Jihad in the Horn of Africa: A Profile of Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr”

Andrew McGregor

January 31, 2011

Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” appears to be losing his grip on the leadership of Somalia’s al-Shabaab, the largest and most formidable of the militant Islamist groups operating in the Horn of Africa. Reports indicate that Godane was relieved of his post as Amir of al-Shabaab at a December 24 meeting of the movement’s Shura Council (WaltaInfo.com, January 15). However, Godane is apparently continuing to act as though he is still leader, issuing statements as the commander of al-Shabaab despite opposition from several other prominent commanders.

GodaneShaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr”

Background

Godane is reported to have trained in Afghanistan along with a number of other al-Shabaab commanders. Like many commanders with an “Afghan” pedigree, Godane has emphasized the international aspects of his movement, using the language and rhetoric of the global jihad propagated by al-Qaeda in statements such as “We will fight and the wars will not end until Islamic Shari’a is implemented in all continents in the world and until Muslims liberate Jerusalem.”

A proponent of Salafism, Godane took over the leadership of al-Shabaab in May 2008 after the death of its leader, Adan Hashi Ayro, in a U.S. cruise missile attack. Godane’s devotion to the global jihad earned him a U.S. terrorist designation under a November 20, 2008 executive order. The al-Shabaab commander has declared wars would continue until Shar’a was implemented across the world and the Muslims liberated Jerusalem (AFP, May 13, 2009).

The ever reclusive Godane usually communicates with the press through the medium of audiotape messages. The Shabaab Amir was seriously wounded in what appeared to be the accidental explosion of a suicide belt during the training of a Pakistani suicide bomber. As many as 17 Shabaab fighters may have been killed in the blast (Garowe Online, May 18, 2009; May 20, 2009; Waagacusub.com, May 18, 2009; see also Terrorism Monitor, June 4, 2009).

Challenges for the Amir

Godane has run up against a number of factors that have led to the challenges now being posed to his leadership from within the movement, which is battling Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for control of the capital of Mogadishu, having already taken over the administration of much of southern Somalia. The most significant of these factors include the following:

  • Godane’s secretive and furtive leadership style gains little respect with Somali fighters who prefer bolder leaders who are unafraid to appear on the battlefield, somewhere Godane never appears.
  • Godane belongs to the Isaaq/Arap a clan and subclan that are far removed and largely unrepresented in the current fighting, leaving him with few armed men under his personal command compared with other commanders, who often lead large contingents of their own southern or central Somali clansmen.
  • Photos of Godane disguising himself as a veiled woman have appeared on Somali websites, diminishing his reputation in comparison to most other Shabaab leaders, who appear in public without disguise and close to the front lines.
  • Godane’s adherence to the philosophy and imperatives of the global jihad have done little to help his movement attain more immediate but elusive objectives, such as the conquest of Mogadishu.
  • The Shabaab leader’s efforts to spread the jihad to the northern Somali regions of Puntland and Somaliland have been largely unsuccessful.
  • Godane has alienated many of the southern clans and sub-clans by imposing bans on badly needed medical and humanitarian relief efforts during a period of widespread drought. In some places al-Shabaab has seized all pharmaceutical supplies, preventing their distribution to impoverished and hungry villagers. This policy does not have the support of significant southern Shabaab commanders such as Shaykh Mukhtar Robow “Ali Mansur.”
  • Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive to take Mogadishu was a failure, resulting in TFG and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces controlling more of the capital than when the offensive began. The heaviest losses were taken by Shabaab fighters of the Rahanweyn clan drawn from Bay and Bakool regions. This contingent is loyal to Godane rival Abu Mansur.
  • Special units loyal to Godane have killed badly wounded Shabaab fighters during combat operations in Mogadishu. The practice of making these men “martyrs” rather than offering them medical treatment has outraged many al-Shabaab commanders.

Indha AddeNot Impressed: Shaykh Yusuf Muhammad Si’ad “Indha Adde”

Godane was openly mocked by TFG Minister of Defense Shaykh Yusuf Muhammad Si’ad “Indha Adde”: “As to the extent I know the so-called Ahmad Godane, he is a fugitive who wears women’s dress such as gowns, veils, headscarves, etc… and what makes me laugh loud is that he is telling us to surrender to him. I am advising him to change his womanly style of dressing and put men’s clothes on and come to the battlefield…” Indha Adde added that Godane had never participated in combat with the Ethiopians during the latter’s occupation of Somalia (Mareeg Online, n.d.).

A Shadowy Leader Wears Out His Welcome

Godane’s apparent successor is Shaykh Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani,” another member of the Isaaq clan and a reputed spiritual as well as military leader. As his nickname suggests, Shaykh Ibrahim is believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir before returning to Somalia to become a commander in the extremist al-Ittihad al-Islami. However, Godane appeared to ignore the reported change of leadership, issuing a new audiotape to the Mogadishu press on December 31 that urged the united forces of al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam to redouble their efforts to topple the TFG and expel AMISOM from Somalia while warning against attempts to exploit divisions within al-Shabaab. Godane also called on the movement to provide aid to those Somalis suffering from hunger in the ongoing drought (Shabelle Media Network, December 31, 2010; Mareeg.com, December 30, 2010). On January 19, Somali warlord and former governor of Banaadir Region Muhammad Omar Habib “Dheere” accused al-Shabaab of burning relief supplies rather than distributing them to starving Somalis (Puntland Post, January 19).

Shaykh Fu’ad Muhammad Qalaf “Shangole,” a senior al-Shabaab member and a field commander in Mogadishu, delivered a damaging blow to Godane’s leadership by giving a December 17 speech that denounced the Shabaab leader for his offensive against fellow Muslims in the Afgoye corridor. Shangole also questioned Godane for avoiding public appearances and his absence from the front lines of the jihad he was supposedly directing (Mareeg.com, January 6). A week later, Shangole again attacked Godane in a speech in Afgoye in which he told al-Shabaab fighters they risked having the Somali people turn their back on Shari’a if it continued to be implemented in a haphazard and vicious form. He also noted that civilians continued to flock to TFG controlled regions because of the movement’s refusal to permit aid agencies to distribute much-needed food and relief aid. Shangole’s remarks were highly significant in that he could hardly be described as a “moderate,” given his reputation as one of the strongest advocates of severe punishments for infractions of Islamic law. Shangole appeared to criticize the Shabaab leadership’s devotion to global jihad rather than the conquest of Somalia when he told a market gathering in Mogadishu that “fighting everyone is not part of the solution” (WaltaInfo, December 24, 2010; The Star [Nairobi], December 30, 2010).

Despite the efforts of TFG president and former Islamic Courts Union chief Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad to institute Shari’a in Somalia, Godane rejects these efforts, saying the “so-called government cannot be described as an Islamist government, because it was created to destroy Islamists in Somalia,” further accusing the president of collaboration with the Ethiopians (Garowe Online, May 13, 2010).

Al-Shabaab’s Triumph in Buhabkaba is Godane’s Defeat

The catalyst for Godane’s downfall was the struggle with Hizb al-Islam for the so-called Afgoye Corridor, in particular the battle for the town of Burhabkaba on the road from Mogadishu to Afgoye. There are nearly half a million internally displaced people (IDPs) living in the so-called Afgoye Corridor outside of Mogadishu, where they are preyed upon by young Islamists whose rapaciousness is backed by their ability to implement “Shari’a” judgments and punishments according to their whims rather than their knowledge of Islamic law. A rally against al-Shabaab’s treatment of IDPs was held in Mogadishu on January 19, a rare occurrence in a nation that lives in fear of Shabaab gunmen (Shabelle Media Network, January 19).

With Shaykh Aweys proclaiming “We will die for Afgoye or defeat al-Shabaab” it appeared Hizb al-Islam was ready to make a last stand against their rival Islamists. However, the battle against Hizb al-Islam did not have the full support of the other Shabaab commanders, many of whom saw useful resources withdrawn from the struggle for Mogadishu to fight fellow Muslims instead of the “apostates” of the TFG. Al-Shabaab’s Shaykh Fu’ad Muhammad Qalaf “Shangole” opposed the campaign: “The fighting in Burhabkaba was not jihad, because it is haram [prohibited] for a Muslim person to kill another Muslim person and then brag about it” (Garowe Online, December 18).

According to some sources, however, an important shipment of weapons intended to help Hizb al-Islam defend its positions in Burhabkaba was seized by TFG troops outside of Mogadishu, leaving the movement with little choice but to surrender or seek terms with al-Shabaab, knowing these would include full integration into al-Shabaab, Godane’s constant demand before accepting reconciliation. The very fact negotiations of any sort took place indicates Godane’s diminished influence in the movement.

While Hizb al-Islam leaders have been promised command positions in al-Shabaab, most fighters will undergo retraining in Shabaab tactics and methods. It will then be up to the movement to decide whether to redeploy Hizb al-Islam fighters as distinct units or distribute them around existing al-Shabaab units (the process followed in the integration of the Ras Kamboni faction) to prevent Hizb al-Islam from re-separating from al-Shabaab, an entirely probable event in the acrimonious world of Somali politics.

The ambitious Shaykh Aweys will attempt to exert his influence within the Shabaab leadership during the current upheaval, always keeping his eye on the position of Amir. Aweys is a clever political tactician used to exerting power and influence from behind the scenes, and al-Shabaab may find it has taken a catalyst for change into its midst through the unification with Hizb al-Islam. The unending war promised by al-Shabaab’s global jihadist faction has diminishing support amongst a war-weary Somali public. Given the continued flight of Somalis from Shabaab controlled territories, it becomes clear that the movement’s global jihad will never graduate beyond a series of largely self-defeating terrorist attacks in neighboring countries. Locally, however, it is likely a mistake to view Awey’s presence in the Shabaab leadership as a moderating influence on the movement, as some observers have suggested. The rivalry between Godane and Aweys is long-standing, and the integration of Hizb al-Islam with al-Shabaab might have hinged partly on Godane’s replacement as leader. In May 2009 Aweys threatened to strike Godane with “an iron hand” (Somaliland Times, May 28, 2009).

War with Somaliland

Clan membership is always important in determining the leadership of any Somali group, and Godane has probably already proven the exception to the rule by taking control of al-Shabaab in the first place. Godane is from the Isaaq clan of the breakaway northern Somali state of Somaliland. This makes him something of a stranger to the southern Somali clans that form the bulk of al-Shabaab’s rank-and-file. Somaliland is far removed from the terrorist bombings organized by Godane and others in the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa have failed to spark the Islamist rebellion in Somaliland that Godane naïvely hoped for. Most residents of Somaliland are proud of 20 years of peace and free elections in the region despite remaining unrecognized by even a single state. Few Isaaq, therefore, have rallied to Godane’s cause, leaving him somewhat isolated in a movement dominated by southern clans.

In March 2006, Godane was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison after being convicted on a range of arms and terrorism related charges (Somaliland Times, December 9, 2009). In 2008 Godane was accused of planning three suicide bombings in the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa that targeted the presidential palace, the Ethiopian trade office and the regional UN offices (Garowe Online, November 27, 2008; AFP, November 27, 2008; see Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008).

Somaliland’s decision to give landlocked Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera incensed Godane, who delivered a new series of threats to Somaliland’s leaders (Jowhar, September 3, 2009; Gabiley.net, December 6, 2008; Radio Gaalkacyo, September 3, 2009).

As Somaliland approached a presidential election in mid-2010, Godane issued a statement in which he denounced the “danger” of elections and democracy, asserting their prohibition by Shari’a: “Every individual should fight democracy verbally, if necessary use his hands to fight democracy, or leave the area where democracy is practiced” (Garowe Online, June 25).

Conclusion

In the tradition of Somali warrior-poets such as Shaykh Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, Godane put his objections to efforts to divide the Shabaab movement into verse:

One may want to pursue it for their personal benefit,

One would want to see it collapse and go backward.

Even if every man works for its demise,

Or expels it to the jungle,

Or lays traps for it,

Or attacks it at midday,

Or sells it out of greed,

It will never collapse,

Even if you wish to side against it (Shabelle Media Network, December 31, 2010).

The reclusive Islamist shaykh from Somaliland will have difficulty retaining or regaining his position as Amir of al-Shabaab. If he is depose but not eliminated he may in fact create the new “Hizb al-Islam,” an Islamist movement that will rival al-Shabaab without overpowering it. He may also be able to draw on certain connections in the ranks of the international Salafi-Jihadi movement to maintain a campaign of suicide bombings and similar attacks both inside and outside of Somalia in pursuit of a global Islamic Caliphate.

This article first appeared in the January issue of the Militant Leadership Monitor

Al-Shabaab Blamed for Assassination of Military Commander in Disputed Somali Region of Sool

Andrew McGregor

November 6, 2009

Violence in the strategically located Somali city of Las Anod continues to threaten a new round of warfare in a region that has largely evaded the interminable fighting consuming Mogadishu and southern Somalia. Las Anod is the administrative capital of Sool region, one of three Somali regions at the center of a territorial dispute between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and the autonomous Somali region of Puntland.

Las AnodColonel Osman Yusuf Nur, commander of Somaliland’s 12th infantry division, was killed in a November 1 roadside bombing that appeared to target his vehicle (Shabelle Media Network, November 1). The Colonel was on his way to visit the scene of an earlier explosion in Las Anod when a remote-controlled bomb blew up his vehicle, killing as many as five other members of his entourage. There were reports that troops rushing to the scene opened fire on civilians gathering at the scene of the bombing (Garowe Online, November 2).

The bombing came at a time of high tension in Las Anod as the dispute between Somaliland and Puntland over the regions of Sool, Sanaaq and Cayn (SSC) heats up, with reports of clashes between Somaliland forces and Puntland militants in Sanaag region at the end of October (Waaheen, October 29). Hundreds of Las Anod residents have also taken to the streets to protest the presence of Somaliland troops, who were reported to have fired on the stone-throwing demonstrators in response, wounding two (Shabelle Media Network, November 2; Garowe Online, November 2; Mareeg Online, November 2). The town was placed under curfew and over 20 individuals arrested in connection with the bombing.

The day before the assassination, former al-Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur” threatened Somaliland and Puntland with invasions by al-Shabaab due to their failure to implement Shari’a (AllPuntland.com, October 31). It was the first statement from Mukhtar Robow since he was replaced as the movement’s spokesman in May (see Terrorism Monitor, June 4). Only three days before the attack, Somaliland’s president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, called for war against al-Shabaab, which is led by Somaliland native Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr.”

To date, there has only been one claim of responsibility for the bombing, coming from one Burale Yusuf, who claimed the act was carried out by a heretofore unknown anti-Somaliland group, the Jabarti National Movement. Burale escaped an early morning raid on his house in Las Anod by Somaliland police forces, though tribal elders quickly organized a press conference to reveal Burale is known as an insane person in the community and was completely incapable of organizing such an attack (Somaliland Press, November 3).

While suspicion has fallen on al-Shabaab, the radical Islamist group is far from the only suspect in the bombing. Besides the radical Islamists, there is also the Northern Somali Unionist Movement (NSUM), which opposes the secession of Somaliland and its control of the SSC region (n-sum.org, May 14).

There is also the Somali Unity Defense Alliance (SUDA) of Colonel Abdi Aziz “Garamgaram” Muhammad, a pro-Puntland militia which has committed several attacks on Somaliland security forces since its formation earlier this year (Garowe Online, November 9).  Garamgaram is a former commander in the militia of notorious warlords and accused war criminal General Muhammad Said Hersi Morgan, known as “the Butcher of Hargeisa (the capital of Somaliland)” for his brutal campaign in the region in the late 1980s against opponents of dictator Siad Barre. SUDA has been described as the military wing of NSUM (Maanhadal.com, November 19, 2008).

Another armed pro-Puntland group determined to liberate the disputed territories from Somaliland’s rule was formed in Nairobi in October by Puntland politician Saleban Ahmad Isse and Colonel Ali Hassan Sabarey (Jidbaale.com, October 11; Somaliland Press, November 2). In January 2008, former Puntland president Adde Musa Hersi declared his government’s intention to resume control of Las Anod (Somalinet, January 15, 2008).

Though the SSC region falls within the boundaries of the former British Somaliland, which Hargeisa used in determining the borders of Somaliland, the majority of its citizens belong to the Darod/Dhulbahante clan, which has close ties to Puntland. Hargeisa’s rule over the regions has proven increasingly unpopular since it sent its troops in 2007 to expel Puntland forces that had been present in the area since 2003. The Dhulbahante made a brief effort in 2008 to form an autonomous state from the three regions to be known as the Northland State of Somalia, though some members of the clan support Hargeisa’s rule.

This article first appeared in the November 6, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Somaliland Charges al-Shabaab Extremists with Suicide Bombings

Andrew McGregor

December 8, 2008

With the completion of a month-long police investigation, Somaliland’s Interior Minister, Abdullahi “Irro” Ismail, has announced al-Shabaab extremists are responsible for the suicide bombings that killed more than 20 people in Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa in late October. Al-Shabaab, originally the youth wing of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU) movement, has emerged as the most militant faction of the Islamist resistance. According to the Interior Minister, the three suicide bombings that targeted the presidential palace, the Ethiopian trade office and the regional UN offices were organized by al-Shabaab leaders Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur” and Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr,” the latter a Somaliland native who trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Somaliland 1Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr”

Among those killed by the car-bombs were the President’s personal secretary and senior anti-terrorism official Ibrahim Hutu. The actual operation was supervised by a man known as Abdulfatah Abdullahi Guutaale. Ismail added; “Somaliland’s enemy, from day one to today, has always been al Shabaab” (Garowe Online, November 27; AFP, November 27). A noted Somaliland Muslim leader, Shaykh Ali Warsame, condemned the attacks as outrageous and un-Islamic (Somaliland Times, November 1). The bombings may have been designed to interfere with upcoming elections next March.

The investigation revealed that of the six suicide bombers involved in the October 29 attacks, only one was from Somaliland, while the other five hailed from Somalia proper. Somaliland, roughly corresponding to the borders of colonial-era British Somaliland, split from Somalia in 1991 following the fall of the Siad Barre regime. As the rest of the country plunged into violence and political chaos, Somaliland created a stable state with democratic elections, but has failed completely in gaining international recognition. Somaliland’s security services are in admitted need of international assistance and training, but Somaliland’s non-sovereign status prevents any such efforts.

At the same time as the Hargeisa explosions, other suicide bombings occurred in neighboring Puntland, a semi-autonomous district of Somalia. A pair of suicide car bombs struck two anti-terrorism offices of the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS) in Bosasso, the economic capital of Puntland. The huge blasts, which Puntland also blamed on al-Shabaab, killed six PIS agents (AFP, October 30).

Somaliland 2A Planned Attack

A document from the ICU’s Shura Council dated September 28, 2006 and signed by Shaykh Dahir Aweys, called for the ICU “to send 30 young martyrs to carry out explosions and killing of the Jewish and American collaborators in the northern regions” (Awdal News Network, October 17, 2006). The Arabic language document included a list of thirteen prominent Somaliland politicians targeted for assassination (including President Dahir Riyale Kahin), all of whom are accused of apostasy by abandoning Islam to work with Americans and Jews. The decision came after ICU leaders viewed a video purporting to show the torture of Shaykh Muhammad Ismail by Somaliland security officials. Somaliland officials described the tape as a fake. The Shaykh was charged earlier with involvement in an attempt to disrupt the September 2005 elections with bombings.

Some of Somalia’s Islamists are intent on integrating Somaliland into a “Greater Somalia” that would also include Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, semi-autonomous Puntland, Djibouti and north-eastern Kenya.

Determining Responsibility

The day after the bombings, al-Shabaab posted a videotape to jihadi websites showing the last testament of one of the suicide bombers, though al-Shabaab did not explicitly claim credit for the attacks. The young man pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and called for the expulsion of all foreigners in Somalia, especially Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers. Two of the suicide bombers were identified by name; Abul Salam Hersi and Abdul-Aziz Saad, both of whom were members of the Hawiye/Habr Gidir Ayr sub-clan, which supplies many of the Islamist fighters engaged in the struggle for Mogadishu (al-Jazeera, October 30; Somaliland Times, November 1).

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer suggested al-Qaeda was the responsible party; “Nobody has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but they have the markings of al-Qaeda … We believe that these senseless attacks highlight the determination of violent extremists to undermine peace and stability throughout Somalia and the Horn of Africa” (AFP, October 29).

Frazer, however, failed to mention the American connection to the suicide attacks. It’s believed that one of the suicide bombers was 26-year old Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of Minneapolis, home to a substantial Somali émigré population. Ahmed moved to Minnesota in 1996 and graduated high school there before becoming one of over a dozen young Somali men to disappear from the area in recent months. All are believed to have returned to Somalia to join the fighting, possibly as suicide bombers. FBI officials will not confirm whether an investigation is under way (Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune, November 25; KSTP-TV [St.Paul], November 29; WCCO-TV [Minneapolis-St.Paul], November 26; AP, November 26). Abdulfatah Abdullahi Guutaale, the local organizer of the Hargeisa bombings, once lived in the Minneapolis area and may have a U.S. green card, according to the Somaliland Interior Ministry investigation (AFP, November 27).

Accusations that Somaliland officials were harassing refugees from Somalia following the blasts were denied by the government (Shabelle, November 17). Interior Minister Abdullahi Ismail Irro issued a statement urging Somalilanders to take possible suspects to the nearest police station instead of taking the law into their own hands (IRIN, November 10). Another victim of the bombings was Somaliland’s voter registration campaign, which has now been suspended.

Prior al-Shabaab Activities in Somaliland

In December 2006, a major trial ended in Somaliland in which 15 suspects were charged (six in absentia) with conspiracy to commit terror, illegal importation of arms and explosives and the wounding of three policemen in September/October 2005. Most of the suspects were convicted and sentenced to 20 – 25 years in prison. Among those sentenced to 25 years was Shaykh Muhammad Ismail, a leading Islamist radical. Two of the others sentenced in absentia were Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” (a suspect in the latest Hargeisa attacks) and Ibrahim Jama Afghani, another veteran of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan (Somaliland Times, December 9, 2006).

Surprisingly, both Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Aden Hashi Farah “Ayrow,” an Afghanistan veteran and military commander of al-Shabaab, were acquitted due to a lack of evidence. The two were tried in absentia.  Aden Hashi was killed in a U.S. airstrike on his home last May. Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys is a former colonel in the Somali army and the leader of what might be termed the “rejectionist” faction of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), taking a hard-line on peace efforts while calling for the destruction of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the expulsion of all foreign troops. Aweys is an inflexible opponent of Somaliland’s struggle for independence; “People in Somaliland worship a deity called “Peace” and this deity is mirrored on Western ideology…” (Somaliland Times, December 9, 2006).

The al-Shabaab threat has been used for political purposes within Somaliland. A wave of bombings struck Hargeisa in April, including a grenade attack on the home of a cabinet minister and a large bomb that caused heavy damage to one of Somaliland’s houses of parliament, the House of Guurti (elders). The government blamed the opposition Kulmiye party (Garowe Online, April 10). In August, Interior Minister Irro accused a leading member of the opposition Kulmiye party of being a member of al-Shabaab. The arrest of Hersi Ali Haji Hassan followed his criticism of an exclusive livestock export deal made by the Somaliland president with a Saudi Arabian company. The Kulmiye party responded by accusing the President of damaging the region’s peaceful image (Garowe Online, August 12). Raising livestock is a major industry in Somaliland and the President’s grant of a monopoly on exports to a Saudi firm brought charges from the opposition of violating the constitution and even “high treason,” an impeachable offense (Garowe Online, July 29).

A Low Level War with Puntland

Somaliland is also engaged in a bitter dispute with Puntland over the Sool and Sanaag regions, which both territories claim. A local insurgent group fighting to end Somaliland’s “occupation” of the Sool region, the Somali Unity Defense Alliance (SUDA), appears to be a thinly veiled Puntland proxy. Such accusations are denied by the group’s leader, Colonel Abdiaziz “Garamgaram” Muhammad, who is best known as a former commander in the militia of notorious warlord and accused war criminal Muhammad Said Hersi Morgan while the latter was fighting the Juba Valley Alliance for control of the port of Kismayo (now in the hands of al-Shabaab) (Garowe Online, September 10). Colonel Muhammad’s predecessor, Colonel Deyr Abdi, was captured by Somaliland security forces when they raided a gathering of pro-Puntland militias at the regional capital of Las Anod last January. Colonel Abdi had been appointed military commander of the region by Puntland’s ruler, General Adde Musa. A column of Somaliland troops in 20 armored trucks under Colonel Hashi Yare seized the coastal town of Las Qorey last July after Puntland troops withdrew to the east (Garowe Online, July 9).

Conclusion

Somali insurgents, including al-Shabaab, regard the Hargeisa government as being U.S. and Ethiopian backed. Somaliland authorities again became hopeful international recognition might at last be on the way when U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer met with the Somaliland president for security talks last February. The meeting followed a visit by President Dahir Rayale to Washington the previous month. The October 29 blasts will undermine Somaliland’s projection of an image of security and damage its prospects for recognition. The consequent withdrawal of United Nations personnel leaves Somaliland more isolated than ever. There are fears that Islamist extremism may gain ground in Somaliland if recognition of Somaliland’s independence continues to be withheld. Italy and a handful of African countries pose the main opposition to Somaliland’s independence.

This article first appeared in the December 8, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor