1. For the latter, see:
  2. See:
  3. For the video, see:
  4. The full video is available at:

This article first appeared in the July 2016 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor

French Foreign Legion Operation in the Strategic Passe de Salvador

Andrew McGregor

Tips and Trends: The AIS African Security Report, May 2015

The Passe de Salvador runs past the northwest side of north-eastern Niger’s Plateau du Manguéni, near the frontier between Libya, Algeria and the Agadez region of Niger. On the Niger side, the pass connects to the smugglers’ route running across the Ténéré du Tafassâsset desert parallel to the Algerian border in northern Niger, a route used by veteran Algerian jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar when he withdrew his forces from northern Mali to southern Libya in early 2013. The Passe de Salvador has traditionally been controlled by Adrar Tuareg centered on the south-western Libyan town of Ubari, unlike the Passe de Toummo on the southern side of the Plateau du Manguéni, which is controlled by the Tuareg’s traditional nomad rivals, the Tubu, who operate on both sides of the Libya-Niger border.

Salvador Pass 2Passe de Salvador, top left; Fort Madama, bottom right.

The 2e Régiment étranger de parachutistes (2e REP) was originally raised from Foreign Legion troops in 1948 for use in the French colonies of Indochina. Few members of the regiment survived the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 (in which the “paras” played a prominent role) and the subsequent imprisonment of the survivors by the Viet Minh. Since then, the rebuilt airborne unit has served on numerous operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and across a host of Middle Eastern and African countries. Now based in Corsica, 2e REP is likely to be the first unit deployed in foreign operations as the lead unit of France’s Rapid Reaction Corps and is kept at a stage of alertness that allows it deploy within 24 hours of receiving orders.

In a world where helicopter-borne air assault operations have largely replaced airborne operations and there is criticism in some Western nations that paratroopers are expensive and little-used, France continues to be an exponent of airborne operations, though it has not carried out such an operation during hostilities for over 35 years (the last being at Kolwezi, Zaïre, in 1978). Since that time, two French airborne divisions have been reduced to a single brigade, the 11e Brigade Parachutiste, consisting of roughly 8500 men organized into eight regiments, only one of which is composed of Legionnaires. Participation in hard fighting in Afghanistan helped sharpen the combat skills of the 11th Brigade and other French military units. [1]

2e REP arrived in northern Mali from a French base in Côte d’Ivoire in dramatic fashion on January 28, 2013 with a parachute drop of a company-size unit into the region just north of Timbuktu to cut off retreating jihadists being pushed north by French armor, marine infantry and Chadian forces during Operation Serval (in the event, no jihadists were encountered by the 2e REP). [2] An unidentified French Special Forces unit (possibly elements of the Commando parachutiste de l’air n°10 (CPA 10 – No. 10 Air Parachute Commando) carried out another drop on northern Mali’s Tessalit Airport on the evening of February 7, 2013 as part of a complex land-air operation involving Chadian troops and helicopter-borne French troops of the 1er régiment de chasseurs parachutistes (1er RCP) and the 21e Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine (21e RIMa – actually a light armored unit despite its name) as well as elements of other units formed into a combined-arms tactical battle group (L’Express, February 21, 2013). [3] Since then, 2e REP has continued operations in northern Mali as part of France’s military strategy for northern Africa, Operation Barkhane.

Operation Kunama II

In mid-April, perhaps as much in an attempt to engage in high-level training in oppressive conditions as from operational concerns, 2e REP made a daring night jump into the unfamiliar terrain of the Salvador Pass linking Libya to Niger, a desolate but strategically important site frequently used by Saharan smugglers, terrorists and insurgents. [4] There are unconfirmed reports that French Special Forces were inserted into the Pass in the early days of Operation Serval and even mounted cross-border operations against jihadists who had fled to the ungoverned regions of south-western Libya.

Rather than drop the paras into the Pass itself, it was decided to land them on the adjacent Manguéni Plateau five kilometers from the Pass. There they were met by their operational partners, 50 men of the much lower-budget Nigerien Army who were forced to drive rather than fly to the rendezvous. Food and water were supplied to the French troops on pallets dropped by C-130 cargo aircraft.

After consolidating control of the Salvador Pass, the French and Nigerien troops left on a long and challenging drive to the old colonial-era Legion fort at Madama on the Djado Plateau, near which French forces set up a forward operating base and airstrip in October 2014.  The fort still has a garrison of Nigerien troops tasked with controlling the smuggling and trafficking routes that run through the area, some of which are used by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the related al-Murabitoun.

Salvador Pass 1French Legionnaires and Nigerien Troops at Fort Madama

The drive to Fort Madama exposed some weaknesses in the six-wheeled Panhard ERC 90 Sagaie armored all-terrain vehicles used by the French in northern Mali, as they began to quickly break down in the harsh conditions and terrain; according to the unit’s colonel, “Our vehicles are designed for Europe. Here, we are left with temperatures rising to 40-45 degrees maybe even 50 degrees. Our tanks are not designed for that and also suffer from the sand. It creeps everywhere and everything deteriorates” (RFI, April 23, 2015).

While no contact was made with jihadist forces or the region’s elusive smugglers during Operation Kunama II, it provided necessary field experience, training opportunities and logistical support practice for French military forces in some of the world’s most hostile terrain. Though jihadist activities were not interrupted by the operation, it nevertheless sent a clear signal to jihadis and smugglers alike that powerful French forces can be deployed in the Niger-Libya border region within hours if the presence of armed groups in the area is detected by French Harfang drones based in the Nigerien capital of Niamey.


  1. Pp. 38-39,
  2. Footage of the drop shot from a Harfang drone can be viewed here: . Footage of an airdrop of heavy equipment the next day at Timbuktu Airport by the 17e Régiment du Génie Parachutiste (17e RGP – 17th Parachute Engineer Regiment) can be viewed at:
  3. These improvised formations with integrated fire support are known in the French Army as Groupement tactique interarmes (GTIA). French troops typically train and operate in such formations.
  4. Video of 2e REP in the Passe de Salvador can be seen at:

Operation Barkhane: France’s New Military Approach to Counter-Terrorism in Africa

Andrew McGregor

July 24, 2014

With several military operations underway in the former colonies of French West Africa, Paris has decided to reorganize its deployments with an eye to providing a more mobile and coordinated military response to threats from terrorists, insurgents or other forces intent on disturbing the security of France’s African backyard.

France will redeploy most of its forces in Africa as part of the new Operation Barkhane (the name refers to a sickle-shaped sand dune). Following diplomatic agreements with Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (the “Sahel G-5”), over 3,000 French troops will be involved in securing the Sahel-Sahara region in cooperative operations involving G-5 troops. Other assets to be deployed in the operation include 20 helicopters, 200 armored vehicles, 200 trucks, six fighter-jets, ten transport aircraft and three drones (Le Figaro [Paris], July 13).

Operation BarkhanePresident Hollande made a tour of Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Chad between July 17 to 19 to discuss the new security arrangements with political leaders, but also to promote French trade in the face of growing Chinese competition (Economist, July 19). In Niger, Hollande was met by a group protesting French uranium mining operations in that country (AFP, July 18). In a speech given in Abidjan, French president François Hollande declared that the reorganization of French military assets in Africa would enable “quick and effective responses to crisis… Rather than having heavy and unwieldy crisis bases, we prefer to have facilities that can be used for fast and effective interventions” (Nouvel Observateur [Paris], July 19).

The official launch of Operation Barkhane will come in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena on August 1. The operation will be commanded by the highly-experienced Major General Jean-Pierre Palasset, who commanded the 27e Brigade d’Infanterie de Montagne (27th Mountain Infantry Battalion, 2003-2005) before leading Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011) and serving as commander of the Brigade La Fayette, a joint unit comprising most of the French forces serving in Afghanistan (2011-2012).

The initiation of Operation Barkhane brings an end to four existing French operations in Africa; Licorne (Côte d’Ivoire, 2002-2014), Épervier (Chad, 1986-2014), Sabre (Burkina Faso, 2012-2014) and Serval (Mali, 2013-2014). Licorne is coming to an end (though 450 French troops will remain in Abidjan as part of a logistical base for French operations) while the other operations will be folded into Operation Barkhane. Operation Sangaris (Central African Republic, 2013 – present) is classified as a humanitarian rather than counter-terrorism mission and the deployment of some 2,000 French troops will continue until the arrival of a UN force in September (Bloomberg, July 21). Some 1200 French soldiers will remain in northern Mali (Guardian [Lagos], July 15). Existing French military deployments in Djibouti, Dakar (Senegal) and Libreville (Gabon) are expected to be scaled back significantly, a process already underway in Dakar (Jeune Afrique, July 19).

8 RPIMaSoldiers of the 8th Regiment of Marine Infantry Paratroopers (8e RPIMa), deployed in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire

The force in Chad has been boosted from 950 to 1250 men. Chad will play an important role in Operation Barkhane – N’Djamena’s Kossei airbase will provide the overall command center, with two smaller bases in northern Chad at Faya Largeau and Abéché, both close to the Libyan border. Zouar, a town in the Tubu-dominate Tibesti Masif of northern Chad, has also been mentioned as a possibility (Jeune Afrique, July 19). Kossei will provide a home for three Rafale fighter-jets, Puma helicopters and a variety of transport and fuelling aircraft. Chadian troops fought side-by-side with French forces in northern Mali in 2013 and are regarded as the most effective combat partners for France in North Africa despite a recent mixed performance in the CAR. Four Chadian troops under UN command died in a June 11 suicide bombing in the northern Mali town of Aguelhok (AFP, June 11). Chadian opposition and human rights groups are dismayed by the new agreement, which appears to legitimize and even guarantee the continued rule of President Idriss Déby, who has held power since 1990 (RFI, July 19).

Intelligence operations will be headquartered in Niamey, the capital of Niger and home to French unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations in West Africa. There are currently about 300 French troops stationed in Niger, most of them involved in protecting, maintaining and operating two unarmed General Atomic MQ-9 Reaper drones and an older Israeli-built Harfang drone (Bloomberg, July 21). The French-operated Harfang drones are being gradually phased out in favor of the MQ-9s, though the Harfangs saw extensive service during French operations in northern Mali in 2013. Three Mirage 2000 fighter-jets will be transferred from N’Djamena to Niamey. A French Navy Dassault Atlantique 2 surveillance aircraft has been withdrawn from Niamey with the conclusion of Operation Serval.

Small groups of French Special Forces will continue to be based in Ougadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, and at Atar, a small settlement in northwestern Mauritania. Other small bases are planned for Tessalit in Mali, which controls the road running between the rebellious Kidal region and southern Algeria, and in Madama in Niger, a strategic post near the Malian border that was the site of a French colonial fort. There are reports that French troops have already occupied the nearby Salvador Pass, an important smuggling route between Niger and Libya that appears to have acted as a main transit route for terrorists passing through the region (Libération [Paris], July 16).

French forces in the Sahel-Sahara region will continue to be targeted by Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Murabitun group, which claimed responsibility for the death of one Legionnaire and the wounding of six others in a suicide bomb attack in northern Mali on July 15 (al-Akhbar [Nouackchott], July 16; RFI, July 17). Much of the ground element for Operation Barkhane is likely to be drawn from the French Légion étrangère and the Troupes de marine, the successor to the French Colonial Infantry.

The implementation of Operation Barkhane, an apparently permanent defense agreement with five former French colonies, raises a number of important questions, not least of which is what attitude will be adopted by Algeria, the most powerful nation in the Sahara-Sahel region but one that views all French military activities there with great suspicion based on Algeria’s 132-year experience of French occupation. There is also a question of whether the new defense agreements will permit French forces in hot pursuit of terrorists to cross national borders of G-5 nations without obtaining permission first. The permanent deployments also seem to present a challenge to local democracy and sovereignty while preserving French commercial and political interests in the region. For France, Operation Barkhane will enhance French ability to fend off Chinese commercial and trade challenges and allow France to secure its energy supplies while disrupting terrorist networks and containing the threat from southern Libya.

This article first appeared in the July 24, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Qaeda Responds to Sectarian Clashes in the Central African Republic

Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2014

In a statement entitled “Central African Tragedy… Between Crusader Deceit and Muslim Betrayal,” al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has taken note of the ongoing reprisals against Muslims in the Central African Republic (CAR) being carried out by Christian “anti-balaka” militias, referring to the attacks as “a new episode in the series of spiteful crusades against Islam and its people.” [1] Over 15,000 Muslim civilians live in improvised camps where they are surrounded by armed militias intent on killing them for their alleged support of the largely Muslim Séléka rebel movement that briefly seized power last year (Reuters, February 25).

Troops of the French 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade secure Bangui Airport (

AQIM describes the international peacekeeping forces being sent to the CAR as arriving “only to increase the suffering of Muslims.” France comes in for special attention as “a malevolent colonial crusader… [that] continues to play the role of guardian of the African continent” while fueling conflict and looting wealth “in order to preserve their interests and satisfy their arrogant whims.” AQIM concludes by warning France: “Your crimes will not go unpunished and the war between us and you continues.”

The Islamist movement also condemns the “shameful silence” of the Islamic community, “a nation of one billion.” Noting that some conflicts involving Muslims gain the attention of the Muslim world while others do not, AQIM asks: “Why differentiate between a persecutor and a persecutor and a tragedy and a tragedy?”

The African Union peacekeeping mission in the CAR, the Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA), has some 6,000 troops from Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  There are an additional 600 police officers from the same countries engaged in training local police forces. Part of MISCA’s difficulty in restoring order to the CAR lies in the fact that the mission is trusted by neither the ex-Séléka rebels nor the anti-balaka militias. It has already become clear that the combined forces of the 2,000 man French deployment (locally referred to as “Sangaris” after the name of the French operation in the CAR) and MISCA are far from sufficient to restore order and security in a large nation with little infrastructure or road systems.

MISCA raided the Boy Rab quarter of Bangui, a base for anti-balaka militias, on February 15, detaining a number of important militia leaders, including Lieutenant Konaté and Lieutenant Ganagi Hervé. Another important anti-balaka leader, Patrice Edouard Ngaissona, managed to evade the operation, though arms and ammunition were recovered from his home (RFI, February 15). The detainees attempted to escape Bangui prison on February 23, but were foiled by alert Rwandan MISCA guards (AFP, February 24).

Rwandan Peacekeepers examine amulets on a detained Anti-Balaka militant

The anti-balaka militias are reported to be divided over the CAR’s future political direction. One faction continues to call for the return of deposed president François Bozizé, while a more moderate faction is seeking to lower the intensity of the conflict and to cooperate with the new government of interim-president Catherine Samba-Panza (RFI, February 16). The anti-balaka rebels depend heavily on charms and amulets designed to ward off bullets and other threats.

Many residents of the CAR view the Chadians as biased towards the republic’s Muslims, who are often referred to by the Christian population as “Chadians” regardless of their origins. The arrival in Bangui of the projected EU force of 1,000 troops with heavy equipment is still believed to be a month away. The formation of a planned UN force of 10,000 peacekeepers (which would probably absorb most of MISCA) is opposed by Chad and is likely still six months away from materializing (VOA, March 3).

Chad traditionally regards the CAR region as its traditional backyard, dating back to the days when the Sultanate of Wadai (in present-day eastern Chad) used the region as a source of wealth in the form of slaves, ivory and other goods. In more recent years, Chadians have figured in the CAR as traders, mercenaries and even presidential bodyguards. N’Djamena’s influence on CAR politics is considerable and growing, considering Chad’s expanding and oil-financed military might. Most of Chad’s oil production is in the south of the country, just north of the unstable CAR.

Both the EU and the UN are calling on Turkey to contribute to the EU deployment, with the UN secretary-general even making a personal call to Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for assistance. The likelihood of such a commitment is, however, still uncertain, as Ankara is consumed externally with the Syrian crisis and internally by a corruption scandal and approaching elections (Today’s Zaman [Istanbul], March 2). Turkey is, moreover, heavily involved in the reconstruction of Somalia and may be wary of adding a military role in an unfamiliar area.

French forces currently deployed to the CAR include Alpine troops of the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade, some of whom are specialists in urban warfare, and troops of the 8th Régiment de Parachutistes d’Infanterie de Marine (8e RPIMa), an airborne unit with experience in French Indo-China, Algeria, Chad and Afghanistan.

The French intervention in the CAR is not the first in that nation’s post-independence period; in September 1979, units from the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE – France’s external intelligence service until reorganization in 1982) and the 1st RPIMa seized Bangui’s airport, allowing transports carrying 300 troops to land with the purpose of replacing “Emperor” Jean-Bédel Bokassa with a new president, David Dacko, who helpfully arrived with the French troops.


1. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, “Central African Tragedy… Between Crusader Deceit and Muslim Betrayal,” February 26, 2014,

This article first appeared in the March 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Merger of Northern Mali Rebel Movements Creates Political Distance from Islamist Militants

Andrew McGregor

November 14, 2013

Proclaiming that the move was the only means of securing peace in northern Mali, the three largest rebel movements in the region announced their merger on November 4. The merger brings together the normally hostile members of one Arab militia, the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), and two Tuareg groups, the secular Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), which contains many former members of the al-Qaeda-allied Islamist Ansar al-Din movement.  No name has been chosen for the new movement, which will be effective “within 45 days” after approval had been given by the membership of each group (Soir de Bamako, November 4; al-Jazeera, November 5; AFP, November 5). The rebel movements are looking to present a united front after withdrawing from peace talks with the central government on September 26. Reports of a forthcoming decision to merge, undertaken by delegations of the three groups based at the now-suspended peace talks in the Burkina Faso capital of Ouagadougou, were given a hostile reception by groups of youths in Kidal (, November 1).