Category Archives: Sudan

The First Siege of al-Fashir, 1884: Prototype of a Modern Atrocity

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Historical Background Report

December 3, 2025

Fighters of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entered the North Darfur capital of al-Fashir in late October, launching a wave of atrocities based on ethnic persecution of non-Arab tribal groups in Darfur. The 18-month siege of al-Fashir that preceded these terrible events bore many parallels to the first siege of the city in 1884, one in which many Arab ancestors of current RSF personnel participated as followers of the Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad. Then, as now, most of the besieged were non-Arab and faced a similar fate when their defenses were overrun.

Map of the Sultanate of Darfur, 1914 

With the encouragement of his Ta’ashi Arab deputy, ‘Abd Allahi, Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the expected Mahdi in 1881. The Mahdi as a messianic figure who appears at the end of time to restore justice in an oppressive world before the arrival of the Nabi Isa (the Prophet Jesus) figures prominently in both Sunni and Shi’ite eschatology (the study of final judgment and the last days of mankind).

Pious and charismatic, Muhammad Ahmad put himself at the head of a growing rebellion against the massively unpopular rule of Egypt’s Turko-Egyptian elite. The Turko-Egyptians invaded Sudan in 1821, replacing numerous chiefdoms and kingdoms with their own rule, one that was at once parsimonious, rapacious, grasping, incompetent and exploitative. Besides brutal methods of tax collection, the new elite angered many Sudanese by their interference in the slave trade, a thriving institution in Sudan. This interference was made more irksome by Egyptian Army officers who appeared publicly to be working to end slavery while making immense profits through their own covert involvement in the trade.

Muhammad Ahmad, the Sudanese Mahdi

A former Sufi, Muhammad Ahmad was a Dongolawi (one of three powerful groups of Arabized Nubians, including the Ja’alin and the Sha’iqiya) from northern Sudan. He began to attract followers, the so-called ansar (“supporters,” i.e., of religion), at his base on Aba Island in the White Nile. Forced from Aba by government troops, the Mahdi and his followers fled to the Nuba mountains of southern Kordofan and later into the plains of northern Kordofan, where they began besieging towns held by Turko-Egyptian troops, including local recruits, many of whom were Blacks taken as slaves by government-backed slaving expeditions. With Kordofan largely under Mahdist control, Muhammad Ahmad turned his attention west to the old sultanate of Darfur, a powerful Muslim kingdom since its foundation by the Fur people of Jabal Marra in the 17th century, but under Egyptian control since 1874. Al-Fashir, the sultanate’s capital, was established by Sultan ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1792 in the plains east of the mountainous Fur homeland of Jabal Marra. Formerly, the Fur sultans had maintained a peripatetic court, roaming the hills of Jabal Marra.

After many years of expansion, Darfur was nearly two-thirds non-Fur by the time of the 1884 siege. Intermarriage with non-Fur ethnic groups had been encouraged in the royal family as a means of consolidating political control, and by the latter half of the 19th century the royal family was probably as much Zaghawa by blood as Fur. Fur was still the court language, but Arabic was the language of official correspondence. A willingness to bring non-Fur into important administrative positions, a reliance on slave labor and a high tolerance for pre-Islamic religious practices helped maintain the Fur royalty. The main dissenters were the nomadic Baqqara (cattle-herding) Arabs of southern Darfur, who maintained their independence by retreating into the marshes along the border with the southern region of Bahr al-Ghazal whenever the sultan decided it was time to send out a punitive column to bring them in line. Repeated clashes grew into bitterness on both sides, a situation that only deteriorated under the rule of the Turko-Egyptians, leaving both the Baqqara tribes and their northern Abbala (camel-herding) Arab cousins ready to be led into full-scale revolt under a strong leader such as the Mahdi, who represented a local form of Islam that differed from that promoted by the Egyptian religious scholars who had followed the army into Sudan and set up their own government-allied form of Islam.

Zubayr Takes al-Fashir – 1874

In 1883, al-Fashir was a town of only 2650 people, including both Arabs and non-Arab groups such as the Fur, the Zaghawa, the Berti and others. By the time of the siege a year later, it had been ten years since the powerful slaver and freebooter Zubayr Mansur Pasha had roared north to conquer Darfur with an army of loyal Black slave-troops (bazinger-s) from his headquarters in Bahr al-Ghazal. [1]

Zubayr Mansur Pasha

Zubayr was a Nile Valley Ja’ali of modest background who had worked his way up through the ranks of the slavers busy depopulating parts of southern Sudan in the mid-19th century. He had become wealthy and powerful through his subjugation of the immense southern province of Bahr al-Ghazal before eying the riches of its independent northern neighbor, the sultanate of Darfur. After the defeat and death of Fur sultan Ibrahim Qarad bin Muhammad Husayn in a great battle at Manawashi in 1874, the way was open for Zubayr to enter al-Fashir without a fight on November 2, 1874. The Fur capital was thoroughly looted by Zubayr, who had sworn allegiance to the Egyptian khedive but acted mainly in his own interests. As Zubayr led his army west to conquer neighboring Wadai Sultanate, a weaker detachment of the Egyptian Army entered al-Fashir five days after Zubayr. These troops were led by Governor General Isma’il Ayub Pasha, who claimed Darfur for the growing Egyptian Empire in Africa and confiscated much of the loot Zubayr had left behind in al-Fashir. Isma’il Ayub claimed most of the credit for taking al-Fashir and was duly promoted, while Zubayr found himself cheated out of his anticipated khedive-approved rule of Darfur. Zubayr departed to protest in person in Cairo, where, being judged as overly ambitious and a threat to Egyptian sovereignty in Sudan, he was compelled to remain in comfortable but closely-watched exile. [2]

Opposite the sultan’s al-Fashir palace, Isma’il Ayub ordered the construction of a square fort with a deep trench and bank patrolled by sentries. Inside the fort was a house for the governor and barracks for the troops (Na’um Bey, 1913). A strong zariba (fence made of thorn bushes) surrounded the defenses. A gun at each angle was sufficient to control the town under normal circumstances.

Alexander Macomb Mason Bey

When F Sidney Ensor visited al-Fashir in the late 1870s during an Egyptian government railroad survey, he found the palace occupied by Colonel Alexander Macomb Mason Bey, a Confederate veteran of the Virginia State Navy. Mason was on the staff of the Egyptian khedive after a stint fighting Spain as a mercenary officer in the Chilean Navy. Improvements to the remains of the old palace were made by Egyptian troops to make it suitable for the accommodation of officers, including floors of Norway pine imported at great expense from England.

Slatin and the Loss of Darfur

Rudolf Slatin, a 27-year-old Austrian mercenary in the employ of the Khedive in Sudan, was with the Mahdist army at the time al-Fashir was taken, only seven days after he had surrendered. Slatin, despite only a brief employment by the Austro-Hungarian Army in the Balkans, arrived in Darfur in 1879 and was soon after appointed governor of Darfur in 1881 by Sudan’s governor general, Muhammad Rauf Pasha.

Rudolf Slatin in Mahdist Uniform

The young Austrian’s time was almost immediately consumed by military matters, fighting a series of battles, first against the displaced Fur royals, then against the Arabs who had rallied to the Mahdi. In a desperate move, he converted to Islam in 1883 in an unsuccessful attempt to rally his Muslim troops shortly before his surrender at Dara. Thus began Slatin’s 11-year residence in the camp of the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa (“successor”). His surrender was marred, however, by his surprising failure to first destroy the Dara garrison’s vast stocks of powder, ammunition and other war materiel that now fell into the eager hands of the Mahdists.

Mahdist Assault on al-Fashir

In early January, 1884, Amir Muhammad Bey Khalid “Zuqal” began marching on al-Fashir, which had already indicated its intention of surrendering after receiving letters from Slatin (now in the Mahdist camp) urging its commander to do so. In anticipation of surrender, the garrison had sent the keys to the treasury to Zuqal by courier and adopted the patched jibba-s (cotton outer garments) worn by the Mahdists. All seemed ready for a peaceful transfer of power; the Egyptian troops were expected to shift their allegiance to the Mahdi.

Zuqal, a Ja’ali Arab from the Nile Valley, had once been one of Slatin’s aides. As a trader and government official, Zuqal was a member of the Bahhara (“those of the river”), the Arab (or Arabo-Nubian) tribes of northern Sudan’s Nile region who had spread as traders throughout Sudan in the wake of the 19th century Turko-Egyptian expansion. A relative of the Mahdi, he was sent by Slatin to Kordofan to appeal to the Mahdi to refrain from raising a rebellion amongst the Arabs in Darfur. Zuqal instead transferred his loyalties to Muhammad Ahmad, being appointed Darfur’s new governor in turn after Slatin’s surrender on December 23, 1883. Many of the smaller Egyptian Army outposts in Darfur soon followed Slatin’s lead, especially after it became known that the Egyptian Army relief expedition led by General William Hicks Pasha (a veteran of the Indian Army) had been utterly destroyed by the Mahdi in Kordofan in November.

The commander of the Fashir garrison and governor of the city since 1879 was Sa’id Bey Juma’a, a native of Egypt’s Fayyum Oasis. Well known for his “rich vocabulary of bad language,” Sa’id Bey was not always popular with his fellow officers, but was known for his personal courage and devotion to Darfur (Hill,1967, p.325).

Sa’id Bey Juma’a in Mahdist Uniform

Sa’id Bey was a hard man, but not a stupid man. His small garrison was already weak before the Mahdist siege started. In August 1883, he had dispatched a large force from al-Fashir to clear the surrounding region of insurgents; only 99 men returned. Since then, the Mahdists had only grown in numbers, especially after the defeat of Hicks Pasha and the capture of thousands of Remington rifles. Sa’id Bey and the people of al-Fashir had already decided to submit to the Mahdi, but began to think twice when they heard of the atrocities that had followed the capitulation of Dara, Slatin Bey’s former headquarters (Slatin, p.248).

In the way that the flapping of a butterfly’s wings might be the first breath of a hurricane, one ill-advised admonition changed what was intended to be a peaceful transition of power into a bloody weeks-long confrontation followed by scenes of torture and murder. The courier between al-Fashir and Zuqal’s camp, a local fiki (rural holy man) named Khalifa ‘Abd al-Rahman, full of the religious fervor of the Mahdist revolution and its prohibitions on alcohol and tobacco, piously informed Sa’id Bey Juma’a that he must stop smoking cigarettes.

This was the last straw for Sa’id Bey, who was already alarmed by the brutality dealt out to the officers and leading citizens of Dara and Um Shanga after they had been guaranteed safety. The Bey issued orders for the imprudent fiki to be shot and for his men to discard their Mahdist jibba-s and re-don the uniforms of the Egyptian Army. The fiki somehow escaped his appearance before a firing squad and sent a message to Zuqal regarding Sa’id Bey’s change of heart, no doubt omitting his own role in that reversal. Sa’id Bey now prepared to meet Zuqal’s army with a garrison of 1,000 men, 10 guns and a hand-cranked Gatling gun. The city’s weak point was its wells, the only source of fresh water, which lay just outside the city walls. These could only be used during a siege by teams working under the protection of cover fire from the walls.

Zuqal launched three assaults on the town, each of which was repelled by the desperate garrison. Sa’id Bey in turn launched several unsuccessful sorties. The Mahdist Amir was compelled to send for reinforcements from Dara and Kabkabiya while recruiting local Arabs to help invest the city. An attempt to bombard the city into submission was made, using artillery captured from other units of the Egyptian Army. This too failed, as the experienced gunners of the Fashir garrison targeted and destroyed the Mahdist guns (Wingate, pp. 130-131).

Death of Hicks Pasha at the Battle of Shaykan

Amir Zuqal, who had taken up a position on the site of Sultan Ibrahim’s old palace now ordered his men to fill in the wells just under the city walls, which was carried out under heavy fire from above. The Amir also ordered the captured munitions brought up from Dara that Slatin had failed to destroy before his surrender. As thirst and hunger increased within the walls, Zuqal ordered Slatin (who had also been brought up from Dara for this purpose) to write Sa’id Bey, urging him to capitulate. With the Egyptian Army relief column having already been destroyed by the Mahdi at Shaykan (Kordofan) in November 1883, there was now no alternative to surrender after 15 days of siege. Sa’id Bey would later say that the garrison could have held out at al-Fashir, but for the ammunition stores that Slatin had turned over to the Mahdists (Neufeld, 1899, pp.319-320).

Occupation of al-Fashir

With the city having been so recently looted of its treasures in 1874 by Zubayr and the Egyptian Army (which confiscated some of Zubayr’s loot for transport to Cairo), the Mahdists turned to extreme measures to find wealth they were certain had been hidden by merchants and officers of the Egyptian garrison.

According to Slatin, who witnessed events from the Mahdist camp: “The horrible scenes at Dara were now re-enacted with even greater severity, and numbers of people were tortured in the most merciless manner” (Slatin, p. 149). Egyptian officers were targeted especially; Major Hamada Effendi was flogged daily for three days in an unsuccessful attempt to make him reveal where his money was hidden; after the flogging ceased each day, a mixture of salt-water and hot peppers was poured over his ragged flesh. Called a slave by one of his captors, another officer, Ibrahim Tagalawi, shot his wife, his brother and himself; Sa’id Agha Fula committed suicide rather than undergo the disgrace of flogging. The Mahdi’s army had need of professional soldiers, so Zuqal eventually ordered a halt to the floggings and beatings of the officers. Sa’id Bey Juma’a, the bristly nicotine-deprived governor, escaped death only through the intervention of Slatin and, after a term of imprisonment, became chief of the Mahdist artillery in the siege of Khartoum. Slatin became a closely-watched bodyguard and advisor to the Mahdi’s successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi al-Ta’aisha, before escaping from Omdurman in 1895.

Only days after the fall of al-Fashir, Slatin received a letter containing orders he could no longer carry out as a prisoner of the Mahdi. Khartoum had instructed him to concentrate all his men and supplies at al-Fashir and there await the arrival of Fur “sultan” ‘Abd al-Shakur ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Shattut, who would restore Fur rule in al-Fashir under Egyptian sovereignty. That was Governor General Gordon’s plan. In reality, ‘Abd al-Shakur, who had been plucked from the Fur royal exiles living in Cairo since 1874, made only a sluggish, alcohol-fogged procession up the Nile, failing to get much further than Dongola. Gordon pulled the plug on the whole operation and ‘Abd al-Shakur returned to the safety of obscurity.

Conqueror of al-Fashir

Zuqal crowned his conquest of the Fur capital by marrying the Iya Basi (Fur – “great sister”), a traditional pre-Islamic position in the Fur royal hierarchy assumed by a full sister of the sultan. The Iya Basi maintained her own palace, wealth and retinue of hundreds of slaves and servants. Now comfortably ensconced in al-Fashir, Zuqal began the dangerous practice of ignoring summonses from the Mahdi to join his forces in Kordofan.

At the time of the siege, Sultan Harun Dud Banga was in the ancestral Fur homeland, the mountains of Jabal Marra, where he had been fighting a guerrilla campaign against the Turko-Egyptians. With the Egyptian Army no longer a threat after their collapse in Darfur, the sultan was faced with a new and more dangerous enemy – the Mahdists, with their core of Arab tribesmen who had resisted Fur rule for many years. Zuqal assembled an army of captured Sudanese regulars who had served in the Egyptian Army and Black slave troops (bazinger-s), supplemented by as many as 20,000 Arabs. The Mahdist army marched into the hills of Jabal Marra, where they cornered Sultan Harun in a hill-top stronghold. The Mahdists suffered enormous losses storming the fortress, but eventually broke resistance after a two-month siege. Harun was enlisted in the Mahdi’s army and reported to have met his death a few years later fighting the Abyssinians at Gallabat in 1889, though another account claims he survived the Mahdiya and lived quietly at al-Qadarif in eastern Sudan until 1903. [3]

The Mahdi died soon after the conquest of Khartoum and the death of hir rival Gordon, but Zuqal remained at al-Fashir until March 1886, when he finally responded to a series of letters from the Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi summoning him to Omdurman. The main obstacle to ‘Abd Allahi’s efforts to consolidate his power as the Mahdi’s successor came from the Mahdi’s Nile Valley Arab relatives, the Ashraf; Zuqal, as a relative of the Mahdi, was now under suspicion. His departure for Omdurman with a large armed following only alarmed the Khalifa, who ordered Hamdan Abu ‘Anja to intercept Zuqal’s party. Zuqal quickly found himself under arrest at al-‘Ubayd in Kordofan, relieved of his soldiers and his wealth (Wingate, pp.291-292).

After the Ashraf ceased to be a threat to ‘Abd Allahi’s power, Zuqal found his way back into the Khalifa’s good graces and back out again. He was eventually exiled to Rajaf in southern Sudan but freed by Belgian forces in 1897. [4] He returned to Darfur only to be executed by ‘Ali Dinar, who had restored the Fur Sultanate in the days after the Battle of Omdurman (1898). Zuqal was taken into the hills of Jabal Marra, where he was “lowered into a well containing the bones of many former offenders, the rope cut, and left to die, with a guard posted to ensure no assistance” (Egyptian Army Military Intelligence Summary, 1902).

Aftermath

Many of the Black soldiers who served under Slatin before being absorbed into the Mahdist ranks mutinied in al-‘Ubayd in October 1885. Most of these troops came from the Nuba Hills of South Kordofan, and it was to that place that they marched, still in order and under arms. Such defiance could not be condoned by the Khalifa, and Mahdist troops spent months exterminating the mutineers in the hills.

Egyptian Troops in Action in Sudan, 1879

Sa’id Bey died in his home oasis of Fayyum in 1912, having sought a quiet life there since his experiences in the Mahdiya.

When Sultan ‘Ali Dinar revived the Fur Sultanate in 1898, he began repairing the damage and neglect of the city by ordering the construction of a vast new palace compound (hosh) and mosque, as well as a qubba-style (beehive-shaped) memorial to his father, Zakariya. Despite the ever-present risk of a raid by the restless Arab Baqqara (especially the Rizayqat of Musa Madibbo), al-Fashir grew in importance and prosperity under Sultan ‘Ali Dinar until 1916, when it was occupied once more by the Egyptian Army, this time under British leadership and direction.

Notes

  1. Egyptian ranks and titles used in this paper include Agha, Bey, Effendi, Khedive and Pasha. All were part of the Turkish nomenclature for political and military titles, Turkish still being the working language of the Egyptian Army in the 19th Definitions below (with the exception of khedive) are those relevant to military usage.

Agha: An honorific for officers below the rank of Kaimakam (roughly ‘colonel’), it also tended to indicate the officer was non-literate.

Bey: An honorific for senior officers below the level of Pasha, available in several grades.

Effendi: Like Agha, an honorific for officers below the rank of Kaimakam, but implying literacy and education.

Khedive: “Viceroy,” i.e. of the Ottoman sultan. Originally from the Persian khediv. Though first used by Muhammad ‘Ali in 1805, its use was only recognized officially by the Ottoman sultan from 1867 to 1914.

Pasha: Another Turkish term with Persian origins, Pasha was the highest title, available in four grades for military officers.

  1. For the consequent collusion between Zubayr in Cairo and his ill-fated son Sulayman in Bahr al-Ghazal, see: “Romolo Gessi Pasha: Early Counter-Insurgency Lessons from an Italian Soldier of Fortune’s Campaign in Central Africa,” Military History Online/AIS, August 21, 2016, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=3696
  2. For Gallabat, see Hill (1967), p.4 and Wingate (1891), p.325; for al-Qadarif, see Sudan Archives Durham SAD 731/6/68 and HHS Morant: “Recent History of Darfur” (Sudan Military Intelligence Report no.104).
  3. Rajaf, a town in Central Equatoria (now part of the state of South Sudan), was near the southernmost extent of the Mahdist state and used as a place of exile for those who offended the Khalifa. The Mahdists were expelled from the town in February 1897 by Congo Free State forces led by Louis-Napoléon Chaltin, a veteran of the 1882-1884 Congo Free State war with Zanzibari Arab merchants and slavers.

Bibliography

Egyptian Army Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) no. 93, April 1902, Sudan Archives Durham, SAD 735/3/1-27.

Ensor, F. Sidney: Incidents on a Journey through Nubia to Darfoor, WH Allen, London, 1881.

Farwell, Byron: Prisoners of the Mahdi, Harper and Row, New York, 1967.

Haim Shaked: The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi: A Historical Study of Kitab sa’adat al-mustahdi bi-sirat al-Imam al-Mahdi by Isma’il b. ‘Abd al-Qadir, Transaction Books, New Brunswick N.J., 1978.

Hill, Richard: A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan, 2nd Ed., Frank Cass & Co., London, 1967.

Holt, PM: The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A study of its origins, development and overthrow, (2nd ed.), Oxford, 1970.

Lampen, GD: “History of Darfur,” Sudan Notes and Records 31(2), 1950, pp. 177-209.

Mamdani, Mahmood: Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, Pantheon Books, New York, 2009.

McGregor, Andrew: “American Civil War Veterans and the Egyptian Empire in Africa,” A lecture given at the Royal Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, March 28, 2018, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4264

Na’um Bey Shuqair: “The Masalit and Tama Sultanates: Are they within Darfur or Wadai Sultanate,” Typescript, February 2, 1913, Sudan Archives Durham, SAD 731/6/109.

Neufeld, Charles: A Prisoner of the Khaleefa. Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman, Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London, 1899.

Report on the Egyptian Provinces of the Sûdan, Red Sea, and Equator, Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards, War Office, HM Stationary Office, London, 1883.

Slatin Pasha, Colonel Sir Rudolf: Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895, Edwin Arnold, London, 1897.

Theobald, AB: The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1951.

Wingate, Major FR: Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, MacMillan and Co., London, 1891.

 

Rapid Support Forces Establish Rival Government as Sudan’s War Spirals

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Terrorism Monitor

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

November 20, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of al-Fashir, accompanied by exterminatory extrajudicial killings after an 18-month siege, represents the militia’s most significant territorial victory to date and accelerates the effective partition of Sudan.
  • With control over most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, the RSF is consolidating a parallel “Tasis State,” seeking external legitimacy despite its reliance on predatory militias and systematic abuses.
  • The Sudanese Armed Forces–Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF–TSC) coalition remains internally divided and constrained by Islamist-aligned networks, leaving both major coalitions dependent on abusive partners and limiting prospects for a negotiated national political settlement.

Until 2005, Sudan was Africa’s largest country by territory size. After 22 years of civil war, South Sudan separated, taking the nation’s oil wealth and roughly one-third of its territory with it. Today, after two-and-one-half years of a new civil war, the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) declared its intention on July 2 to form a new state, splitting the country once again. Though the RSF’s stated intention is to form a new government for all Sudan, it is in reality now focusing on consolidating its control of the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur, having been ejected from Khartoum and the central region of al-Jazirah by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its allies.

(Maprr)

The initiative is designed to provide legitimacy and access to aid and arms for a paramilitary accused of genocide, ethnic cleansing, looting, destruction of cultural institutions, sexual violence, war crimes and widespread atrocities.

The Battle for al-Fashir

RSF Fighter with Dead Civilians

Crucial to the establishment of a new RSF state based largely in western Sudan is the seizure and occupation of al-Fashir, the traditional capital of Darfur since its founding in the late 18th century as capital of the Fur Sultanate. After an 18-month siege, the city was taken by the RSF on October 27, when the movement overran the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division and elements of the Sudan Liberation Movement-MM led by Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minawi (now resident in Port Sudan). Taking al-Fashir frees up RSF forces for the ongoing battle for neighboring Kordofan region and solidifies its control of Darfur (Mada Masr, July 11).

Minni Arko Minawi, Governor of Darfur and Leader of the SLA-MM

The entry of RSF forces was followed by massacres largely targeting the non-Arab population of the city that have killed at least 1500 people, including 460 patients and health workers at the Saudi Maternity Hospital (Al-Jazeera, October 30). According to the Sudan Doctors’ Network, “Hospitals in El Fasher have been transformed into human slaughterhouses” (Radio Dabanga, October 30). The atrocities appear to exceed even the dark episodes that followed the taking of al-Fashir after a siege by Mahdist forces in 1883. RSF commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” acknowledged he had “observed abuses occurring in al-Fashir” and pledged to hold RSF personnel accountable for their crimes (Sudan Tribune, October 29).

During the siege RSF constructed 68 km of 3-meter-tall sand berms alongside 3-meter-deep ditches as wide as five meters around al-Fashir to prevent escape from the siege (Radio Dabanga, September 30; Mada Masr, September 5). [1] People fleeing al-Fashir along the so-called “Road of Death” to nearby cholera-stricken Tawila were routinely deprived of all their possessions before being killed or raped as suspected supporters of the SAF. Others were forced to provide blood for wounded RSF fighters; many of these died soon after (Sudan Tribune, September 6). Those remaining in al-Fashir were reduced to eating leaves or a diminishing supply of animal feed as supplies of food, medicine and other aid were interrupted by the RSF’s siege lines (Al-Jazeera, September 4).

Palace of Sultan ‘Ali Dinar, al-Fashir (TIKA)

Earlier this year, the RSF, having already looted the Sudan National Museum in Khartoum, bombed the historical al-Fashir palace of Fur Sultan ‘Ali Dinar (1898-1916), a revered national symbol of anti-colonial resistance, but one who campaigned constantly against the western Arab tribes that now dominate the RSF (Radio Dabanga, January 22; Darfur Network for Human Rights, January 17).

South of al-Fashir, there are indications that the RSF has turned the airbase at Nyala into a base for Iranian and Chinese-designed drones capable of striking any target within Sudan (Sudan Tribune, September 29). The RSF has also made major improvements in its air-defense systems through the use of Wagner Group-supplied surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the SAF’s Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci high-altitude, long-endurance drones, once expected to be a game-changing weapon in the struggle to relieve al-Fashir (Military Africa, September 28).

The Tasis State

A political charter to form a parallel “transitional peace government” was signed in February by the RSF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) and other armed groups (the “Tasis Alliance”) operating in western Sudan (al-Jazeera, July 28). The new state was declared on July 26 as the “Government of Peace and Unity,” but is more commonly known as “the Tasis State.” Though the new state insists it represents all parts of Sudan, in reality it can only govern those regions currently controlled in whole or part by the RSF and the SPLM-N (Darfur, parts of Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile State). For now, the Tasis capital is in Nyala (southern Darfur), but will likely be shifted to al-Fashir.

The Tasis (“Founding”) Alliance is formed from 24 armed and civil groups, including the RSF, the SPLM-N, the Beja Congress of eastern Sudan, the Rasha’ida Arab “Free Lions” of eastern Sudan, and factions of the National Umma Party (UP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the largely Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4; Sudan Tribune, January 22). To maintain a façade of ruling all Sudan, Tasis has appointed regional governors for Khartoum and the Eastern region, despite the RSF currently having no presence in these areas (Sudan Tribune, July 26; Arab Weekly, July 28).

The head of the presidential council is RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”; his deputy is SPLM-N leader ‘Abd al-Aziz Hilu (see MLM, June 2012). Both attended the swearing in of the presidential council in Nyala on August 30; the ceremony site was bombed several hours later by the SAF (Mada Masr, September 5).

Tasis Prime Minister Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi

As prime minister, the Darfur Arabs controlling the RSF have appointed Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi, a known ally of Hemetti. The appointment has significant symbolic value with reference to the rivalry between the Baqqara (cattle-herding) Arabs of Darfur and the riverain Arabs of northern Sudan in the time of the Mahdist State (1885-1898), when the northern Arab relatives of the Mahdi, the ashraf, were repressed by the Mahdi’s successor, Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi, a member of Darfur’s Ta’aisha tribe. Sudan’s northern Arab minority has dominated Sudan since independence in 1956, and the appointment of a Ta’aishi as prime minister is a political signal understood by all Sudanese.

The RSF justifies its declaration of a new state by saying it is necessitated by an urgent need for identity documents, currency, security, medicine, healthcare and education identity documents (Mada Masr, August 16). One purpose of establishing the rival state is to establish legitimacy in talks hosted by outside parties such as the Quartet – the US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia (better known as “the Quad”). For now, only the UAE recognizes the RSF as a de facto authority (Mada Masr, September 28). Sudan’s government has complained to the UN about the UAE’s alleged involvement in supplying arms, logistical support and Colombian mercenaries to the RSF (AIS Special Report, June 13; Mada Masr, September 14).

The UN Security Council rejected the declaration of a rival state in Sudan, calling it “a direct threat to Sudan’s territorial integrity” (UN News, August 13). It has also been opposed by many Arab states, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (New Arab, March 6). Other opposition comes from the US and the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in 2021. Besides the UAE, supporters include Khalifa Haftar’s eastern Libya, Chad, Kenya, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

THE SAF/TSC Government

The Port Sudan-based SAF/Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government is making its own bid for legitimacy in the face of what it regards as exclusion from international peace efforts supported by the Quad, the UN and the AU. Declaring it will not negotiate without a declaration of its legitimacy, the SAF/TSC has also rejected all efforts to place the RSF on an equal footing and insists only a military resolution can bring peace to Sudan (Mada Masr, September 20).

Finance Minister and JEM leader Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (Akhbar al-Sudan/Facebook)

On May 19, Kamil al-Tayib Idris, with doctorates in international relations and international law, was appointed Sudan’s first civilian prime minister since 2022 by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, head of the SAF and chair of the TSC. Shortly afterward, the new PM tried to expel two powerful former rebel leaders from the TSC cabinet, JEM’s Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (minister of finance) and Darfur governor Minni Arko Minawi, but was quickly overruled by al- Burhan, who doubtless has no desire to see these leaders and their valuable troops depart the SAF-led coalition (Al-Jazeera, July 23). Many former rebel leaders and their subordinates gained their positions as TSC ministers under the terms of the 2020 Juba peace agreement (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, April 21, 2021).

Traditional Parties Divided

The National Umma Party (NUP) is the political arm of Sudan’s neo-Mahdist movement and has been a strong, western-based political force in Sudan since independence under the leadership of various descendants of its founder ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah, “the Mahdi” (1843-1885). The party is currently divided, with a faction led by acting head Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Douma backing the Port Sudan SAF/TSC government while a faction led by Fadlallah Burma Nasir supports the RSF and the creation of a parallel Sudanese state (Sudan Tribune, July 8). Fadlallah has accepted an appointment to be speaker of the Tasis government’s legislative council.

Khatmiyya Leader Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani

The NUP’s historical rival is the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Sayyid Muhammad ‘Uthman al-Mirghani, the 89-year-old leader of the historically pro-Egyptian Khatmiyya Sufi order and descendant of the order’s founder, ‘Ali al-Mirghani (1873-1968). The leadership of the DUP is in turmoil after decrees allegedly issued by Sayyid al-Mirghani on June 24 replaced the party leader’s son, Ja’afar al-Sadiq, as deputy leader with Ahmad Sa’ad Omar, a loyalist of deposed president Omar al-Bashir. Many DUP leaders allege the maneuver was the work of another of al-Mirghani’s sons, ‘Abd Allah al-Mahjub, who was taking advantage of the elderly Sufi leader, a resident of Cairo who is known for his publicly expressed support for the SAF but has little other political involvement (Sudan Tribune, June 25; Altaghyeer.info, July 8, 2024).

A faction under Ibrahim al-Mirghani, another descendant of Khatmiyya founder ‘Ali al-Mirghani, has come out in support of the RSF and the Tasis alliance. A DUP spokesman declared in February that “the presence of Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Mirghani does not represent the party in any way, and he only represents himself and the constituencies that entrusted him with the mission” (SUNA, February 20).

The Islamists Return

Much like the RSF-led Tasis coalition, the “official” SAF/TSC government and its armed supporters also constitute a tenuous alliance. Complicating its own search for legitimacy is the presence within the coalition of many Islamists, including veterans of the discredited military-Islamist government of Omar al-Bashir, who was deposed in 2019 and is currently wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, torture and genocide. Islamist militias under SAF command have played a major role in the fighting, most notably the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade, tied to the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP).

Commander of the Bara’a Bin Malik Brigade, al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha (Sudan Tribune)

The NCP, which ruled Sudan from 1998 to 2019, is currently led by Ahmad Harun (also wanted by the ICC on charges of war crimes and genocide in Darfur). Harun believes Western political models are inappropriate for Sudan and that there must be a political role for the army, but insists the Islamists will wait to seek power via the ballot box after the war’s conclusion  (Sudan Tribune, July 25; Arab Weekly, July 26).

The RSF is strongly opposed to a political return by the Islamists, blaming them for initiating the current conflict (Sudan Tribune, July 25). Tasis prime minister Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi explained in an interview that General al-Burhan has “benefited from the Islamists’ infiltration of the military establishment” and that he “became the general who served the Islamists most after the [2019] revolution” (Assayha, October 16). The Tasis alliance has declared they will dissolve all Islamist militias affiliated with the NCP after they take control of Sudan (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4).

Conclusion

The problem is that there are not two groups fighting for power in Sudan, but many, who have flocked to one or the other of the major coalitions (RSF and SAF) to further their own interests, even when that has meant splitting existing movements. In turn, the leaders of the major coalitions have become beholden to unreliable partners who have a track record of opportunism. In this situation, a victory by either side may mark not the end of the conflict, but only the starting point of a new one.

Most international support (however unenthusiastic) tends to line up behind the SAF/TSC as the default successor to the line of recognized Sudanese governments. However, the civilian leaders in the TSC are in thrall to the military members of the TSC, particularly TSC chairman General al-Burhan. While many civilian members reject a return to the political Islamism of the era of President Omar al-Bashir, they must contend with the fact that the northern Arab generals of the SAF are precisely those that survived the frequent purges of non-Islamist officers during the Bashir regime.

The RSF’s new Tasis State is not without its own international support, but these backers remain focused on what can be gained by supporting a paramilitary (led by Darfur Arabs) that has adopted a veneer of statehood to cloak the fact it is manifestly incapable of running anything resembling a 21st century administration with any other objective than the personal enrichment of its leadership. The inability of both RSF and SAF commanders to envision the possibility of a Sudanese nation led by a member of Sudan’s non-Arab majority guarantees further rounds of combat focused on the pursuit of ethnic-based power sharing.

On the battlefield, ongoing atrocities by both the SAF and the RSF mean there is little to choose between them in a humanitarian sense. Beyond the deliberate destruction of national infrastructure (much of which is the now ruined and irreplaceable legacy of the brief days of oil wealth before the separation of South Sudan), a recent UN report entitled “A War of Atrocities” found both side guilty of adopting a brutal approach to achieving their attainment of power: “Both sides have deliberately targeted civilians through attacks, summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and inhuman treatment in detention facilities, including denial of food, sanitation, and medical care. These are not accidental tragedies but deliberate strategies amounting to war crimes” (UN Human Rights Council, September 5). Ultimately, the division of Sudan into two dysfunctional states rather than one cannot offer the Sudanese people the prospect of stability or prosperity.

Note

  1. “Special Report: No Safe Haven: Bombardment of Abu Shouk IDP Camp and El-Fasher’s Increasing Berm Encirclement,” September 11, 2025, https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/e3d32307-89f9-4573-8c87-fc7d15239a9f

 

Battle for Jabal Arkenu: Controlling the Supply Lines in Sudan’s Civil War

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AIS Special Report

June 13, 2025

Andrew McGregor

Jabal Arkenu

The year was 1923, and Egyptian explorer Hassanein Bey was on a camel-borne search for two “lost oases” in the unknown depths of the Libyan Desert. Even the South Pole had been visited less than 12 years earlier, but this corner of the south-eastern Libyan Desert remained blank on most charts despite rumors of two mountains where water could be found in an otherwise barren, burning wasteland. Hassanein Bey and his small party of desert dwellers were 111 days out from his starting point in the Libyan port of Sollum when an amazing sight appeared:

We were having a hard time of it crossing the high steep sand-dunes when suddenly mountains rose before us like medieval castles half hidden in the mist. A few minutes later the sun was on them, turning the cold gray into warm rose and pink… I had found what I came to seek. These were the mountains of Arkenu. [1]

Though Jabal Arkenu defined remote isolation at the time, Hassanein believed that “Arkenu may conceivably prove to have strategic value at some future time.” The explorer was right; only days ago the desert round Arkenu was the scene of a battle with great implications for the future of Sudan.

Hassanein Bey

The Spiral Sisters

The area around Jabal Arkenu and its larger sister mountain Jabal ‘Uwaynat (25 km south-east of Jabal Arkenu) now mark the intersection of the borders of Libya, Egypt and Sudan, with the north-eastern corner of Chad not far to the south. As such, the region is now known as the Triangle area (al-Muthalath). The region around Jabal ‘Uwaynat, once a path for the Ancient Egyptians into the African interior according to recently discovered inscriptions, has now become a pathway for smugglers, mercenaries, rebels, human traffickers and gold miners. [2] In an otherwise waterless region, the massive spiral mountains collect local rainfall in natural basins within the rocks, a fact long known to the indigenous Tubu desert dwellers who brought their camels there to graze and water.

Jabal Arkenu

The recent discovery of gold in the region has attracted artisanal gold miners who operate in the region with little regard to borders. Egypt and Libya are seeking to replace these miners with modern mining operations, while Sudan is satisfied to collect fees through the Sudanese Minerals Resources Company without providing any services (Radio Dabanga, November 8, 2024).

The Attack on the Triangle

One hundred and two years after Hassanein Bey rediscovered the lost mountain oases, war has arrived in al-Muthalath. Possession of the desert crossing that passes through the Triangle region has suddenly become a strategic imperative for Sudanese government forces (the Sudan Armed Forces – SAF) and their adversaries in Sudan’s civil war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” The latter group, once a government paramilitary before breaking with the SAF, has acquired the support of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and an Islamist militia belonging to the so-called Libyan National Army of “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar.

This militia, known as Subul al-Salam (“Ways of Peace”), crossed 3 km into Sudan near Jabal Arkenu on June 6 in support of RSF units (Sudan Tribune, June 11). The joint Libyan-RSF movement displaced the main Sudanese units controlling the border, the Central Reserve Forces (a police paramilitary) and the Darfur Joint Force (Atalyar, March 21; Sudan Tribune, March 22). The SAF presence consisted of only a small number of intelligence and security agents (Mada Masr, June 14). The Darfur Joint Force (a.k.a. Sudanese Joint Force, or Juba Peace Agreement Joint Forces) consists of rebel forces that were signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement and have since sided with the Port Sudan-based Sudan government. The main elements hail from Darfur’s powerful Zaghawa minority – the Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) and Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Some SLA fighters may be using Emirati-supplied weapons obtained when they were fighting as mercenaries on behalf of Khalifa Haftar before the signing of the Juba peace agreement (France24.com, April 20).

Fighting began on June 8. The RSF announced its takeover of the Triangle border region on June 11, claiming heavy SAF losses (AFP, June 11).  After a “defensive withdrawal” of government forces, the closest Sudanese army presence may now be 400 km from the Triangle region (Sudan Tribune, June 11).  According to the RSF, the region contains “rich natural resources, including oil, gas and minerals (Rapidsupportforce.com, June 12).

The SAF said its forces in the Triangle region were subject to a “surprise attack” by the RSF’s “terrorist militia” and Libya’s Subul al-Salam battalion (Libya Observer, June 11). Sudan’s military further declared the role of the Libyan militia was “a reprehensible and unprecedented gesture and a flagrant violation of international law… the direct intervention of Khalifa Haftar’s forces alongside the Rapid Support Forces in the war is a blatant aggression against Sudan, its land, and its people, and an extension of the international and regional conspiracy against our country…” (Darfur 24, June 10).

‘Abd al-Rahman Hasham al-Kilani

For his part, Subul al-Salam commander ‘Abd al-Rahman Hasham al-Kilani brushed over the encounter, claiming it was the result of a “misunderstanding” with the Darfur Joint Force, which believed the Libyan militia had crossed the border (Mada Masr, June 14). Haftar’s military command described allegations of participation by his forces as false and “a blatant attempt to export Sudan’s internal crisis” (Radio Dabanga, June 12).

Colombian mercenaries after their convoy was attacked in North Sudan, November 20, 2024 (La Silla Vacía)

Late last year, a battalion of at least 350 Colombian mercenaries began moving in stages from Abu Dhabi to Benghazi, through the desert to the Kufra district and then south across the border into northern Darfur using a crossing just south of the Triangle region. The mercenaries, combat-experienced veterans of the Colombian army, were recruited by Dubai-based Colonel Álvaro Quijano on the understanding they would be deployed as static defense for oil installations in the Middle East. Instead their passports were seized by Libyan soldiers in Benghazi who explained they were being sent south to fight alongside the RSF in Sudan.  Quijano, a Colombian, is an associate of a private security firm, the UAE-based Global Security Service Group. One convoy was ambushed by the Darfur Joint Force after crossing the border into Sudan, leading to the loss of three men. Once in Darfur, some of the Colombians have been sent into street-to-street fighting in the besieged North Darfur capital, al-Fashir, while others have been sent to train RSF fighters in Nyala, capital of South Darfur (La Silla Vacia [Bogota], November 26, 2024; March 2, 2025; March 3, 2025).

The Salafists of Kufra

The oasis of Kufra in south-eastern Libya, home of the Subul al-Salam brigade, was for centuries a major stage for trans-Saharan caravans and the shipment of slaves until its conquest by Italy in the 1930s. Kufra was dominated for centuries by indigenous Black semi-nomadic Tubu tribesmen until they were displaced by Zuwaya Arabs in 1840. Since the 2011 Libyan Revolution, Kufra has become an important stage for the transportation of sub-Saharan African migrants moving through the Triangle region to the Mediterranean coast, with numerous clashes occurring between the rival Zuwaya and Tubu communities (Libya Observer, March 5, 2018).

Libya

The brigade was formed by ‘Abd al-Rahman Hashim al-Kilani, a Madkhali Salafist, after Zuwaya clashes with the Tubu and their Darfuri allies in 2015. Salafism is a revivalist interpretation of Islam that believes Islam’s authentic form was found in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his first three successors (the Salaf). With the encouragement and funding of Saudi Arabia, Salafism has grown rapidly in recent decades, often displacing traditional and more flexible forms of Islam around the world. It has become associated in its most extreme form with political and religious violence (Salafi-Jihadism). Madkhalism is a form of Salafism developed by Saudi shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali that emphasizes a “quietist” approach to religion, avoiding overt political involvement while emphasizing obedience to authoritarian leaders. Madkhalism has found fertile ground in Libya, where its followers have formed powerful militias in Kufra, Tripoli and other regions. [3]

Salafists oppose Sufi approaches to Islam, rejecting their rites and rituals as bid’ah (religious innovation, i.e. practices that did not exist in the times of the Salaf). Libya has a strong Sufi tradition, with the powerful Sanusi order leading the resistance to Italian colonialism. Though Kufra was the traditional headquarters of the Sanusi Sufi order, the anti-Sufi Madkhalists destroyed the funerary shrine of Sanusi leader Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (1844-1902) and stole his remains in 2018 (Terrorism Monitor, April 6, 2018). Since then, the Madkhalist Salafis have held the upper hand in southeastern Libya.

After its formation, Subul al-Salam quickly aligned with the forces of General Khalifa al-Haftar (a leading military commander under Mu’ammar Qaddafi until his defeat by Chadian forces in the 1987 “Toyota War” and later an alleged anti-Qaddafi CIA asset after his exile to the United States), who supplied the Zuwaya fighters with 40 armored Toyota trucks (Libya Herald, October 20, 2016).

Libya is currently divided politically between two factions – the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) dominated by al-Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA – an alignment of various militias and other armed groups under al-Haftar’s command rather than a true “national army”) versus the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli. The latter controls western Libya (Tripolitania), while al-Haftar’s LNA controls the east (Cyrenaïca) and the south-west (Fezzan).

Tribal ties remain important in Libya; it is worth noting al-Haftar’s mother was from the Zuwaya, who have established a trading network from Kufra in the south to the Mediterranean coast in the north. Al-Haftar relies for weapons and other support from Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is also believed to supply weapons to the RSF. Prior to the Libyan offensive, satellite imagery revealed an increase in UAE cargo aircraft arriving at the Kufra airport, including three IL-76TD cargo planes present between May 21 and May 31 (X, June 10). After the Libyan/RSF takeover of the Triangle region, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry denounced the “dangerous escalation of the Abu Dhabi regime-sponsored external aggression against Sudan,” describing it as a “flagrant violation of international law” (Al-Monitor, June 11; Fes News, June 11). The ministry further condemned the “blatant aggression… supported by the United Arab Emirates and its militias in the region” (Radio Dabanga, June 12). Al-Haftar also has Egyptian backing and has been supported in the field by Russian military contractors, most notably in his failed 2019 campaign to take Tripoli and unite Libya under his rule.

The Subul al-Salam brigade has clashed with Sudanese fighters before, killing 13 members of the Darfuri Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2016. The members of JEM, a mainly Zaghawa rebel group, were operating as mercenaries near the oasis of Jaghbub at the time alongside a group of indigenous Black Tubu fighters.

Saddam al-Hafter – The Heir Apparent

Subul al-Salam comes under the direction of Khalifa Haftar’s son, Saddam, who is being groomed to succeed his 81-year-old father. At the same time the Russian-backed Khalifa is being supplied with heavy weapons, armored vehicles and Pantsir air defense systems by the Kremlin, Saddam has been holding quiet meetings in Washington with top state department and intelligence officials in the Trump administration (Militarnyi.com, May 26; MEE, June 12). Saddam is overseeing the Russian rehabilitation of a disused Qaddafi-era airbase (Matan al-Sarra) in southeastern Libya for use by Russia’s Africa Corps (EDM, April 17). Al-Haftar has already been accused of using Matan al-Sarra as a distribution point for arms headed to the RSF. (Sudan Tribune, June 11). When completed, Matan al-Sarra will join six other bases used by Russian forces in Haftar-controlled regions of Libya – al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, and al-Qardabiya

(MAPPR)

RSF Strategic Objectives

The RSF is looking to take the war into the Northern Province (home of the Arab-Nubian elites that have governed Sudan since independence), and notes that control of the Triangle region “is a significant step that will impact multiple combat front lines, particularly in the northern desert” (Rapidsupportforce.com, June 12). The RSF is dominated by Sudan’s western Arabs (residents of Kordofan and Darfur) who have been rivals of the more politically and economically successful northern Arabs since the days of the Mahdiyya (1881-1899).

As a step towards consolidating control of northern Sudan and supply lines from southern Libya, the RSF took al-Malha (a Meidobi town 210 km northeast of al-Fashir) in March, killing 40 people and burning down the market after looting it. Al-Malha connects northeast to the strategic Nile town of al-Dabba in Northern State via the Wadi al-Milk and east to the town of Hamrat al-Shaykh in North Kordofan, which the RSF hopes to incorporate into a new state together with Darfur, one independent of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government and the SAF in the temporary Sudanese capital in Port Sudan.

The RSF is increasingly concerned that it may lose its most important supply line for UAE arms and military materiel, which runs from an Emirati-built airbase in Um Jaras (or Amjarass, Ennedi province) east into West Darfur. SAF commander and TSC chairman General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan has demanded that Chad dismantle the Um Jaras base and close Chad’s border with Darfur to RSF-destined logistical convoys. Chad’s ruler, Mahamat Idris Déby Itno, like many of Chad’s ruling elite, is a member of the Zaghawa ethnic group, which straddles the Chad-Sudan border. However, the Darfur Zaghawa oppose the Arab-dominated RSF and sent a delegation of elders in February to meet with President Déby to urge an end to Chadian accommodation of the RSF (Mada Masr, March 7). Should Chad’s leadership decide to back away from the RSF, the establishment of a secure alternative supply route for UAE arms and supplies through Libya to northern Sudan will become imperative.

Notes

  1. AM Hassanein Bey: The Lost Oases, New York and London, 1925, pp. 210-217.
  2. Andrew McGregor, “Egyptian exploration of the African interior – Caravans to Yam,” Ancient History Magazine 15, April/May 2017, pp. 38-45. For Jabal ‘Uwaynat, see: “Jabal ‘Uwaynat: Mysterious Desert Mountain Becomes a Three-Border Security Flashpoint,” AIS Special Report, June 13, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=3930
  3. Andrew McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis: A Profile of Salafist Shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=5244

Drone Attacks on Port Sudan Jeopardize Plan for Russian Red Sea Naval Base

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Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 22, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC.

Andrew McGregor

May 28, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Russia’s plans to create a naval base on the Sudanese coast of the Red Sea have been upset by drone attacks launched on Port Sudan in early May. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces claimed responsibility for the attack.
  • The destruction of Port Sudan’s infrastructure demonstrates that Sudan’s domestic instability would threaten a Russian base, potentially jeopardizing a broader arms-for-access agreement that included Sudan’s acquisition of Russian warplanes.
  • Sudan accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of supplying the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones used in the attack. The UAE and the PRC may be acting to curb Russia’s naval ambitions.

Fuel depot in Port Sudan burns after drone attack, May 5, 2025 (Xinhua).

Russia’s hope of establishing a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast took a serious blow when drones shattered infrastructure at its proposed site from May 4 to 8 (Sudan Tribune, May 7, 9). The week-long drone attack, believed to have been carried out by Sudan’s rebel paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), exposed the vulnerability of the port’s proposed site to damage related to domestic instability. The alleged involvement of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the supplier of the RSF’s People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones complicates the international implications of the devastating attack.

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, May 6, 2025 (Sudan Tribune)

Following the destruction of the Khartoum/Omdurman capital region and its industrial base early in Sudan’s civil war in 2023, Port Sudan has acted as the political and military headquarters of the Sudanese state. Port Sudan operates under the unelected Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and its dominant partner, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), commanded by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan. Both the RSF and the UAE reject what they refer to as “the Port Sudan Authority” as the legitimate government of Sudan (Mada Masr, May 9). The city hosts Sudan’s most important port, its last functioning civil airport, a naval base, and a military airport. Crude oil from Sudan and South Sudan is exported from Port Sudan, and refined petroleum products for domestic use are stored there. It is the only delivery point for desperately needed aid and relief supplies in the war-ravaged nation.

Smoke billowed from the Sudanese Navy’s base at Flamingo Bay, 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) north of Port Sudan’s commercial port, after being struck by drones for five successive days in early May (Sudan Tribune, May 7, 9). Satellite imagery published by Russian site Insider.ru revealed what appeared to be large-scale destruction at the base (Insider.ru, May 13). Flamingo Bay is the proposed site for the new Russian naval base (AIS, March 24, 2022; see EDM, July 8, 2024, March 6, April 30; New Arab, May 8).

Flamingo Bay naval facility, north of Port Sudan (GoogleEarth)

The destruction of oil depots at Port Sudan has created immediate fuel shortages and rising prices in government-held territory. The port is suffering from shortages of food and clean water, blackouts, and looting by desperate citizens (Radio Dabanga, May 8). Thousands have fled the city as civil authorities warn of an environmental and health disaster (Sudan Tribune, May 6; Mada Masr, May 9). Drones also struck radar installations, warehouses, and munitions stores at Osman Digna Air Base in Port Sudan, causing a series of explosions (Sudan TV, May 5). The strikes halted civilian air traffic, including humanitarian aid flights, by causing heavy damage at the adjacent Port Sudan International Airport (Sudan Tribune, May 7; Radio Dabanga, May 8). Other targets included General al-Burhan’s residence and the Marina Hotel, which often houses foreign diplomats (Mada Masr, May 9). Swarms of drones struck the historic Red Sea port of Suakin, some 50 kilometers (31 miles) south of Port Sudan, and the eastern city of Kassala on May 4 to 6 (Xinhua, May 6). Qatar, the UAE’s regional rival, is redeveloping Suakin in a $4 billion project.

Osman Digna military airport in flames, May 4, 2025

As the attacks continued, Moscow expressed “deep concern over the ongoing bloody armed confrontation” in Sudan (TASS, May 5). Despite three years of Russian attacks on civilian targets and infrastructure in Ukraine, the Kremlin statement added that “Russia believes that carrying out attacks on civilian infrastructure is unacceptable” (TASS, May 5). The Russian embassy in Sudan reported operations at its temporary embassy in Port Sudan were unaffected by the bombing, saying that “the situation is tense, naturally, but not critical” (RIA Novosti, May 6).

Other than drones, the RSF does not have aerial assets or personnel operating closer to Port Sudan than Omdurman, 670 kilometers (416 miles) away. The attack’s precise targeting suggests that the RSF obtained or was given accurate coordinates by means normally unavailable to the technologically weak paramilitary. The operational range of the PRC-made Sunflower-200 one-way attack drones, which military analysts believe the RSF used, is 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers (932 to 1,242 miles), with a 30- to 40-kilogram payload (Defense Express, May 6; Cobtec International, accessed May 21). The UAE obtained the Sunflower-200 in January 2024 (Janes, January 25, 2024).

Sunflower-200 Drone (Cobtec)

The commander of the Red Sea military region and the Sudanese Navy, Lieutenant General Mahjub Bushra, claimed that drones were launched from UAE military facilities at Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland (Sudan TV, May 5). Puntland’s Minister of Information, Mahmoud Aydid Dirir, described the accusation that the UAE operated missiles from Bosaso as part of “a broader effort to undermine Puntland’s reputation and its ongoing fight against terrorism” (Mogadishu24, May 8).

SAF intelligence presented another scenario, suggesting the drones may have entered RSF-controlled regions of Sudan via the Libyan desert, past remote Jabal ‘Uwaynat (where Libya, Sudan, and Egypt meet) and into Darfur to be distributed to strategic launch points further east (AIS, June 13, 2017; France24.com, April 19; Mada Masr, May 9). Another possible route for the RSF to obtain the drones would be through the Amdjarass airstrip in Chad, close to RSF-held territory in Sudan. UAE transport aircraft make regular trips to Amdjarass. Many of the flights are believed to be delivering arms, though the UAE claims they deliver only humanitarian supplies (Reuters, December 12, 2024; Africa Defense Forum, January 7).

Sudan cut off diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi on May 6 because of their alleged involvement in the attacks, denouncing it for “state terrorism” while threatening retaliation (Middle East Eye; Sudan Tribune, May 8; Mada Masr, May 9). RSF sources confirmed the paramilitary’s responsibility for the strikes on Port Sudan, Kassala, and oil depots in Kosti (White Nile Province) as part of a plan to take the war to Port Sudan and the relatively untouched north of Sudan (Mada Masr, May 9).

An indefinite delay in the construction of a Russian naval facility at Port Sudan due to the attacks will likely jeopardize the Sudanese state’s planned acquisition of Russian warplanes, such as the Su-30 and Su-35, in exchange for the use of the port. The potential loss of Russian interest in Sudan could work in the PRC’s interest. Even though PRC-made drones caused the damage to Port Sudan, the Sudanese state (TSC/SAF) has only blamed the intermediary supplier, the UAE. If Russia backs off from the port deal and its reciprocal arms supplies, Beijing may be able to step in to make arrangements with the Sudanese state (TSC/SAF).

The PRC is obliged, as a signatory to the United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty, to prevent the UAE from selling PRC arms to a banned entity such as the RSF. It seems improbable that the PRC is unaware of how the UAE disposes of its hi-tech military imports. This raises the question of whether the UAE is mediating the transfer of PRC drones through established supply networks to the RSF to deter the expansion of Russian influence and facilities in Africa. The PRC has its own ambitions in Africa, as well as a naval base in Djibouti at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

It is uncertain whether Russia has supplied Sudan with advanced air defense systems. Sudanese Major General Mutasim ‘Abd al-Qadir indicated that Russia has discretely supplied defense systems, while Sudanese intelligence sources indicate that Sudan turned down a Russian offer to deploy a S-400 air defense system at Port Sudan due to fears of negative U.S. and European reactions (Mada Masr, May 9; Insider.ru, May 13). Advanced air defense systems would be essential for the existence of a Russian base at Port Sudan, but would also raise issues regarding the touchy issue of Sudanese sovereignty.

The UAE has taken advantage of Russian naval base troubles. After the post-Assad government of Syria canceled 2019’s 49-year agreement with Russia’s Stroynasgas to manage the port of Tartus, the UAE’s DP World signed a memorandum of agreement to take over management of the port on May 16 with a projected $800 million investment (TASS, January 21; SANA, May 16). The Russian facility at Port Sudan was intended in part to replace the loss of Tartus. As the feasibility of establishing a Russian base in the Red Sea begins to diminish under the weight of domestic insecurity and foreign intervention, Moscow may intensify discussions to create an alternative naval base at the Libyan port of Tobruk.

Credibility of Russia’s Red Sea Naval Facility Agreement with Sudan

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Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 22, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Moscow is pursuing the construction of a naval port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, reflected in the finalization of an agreement between Russia and Sudan in February.
  • The deal appears to be part of the Kremlin’s efforts to create new strategic assets in Africa following the loss of air and naval bases in Syria.
  • The elected government of Sudan’s inability to ratify the agreement reflects the salience of domestic and international opposition to a changed security situation on this vital maritime trade route.

Russia and the leading faction in Sudan’s ongoing civil war have reportedly finalized an agreement to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast. Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, there may be no more strategically important body of water in the world than the Red Sea. Access to the sea, which carries 10 to 12 percent of global trade on its waters, is gained only through the Egyptian-controlled canal to the north and the narrow Bab al-Mandab strait to the south (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed March 4). So far, no state outside of the region has established a naval base between the canal and Bab al-Mandab since the departure of the British from Sudan’s primary Red Sea port, Port Sudan, in 1956. That appeared to change on February 12 with the announcement that an agreement had been reached to construct a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.

The announcement was made by Dr. ‘Ali Yusuf Sharif, appointed in November 2024 as nominal foreign minister by Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, whose faction controls most of Sudan. During a televised press conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, Sharif said “This is an easy question, there are no obstacles, we are in complete agreement” (Izvestiya, February 12; Al Arabiya; Atalayar, February 13). After the meeting, Lavrov expressed his appreciation for the “balanced and constructive position” taken by Sudan on the situation in Ukraine (TASS, February 12). There has been no confirmation from Moscow of the official signing of this deal.

‘Ali Yusuf Sharif and Sergei Lavrov

Since 2017, Moscow and Khartoum, represented by the since-deposed Sudanese president, ‘Omar al-Bashir, have discussed the creation of a Russian naval base in Sudan (See EDM, December 6, 2017). A preliminary agreement, forming the basis for the current pact, was developed in 2020 but never implemented. This original agreement includes a 25-year lease with a possible ten-year extension (Uz Daily, November 15, 2020).

Moscow holds a vested interest in establishing a naval base in this region, especially as the future of its naval base in Tartus, Syria remains uncertain (Military Review, December 11, 2024; Izvestiya, January 22). The primary function of Russia’s new “logistical base,” as it is described by Moscow, is to repair and replenish up to four Russian naval craft at a time, including nuclear-powered vessels. The base will house up to 300 personnel, with an option to increase this number with Sudan’s permission (TASS, February 12; Sudan Tribune, February 12). Russia will be responsible for air defense and internal security, while Sudan will provide external security in tandem with temporary Russian defensive positions outside the base. Russia will be at liberty to import and export weapons, munitions, and military material to and from the base (Vreme, February 13).

Sukhoi Su—25 Aircraft (Military Africa)

The completion of the deal may open the possibility for Sudan to purchase Russian-built SU-30 and SU-35 fighter jets, which it has sought since 2017 (Sudan Tribune, July 16, 2024). The sale has been complicated by an inability to finalize the port offer, U.S. sanctions on Russian manufacturers, and Sudan’s difficulty in making payments. Oil-rich Algeria, by comparison, has just completed a deal to obtain 14 fifth-generation Russian SU-57 stealth fighters (Janes.com, February 14).

Cooperation with Russia is also attractive to Sudan given Khartoum’s need to secure oil exports on its coast. Port Sudan serves as the export point for Sudan’s troubled oil industry, now operating at only slightly more than 40 percent of pre-war production. Sudan’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MOP) is currently discussing a new partnership with Russia related to exploration, financing, and technical assistance (Sudan Tribune, January 25). In November 2024, MOP Minister Dr. Muhyaddin Na’im Muhammad Sa’id met with his Russian counterpart in Moscow to discuss prospects for joint projects and attractive areas for Russian companies to invest in oil and gas exploration (Sudan News Agency, November 16, 2024). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formerly Sudan’s main energy partner. According to one Sudanese economic expert, “the [civil] war has changed this equation” in favor of gaining expertise, especially related to oil extraction, from Russia (Sudan Tribune, January 25).

Sudan Began to Run Out of Fuel, Medicines and Wheat When Beja Protests Closed Port Sudan in 2021 (AFP)

For Russia, there is a risk in initiating the construction of an expensive naval facility during a period of continued instability in Sudan. There is also the question of overland supply from Khartoum to Port Sudan, which essentially follows a single highway that has been blocked in the past by Beja protestors (New Arab, October 27, 2021; see EDM, November 14, 2023). To mitigate such risks, Sudan appears to be trying to follow the “Djibouti approach” to hosting foreign military bases. Djibouti currently hosts separate French, Chinese, U.S., Italian, and Japanese military facilities while U.K. forces are hosted at the U.S. facility (see EDM, July 8, 2024). According to Sharif, the new Russian base in Sudan, like those in Djibouti, will not pose a threat to the sovereignty of its neighbors nor Sudan itself (Anadolu Ajansi, February 13).

There are, however, major and ongoing differences between the military and civil components of the de facto government in Port Sudan that could sideline Russian ambitions in the Red Sea. Sharif’s claim that there were “no obstacles” to implementing the agreement is not necessarily correct. There is broad opposition to the unelected leaders of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) making a deal with major implications for Sudanese sovereignty (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, 2023). As the deal cannot presently be ratified by any elected body in Sudan, there is a strong possibility that a future government (elected or otherwise) might reject the deal entirely as having no legal legitimacy. The January 20 cancellation of Russia’s 2017 49-year lease on the port of Tartus by the new Syrian regime provides an exemplary lesson on such a danger (Maritime Executive, January 21).

Another approach the Sudanese leadership may use to mitigate security risks, and in turn, may increase Russia’s attraction to creating a naval base in the country, is via deliberate changes in government representation. The de facto leader of Sudan is Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, chair of the unelected Transitional Sovereignty Council and commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Al-Burhan’s government is now located in Port Sudan rather than war-torn Khartoum. Al-Burhan differs from previous leaders, as he has attempted to garner support from eastern Sudan, a traditionally impoverished area with little influence or representation in the central government. Most of the rebellions, coups, and civil conflicts that have plagued Sudan since independence and effectively prevented its successful development have been sparked by the inequality, domination, and monopolization of power. Since eastern Sudan has been dominated since independence by the Arab Nubian elites of northern and central Sudan, al-Burhan’s emphasis on involving eastern Sudan in his government represents a measure to prevent future coups or conflict. One of the figures who will likely be involved in establishing a Russian naval base in Sudan is ‘Umar Banfir, the new trade minister. Banfir is the former director of Sudan’s Sea Ports Authority and is expected to represent eastern interests to the government (Jordan Times, November 4, 2024).

Sanctions imposed by the United States on the SAF and al-Burhan personally in the last days of the Biden Administration appear correlated with al-Burhan’s renewed interest in securing the naval base deal with Russia (US Treasury Department, October 24, 2024; US Department of State, January 16; US Treasury Department, January 25).

Meanwhile, there is little evidence to suggest that the new Trump administration will impose additional sanctions or attempt to restrict Sudan’s pursuit of a new deal with Russia given the previous removal of sanctions under the first Trump administration (Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2017). Nearby Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain firmly opposed to the deal (Sudan Tribune, July 16, 2024).

Domestic political opposition, foreign objections, tribal unrest, and local fears that a Russian base might attract attacks from rivals, which in turn could damage or shut down Sudan’s most important port, remain considerable threats to the construction of a Russian naval facility in Port Sudan. These considerations also threaten Russian attempts to reinvigorate Sudan’s oil production, which has been declining for years due to a lack of investment and civil conflict. While the Russian naval base deal in Sudan holds strategic potential for Moscow, its success hinges on overcoming these political, domestic, and regional challenges.

Iran’s Red Sea Strategy Amid the RSF–SAF Fratricidal War in Sudan

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 22(11), Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

December 11, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • Iran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with drones and other weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” This has given rise to concerns that Tehran desires to establish a naval facility in Sudan.
  • In combination with the Iran-friendly Houthi movement in Yemen, such a base would offer a point from which Iran could further threaten Red Sea shipping as well as the main maritime entry point for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.
  • Iran–Sudan relations have fluctuated over the last several decades, especially since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir. In particular, tensions stemming from Sudan’s Sunni-majority population and Iran’s promotion of Shi’ism tend to place a limit on Tehran–Khartoum ties.
  • Despite official denials, Iran is suspected of either attempting to establish a naval facility on Sudan’s Red Sea coast or gain access to preexisting ports there given the strategic advantages offered by doing so. Doing so may represent a bridge too far for U.S.–Sudan relations, which Khartoum has spent years working to improve.

A supporter of the Palestinian cause since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has adopted an aggressive stance in response to Israel’s offensive on Gaza. As part of a strategy to assert itself regionally, Tehran has taken advantage of its proximity to the Red Sea, one of the world’s most important trade conduits, to apply pressure on Israel and its Western backers. With the Iran-friendly Houthi movement in Yemen installed near the narrow Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, Iran is taking a new interest in Sudan and its 465-mile Red Sea coastline. To this end, Tehran is supplying the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan with potentially game-changing weaponry in its struggle against the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” This raises two questions: What does Tehran want in return? And is it likely to get it?

Sudan’s Relations with Iran

In the 1990s, Iran enjoyed a close relationship with the Islamist military regime of President Omar al-Bashir. He welcomed Iranian technical and diplomatic support in his effort to create a more Islamic state and defeat South Sudanese separatists. Many of the Islamists who were ejected from power after al-Bashir’s overthrow in 2019 now support General al-Burhan’s SAF.

Relations with Iran were cut in January 2016 when Khartoum sided with Saudi Arabia after a mob attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran in reaction to the execution of top Saudi Shi’ite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr and 46 others on January 2, 2016 (Press TV [Tehran], February 5). Al-Bashir’s government then turned to Iran’s Arab rivals in the Gulf states for support. During this time, Sudanese troops (mostly RSF) fought alongside Saudi forces against the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen.

Sudanese Troops in Yemen (AFP)

The centuries-old Sunni–Shi’ite religious divide complicates relations between Sunni Sudan and Shi’ite Iran. After al-Bashir downgraded relations with Iran in 2014, he made it clear the move was made in reaction to alleged attempts by Iranian diplomats to spread Shi’ism in Sudan: “We do not know Shi’ite Islam. We are Sunnis. We have enough problems and conflicts and we do not accept introducing a new element of conflict in Sudanese society” (Sudan Tribune, January 31, 2016).

A March 2023 Saudi–Iranian rapprochement brokered by Beijing allowed Khartoum to make its own move to renew relations with Tehran. The shift was welcomed at the time by Hemetti, who had risen from a minor member of the notorious Janjaweed militia to commander of the RSF paramilitary (X/@Generaldagllo, March 10, 2023). When the renewal of diplomatic relations was made official in October 2023, one of Tehran’s most immediate concerns was Sudan’s growing relationship with Israel through the U.S.-backed Abraham Accords (Sudan Tribune, October 9, 2023).

The Israel Issue in Sudan–Iran Relations

‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali, Sudan’s acting minister of foreign affairs, met Iran’s late president, Ebrahim Raisi, in Tehran on February 5 to discuss their countries’ improved relationship. During the meeting, Raisi emphasized that the “criminal Zionist regime” could never be a friend to Islamic countries. Without mentioning Sudan by name, he condemned those Islamic nations that chose to pursue normalization of relations with Israel (Mehr News [Tehran], February 5).

Sudanese Foreign Minister ‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali (Osman Bakır – Anadolu Agency)

Following a law implemented in 1958, Sudanese leaders were forbidden from normalizing relations with Israel. The upheavals that followed the overthrow of President al-Bashir in 2019 provided an opening for the United States to bring Sudan into the Abraham Accords in exchange for a long-desired removal of American sanctions on Sudan. A member of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council, Admiral Ibrahim Jaber, rejected suggestions that relations with Iran spelled an end to the Accord, claiming that renewed relations with Iran would not affect diplomatic normalization with Israel: “We will pursue normalization when it benefits us and refrain from it otherwise” (Sudan Tribune, March 24).

On February 2, 2023, Sudan and Israel finalized a deal to normalize relations. Israel hoped the deal would facilitate the deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers, but the outbreak of hostilities in Sudan in mid-April 2023 put further developments in this area on hold (Haaretz, February 3, 2020). If Sudan grows closer to Iran, its commitment to the Abraham Accords—which were half-hearted at best, even before the Gaza offensive—is likely to wither on the vine.

Iran and al-Burhan

Iran’s support for al-Burhan and the SAF is assisted by the Sudanese army’s solidly Islamist officer corps (the result of repeated purges) and the backing of Islamist militias and leaders from the al-Bashir regime connected to the SAF. Despite the Sunni–Shi’a divide, Sudan’s Islamists have a long record of cooperation with Tehran. These ties in the past included Iranian military training for Sudan’s Popular Defense Forces. [1]

In return for arms, Iran will likely demand that Sudan cut its already damaged ties with Israel and abandon the Abraham Accords entirely. Israel has a long history of encouraging and arming conflicts within Sudan as a response to the opposition of successive regimes in Khartoum. In this tradition, acting foreign minister ‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali blamed Israel for encouraging the RSF during a January visit to Tehran (Press TV [Tehran], January 20). Sudanese officials have also suggested that Washington step in to halt the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) military support for the RSF before criticizing the SAF’s ties to Iran (Sudan Tribune, February 3).

Though relations between the UAE and Iran have shown signs of improvement over the last year, the issue of Sudan remains a point of contention, with the UAE being accused of providing weapons and financial support to the RSF. [2]

Iranian Drones and the Resurgence of the SAF

Wad al-Bashir Bridge, Omdurman (Sudan Tribune)

In March, coordinated tactics using drones, artillery, and infantry enabled the SAF to retake the old city area of Omdurman, the national radio and television headquarters, and the Wad al-Bashir Bridge, which is a vital supply link for the RSF. The success of this offensive is believed to be partly due to the arrival of modern Iranian drones (Al Jazeera, March 12; Radio Dabanga, March 17). The drones, which are also used to direct artillery strikes, operate out of the Wadi Sayidna base north of Omdurman. The RSF claims that the SAF receives air deliveries of Iranian drones twice a week out of Port Sudan (Reuters, April 10).

Iran began supplying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Sudan in 2008. This allowed the SAF to build a small arsenal of Ababil-3 drones, which have capabilities useful in the type of urban warfare common to the ongoing Sudanese conflict. Sudan also produces its own copy of the Ababil-3, known as the Zagil-3. Iranian Mohajer-class drones are also used by the SAF, with the latest in the series, the Mohajer-6, providing game-changing capabilities, including an arms payload of up to 150 kg (Military Africa, April 20, 2023).

Sudanese Zagil-3 Drone – variant of the Iranian Ababil-3 (Skyscrapercity.com)

First produced in 2018, the Mohajer-6 has a relatively low ceiling of 3.4 miles, which makes it vulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses. The drone has seen extensive use by Russia in its latest war against Ukraine. In mid-January, the RSF claimed to have shot down a Mohajer-6 drone in Khartoum State using a man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) (Military Africa, January 15). The RSF released photos of another downed Mohajer-6 in Omdurman on January 28 (X/@RSFSudan, January 28; Asharq al-Awsat, January 29; Radio Dabanga, January 29). Despite these public losses, the new Iranian drones have played an important role in restoring the SAF’s military credibility.

A Red Sea Port for Iran

Citing Ahmad Hassan Muhammad, “a senior Sudanese intelligence official” and alleged advisor to General al-Burhan, the Wall Street Journal reported on March 3 that Iran had unsuccessfully pressed Sudan for permission to establish an Iranian naval port on the Red Sea in exchange for advanced weapons, drones, and a seagoing helicopter carrier (Wall Street Journal, March 3). Former Sudanese foreign minister ‘Ali al-Sadiq ‘Ali responded quickly and described the report as “incorrect,” saying “Iran has never asked Sudan to build an Iranian base. I recently visited Iran, and this was not discussed” (Sputnik [Moscow], March 4).

Other sources in Sudanese military intelligence suggested such an offer was likely never made, and its disclosure may have been a means for al-Burhan to express dissatisfaction with the lack of support the SAF has received from the international community (Asharq al-Awsat, March 4). An Iranian foreign ministry spokesman described the report as “baseless and politically motivated” (Radio Dabanga, March 5). SAF spokesman Brigadier General Nabil ‘Abd Allah refuted the claim as “absolutely untrue” and denied there was any advisor to al-Burhan bearing the name Ahmad Hassan Muhammad (Sudan Tribune, March 4).

Iranian Frigate IRIS Alborz

Despite the strong denials, it would be odd if Iran had not brought up the possibility of using a port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast behind closed doors, even if Iran had not asked to build a military base. An Iranian military base or port access on the western coast of the Red Sea—combined with Iran-friendly Houthis on the eastern side of the Red Sea—would make it easier for Tehran to have an armed presence along one of the world’s most important maritime routes. Iran has also recently operated three ships in and around the Red Sea. The first, operating in the Red Sea, is the IRIS Alborz, an Alvand-class British-built frigate launched in 1969 that has since been modernized. It is accompanied by the IRIS Beshehr, a Bandar Abbas-class replenishment vessel. The third is the MV Behshad, a cargo vessel believed to operate as a spy ship for Iran in the Gulf of Aden since 2021. The Behshad was alleged to have supplied information to Houthi missile groups from the Gulf of Aden but appears to have returned to Iran in April, simultaneous with a severe drop in Houthi missile attacks (Radio Dabanga, March 5; Alma Research and Education Center [Israel], April 24).

An Iranian presence would be discouraged by Egypt, which backs the SAF and has four naval ports of its own on the Red Sea. Russia, which has long sought a naval base on Sudan’s coast, would no doubt be displeased to see its Iranian ally take precedence. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran remain tense, and the Saudis would not be happy to see an Iranian naval base opposite its port of Jeddah, the main maritime entry point for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Sudan has its own concerns. As with a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, an Iranian base could attract unwanted military attention from other powers. Sudan cannot afford to have its only modern sea-based port and main inlet for trade damaged or destroyed through military action. The United States, believed to have carried out a crippling cyber-attack on the Behshad in February, would be almost certain to reimpose sanctions on Sudan should it provide a naval port to Iran.

Conclusion

Though its need for military support against the RSF is serious, Sudan’s government is likely to take a measured approach toward improving its relations with Iran. The SAF has no more public support than the RSF and is seen by many Sudanese as too deeply involved with the Islamists who wielded power in Sudan during the three decades of Omar al-Bashir’s unpopular regime. Sudan’s Islamists, proud Sunnis who are tightly tied to the transitional government, are poor candidates to become puppets of Shi’ite Iran. Sudan’s army (commanded by Sunni Islamists) is also unlikely to commit itself militarily to the pursuit of Iranian objectives. There is, of course, the possibility of an RSF victory in the ongoing struggle, but for now, the RSF has no presence in eastern Sudan and no ties to Iran.

Sudan has no interest in seeing damaging U.S. sanctions restored after spending years trying to convince Washington it is not a state sponsor of terrorism. Once the current conflict ends, Sudan will need help, not hindrance, in its reconstruction, and will need to look further than Iran for assistance. All these factors speak against the establishment of an Iranian naval facility in Sudan or a formal alliance. If, however, Iranian assistance brings about an SAF triumph, Tehran is certain to come calling for payment in some form.

Notes:

[1] Jago Salmon: A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2007, pp.17-18.

[2] Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, S/2024/65, January 15, 2024, pp. 14–15, 51–52.

Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

July 8, 2024

Executive Summary:

  • The Kremlin has reconsidered its support for the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, throwing more weight behind the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Transitional Sovereignty Council.
  • The move serves to align Moscow’s position more closely with that of Iran, seeks to dampen the SAF’s cooperation with Ukraine, and highlights the ongoing interest in establishing a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.
  • Should Russia possess naval bases in both Libya and Sudan, it will have an opportunity to establish supply lines into the landlocked nations of the African interior that now host units of Moscow’s Africa Corps.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” (Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service)

The Kremlin is backing away from its support of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s ongoing internal war. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed Moscow’s gradual shift on April 29 during a visit to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, April 29). Russia once saw RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” as vital to establishing a Russian port on the Red Sea in Port Sudan (see EDM, November 14, 2023). The situation has since changed. Before his death, notorious Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin worked closely with the RSF, supplying arms in return for gold (see Terrorism Monitor, December 15, 2023). Simultaneously, however, the Kremlin maintained open channels with their opposition, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government. Moscow is now exploiting these openings.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov

Supporting the SAF and TSC, with control over Port Sudan, aligns Russian policy with Iran’s. For its part, Tehran has been supplying advanced drones to the SAF. The switch also helps sever the SAF’s relationship with Ukraine, which has been supplying drones and special forces assistance to General Abdel al-Fatah al-Burhan’s SAF since the summer of 2023 (Kyiv Independent, September 20, 2023; see EDM, November 14, 2023).

Bogdanov confirmed the Kremlin’s shift during his two-day visit to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, April 29). His military-heavy delegation offered Sudan “unrestricted qualitative military aid” while disapproving of Sudan’s military cooperation with Ukraine (Sudan Tribune, April 30). Bogdanov later clarified that Russia recognizes the TSC as the legitimate representative of the Sudanese people (Al-Mayadeen, May 31). The Russian official had met with Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Ali Bagheri Kani two days earlier in an apparent effort to align the Kremlin’s new approach with that of Tehran (Nour News, April 25).

Ukrainian Timur Unit Leaders

Some reports have claimed that operatives of the “Timur” unit of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) have been active in Sudan. While the leader of the unit neither confirms nor denies their presence, he declared, “Wherever there are soldiers, officers, or persons engaged by the special services of the Russian Federation, we catch up with them” (Ukrainska Pravda, February 13; New Arab, February 26). Ukrainian sources have reported months-long operations carried out in Sudan by Ukrainian special forces against “Russian mercenaries and their local terrorist partners” (Kyiv Post, January 30). Sources suggested that, during Bogdanov’s April visit, Sudan pledged to abandon military cooperation with the Ukrainians, while Russia agreed likewise to halt assistance to the RSF (Mada Madr, June 7).  The RSF has steadily become reliant on support from the United Arab Emirates in the face of diminishing Russian supplies since Prigozhin’s death.

Kyiv likely sought to interrupt the RSF-assisted flow of Sudanese gold that was helping Russia overcome international sanctions. In changing support from the RSF to the SAF, Moscow would temporarily forgo the gold shipments that have helped the Russian economy. The diminishing size of these shipments due to Sudan’s conflict, however, removes much of Russia’s incentive to continue supporting the RSF. Meanwhile, the Libyan port of Tobruk is effectively becoming a Russian naval base (see EDM, March 12). Should Russia possess naval bases in both Libya and Sudan, it will have an opportunity to establish supply lines into the landlocked nations of the African interior that now host units of Moscow’s Africa Corps.

Moscow is eager to implement a 2019 deal with Sudan to establish a Russian Red Sea naval base near Port Sudan capable of accommodating up to four ships at a time, including those with a nuclear power plant. Progress has been halted, however, due to the ongoing absence of a parliament or other legislative body in Sudan capable of ratifying the agreement (Military Review, February 13).

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan (left) with General Yasir al-Atta (Sudans Post)

On May 25, Yasir al-Atta, a member of the Sovereignty Council and deputy commander of the army, declared that the TSC was ready to approve the deal, though the port was no longer described as a naval base. He stated, “Russia proposed military cooperation through a logistics supply center, not a full military base, in exchange for urgent supplies of weapons and ammunition” (Radio Dabanga, May 29; Mada Madr, June 7). While Atta said a partnership agreement with Russia was expected soon, he stressed that Sudan was open to similar agreements with countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Riyadh, which opposes the Russian port, has offered greater investment in Sudan if it drops the deal (Sudan Tribune, May 25).

Port Sudan – Red Sea Gateway to Africa

The Sudanese ambassador to Russia has assured Moscow that Sudan is not backing away from its commitment to construct a Russian naval base. Yet, Bogdanov confirmed on June 12 that while discussions on the port continued, “there are no firm agreements at this time” (Sputnik, June 1; Sudan Tribune, June 12). Many civilian leaders in Sudan question the TSC and the SAF’s right to implement an agreement with sovereignty implications. They also fear that the arrival of Russian military aid might only prolong the devastating conflict (Mada Madr, June 7).

Sudan may be looking to the Djibouti for-profit model of hosting naval bases for various countries. Jibril Ibrahim, Sudan’s finance minister (also the leader of Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement, now allied to the SAF), recently characterized the proposed Russian facility as “not a large base, but rather a service center for Russian ships to obtain supplies.” He added that Sudan’s Red Sea coast could “accommodate everyone if the United States wants to buy a similar port” (Asharq al-Awsat, June 8).  

Transitional Sovereignty Council leaders in Port Sudan may be using the extended negotiations with the Kremlin as a means of focusing Western attention on the conflict and the need to interrupt the supply of weapons and personnel to the RSF. Sudan routinely says its cooperation with Russia and Iran is unavoidable without Western support (Sudan Tribune, May 3). Otherwise, the degree of military cooperation between Sudan and Russia will depend greatly on how badly the politicians and generals in Port Sudan seek potentially game-changing Russian arms.

 

Drones Over the Nile: Unmanned Aerial Warfare and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report on Sudan

June 24, 2024

The growing importance of drones in modern warfare has been amply demonstrated in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though both states still possess manned military aircraft. In Africa, drones have been used extensively in the struggle between Libya’s rival governments, but the first broad use of drones by a “rebel” movement is taking place in Sudan. There, drones are in steady use by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a former state paramilitary that launched attacks on government institutions and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on April 15, 2023. Only days after the conflict began, the SAF and other state security institutions declared the RSF “a rebel entity” that was fighting the state and ordered its dissolution (Al-Jazeera, April 17, 2023). [1]

Both the RSF and SAF have used drones for surveillance and offensive purposes since the beginning of the conflict. The SAF is now receiving shipments of advanced Iranian drones, while the RSF relies on shipments of drones and other weapons from the anti-Iran, anti-Islamist United Arab Emirates (UAE). Sudan recalled its ambassador to Chad on June 25 over allegations that Chad is allowing the UAE to ferry military supplies to the RSF through its airports. The import of drones to Sudan violates a 2005 UN Security Council resolution that bans the supply of weapons to the Sudanese government and armed groups in Darfur.

Omdurman Market (Sky News)

The precision-guided munitions of Iranian Mohajer-6 drones played a decisive factor in the SAF’s March offensive that retook old Omdurman and the National Radio and Television Corporation from the RSF (Radio Dabanga, March 17, 2024). The Mohajer-6 UAVs are, however, vulnerable to the RSF’s limited anti-aircraft weapons, mostly man-portable (MANPAD) systems that are less effective against small “suicide” drones. Earlier this year, RSF forces in Omdurman released photos of a downed Iranian Mohajer-6 drone operated by the SAF and “its extremist backers from the former regime” (a reference to Islamist groups formerly allied to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir). The RSF claimed it was the third such SAF drone to have been brought down (Radio Dabanga, January 29, 2024).

Captured RSF Quadcopter Drone

The SAF began using FPV (first-person view) quadcopter loitering munitions (a.k.a. “suicide” drones) in September 2023. With an ability to hover for long periods before the user finds a target and drives the drone and its warhead into it, loitering munitions provide a cheap and useful tool in urban warfare of the type being practiced in Khartoum and Omdurman. Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation produces its own Kamin-25 loitering munitions (Military Africa, September 15, 2023).

The SAF uses several Chinese drone types, most notably the Rainbow CH-3 (used for reconnaissance, surveillance and attacks) and the enhanced Rainbow CH-4, which uses precision-guided munitions and has a range of up to 5,000 km (Military Africa, April 20, 2023). Most SAF drones operate out of Wadi Sayidna airbase north of Omdurman. On June 7, SAF air defense systems shot down two drones targeting the base (Radio Dabanga, June 7, 2024; Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024). SAF-held airbases are a common target of RSF drones.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones

The RSF also operates Chinese-made Sunflower-200 “suicide drones,” an improved version of the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition drone. These have been deployed with the alleged assistance of Russian PMC Wagner personnel (Military Africa, April 27, 2024; Defense Express, August 16, 2023). Russia is a major purchaser of the Shahed-136, which it uses in Ukraine in a modified form known as the Geran-2. The RSF also operates UAE-supplied, Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) drones, modified to drop two 120mm mortar rounds on its target (Military Africa, February 12, 2024).

RSF drone brought down by the SAF in Shendi, April 23, 2024. (ST)

Recently, the RSF has used Chinese-made drones to bring the war to the previously safe cities of Upper Nubia, home of the riverine Arabs who have dominated Sudan’s politics and military since independence. The SAF’s Third Infantry Division was attacked by drones in Shendi (150 km north of Khartoum) on April 23, while an earlier attack in Atbara targeted the Bara’a bin Malik Brigade of Islamist fighters on March 2 (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 23, 2024). The Brigade is a hardline Islamist militia fighting alongside the SAF as part of the “popular mobilization” strategy that has brought both former rebel movements and ex-members of Omar al-Bashir’s military/Islamist regime on side with the SAF (Al-Taghyeer, April 3, 2024).

General Shams al-Din Kabbashi

Brigadier Tibieg Mustafa, identified as an advisor to the RSF leader, insisted that the RSF had no part in the drone attacks on Shendi or Atbara: “What happened reflects internal disputes between the Army and the Islamic Brigades of Al-Barra’a bin Malik, which fight alongside the Army” (Radio Tamazuj, April 25, 2024). There appear to be differences in the SAF’s senior command over the role of the Islamic Brigades; General Shams al-Din Kabbashi, the army’s deputy commander, believes their inclusion is dangerous, while General Yasir al-Atta, a member of the sovereignty council, insists the SAF is open to all Sudanese, including Islamists (Middle East Eye, April 4, 2024). Despite Brigadier Tibieg’s claim, there seems little reason at this time to believe the SAF is attacking its allies with drones.

General Yasir al-Atta (ST)

On April 24, three reconnaissance drones were spotted flying over the Nubian town of Hambukol (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 25, 2024).  Shendi was attacked again on June 9, when five “suicide” drones were shot down by the Third Infantry Division. No damage or casualties were reported but widespread panic was reported in the town (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], June 9, 2024).

On June 7, the SAF’s 18th Infantry Division shot down two RSF drones targeting the Kenana airbase in White Nile State and the division headquarters in Kosti (White Nile State). The attacks came a day after SAF commander General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan arrived in Kosti (Sudan Tribune, June 7, 2024).

RSF advances east of the Nile have brought previously safe cities within range of RSF aerial attacks. In early April, two or three RSF drones panicked the eastern city of al-Qadarif when they struck the local headquarters of the General Intelligence Service and a judiciary building (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], April 9, 2024; Asharq al-Awsat, April 10, 2024).

Unlike the SAF, the RSF has no air force, but drones have provided an available and low-cost alternative that allows the paramilitary to spread terror in SAF-held cities well behind the lines and attack SAF facilities, airbases in particular.

NOTE

  1. The description of the RSF as “rebels” is somewhat contentious; see for example a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), that insists the RSF is “not a ‘rebel’ group – it’s recognized by law and was developed, tolerated and sustained as an instrument of state power…” (USIP, April 20, 2023).

 

Assessing the War in Sudan: Is an RSF Victory in Sight?

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 21(24)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

December 15, 2023

After eight months of brutal warfare, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now appear to have the upper hand against the better-armed Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti,” the RSF has conducted a highly mobile campaign against the SAF’s reactive and defensive posture, allowing the group to take the initiative in all regions of the conflict. With the Sudanese capital of Khartoum now a devastated battlefield, the ineffective government, led by SAF commander-in-chief General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, operates from a temporary base in Port Sudan, which suffers from power shortages and a chronic lack of fresh water.

Peace talks in Jeddah between the two military factions, assisted by Saudi, American, and African Union mediators, were indefinitely suspended earlier this month after both sides failed to meet commitments agreed upon in earlier negotiations (al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], December 4; Africa News, December 5). The animosity between the factions is severe and historically based in the rivalry between the poor Arab tribesmen of western Sudan (the RSF) and the Arab elites of the Nile region who have controlled Sudan and its military since the country gained independence in 1956.

RSF Commander General Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti”

Resistance to the RSF onslaught is weakening at all levels, placing Sudan’s diverse population at risk of rule by Arab supremacists with a record of savage conduct and a general ignorance of the means of development, administrative techniques, economic theory, and international relations.

The Impending RSF Conquest of Darfur

Four of Darfur’s five states, comprising nearly 80 percent of the western province, are now in RSF hands. North Darfur state and its capital, al-Fashir, may be the RSF’s next target. Al-Fashir is strategically and symbolically important as the former capital of the once powerful Fur Sultanate (c.1650-1916). Security in North Darfur is provided largely by the Joint Protection Force (JPF), an alliance of five non-Arab armed movements that has been busy recruiting in the region in anticipation of an RSF offensive. The RSF has also been recruiting from the region’s Arab population, setting the stage for a vicious ethnic conflict that will inevitably result in the mass slaughter and displacement of many of North Darfur’s civilians. Convoys bringing supplies to North Darfur from central Sudan have stopped, creating shortages of food, fuel, and medicines (Sudan Tribune, December 7).

JEM Leader Jibril Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune)

Two major armed movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), abandoned their self-declared neutrality on November 16 to announce their support for the SAF. Both groups also declared their willingness “to participate in military operations on all fronts without hesitation” (Radio Dabanga, November 17). JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim also condemned the RSF’s use of Arab mercenaries from Chad and Niger who have been promised the right to settle on land cleared of its non-Arab residents. The declaration followed months of murder and rape inflicted by the RSF on the non-Arab Black population of Darfur. The most notable atrocity involved the murder of some 1,300 civilians (mostly Masalit, an ethnic group in western Sudan and eastern Chad) in a camp for displaced people in West Darfur. The RSF attack began on November 2 and only ended three days later (Al Jazeera, November 10). The non-Arab Masalit have been targeted by the RSF and Arab militias since the start of the war in what appears to be an effort to ethnically cleanse the region of its indigenous Black population (see Terrorism Monitor, June 26).

Zaghawa Nomads (X)

Despite their small numbers, the ambitious Black African Zaghawa ethnic group plays a leading role in Darfur’s anti-government opposition. SLA-MM leader Minni Minawi, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim, and al-Tahir Hajar, leader of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), are all Zaghawa. During the fighting for Nyala, RSF gunmen were accused of assassinating prominent members of the Zaghawa community (Sudan Tribune, September 16).

Darfur Governor and SLA-MM Leader Minni Minawi (AFP)

Minni Minawi, governor of Darfur since August 2021, remains wary of the SAF, which continues to be commanded by members of Sudan’s riverine Arab elite. The rank-and-file troops are composed of conscripts from other regions, including many non-Arabs. Without substantial reforms to the composition of the SAF, Minawi notes its victory might only mean a return to an oppressive status quo (Sudan War Monitor, December 4).

RSF’s Series of Conquests

Under pressure from the RSF, garrisons across Darfur have fallen like dominos. Nyala, Sudan’s second-largest city, is the capital of South Darfur and an important military strongpoint. It fell after a long siege followed by a four-day assault that ended on October 26, killing hundreds of civilians during the shelling of the city (Asharq al-Awsat, October 29).

Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur, was lost after the SAF’s 21st Infantry Division fled on October 31, allowing the RSF to walk in. Al-Geneina, capital of West Darfur, was taken by the RSF on November 4 after most of the 15th Division garrison fled, leaving hundreds of troops and weapons behind. Masalit civilians and captured troops were abused, whipped, and forced to run barefoot through the rubble (Sudan War Monitor, November 6). Gathering smaller garrisons along the way, the remaining defenders fled to Chad, where they were disarmed and interned. Elsewhere in South Darfur, officers have changed into civilian clothes and made for the border with South Sudan (Sudan War Monitor, November 27).

SAF Leader General al-Burhan (BBC)

As it consolidates control of Darfur, the RSF is now poised to begin operations against al-Ubayd, the capital of neighboring North Kordofan. The RSF has already driven away the SAF’s garrison in the western Kordofan town of al-Mojalid and the nearby Balila oilfield (a joint Sudanese-Chinese project), despite intensive airstrikes by the SAF (Asharq al-Awsat, October 31; al-Taghayeer [Khartoum], November 27).

Where Do Armed Opposition Movements Stand?

The war of the generals has finally shattered the hard-won 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), which promised a new era of peace in Sudan by reconciling the government with the nation’s leading rebel movements. However, two of the most powerful movements rejected the process entirely. In practice, the JPA has been described as “a mechanism to disburse political patronage to a few key rebel leaders.” [1]

One of the principal armed movements in Darfur is the largely Fur-based Sudan Liberation Army of Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (SLA-AW). The group helped launch the 2003 rebel attacks on the SAF that sparked nearly two decades of war in Darfur (Darfur means “abode of the Fur”). The movement was not a signatory to the JPA and is not part of North Darfur’s Joint Protection Force. Nonetheless, General Yusuf Karjakula led a group of SLA-AW fighters from its Jabal Marra stronghold to al-Fashir in late November where they deployed to protect IDP camps from RSF assaults (Sudan Tribune, December 3). The general also met with SAF and JPF commanders, suggesting the SLA-AW may be considering joint operations to defend al-Fashir despite long-standing distrust of the SAF.

Many of the armed opposition movements have begun to split internally over the issue of alignment with the RSF or the SAF (for the rebel movements, see Terrorism Monitor, August 8). Even Minni Minawi’s faction of the SLA is experiencing divisions between its SAF-supporting leader and its military commander, General Juma Haggar, who supports the RSF (Sudan War Monitor, December 4). The Sudan Liberation Army-Transitional Council (SLA-TC), led by Al-Hadi Idris Yahya Farajallah, is considered close to the RSF, though the movement’s vice-president, Salah al-Din Abdel-Rahman al-Ma’rouf “Salah Rasas,” is considered to be a supporter of the SAF (Sudan War Monitor, December 4). A new faction of JEM under Sulayman Sandal Haggar split from the movement in August 2023 after some JEM members charged leader Jibril Ibrahim with backing the SAF (Darfur24, August 30).

Some rebel leaders are attempting to remain neutral, like Al-Tahir Abu Bakr Hajar, leader of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), though some of his men were reported among the defenders of Nyala (Sudan War Monitor, October 26).

Foreign Intervention in the Sudan Conflict

There are allegations of foreign interference in the conflict, notably support for the RSF from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia’s Wagner Group, as well as Ukrainian support for General al-Burhan’s SAF.

Alleged Ukrainian Sniper on Ridge Northwest of Omdurman (Bellingcat)

Al-Burhan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met in Ireland on September 23 to discuss responses to the pro-RSF activities of the Russian Wagner Group in Sudan (Kyiv Independent, September 23; Sudan Tribune, September 23). The meeting came days after the release of videos alleged to show Ukrainian drone attacks on RSF forces in the Sudanese capital (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 14). Since then, videos have emerged of Ukrainian snipers operating in the hills northwest of Omdurman, as geolocated by independent investigative collective Bellingcat (Bellingcat.com, October 7). There have also been videos released on November 6, allegedly showing personnel of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate of Intelligence engaging with RSF fighters, Wagner personnel, and members of Russia’s special forces in the Sudanese city of Omdurman (Kyiv Post, November 6; Sudan War Monitor, November 10).

Journalists seeking confirmation or denial of these activities have been referred to the words of Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence service HUR MOU (Holovne upravlinnja rozvidky Ministerstva oborony Ukrajiny), who stated last May that “we have killed Russians and will continue to kill Russians anywhere in the world, until the complete victory of Ukraine” (New Voice of Ukraine, May 17). RSF leader Hemetti has expressed his support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and his paramilitary force is alleged to have engaged in gold smuggling with Wagner operatives in exchange for arms and advisors.

Small operations of the type allegedly engaged in by Ukraine in Sudan ultimately have little influence on the outcome of the war. However, they do diminish the local reputation of Wagner operatives who have helped finance Russia’s war in Ukraine by smuggling gold from regions of western Sudan under RSF control.

General Yassir al-Atta

General Yassir al-Atta (deputy to al-Burhan) stated that military intelligence and diplomatic sources had confirmed that the UAE was shipping supplies to the RSF through neighboring countries, including Chad. The allegation was denied by authorities in the UAE (Radio Tamazuj [Juba], November 29). The UAE is Sudan’s main trading partner, has been a major investor in Sudan in recent years, and is the primary destination for gold smuggled out of western Sudan. Al-Atta’s description of the UAE as a “mafia-state” led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between the two countries (Radio Dabanga, December 11).

Atta’s remarks also incensed Chadian authorities. On December 11, they demanded an official Sudanese apology for claiming the UAE had been allowed to ship weapons and munitions to the RSF through Chad. N’Djamena promised to take “measures” if the apology did not come within three days (Sudan Tribune, December 11). Darfur governor Minni Minawi had already accused Chadian authorities of allowing the passage of arms and mercenaries through Chad to the RSF in mid-November (Radio Dabanga, November 17).

There are further allegations that the Zaghawa generals who control Chad’s powerful military are annoyed by the UAE’s support of the mainly-Arab RSF and are providing clandestine support to their Zaghawa kinsmen in JEM and the SLA-MM (Sudan Tribune, December 7).

Destruction of Khartoum

Little remains in SAF hands in Khartoum other than the much-battered army headquarters and a small patch of Khartoum North (Bahri) connected by the SAF-controlled Blue Nile rail bridge. Khartoum’s al-Jaili refinery, the largest fuel production facility in Sudan, was destroyed in a bombing on December 6, the fourth such bombing of that location since the war began. Both the RSF and the SAF accuse the other of being responsible for the destruction (Sudan Tribune, December 6). RSF posts are dispersed throughout Khartoum; in the SAF’s attempt to find and destroy them, large parts of the city have been smashed by airstrikes and artillery, including many of its most notable buildings.

The RSF now controls all of Khartoum State, with the exception of the SAF-controlled pockets in Khartoum and northern Omdurman. RSF patrols have been spotted recently in eastern Sudan, possibly preparing the way for an occupation of that region. Twenty-five miles south of Khartoum, the strategic Jabal Awliya military base and airport fell on November 20 after a siege and two-day assault, removing a major obstacle to a RSF incursion into White Nile State (Radio Dabanga, November 21).

Conclusion

The SAF is highly demoralized and suffers from high rates of desertion and defection. Resistance to the RSF is collapsing in many parts of the country, diminishing hopes for a negotiated settlement. There are thousands of dead, soldiers and civilians alike. The country’s GDP is expected to decline by 18 percent this year due to the war (Africa News, October 12), with over half the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Six million Sudanese are displaced and cut off from normal avenues of support. As famine approaches, the only trade activity that still works is the import and distribution of arms, despite an international embargo.

Civilian groups that had previously discovered the power of the people when overthrowing President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 have now discovered that they have zero influence in the current military power struggle. Most alarming is the emergence of patterns of ethnic and tribal violence that have ways of resisting political settlement while perpetuating grievances both new and traditional. Focused on self-enrichment, the RSF’s barely literate leadership has no rational plan for reviving the state. There is little chance that the RSF’s military success can translate into a brighter future for Sudan’s 46 million people.

Note:

[1] Amar Jamal, “Key Actors in the Juba Peace Agreement: Roles, Impacts and Lessons,” Rift Valley Institute Research Report, September 14, 2023, p.16, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/RVI%202023.09.14%20Key%20Actors%20in%20the%20JPA.pdf

Russia in the Red Sea (Part Three): Converging Wars Obstruct Russian Plans for Naval Port in Sudan

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Eurasia Daily Monitor 20(176)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

Andrew McGregor

November 14, 2023

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and the expanded war has pulled some of the Kremlin’s attention to the Middle East and North Africa. The conflict gives fresh impetus to Russia’s interest in establishing a stronger foothold in the Red Sea region. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the ongoing power struggle in Sudan have derailed Moscow’s efforts to establish a naval port in Sudan. The Wagner Group has allied with one side of the fight, which has hurt Russia’s prospects, especially if the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan prevail (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, May 26, June 9). In addition, recent drone attacks in Khartoum, possibly of Ukrainian origin, suggest Kyiv may be trying to challenge Russia’s military contractors in Africa (The Moscow Times, September 20). The outcome of the fighting in Sudan will have important implications for the Kremlin’s efforts to establish a stronger military presence in the Red Sea region.

Before these geopolitical upheavals, Russia seemed well on its way to setting up its planned naval base. In 2017, an agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir called for the establishment of a Russian base at an unspecified location on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in return for arms and other military gear from Moscow. Operated by 300 Russian servicemen, the base would support as many as four Russian naval vessels at a time (see EDM, December 6, 2017).

Map showing location of Arakiyai (Abdul-Razak M Mohamed).

By 2021, the new Sudanese government began having second thoughts about the deal and sought new terms that included economic aid (The Arab Weekly, September 16, 2021). Initially, Moscow had hoped that the base would be established in Port Sudan, building on existing infrastructure there. Khartoum, however, suggested a new base be built from scratch at Arakiyai, a remote fishing village so small it does not appear on most maps (Radio Dabanga, December 7, 2021). Without supporting infrastructure or sufficient fresh water, the Arakiyai suggestion was meant to cool Russian designs on Sudanese waters.

Port of Suakin

The only other viable option would be the ancient Arab port of Suakin. Originally built to accommodate shallow draft dhows, the British moved operations from Suakin to Port Sudan when it became clear that Suakin could not accommodate deep-draft naval and commercial ships. Dredging has since improved access, but the construction of new facilities would take years (Middle East Eye, September 30, 2022).

The ancient coral city of Suakin, with the modern ‘Uthman Diqna port in the background.

In 2022, Sudan’s military rulers appeared ready to finalize a treaty authorizing the establishment of a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. The leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemetti”), took the lead in most of these negotiations. He arrived in Moscow on February 23, one day before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with a delegation that did not include any SAF representatives. Hemetti expressed surprise that anyone might find a Russian base in Sudan controversial (Africanews, March 3, 2022).

Port Sudan is a politically unstable city that serves as Sudan’s primary connection to international trade routes. The city is riddled with ethnic rivalries and tribal divisions that could threaten any foreign military presence there. Port Sudan is separated from the Nile Valley by 250 miles of sun-baked desert inhabited almost entirely by Arab and Beja nomads. This isolation makes port operations and onward transportation of goods vulnerable to any group that could block the intersection of roads and narrow-gauge rail connections with the Nile.

Such interruptions do happen as a result of tensions between three major ethnic groups in the region; the Beja, the Bani Amer and the Nuba. [1] Scores have been killed in clashes between these groups since 2018. Swords, spears and knives were the weapons of choice until firearms were introduced to these street-fights, increasing the death toll. At times, the RSF has been called in to restore order.

On September 18, the SAF clashed with a Beja militia in Port Sudan led by Shibah Dirar, former leader of the militant Eastern Front. Dirar claims to support the army but would prefer they stay out of eastern Sudan (Al-Jazeera, September 21). SAF units arrived after Dirar’s men set up a checkpoint for all traffic leaving the port, allegedly to prevent a “fifth column” from smuggling supplies to the RSF (Radio Dabanga, September 19). With much of the government’s administration currently operating from Port Sudan rather than Khartoum, panic spread as residents feared the gunfire announced an RSF attack (Sudan Tribune, September 18). It was the latest in a series of Beja interventions; most notably, the Supreme Council of Beja closed all operations at the port for six weeks in September-October 2021. Dirar tried to shut the port down again in December 2022, even as it was still trying to recover from the 2021 shutdown (Al-Taghyeer [Khartoum], December 9, 2022).

There is, however, no unanimity of opinion in the various tribal groups that make up the Beja people, which include separatists, Islamists, reformers and even supporters of the discredited al-Bashir regime. On May 4, the Port Sudan office of UN envoy Volker Perthes was stormed by protesters demanding his departure, many of them old regime supporters (Sudan Tribune, May 4).

The outbreak of fighting in and around Khartoum may squash any chances for the establishment of a Russian naval base in the near future. Videos circulating on X (formerly Twitter) on September 14 depicted a series of attacks by first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones in Omdurman against RSF fighters and vehicles (Twitter.com/War Noir, September 14; Twitter.com/Mupper2 September 14). FPV drones are cheap and commercially available and can be easily modified to carry the warhead of a rocket-propelled grenade. The drone pilot, wearing video goggles, controls the low and fast flight of the explosive drones with the assistance of a spotter drone that selects targets and records the results.

Such capabilities could threaten a prospective Russian base should the fighting in Sudan continue over the long term. FPV drones have become commonplace in Ukraine, but this constituted their first appearance in an African conflict (both the SAF and RSF use other types of drones). The tactics seen in the videos resemble those used by Ukrainian forces, and parts of the videos appear to display Ukrainian text on the drone controller’s monitor. When questioned by journalists about the attacks, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov simply said, “A year ago, I personally and openly said that all Russian war criminals who fought, are fighting, or plan to fight against Ukraine will be punished anywhere in the world” (Holosameryky.com, September 23).

Possible Ukrainian involvement in Sudan led to a flurry of diplomatic efforts by Moscow and Kyiv. On September 21, General al-Burhan spoke with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York. Lavrov indicated Moscow’s support for al-Burhan and the SAF’s efforts to stabilize Sudan despite Wagner’s association with the RSF (TASS, September 21). Two days later, al-Burhan met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov for “unscheduled” talks at Ireland’s Shannon Airport (Kyiv Independent; Sudan Tribune, September 23). Zelenskyy reported that the two leaders discussed the activity of illegal armed groups financed by Russia (i.e., Wagner). Afterward, Zelenskyy said he was “grateful for Sudan’s consistent support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Anadolu Agency, September 23). These developments point to Ukraine potentially pursuing a policy in Africa that will challenge Moscow’s Wagner gambit. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, “Our strategy is not to replace Russia but to free Africa from Russia’s grip” (Africanews, August 17).

Russian Navy frigate Admiral Grigorovich visits Port Sudan in 2021 (AFP).

Perhaps most troubling for the Kremlin is the inherent political instability of Sudan. Even before the current power struggle, regional insurgencies, tribal clashes, mass demonstrations, and coup attempts have characterized the country’s political process. The months-long struggle between Sudan’s two most powerful military commanders is reducing the national capital to rubble and has had a similar effect on Khartoum’s international commitments. A Russian deal with one military faction is unlikely to be honored by the other, leaving a possible Russian base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in limbo. The SAF leadership is convinced that Moscow now controls the Wagner Group following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted mutiny and death, with the mercenary group supplying the RSF with arms and munitions. As a result, a victorious SAF would be unlikely to approve a Russian naval base and official military presence in Sudan.

There is a possibility Sudan could be cut off from aid and grain supplies should the presence of Russian (or other foreign) forces in Port Sudan draw attacks from their present or future rivals. The risk seemed remote until recently, but if Ukrainian special forces are indeed operating drones in the Sudanese capital, the danger of hosting a foreign naval base in Sudan’s most strategic location begins to come into focus. The consequences for Sudan of any extended shutdown of Port Sudan would be catastrophic.

Notes

  1. Today’s Beja are the heavily Arabized descendants of a group who have lived in eastern Sudan for six to seven thousand years. Arabic is now the dominant language, but many still speak the original Beja language, To Bedawie. The Bani Amer are a confederation of local peoples, largely Tigrayan and Beja, first assembled under an Arab ruling caste. They speak Tigrayan, To Bedawie and Arabic. The Black African Nuba, Muslim and Christian, are relative newcomers to Port Sudan. Many were driven out of their homes in the Nuba Hills of Southern Kordofan during the severe government suppression of the Nuba in the 1980s and 1990s, finding work on Port Sudan’s docks and construction projects.
  2. The close ties between the RSF, Russia and the Wagner Group are examined in “Putin’s New Russian Empire is Suddenly on the Rocks: How the War in Ukraine Threatens Russian Interests in Sudan,” AIS Special Report on Ukraine No.3, March 24, 2022.