Category Archives: Drones

Drones Over the Nile: Unmanned Aerial Warfare and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report on Sudan

June 24, 2024

The growing importance of drones in modern warfare has been amply demonstrated in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though both states still possess manned military aircraft. In Africa, drones have been used extensively in the struggle between Libya’s rival governments, but the first broad use of drones by a “rebel” movement is taking place in Sudan. There, drones are in steady use by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a former state paramilitary that launched attacks on government institutions and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on April 15, 2023. Only days after the conflict began, the SAF and other state security institutions declared the RSF “a rebel entity” that was fighting the state and ordered its dissolution (Al-Jazeera, April 17, 2023). [1]

Both the RSF and SAF have used drones for surveillance and offensive purposes since the beginning of the conflict. The SAF is now receiving shipments of advanced Iranian drones, while the RSF relies on shipments of drones and other weapons from the anti-Iran, anti-Islamist United Arab Emirates (UAE). Sudan recalled its ambassador to Chad on June 25 over allegations that Chad is allowing the UAE to ferry military supplies to the RSF through its airports. The import of drones to Sudan violates a 2005 UN Security Council resolution that bans the supply of weapons to the Sudanese government and armed groups in Darfur.

Omdurman Market (Sky News)

The precision-guided munitions of Iranian Mohajer-6 drones played a decisive factor in the SAF’s March offensive that retook old Omdurman and the National Radio and Television Corporation from the RSF (Radio Dabanga, March 17, 2024). The Mohajer-6 UAVs are, however, vulnerable to the RSF’s limited anti-aircraft weapons, mostly man-portable (MANPAD) systems that are less effective against small “suicide” drones. Earlier this year, RSF forces in Omdurman released photos of a downed Iranian Mohajer-6 drone operated by the SAF and “its extremist backers from the former regime” (a reference to Islamist groups formerly allied to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir). The RSF claimed it was the third such SAF drone to have been brought down (Radio Dabanga, January 29, 2024).

Captured RSF Quadcopter Drone

The SAF began using FPV (first-person view) quadcopter loitering munitions (a.k.a. “suicide” drones) in September 2023. With an ability to hover for long periods before the user finds a target and drives the drone and its warhead into it, loitering munitions provide a cheap and useful tool in urban warfare of the type being practiced in Khartoum and Omdurman. Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation produces its own Kamin-25 loitering munitions (Military Africa, September 15, 2023).

The SAF uses several Chinese drone types, most notably the Rainbow CH-3 (used for reconnaissance, surveillance and attacks) and the enhanced Rainbow CH-4, which uses precision-guided munitions and has a range of up to 5,000 km (Military Africa, April 20, 2023). Most SAF drones operate out of Wadi Sayidna airbase north of Omdurman. On June 7, SAF air defense systems shot down two drones targeting the base (Radio Dabanga, June 7, 2024; Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024). SAF-held airbases are a common target of RSF drones.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones

The RSF also operates Chinese-made Sunflower-200 “suicide drones,” an improved version of the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition drone. These have been deployed with the alleged assistance of Russian PMC Wagner personnel (Military Africa, April 27, 2024; Defense Express, August 16, 2023). Russia is a major purchaser of the Shahed-136, which it uses in Ukraine in a modified form known as the Geran-2. The RSF also operates UAE-supplied, Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) drones, modified to drop two 120mm mortar rounds on its target (Military Africa, February 12, 2024).

RSF drone brought down by the SAF in Shendi, April 23, 2024. (ST)

Recently, the RSF has used Chinese-made drones to bring the war to the previously safe cities of Upper Nubia, home of the riverine Arabs who have dominated Sudan’s politics and military since independence. The SAF’s Third Infantry Division was attacked by drones in Shendi (150 km north of Khartoum) on April 23, while an earlier attack in Atbara targeted the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade of Islamist fighters on March 2 (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 23, 2024). The Brigade is a hardline Islamist militia fighting alongside the SAF as part of the “popular mobilization” strategy that has brought both former rebel movements and ex-members of Omar al-Bashir’s military/Islamist regime on side with the SAF (Al-Taghyeer, April 3, 2024).

General Shams al-Din Kabbashi

Brigadier Tibieg Mustafa, identified as an advisor to the RSF leader, insisted that the RSF had no part in the drone attacks on Shendi or Atbara: “What happened reflects internal disputes between the Army and the Islamic Brigades of Al-Barra’a bin Malik, which fight alongside the Army” (Radio Tamazuj, April 25, 2024). There appear to be differences in the SAF’s senior command over the role of the Islamic Brigades; General Shams al-Din Kabbashi, the army’s deputy commander, believes their inclusion is dangerous, while General Yasir al-Atta, a member of the sovereignty council, insists the SAF is open to all Sudanese, including Islamists (Middle East Eye, April 4, 2024). Despite Brigadier Tibieg’s claim, there seems little reason at this time to believe the SAF is attacking its allies with drones.

General Yasir al-Atta (ST)

On April 24, three reconnaissance drones were spotted flying over the Nubian town of Hambukol (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 25, 2024).  Shendi was attacked again on June 9, when five “suicide” drones were shot down by the Third Infantry Division. No damage or casualties were reported but widespread panic was reported in the town (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024).

On June 7, the SAF’s 18th Infantry Division shot down two RSF drones targeting the Kenana airbase in White Nile State and the division headquarters in Kosti (White Nile State). The attacks came a day after SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan arrived in Kosti (Sudan Tribune, June 7, 2024).

RSF advances east of the Nile have brought previously safe cities within range of RSF aerial attacks. In early April, two or three RSF drones panicked the eastern city of al-Qadarif when they struck the local headquarters of the General Intelligence Service and a judiciary building (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 9, 2024; Asharq al-Awsat, April 10, 2024).

Unlike the SAF, the RSF has no air force, but drones have provided an available and low-cost alternative that allows the paramilitary to spread terror in SAF-held cities well behind the lines and attack SAF facilities, airbases in particular.

NOTE

  1. The description of the RSF as “rebels” is somewhat contentious; see for example a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), that insists the RSF is “not a ‘rebel’ group – it’s recognized by law and was developed, tolerated and sustained as an instrument of state power…” (USIP, April 20, 2023).

 

Al-Qaeda Strikes U.S. Drone Base in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate

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Andrew McGregor

October 18, 2013

Yemen’s al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has claimed that its September 30 attack on a military base in eastern Yemen was focused on the destruction of an American drone operations command-and-control room. In its statement, AQAP said that its attack was directed against an “intelligence and operations room” at the Mukalla air base and promised that further attacks on American drone installations would follow: “Such joint security targets, which participate with the Americans in their war on the Muslim people, are a legitimate target for our operations, and we will puncture these eyes that the enemy uses” (Shumukh al-Islam, October 14). However, Yemeni officials denied that any American drone operations room existed at the base, saying the command-and-control room there was dedicated exclusively to anti-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea (Reuters, October 14).

Mukalla, Yemen

AQAP’s claim referred to an attack by Islamist militants on the headquarters of the Yemen Army’s Second Military Region at the port of Mukalla, capital of Yemen’s eastern Hadramawt governorate. The operation began with the detonation of a car-bomb at the entrance gate of the base, followed by the infiltration of militants disguised as Yemeni Special Forces personnel (Saba [Sana’a], September 30; Yemen Post, October 3). The tactic created massive confusion at the base, allowing the militants to seize a number of soldiers as hostages before taking taking refuge in a three-storey building.

The military responded with a fierce counter-attack that deployed Special Forces troops from Sana’a using RPGs, missiles and fire from four tanks that destroyed much of the installation during a three-day standoff. Four soldiers were reported killed and nine wounded in the effort to re-take the base from Islamist militants who claimed to have killed dozens of officers in the initial attack (Mukalla2011.net, October 1; Felix News Agency, October 5; Reuters, October 14; Yemen Post, October 3).

The attack came only days after AQAP strikes in southern Yemen killed 31 soldiers and policemen in southern Yemen (Reuters, September 30). Other air bases have been targeted by AQAP this year, including al-Anad airbase in Lahj governorate, where three pilots were killed by gunmen on motorcycles only days after the base’s gas tanks were set ablaze (Yemen Times, May 9).

Not long after the attack on the Hadramawt military headquarters, a senior intelligence officer was killed in Mukalla on October 10 (Yemen Post, October 11). AQAP’s assassination campaign has claimed the lives of some 90 senior officers of Yemen’s security forces since the 2011 uprising against the regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh (Yemen Observer, September 1).

Yemen’s current president, Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi, reported that he has requested the provision of armed drones from the United States, saying that the American drone attacks have “widely curtailed al-Qaeda activities” while describing claims of significant civilian casualties as “exaggerated” (SABA [Sana’a], August 22; Yemen Online, August 24). While the Yemeni request for armed drones remains under consideration, Yemen’s air force took delivery of two American surveillance aircraft in mid-September (AP, September 16).

Despite the president’s enthusiasm for armed drones, there have been calls in Yemen for a review of the nation’s counterterrorism strategy to address the root causes of Islamist extremism rather than continuing the pursuit of an exclusively military response. In Hadramawt, the influential Imam Abu al-Harith Omar bin Salim Bawazir has claimed some success in persuading militants to abandon al-Qaeda’s ideology and “distorted” approach to Islam, though he complains of a lack of support for these efforts from authorities (Yemen Post, October 11). Local human rights groups in Hadramawt have also complained of the “negative effects” of American drone strikes in the region (Mukalla Online, October 10). Yemeni sources indicate that over 30 American drone strikes on suspected militants have taken place in Yemen since the beginning of the year (Felix News Agency, September 1).

While the internal debate in Yemen over the use of American drones continues, the Sahelian nation of Niger has requested the deployment of American armed drones in that country to “collect intelligence and conduct operations” against Islamist militants who took refuge in Niger after being driven out of northern Mali by joint French-African Union military operations (Reuters, September 19).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor on October 18, 2013

Is Lebanon’s Hezbollah Equipped with New Iranian Drones?

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Andrew McGregor

November 24, 2010

As Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah movement and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) continue on what seems an inevitable path to a new round of open conflict, a report has emerged claiming Hezbollah’s armed wing has recently received a number of Iran’s most advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), courtesy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (al-Siyasah [Kuwait], November 6).

drone - iranIranian-made Karrar Drone

The report claims that sources close to high-ranking members of Hezbollah’s military force have revealed the movement has taken possession of three types of Iranian-supplied UAVs. These include Chinese-made drones, Iranian-made Ra’d (“Thunder”) drones and, most importantly, the Iranian-made long-range Karrar drones, introduced on August 22. According to the sources, these weapons are being kept in the Bekaa Valley of east Lebanon.

The Karrar (“Striker”) is a turbojet-powered drone capable of long-range reconnaissance and attack missions with a flight range of 1,000 km at low or high altitudes and a flight speed of 900 to 1,000 k/p/h, according to Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi (Defense Update, August 24). The four meter-long drone can carry two 115 kilogram bombs or a guided missile of 227 kilograms and can be deployed on the back of a truck to a ground-launch position where it can be fired with the aid of a jet-fuelled take-off system. Mobility is an important consideration for Hezbollah, all of whose territory is within easy range of Israeli aerial counterstrikes. The response time of Israeli warplanes to mobile missile launches during the 2006 conflict was typically less than ten minutes, leaving little time for launch crews and equipment to clear the area. The Karrar can be retrieved by its operators through the deployment of a rear-mounted parachute.

Iran opened two new production lines in February for the manufacture of Ra’d and Nazir (“Herald”) short-range, low-altitude UAVs with reduced radar-detection signatures. The Iranian Air Force also reports the development of its first stealth drone, the Sofreh Mahi (“Manta Ray”) (Press TV, February 8; Fars News Agency, February 8).

Israel is preparing a multi-level missile defense system, with the new Iron Dome system expected to provide a defense against short-range rocket attacks. The Iron Dome system, however, is very complex and training its military operators has proven a larger challenge than anticipated, causing a delay in deployment.  Its manufacturer, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, has developed a cheaper and simpler version of the system called “Iron Flame.” This stripped-down surface-to-surface missile system can carry a variety of different warheads for various missions (Defense Update, November 10). The Israeli press quoted senior Israeli military sources as saying Iron Dome will now be deployed only in the case of massive rocket attacks from Gaza or south Lebanon (Jerusalem Post, November 8). The disparate cost between the complex Tamir interceptor missile used in the Iron Dome system and the cheap Qassam or Katyusha rockets it is meant to destroy is a major concern in deciding when and where to deploy Iron Dome.

Should reports of Hezbollah’s new drone be accurate, the question is whether these weapons have been supplied for Hezbollah’s use in retaliation against a new Israeli offensive or whether their deployment is intended to make them available in response to an Israeli or American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is important to note that this latest report suggests that, as in the case of earlier Iranian supplies of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, the new UAVs remain under the control of the IRGC trainers assigned to their management and cannot be used without the direct authorization of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Syed Ali Hoseyni Khamene’i.

Al-Siyasah is a firm opponent of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. It has reported in the past that the core al-Qaeda leadership is based in Iran and that Hezbollah is stockpiling Iranian-built chemical weapons (al-Siyasah, June 7, 2010; September 3, 2009). Neither allegation has been confirmed.

 

This article first appeared in the November 24, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor