Jamaat ul-Ahrar: The New Face of Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Farhan Zahid

The number of terrorist acts in settled districts of Pakistan has taken a nose dive in the last few months. It appears that an ongoing military operation (Operation Zarb-e-Azb) has taken its toll on terrorists based primarily in North Waziristan and more generally in the whole of the tribal areas of Pakistan. The operation may have an impact on the diminishing number of terrorist acts, but the real reason seems to be the split of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) into two major factions.

The emergence of Jamaat ul-Ahrar is the latest development in the factional infighting inside the TTP. Key TTP commanders who have joined hands with Jamaat ul-Ahrar and become part of its shura (consultative council) are Qari Shakil Haqqani from Charsadda, Maulana Yasin from Swat, Mufti Mishbah from Peshawar districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province, Qari Ismail from Khyber district, Maulana Abdullah from Bajaur district, and Maulana Haider and Mansoor Nazim from the Orakzai district of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Dawn [Karachi], August 26, 2014).

 

FATA

A Battle for Leadership

The split was overdue as key commanders had developed major differences over getting control of the tribal districts. Fierce clashes erupted between militants loyal to Khalid Mehsud (a.k.a. Sajna) and Sheryar Mehsud over control of South Waziristan. TTP Amir Maulana Fazlullah was impatient to prove his iron grip over the TTP and immediately sacked Khalid Mehsud before appointing Khalid Haqqani as the new commander of South Waziristan district. The TTP shura refused to endorse Fazlullah’s decision, leading to fragmentation (The News [Islamabad], May 29, 2014).

In fact, the TTP started to fragment right after the death of its former Emir, Hakimullah Mehsud, in a drone attack in South Waziristan last December. The TTP’s supreme shura council met several times to decide on a new Emir. Shura members reluctantly agreed on the name of Fazlullah, the notorious head of the TTP-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nizam Shariat-e-Mohammadi. Supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Omar is believed to have put his weight behind Fazlullah, leading to his selection as the new Emir of the TTP. Unlike previous TTP Emirs (namely Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud), Fazlullah belongs to the Mingora district of Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province.

Since the TTP is an agglomerate of 27 to 40 Taliban groups based in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the Emir is traditionally from the tribal areas, the selection of Fazlullah became a bone of contention from the very beginning among other group leaders vying for the slot. The TTP was founded by Mehsudi tribesmen in August 2007 with Baitullah Mehsud as its first Emir. As the TTP is still Mehsud and Wazir dominated, it was difficult for both Mehsud and Wazir tribesmen to appoint a non-Mehsud and non-Wazir Emir who is not even from the tribal areas. It was more or less like a non-Arab commanding al-Qaeda Central.

In this image taken from a video recording, Pakistan Taliban commander, gives an interview in Pakistan's Mohmand tribal regionOmar Khalid Khorasani

Another important issue surfaced with the formation of Jamaat ul-Ahrar by the TTP commander of Mohmand district, Omar Khalid Khorasani (a.k.a. Abdul Wali). Khorasani belongs to the Safi tribe of Mohmand district. During his long tenure as TTP commander of the district and in the absence of a strong TTP Emir in Waziristan, Khorasani announced his own faction, Jamaat ul-Ahrar, in September 2014. Khorasani accused Fazlullah and his allied commanders of deviating from the TTP ideology. Fazlullah, who was in Afghanistan and missed the shura council’s meetings, slammed Khorasani’s decision and called him a traitor and deviator. He said Khorasani was “conspiring against the Emirates of Afghanistan Emir Mullah Muhammad Omar, and [had] links to shadowy militant organizations.” All Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan regard Mullah Omar as the ceremonial head of the Taliban and pledge allegiance to his authority, though virtually all act independently (Dawn [Karachi], September 7, 2014). Khorasani managed to lure both the newly emerged Punjabi Taliban branch Ahara ul-Hind, involved in the Islamabad Court Complex attack in June 2014 and led by Qasim Khorasani, and Junad-e-Hafza, another shadowy organization based in Punjab. Ahrar ul-Hind has now merged with Jamaat ul-Ahrar (Newsweek Pakistan, September 2014).

The split has had a major impact on the conduct of terrorist operations in settled districts of Pakistan. TTP commanders in Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province, Punjab province and the southern port city of Karachi have had to decide whether to side with the TTP Fazlullah faction or with the Khorasani-led Jamaat ul-Ahrar.

Khorasani has strong links with al-Qaeda and is believed to have sheltered hundreds of Arab, Uzbeks and Chinese Uyghurs in areas under his control. There is a strong possibility that al-Qaeda may favor Khorasani with his local franchise rather than Fazalullah, who may already be weighing his option to pledge allegiance to Caliph of the Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Jamaatul Ahrar spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan has already welcomed the creation of al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent by Ayman al-Zawahiri (Dawn, September 5, 2014). On the other hand, TTP-Fazalullah spokesman Shahidullah Shahid appeared to have leaning towards the Islamic State:

From the very beginning, when the Islamic State did not exist, we are helping and supporting the Mujahideen of Iraq and Syria. Our group [TTP] had sent between 1,000 and 1,500 fighters to the (Middle Eastern) region so far. We are with you in these hard times and will help you as much as possible. We advise you to be patient and determined at such a hard time and stay united, as your enemies stand united against you (The News, October 6, 2014).

Apart from this development, the TTP has distributed pamphlets and did wall chalking in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province, leaving messages encouraging Muslims to join hands with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State. The wall chalking and pamphlets are clear efforts to gear up support for the Islamic State in Pakistan, where an on-going Islamist insurgency could provide thousands of potential recruits for Islamic State’s endeavors in Syria and Iraq. According to Pakistani terrorism analyst Amir Mir: “The rise and success of the Islamic State could play an inspirational role in Pakistan where 100-plus al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked Jihadi groups are currently operating” (The News, October 6, 2014).

Ideology and Links

The Khorasani faction of the TTP is known to have hard-core Islamist beliefs. Khorasani has always opposed peace talks with government. The group staunchly believes in creating an Islamic Caliphate in Pakistan governed in a Wahhabi/Salafist style. Khorasani has shown his hatred for the present constitution and has at times vowed to replace it with Shari’a (The News, September 27, 2013). Jamaat ul-Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan condemned the Nobel Award committee for choosing Malala Yousafzai for the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize, calling her “an agent of non-believers” (Indian Express, October 11, 2014). The Khorasani group also condemned democracy and all parties inclined towards establishing strong democratic institutions in Pakistan (Dawn [Karachi], August 26, 2014)
The Mohmand TTP, which has traditionally been headed by Omar Khalid Khorasani, is one of the strongest of the TTP-affiliated groups based in tribal areas. During his rise to power in Mohmand district, Khorasani had to face the Shah Khalid group, a formidable enemy whom he successfully defeated after fierce battles in 2008. Afterwards Khorasani became the undisputed warlord of Mohmand district.

Khorasani managed to hold back successive military operations against his group in 2010. Operation Brekhna (Thunder) was launched by the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corp to flush out Khorasni’s group in Mohmand. Khorasani, aided by his right hand Qari Shakeel, successfully held back the military onslaught and at a later stage took refuge in Afghanistan, salvaging his forces. The Khorsani forces regained all control after the withdrawal of the military from tactical strongholds. In one brutal assault, the Khorasani-led militants kidnapped and beheaded 23 personnel of the Frontier Corps in 2010. Khorasani was also the first of Pakistan’s jihadists to denounce the Lal Masjid operation (Red Mosque military operation in 2007, a.k.a. Operation Silence) and vowed to take revenge.

The Khorasani faction has spread tentacles in settled districts as far as Karachi. The most recent terrorist attack launched in January by Khorasani-affiliated militants in Karachi was the assassination of Superintendent of Police Mohammad Aslam Khan in a suicide bombing. Several earlier attempts on the life of Khan by other Taliban factions were unsuccessful, including one that completely destroyed his house and resulted in the death of six police officers. Khan was known for his anti-TTP stance and conducted scores of operations against TTP strongholds in peripheral areas of Karachi in the last five years. At least 40 TTP leaders and rank and file were killed in Khan-led operations in Karachi.
Now heading his own faction, Khorasani will attempt to appeal to more TTP factions based in Karachi’s Pashtun-dominated suburbs, as the cosmopolitan city offers more opportunities for extortion from traders and businessmen than the tribal areas and other parts of Pakistan. Khorasani also has a base in Islamabad’s slums, where many of the militants relocated during military operations in 2010. The Khan-koh suburb of Islamabad is now home to hundreds of TTP militants involved in extortion and kidnappings in Islamabad and the neighboring Rawalpindi district.

Conclusion

With the announcement of the Islamic State in areas the militant Islamist group has carved out of the war-torn Iraq and Syrian states, the jihadi global perspective is about to shift to a new paradigm. The surfacing of Jamaat ul-Ahrar from the TTP’s wings showcases the change of course by Pakistani Islamist militants. Al-Qaeda, which used to define the course of action for Pakistani militant groups, now appears to be losing ground to the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda ideologues now have to compete with their own splinter group (IS, formerly al-Qaeda in Iraq) in obtaining the confidence of Islamist groups in Pakistan. It seems that al-Qaeda is already on course to accept the Islamic State’s challenge. The establishment of a new al-Qaeda branch, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, is one step in reasserting the group’s desire to dominate the Pakistani jihad scene. Jamaat ul-Ahrar, composed of seasoned jihadis like Omar Khalid Khorasani, would definitely weigh their options before joining hands with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. At the moment, the possibility of joining the Islamic State appears to be less significant as al-Qaeda already has a developed network in Pakistan. Joining the Islamic State would provide more coverage in terms of media attention; on the other hand al-Qaeda will have to reinvigorate itself for staying on course.

The Author

Farhan Zahid earned his Ph.D. in Counter Terrorism Studies from the University of Brussels, Belgium. Dr. Zahid has authored more than 20 research papers and articles. He writes on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, Pakistani al- Qaeda-linked groups, Islamist violent non-state actors in Pakistan, jihadi Ideologies and the Afghan Taliban.

The preceding is a guest contribution to Aberfoyle International Security (AIS) and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of AIS.

A Profile of Asim Umar: Amir of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinet

Dr. Farhan Zahid

Special Contribution to the AIS Website, October 1, 2014

The rise of the Islamic State (former ISIS) and its establishment of a self-proclaimed Caliphate) not only shocked terrorism and security analysts but also the Islamic State’s parent organization – al-Qaeda. Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, the current Amir of al-Qaeda, must have serious concerns about the arrival of a new competitor in the arena of global jihad, once considered synonymous with al-Qaeda. There is no doubt that with experience, global reach, affiliated groups and associated movements in more than 60 countries, al-Qaeda is going to be in the jihadi business for a long time, whereas the Islamic State may not survive long. Whatever the course of events, al- Zawahiri is currently in a fix. Thousands of al-Qaeda sympathizers across the globe have expectations that their Amir will compete with the so-called Islamic State with new strategies and tactics. Al-Zawahiri would obviously not like to be seen as meek. It appears that in this dog-eat-dog situation, al-Zawahiri is set to compete with the Islamic State to preserve al-Qaeda’s status in the world of jihad.

The establishment of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is one such step in this regard. Though al-Qaeda already has two associated groups in India and six in Pakistan, it seems that al-Zawahiri intends to reinvigorate the current set up. The al-Qaeda associated groups in the region are:

India

1. Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
2. Indian Mujahideen (IM)

Pakistan

1. Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami(HuJI)
2. Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
3. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
4. Jaysh-e-Mohammad (JeM)
5. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
6. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Al-Zawahiri selected Maulana Asim Umar as the Amir of AQIS. Umar is a known jihadi ideologue and propagandist as well as an active figure amongst jihadi forces in Pakistan. His selection by al- Zawahiri from the available lot of senior jihadi is by no means a coincidence. Umar has worked with almost all jihadi organizations of Pakistan and he may help al-Qaeda Core to strengthen ties and possibly merge with these organizations. The immense number of jihadis in Pakistan and the number of attacks over the last 12 years prove the point that Pakistan’s huge youth bulge may provide a pool of new recruits to al-Qaeda. Umar’s connections with Pakistani sectarian outfits and Islamist Kashmiri jihadi organizations would be an asset for al-Qaeda’s expansion in Pakistan and India.
According to unconfirmed sources, Umar hails from the southern Pakistani metropolis of Karachi, a city distinguished by its relatively secular and modern atmosphere in comparison with other Pakistani urban centers.

Umar studied at the Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia madrassa in Karachi, a seminary notorious for producing jihadis. Mufti Nizam Uddin Shamzai, the slain former principal of the seminary, had been a staunch supporter and mentor of the Afghan Taliban regime. Shamzai also patronized Pakistani jihadi organizations Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI), Hakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jaysh-e-Mohammad (JeM), and sectarian jihadi organizations like Sipha-e-Sahaba (SeS) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Express Tribune [ Karachi], February 12, 2011). Shamzai was shot dead in front of his own madrassa in May 2004 by unknown assailants.

Shamzai declared jihad against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan in 2001. Upon proclamation of his fatwa, thousands rushed to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban and al-Qaeda during the U.S. invasion in October 2001. When the Pakistani military regime sided with the United States at the beginning of Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Shamzai issued another fatwa, this time against the Pakistan Army (Daily Times [Lahore], May 31, 2004).

Shamzai’s two most prominent students were Qari Saifullah Akhter and Fazal ur-Rehman Khalil. After graduating from Shamzai’s madrassa in Karachi, Akhter and Khalil laid the foundations of Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI), the oldest Pakistani Islamist terror group, in 1983. A few years later Khalil parted ways and established his own terrorist outfit, Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) in 1987. In February 1998, HuM organized Osama bin Laden’s press conference in Khost, Afghanistan, where he proclaimed his fatwa against the U.S. and its allies and also announced the formation of the Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders. [1]

Both terrorist groups remain involved in the Indian Kashmir insurgency. Masood Azahar, another of Shamzai’s students and a high-ranking member of HuM, founded Jaysh-e-Mohammad (JeM) after being released from an Indian jail in exchange for the release of Indian airline passengers hijacked by HuM militants in 1999. HuJI and HuM turned against the state of Pakistan as the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf decided to side with the United States. A HuM splinter group, HuM al-Alami, twice attempted to assassinate General Musharraf in 2002 in Karachi. [2]

Umar also studied at Darul Uloom Haqannia madrassa, located in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The seminar y has a reputation as a jihad factory because of its decades- old practice of sending students to Afghanistan to fight against Russian and later American forces. With more than 10,000 students, the madrassa is headed by Sami ul-Haq, leader of the Deobandist Jamiat-e-Ulea Islam political part.
More than 10,000 strong student body the madrassa is headed by Sami ul Haq, leader of Deobandi sect Islamist party Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam. Half of the Afghan Taliban cabinet considered Darul Uloom Haqannia as their alma mater. Mullah Omar, the supreme commander of the Afghan Taliban, reportedly studied at the madrassa. (Reuters Pakistan, September 9, 2014)

Works of Asim Umar

Umar, the newly appointed Amir of AQIS, has written a number of conspiracy theory books. Umar writes in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. His favorite topic is Dajjal (the Islamic equivalent of the Anti-Christ). Despite being part of Pakistan’s jihadist network, Umar focuses on cosmic and Manichean issues like second coming of the Nabi Issa (the Prophet Jesus), the appearance of the Mahdi, Armageddon, and Dajjal. Umar connects these upcoming scenarios with current events like the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the activities of private security contractor Blackwater/Xe (known since 2011 as Academie) and the Bermuda Triangle.

Dajjal Ka Lashkar: Black Water (Army of Anti-Christ: the Black Water)

Umar describes events related to private security company Blackwater/Xe activities in Pakistan, and narrates some of his own experiences. In Umar’s view, the employment of Blackwater/Xe in Pakistan and their growing influence at the behest of Pakistani apostate rulers, is part of a Christian-Jewish conspiracy against Pakistan, much bigger than anyone could imagine. Umar considers Blackwater/Xe an organization of religious fanatics spying in Pakistan. Blackwater/Xe, according to Umar, is working to steal Pakistan’s nuclear assets and is part of a wider plan for setting appropriate conditions for the arrival of Dajjal. In this view, Black Water has managed to create an economic crisis in Pakistan while recruiting thousands of apostate Pakistanis and trying hard to push the Pakistani government to provide them with bases and air strips in Pakistani territory. In the last chapter of this work, Umar lists U.S. military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. [3]

Umar 1Teesri Jang -e- Azeem Aur Dajjal (World War III and Dajjal)

Umar links the impending outbreak of the Third World War with the arrival of Dajjal while describing signs and events before the Battle of Armageddon. Umar identifies a long list of events from wars in Bosnia, Chechnya, Pakistan, India, Syria, Iraq and even relates the roles of the IMF, World Bank, international media , private firms like Blackwater/Xe and multinationals like Nestle to a “Western plan” to depopulate Muslim countries by launching population control campaigns. [4]

Imam Mehdi ke Doost aur Dushman (Friends and Foes of the Mahdi [Messiah])

In this work, Umar links various different conspiracies to the role of Shi’a clergy and the collusion of various different Shi’a sects (such as the Ismailis, Alawis, etc.). Another important sign, according to Umar, is the emancipation of women. Umar claims families such as the Rockefellers, Bushes and the family of the Agha Khan have been hatching conspiracies against the Imam (Messiah). In a tacit manner, Umar cites the Yemeni people and, indirectly, Osama bin Laden, in upholding the truth and acting as friends of the Imam. Umar dedicates the book to Ghazi Abdur Rasheed, leader of the radical Islamists killed during the Red Mosque Operation (Operation Silence) in Islamabad in July 2007. [5]

Umar 2Bermuda Tikon aur Dajjal (Bermuda Triangle and Dajjal)

Umar describes the Bermuda Triangle and alleged disappearances of vessels in detail. He narrates eye-witness accounts and then elucidates the links between extraterrestrials and Dajjal with the involvement of the U.S. government, NASA, Pentagon and American scientists. Umar then explores his favorite conspiracy theory, one suggesting the Shi’a, the U.S. government, the European Union, apostate Muslim regimes, Blackwater/Xe, the World Health Organization, UNICEF and others are working together to side with Dajjal in the end days. Umar dedicated this book to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. [6]

Association with Pakistani Islamist Terrorist Groups

Before becoming the Amir of AQIS, Umar has tagged along with Jihadi organizations in Pakistan in various capacities. He served as propagandist of Harkat al Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) and Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM). Umar was also close to Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and has written openly against “Shi’a designs” in Pakistan in his books. The moment when Umar became associated with al-Qaeda is not known, but it is assumed that the relationship developed in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan where al-Qaeda was running training camps and graduating thousands of HuJI and HuM militants every year from 1996 to 2001. The relationship strengthened after hundreds of militants escaped the Red Mosque Operation and joined hands with al-Qaeda in tribal areas. [7]

Umar has a long association with al-Qaeda Core in tribal areas of Pakistan under the protection of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Because of his jihadi credentials he was earlier selected by al-Zawahiri to head al-Qaeda’ss Shari’a committee in Pakistan (NDTV [New Delhi], September 4, 2014). After taking charge of AQIS, Umar has reaffirmed his stance by declaring the United States his prime enemy. In his message to Indian youth he asked: “Why is it that the Muslims of India are totally absent from the fields of jihad? Rise! Awaken! Participate in this global jihad to give a final push to the collapsing edifice of America” (Hindustan Times, September 4, 2014)

As a result of his long jihadi career in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan, Umar speaks fluent Arabic, Urdu, Uzbek and Pashto. While working for the overwhelmingly Pashtun TTP, Umar translated jihadi material from Pashto to Urdu. Because of his Islamic clerical education, Umar is well versed in Islamic issues. He is a good orator as well as an effective propagandist. However, little is known about his jihadi credentials as far as field operations are concerned. According to one source, Umar is more of an ideologue than actual fighter. [8]

Umar’s current focus is on jihadi activities in Indian Kashmir, Assam, Myanmar and Pakistan. He has capitalized on the available pool of jihadis in Pakistan to raise a new cluster from regions experiencing jihadi turbulence. Umar has denounced taking refu
“Those (Kashmiris) who swore to martyrs to walk their path till their last breath and vowed to continue jihad; who convinced them to shun jihad and dream about [obtaining the] freedom of Kashmir by resorting to protests, shutdowns and democratic ways?… Caravans are heading from Afghanistan to liberate India and it is not being done on instructions of any intelligence agency, and not as part of some governmental policy, but simply to abide God’s command…”  [9]

Conclusion

Al-Qaeda Amir Ayman al- Zawahiri is ready to compete with the Islamic State. In a country like Pakistan where a range of jihadis is available, hoping to recruit and revive many of the dormant jihadi groups under the banner of AQIS. Elevating Asim Umar to Amir of AQIS is a tactical move; Umar’s experience of working with jihadi organizations will enable him to widen the al-Qaeda network in Pakistan and India.

Notes

1. HuMA, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/HuMA.htm)
2. (HuMA, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/HuMA.htm)
3. Asim Umar, Dajjal Ka Lashkar: Black Water, Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum, Islamabad, 2009.
4. Asim Umar, Teesri Jang -e- Azeem Aur Dajjal , Al-Ghazi Welfare Trust, Bagh, Azad Kashmir, October 2006.
5. Asim Umar, Imam Mehdi ke Doost aur Dushman, Al-Hajira Publications, Karachi, May 2009.
6. Asim Umar, Bermuda Tikon aur Dajjal, Al-Hajira Publications, Karachi, 2009.
7. Interview with a local journalist in Islamabad who requested anonymity, September 10, 2014.
8. Ibid
9. As-Sahab Media video: War Should Continue, Message to Muslims of Kashmir, Shamikh, June 16, 2014.

The Author

Farhan Zahid earned his Ph.D. in Counter Terrorism Studies from the University of Brussels, Belgium. Dr. Zahid has authored more than 20 research papers and articles. He writes on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, Pakistani al- Qaeda-linked groups, Islamist violent non-state actors in Pakistan, jihadi Ideologies and the Afghan Taliban.

