Category Archives: Sudan

Russia in the Red Sea (Part Three): Converging Wars Obstruct Russian Plans for Naval Port in Sudan

Posted on by

Eurasia Daily Monitor 20(176)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

Andrew McGregor

November 14, 2023

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and the expanded war has pulled some of the Kremlin’s attention to the Middle East and North Africa. The conflict gives fresh impetus to Russia’s interest in establishing a stronger foothold in the Red Sea region. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the ongoing power struggle in Sudan have derailed Moscow’s efforts to establish a naval port in Sudan. The Wagner Group has allied with one side of the fight, which has hurt Russia’s prospects, especially if the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan prevail (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, May 26, June 9). In addition, recent drone attacks in Khartoum, possibly of Ukrainian origin, suggest Kyiv may be trying to challenge Russia’s military contractors in Africa (The Moscow Times, September 20). The outcome of the fighting in Sudan will have important implications for the Kremlin’s efforts to establish a stronger military presence in the Red Sea region.

Before these geopolitical upheavals, Russia seemed well on its way to setting up its planned naval base. In 2017, an agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir called for the establishment of a Russian base at an unspecified location on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in return for arms and other military gear from Moscow. Operated by 300 Russian servicemen, the base would support as many as four Russian naval vessels at a time (see EDM, December 6, 2017).

Map showing location of Arakiyai (Abdul-Razak M Mohamed).

By 2021, the new Sudanese government began having second thoughts about the deal and sought new terms that included economic aid (The Arab Weekly, September 16, 2021). Initially, Moscow had hoped that the base would be established in Port Sudan, building on existing infrastructure there. Khartoum, however, suggested a new base be built from scratch at Arakiyai, a remote fishing village so small it does not appear on most maps (Radio Dabanga, December 7, 2021). Without supporting infrastructure or sufficient fresh water, the Arakiyai suggestion was meant to cool Russian designs on Sudanese waters.

Port of Suakin

The only other viable option would be the ancient Arab port of Suakin. Originally built to accommodate shallow draft dhows, the British moved operations from Suakin to Port Sudan when it became clear that Suakin could not accommodate deep-draft naval and commercial ships. Dredging has since improved access, but the construction of new facilities would take years (Middle East Eye, September 30, 2022).

The ancient coral city of Suakin, with the modern ‘Uthman Diqna port in the background.

In 2022, Sudan’s military rulers appeared ready to finalize a treaty authorizing the establishment of a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. The leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemetti”), took the lead in most of these negotiations. He arrived in Moscow on February 23, one day before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with a delegation that did not include any SAF representatives. Hemetti expressed surprise that anyone might find a Russian base in Sudan controversial (Africanews, March 3, 2022).

Port Sudan is a politically unstable city that serves as Sudan’s primary connection to international trade routes. The city is riddled with ethnic rivalries and tribal divisions that could threaten any foreign military presence there. Port Sudan is separated from the Nile Valley by 250 miles of sun-baked desert inhabited almost entirely by Arab and Beja nomads. This isolation makes port operations and onward transportation of goods vulnerable to any group that could block the intersection of roads and narrow-gauge rail connections with the Nile.

The outbreak of fighting in and around Khartoum may squash any chances for the establishment of a Russian naval base in the near future. Videos circulating on X (formerly Twitter) on September 14 depicted a series of attacks by first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones in Omdurman against RSF fighters and vehicles (Twitter.com/War Noir, September 14; Twitter.com/Mupper2 September 14). FPV drones are cheap and commercially available and can be easily modified to carry the warhead of a rocket-propelled grenade. The drone pilot, wearing video goggles, controls the low and fast flight of the explosive drones with the assistance of a spotter drone that selects targets and records the results.

Such capabilities could threaten a prospective Russian base should the fighting in Sudan continue over the long term. FPV drones have become commonplace in Ukraine, but this constituted their first appearance in an African conflict (both the SAF and RSF use other types of drones). The tactics seen in the videos resemble those used by Ukrainian forces, and parts of the videos appear to display Ukrainian text on the drone controller’s monitor. When questioned by journalists about the attacks, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov simply said, “A year ago, I personally and openly said that all Russian war criminals who fought, are fighting, or plan to fight against Ukraine will be punished anywhere in the world” (Holosameryky.com, September 23).

Possible Ukrainian involvement in Sudan led to a flurry of diplomatic efforts by Moscow and Kyiv. On September 21, General al-Burhan spoke with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York. Lavrov indicated Moscow’s support for al-Burhan and the SAF’s efforts to stabilize Sudan despite Wagner’s association with the RSF (TASS, September 21). Two days later, al-Burhan met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov for “unscheduled” talks at Ireland’s Shannon Airport (Kyiv Independent; Sudan Tribune, September 23). Zelenskyy reported that the two leaders discussed the activity of illegal armed groups financed by Russia (i.e., Wagner). Afterward, Zelenskyy said he was “grateful for Sudan’s consistent support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Anadolu Agency, September 23). These developments point to Ukraine potentially pursuing a policy in Africa that will challenge Moscow’s Wagner gambit. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, “Our strategy is not to replace Russia but to free Africa from Russia’s grip” (Africanews, August 17).

Russian Navy frigate Admiral Grigorovich visits Port Sudan in 2021 (AFP).

Perhaps most troubling for the Kremlin is the inherent political instability of Sudan. Even before the current power struggle, regional insurgencies, tribal clashes, mass demonstrations, and coup attempts have characterized the country’s political process. The months-long struggle between Sudan’s two most powerful military commanders is reducing the national capital to rubble and has had a similar effect on Khartoum’s international commitments. A Russian deal with one military faction is unlikely to be honored by the other, leaving a possible Russian base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in limbo. The SAF leadership is convinced that Moscow now controls the Wagner Group following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted mutiny and death, with the mercenary group supplying the RSF with arms and munitions. As a result, a victorious SAF would be unlikely to approve a Russian naval base and official military presence in Sudan.

 

The Third Front: Sudan’s Armed Rebel Movements Join the War Between the Generals

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 21(16)

August 8, 2023

When a violent struggle between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti” and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) led by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan broke out in mid-April, Sudan had not yet reconciled with several armed rebel movements at war with the central government for decades. With ceasefire agreements in place with most rebel movements, progress towards peace was inching along before and even after the 2019 military coup. However, the new round of national violence threatens to reignite simmering conflicts and pull existing rebel movements into a potentially devastating “third front.”

Dr. John Garang de Mabior

The most notable of these movements is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N, Harakat al-Sha’abi li-Tahrir al-Sudan al-Shamal), which in many ways represented the last vestige of Colonel John Garang’s revolutionary “New Sudan” vision for a Sudanese nation united by democracy, ethnic cooperation, and political secularism. As the intellectual and military leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from 1985 to 2005, the US-educated Garang was able to impose his unifying vision on a movement whose Christian and animist south Sudanese members preferred separation from the rule of north Sudan’s Arab-centric Islamists rather than a union. Garang’s sudden death in a 2005 helicopter crash revealed the shallow acceptance of the “New Sudan” in southern Sudan, where even his closest comrades began to advance a separatist project that would lead to the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (Al Jazeera, August 1, 2005). Independence stranded non-Arab SPLA units in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, which now lay on the northern side of the Sudanese divide.

Map of Regions of Rebellion in Sudan (Lancet)

These armed units reorganized as the SPLM–N to continue the uneven fight against Sudan’s military-Islamist government and preserve the “New Sudan” ideology, sometimes in coordination with the rebel movements of Darfur. Falling victim to the factionalism that pervades Sudanese politics, the Southern Kordofan wing of the SPLM–N (under ‘Abd al-Aziz Wad Hilu) made a bitter split with the Blue Nile wing (under Malik Agar Ayer) in 2017. At the time, Agar condemned Wad Hilu for “abandoning” the New Sudan project (Sudan Tribune, August 27, 2022). Since Agar joined the SAF-dominated Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) that ruled Sudan in 2021, it is his former deputy Yasir Arman (an Arab of the influential Ja’alin tribe) who has become the leading adherent of the New Sudan vision, which he feels the rest of the country is finally ready for, following the 2019 popular uprising.

The Juba Agreement—A Step Towards Reconciliation

The Juba Peace Agreement of August 2020 (mediated by South Sudanese president Salva Kiir Mayardit, John Garang’s former deputy) offered the Sudanese rebel movements posts in national and regional governments, economic rights, land titles, and integration into the security forces. It did not, however, call for the disarmament of signatory groups until national elections were held. Signatories included two powerful groups from Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM, led by Jibril Ibrahim) and the largely Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA–MM, led by Sulayman Arcua “Minni” Minnawi, now governor of Darfur). The largely Fur faction of the SLA led by ‘Abd al-Wahid Nur (SLA–AW) declined to sign the agreement. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) were divided over the agreement, with Malik Agar’s Blue Nile faction signing on while ‘Abd al-Aziz Wad Hilu refused, citing the need to first make Sudan a secular rather than an Islamic state.

After Hemeti lost his position on Sudan’s TSC as a consequence of the RSF rebellion, TSC chairman General ‘Abd al-Fatah Burhan replaced him with Malik Agar, who had already joined the Sovereignty Council in February 2021 (SUNA, May 20). Increasingly distant from his SPLA roots, Agar has become one of the most prominent diplomatic representatives of al-Burhan’s rule.

Malik Agar—From Rebel to Vice President

Malik Agar is a member of the Ingassana, a Black African tribe inhabiting the boulder-strewn hills of the Blue Nile region, though years of conflict have forced many Ingassana to live as refugees in South Sudan. Since joining the Sovereignty Council, Agar has established close ties with General al-Burhan, but is also known to have had good relations with General Hemeti before April’s outbreak of hostilities.

Malik Agar (New Humanitarian)

Many SPLM–N members became alarmed when Malik Agar used the newfound authority granted to him by the Juba Agreement to award most government posts in the region, including the governorship, to members of his own Ingassana people, a minority group that played little role in the armed struggle against Khartoum. Increasingly unpopular in his home region, Agar sought new opportunities through his role as a member of the ruling Sovereignty Council and growing alignment with Generals al-Burhan and Hemeti in Khartoum. Agar rejected popular opposition to the October 25, 2019 military coup d’état that overthrew the civilian-military transitional regime established in September 2019. Agar stated at the time that, “What is happening in Sudan is chaos and terrorism against the state, and I do not call it a revolution” (Sudan Tribune, October 26, 2022).

The coup divided the rebels who had signed the Juba Agreement. Some had done quite well from the agreement, and while many government members resigned after the coup, former Darfur rebel leaders Jibril Ibrahim and Minni Minnawi (like Agar, new members of the TSC) both retained their positions (Radio Dabanga, April 11). Civilian prime minister ‘Abd Allah Hamdok appointed Jibril Ibrahim as Sudan’s finance minister on February 8, 2021, despite his associations with the military/Islamist Bashir regime.

Meanwhile, the civilian coalition known as the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) strongly opposed the military coup. Despite the major role played by the FFC in overthrowing the regime of President Omar al-Bashir, the ties of Malik Agar’s deputy, Yasir Arman, to the FFC annoyed Agar and contributed to their eventual split. In November 2022, an alternative coalition, the Forces for Freedom and Change–Democratic Bloc (FFC–DB), was formed from groups supporting the military coup, including JEM, the Beja High Council of east Sudan, the Democratic Unionist Party (closely associated with the Khatmiyya Sufi order), and Freedom and Change–National Consensus (FC–NC).

Yasir Sa’ad Arman—Keeping the New Sudan Alive

Some of the strongest criticism of the coup-backing rebel movements has come from the third man in the SPLM–N leadership, Yasir Arman, a Ja’alin Arab and thus related to the powerful Nile Valley Arab power base that has ruled Sudan since independence. Despite his origins, Arman opposes the traditional power structure in Sudan, becoming a close follower of John Garang and a loyal adherent to his New Sudan ideology since 1987. After the separation of the south, Arman became a leading figure in the SPLM–N, joining Malik Agar’s faction after the movement’s split in 2017.

Yasir Sa’ad Arman (Asharq al-Awsat)

Arman and Agar had serious differences over how to proceed following the 2021 SAF/RSF military coup; while Agar is now widely viewed as being pro-coup, Arman describes the coup as a failure in every sense and fears it may provide cover for the restoration of al-Bashir’s Islamist regime (a viewpoint shared by the RSF, at least publicly). Ongoing differences led to a fissure between the two men, leading to what was described as an “amicable” split and the creation of Arman’s new movement in August 2022: the SPLM–Revolutionary Democratic Current (RDC) (Sudan Tribune, August 27, 2022). The mitosis of the SPLM–N was complete with the establishment of three related but rival movements with incompatible goals.

Arman has called for a united civilian front to move Sudan forward, with one exception: “The Islamists of the old regime who were behind and actively involved in this war should not be rewarded and involved in the process of the unified civilian front” (Sudan Tribune, June 29). Arman has elsewhere explained that “the roots of this war lie in the policy of creating multiple armies to protect [al-Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party] system… (Sudan Tribune, June 8). Along similar lines, Malik Agar maintains that the Juba Agreement calls for a single Sudanese army, declaring that: “Having more than one army destabilizes the country” (Ahram Online [Cairo], June 22).

Political Violence Returns to the Nuba Hills

South Kordofan’s SPLM–N commander, ‘Abd al-Aziz Wad al-Hilu, is a Nuba, one of roughly 2 million in Sudan. Indigenous Black Africans, most Nuba live in the Nuba Hills of South Kordofan in remote but easily defensible communities. The Nuba speak roughly 100 languages from hill to hill, using Arabic as a lingua franca. Long subject to attacks from Arab slave-raiders, Egyptians, Mahdists, British imperialists, and Sudanese government troops, the Nuba began to develop a political identity in the later 20th century, which is best expressed today in Wad al-Hilu’s faction of the SPLM–N.

Al-Hilu is based in the town of Kauda in the Nuba Mountains, and believes Yasir Arman failed to press for the self-determination of the Nuba regions of South Kordofan, which was al-Hilu’s core demand. Complicating issues in South Kordofan is the arrival of roughly 200,000 Nuba fleeing the fighting in Khartoum. They also are all in need of humanitarian and medical assistance (Radio Dabanga, June 14).

By June 8, SPLM–N fighters began to deploy around the South Kordofan capital Kadugli, which was already subject to a blockade by RSF forces. Residents of Kadugli began to flee the city on June 21 as the SPLM–N launched attacks on positions of the SAF’s 54th Infantry Brigade around the city, although the army claimed to have repelled the attacks while inflicting heavy losses on their opponents (Facebook–General Command of the Armed Forces, June 21). SAF MiG and Sukhoi warplanes were deployed against the attackers and their bases in the hills. The SAF described the attacks as “treacherous” violations of an annually renewed ceasefire between the rebel movement and the military. The ceasefires had permitted the delivery of aid to SPLM–N-held territories and allowed the free passage of individuals in and out of these regions, but the SPLM–N claimed no pact had been broken as the ceasefires were unilateral.

Dilling, South Kordofan (Matt Stewart)

According to a spokesman for al-Hilu, nearly simultaneous fighting in the mainly Nuba town of Dilling began when SAF troops killed a SPLM–N fighter in a Dilling market. When SPLM–N men asked to bury the body, they were met instead with racial insults by SAF troops (Radio Dabanga, June 28). [1] On the same day as the SPLM–N attack on Dilling, the RSF reportedly seized the SAF’s Tayba military base in al-Dibaybat, which is 50 kilometers from Dilling, and took weapons, ammunition, and prisoners (al-Taghyir [Khartoum], June 21). Residents of al-Dibaybat fled the RSF occupation, fearing “immoral acts” by RSF troops and bombing from SAF warplanes (Radio Dabanga, June 23).

SPLM–N attacks on the regions around Dilling and South Kordofan capital Kadugli resumed on July 15, with the movement taking the SAF’s al-Farshaya camp near Dilling (Sudan Tribune, July 18). Once again, the strikes came at the same time as RSF attacks on the SAF’s Dilling garrison and the interception of an SAF column attempting to evacuate army personnel trapped in al-Farshaya (Radio Dabanga, July 18). SPLM–N forces also seized the Karakaya oil facility south of Dilling after its SAF guards fled. With the separation of South Sudan, South Kordofan now has Sudan’s most productive oil fields.

The SPLM–N Attack on Blue Nile State

With Agar’s influence waning in Blue Nile State, Wad Hilu has begun to pull in some of Agar’s former followers in the region despite local consequences. A two-day assault (June 25-26) by al-Hilu’s forces on the SAF-held city of Kurmuk in Blue Nile State failed to dislodge army forces but displaced nearly 36,000 people (Radio Dabanga, June 28). Al-Hilu’s men resumed attacks on Kurmuk on July 10 and seized two SAF garrisons in eastern South Kordofan (Radio Dabanga, July 11).

Fighting in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan regions is exacerbated by festering ethnic conflicts, notably Hausa versus Funj (or Birta) in Blue Nile, and Nuba versus Missiriya Arabs in South Kordofan, with the latter allegedly having support from the RSF before the current national conflict (Middle East Monitor, October 20, 2022).

SPLM-N Patrol in South Kordofan (Sudan Tribune)

A representative of the traditional Funj people of the Blue Nile region, Obeid Muhammad Sulayman “Abu Shotal,” shares the local perception that the Hausa (originally Muslim Nigerians who settled along the pilgrimage route through Sudan in the last two centuries) are “foreigners” with no land rights in the region: “The land of Blue Nile is a red line for us … it belongs only to the original people” (AFP, August 27, 2022). [2] When Malik Agar began to grow closer to the Hausa for political purposes, the result was further alienation from his Blue Nile supporters. With hundreds of lives lost in ethnic conflict, the Sudanese army was blamed for failing to provide security in the region (Al Jazeera, October 20, 2022).

Conclusion

The SPLM–N attacks on the SAF are allegedly intended to help protect the civilian population from RSF attacks where the SAF cannot. According to an SPLM-N official:

The SPLM–N is the people’s movement and it has the right and responsibilities to protect lives and properties of the people under its control. This is what is happening in South Kordofan and Blue Nile areas … they are protecting our own legitimate territory (Sudan Tribune, July 20).

The question is whether the SPLM–N is working in league with the RSF, a group with which the rebels have had a tense relationship in the past. So far, there are no reports of the SPLM–N clashing with the RSF, although this could change quickly in the insecure environment. In the meantime, it is worth watching to see whether an apparent coordination of attacks continues. Even if unintentional, SPLM–N military activity could support RSF operations by weakening the SAF. Any expansion of SPLM–N controlled territories will strengthen their hand when, and if, peace talks ever resume in this shattered but resilient nation.

Since April, the official security forces of Sudan have lost all credibility in their mission of defending the Sudanese people. However, the factionalism and opportunism of the rebel movements and their leaders contributes little to their own credibility as an alternative. The unifying principle behind Garang’s New Sudan ideology appears to be a lost cause when even its strongest supporters cannot work together.

Notes:

[1] Sudanese Arabs frequently refer to Black Africans (such as the Nuba) as abdin (slaves), a legacy of Sudan’s long history of race-based slavery. Social media has provided a home for provocative and insulting attacks on various ethnic groups in Sudan, fueling further internal violence.

[2] The Blue Nile region was part of the once powerful Funj Sultanate, 1504-1821. The sultanate was conquered by the son of Egypt’s Muhammad Ali Pasha in 1821 and was heavily raided for slaves thereafter.

“There Will Be No Dar Masalit, Only Dar Arab”: Sudan’s Ethnic Divisions Destroy West Darfur

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, Washington DC

June 26, 2023

Arab Tribesman and RSF vehicle, West Darfur, June 2022 (AP)

The conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Sudan started on April 15. However, parts of Darfur were already experiencing ethnic and political violence, much of it dating back to the 1990s. While the clashes in Khartoum dominate international media attention, fighting in the more remote Darfur region has exploded in intensity and bloodshed, particularly in one of the region’s five states—West Darfur.

West Darfur is home to the Masalit people, Black Africans claiming ancestral origins in Tunisia. Historically, the region is known as “Dar Masalit” (dar meaning “abode of” or “home of”). Based in the historically volatile border region between western Darfur and eastern Chad, the Masalit took advantage of political upheavals in the region to establish an independent border sultanate in the late 19th century. The young sultanate, however, immediately faced invasion by Sudanese Mahdists and attacks from the Sultan of Darfur, who considered the sultanate his property.

Range of the Masalit People (Joshua Project)

Famed for their fierceness in battle, the Masalit also fought two major battles against the French in 1910, halting the eastward expansion of the French colonialists and the absorption of Dar Masalit into French-ruled Chad. The Anglo-Egyptian army that occupied Darfur in 1916 continued west into Dar Masalit, leading to its eventual formal absorption in 1922 into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (and later independent Sudan) following a border treaty between Britain and France. To this day, however, the Masalit and other tribes of the region have closer relations with their kinsmen in Chad than Sudan’s ruling Nile Valley Arabs. Al-Geneina (a.k.a. al-Junaynah), the capital of West Darfur, is 745 miles from Khartoum, but only 17 miles from Chad.

In all its turbulent history, the escalating conflict in West Darfur now represents the greatest threat in many years to the existence of the Masalit homeland.

Arabism vs. Traditional Society

As the Khartoum regime began to promote an Arab supremacist/Islamist ideology in the 1990s, it replaced the traditional administrative structure of the Masalit with appointees from the military and the Rizayqat Arabs of North Darfur. Persecution of Masalit community leaders followed, and soon Arab militias began to attack Masalit villages and burn their crops to force them into out-migration. By 1997-1999, the Masalit were suffering thousands of civilian casualties as government-armed Arab militias ran wild under the direction of national intelligence units. Khartoum staunched local resistance by disarming the Masalit and conscripting their young men to fight the rebels in South Sudan.

Sudan Minister of National Defense ‘Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn

In 1999, then Sudanese Interior Minister ‘Abd al-Rahim Muhammed Husayn declared the Masalit to be outlaws and enemies of the regime, falsely claiming they had murdered all the Arab leaders in Dar Masalit. [1] Promoted to Minister of National Defense, ‘Abd al-Rahim found himself facing an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant in March 2012 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. [2] Fighting between the Masalit and Arabs broke out again in January 2020 and again in April 2021, leaving 452 dead and over 500 wounded (Darfur24, July 21, 2021).

Sudanese Army Recruitment in Darfur

More recently, the Sudanese Army launched an intensive recruitment effort in Darfur a month before hostilities between the army and the RSF, which is composed mainly of Darfur Arabs, broke out in mid-April. The recruitment campaign targeted Arab tribesmen, focusing on the Mahamid clan of the Rizayqat Arabs. The chief of the Mahamid is Musa Hilal, the former leader of the infamous Janjaweed and a main rival of his cousin and former protegé, RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” a member of the Mahariya branch of the Rizayqat.

Musa Hilal (Sudan Tribune)

Some Arab leaders suspect the military focused on recruiting followers of Musa Hilal in order to create a new border force that would rival Hemetti’s RSF (al-Jazeera, May 3). The new force could incorporate Musa loyalists returning from work as mercenaries in Libya. Mahmud Madibbo, who is the nazir (paramount chief) of the Rizayqat, declared “our total rejection of the campaigns of recruitment of tribal youth by intelligence agencies working to mobilize the tribes for more war and prolong the tribal conflict that has claimed a number of innocent lives” (Sudan Tribune, March 16). The latest in a long line of powerful Rizayqat chiefs, Mahmud is a supporter of Hemetti and vowed last year to protect him.

Rizayqat elders met in 2020 with leaders of the RSF, but were unsuccessful in working out the differences between Musa Hilal and Hemetti. Relations between their respective branches of the Rizayqat, the Mahamid and the Mahariya, became tense after the violent 2017 clashes between Musa’s Mahamid supporters and the RSF, in which Hemetti’s brother, Brigadier ‘Abd al-Rahim Juma’a Daglo, was killed. Musa Hilal served four years in prison after being charged with attacking government forces, although he was pardoned and released by the post-revolution transitional government in March 2021.

The Destruction of al-Geneina

Al-Geneina, the capital of West Darfur state, is home to nearly half a million people. Escalating violence, much of it ethnic-based, forced the West Darfur governor to declare a State of Emergency and a 7AM to 7PM curfew on April 10, five days before the conflict between the RSF and SAF broke out. Arab gunmen on motorcycles and camels were reportedly attacking the eastern part of al-Geneina, burning houses and shooting randomly at people. Security forces were conspicuously absent from the streets (Sudan Tribune, April 10).

Al-Geneina in Peacetime (UN News)

By late April, the police and much of the regular army had fled as armed Arab tribesmen began to pour into al-Geneina from north and central Darfur. Indiscriminate fire killed many, camps for displaced people were overrun and medical facilities, including the Red Crescent headquarters, were looted and burned, destroying blood banks and valuable medical equipment (Sudan Tribune, April 27). All dialysis patients in al-Geneina died after equipment and medicines were looted (Darfur24, June 10). Al-Geneina airport has since closed, which prevented the arrival of humanitarian assistance.

Al-Geneina Now (Mail and Guardian)

Doctors and other health workers have fallen victim to snipers and the generators needed to power emergency clinics have been stolen by gunmen. Markets, government buildings, schools and aid agencies remain closed after being looted and the water system, communications and power grid have been disabled (Middle East Monitor, May 26). Many private homes have been destroyed. Areas where residents have taken refuge in large numbers have come under attack by RSF forces firing RPGs (Radio Dabanga, June 14). Other African groups besides the Masalit are also being attacked in al-Geneina by Arab militias backed by RSF forces under the command of ‘Abd al-Rahman Juma’a. Hundreds of bodies lie in the streets as snipers prevent anyone from going outside. Rape, arson and armed robbery have become common (Darfur24, June 10). According to West Darfur’s deputy governor, al-Bukhari ‘Abd Allah, “The magnitude of suffering is inconceivable in El Geneina” (Radio Dabanga, June 8).

Masalit and RSF Responses

In the first days of May, Masalit residents were reported to have seized 7,000 weapons from an abandoned police armory in al-Geneina, though a Masalit leader denied responsibility (Sudan Tribune, May 2). Weapons are plentiful and arrive regularly from Chad. However, they are expensive, and only wealthy residents can afford the $1300 it costs to purchase a Kalashnikov (France24.com, May 19).

RSF Patrol, West Darfur (AP)

The RSF has attempted to obscure its part in the violence by insisting, as it has in Khartoum, that men were impersonating RSF personnel during attacks on civilians. The RSF used social media to condemn a May 14 SAF attack in al-Geneina using tanks and heavy artillery that allegedly killed 20 civilians and damaged the Nassim mosque (RSF Twitter, May 14). The paramilitary has also called for an independent investigation into the violence in al-Geneina, and is no doubt confident that no such inquiry can proceed under the current conditions.

Despite the RSF’s role in the fighting, Hemetti issued a message in late May calling on the people of al-Geneina to “reject regionalism and tribalism. Stop fighting amongst yourselves immediately” (Middle East Monitor, May 26). Nevertheless, by June 15, there were over 1,000 dead in al-Geneina, including women and children, with thousands more wounded and unable to receive treatment. Over 100,000 residents have fled across the border to Chad or other parts of Darfur (al-Hadath TV [Dubai], June 15; Darfur24, June 10).

The Murder of West Darfur’s Governor

Governor Khamis ‘Abd Allah Abkar

The governor of West Darfur, Khamis ‘Abd Allah Abkar, was murdered on June 14, only two hours after receiving an interview form al-Hadath TV. During the interview, Khamis denounced the killing of civilians by the RSF and Arab militants in West Darfur: “There is an ongoing genocide in the region and therefore we need international intervention to protect the remaining population of the region” (Sudan Tribune, June 14). Khamis led Masalit self-defense militias during the Arab attacks of the 1990s. Arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison, Khamis nonetheless escaped in 2003. He then joined the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel movement but eventually left to form his own breakaway movement, the SLA-Khamis Abakr (SLA-KA) (Small Arms Survey, July 2010). In time, this became the largely Masalit Sudanese Alliance Forces. Khamis was appointed governor of West Darfur after this new group joined four other rebel groups in signing the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA).

Khamis’ arrest by RSF forces followed his interview, with a short video clip appearing on social media showing the governor being unloaded from a vehicle by armed men, one of whom appears to have tried to attack him with a chair as he was being led into a room (Twitter, June 14). A second video then appeared on social media showing the governor’s bloody body, while unseen individuals celebrate offscreen (Sudan Tribune, June 14). SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan accused the RSF of the killing, noting “the dead man had nothing to do with the conflict” (al-Hadath TV [Dubai], June 15). The RSF condemned the murder of the governor. However, an RSF spokesman did not affirm or deny responsibility for the murder, stating only that, “We are in a state of war and there is no safe place in West Darfur” (The New Arab, June 15; Channels Television [Lagos], June 16; SUNA, June 14).

Masalit Sultan Sa’ad ‘Abd al-Rahman Bahr al-Din

West Darfur’s traditional leadership has been challenged as well as its political leadership. After Rizayqat gunmen carried out three major massacres of Masalit civilians between 2019 and 2022, killing a total of 378 people, the Sultan of Dar Masalit, Sa’ad ‘Abd al-Rahman Bahar al-Din, complained of the growth of government-sponsored “Arabism,” accompanied by the disarmament of the Masalit and the arming of Arab militias. As sultan (a largely symbolic but influential position), Sa’ad hinted in 2021 that it might be time to re-examine the Gilani Agreement of 1919, which saw Dar Masalit absorbed by Anglo-Egyptian Sudan rather than French-ruled Chad (Darfur24, May 14, 2021). The sultan later complained it would have been better for Dar Masalit to have been absorbed by Chad, which despite being one of the world’s poorest nations, “has a strong security apparatus.” (BBC, May 31, 2022). Masalit tribal leaders have been targeted in the fighting; among the victims is the Sultan’s brother, Amir Tariq. The sultan’s palace overlooking the city was looted and partly destroyed and an Arab fighter was filmed outside the damaged building declaring “There will be no Dar Masalit again, only Dar Arab” (Sudan Tribune, June 13).

Conclusion

With local support from Darfur’s Arab tribes (and across the board support is not guaranteed), the RSF could make Darfur a stronghold in the event that the paramilitary is driven from Khartoum and other Sudanese cities. Mustafa Tambour, leader of the breakaway Sudan Liberation Movement-Tambour (SLM-T), recently reported that goods, vehicles, and cash looted by the RSF in Khartoum are being shipped to parts of central and western Darfur (Radio Dabanga, June 13).

On the other hand, the assassination of Governor Khamis, as leader of one of the five Darfur rebel movements to sign the JPA, has the potential to draw the other rebel leaders into the conflict, especially as violence has spread across the rest of Darfur, where the joint patrols of the JPA signatories have helped, if not maintain security, at least prevent insecurity from becoming much worse. Such joint operations have had less success in West Darfur. When Darfur Governor Minni Minnawi tried on May 24 to deploy a joint force of former rebel groups to escort a commercial convoy into al-Geneina and stop the violence against civilians, for example, his forces were ambushed outside the city by RSF troops supported by armed Arabs (Sudan Tribune, May 24). For the moment, there appears to be little to prevent the further displacement of the Masalit from their traditional homeland.

NOTES

  1. Daowd Ibrahim Salih, Mohamed Adam Yahya, Abdul Hafiz Omar Sharief and Osman Abbakorah (Masalit Community in Exile): “The Hidden Slaughter and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Sudan: An Open Letter to the International Community,” Damanga.org, April 8, 1999.
  2. “Situation in Darfur, Sudan,” Case Information Sheet, The Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12, May 1, 2012, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CaseInformationSheets/HusseinEng.pdf

This article first appeared in the June 26, 2023 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Sudan’s Fratricidal Conflict: An Assessment of SAF and RSF Strategies and Tactics

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor

May 27, 2023

Khartoum, May 2023 (Reuters)

The ongoing conflict in Sudan pits two very different wings of the Sudanese military in a struggle to control a population that would largely prefer democratic civilian rule over domination by either force after decades of political and economic stagnation under military rule. Differences in ethnic composition, training, and weapons have compelled the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF, led by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan) and the rival Rapid Support Forces paramilitary (RSF, led by General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” ) to adopt different strategies and tactics in their search for victory (Terrorism Monitor, April 28). Although Sudan is the third-largest nation in Africa, with an area of nearly 720,000 square miles, the main battleground between SAF and RSF is the tri-city area of Khartoum, Omdurman, and industrial Khartoum North (or Bahri), which poses a problem for the combatants.

Troublesome Terrain

Neither the SAF nor the RSF have much experience in urban warfare. Sudanese warfare is combat in the desert, the bush, and the mountains. The last sieges of Sudanese cities occurred in the Mahdist campaigns of 1881-1885. Since then, the only fighting carried out in Khartoum consists of a couple of very brief mutinies during Anglo-Egyptian rule, a failed 1976 Libyan-backed coup attempt that killed 800 people, and a day of combat (mostly in northern Omdurman) when Darfuri rebels stormed the city in 2008 (Sudan Tribune, June 20, 2008).

Initially intended to operate in the great open spaces of Sudan and remote borders of strategic significance, the RSF’s main operational equipment consists of so-called “technicals,” which are open-bed 4x4s (the Toyota Hilux is preferred) armed with a 50-caliber machine gun. Though intended for use in the desert, the technicals are nimbler in urban warfare than the SAF’s armor. The RSF began with no armor of its own, but has captured much since, including Ukrainian-made tanks, though it does not have the trained crews needed to operate this armor. [1]

Map of important targets in the Tri-City Capital area (Torchlight.ai)

Rapid strikes on SAF bases allowed the RSF to seize large quantities of weapons and ammunition at the outset of the conflict and overcome the paramilitary’s usual reliance on government supplies. The RSF has continued to depend on quick hit-and-run strikes on military and civilian infrastructure rather than holding and defending territory, tactics more familiar to the regular army. Any RSF success is immediately documented on social media, a conflict forum in which the SAF appears to be lagging behind.

RSF in Khartoum

The RSF is able to pull in most of its forces to the capital as it currently assumes no responsibility for national security. The SAF, on the other hand, continues to be responsible for the borders (previously the responsibility of the RSF) and for containing rebel movements in South Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile State. The RSF’s strategy is to disperse its forces in civilian areas of the tri-city to negate the SAF’s advantages in armor, aircraft and artillery, while applying maximum political pressure on the SAF by depriving the civilian population of basic needs and services. The RSF is using the SAF’s aerial advantage against it; damage to residential areas and infrastructure from bombing alienates the SAF from the population. The RSF obtained anti-aircraft missile systems during its deployment in Yemen and may have seized more in the opening days of the conflict; it has since claimed to have downed several SAF aircraft (Arab News, October 10, 2022).

Saudi aircraft destroyed at Khartoum Airport (SamChui.com)

With no air power of its own, the RSF targeted airbases throughout Sudan in the first days of the conflict, many of which appear to have been unprepared for the RSF assault. Air facilities that have suffered heavy RSF attacks include the Geneina, Nyala and al-Fashir airbases in Darfur, Merowe airport in Northern State, Wadi Sayyidna north of Omdurman and the Jabal Awliya airbase 40 km south of Khartoum. The intention is not to hold these airbases or capture warplanes, but to damage runways and aircraft that subsequently cannot be used by the RSF. Lingering too long can invite devastating counter-attacks, such as the RSF suffered at Merowe when a fleeing convoy was struck by SAF warplanes (SAF/Facebook, April 20). Pro-Islamist media claim that hundreds of those killed at Merowe were foreign fighters recruited by the RSF (Tayba TV [Khartoum], May 1).

Map showing military airfields struck by the RSF (Middle East Eye)

Khartoum International Airport, which also hosts military aircraft, has been badly damaged in RSF attacks, though SAF Sukhoi and MiG aircraft continue attacks on various neighborhoods of the tri-city area believed to host concentrations of RSF fighters. SAF air superiority in Khartoum is ultimately of limited value, however, unless it chooses to obliterate large parts of the city of five million people in pursuit of mobile RSF units. With the army taking little apparent notice of gradual RSF deployments in the capital region in the weeks prior to the outbreak of fighting, the paramilitary struck fast to take the General Command headquarters and seize the SAF leadership. In this, they were only partly successful, with SAF leader, General Abdelfattah al-Burhan, escaping even though his home was occupied by RSF fighters. Many of his bodyguards were killed in the attack and the Inspector General of the SAF (number three in the command) and 130 others were captured (Al-Arabiya, May 10). Both sides have attempted to strike a decisive blow by taking out the other side’s leader. Neither have succeeded, with both the RSF and SAF leaders being forced to maintain low profiles to avoid assassins.

SAF Responses to RSF

To help address RSF tactics in Khartoum, the SAF command has brought in the Central Reserve Police (CRP, popularly known as Abu Tira). Similarly armed to the RSF, the CRP is accused of committing crimes and human rights violations in Darfur and in Khartoum during the 2019 anti-‘Umar al-Bashir protests (Sudan Tribune, April 29). The roughly 80,000 strong CRP is trained as a highly maneuverable paramilitary, whose main task will be to consolidate areas once the SAF has cleared them of RSF fighters. They will also assist in blocking RSF supply lines, especially in south Khartoum, where supplies by land do not have to deal with crossing the White or Blue Niles, which are controlled by the SAF.

Central Reserve Police on patrol in the south of Khartoum on 29 April 2023

The RSF claims that both the CRP and SAF regulars wear RSF uniforms to commit crimes in Khartoum, attack the headquarters of opposition politicians, and mislead the public (RSF/Twitter, May 16; RSF/Twitter, May 17). The RSF’s repeated accusations that their opponents commit grave crimes while wearing RSF gear predates the current struggle. For example, in January the RSF commander “Hemedti” denied reports of RSF involvement in a coup attempt in neighboring Central African Republic (CAR), claiming that “large quantities of RSF uniforms are being smuggled across the border” (Middle East Eye, January 18, 2023).

The SAF has also been accused of reviving the infamous Katayib al-Zili (Shadow Brigades), which are armed Islamist civilians associated with former president al-Bashir and the now-banned Islamist National Congress Party (NCP). During the 2019 revolution against al-Bashir, his vice-president, veteran Islamist ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, threatened protesters with the notorious “Shadow Brigades,” which are known for running illegal detention facilities called “ghost houses,” where torture and murder were routine practices (Asharq al-Awsat, January 16, 2020). On May 16, the RSF claimed to have overrun SAF camps in Bahri used for training Shadow Brigades while capturing more than 700 individuals (RSF Twitter, May 16, 2023).

Conclusion

Beside troop concentrations and obvious military targets, government buildings, markets, bridges, factories, hospitals and places of worship have all been targeted in the urban fighting. Two-thirds of the nation’s hospitals have ceased functioning (much of Khartoum North’s East Nile Hospital was destroyed by an SAF bombing strike), with some even being converted into military bases (Asharq al-Awsat, May 19). The RSF has been accused of stealing ambulances and medical supplies while terrorizing patients (Radio Dabanga, May 15).

RSF Troops after Taking the State Broadcaster in Omdurman (RSF/Twitter)

Though the RSF claims to have no religious motivation and to even have Christians in its ranks, it appears to have attacked and looted Coptic, Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, turning some of the well-built structures into military bases (RSF/witter, May 14; Radio Dabanga, May 15; Religionnews.com, May 15; Radio Dabanga, May 17). Both the Azhari and Bur’i al-Dereisa mosques in Khartoum were bombed in mid-May, apparently by SAF aircraft (RSF Twitter, May 13; Radio Dabanga, May 15).  Warehouses and factories in industrial Khartoum North have also been looted with economic consequences for Sudan. There is a serious danger of important state heritage institutions, such as the National Archives or the National Museum, becoming subject to looting, aerial bombing or accidental destruction.

The RSF, with a long reputation for using mass rapes as a tactic to break resistance in Darfur, has been accused of raping women in the capital, though the paramilitary insists the culprits are impersonating RSF personnel. Rights activists have also made unverified claims of rape by SAF personnel (Radio Dabanga, May 16).

The differing capabilities of the two antagonists in the Battle of Khartoum and their shared inexperience in urban warfare make it difficult for them to come fully to grips with each other. With a decisive military decision unlikely and negotiations complicated by tribal rivalries and the re-emergence of Sudan’s long-dominant Islamists, short-term prospects of a return to peace are growing ever more distant.

Note:

[1] On May 1, the RSF released a video to prove their seizure of all the armored vehicles of the Army’s 1st Infantry Brigade (RSF/Twitter, May 1).

This article first appeared in the May 27, 2023 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan

Posted on by

Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9

Andrew McGregor

April 28, 2023

Sudan Air Force Warplane Strikes Targets in Khartoum

Sudan ended over a quarter-century of Islamist-military rule with the 2019 overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir, whose rule was based on Islamism, Arab supremacy, and the ruthless application of military power. A joint civilian-military government was formed to lead the transition to a civilian-led democracy. However, an October 2021 coup led by Sudan’s military and security forces ended all progress toward civilian rule, severing at the same time most of Sudan’s economic and financial ties to the West.

The UN and international diplomats have been trying to guide negotiations for a democratic transition between the military and the civilian Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition. The final version of the Framework Agreement on transition was to be signed on April 6. However, the deadline passed when the security forces indicated they were not prepared to sign due to the inability of two competing elements of the military to agree on integration and military reform provisions.

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (Reuters)

The Framework Agreement called for the integration of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, or al-Quwwat al-Musallaha al-Sudaniya) and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF, or al-Quwat al-Da’m al-Sari). The SAF is led by Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, who is Sudan’s de facto leader as Chair of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), while the RSF is a 30,000-strong paramilitary led by the number two figure in Sudan, TSC Deputy Chair Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti.” The Framework Agreement was intended to lead Sudan to civilian rule. The SAF, however, is highly politicized, and many of its senior officers adhere to an Islamist ideology that rejects the idea of secular government. Rather than unifying the security forces, the Framework Agreement ultimately brought their differences to a head. Supporters of the former president in the SAF are seemingly using the dispute to create a state of political insecurity favorable for a return to Islamist-military rule. Nation-wide fighting finally broke out on April 15 between the two factions.

The RSF, which was loyal to al-Bashir until his overthrow, has sought international support by accusing the army of mounting a “coup d’état” and seeking “to repeat the failed experiences of the rule of the Islamic Movement that conquered our country and destroyed the dreams of our people for thirty years” (Facebook/RSFCommand, April 16). The paramilitary now refers to their former military partners as “fascist military leaders” supported by “a crowd of corrupt Islamic people thirsty for the blood of the Sudanese people” (Facebook/RSFCommand, April 17). In a February 19 televised speech, Hemeti described the 2019 military coup as a “mistake” that has become “a gateway for the return of the former regime” and warned of efforts by Islamists to restore the Bashir regime (Radio Dabanga, February 21; BBC, February 20).

RSF Commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti”

The RSF, much feared within Sudan, is a close-knit operation—the second-in-command is Hemeti’s brother, ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daqlo, while Hemeti’s commanders are all from his own Mahariya clan of the Rizayqat Arabs. The paramilitary has participated in UAE-funded operations in Yemen and in counter-insurgency operations in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile State. It is especially active along the borders with Libya and the Central African Republic, and its brutal response to anti-regime demonstrations in Khartoum and elsewhere has made it widely unpopular. [1]

Ethnic Dimensions of the Conflict

Many Darfur Arabs, who comprise the RSF’s base, dislike the Khartoum ruling class, which consists mostly of members of Sudan’s powerful northern Nile-based Arab tribes, who have controlled the country since independence in 1956: the Ja’alin, the Danagla, and the Sha’iqiya (al-Bashir is Ja’alin, al-Burhan is Sha’iqiya). The riverine Arabs, in turn, regard the Darfur Arabs as backwards and “Africanized.” Like many Darfur Arabs, Hemeti, with nothing more than a Quranic school education, is likely to believe he will never be accepted by the riverine military and political elite. Al-Burhan, on the other hand, is regarded in Darfur as the prime architect of a genocide of non-Arab Muslims and is well-remembered for his threats to exterminate the Fur people, who were the former rulers of Darfur.

During a March “Security and Military Reform Workshop” in Khartoum, the RSF hinted at the longstanding rivalry between the Arab tribes of western Sudan and those of the Nile region (New Arab, April 17). Referring to the SAF as “an army composed of a specific militia belonging to certain tribes,” the RSF reminded those present of a struggle that dates back to the days of Mahdist rule (1885-1899). At that time, western Arabs, particularly the Ta’aisha, took power after the early death of the Mahdi in 1885 and the subsequent sidelining of his riverine relatives by the Mahdi’s Ta’aishi successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi.

Violence returned to Darfur in the modern era with the growing influence of the Arab Gathering (Tajamu al-Arabi), an Arab supremacist group following an ideology developed by Mu’ammar Qaddafi and spread by the leaders of Libya’s Islamic Legion (Failaq al-Islamiya) in the 1980s. Clashes over land developed between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslim tribes of Darfur, particularly the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masalit. The latter groups united in outright rebellion in 2003, while the Bashir government responded by unleashing Janjaweed (a Sudanese Arab militia) gunmen and bandits on the non-Arab civilian population under military direction. The leader of the Janjaweed was Shaykh Musa Hilal ‘Abd Allah, the nazir (chief) of the Um Jalul clan of the Mahamid Arabs, a branch of the northern Rizayqat of Darfur. One of his deputies during the 2003-2005 period of the worst Janjaweed abuses (murder, rape, torture, arson) was Hemeti, who is a cousin from the Awlad Mansur clan of the Mahariya branch of the Northern Rizayqat. [2]

When the crimes of the Janjaweed began to attract unwanted international attention in 2005, the government integrated the gunmen into the Border Guards (Haras al-Hudud), a small camel-mounted unit. Integration into official security structures shielded the Janjaweed from prosecution and brought them under tighter government control. This formation would evolve by 2013 into the RSF, which was conceived as a counter-insurgency force composed mostly of former Janjaweed. The RSF came under the direct authority of the National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS, or Jihaz al-Amn al-Watani wa’l-Mukhabarat) rather than the army and became notorious for their human rights abuses and lack of discipline. Even at this early stage, the RSF became known for clashes with the SAF.

Factions Fail to Integrate

Since becoming Sudan’s de facto ruler in 2019, al-Burhan has displayed an inability to rein in the RSF. He has allowed it to become, as some suggest, a “state-within-a-state.” The RSF, with its young leadership, has for some time offered better training and greater opportunities to make money than enlistment in the SAF.

The SAF wants the RSF to be integrated with the army within a year or two at most. However, the RSF prefers a ten-year timeline (in other words, no real integration at all). UN mediators suggested a five-year compromise, which was swiftly rejected by both parties (New Arab, April 17).

SAF Soldiers at Khartoum Airport (Dabanga)

Hemeti’s power and influence will disappear if the RSF comes under the command of the SAF’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The RSF leader has thus demanded his paramilitary report directly to a civilian government. This essentially preserved the RSF’s autonomy while allowing Hemeti to maintain a major political role.

Al-Burhan dissolved the RSF on April 17 and labelled it a “rebel” movement, adding that the matter is an internal one that does not require interference from the international community. There are, however, questions regarding al-Burhan’s legal authority to dissolve the RSF (Radio Dabanga, April 18). As noted by Dr. Jebril El-Abidi, it was a mistake to try to integrate the RSF into the national military as a complete unit, encouraging continued loyalty to RSF leaders rather than the general command (Asharq al-Awsat, April 20).

When Gold Makes Things Worse

Sudan is now the third-largest gold producer in Africa. However, as much as 80 percent of production is smuggled out of the country, and much of it to Russia. This contributes nothing in the way to state revenues that are already badly diminished by the separation of oil-rich South Sudan.

Joining existing US sanctions, EU sanctions were imposed in March on M-Invest and its subsidiary Sudan Meroe Gold, mining companies tied to Russia’s Wagner Group, for illegally trading in gold “looted by force from local traders” (Sudan Tribune, March 2). In March 2022, an executive with a Sudanese gold mine informed The Telegraph that Russia was smuggling 30 tonnes of gold from Sudan every year to build its reserves and weaken the effects of sanctions imposed on Russia for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The gold is transported in small planes from military airports not subject to customs inspections (The Telegraph, March 3, 2022). Sudan’s Minerals Minister, an ally of the RSF, described the allegations as “baseless” (Sudan Tribune, March 11, 2022).

Remote mines operated by Meroe Gold were guarded by Wagner Group personnel who were also involved in training the RSF (Sudan Tribune, March 21, 2022). It is unclear if Wagner continues in these roles; Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin insists there has been no Wagner presence in Sudan for two years. US authorities have claimed the Wagner Group is now providing weapons to the RSF through bases in Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) (The New Arab, April 22).

Documents obtained by an anti-corruption NGO revealed the RSF has its own bank account in Abu Dhabi that it has used to obtain vehicles suitable for conversion to machine-gun mounted “technicals.” Financing comes from al-Junaid Gold Company, which is officially owned by ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daglo and his two sons (Global Witness, April 5, 2020). Al-Junaid has since diversified into numerous other economic activities, its revenues providing independence for the RSF.

In Darfur, gold was discovered in 2012 at Jabal Amer (northwest of Kabkabiya). In July 2015, Musa Hilal and his Mahamid followers took control of Jabal Amer after slaughtering hundreds of Bani Hussayn Arabs working the artisanal mines. This reaped enormous profits until Musa’s arrest in November 2017, at which point control of the mines was transferred to Hemeti and the RSF. The SAF in turn seized control of Jabal Amer in October 2020.

Smuggled gold is typically exported through the Wagner Group-occupied CAR or by air to the Russian base in Latakia, Syria. Wagner elements have been accused of attacks on artisanal gold miners close to the border with the CAR (Radio Dabanga, August 1, 2022). Moscow has little interest in a return to civilian rule in Sudan as one of the first tasks of a new government would be to take control of gold exports to ensure revenues wind up in the public treasury instead of private hands.

“Admiral Grigorovich” Frigate, Port Sudan, 2021 (al-Arabiya)

Beyond gold, a deal was reached in February between Russia and Sudan’s military rulers for the establishment of a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast in return for arms and military equipment, although it awaits ratification by a new civilian government (al-Arabiya, February 11; Sudan Tribune, February 11). The 25-year deal, with automatic 10-year extensions if neither side objects, would allow a base of 300 Russian military personnel capable of accommodating four Russian ships at a time, including nuclear-powered vessels. [3] Egypt and Saudi Arabia are both unhappy about the deal, which would see a long-term Russian naval presence in the strategic Red Sea. French, American, British, and Norwegian diplomats have all expressed concerns about the growing involvement of Wagner Group companies and personnel in Sudan, much of it facilitated through the RSF. [4]

Islamism in the Regular Army

The RSF has accused the army’s “fascist military leaders” of “religious mania” (Facebook, April 17; Facebook, April 18). Many Islamist al-Bashir loyalists, known as keizan, are prominent in the high ranks of the army. Loyalists of al-Bashir and the banned Islamist National Congress Party (NCP, now operating under the name “Islamist Movement”) have stepped up activity in recent weeks, calling for the assassination of UN envoy Volker Perthes and attacking pro-democracy demonstrators in Khartoum North (Reuters, April 11). The Islamists describe pro-democracy activists as secularists intent on attacking Sudan’s traditional Islamic faith (Middle East Monitor, April 9, 2019).

Airstrike Damage, Khartoum (NBC)

Before the current fighting broke out, the FFC and its partners warned of NCP efforts to provoke a confrontation between the army and the RSF that would create conditions favorable to a return to Islamist rule. Leading Islamists and NCP members (including those held on human rights violations) began leaving detention facilities and returning to government posts (especially Military Intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) after the 2021 military coup, while al-Burhan dissolved a committee looking into corrupt arrangements between the NCP government and the army. General Ahmad Ibrahim Mufaddal, an NCP loyalist, was appointed last November to lead the General Intelligence Service (GIS, or Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma), successor to the powerful NISS that held an iron grip on political dissent during the Bashir regime. The RSF, seen as traitors for their failure to prevent the overthrow of al-Bashir, is especially disliked by the Islamists.

In recent days, prisons across the country have been emptied of thousands of criminal and political inmates, either through release or escape. Among those to have walked out of the notorious Kober prison are Ahmad Haroun, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court, and leading Islamists of the al-Bashir regime, including former vice-president ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, Awad al-Jaz, and Nafi al-Nafi. Both the FFC and the RSF allege an army plan to restore leading Islamists to power. Al-Bashir himself is still believed to be in a military prison hospital (Darfur 24, April 25; Darfur 24, April 26; Al Jazeera, April 26; Radio Dabanga, April 26).

Map produced by Thomas van Linge showing territory held by the Army (red), the RSF (mustard yellow) and rebel movements (green).

Conclusion

Fighting is underway in most parts of Sudan, but is especially intense in Darfur, the home of Hemeti’s power base but also the source of much of the SAF’s rank-and-file. Long-standing tribal clashes in West Darfur have intensified with the breakdown of security. Khartoum has experienced looting, street-fighting, and aerial bombing.

A SAF victory would likely allow an entrenchment of Islamist military rule, while an RSF victory might find room for a civilian government, but only under RSF influence. The paramilitary would still absorb the arms and facilities of the SAF and become the sole security organization in Sudan. The ambitious Hemeti is likely to seek a leading role in any new government, possibly as head of state.

Any war in Sudan has a high chance of spilling over into its unstable neighbors, such as Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya and South Sudan. The Wagner Group is already involved in the last three of these nations.

Hemeti is having trouble selling his new image as a champion of democracy as he attempts to portray al-Burhan as the figurehead of a radical Islamist movement and uses slogans like “power belongs to the people” and “what is happening now is the price of democracy.” Hemeti has even tried to claim the RSF are fighting al-Burhan “and his Islamist gang” (the keizan) within the SAF, and not the army itself (Radio Dabanga, April 17). Al-Burhan has similarly suggested he was prepared to negotiate only with “parties within the RSF” seeking dialogue, and not the current RSF leaders (Sudan Tribune, April 20).

If the Framework Agreement is signed and free elections follow, the Islamist faction will lose any chance of retaking control of Sudan, short of mounting yet another coup, one that, in the current environment, would meet with massive resistance in the streets as well as in the international arena. Despite their rhetoric, Hemeti and his private army will not provide a road to a democratic transition and civilian rule. For the Islamists, therefore, this may be their last chance to seize power.

Notes 

[1] See “Army for Sale: Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and the Battle for Libya,” AIS Special Report, August 4, 2019.

[2] The northern Rizayqat Abbala (camel-breeding Arabs) include the Mahamid, Mahariya, and Irayqat groups. The core of the Janjaweed was from the Mahamid and Mahariya branches of the northern Rizayqat. The southern Baqqara Rizayqat (cattle-breeding Arabs), had little to do with the Janjaweed. The meaning of the term Janjaweed is disputed, but is commonly given as “Devils on Horseback.” The term was not used by the Arab militias themselves or by the government.

[3] For Russian mercenaries in Sudan and Moscow’s search for a naval base on the Sudanese Red Sea coast, see: “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 6, 2019.

[4] For details, see “Putin’s New Russian Empire is Suddenly on the Rocks: How the War in Ukraine Threatens Russian Interests in Sudan,” AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.3, March 24, 2022.

This article first appeared in the April 28, 2023 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, Washington, DC.

Putin’s New Russian Empire is Suddenly on the Rocks: How the War in Ukraine Threatens Russian Interests in Sudan

Posted on by

AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.3

March 24, 2022

Andrew McGregor

Blue and yellow flags carried by anti-government protesters are a new and unusual sight in the streets of Khartoum. However, these banners are less a show of support for besieged Ukrainians than a rejection of a Sudanese military regime that continues to grow closer to Russia even as President Vladimir Putin’s army carries out widely condemned atrocities and war crimes in a sovereign state. At stake is not only Sudan’s own sovereignty, but the ability of its rulers to offer food security and a path to development.

With the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudan ended over a quarter-century of military-Islamist rule. Though promises were made that a joint civilian-military transitional government would lead to a new era of democratic civilian rule, a military coup in October 2021 ended that experiment and led to the severing of most economic and financial ties to the West, including $US 700 million of American aid.

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency)

The junta’s leader, General ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, is typical of the Islamist military officers who enjoyed great power during al-Bashir’s rule, but his ambitious deputy, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” represents a new and growing power in Sudan as commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Created from the remnants of the infamous Janjaweed, the RSF was intended to serve as a paramilitary focused on establishing security in Darfur under the guidance of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS – now rebranded as the General Intelligence Services – GIS) rather than the military. The RSF quickly developed a reputation for atrocities and war crimes in restive Darfur. [1] Since then, it has exploited its independence to grow vastly in strength while establishing its own economic base. Besides serving as revenue-producing rental troops in Libya and Yemen, the RSF now acts as a regime-defending internal security force in most Sudanese cities, including the capital of Khartoum, where the RSF was accused of rapes, murders and massacres after al-Bashir’s overthrow.

With Western nations and international institutions avoiding any interaction with Sudan’s military rulers, Russia has helped provide diplomatic support for the coup leaders at the UN and elsewhere. Russia has also provided direct and indirect support to the Sudanese military and the RSF in return for access to Sudanese resources, especially gold, and an agreement to permit the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Internally, however, Khartoum’s dalliance with Putin’s Russia and the activities of Russian “Wagner Group” mercenaries closely tied to the Kremlin have aggravated opposition to the regime rather than appease it. There have been continuous street protests since the coup, with scores killed by security forces. The participation of Russian mercenaries in repressing popular opposition and manipulating information sources has scandalized many Sudanese. [2]

Rather than back off from an unpopular association with Moscow, Hemetti chose to lead an ill-timed and ill-advised eight-day mission to Moscow only one day before the invasion of Ukraine. Hemetti’s request for supplies of Russian arms and military assistance in exchange for a Red Sea naval base at the same time Russian troops were slaughtering Ukrainian civilians and Sudanese citizens were going hungry was met with disbelief in many quarters.

Sudan, like many other African nations, is a major consumer of Russian and Ukrainian wheat, these sources providing 35% of Sudan’s supply in 2021 (BNNBloomberg, March 15, 2022). Soaring prices for grain are not helped by the retreat of international donors after the military coup, including those agencies that might be the most helpful in securing affordable and reliable supplies. Despite this, Hemetti’s primary focus remained on obtaining weapons rather than provisions.

Sudan abstained on the UN General Assembly motion to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demand Russia’s immediate withdrawal. Despite intense diplomatic pressure from the US and the EU to condemn Russia’s invasion, the military-dominated Sovereign Council that currently governs Sudan would go no further than calling for negotiations and a diplomatic solution.

Sudan’s civilian opposition coalition, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), has condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and rejects Russian interference in Sudanese affairs. The National Umma Party (NUP), one of Sudan’s largest, was specific, objecting that Hemetti’s visit to Moscow did not serve Sudanese interests while declaring the invasion was an “unjust war against a free people to force them to give up their sovereignty” (Radio Dabanga, March 1, 2022). Though Russia’s growing presence and influence in Sudan appears to threaten Sudan’s sovereignty as well, events in Ukraine may reverse this trend and even threaten the African nation’s governing structure.

Sudanese Support for Russia – At a Cost

Hemetti and a large Sudanese delegation arrived in Moscow for a week-long visit on February 23, 2022, the day before the attack on Ukraine was launched. It was not Hemetti’s first trip to Moscow; in 2019 he visited on an arms-shopping mission. Since 2017, Sudan has been a leading purchaser of Russian arms, which now represent 50% of Sudanese purchases. [3]

Patrushev and Hemetti, February 25, 2022 (Sudan Tribune)

Notably, the delegation did not include a representative of the Sudanese armed forces. In Sudan, it is Hemetti’s RSF that works closely with Russian mercenaries of the infamous Wagner Group, who have been deployed in support of the military regime. One of Hemetti’s main concerns was reported to involve obtaining Russian weapons for his RSF as well as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) (Sudan Tribune, February 25, 2022). Among the high-end items sought by Hemetti were S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and Sukhoi Su-35 jet-fighters at a time when tensions with Ethiopia are high. Other countries, such as Egypt and Indonesia, have recently backed out of deals for the purchase of Su-35s due to their second-rate radar systems and the possibility of US sanctions designed to prevent large weapons purchases from Russia (Forbes, January 11, 2022).

Russian-made Sudanese Sukhoi Su-35 in Sudanese Colors (MilitaryWatchMagazine)

On arrival, Hemetti expressed his support for the independence of the two Russian-engineered republics in the Donbas regions and Russia’s military pressure on Ukraine, declaring: “The whole world must realize that [Russia] has the right to defend its people” (Sudan Tribune, February 24, 2022). Hemetti’s remarks seemed to echo Russian assertions that Putin is defending ethnic Russians from genocide at the hands of Ukrainian “Nazis.” Widely condemned almost immediately, Hemetti’s remarks created a diplomatic stir that Sudan’s Foreign Ministry addressed by stating: “We consider that publishing that statement in this manner is a deliberate distortion, taking the speech of the First Deputy out of context, and a cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters” (Sudan Tribune, February 24, 2022). Accused of war crimes himself in Darfur, Hemetti is unlikely to have any qualms about establishing closer ties to Putin’s Russia even as it commits war crimes in Ukraine.

An Arabic-language news-site based in London, al-Araby al-Jadid, claimed that al-Burhan told Egyptian authorities he suspected Hemetti and his RSF of planning a coup to replace him with another military figurehead (Sudan Tribune, February 26, 2022). Though al-Burhan is the senior figure in the junta that overthrew President Omar al-Bashir, Hemetti has emerged as the real power, as witnessed by his direct dealings with senior Russian officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, head of the Russian Federation Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin.

After Hemetti’s visit to Moscow, al-Burhan made a call to Saudi Arabia to talk to officials there about Red Sea security issues – in other words, a discussion of Hemetti’s views on allowing a Russian Red Sea naval base directly opposite the Saudi cities of Mecca and Jeddah.

Sudanese Gold, Russian Miners

In early March, an executive with a leading Sudanese gold company revealed to the Telegraph that Russia has been smuggling roughly 30 tonnes of gold from Sudan each year to build up its reserves and weaken the effect of sanctions imposed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Working in collusion with Hemetti and his RSF, Russian mining firm M-Invest (closely tied to the “Wagner Group”), through its local subsidiary Meroe Gold, has been smuggling gold in small planes from military airstrips (The Telegraph, March 3, 2022; Government.ru, November 24, 2017). In response to the allegations, Hemetti said the identity of the end buyers of smuggled Sudanese gold was unimportant; what mattered was who was selling the gold. The RSF chief claimed 40 individuals had already been arrested, but declined to provide any further information (VOA, March 10, 2022). Russian involvement in the Sudanese mining sector began in 2017 with the signing of several agreements between former president Omar al-Bashir and Vladimir Putin.

Sudan’s Minister of Minerals, Muhammad Bashir Abunmo, rejected the claims of Russian smuggling as “baseless accusations” devised to “justify the Western campaign against Russia.” The minister, a member of Minni Minnawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM), insisted that Meroe Gold produces only three tons of gold per year, and that much of that was retained by the Sudanese government (Sudan Tribune, March 12, 2022). The Sudanese acting ambassador to Russia, Onor Ahmad Onor, also rejected the claims: “I have nothing to say other than it is fake news and a story created from the imagination of the Telegraph reporter” (VOA, March 10, 2022). Moscow has also denied the allegations.

On Hemetti’s return, the opposition Forces for Freedom and Change, accused Russia of “stealing resources” and interfering in Sudanese affairs to support its role in “regional and international conflicts” (Middle East Monitor, March 3, 2022). Sudan desperately needs the gold to try to avert an economic collapse brought on by the military coup, so any losses due to smuggling will only contribute to the nation’s financial crisis.

Secret documents obtained by anti-corruption NGO Global Witness in 2020 revealed the complex financial network the RSF has established (including its own bank account in Abu Dhabi), allowing it to independently obtain 1,000 vehicles from Dubai suppliers, most of them Toyota 4x4s that can be converted to lightly armored, machine-gun mounted “technicals” of the type widely used in the Sahara and Sahel regions. Important parts of the network appear to be controlled by Hemetti’s younger brothers, Al-Goni Hamdan Daglo and ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daglo, the deputy head of the RSF. Much of the financing for this network comes from the al-Junaid gold company, which trades in the output of the RSF-controlled gold mines in the Jabal Amr region of Darfur, seized by the RSF in 2017. Al-Junaid is officially owned by ‘Abd al-Rahim Hamdan Daglo and his two sons (Global Witness, April 5, 2020).

RSF operations in Yemen provide another revenue stream, courtesy of financing provided by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to Hemetti: “People ask where do we get this money from? We have the salaries of our troops fighting abroad and our gold investments, money from gold and other investments” (Global Witness, December 9, 2019).

A Russian Naval Base on the Red Sea?

After extensive discussions, a 25-year agreement allowing the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s east coast was signed in 2017 by al-Bashir and Putin, though it was not immediately implemented. [4] The agreement, renewable for further ten-year terms with the consent of both parties, came as al-Bashir complained he needed Russian support to fend off alleged American aggression against Sudan. Under its conditions, Russia will be able to use the base and install 300 Russian personnel to support up to four Russian naval ships (including those powered by nuclear energy) operating in the Red Sea. In return, Sudan would receive Russian arms and other military equipment.

After President Putin authorized his Defense Ministry to establish the Russian base in November 2020, Prime Minister Mikhael Mishustin emphasized that the facility would be “defensive and not aimed against other countries” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 20, 2020). Russia describes the planned base as a “material-technical support facility.”

The agreement was suspended after Sudanese officials had second thoughts about certain clauses in 2021. Many civil and military leaders were less than enthusiastic about the project. Armed Forces chief-of-staff and former Sudanese point-man on the project, General Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Hussein, described the pact as including “clauses that were somewhat harmful to the country,” forcing a general review (AFP, June 2, 2021). Last September, Khartoum was reported to be seeking a modification of the terms surrounding the new Russian base to include not only arms as compensation, but also badly-needed economic assistance. The Sudanese also floated the idea of replacing the 25-year agreement with one covering only five years, with the potential of renewing the agreement up to a 25-year period (The Arab Weekly, September 16, 2021).

The stalled agreement was a focus of Hemetti’s visit to Moscow as the two parties moved towards implementation. On March 3, Hemetti declared: “We have 730 kilometres along the Red Sea. If any country wants to open a base and it is in our interests and doesn’t threaten our national security we have no problem in dealing with anyone, Russian or otherwise” (Reuters, March 3, 2022; AfricaNews, March 2, 2022). Hemetti, however, insisted that the decision was ultimately that of the defense minister, “so it is not my responsibility. But if there is any benefit from the base, in addition to its commitment to community responsibility, for the people of eastern Sudan, we do not object to its establishment” (Sudan Tribune, March 2, 2022).

Hemetti added that he was perplexed by the opposition to a Russian base in Sudan, pointing out that many African countries hosted military bases belonging to foreign powers. Authorities in Cairo were reported to be surprised and angered by Hemetti’s remarks, having no desire to see Russian naval ships patrolling off Egypt’s Red Sea coast near the entrance to the Suez Canal. A demand for clarification was issued almost immediately (Middle East Monitor, March 7, 2022). Egypt abandoned its initial neutral stance on the conflict in Ukraine to vote in favor of the UN General Assembly’s denunciation of the Russian invasion. The change came partly because of diplomatic pressure applied by Ukrainian and American representatives despite demands from the Russian ambassador that Egypt support the invasion.

The location of a Russian Red Sea base remains up in the air, however. Sudan’s Red Sea Coast is little developed, largely due to a lack of suitable ports and an extreme shortage of fresh water that limits population concentrations. Coastal navigation is complicated by numerous shoals, rocky islands and a massive coral reef running parallel to the coast that limits the number of approaches. Russia appears to have been under the impression they could build their naval facilities near Port Sudan, which has rail and road connections to Khartoum, or at the historical port of Suakin, some 50 km south of Port Sudan with access to the same transportation network. Both ports are located near passages through the reef. Suakin was replaced by Port Sudan during the British occupation in 1909 when it proved unable to accommodate seagoing warships and freighters with a deep draft, though modern dredging has helped improve access. The Sudanese coastal navy operates out of Flamingo Bay, just north of the commercial docks in Port Sudan.

Beja Tribesmen Protesting in Port Sudan – The Flag is that of the Beja Congress (al-Arabiya)

Port Sudan is located in Sudan’s unsettled Red Sea Province, where power struggles between the Hadendowa and Bani Amer branches of the Beja people have resulted in blockades of the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway and the closure of port terminals by protesters (Sudan Tribune, February 23, 2022). When Hemetti travelled to Port Sudan after his return from Moscow, he was met by large street protests partly inspired by local fears of a Russian takeover (Al-Jazeera, March 18, 2022).

Arakiyai – Port in the Middle of Nowhere (Map by Abdul-Razak M. Mohamed)

Last year, Sudanese military authorities, eager for Russian arms and training but wary of a permanent Russian military presence in Sudan, instead suggested a Russian base at Arakiyai, a tiny fishing village with no infrastructure well north of Port Sudan and served only by a minor coastal road from the south (Radio Dabanga, December 7, 2021). The village is rarely even marked on maps. Constructing a new and isolated Russian base at Arakiyai from scratch would be far more difficult and expensive than incorporating existing infrastructure at Port Sudan. Ultimately, it would mean a delay of several years before the base could become operational.

The presence of a Russian nuclear-powered fleet in the Red Sea would ultimately be unacceptable to the West, which relies on free access to the Suez Canal at the sea’s northern end for shipments of oil, resources and commercial products bound for Europe and beyond. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations, wary of a Russian-Iranian axis in the region, also object to a Russian naval base on the Sudanese coast.

Outlook

It seems difficult to believe that the Sudanese junta would have mounted their coup without some kind of understanding from Russia that they would step in to replace the economic support Sudan was receiving from the West. Even in better times, however, it was never realistic to expect that Russian investments could make up for the billions of dollars of financial support suspended by the EU, the US and the IMF/World Bank after the military coup. Regardless of the outcome of the Ukraine conflict, Russia’s economy is shattered for years to come and their arms stocks are being drained by the fighting. There will be no largesse, military or financial, from Moscow’s direction for some years to come. Hemetti, with a nation of hungry and impoverished citizens looking for leadership, may discover his Russian gambit to avoid troublesome “Western interference” will be his downfall. Until a democratic civilian government is soon installed in Khartoum, Sudan will be hard pressed to find financial assistance unless it turns to China, another authoritarian state that will seek major concessions in return for economic and military support.

Hemetti, with his third-grade education and no background in economics or international relations, is playing a dangerous game by allying the junta with Russia and committing to the establishment of a Russian naval base in the strategically sensitive Red Sea. Moscow cares nothing for the quality of life in Sudan; the Wagner Group even less. Though Hemetti can count on the support of the paramilitary RSF, he does not necessarily have the backing of the officer corps of the Sudanese army, including the chief of the ruling Sovereign Council, General ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan. Hemetti has essentially usurped the functions of Sudan’s foreign relations ministry, dealing with other nations on his own authority.

After Hemetti’s Moscow call, al-Burhan made a separate visit to his patrons in the United Arab Emirates, perhaps to shore up support in the event of a confrontation with Hemetti, who appears to be edging Sudan’s formal military leadership to the side. Hemetti’s rise and the inclusion of former Darfuri rebels in the Sudanese cabinet are indicators the growing political strength of Darfur’s Arab and indigenous African tribes in what has traditionally been the private reserve of the three great riverain Arab groups who live along the Nile north of Khartoum – the Ja’alin, the Danagla and the Sha’iqiya. Years of tribal manipulation and ruthless repression in Darfur (the source of most of the Sudanese Army’s manpower and most members of the RSF) are now coming back to haunt the riverain tribes who historically regard the peoples of Darfur as unsophisticated, uneducated and undeserving of political power.

The establishment of a naval base in the Red Sea was part of a greater Putin-inspired project to create an overseas presence as part of the foundation of a neo-Soviet Empire. However, Russia’s economic, diplomatic and military setbacks in its still unresolved conflict with Ukraine are almost certain to postpone, if not cancel, Russia’s imperial ambitions. In Sudan, Hemetti has succeeded in creating an independently financed security machine, but for the 44 million Sudanese who do not benefit from being part of the RSF, external relief and assistance is needed now. With almost daily demonstrations against military rule in Sudan, it is unlikely that brute force alone, even if aided by Russian mercenaries, will be enough to secure and sustain the military government.

Notes

  1. See: “Khartoum Struggles to Control its Controversial ‘Rapid Support Forces’,” Terrorism Monitor, May 30, 2014, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=852
  2. The Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny – SBU) claimed in 2019 to have copies of the personal documents of 149 Wagner Group mercenaries who travelled to Sudan on Russian Ministry of Defense airliners to suppress pro-democracy protests in 2019 (info, Gordonua.com, January 28). See: “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, February 6, 2019, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4356
  3. See: “Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One, Eurasian Daily Monitor, February 11, 2009, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2593 ; Part Two, Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 12, 2009, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2596
  4. See: “Will Khartoum’s Appeal to Putin for Arms and Protection Bring Russian Naval Bases to the Red Sea?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 6, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4081

Army for Sale: Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and the Battle for Libya

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report, August 4, 2019

RSF Patrol (al-Jazeera)

With their barely literate leader General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” in full control of Sudan (though nominally only number two in the ruling military council), Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary has attracted international attention through its brutal repression of civilian demonstrators seeking civilian rule. [1] Now an estimated 30,000 strong, the RSF is deployed in the cities of Sudan, the goldfields of Darfur, the northern borders with Libya and Egypt, the battlefields of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State and even in Yemen, where they serve as part of the Saudi-led coalition battling Houthi rebels.

Good Days for African Warlords: General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”

Though Sudan has little interest in the internal struggle for control of Yemen, the RSF’s deployment of as many as 10,000 men since 2015 was clearly made in return for Saudi and Emirati cash badly needed to prop up the flailing regime of ex-president Omar al-Bashir. Following the coup that overthrew al-Bashir, Sudan’s ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) has accessed $500 million from the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with pledges of another $2.5 billion in commodities to follow. Both nations see military rule as an effective way of keeping Muslim Brotherhood members (known as “Ikhwan” in Sudan) out of the Sudanese government.

Mercenaries for Sale

The TMC and its new civilian partners are in need of Saudi funds to keep new waves of economic protests from breaking out. Thus, the deployment to Yemen continues, but with the precedent of soldiers-for-dollars already set, the TMC is looking for new revenue streams as well as ways to keep Darfur’s Arabs of military age busy abroad rather than pursuing grievances against Khartoum at home.

The answer? A May 17 $6 million contract between the TMC and Dickens & Madson, a Montreal-based firm run by former Israeli intelligence agent Ari Ben-Menashe. Among other things, the contract stated Dickens & Madson would counter unfavorable media coverage of the TMC and (presumably) the RSF, arrange a meeting between President Trump and TMC leaders, and, most ambitiously, create a union with South Sudan and a joint oil project “within three months.”  With only days to go before three months are over, no such union or joint project has emerged.

Dickens & Madson also pledged to obtain financing for the TMC from the United States, the Russian Federation and other countries, including “funding and equipment for the Sudanese military.” Most importantly for the cash-strapped TMC, was the intent to “obtain funding for your Council [TMC] from the Eastern Libyan Military Command in exchange for your military help to the Libyan National Army (LNA).” [2]

The New Qaddafi? Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (Reuters)

One thousand RSF members began arriving in eastern Libya in the last days of July, the beginning of a Libyan deployment that might eventually reach as many as 4,000 fighters. Their new employer is Libyan warlord “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar, whose self-styled “Libyan National Army” (a loosely disciplined collection of militias) has spent the last few months in a so-far frustrated attempt to seize the Libyan capital of Tripoli from the UN-recognized Presidency Council/Government of National Accord (PC/GNA).

According to al-Jazeera, leaked documents revealed that the UAE began picking up Sudanese military personnel in military aircraft from Khartoum in May. The agency further claimed that Hemetti had recruited 450 additional Arab mercenaries from Darfur, Chad and Niger. According to a source, Hemetti specified they should be “light-skinned and speak Arabic” (al-Jazeera, July 24, 2019). Hemetti would have had connections with the Arab tribes in these lands from his days in the Janjaweed, when Khartoum invited regional Arabs to fill areas where indigenous African Muslims had been displaced by state-sponsored violence. The UAE is one of Haftar’s major backers, providing military air support from their eastern Libyan base in al-Khadim.

The RSF is expected to provide security for the Libyan oil facilities that are expected to provide the funds needed to buy the RSF’s services, enabling Haftar to concentrate his forces for a final push to take Tripoli from the collection of militias that have aligned themselves with the PC/GNA.

The Montreal Connection

Ari Ben-Menashe, who arranged the rental of the RSF, is an arms dealer with a checkered business career and a controversial claim to have played a central role in the Iran-Contra affair. Ben-Menashe served a year in an American prison for his role in supplying arms to Iran before being acquitted on the grounds that he was working under orders from Israel. After failing to obtain refugee status in Australia, Ben-Menashe moved to Montreal in 1993, where he obtained Canadian citizenship and set up the Dickens & Madson consulting agency, though his American partner was deported in 2008 to the United States, where he was wanted on multiple racketeering and fraud charges in two states.

While secretly working for Zimbabwean despot Robert Mugabe in 2002, Ben-Menashe helped implicate Mugabe’s main political rival in charges of treason. There are allegations that Ben-Menashe was paid for his services by a Zimbabwean drug lord who wished to maintain his cozy relationship with Mugabe. In 2014, Ben-Menashe signed a $2 million deal with Libyan warlord Ibrahim Jadhran to promote the latter’s attempt to create an autonomous Cyrenaïcan state in eastern Libya. As in other deals Ben-Menashe had with Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, the former intelligence agent pledged to work towards obtaining economic and military support from Russia. The fixer thus encouraged an existing trend to greater Sudanese-Russian cooperation that began with a January 2019 draft military agreement between the two countries that could lead to “a Russian naval base on the Red Sea” (Sputnik, January 12, 2019; Sudan Tribune, January 13, 2019). [3]

Ben-Menashe moved on to another Libyan warlord in 2015, signing a $6 million contract with Khalifa Haftar. Besides promising to improve Western media coverage of Haftar’s campaign against Libya’s UN-recognized government, Ben-Menashe again agreed to seek grants from the Russian Federation “for security equipment and technical support.” Haftar’s campaign received a huge boost in April when Haftar discussed “ongoing counterterrorism efforts” with President Trump by phone. The White House followed up with a statement recognizing “Field Marshal Haftar’s significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources” (Reuters, April 19, 2019). Despite multiple accusations of war crimes and human rights violations including summary executions of opponents and the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets such as hospitals, refugee centers and residential housing, Haftar has already received covert military and open diplomatic support from Russia, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. [4]

Hemetti’s Revenue Streams

Renting out young Darfuri fighters is a proven revenue source for Hemetti. Musa Hilal, Hemetti’s former mentor and Janjaweed commander, opposed the deployment to Yemen and encouraged Arab tribesmen in Darfur not to volunteer. Hilal also accused Hemetti and his patron, former Second Vice President Hasabo Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman (like Hemetti, a member of the Mahariya Branch of the Rizayqat Arabs), of siphoning off millions of dollars donated to Sudan by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in exchange for the use of the RSF in Yemen (al-Jazeera, September 10, 2017).  Hemetti was reported to have been paid directly, and told a press conference he deposited $350 million in Sudan’s Central Bank, but was not clear on how much he may have kept for personal or political uses (African Arguments, August 1, 2019).

An RSF Column in the Desert (AFP)

An April 2018 New York Times investigation of the traffic in migrants through Sudan, based on separate and confidential interviews with known smugglers, suggested that the RSF was, according to the smugglers’ testimony, the main organizer of the cross-border trade, supplying vehicles and sharing in ransom revenues obtained from the detention of the migrants in Libya (NYT, April 22, 2019).

Hemetti’s control of much of Sudan’s newly discovered gold reserves (some of it wrested from Musa Hilal by force) provides him with the financial clout needed to make the former camel trader a candidate for Sudan’s presidency. Darfur, Sudan’s “Wild West,” is already producing enough gold to make it Africa’s third-largest producer, though a remarkable 70% is believed to be smuggled of the country via remote air strips.

Notes:

  1. For RSF commander Hemetti, see: “Snatching the Sudanese Revolution: A Profile of General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo ‘Hemetti’,” Militant Leadership Monitor, June 30, 2019, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4455
  2. The contents of the contract were revealed under the requirements of the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The document can be seen in full at: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6200-Exhibit-AB-20190617-8.pdf
  3. For Russian mercenaries in Sudan and Russia’s search for a naval base on the Sudanese Red Sea coast, see: “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 6, 2019, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4356
  4. For LNA war crimes, see: “Libya’s Video Executioner: A Profile of LNA Special Forces Commander Mahmud al-Warfali, Militant Leadership Monitor, July 6, 2018, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4214

Continued Detention of Rebel POWs suggests Sudan’s military rulers are not ready to settle with the Armed Opposition

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report

May 31, 2019

Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces Operation in South Kordofan (Reuters/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah)

There was much joy in Sudan in the dying hours of the presidency of Omar al-Bashir when the dreaded National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) announced they were releasing all political detainees in the country (SUNA, April 11, 2019). While there were many scenes of elated families greeting detained protesters and opposition figures after their release, some detainees never emerged from Sudan’s grim prisons. The absence of members of the armed opposition who were taken prisoner while fighting to overthrow the Bashir regime raises two important questions: Did the regime change, or only the head-of-state? And what approach will the new Transitional Military Council (TMC) use to deal with the well-armed opposition movements still in the field in Sudan’s western and southern regions?

Prisoners of War?

Only days after the military removed al-Bashir, the TMC chairman, General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, was reminded by an opposition delegation that they were still awaiting the fulfillment of his promise to release members of the armed groups (Sudan Tribune, April 14, 2019). Most of these prisoners belong to the major Sudanese armed opposition groups:

  • The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur-based group led by Jibril Ibrahim seeking a more inclusive government that is not almost exclusively derived from the powerful Nile-based Arab tribal groups (the Ja’alin, the Danagla and the Sha’iqiya) that have dominated Sudanese politics since independence in 1956. JEM’s leadership and membership is largely but not exclusively drawn from the Zaghawa of northwestern Darfur. Due to the political protests across the country, JEM declined to resume talks planned talks with the Bashir regime in mid-January, declaring they could not “betray the revolution,” though they also feared the talks would be used as propaganda to preserve the regime (Sudan Tribune, January 13, 2019).
  • The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – ‘Abd al-Wahid (SLM/A-AW), a group based in the Jabal Marra mountains of Darfur and led by the Paris-based ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Nur. The SLM/A-AW is largely Fur.
  • The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A-MM), a Darfur-based group that has operated out of ungoverned southern Libya for several years as a result of military pressure from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a government paramilitary initially formed from former Janjaweed members, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The leadership and membership is again largely Zaghawa.
  • The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A-N), based in the Nuba Hills of Southern Kordofan and Sudan’s Blue Nile State. Before South Sudan signed a peace agreement with Khartoum in 2005 that would eventually lead to independence in 2011, the SPLM/A as led by Colonel John Garang sought a unified “New Sudan” that would bring the non-Arab majority of Sudan into the central government. With Garang’s death in 2005, South Sudanese separatists gained political and ideological ascendancy, abandoning those parts of the movement still operating in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, both on the northern side of the new border. These parts of the SPLM/A reconstituted themselves as the SPLM/A-North. The movement split in 2017 over leadership differences between ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu (South Kordofan faction) and two other leaders, Malik Agar (Blue Nile faction) and Yasir Arman (then SPLM/A-N secretary-general). Al-Hilu also felt the needs of the Nuba people (who form the majority of the South Kordofan fighters) were not being addressed by the larger leadership (Radio Dabanga, October 23, 2017). South Sudanese president Salva Kiir Mayardit, who continues to struggle to contain a rebellion in South Sudan’s Equatoria region, made efforts to reunite the two SPLM/A-N factions to better negotiate with the TMC after al-Bashir’s overthrow (East African [Nairobi], May 2, 2019). Agar and Arman were both sentenced to death by hanging in absentia along with 15 other members of the SPLM/A-N in March 2014.

The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF – a coalition bringing together Darfur’s JEM with the two factions of the SPLM/A-N) has declared that the civilian groups discussing the creation of a transitional government are not representative without including the armed opposition, noting the nation’s future security and democratic transition are at risk without their inclusion (Radio Dabanga, April 30, 2019). The armed opposition calls the detainees “prisoners-of-war” (a term never used by the Bashir regime), but admits that, after years of detention in some cases, it is unsure of the condition or whereabouts of many rebel prisoners (Sudan Tribune, April 16, 2019). Four days after Bashir’s overthrow, JEM demanded the immediate release of all “war-related detainees,” warning that their continued detention was “a call for the continuation of the war” that would delay the ability of the Sudanese to “reap the fruits of the revolution” (Radio Dabanga, April 15, 2019).

Last August, the SLM/A-MM complained that one of its leaders, “prisoner of war” ‘Abd al-Salam Muhammad Siddig, had died at Omdurman’s al-Huda prison after torture that resulted in two fractured legs and internal bleeding that proved fatal after medical treatment was withheld. The movement alleged that the prisoners were suffering a “slow death” in close confinement.  Accusing Khartoum of violating the Geneva Convention, the statement reminded authorities that “the right of the prisoners to receive medical treatment and follow-up… is a legal right and not a grant from anyone.” (Radio Dabanga, August 15, 2018).

The JEM Prisoners

The Bashir regime was shaken to its core when scores of JEM vehicles crossed the desert from Darfur to suddenly arrive on the outskirts of the national capital in May 2008. The army largely failed to appear in defense of the regime, and the raiders were engaged in running street battles in Omdurman with police and pro-Bashir paramilitaries. As JEM was finally driven out of the capital after a fierce struggle, some 70 JEM members were captured and sentenced to death. When JEM and several other rebel movements declined to sign the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), the prisoners were unable to avail themselves of Article 60, allowing for the release of prisoners of war (DDPD, p.63, Article 60, subsection 329, May 2011). Though the death sentences were not carried out, the prisoners are alleged to have endured a kind of living death of torture and abuse in cramped and squalid conditions (Radio Dabanga, August 15, 2013; Sudan Tribune, September 8, 2018).

According to JEM, many of the prisoners languished under sentences of death after their 2008 capture in tiny, vermin-ridden cells, with only a daily visit to the toilet and no access to bathing facilities. JEM has charged that the men are prisoners of war entitled to decent conditions by the Geneva Convention (Hudocentre.org, November 16, 2015).

When JEM detainees in North Khartoum’s Kober Prison went on a hunger strike in 2013 to protest their treatment, the Director General of Prisons arrived to deliver a little regime reality to the desperate prisoners: “We’ve got the power, wealth, aircraft, and vehicles that enable us to do whatever we want… It is our right to act any way we want against any person in all of Sudan… If I kill you all nobody would ask me why” (Radio Dabanga, September 1, 2013).

Kober Prison, North Khartoum (AFP)

Many JEM rebels were released from Kober and other Sudanese prisons after al-Bashir issued an edict on March 8, 2017. As well as those taken prisoner in Omdurman, there were others taken in later battles at Goz Dango, Fanaga, Donki Baashim and Kulbus (Radio Dabanga, March 9, 2017). A sentence of death was lifted from 66 detainees and another 193 granted amnesty. However, in October 2018, Khartoum admitted that seven JEM prisoners and 21 SPLM/A-N prisoners were still being held in Omdurman’s al-Huda prison despite the presidential amnesty of March 2017 (Radio Dabanga, October 11, 2018).

One of those released under the amnesty, JEM field commander ‘Abd al-Aziz Ousher, complained that a number of senior JEM commanders taken at Goz Dango in April 2015 had not been freed by the presidential amnesty (Radio Dabanga, March 9, 2017). Some 180 JEM prisoners taken at Goz Dango were transferred to al-Huda prison in Omdurman in January 2016. Unable to leave their cells, 23 contracted tuberculosis, which went untreated (Radio Dabanga, September 5, 2016).

President Omar al-Bashir Arrives in Goz Dango to Celebrate SAF/RSF Victory

A report released on May 30 by the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) says that 235 prisoners belonging to the SLM/A-MM and the SLM/A – Transitional Council (SLM/A-TC, a splinter group of the SLM/A-AW) remain inside al-Huda prison. These prisoners are alleged to have endured “cruel treatment and torture” as well as starvation rations and an absence of medical treatment for tuberculosis and injuries sustained in battle or through torture in captivity (Radio Dabanga, May 30, 2019). These fighters were taken prisoner in a series of running battles against the RSF and SAF in Darfur when the two rebel movements attempted to cross back into Sudan from their temporary bases in southern Libya.

Post-Coup Developments

Following the coup, the TMC quickly declared a ceasefire in the three conflict areas (Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State), where many rebel groups were already observing a unilateral ceasefire during the protests for fear the regime would make claims the spontaneous protests were actually planned and executed by the armed opposition. That was exactly the approach the regime took under advice from M-Invest, a Russian company with offices in Khartoum operated by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. Darfuri students in Khartoum were rounded up and tortured into confessions that they were provocateurs working for both Israel and the Wahid al-Nur’s SLM/A-AW (BBC, April 25, 2019; CNN, April 25, 2019). The regime, however, had scapegoated Darfuri students for all manner of anti-government sentiment for years, so the familiar accusations had little resonance in the streets.

Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti,” TMC deputy chairman and leader of the notorious RSF paramilitary, made the surprising move of thanking ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu and the SPLM-N for extending their unilateral ceasefire, adding (after years of brutal repression by the RSF) that the armed opposition movements were a part of the larger movement responsible for deposing President al-Bashir. According to Daglo, the TMC has made contact with the armed movements, including Daglo’s bitter enemies in the Fur-dominated SPLM/A-AW (Radio Dabanga, May 1, 2019). The existence of such contacts has not been verified by the armed opposition and Daglo’s sudden respect for the rebel movements seems disingenuous.

Musa Hilal and Darfur’s Arab Rebels

Another group that has not benefitted from the general release is composed of former Janjaweed commander Musa Hilal and his relatives and followers who were arrested in November 2017. The nazir (chief) of the Mahamid Arabs of Darfur (a branch of the Northern Rizayqat), Hilal acted as a senior government advisor in Khartoum before a dispute with the regime led to his return to Darfur in 2014. Once home, he began to reorganize the Mahamid members of the Border Guard Force (BGF) into the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening (Sahwa) Council (SRAC), an anti-regime vehicle for Hilal’s political ambitions. SRAC cleared out the outnumbered SAF garrisons in northwest Darfur and the Jabal Amer goldfields and began to establish its own administration in these areas.

This direct challenge to Khartoum’s authority demanded a response, which came in the form of a massive RSF assault on Hilal’s headquarters in Mistiriyha. Hilal, his sons, three brothers and some 50 supporters were arrested after violent clashes and sent to Khartoum as detainees. [1]

Hilal and a number of imprisoned supporters began a hunger strike on April 25 to protest their continued detention, which, despite the TMC’s commitment to release prisoners of the Bashir regime, has now lasted one and a half years without trial or contact with their families (Radio Dabanga, April 26, 2019). SRAC issued a statement on May 5 calling on the TMC to release all prisoners of war and political detainees in Darfur and Kordofan (Radio Dabanga, May 5, 2019).

Yasir Arman (in white) with SPLM/A-N Commanders (Radio Dabanga)

Yasir Arman Arrives in Khartoum

A “delegation of good intentions” from the SPLM-N Blue Nile faction arrived in Khartoum for talks with the TMC and protest leaders on May 11. SPLM-N Blue Nile deputy chairman Yasir Arman and movement secretary general Ismail Khamis arrived in Khartoum later on May 26 and did not experience any complications at the airport. Arman declared their goal was to “reach a just peace… [and] democracy and citizenship without discrimination and social justice,” while warning the SPLM/A-N would not accept a new military government (Radio Dabanga, May 28 2019). The SPLM/A-N ceasefire has been extended until July 31, unless the TMC chooses to go on the offensive in the meantime (RFI, April 17, 2019).

While waiting for an opportunity to meet TMC representatives, Arman met with US Chargé d’Affaires Steven Koutsis on May 28. This apparently angered the TMC, which ordered Arman to leave the country if he wished to avoid the implementation of his death sentence (Anadolu Agency, May 29, 2019). Arman said he had received no less than five letters from TMC deputy leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo and one from TMC chairman ‘Abd al-Fatah Burhan demanding his immediate departure from Sudan. Insisting that he had no intention of leaving, Arman described the death sentence hovering over him as “a political ruling par excellence” (Radio Dabanga, May 30, 2019).

Conclusion

The TMC’s warning to Yasir Arman demonstrates that the military council is even less ready to work with the armed opposition than with civilian protest leaders. The plight of the non-Arab POWs who fought for years to remove Bashir is indicative of the enduring elitism of northern Sudan’s Arab population, especially the Nile-based Danagla, Sha’iqiya and Ja’alin tribes. The little-discussed truth of Sudan’s revolution is that many of the pro-democracy demonstrators in Khartoum, like the military, have little interest in the welfare of non-Arab rebels who fought and suffered for years to remove Bashir and the ruling clique. Their plight formed part of Yasir Arman’s agenda for talks in Khartoum, but the TMC’s continuing refusal to even meet with the armed opposition leader suggests the military has little intention of abandoning its anti-insurgency campaigns in Sudan, which provide it with wealth and power at the expense of Sudan’s political and economic development.

Note

[1] See: “Musa Hilal: Darfur’s Most Wanted Man Loses Game of Dare with Khartoum… For Now,” AIS Special Report, December 12, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4096

 

 

 

“Old Wine in Old Bottles?” A Security Q and A on Post-Coup Sudan

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

April 19, 2019 Yasir Arman (Reuters)

Veteran opposition politician Yasir Arman called the April 11 military coup in Sudan nothing more than “old wine in old bottles.” Arman suggested it had preserved “the political and economic structures of the old system,” the military-Islamist alliance that has ruled Sudan since an Islamist-backed military coup brought Brigadier Omar al-Bashir to power in 1989 (Sudan Tribune, April 12). Al-Bashir’s regime was based on three pillars: Islamism, military governance and Arab supremacy.

Despite the coup, demonstrations and sit-ins continue at military facilities beyond the capital, in places such as Port Sudan, al-Gedaref, Kadugli, al-Obeid, and camps for the internally displaced in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, April 16).

Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (Daily Nation)

The coup leaders have formed a Transitional Military Council (TMC) under Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, who commanded Sudanese forces in Yemen, where he formed ties to the Saudi military and its Gulf allies. Most recently he was Inspector General of the Sudanese Army. Al-Burhan replaced the first leader of the TMC, Lieutenant General Muhammad Ahmad Awad ibn Awf, who lasted less than 24 hours. Ibn Awf is a prominent Islamist and al-Bashir loyalist who has worked closely with Darfur’s Janjaweed militias (al-Jazeera, April 20). Under U.S. sanctions for his activities in Darfur, Ibn Awf was unacceptable to both Washington and the protesters. The former chief of Sudan’s Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Kamal ‘Abd al-Maruf al-Mahi (a leading Islamist suspected of having political ambitions), was relieved of his post as deputy chief of the TMC at the same time General Ibn Awf was replaced. [1]

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), a leading force in the demonstrations, is demanding nothing less than a civilian government (Asharq al-Aswat, April 13). The SPA is part of the Alliance for Freedom and Change, which includes the leftist National Consensus Forces and Nidea Sudan, a Paris-based group including opposition politicians and the leaders of armed movements (Middle East Online, April 16). The army is unlikely to clean house, which will continue to frustrate those demanding significant change.

What is al-Bashir’s fate?

Al-Bashir and his two brothers have been moved to the notorious Khobar Prison in Khartoum North (al-Jazeera, April 17). The military council has stated it will prosecute al-Bashir inside Sudan (APA News, April 12). The military has been repeatedly purged until the officer corps consists mostly of men whose fortunes and views are closely aligned with the ex-president’s. These officers may seek to send al-Bashir to a safe haven outside Sudan and avoid a nasty and public prosecution of regime misdoings. Uganda has said it is willing to consider offering asylum to al-Bashir (Monitor [Kampala], April 16).

Al-Bashir still faces two ICC arrest warrants for “massive human rights violations” including war crimes and genocide. However, the ICC lacks the means to detain the former president, and 33 nations (including China and Russia) have ignored the warrants by allowing al-Bashir to make visits to their countries. The ICC is demanding that the new government in Khartoum must surrender al-Bashir as well as four other individuals wanted on charges related to the Darfur conflict, including NCP leader Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Janjaweed leader ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rahman (aka ‘Ali Kushayb), former minister of defense Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussayn and Darfur rebel ‘Abdallah Banda Abakr Nourain (Al-Ahram [Cairo], April 12; for Harun, see AIS Special Report, March 3 ). The military council will not take action on these demands and it would require a massive and unprecedented power shift in Sudan for a future civilian government to surrender these individuals for ICC prosecutions.

What happens to the National Congress Party (NCP)?

Recognizing the hold the ruling NCP had over the Sudanese political system, the SPA has demanded its dissolution and the arrest of its leaders. The TMC has said NCP representatives will not be part of the transitional government (Sudan Tribune, April 15).

What happens to the Rapid Support Force (RSF)?

The RSF (Quwat al-Da’m al-Seri), was created by the NISS in 2013 to absorb Janjaweed gunmen into a more manageable unit with a central control (Terrorism Monitor, May 30 2014). The intent was to deploy the RSF as a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism force composed mostly of Darfur Arabs. The unit is led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti” a member of the Mahariya branch of the Northern Rizayqat Arabs of Darfur. Daglo is now the deputy chief of the TMC.

Ahmad al-Harun, Omar al-Bashir and Muhammad Daglo Hamdan

Though reviled by many Sudanese for its methods, the RSF has had some success in counter-insurgency operations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. It operates in large numbers along the border with Libya, where it hunts Darfuri rebels and interrupts the flow of illegal migrants from east Africa through Sudan to Libya and on into Europe. It has also been deployed in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, where Daglo served under al-Burhan, who may now rely on the RSF’s support.

There have been calls in Sudan to disband the RSF since its creation and its use of violence in the streets of Khartoum to repress the anti-regime demonstrations has not made it any more popular.

The appointment of Hamdan as deputy leader of the TMC does not indicate major change in the power structure and will anger the Darfur rebel movements who accuse him of ordering atrocities. Nonetheless, Daglo has been meeting with US and UK diplomats as the TMC’s representative (Anadolou Agency [Ankara], April 14).

What happens to the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)?

The SPA and many demonstrators have called for the dissolution of the much-feared NISS (Jihaz al-Amn al-Watani wa’l-Mukhabarat) and the regime’s paramilitaries, such as the RSF, the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Haras al-Hudud (Border Guards) (Reuters, April 16). NISS director Salah ‘Abdallah Muhammad Salah (Salah Gosh) resigned on April 13 but was not detained. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Abu Bakr Mustafa, putting the intelligence agency under military control for now. (Reuters, April 14; AFP/France24, April 14).

Ex-NISS Director Salah Gosh (al-Arabiya)

Gosh was NISS director from 2004 to 2009 but was suspected of plotting against al-Bashir in 2012. He was brought back into the fold in February 2018, when he was once again made chief of the NISS to subdue dissent. The NISS used rubber bullets, tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators (Al-Jazeera, April 8). Roving squads of agents in pick-up trucks seized individuals and took them away to “ghost houses” where their unrecorded detention usually included torture. The NISS announced the release of all political prisoners on April 11, but there are reports that many protesters remain in detention (Radio Dabanga, April 16).

The snipers who continually took shots at demonstrators from buildings outside the army’s compound in Khartoum were believed to be NISS agents who defied the army by engaging in firefights with soldiers (Middle East Monitor, April 9). The clashes were indicative of the serious differences the NISS has with the military. The NISS was given extraordinary and extrajudicial powers to act as al-Bashir’s personal protection and enforcement unit. The opportunities for enrichment presented by NISS membership created a sore point with the poorly paid military.

There is no consensus in the opposition as to what should be done with the NISS. The Islamist Popular Congress Party (PCP), led by Dr. ‘Ali al-Haj, is calling for the dissolution of the NISS and the transfer of its responsibilities to the police (Radio Dabanga, April 16). However, the Umma Party of two-time Sudanese prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the center-left Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) of Omar Yusuf al-Digair have called for only a change in the NISS leadership (Sudan Tribune, April 16).

The U.S. will watch Salah Gosh’s fate carefully – the notorious NISS director cooperated closely with the CIA on counter-terrorism issues and was even welcomed in Washington.

Will armed opposition continue?

Since independence, Sudan has been dominated by three powerful riverine tribes from Sudan’s north, the Ja’alin, Danagla and Sha’iqiya (al-Bashir is Ja’alin). This has created enormous internal tensions as Khartoum tries to control restive non-Arab ethnic groups in guerrilla-friendly regions such as Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. While a host of armed opposition groups operate in Darfur, the armed opposition in Blue Nile State and South Kordofan consists of two factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Malik Agar and ‘Abd al- Aziz al-Hilu respectively (for al-Hilu, see MLM, July 2011).

Most of the major rebel movements have refused to engage with the regime for years and appear ready to wait for a new civilian government to renew negotiations, likely under AU mediation.

Malik Agar, leader of the rebellion in Blue Nile State (Sudan Tribune)

Al-Burhan’s appointment as head of the TMC has angered many in Darfur, who accuse him of being “the architect of the genocide” in Darfur and regard his new role as “a play of the Islamists to retain power” (Radio Dabanga, April 15). Burhan is well known in Darfur for his threats to exterminate the Fur people. A leading Darfur rebel, ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (Fur), said that the Sudan “we dream of, cannot come through these racists like ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, Awad Ibn Awf, Omar al-Bashir and their ilk” (Sudan Tribune, April 16).

‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu, leader of the rebellion in South Kordofan (Nuba Reports)

The South Kordofan and Blue Nile factions of the SPLM/A-N declared a unilateral three-month ceasefire on April 17 to give the military “a chance for a peaceful and quick transfer of power to civilians” (al-Jazeera, April 17). Nonetheless, there are reports of escalating violence in Darfur, where hundreds of thousands of displaced indigenous Africans see an opportunity to take revenge on regime associates and reclaim land seized by the regime and given to Arab settlers, many from outside Sudan (al-Jazeera, April 17).

Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has demanded the release of all war-related detainees from Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile State, saying that a refusal to release them “Is a call for the continuation of the war” (Radio Dabanga, April 15).

What about the Army?

The Army has invited the opposition groups to nominate a new civilian prime minister, but the question is whether the PM would serve under or above the TMC, which is unlikely to relinquish control until arrangements have been made for leading military and security figures to make a post-coup “soft-landing.”

During the demonstrations outside military headquarters in Khartoum, low-ranking troops and junior officers emerged at times from the military headquarters to interact with the demonstrators or offer refuge from NISS snipers. Al-Burhan listened to the demonstrators, but he and other officers will view their ongoing role as preventing the disintegration of the country, by whatever means necessary.

The military says it is only interested in holding the defense and interior ministries, which could remove the security sector from civilian oversight and bring the police and intelligence services under military control (Africanews, April 15).

Can the Islamists use the coup to their advantage?

Much of the Islamist political elite has been put under arrest, including al-Bashir loyalist and former prime minister Muhammad Tahir Ayala, leading NCP member Awad al-Jaz and two former vice-presidents, Berri Hassan Saleh and ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, the latter a powerful Islamist who can call on his own supporters for political muscle. It should be recalled, however, that such arrests are often for show – the Islamist behind al-Bashir’s 1989 coup, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, was sent to prison for several months after al-Bashir’s coup 1989 to disguise the Islamist nature of the new regime.

‘Ali al-Hajj, leader of the Islamist Popular Congress Party (PCP) (Alleastafrica)

The military has excluded Islamist parties from talks on Sudan’s political future. Islamists and supporters of the old regime are painting the demonstrators as secularists intent on attacking Sudan’s traditional Islamic faith. (Middle East Monitor, April 9). The dissolution of the NCP would weaken the Islamist grip on Sudan, but the movement has proved to be highly resilient in the face of setbacks.

Besides hosting Osama bin Laden and his followers in the 1990s (they were eventually expelled), religious extremists outside of Khartoum’s control were kept largely in check through most of al-Bashir’s rule. Neighboring states fear a new regime might allow extremists to operate in Sudan, whether deliberately or through negligence. According to an Egyptian government source, Cairo “cannot afford a leadership emerging in Libya or Sudan that tolerates, or even worse condones, militant Islamic activity. This is why we… are keeping a close eye on any possible transition of power in Sudan” (Al-Ahram [Cairo], April 10).

What of the Economic Crisis?

The security situation in Sudan cannot be eased until the uncertainty created by the ongoing economic crisis is resolved. The problems are many, and include a declining currency, raging inflation, massive unemployment, inability to replace oil revenues lost with the separation of South Sudan and the cost of fighting endless rebellions in the provinces.

If the general staff possesses any economic skills, they have yet to be revealed. Unfortunately, most of the TMC’s attention will be drawn to carefully watching their colleagues and rivals for signs of a counter-coup, a persistent danger in these conditions. The generals will also be concerned for their own future; as indicated by their demand for the defense and interior ministry portfolios in a future civilian government, they will work hard to ease their own safe transition into a new regime.

Note

1.The TMC, as announced by General al-Burhan, consists of:

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, President

Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti,” Vice President

Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabbashi Ibrahim Shanto, member and spokesman

General Omar Zine al-‘Abdin Muhammad al-Shaykh, member

General Jalal al-Din al-Shaykh al-Tayib, member

General Mustafa Muhammad Mustafa Ahmad, member

General Yassir ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Atta, member

Airforce General Salah ‘Abd al-Khalig Said ‘Ali, member

Police General al-Tayib Babikir ‘Ali Fadl, memberRear

Admiral Engineer Ibrahim Jabir Ibrahim, member (Sudan Tribune, April 16).

This article first appeared in the April 22, 2019 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Who is Ahmad Harun, the New Leader of Sudan’s Ruling Party?

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report, March 3, 2019

Sudan’s embattled president, Omar al-Bashir, appeared to take a small step back from his authoritarian rule of Sudan on February 28 when he resigned as leader of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP – al-Mu’tamar al-Watani). However, his newly-appointed successor, Ahmad Muhammad Harun, is a long-time Bashir loyalist who, like his patron, is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and therefore has little interest in any regime change that could lead to arrest.

Ahmad Muhammad Harun as Governor of South Kordofan

Harun, a 54-year-old trained as a lawyer, will serve as party chief on an interim basis until the next NCP convention. The promotion came only one week after Harun was appointed deputy chief of the party by al-Bashir and puts Harun in the unusual situation of automatically becoming the party’s next presidential candidate according to party rules (AFP, March 1, 2019). Of course Harun might be replaced at the party’s next convention, but the appointment signals that al-Bashir may be reconsidering his controversial bid to be re-elected president in 2020.

Harun’s promotion comes in the midst of a wave of administrative changes that accompanied the imposition of a state of emergency to deal with the continuing protests against the military-Islamist regime. All of the nation’s 18 provincial governors have been replaced by army officers or officials from the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).

Harun has long been the NCP’s point man on its most difficult files. His talent was spotted early, when he was made Sudan’s youngest minister of state (April 2003 – September 2005). His appointment as NCP chief shows the confidence al-Bashir has in Harun as someone who can keep a strong grip on the ruling party at a time when many members might be tempted to look at different political opportunities.

Harun first proved his usefulness to the regime in the 1990s, when he was involved in the organization and operations of the Murahileen, Arab militias living in the borderlands between north and south Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). Harun and others were able to persuade Missiriya Arab tribesmen to raid and displace their long-time Ngok Dinka neighbors in an effort to control the massive oil reserves along the border between South Kordofan and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces. It was a blueprint that was later used in Darfur, where some Arab tribesmen were convinced by government agents that the looting and murder of their non-Arab Muslim neighbors was not only permissible but also well-rewarded.

The Darfur Security Desk was put under Harun’s control from April 2003 to September 2005, placing him in a command position over the activities of security services and pro-government militias. According to ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, it was during this time that Harun boasted he now had “all the power and authority to kill or forgive whoever in Darfur, for the sake of peace and security.” (Sudan Tribune, February 28, 2007). Harun later denied making the statement.

Janjaweed Gunmen in Darfur, 2008 (Andrew Carter)

According to Harun, the atrocities in Darfur were the work of rebel groups that had been unsuccessful in attempts to confront the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its Janjaweed militias on the battlefield. In consequence, he alleged, the rebels targeted civilians while blaming the government for the atrocities in international forums and media: “They started putting pressure on civilians to move out of villages, they killed their children, women they abducted, they destroyed the infrastructure and means of people’s livelihood, and caused the mass migration of people into refugee camps” (Guardian, December 4, 2008).

ICC charges against Harun were first announced in February 2007 and an arrest warrant was issued in April of the same year. After the charges were laid, Harun made a public appearance to demand the ICC prosecutors first charge US President George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with war crimes (Sudan Tribune, February 28, 2007).

Charges were filed at the same time against former Harun associate and Janjaweed commander ‘Ali Kushayb (a.k.a. ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali). President al-Bashir was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2008.  Like the United States, Sudan is not a signatory to the ICC statutes and has refused all appeals to cooperate with the court.

Among the ICC charges were 51 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including 14 counts of murder, ten counts of rape and the torture of 60 people (Telegraph, June 5, 2008). Most of the charges related to Khartoum’s ruthless counter-insurgency in Darfur during the period 2003 to 2005. Harun was Sudan’s interior minister at the time and responsible for internal security. In 2006, al-Bashir surprised many of those following the Darfur conflict by appointing Harun as Sudan’s new Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, putting Harun in charge of relief efforts for the hundreds of thousands displaced by his own activities in Darfur. In September 2007, Harun was placed in charge of an investigation of human rights abuses in Darfur.

Moreno Ocampo deplored Harun’s appointment to Minister of Humanitarian Affairs: “Formally, [Harun] shares responsibility for the safety and well-being of the displaced population. In reality, he joins in constant abuses against them” (IPSNews, February 6, 2009).

Commander ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu (Paulo Nunes dos Santos/Polaris)

In May 2009, Harun was given a more familiar role as governor of South Kordofan province, where a rebellion was raging. Anti-government guerrilla actions were (and continue to be) led by the mainly Nuba fighters of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A-N, which split-off from South Sudan’s SPLM/A when the south gained independence in July 2011). The movement is led by veteran opposition leader ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu, who lost the May 2011 gubernatorial election to Harun (the NCP candidate) in a contest that was transparently rigged in the last hours when it appeared ‘Abd al-Aziz would be the certain winner. Another division of the SPLM/A-N operates in Blue Nile province; both sections are allied to the main rebel movements in Darfur.

A spokesman for Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was unsurprised at the time that Harun had been appointed governor of South Kordofan: “Having orchestrated the Darfur genocide, Harun is the right choice for the Government of Sudan to complete the unfinished job to ethnically cleanse the Nuba People and bring in Arabs to occupy their lands” (Sudan Tribune, June 21, 2011).

In April 2012, al-Jazeera obtained footage of Harun encouraging SAF troops in Southern Kordofan to take no prisoners during an offensive into rebel-held territory: “You must hand over the place clean. Swept, rubbed, crushed. Don’t bring them back alive. We have no space for them” (Al-Jazeera, April 1 2012).

For the moment, the rebel movements of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile state have extended a unilateral ceasefire, attempting to allow a popular uprising to continue without providing the regime with an opportunity to claim the protests are the work of rebel infiltrators (something security authorities have already done).

Harun maintains that everything he did in Darfur to preserve the regime and the state was his legal duty (Guardian, December 4, 2008). It is an approach al-Bashir will expect as the regime struggles to right itself in the midst of a popular uprising that threatens the president’s three-decade old rule.