The preceding is a guest contribution to Aberfoyle International Security (AIS) and does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of AIS.

The Cutting Strike: Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan

Andrew McGregor

June 26, 2014

Pakistan’s military has spent months trying to convince their civilian masters of the necessity of mounting a large military offensive in the lightly-ruled North Waziristan tribal agency, currently a hotbed for Islamist extremists and foreign fighters. The objections of the political class were finally overcome following the June 8 terrorist attack on Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport, a devastating demonstration of strength by the militants and a further display of the inability of local security forces to contain extremist groups and the futility of continuing peace talks with the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On June 15, Pakistan’s military launched Operation Zarb-e Azb (“the cutting strike”), a massive offensive designed to clear North Waziristan of militants and extremists.  The name of the operation appears to be part of an effort to lend a sense of Islamic legitimacy to the offensive – Azb was the name of the sword carried in battle by the Prophet Muhammad. Pakistani forces were also armed with a religious decision signed by over 100 clerics from various Islamic trends that declared their operations a jihad with the right to use on iron fist on extremists guilty of hundreds of murders (Hindustan Times, June 24).

The operation began with F-16 airstrikes that killed a claimed 105 militants, including the alleged planner of the Jinnah Airport attack, Uzbek commander Abu Abdur Rahman Almani (Dawn [Karachi], June 15). American CIA drone strikes have also targeted militants in the region, though these are not officially part of the government’s offensive. Despite the apparent tacit approval of Islamabad and the unlikelihood that American drone operations inside North Waziristan would be mounted independent of Pakistani authorities during a military operation in the region, Pakistan has still condemned recent drone strikes in North Waziristan as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (The Nation [Islamabad], June 14; June 19).

According to the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Marine General Joseph Dunford, U.S. forces inside Afghanistan were not coordinating with the Pakistani offensive but were ready to intercept militants looking to wait out the operation inside Afghan territory (AP, June 17). The U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan is seen as a major factor in motivating Pakistani authorities to take the offensive in North Waziristan before the Afghan Taliban are able to consolidate their control of the border region in cooperation with local militants.  Some 450,000 residents of North Waziristan have fled the offensive so far, taking advantage of a break in the campaign to allow their evacuation to Bannu, Peshawar, Kohat and, ironically, across the border in Afghanistan (Dawn [Karachi], June 22).

Pakistani Helicopter Operations in North Waziristan

The success of Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan depends to a great extent on the willingness of Afghan president Hamid Karzai to seal the border, though appeals from Islamabad have yet to receive a positive response from Kabul. Karzai, who alleges the terrorist problem in his country has a Pakistani origin, is apparently seeking a commitment from Islamabad that the offensive will be part of a major operation to shut down cross-border militant groups such as the Haqqani Network that have operated with the connivance of Pakistan’s military intelligence service (News on Sunday [Islamabad], June 22). Targeting the Haqqani Network is also a condition of further U.S. military assistance (The News [Islamabad], June 13). Whether Afghan security forces actually have the ability to effectively seal the border remains an open question. Without the full cooperation of Afghan forces, some militants are believed to have already slipped across the border into Paktika and Khost provinces, while others may have scattered into the remote wilderness of North Waziristan’s Shawal Valley (News on Sunday [Islamabad], June 22). Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, Shaida Muhammad Abdali, recently observed that Pakistani authorities had not succeeded in their battle against extremism “because they are fighting those they don’t like, but not those whom they like” (The Hindu, June 24).

The offensive has encountered a generally favorable popular attitude from a populace grown tired of terrorist strikes, particularly after the Karachi Airport attack. Opposition criticism has been muted since the operation began.  First-hand accounts of the fighting are hard to find, however, as the campaign is being tightly managed by the public relations arm of the Inter-Services Intelligence ISI) unit. All journalists were ordered to leave North Waziristan on the first day of the offensive and nearly all accounts of the fighting since have originated with the military. Cell phone service has been cut off in the agency and internet service is practically non-existent (News on Sunday [Islamabad], June 22).

Pakistani tactics have included integrated operations involving Cobra helicopter gunships, snipers and artillery, deployments along the Afghan border to prevent militants from escaping, securing the boundaries of urban centers like Miranshah and Mirali, processing refugees through filtration points to weed out fugitive militants and the establishment of “surrender points” to encourage militants to lay down their arms without fear of immediate retribution.

The Army’s offensive reflects a shift in strategic thinking in the Pakistani military under the new leadership of Chief-of-Staff General Raheel Sharif, who has emphasized the danger of Islamist militancy in the tribal agencies over the traditional attempts by the Pakistani military to co-opt such groups in the interest of maintaining “strategic depth” in the event of a major conflict with India (Express Tribune [Karachi], June 24). While the political leadership in Islamabad has reluctantly agreed to the necessity of a major military operation in the tribal region, it continues to fear a major backlash from terrorist cells based in Pakistan’s poorly secured urban centers. Creating a local administration capable of maintaining order and security in North Waziristan after the conclusion of active operations will also pose a major challenge to Islamabad.

This article was first published in the June 26, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship

Andrew McGregor

October 14, 2011

Following a series of high-level meetings between American and Pakistani security and military figures related to the operations of the notorious Haqqani Network in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, the leadership of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has released a statement denouncing what it perceives as an American attempt to detach the Haqqani Network from the Taliban command in the interests of creating divisions within the movement.  The statement is also critical of American suggestions that the Haqqani Network has close ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the latter agency long suspected of having close ties to the Taliban and various other Islamist militant groups active in Kashmir and in the tribal agencies of Pakistan’s northwest frontier. The Taliban consider this an attempt to “attribute the decisive and staggering attacks by Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate to the neighboring country of Pakistan” (ansar1.info, September 27).

Jalaluddin Haqqani

The Taliban assert that the success of their summer “Badr” offensive was so successful that it forced many Coalition partners to reassess their participation in the Afghanistan conflict. Afghanistan’s government claimed from the beginning that “Badr” was coordinated with the ISI (Tolo News [Kabul], May 28). According to the Taliban statement, the success of this campaign revealed the true nature of the “lies and false information” spread by CIA chief General David Petraeus and others in the American command. Unwilling to attribute these victories to the Afghan Taliban, these same U.S. officials have concocted an intervention from Pakistan to explain their defeats at the hands of an enemy they claim to have weakened long ago. These unfounded allegations are meant to “deceive the members in its coalition for a bit longer.”

The Taliban are especially disturbed by American suggestions that veteran Pashtun jihadi commander Jalaluddin Haqqani is not part of the Afghan Taliban command but is rather somehow a separate force “tied to others.” The statement asserts that such efforts are designed to “give a bad name to our prominent figures by tying them to foreign intelligence… the Islamic Emirate is at its strongest and [is] unified more than it has been at any other stage… Neither are our bases in Pakistan, nor do we need residence outside of our country… The respected Jalaluddin Haqqani is [one of] the Islamic Emirate’s honorable and dignified personalities and receives all guidance for operations from the leader of the Islamic Emirate.”

The U.S. military has long been frustrated by deadly operations carried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces, which typically retire into Pakistan after finishing their operations, placing them beyond most forms of retribution by American forces.  A series of meetings in the last few weeks has been designed to goad Pakistan’s military into carrying out a major offensive against the Haqqani Network and compel the ISI to stop its support for the group (Pakistan Observer, October 10).

According to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, “We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the border attacking our forces and [Afghans] and disappearing back into a safe haven… We keep telling [the Pakistanis] you can’t choose among terrorists. If you are against terrorism, you have to be against all forms of terrorism” (Dawn [Karachi], September 22).

This article was originally published in the October 14, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Security Failure Leads to Taliban Suicide Attack on Pakistan’s Strategic Kohat Tunnel

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2011

A pair of suicide bombings on January 28 constituted the latest round in a bitter struggle between Taliban militants and government security forces for control of Pakistan’s strategic Kohat Tunnel, an important part of Pakistan’s N55 highway (popularly known as the “Indus Highway”), which is heavily used by NATO supply convoys headed for Afghanistan and Pakistani military convoys headed for volatile Waziristan.

KohatAftermath of the Kohat Tunnel Suicide Bombing

The first bombing was carried out by a Bedford truck full of explosives that entered the tunnel from the Darra Adamkhel side, apparently unchallenged by tunnel security units. The explosives were detonated some 600 meters inside as the driver crashed the truck into the wall of the tunnel. The blast damaged the electrical, drainage and exhaust systems and created a crater one meter deep and six meters wide. This forced a 24-hour closure of the tunnel, which was later reopened to small vehicles only (Express Tribune [Karachi], January 30; Daily Times [Lahore], February 2). Repairs enabling the passage of heavy vehicles are expected to take some time. Bomb disposal experts later estimated the truck-bomb contained roughly 500 kg of explosives (Pakistan Observer, February 4).

A second explosion followed as an oil tanker rigged with a similar charge of explosives crashed into a military checkpoint outside the tunnel. Normally manned by units of the regular army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC), the checkpoint was unmanned at the time of the attack, approximately 12:30 AM. The tunnel has only been open at night for the past two months after night-time use was banned following its brief seizure in January 2008 by Taliban forces who set off explosives inside the tunnel. A male civilian and two women were killed immediately in a car following the tanker to the tunnel. The death toll in the two attacks has now reached eight, as several wounded have succumbed to their injuries (Pakistan Observer, February 4). The owner of the oil tanker has appealed to the government for compensation for the destruction of the tanker (The News [Islamabad], February 5).

Responsibility for the blasts was claimed by the Darra Adamkhel Taliban under the leadership of Tariq Afridi (The News, January 30). Tariq Afridi took command of the Darra Adamkhel fighters in November 2009 after the group’s two principal leaders were killed in a military operation in 2008. Taliban fighters based in the hills around Darra Adamkhel (and its thriving arms bazaar) have made regular attacks on supply convoys passing through the region.  The Darra Adamkhel command is most notorious for the kidnapping and murder of Polish engineer Petr Stanczak in February 2009 (The News, February 15, 2009; Dawn [Karachi], April 26, 2009). Taliban fighters in the area have also been responsible for numerous attacks on the region’s substantial Shiite minority. Reports last December indicated that members of the local Taliban were shaving their beards and infiltrating the Darra Adamkhel area (Daily Times, December 6, 2010).

The strategic 1.9 km tunnel was built with Japanese assistance and completed in 2004. It connects the relatively isolated Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa district with Peshawar and the rest of Pakistan. The tunnel allows shipping by large trucks that was previously impossible due to the dangerous hairpin turns of the old 14 km Kohat Pass road. Control of the tunnel has been an important Taliban objective for several years. A major battle between militants and government troops over several days in January 2008 saw Taliban fighters led by Tariq Afridi take temporary control of the tunnel before being driven off by a massive military response (PakTribune, January 28, 2008; The Nation [Islamabad], January 31; Reuters, January 27, 2008).

This article first appeared in the February 10, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Defeating the “Forces of Paganism”: Former Military Intelligence Chief Hamid Gul Blends Pakistani Nationalism and Islamic Revolution

Andrew McGregor

January 28, 2011

The retired former chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, is one of the most controversial political figures in Pakistan. Despite his once extremely close ties with the American Central Intelligence Agency during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Gul has since become one of Pakistan’s harshest critics of American foreign policy in South and Central Asia. Speaking at a recent Sufi ceremony in the northeastern Punjab town of Gujranwala, Gul, who was director of the ISI from 1987 to 1989, suggested that conflicts in Afghanistan have historically been a catalyst for massive change in South Asia and that “this change is knocking at our door… The forces of paganism have faced the worst defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but these forces are reluctant to accept their defeat. By 2012, these forces will be totally exhausted.” In Pakistan, however, Gul says what is needed is not a bloodbath, but rather a “soft Islamic revolution” (Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, January 17).

Gul 1Hamid Gul and Taliban Friends

General Gul is certainly one of the most talkative former intelligence directors in the world, constantly seeking the spotlight through provocative remarks presented in a seemingly endless series of television and print interviews. While the United States has regularly claimed Gul is a supporter of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, Gul counters that his activities are strictly based on morality, Pakistani sovereignty and the struggle of Muslims to free themselves from foreign occupation and manipulation:

The Americans sent my name to the UN Security Council to put me on a sanctions list and declare me an international terrorist. But they failed because the Chinese knew the truth well and blocked that move. Basically, the Americans have nothing against me. I saw the charges and I replied to them in the English-language press in Pakistan. I said if they have anything against me to bring it forward, put me on trial. Tell me what wrong I have done. I have been taking moral stands. The Americans talk of freedom of speech, but apparently my speech hurts them because it counters their excesses… I do not support terror at all, but jihad is our right when a nation is oppressed. According to the United Nations Charter, national resistance for liberation is a right. We call this a jihad (al-Jazeera, February 17, 2010).


Pakistan’s Relations with the United States

In his capacity as Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and later ISI director under Benazir Bhutto, Gul worked closely with American intelligence agencies in coordinating and supplying the Afghan mujahideen’s struggle against Soviet occupation. This relationship began to suffer when Gul observed that American funding and interest in Afghanistan declined rapidly after the expulsion of the Soviets in 1989.  Sanctions related to Pakistan’s secret nuclear program further inflamed Gul, who tried to rally Muslim opposition to the U.S. led “War on Terrorism.” According to Gul: “The Muslim world must stand united to confront the U.S. in its so-called war against terror which is in reality a war against Muslims. Let us destroy America wherever its troops are trapped” (Daily Times [Lahore], August 30, 2003).

Gul continues to view the United States as the adversary of the Islamic world, telling a Rawalpindi daily that America will never be Pakistan’s friend – in fact, it is an even greater enemy than India (Nawa-i-Waqt [Rawalpindi], January 17). The former ISI chief claims U.S. military contractors (read Blackwater/XE) and CIA-directed drone attacks are actively working to destabilize Pakistan from within.

The former ISI chief continues to maintain the 9/11 attacks were part of an American plot to seize the resource-rich Muslim states, a plot that later instigated the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in 2007 as a means of bringing the Muslim mujahideen and the Pakistan Army into confrontation (South Asian News Agency, January 19). He cites as proof of American intentions the fact that U.S. forces did not quickly withdraw from Afghanistan after dispersing al-Qaeda elements in late 2001 and claims the Obama administration is now working to replace U.S. government troops with American mercenaries as a means of deflecting negative public opinion: “This is a very dangerous trend if we are to believe that mercenaries can win wars and carry forward the political objectives of the country. This means that whoever has more money can employ more mercenaries, win wars, win territories, etc.” (al-Jazeera, February 18, 2010).

Gul was consistent in his response to recent news of the death of his long-time associate and former ISI Colonel (retd) Sultan Amir Tarar (a.k.a. Colonel Imam) while in the hands of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Colonel Imam was kidnapped in March 2010 while on a mysterious mission to North Waziristan along with two other men, one of whom was murdered last year. Though the Taliban’s demands for the release of prisoners in government prisons were never met, the group is claiming Colonel Imam died of heart failure. Gul insists that his former colleague did not suffer from heart problems, but was instead killed by Indian intelligence and agents of private military contractor Blackwater/XE under a U.S. contract (Express Tribune [Karachi], January 23; The News [Islamabad], January 27).

Wikileaks Controversy

General Gul’s name appears in 92,000 of the U.S. diplomatic cables leaked to Wikileaks, most often in connection to his alleged ties with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda operatives. While the cables represent only raw, unanalyzed intelligence reports, the sheer volume of those mentioning Gul in connection with militant groups is nevertheless alarming. Included in the documents are reports of Gul obtaining arms and munitions for the Taliban, orchestrating the abduction of United Nations personnel in Afghanistan and bragging about his role in ordering suicide bombings, all of which remain unverified.

Gul’s response to the allegations contained in the cables was emphatic: “These documents are nonsense. They are ironic, wrong and stupid. I deny every single word in them… It is all rubbish.” For once, Gul did not blame the United States, saying the allegations were more likely the work of Afghan and Indian intelligence services (Der Spiegel, July 26, 2010).

Despite his alleged connections to Afghanistan’s Taliban, Gul sees a different motivation behind the activities of Pakistan’s own Taliban: “The Pakistani Taliban are being sponsored by the Indian intelligence and the Mossad, by the way, to carry out their attacks in Pakistan. Mossad is very active in Pakistan and they are providing all the guidance and technical support to the Indian intelligence. So, Pakistan has to have its back covered – no country can fight on two fronts.”  These remarks run contrary to the belief of Western governments that Pakistan’s ISI has close ties to the Pakistani Taliban.

Gul 2General Ahmed Shuga Pasha

Dueling Court Cases

This month a Brooklyn-based U.S. court summoned current ISI Director Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, his predecessor, Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj (current Adjutant-General of the Pakistan Army), and two other Pakistan Army officers in connection with a suit brought by two Israeli-Americans who lost relatives in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

The summons threatens to be another major blow to American-Pakistani relations, with the Islamabad government promising to resist all attempts to make serving officers of its military appear before an American court. Just in case the government’s will falters, Islamist political parties have been issuing threats of insurrection if the government fails to resist. According to Jamaat-ud-Dawah official Professor Hafiz Abdur Rehman Makki: “The Americans are the most foolish people in the world. They think that Pakistan is like an article in a cupboard and they will order it the way they like. It is due to our rulers only” (Nawa-i-Waqt, January 19). Many of the Islamists view the court case as a conspiracy engineered by Indian and Israeli intelligence agencies.

The case seems ready made for one of Gul’s appeals to Pakistani nationalism. The former ISI chief told an American periodical, “The United States [doesn’t] care about any international law or the sovereignty and dignity of any country. [The] United States of America is the violator of all the international rules and laws.” Gul further claimed the court might give a biased verdict that would slander Pakistan in the eyes of the international community (New American, January 24).

The case appears to have already had repercussions after the name of the CIA’s Islamabad station chief was leaked to a Pakistani journalist who has filed a murder case against CIA station chief Jonathan Banks, with other notices being served on CIA director Leon Panetta and U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates in relation to the death of journalist Karim Khan’s brother and son in a December 2009 drone attack in North Waziristan. Gul suggests the ISI may have leaked Banks’ name as revenge for the summons issued on its director, General Shuja Pasha, in the Brooklyn Mumbai trial (Newsweek Pakistan, January 10).

The Benazir Bhutto Assassination

Though Gul was frequently named as a suspect in Bhutto’s assassination, he was largely cleared of involvement by the Pakistan government in April 2010. It was Bhutto who replaced Gul as ISI director in 1987. The rift between Bhutto and Gul reached a critical point when Bhutto named Gul as one of four prominent Pakistanis she claimed were behind the October 18, 2007, bombing of her motorcade in Karachi, which killed 139 people and left hundreds injured.

Gul has frequently claimed Washington was behind Bhutto’s murder, but more recently has set his sights on former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf as a main suspect, saying Musharraf was responsible for Bhutto’s death and should be subject to investigation and questioning (The Nation [Islamabad], December 27, 2010; The News [Islamabad], January 5; Times of India, December 27, 2010).

Conclusion

It is difficult to assess Gul’s importance in the ongoing struggle for Pakistan’s future. There seems little doubt that Gul maintains extensive contacts within the shadowy and dangerous world of covert operations in South Asia. However, the seriousness of the Western allegations leveled at the former ISI chief seem incompatible with his accessibility to the press, leading some to dismiss his importance. Nevertheless, General Gul presents an attractive mix of Islamic revolution and Pakistani nationalism that finds a ready audience inside Pakistan. His claims that allegations of ties to terrorism are an American/Israeli/Indian conspiracy to deny him his role as a “credible critic” of Western intervention in the region likewise reverberate favorably with the Pakistani public. Gul’s importance stands primarily in the extent to which he represents a pro-Islamist, anti-American trend in Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, organizations which will ultimately have far more to do with the future direction of Pakistan than Taliban gunmen.

Hizb-I-Islami Leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Claims Civil War that Followed Russian Withdrawal Will Not Be Repeated

Andrew McGregor

September 23, 2010

Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Afghanistan’s Hizb-i-Islami and a former prime minister of the country, recently outlined his views on the future of the Afghan conflict, the jihad in Pakistan, the role of al-Qaeda, the legitimacy of suicide attacks and other issues (Geo News TV, September 15). [1]

Hekmatyar PakistanGulbuddin Hekmatyar on an Official Visit to Pakistan

The fate of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood at the hands of al-Qaeda assassins posing as Algerian journalists in 2001 is never far from the minds of Afghan political leaders, so to protect Hekmatyar’s security the interview with Pakistan’s Geo News TV was carried out by sending Hekmatyar a videotape containing questions and receiving a videotape carrying replies in return.

Hekmatyar sees most parties to the current conflict in Afghanistan coming out weaker as a result of the war. Iran and Pakistan have become embroiled in their own difficulties, while even al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban are not in a position to aid the Afghan mujahideen as they did in the past. Afghanistan’s own Northern Alliance has “disintegrated,” while other proxy groups used by Russia and the United States have become “diluted”. “The United States and its allies will have to face a similar fate after the evacuation from Afghanistan as the Soviet Union did. They will neither be able to do what they did after the 9/11 incident, nor what they did after Soviet Union’s withdrawal [when] they created the Northern Alliance in collaboration with Russia, which blocked the establishment of an Islamic government by the mujahideen.” Iran, however, is accused by Hekmatyar of cooperating with the United States while pretending to be its opponent. As a result, “Iran never had the level of influence in Afghanistan’s internal affairs as it has now.”

Surprisingly, Hekmatyar appealed to the Taliban of Pakistan to abandon their fight against the government of Asif Ali Zardari and devote their energies to driving out the foreign troops based in Afghanistan. Should the current situation change in Pakistan, the direction of its mujahideen could be refocused. “If the occupying forces attack Pakistan or any other Muslim country, it will become obligatory on all Muslims to support the Pakistani mujahideen. No doubt, the supporters of infidels [i.e. the Islamabad government] are also violating the teachings of Islam, but we need to differentiate between the bigger and smaller enemies and adopt different approaches in dealing with them.” Hekmatyar claims Afghan president Hamid Karzai does not have the authority to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces from Afghanistan. Instead, he offers a plan prepared by his party entitled Milli Meesaq (the National Charter), which he claims is supported by a majority of Afghan politicians.

The veteran Islamist warlord claims there is little chance of al-Qaeda re-establishing itself in Afghanistan, though he says their presence has been exaggerated to justify the aggression of the Western nations. “There are no al-Qaeda centers or warriors in Afghanistan anymore. The Western countries themselves have accepted that the number of al-Qaeda warriors in Afghanistan is less than 100. Is it possible that 150,000 troops equipped with modern weapons have been fighting for nine years to kill 100 warriors?”

Nevertheless, Hekmatyar advocates tactics closely associated with al-Qaeda, including attacking religious scholars who oppose suicide attacks as “pro-government opportunists.” Other than those who carry out strikes against mosques, those who give their lives in suicide attacks will be “well rewarded by God.” When asked if responsibility for 9/11 lay with al-Qaeda, the Jews or the Americans, Hekmatyar said he believed al-Qaeda was responsible, “because the Jews cannot prepare such committed people who can sacrifice their lives in suicide attacks.”

This article first appeared in the September 23, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Pakistan to Strengthen Paramilitary Levies to Secure Tribal Frontier

Andrew McGregor

February 25, 2010

With roughly 20% of its combat capability currently deployed, combating insurgency in the northwest frontier region, Pakistan’s military is eager to consolidate its hold on the tribal areas and return its regular forces to the eastern frontier with India. To accomplish this, the government has turned to one of its weakest and most unreliable security forces: the paramilitary Levies.

Bajaur LeviesLevies of the Bajaur Agency (FATA)

On February 17, President Asif Ali Zardari announced a new plan to upgrade the Levies to enable them to take on the task of providing police services and general security after the withdrawal of the army (Associated Press of Pakistan, February 17). According to the President, “The anti-militancy war is a huge national effort and calls for strengthening and upgrading all its components” (The News [Islamabad], February 19).

The Levies (originally the “Swat Levies”) were created by the British in 1895 as a paramilitary police force. The Levies now come under the administrative control of the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON). The restructuring of the Levies will include an expansion in numbers, better training and the provision of modern weapons and equipment (Daily Times [Lahore], February 15). A special directorate general will be created to oversee the upgrade and operations of the Levies.

To accomplish this, the Levies have been allocated a supplementary grant equivalent to 300% of its current budget. This will be followed by $17.6 million in spending to improve the levies over the next two years. Some of this money will be spent on the construction of new posts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan (Associated Press of Pakistan, February 17). New equipment is vitally needed; until now the Levies have been issued little more than an outdated rifle and a handful of rounds.

The unreliable Levies will have an uphill struggle to maintain control in the frontier region. On February 14, the Political Agent for Orakzai Agency ordered the pay of local Levies suspended over their failure to perform their duties, citing fear of Taliban militants. The Levies were warned that they would be dismissed if they did not resume their activities (The News, February 14). Six officers from the Malakand Levies were among 155 NWFP officials against whom the government recently initiated action due to their ties to Islamist militants (The News, January 14). Last August, 66 Levies personnel, including a subadar major, were suspended after they were charged with laying down their arms before the Taliban in Malakand Division in the lead-up to Operation Rah-e Rast (Nawa-e Waqt, August 27, 2009). Nevertheless, over 100 Levies have been killed and another 40 injured in clashes with militants in the last four years (The News, February 19). A suicide attack in Jamrud (Khyber Agency) on February 10 killed 15 Levies and Khassadars (Tribal Police) (The News, February 12).

Poor pay and lack of compensation to heirs if killed in action are issues that pose a major problem to recruiting capable personnel to the Levies. Taliban salaries are far higher and compensation of Rs 5 million ($58,871) is paid to the families of dead Taliban fighters (Khabrain [Islamabad], August 19, 2009). On February 9, the Peshawar High Court responded to a number of lawsuits filed by heirs of deceased Levies and ordered SAFRON to pay Rs 1 million ($11,774) as compensation to the heirs of Levies and other security personnel killed in military operations in the tribal region (The News, February 10). The upgrade program is expected to bring the wages of the Levies and Khassadars in line with NWFP police personnel in urban areas. Levies are currently paid Rs 3,500 ($41) per month, less than the official minimum wage.

Habibullah Khan, a senior member of the FATA secretariat, has suggested that the Levies establish their own investigative and intelligence services (The News, July 31, 2009). The FATA secretariat has also urged the recruitment of another 5,000 Levies to bolster the current 6,779 Levies in their new mission of securing the gains of the Pakistani military.

This article first appeared in the February 25, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Pakistani Taliban Display Effectiveness of their Intelligence Network with Attack on U.S. Special Forces

Andrew McGregor

February 19, 2010

Following the Afghan Taliban intelligence coup that led to the late December suicide-bombing at an American base in Khost province that killed seven CIA agents, Pakistan’s Taliban have apparently scored an intelligence success of their own, exposing a secret U.S. operation in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) by killing three American Special Forces operatives in a carefully targeted suicide car-bombing. The attack took place outside the re-opening of a girls’ school in Shahi Koto, an area of the Lower Dir district of the NWFP. The Pakistani military claimed to have cleared Upper and Lower Dir of militants in the summer of 2009.

frontier constabularyThe suicide bomber appears to have waited for the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) vehicle carrying the Americans before driving his car alongside and detonating a powerful bomb of 50 to 60 kilograms of explosives. Other than the three Americans, five schoolgirls and an FC soldier were killed. Dozens of schoolgirls were wounded after being trapped under the rubble of the demolished school building (AFP, February 4). The girls’ school was one of dozens destroyed by TTP forces under the command of Maulana Fazlullah last year. It was rebuilt with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Investigators from Pakistan’s security services claimed the suicide bomber was an Uzbek who was part of a group of militants fleeing from military operations in Bajaur (The News [Islamabad], February 8; see also Terrorism Monitor, February 11).

The suicide bombing was carried out with deliberation; the attacker appeared to know when the convoy was destined to arrive and which of the five vehicles contained the Americans. Police are investigating whether the attacker had inside information (Daily Times [Lahore], February 5).

Besides proving their ability to strike targets even in areas “cleared” of insurgents by the Pakistani military, those behind the bombing also sent a powerful signal to the local community that their children will not be safe at schools which are not authorized by the TTP. One leading Pakistani daily expressed astonishment that TTP insurgents would take revenge for the death of TTP leader Hakimullah Mahsud by a cruel attack on a crowded girls’ school. “Is this the bravado that the Mahsuds are known for?” (Business Recorder [Karachi], February 9).

A spokesman for the Frontier Corps initially claimed the dead foreigners were “working for an NGO” and were from “the international community” (The Nation, February 9). An editorial in a leading Pakistani daily described the initial confusion that sparked debate in Pakistan over the identity of the deceased and the nature of their mission in Pakistan. “Three foreign nationals were reported killed. Initially they were said to be ‘foreign journalists,’ then they became aid workers perhaps working with USAID but by mid-afternoon they had become ‘U.S. army personnel’ and by late afternoon as per a statement by the U.S. embassy in Islamabad they were ‘trainers’ working with the Frontier Corps” (The News, February 4).

Despite clumsy attempts to conceal the identity and mission of the dead Americans, the bombing provided conclusive evidence of an American military presence in Pakistan that had been concealed from the public, the political opposition and the media.  A U.S. embassy official in Islamabad denied the mission was ever covert. “It’s not a secret program by any means. The F.C. is operational in those areas. They’ve requested training and assistance and we’re providing them… Do we highlight it actively? No. But it’s not that we don’t talk about it” (AFP, February 4). Eventually embassy officials revealed there were roughly 200 U.S. troops in Pakistan on a mission to provide security assistance and training in combat and intelligence methods to FC personnel. The training program had started in the summer of 2008 and was accompanied by shipments of useful supplies generally missing from FC inventories: night scopes for rifles, night vision equipment, body armor, medical supplies, communications equipment, etc. (AFP, February 4).

Pakistan’s Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Qamar Zaman Kaira, said the government has never denied the presence of American troops in side Pakistan, and that their sole purpose was to upgrade the training of forces on the northwest frontier that were not properly equipped to tackle terrorism (Associated Press of Pakistan, February 5).

The bombing and the initial confusion over the identity of the victims immediately fed into the popular belief in Pakistan that large numbers of private military contractors from American firm Xe Services LLC (still almost exclusively known in Pakistan by its former name – Blackwater Worldwide) are conducting covert operations in Pakistan, including many of the bombings that have been blamed on the local Taliban. In a claim of responsibility made shortly after the blast, TTP spokesman Azam Tariq stated, “The Americans killed were members of the Blackwater group. We know they are responsible for bomb blasts in Peshawar and other Pakistani cities” (The Nation [Islamabad], February 3). Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, stated that the dead and wounded servicemen were members of the regular armed forces and not contractors from Xe Services, saying Taliban claims to the contrary were predictable. “They’re certain to say that. That’s what they do. They’re adept at propaganda and distortion” (Dawn [Karachi], February 5). Two prominent ex-leaders of the Pakistani military and intelligence services, former chief of army staff General (Ret’d.) Aslam Beg and former military intelligence director Lieutenant General (Ret’d.) Amjad Shoaib, inflamed the controversy by insisting the dead servicemen were actually members of Blackwater’s “Special Operational Group” (Jang [Rawalpindi], February 7; PakObserver, February 5).

Another Taliban commander known as Hafizullah told the press that the attack specifically targeted the U.S. Special Forces soldiers after Pakistani security officials claimed the true target was F.C. Colonel Nadeem Mirza, who suffered injuries in the attack. Hafizullah also hinted that the TTP had prior information about the formation and timing of the convoy (The News, February 8).

The former security chief in Pakistan’s tribal agencies, Brigadier (Ret’d.) Mehmood Shah, suggested the information may have come from inside the Frontier Corps, which is recruited from the same tribal population from which the Taliban are drawn. Shah remarked that the paramilitary F.C. was not as well-disciplined as the regular forces and that the rank and file could not be trusted with secret information (The News, February 8).

Pakistani defense analyst Ikram Sehgal noted that the F.C. remains a poor cousin to the Pakistani regular forces deployed along the eastern frontier with India. “Locally recruited Frontier Corps troops are lightly armed, good only in their policing role, dealing with tribal rivalry and border smuggling, rather than engaging in military operations combating well-armed and experienced guerrillas” (The News, February 11).

An Islamabad daily usually well-informed on military issues said their sources indicated the Special Forces unit was involved in training a 1,000 man F.C. commando force to carry out operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the difficult terrain of the North-West Frontier. The U.S.-funded program was not publicized to avoid a public backlash in Pakistan. “In the beginning, the American military trainers confined themselves to training compounds due to security concerns in Pakistan. However, they had now started accompanying Pakistani troops on special guerrilla operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants, eventually leading to the Wednesday incident in Lower Dir which shares a border with Afghanistan and with the restive Swat district…” (The News, February 4).

The Americans were the first U.S. troops killed in Pakistan since an Air Force Major and a Navy cryptologist were killed in the September 20, 2008 TTP bombing of the Marriot hotel in Islamabad.

This article first appeared in the February 18, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Qaeda Ideologue Rules on Permissibility of Mass-Casualty Market Bombings

Andrew McGregor

February 12, 2010

Al-Qaeda’s al-Fajr Media Center has released a religious ruling on the permissibility of mass-casualty attacks in public places like markets. Written by Shaykh Atiyatullah, the ruling came in response to an inquiry into the October 28, 2009 market bombing in Peshawar. The bombing was carried out through the detonation of 150 kg of explosives hidden in a parked car, and it devastated the Mina Bazaar of Peshawar, reserved for the use of women and children. Over 100 people were killed and 200 wounded, mostly women. At the time, both the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qaeda denied involvement in the attack, which sparked widespread outrage (The News [Islamabad], October 29, 2009; Dawn [Karachi], October 30).

Abu al-YazidShaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid

In the format typical of such rulings, a questioner asked whether it was permissible in Islam to celebrate the deaths of “shoppers, merchants and the general populace,” given what the questioner asserted to be the victim’s “serious shortcomings in matters of religion, thinking only about their worldly life and sustenance, refraining from jihad, deserting the mujahideen, and living under the authority of an apostate government?”

Shaykh Atiyatullah’s ruling starts out in a promising fashion with a strong condemnation of such attacks, saying that Muslims are obliged to object to them as means of spreading corruption, falsehood, oppression and transgression. In short, they are “contrary to the pure religion of Islam.” According to the shaykh, “It is a religious fact known to all that it is forbidden to transgress against a Muslim’s life… It is considered one of the greatest of sins after shirk [polytheism].”

Based on these considerations, Shaykh Atiyatullah draws the conclusion that these types of bombings could not have been carried out by the mujahideen, whose activities never transgress the laws of Islam. “We firmly believe that they are carried out by the enemies of Allah, either through criminal security contractors such as Blackwater [Xe Services LLC] and their likes, or other filthy groups working under Pakistani intelligence [Inter-Services Intelligence – ISI] or some criminal impure generals in the army.” The Shaykh alleges that the purpose of these bombings is to discredit the mujahideen and destroy their image in the Islamic world while scaring Muslims away from participating in jihad.

Shaykh Atiyatullah provides a lengthy quotation from an earlier statement by al-Qaeda’s commander in Afghanistan, Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. Shaykh Saeed al-Masri) on the Peshawar bombing (ansarnet.info, November 11, 2009). Part of the passage cited by Atiyatullah similarly claims the bombing and all those like it to be the work of Blackwater and Western intelligence agencies in league with the apostate rulers of Muslim nations:

We believe that such bombings are the work of the Crusaders, the enemies of God, and their allies in the government and intelligence. It is part of the dirty war that they practice. How could that not be when they are the ones who mean harm to Muslims? They do not have any consideration for any sanctity and Muslim blood is worthless to them. Today, everyone knows that Blackwater and other criminal groups have violated Pakistan with support from [Pakistan’s] corrupt and criminal government and its security agencies. They commit these ugly actions and blame them on the mujahideen through their media outlets in order to tarnish the image of the mujahideen and Muslims.

Shaykh Atiyatullah pauses to consider the possibility that some of these mass-casualty attacks on civilians may have been committed by the mujahideen, noting that if this is so, the culprits “are not mujahideen, but rather havoc-wreaking criminals… But in reality the probability of this is negligible, and all praise is due to Allah, the mujahideen can certainly not do this.”

This article first appeared in the February 12, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor