Egyptian Police Strike is Latest Challenge to National Security

Andrew McGregor

October 28, 2011

While Egypt’s military not only survived the January 25 Revolution, but succeeded in taking complete control of all government functions, the internal collapse of the nation’s Interior Ministry continues (see Terrorism Monitor, April 7, 2011; Terrorism Monitor Briefs, July 22).  Responsible for Egypt’s domestic security and policing, the Interior Ministry was blamed for much of the violence inflicted on demonstrators during the Revolution. Former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly is now facing charges connected to the deaths of protestors, as are a number of other police officials. However, many police never returned to work after the Revolution, while others have engaged in anti-Ministry protests and arson attacks on police facilities. Now a series of police strikes has broken out across Egypt that threatens to bring an end to the Egyptian Interior Ministry in its current form.

Striking Egyptian Police, Cairo

Demoralization is the dominant trend in Egypt’s police forces since the Revolution, with many fearing prosecution by the nation’s new military rulers. The police strikes are also part of a larger wave of labor unrest that continues to sweep Egypt since the Revolution, with damaging effects on the national economy and the nation’s tourism industry, an important source of jobs and foreign currency.

The police strikes began on October 24. Thousands of police have gathered in a camp outside the gates of the Interior Ministry headquarters in Cairo, while in the Red Sea Province city of Hughada, striking police stormed the local police headquarters and destroyed the office of its director. Police at Cairo’s international airport have erected tents in the airport’s arrivals hall (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 26). Most importantly, the strikers’ have threatened not to provide security for Egypt’s November 27 parliamentary elections.

Though he was regarded as an unpopular choice within the ministry, new Interior Minister Mansur Essawy took office last March by pledging he would restore security and reduce the role played in Egyptian life by the security services (Ahram Online, March 23; al-Jazeera, March 7). However, since the revolution police are rarely seen on the streets and Egyptians have been urged to take measures to ensure their own security. Crime rates are soaring and car-theft has become an epidemic as police fail or refuse to respond to complaints (Ahram Online, October 26).

Many of the protestors’ grievances predate the Revolution, but complainants at that time were routinely met with investigation, punishment or dismissal. Though the nature of the exact grievances differs according to local circumstances, most can be grouped into the following categories:

  • Calls for the resignation of Interior Minister Mansur Essawy.
  • Higher wages, though some police have said this does not necessarily entail greater funds from the public purse, only the proper distribution of funds now stolen by senior police officials.
  • Access to police hospitals, which in practice are only open to senior police officers and their friends and families.
  • Improved working hours and coverage of transportation expenses.
  • The dismissal of a number of police generals known for corruption and their close ties to former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly.
  • An end to military trials for policemen. Some striking policemen claim it was fear of military trials for disobedience that was responsible for their brutal treatment of protestors during the Revolution (Bikya Masr [Cairo], October 25; al-Masry al-Youm, October 24, October 26).

Some demonstrating policemen have complained their representatives have emerged from discussions from senior ministry officials with raises for themselves, but nothing for their comrades (Daily News Egypt, October 25).

Civilian ministry workers have also joined the protests, claiming they are treated worse than the policemen, although demands such as institutionalized recruitment of their sons and daughters for ministry jobs seem to reflect the ways of the old regime (Daily News Egypt, October 25).

On October 25, the ministry issued a statement saying it had agreed to most of the strikers’ demands, but warned that it would not tolerate any threats to the security of the November parliamentary elections (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 26). Deputy Interior Minister General Abd al-Latif al-Bidiny offered some observations on the strike on state TV on October 26, acknowledging the legitimacy of the strikers’ demands while suggesting the entire structure of the Interior Ministry needed to be replaced, but only after the political and security spheres had stabilized (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 26).

This article was first published in the October 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Former Deputy Commander Describes Work of Russia’s Alpha Counter-Terrorism Unit

Andrew McGregor

October 28, 2011

The former deputy commander and 15-year veteran of Russia’s elite Alfa counterterrorist unit, Sergey Goncharov, has shed some light on various controversial operations carried out by his former unit in a wide-ranging interview carried by a Russian magazine (Itogi, October 10). Goncharov is currently head of the Alfa Veteran Association which has engaged in anti-Yeltsin political activism in the past but is mainly concerned now with providing protection to Russian “VIPs.”

Alfa’s participation in incidents such as the January 1991 massacre of Lithuanian civilians in Vilnius has left some Alfa veterans open to prosecution (see Rian.ru, July 22). Nonetheless, Goncharov maintains that Alfa Group does not act as an enforcement team for politicians: “We have never been afraid to disagree with decisions imposed from above. And when some kind of TsK [Central Committee] member, who has never held anything other than a hunting rifle, orders us to resolve a problem in a particular way, he needs to be politely sent away. And they have been sent away.”

Goncharov defended the Alfa Group’s role in the 2002 Nord-Ost Theater crisis (in which 129 hostages were killed by poison gas released by Russian Special Forces) and the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis (in which 334 hostages and 21 security men were killed in a bungled rescue operation): “Both operations are black marks on both the unit and on the history of Russian antiterrorist efforts. Nonetheless, in the first one, in my opinion, the tactic that was selected was the only possible solution to avoid an enormous loss of life. Of course, it is a great pity that hostages were killed and died from [gas] poisoning, but the use of the so-called “laughing gas” was just about the only solution available at that time… The use of the gas allowed us to enter the auditorium and with precise sniper fire neutralize the terrorists, without incurring huge losses [to Alfa forces]. But at Beslan actually there was no assault. There the guys saved the children, and did not kill the terrorists. They drew fire on themselves as they covered the students with their own bodies.”

In 2005, Goncharov made the surprising claim, against all available evidence, that the assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar was carried out by American Special Forces rather than Russian agents (Pravda, August 20, 2005; for the assassination see Terrorism Monitor, May 17, 2005).

However, Goncharov advocates the “targeted elimination of terrorist leaders,” suggesting that the Alfa group has an important role to play in such operations: “[Assassination] is one of the most effective methods of combating terrorism under contemporary conditions. Using medical terminology, the ‘Alfa’ group is a sharp scalpel, a direct action instrument, and the final argument when pills and enemas do not help.” Goncharov notes, however, that such operations can only have a limited effect: “If someone thinks that the elimination of a single leader will result in the destruction of an entire command, this is not correct. Terrorism is an enormous business, in which many countries are engaged. This business is passed on as a legacy, from one killed leader to another.”

Turning to the ongoing conflict in the North Caucasus, Goncharov maintains that the struggle there is financed by external sources: “Fighting in our North Caucasus has been going on so long not for an ideal, but only because combat operations are so lavishly financed. And by whom? One can only speculate. But I personally think this: no matter how hard we try to become friends with the Americans, we will never become friends with them. We can only be fellow travelers with them up until the time they use us for their own purposes. And then they will continue on their own way. And instability in the North Caucasus plays into their hands.”

This article was first published in the October 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

A Portable War: Libya’s Internal Conflict Shifts to Mali

Andrew McGregor

October 28, 2011

Mali, like its neighbor Niger, is facing the return of an estimated 200,000 of its citizens from Libya. Most are Malian workers and their families who have been forced to flee Libya by the virulently “anti-African” forces that have seized power in that country. Some, however, are long-term Tuareg members of the Libyan military who have suddenly lost their jobs but not their arms. Armed Tuareg began returning to northern Mali in large numbers in August and continue to arrive in their homeland in convoys from Libya (El-Khabar [Algiers], August 29).

Unfortunately, Mali has nothing to offer these returnees; not aid, not employment, nor even a sense of national identity; in sum, nothing that might provide some counter-incentive to rebellion. Disenchantment with the West is at an all-time high among the Tuareg. Even the French have fallen from favor; while the Tuareg could once count on a sympathetic reception in Paris and from elements of the French military, in the last few months Tuareg fighters have found themselves on the receiving end of French airstrikes and their home communities attacked by French-armed rebels. Both France and the United States have also made extensive efforts to train and equip the generally ineffective and cash-strapped militaries of Mali, Niger and several other Sahara/Sahel states in the name of combatting terrorism, improvements that run counter to Tuareg interests. A Malian government minister was quoted by a French news agency as saying the returning Malians were really a Libyan problem: “They’re Libyans, all the same. It’s up to the Transitional National Council [TNC] to play the card of national reconciliation and to accept them, so that the Sahel, already destabilized, doesn’t get worse” (AFP, October 10).

Pro-Qaddafi Tuareg Fighters in Libya

Another 400 armed Tuareg arrived in northern Mali from Libya on October 15, with many keeping their distance from authorities by heading straight into the northern desert (Ennahar [Algiers], October 18). Their arrival prompted an urgent invitation from Algeria for President Touré to visit Algerian president Abdel Aziz Bouteflika (Maliba [Bamako], October 17). According to Malian officials, the returned Tuareg were in two armed groups; the first with some 50 4×4 trucks about 25 miles outside the northern town of Kidal, the second consisting of former followers and associates of Ibrahim ag Bahanga grouped near Tinzawatene on the Algerian border (Reuters, October 20; L’Aube [Bamako], October 13). An ominous development was the recent desertion of three leading Tuareg officers from the Malian Army, including Colonel Assalath ag Khabi, Lieutenant-Colonel Mbarek Akly Ag and Commander Hassan Habré. All three are reported to have headed for the north (El Watan [Algiers], October 20).

Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga, a prominent rebel leader and cousin of the late Ibrahim ag Bahanga who has already deserted the Armée du Malitwice to join rebellions in the north, was given a three-year leave “for personal reasons without pay” by Maliian defense minister Natie Plea beginning on July 1, apparently for the purpose of allowing ag Fagaga to lead a group of young Tuareg to Libya to join the defense of Qaddafi’s regime (Le Hoggar [Bamako], September 16). Ag Fagaga is now believed to be back in northern Mali, preparing for yet another round of rebellion.

The Malian government’s response to these developments was to send Interior Minister General Kafougouna Kona north to open talks with the rebels. General Kona has experience in negotiating with the Tuareg and is trusted by President Touré (BBC, October 17).

According to some reports, Qaddafi offered the Tuareg their own Sahelian/Saharan state to secure their loyalty (al-Jazeera, September 28; El Watan [Algiers], October 20). Only days before his resignation, Dr. Mahmud Jibril, the chairman of the Executive Bureau of the Libyan TNC, suggested that Mu’ammar Qaddafi was planning to use the Tuareg tribes to fight his way back into power, adding that the late Libyan leader was constantly on the move in Tuareg territories in southern Libya, northern Niger and southern Algeria. Rather bizarrely, Jibril then claimed that Qaddafi’s operatives in Darfur were raising a force of 10,000 to 15,000 Rashaydah tribesmen from Sudan (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 19). The Rashaydah are an Arab tribe found in the Arabian Peninsula, but also in Eritrea and the Eastern Province of Sudan, where they moved in large numbers in the mid-19th century.  In general the Rashaydah remain aloof from local politics, preferring to focus on their camel herds. Jibril’s suggestion that large numbers of Rashaydah tribesmen could be rallied to Qaddafi’s cause seems strange and highly unlikely.

Arms Smuggling and Drug Trafficking

The Tamanrasset-based Joint Operational Military Committee, created by the intelligence services of Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania in 2010 to provide a joint response to border security and terrorism issues, has turned its attention to trying to control the outflow of arms from Libya (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, July 8, 2010). The committee, which got off to a slow start, has announced its “first success”; identifying 26 arms traffickers and issuing warrants for their arrest (Jeune Afrique, October 14; L’Essor [Bamako], October 6). The list includes a number of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) commanders and is based on an investigation that discovered three major networks for smuggling arms out of Libya, the “most dangerous” consisting of Chadians and Libyans (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], October 8).

Security sources in the Sahel are reporting that AQIM is expanding its operations into the very lucrative business of people-smuggling by setting up an elaborate network that has the added advantage of allowing AQIM operatives to infiltrate into Europe (Info Matin [Bamako], October 6).

Drug trafficking continues to be another destabilizing factor in northern Mali as well-armed gangs battle over the lucrative trade. In early September at least five gunmen were killed in a battle between Tuareg traffickers and Reguibat Arabs with ties to the Saharawi Polisario Front. The battle ensued after the Tuareg kidnapped three Reguibat, including a senior Polisario officer, Major Harane Ould Zouida (Jeune Afrique, September 20). Such incidents are far from unknown in today’s Sahara; in January a major battle was fought between Bérabiche Arabs running drugs to Libya and Tuareg demanding a fee for passing through their territory (El Watan [Algiers], January 4; see also Terrorism Monitor, January 14). In this environment, drug traffickers are likely to be offering premium prices for military hardware finding its way out of Libya.

Traditional authority is now being challenged in both the Arab and Tuareg communities of northern Mali as AQIM, smugglers, rebel leaders and traffickers compete for the loyalty of young men in a severely underdeveloped region. The “noble” clans of the Arab and Tuareg communities have also suffered electoral defeats at the hands of “vassal” clans, a development the former blame on the vassal candidates buying votes with smuggling money (U.S. Embassy Bamako cable, February 1, 2010, as published in the Guardian, December 14, 2010; Le Monde, December 22, 2010; MaliKounda.com, December 7, 2009). The rivalry has spilled over into a contest for control of trafficking and smuggling networks. Ex-fighters of the Sahrawi Polisario Front (currently confined to camps in southern Algeria) have also entered the struggle for dominance in cross-Saharan drug smuggling. Members of Venezuelan, Spanish, Portuguese and Colombian drug cartels engage in frequently bloody competition in Bamako that rarely attracts the attention of the police (El Watan [Algiers], January 3).

A Tuareg Member of Parliament from the Kidal Region, Deyti ag Sidimo, has been charged by Algeria with involvement in arms and drug trafficking. The MP may be extradited to Algeria if his parliamentary immunity is lifted (Info Matin [Bamako], October 13; Le Combat [Bamako], October 4; Jeune Afrique, October 9-15).

Attack on the Abeibara Barracks

An example of the government’s inability to secure the Kidal region of north Mali was presented on October 2, when gunmen arrived at the site of a military barracks under construction in Abeibara. The gunmen sent the workers away with a warning not to return under pain of death before blowing up the construction materials. A National Guard unit tasked with protecting the work was apparently absent at the time of the attack. Military officials admitted that they did not know if the gunmen were AQIM, soldiers just returned from Libya or part of a criminal gang involved in the trafficking the construction of the barracks was meant to prevent (Info Matin [Bamako], October 26; AFP, October 3). It has also been suggested the attack was the work of local companies that had been outbid on the construction contract (Le Prétoire [Bamako], October 5). Fifteen soldiers were killed when a military garrison at Abeibara was attacked by a Tuareg rebel group under Ibrahim ag Bahanga in 2008 (Reuters, May 23, 2008).

Burned-out AQIM vehicle in the Wagadou Forest

Mauritanian Raid in Mali’s Wagadou Forest

Mauritanian jets carried out air strikes on October 20 on AQIM forces gathered in the Wagadou Forest (60 miles south of the Mali-Mauritania border), allegedly destroying two vehicles loaded with explosives (L’Agence Mauritanienne d’Information [AMI – Nouakchott], October 20; AFP, October 22). The Mauritanians appear to have hit their primary target, AQIM commander Tayyib Ould Sid Ali, who was on board one of the vehicles destroyed in the air strike. Mauritanian officials confirmed his death, saying Sid Ali was preparing new terrorist attacks in Mauritania after having been active in the region since 2007 (Ennahar [Algiers], October 22). The precision of the attack in difficult terrain suggested that Nouakchott had received accurate intelligence information regarding Sid Ali’s location. Mauritania’s security services had disrupted a Sid Ali-planned attempt to assassinate Mauritanian president Muhammad Ould Abdel Aziz in Nouakchott in February by intercepting AQIM vehicles after they crossed the border (Quotidien Nouakchott, February 3; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, February 10).

Mauritania’s aggressive French-backed approach to the elimination of AQIM has seen several Mauritanian military incursions into Mali in the last year, including a previous ground assault on an AQIM camp in the Wagadou Forest in June that killed 15 militants and destroyed a number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons possibly obtained from looted Libyan armories (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], June 25; AFP, June 26; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, July 7). Mali’s military has played only a minimal role in these operations and questions have been raised in Bamako regarding the government’s prior knowledge of these events and the military’s relative lack of participation.

2012 Elections

With the second term of Amadou Toumani Touré’s presidency coming to an end, national elections will determine a new government for Mali in Spring 2012.  Though at least 20 individuals are expected to run for president, the contest is expected to be fought hardly between three prominent candidates, Dioncounda Traore, Soumaila Cisse and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

Mali’s Islamists see a political opportunity in the coming elections, with noted religious leaders Cherif Ousmane Madani Haidara and Imam Mahmoud Dicko making it clear Islamist groups will be involved (L’Indépendant [Bamako], September 29).

Reshaping the Rebellion

Three factors have redrawn the shape and ambition of the simmering rebellion in northern Mali in the last few months:

  • The arrival in northern Mali (and neighboring Niger) of hundreds of experienced Tuareg combat veterans with enough weapons and ammunition to sustain an extended and possibly successful rebellion against a weak national defense force.
  • The death of the controversial rebel leader Ibrahim ag Bahanga has removed a powerful but often divisive force in the Tuareg rebel leadership. This has opened space for the development of new coalitions and the emergence of new leaders with a broader base of support.
  • The July declaration of independence by South Sudan has provided the lesson that a determined and sustained rebellion can overcome internal divisions and foreign opposition to arrive at eventual independence, even if secession means leaving with valuable resources such as oil or uranium.

On October 16 the Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) announced its merger with the Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali (MTNM), led until recently by the late Ibrahim ag Bahanga (mnamov.net, October 17). The resulting Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) stated its intention to use “all means necessary” to end Mali’s “illegal occupation” of “Azawad” if the Bamako government does not open negotiations before November 5.  Azawad is the name used by the Tuareg for their traditional territory in the Sahel/Sahara region north of Timbuktu. The term can also include traditional Tuareg lands in northern Niger and southern Algeria. The MNLA spokesman, veteran rebel Hama ag Sid’Ahmed, (former father-in-law of Ibrahim ag Bahanga) said that a number of high-ranking officers from the Libyan military had joined the group (BBC, October 17; Proces-Verbal [Bamako], October 17).

Two other groups have emerged since the return of the fighters from Libya with the stated intent of achieving autonomy for “Azawad.” The first is the Front Démocratique pour l’Autonomie Politique de l’Azawad (FDAPA), which includes veterans of the struggle for Bani Walid under the command of Colonel Awanz ag Amakadaye, a Malian Tuareg who served as a high-ranking officer in the regular Libyan Army (Kidal.Info, October 18; AFP, October 12; MaliWeb, October 25). The other group is an Arab “political and military movement” called the Front Patriotique Arabe de l’Azawad (FPAA). The group appears to be a kind of successor to the Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA), an earlier expression of Arab militancy in northern Mali. Like the Tuareg, the Arab nomads of northern Mali have in the past suffered attacks from Songhai tribal militias such as the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy (“Masters of the Land,” founded by Mohamed N’Tissa Maiga), which advocated the extermination of the nomadic Arabs and Tuareg of Mali (see interview with Maiga – Le Politicien [Bamako], July 21). These assaults played a large role in initiating the Tuareg and Arab rebellions of the 1990s and there have been calls in certain quarters of Mali for a revival of the Ganda Koy (Le Tambour [Bamako], November 25, 2008; Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako], November 19, 2008).

Conclusion

Mali is experiencing its own “blowback” as a result of its support for the Qaddafi regime in Libya. No effort was made to prevent Malian Tuareg from joining Qaddafi’s forces; indeed, the government even granted leave of absences to Tuareg officers who wished to fight in Libya. Bamako’s thinking no doubt went along the lines of believing that such assistance might help preserve the ever-generous Qaddafi regime; if, on the other hand, things did not go well for the Libyan regime, Bamako could at least count on the loss of a number of troublemakers and officers of uncertain loyalty. What was likely not anticipated was the return of hundreds of well-trained and well-armed Tuareg military professionals, some of whom have been absent from Mali for decades, along with most of the more recent pro-Qaddafi volunteers. Mali is suddenly faced with the possible existence of a professional insurgent force that needs only to fight a war of mobility on its own turf, territory that has often proved disastrous for a Malian military composed mostly of southerners with little or no experience of desert conditions and tactics. If another round of Tuareg rebellion breaks out in Mali, the security forces will be hard pressed to deal with it, leaving ample space and opportunity for AQIM to expand its influence and power at the expense of the Malian state.

This article first appeared in the October 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Salafist Attacks on Sufi Shrines in Libya May Indicate Prolonged Sectarian Violence

Andrew McGregor

October 20, 2011

A sudden series of attacks on Sufi shrines and tombs in and around the Libyan capital of Tripoli by heavily armed men in uniform has shocked the large Sufi community in Libya and may indicate the development of a pattern of sectarian attacks similar to those against Sufi groups in Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and elsewhere. Supporters in Tripoli welcomed the attacks, claiming the Sufis were using the shrines to practice “black magic” (AP, October 13).

Exhumed Tomb of Sidi Abdul Rahman al-Masri, Tripoli

In Tripoli, the attackers broke into the shrines of Abdul Rahman al-Masri and Salim Abu Sa’if, exhuming and taking away their remains while burning relics and other items found at the shrines. Similar attacks were reported elsewhere in Tripoli and in the nearby town of Janzour. Some of the attackers boasted of having come from Egypt for the purpose of destroying Sufi shrines (AP, October 13). Tripoli’s revolutionary military council is currently headed by Benghazi Salafist militia leader Abd al-Hakim Belhadj.

Salafists in general oppose the construction of elaborate tombs for Muslim holy men or their visitation in the hope of securing their intercession through pilgrimage and prayer. The sentiment runs so strongly in the Salafist community that Saudi Wahhabis even once tried to destroy the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina.

In Somalia, heavily armed al-Shabaab fighters have used hammers and other tools to destroy Sufi shrines and graves while chanting “Allahu Akbar.” According to an al-Shabaab official, such operations would continue “until we eradicate the culture of worshiping graves” (AFP, March 26; see Terrorism Monitor Brief, April 2, 2010). Al-Shabaab’s anti-Sufi approach led to the foundation of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a (ASJ), a Sufi-dominated militia devoted to the destruction of al-Shabaab’s Salafi-Jihadists.

In recent years the ever-mercurial Gaddafi backed away from his regime’s anti-Sufi policies (largely directed at the once-powerful Sanussi order) and began to encourage the wider adoption of Sufism by Libyan Muslims as a means of countering the growth of Islamism in centers like Benghazi. To this end Tripoli was the surprising host of the Second World Sufi Conference, held in the Libyan capital last February (Tripoli Post, February 15).

Transitional National Council head Mustafa Abdul Jalil denounced the attacks, describing them as “not on the side of the revolution,” while urging a noted religious leader in the rebel ranks, al-Sadiq al-Gheriani, to issue a fatwa condemning such attacks. Al-Gheriani has already said he opposes the construction of such shrines, but does not advocate their forcible removal while the successful rebel forces still lack a unified command (AP, October 13).

In neighboring Egypt there have been reports that Salafists intend to destroy a number of Sufi shrines and mosques, beginning with the mosque housing the tomb of al-Mursi Abu’l-Abbas and continuing with the destruction of 15 other Sufi mosques in Alexandria. Sufis in that city have supplied the Egyptian military with a list of 20 mosques that have already been attacked by Salafists. Street-fights have broken out elsewhere in Egypt as Salafists use the post-Revolution breakdown in law and order to attack Sufi shrines (al-Masry al-Youm, April 12). Sufis in Egypt are reported to be forming self-defense committees.

This article was first published in the October 20, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

IRGC Commander Describes Iranian Victory over Kurdish Insurgents

Andrew McGregor

October 20, 2011

The commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corp maintains that it was the Guards’ ability to confront Kurdish guerrillas on their own terms that led to an apparent defeat of the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane (Party of Free Life of Iranian Kurdistan – PJAK) after a three-month offensive.

IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jaffari

Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Mohammad Ali Jaffari suggested that PJAK had mistakenly believed that Iranian forces would use “classic warfare” tactics incapable of defeating guerrillas in the field: “The IRGC’s capability in both classic and asymmetric and guerrilla warfare surprised the PJAK terrorist group so much that they surrendered… Since the IRGC enjoys asymmetric and guerrilla warfare capability, in addition to its capability in classic wars, the PJAK group was encountered in its own method… and they realized that we have the ability to deploy troops and defeat everyone everywhere” (Fars News Agency, October 8; ISNA, October 8).

Following a series of border incursions by teams of PJAK fighters, Iran deployed a force of 5,000 IRGC troops and Border Guards to largely ethnic-Kurdish northwestern Iran, where they destroyed a PJAK base in the Jasosan Heights near Sar Dasht city in West Azerbaijan Province (Fars News Agency, September 26). The offensive halted for a month following a Ramadan ceasefire negotiated by northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but operations resumed when it became clear PJAK had not used the break to withdraw to their bases in northern Iraq. The IRGC also claimed that PJAK had used the Ramadan ceasefire to dig tunnels in the Jasosan Heights along the border and to receive weapons and equipment supplied by the U.S. Consulate in Arbil (Fars News Agency, October 8).

After a number of battlefield setbacks that included the death of PJAK deputy commander Majid Kavian (a.k.a. Samakou Sarhaldan), PJAK unsuccessfully tried to have the ceasefire renewed, an impossibility so long as PJAK occupied Iranian territory (Sepah News, September 7). KRG president Masoud Barzani, wary of the possible implications of sending Kurds to secure the borders from other Kurds, instead urged both PJAK and their senior partner, the Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party – PKK) to come to settlements with their respective Iranian and Turkish opponents (AFP, September 7).

By September 21, the IRGC was claiming to have killed over 180 PJAK fighters while driving the group out of northwestern Iran (Payvand Iran News, September 21). PJAK claimed to have killed 600 Iranian soldiers in its resistance to the Iranian offensive, a figure that has little basis in reality (AFP, September 15). The real figure is more likely in the dozens. Iranian Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi said that PJAK had agreed to stay one kilometer away from the Iranian border but promised that Iranian forces would continue taking action against PJAK until the group was destroyed (Mehr News Agency, October 9).

Brigadier General Ali Shademani, Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the Iranian Armed Forces, told Iran’s official press that PJAK was a creation of the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel and would be replaced by these nations once it became clear PJAK would not succeed in its objectives (Press TV, September 29). PJAK in turn has accused the United States of providing intelligence about the Kurdish insurgents to Turkey which is then shared with the Iranians, though Ankara has denied passing on U.S. intelligence reports to Tehran (Rudaw.net, September 10).

murat karayilanMurat Karayilan (IMCTV)

Some Turkish media sources reported that the effective leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, was captured during Iranian operations in mid-August. The Iranians allegedly located the PKK commander by using intelligence provided by Turkey’s Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (National Intelligence Organization – MIT).  It is widely suspected in Turkey that Iran intervened to save Murat Karayilan from being killed by Turkish bombing by arresting and later releasing the PKK leader (Hurriyet, October 17). In this scenario it has been speculated that the PJAK withdrawal from its forward bases in Iran was the price of Karayilan’s freedom (Yeni Safak, October 12; Today’s Zaman, October 12; Hurriyet, October 11).

Karayilan affirmed that he was not under detention in Iran when he appeared on the PKK-affiliated Roj TV in early October, a declaration Iranian authorities supported by saying they had no information regarding the alleged arrest of Karayilan (Rudaw.net, October 18). Turkish authorities expressed satisfaction with Iran’s denials, saying Turks should “turn a blind eye” to the allegations while refuting a rumor that Karayilan had been captured by Syrian forces (Hurriyet October 14).

This article was first published in the October 20, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Free Syrian Army Leader Threatens Strikes on Syrian Military

Andrew McGregor

October 14, 2011

Since the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on July 29, the force led by  
Colonel Riyad Musa al-Asa’d (formerly an engineer in the Syrian Air Force) has become the core of a small but still largely ineffective armed opposition to the Syrian regime. [1]

Free Syrian Army Commander Colonel Riyad Musa al-Asa’d

The only visible part of the FSA is a camp inside Turkey’s Hatay Province containing roughly 65 former Syrian soldiers and officers. The camp is surrounded by troops of the Turkish military, which has been conducting an October 5-13 mobilization exercise in Hatay Province (Hurriyet, October 5; AFP, October 5). It is from here that Colonel al-Asa’ad attempts to recruit and direct defectors from the Syrian Army, which he says number some 10,000, spread all over Syria. The FSA also operates a press office from the camp which tries to rally international support for the FSA and its campaign of armed opposition to the regime of Bashar Assad. As part of this effort Colonel al-Asa’d has recently granted a series of interviews to regional and international news outlets describing the formation of the FSA and its intent to overthrow the Syrian regime.

Colonel al-Asa’d makes some bold claims about the FSA and its ability to control defectors from the Syrian military by creating a type of mirror force: “We have formed a complete army and distributed the regiments and companies according to the system operating in the regular Syrian army’s command… There is a need to create an army nucleus capable of controlling matters and which turns into an official army after the regime’s downfall” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 9).

While some defectors have joined the FSA, it seems clear that many other military defectors have simply gone home or into hiding. One group was recently involved in fighting with regime forces in Rastan in a battle in which 40 people are said to have been killed before the FSA was driven from the town (The National [Abu Dhabi], September 30).

Despite the claims of Colonel al-Asa’d and the FSA, the new armed opposition force is still a long way from mounting an effective campaign against the regime. The FSA remains poorly organized and lacks safe bases from which to mount attacks on the Syrian Army. The FSA has few weapons and admits it lacks external support. While Turkey appears willing at the moment to offer refuge to Colonel Asa’d and his small group of followers, this is still a long way from allowing a large resistance force to carry out cross-border military operations. According to the Colonel, “The Turks are the only ones standing with us now. The Arabs have let us down and therefore we have no one except them.” The FSA rejects foreign intervention, but is asking for an “air and naval embargo” against Syria and a “no-fly zone” in certain parts of Syria (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18; Hurriyet, October 10).

Colonel Asa’d maintains that until now, the FSA has refrained from carrying out operations against fellow soldiers in the Syrian Army, preferring instead to combat selected groups such as the non-military security forces, air intelligence and the Shabihah, an informal pro-regime militia. Now, however, shelling of civilians by the regular army and bombings by the air force have compelled the FSA to direct their attention towards the regular forces: “We excluded [the regular army] at first, but we are now forced to target it. We are going to strike with all our force” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 9). In an interview with a UK daily, al-Asa’d said he is coordinating a campaign of guerrilla attacks and assassinations through intermediaries that cross between Turkey and Syria (Independent, October 10).

Nevertheless, Colonel al-Asa’d told a Turkish daily that assistance of the type received by Libyan rebels from NATO would be essential to the FSA’s success: “If the international community helps us, then we can do it, but we are sure the struggle will be more difficult without arms… The international community has helped opposition forces in Libya but we have been waiting and suffering for seven months. The situation is less complicated in Syria than the situation in Libya but we haven’t received any help so far” (Hurriyet, October 8).

Note

1. For the founding statement of the FSA, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZcCbIPM37w

This article was first published in the October 14, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship

Andrew McGregor

October 14, 2011

Following a series of high-level meetings between American and Pakistani security and military figures related to the operations of the notorious Haqqani Network in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, the leadership of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has released a statement denouncing what it perceives as an American attempt to detach the Haqqani Network from the Taliban command in the interests of creating divisions within the movement.  The statement is also critical of American suggestions that the Haqqani Network has close ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the latter agency long suspected of having close ties to the Taliban and various other Islamist militant groups active in Kashmir and in the tribal agencies of Pakistan’s northwest frontier. The Taliban consider this an attempt to “attribute the decisive and staggering attacks by Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate to the neighboring country of Pakistan” (ansar1.info, September 27).

Jalaluddin Haqqani

The Taliban assert that the success of their summer “Badr” offensive was so successful that it forced many Coalition partners to reassess their participation in the Afghanistan conflict. Afghanistan’s government claimed from the beginning that “Badr” was coordinated with the ISI (Tolo News [Kabul], May 28). According to the Taliban statement, the success of this campaign revealed the true nature of the “lies and false information” spread by CIA chief General David Petraeus and others in the American command. Unwilling to attribute these victories to the Afghan Taliban, these same U.S. officials have concocted an intervention from Pakistan to explain their defeats at the hands of an enemy they claim to have weakened long ago. These unfounded allegations are meant to “deceive the members in its coalition for a bit longer.”

The Taliban are especially disturbed by American suggestions that veteran Pashtun jihadi commander Jalaluddin Haqqani is not part of the Afghan Taliban command but is rather somehow a separate force “tied to others.” The statement asserts that such efforts are designed to “give a bad name to our prominent figures by tying them to foreign intelligence… the Islamic Emirate is at its strongest and [is] unified more than it has been at any other stage… Neither are our bases in Pakistan, nor do we need residence outside of our country… The respected Jalaluddin Haqqani is [one of] the Islamic Emirate’s honorable and dignified personalities and receives all guidance for operations from the leader of the Islamic Emirate.”

The U.S. military has long been frustrated by deadly operations carried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces, which typically retire into Pakistan after finishing their operations, placing them beyond most forms of retribution by American forces.  A series of meetings in the last few weeks has been designed to goad Pakistan’s military into carrying out a major offensive against the Haqqani Network and compel the ISI to stop its support for the group (Pakistan Observer, October 10).

According to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, “We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the border attacking our forces and [Afghans] and disappearing back into a safe haven… We keep telling [the Pakistanis] you can’t choose among terrorists. If you are against terrorism, you have to be against all forms of terrorism” (Dawn [Karachi], September 22).

This article was originally published in the October 14, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Bursting the Dam of Ma’rib: Regional Destabilization and the Collapse of the Yemeni State

Jamestown Foundation Conference:

Yemen after the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Disintegration?
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Washington, D.C

October 13, 2011

Bursting the Dam of Ma’rib: Regional Destabilization and the Collapse of the Yemeni State

Address by Andrew McGregor

Introduction

The Arab Spring is merely the beginning of what will probably be several decades of accelerated political, social and cultural growth in the Middle East. It will also be a time of heightened instability due to environmental and demographic changes that are fuelling demands for political change. Yemen is undoubtedly a prime example of a nation consumed by such changes.

Yemen - Dam of MaribRuins of the Great Dam of Ma’rib

While acknowledging that there are many bright and energetic individuals working towards solutions for Yemen’s mounting problems, I think that a broad calculation of the rapidly deteriorating political, economic and environmental situation in Yemen can only result in a rather alarming assessment of Yemen as the center of a massive threat to long-term regional security in one of the most sensitive regions of the planet.

The Ma’rib Dam

While my paper has been assigned to the so-called “Water Panel” at today’s event, I actually intend to discuss the ancient Ma’rib Dam as a kind of metaphor for the impending collapse that threatens modern Yemen.

The Ma’rib Dam was one of the great engineering feats of antiquity. By the 9th century BCE this project had transformed large parts of Ma’rib into fertile gardens that observers often described as “a paradise.” With their food supply assured, the ancient Sabaeans were able to build a remarkable civilization in Yemen. However, by the first century of the Common Era, the dam began to break, with each breach destroying parts of the massive irrigation system and sending local tribes flooding out of the region. Successive attempts to repair the dam were made, but the final collapse in 542 triggered a major migration from this part of Yemen as the land returned to desert and the region suffered an economic collapse from which it never fully recovered. The catastrophe was even mentioned in the Qu’ran, where it was described as a divine punishment caused by the people of Ma’rib turning away from God. The mass migrations that followed the dam’s collapse permanently changed the political, social and cultural future of the rest of Arabia and even North Africa.

Challenges

Yemen is facing a similar catastrophe today – Oil, the mainstay of the economy and the source of three-quarters of the state budget, will run out in 2017. Water is quickly running out across the country, with the capital of Sana’a likely to run out first. The country is also experiencing a population explosion, with the population expected to triple by 2060. Civil wars and political instability make it extremely difficult to address any of these problems. A major catastrophe is coming in Yemen, one that will have a massive impact on regional security.

Before speaking of a Yemeni decline we must recognize that Yemen is already at the bottom of the heap in a number of important sectors, most notably being the poorest country in the Arab world, with the lowest GDP and few economic prospects. Current economic indicators are not good; inflation is racing ahead and the value of Yemen’s currency is declining rapidly. Public debt is on the rise while foreign currency reserves are shrinking. Yemen’s inability to suppress the Houthist rebellion in the north has been a major drain on the national treasury even before unrest began to spread through the rest of the country.

Yemen is already a net importer of food and is experiencing major increases in the cost of basic commodities. With fish stocks in massive decline and a major part of the agricultural sector and Yemen’s arable land devoted to the production of the drug qat, many Yemenis may soon find themselves unable to feed themselves. As qat is a far more lucrative crop that any food product, it is extremely hard to convince farmers to shift away from water-intensive qat production to something more useful. One consequence of the local population explosion will be an even greater demand for qat.

Current water demand is already well in excess of renewable resources, yet despite this qat production continues to consume something between 33 and 40% of water used for agriculture. Desalinization plants may be able to supply some of Yemen’s expanding water needs, but this option is enormously expensive, even prohibitive in the case of pumping desalinized water to the highlands. The Yemeni capital of Sana’a may run out of water at the same time the nation runs out of oil in 2017. The capital’s explosive population growth is rapidly making continued inhabitation untenable, but it is difficult to see how suggestions the capital might be moved from the arid highlands could be funded.

Perhaps most alarming is Yemen’s soaring population growth. From roughly 24 million people today, Yemen is expected to have a population of roughly 60 million by 2050, though it seems almost certain that some kind of internal collapse would occur before such a figure could be reached. Half the population is already under 15 years of age and will encounter few prospects as they come of age. Urbanization is placing further pressures on water supply and increases the number of people reliant on the state rather than their own resources.

Yemen currently has a 35 to 40% unemployment rate. A shrinking economy will soon be unable to provide employment for possibly a majority of Yemenis, a dangerous prospect. Unemployment also provides a large pool of disaffected young men for recruitment into various types of militant organizations.

Growing populations elsewhere and the impact of labor-saving technology will send remittances into further decline as demand for Yemen’s largely unskilled work force in the Gulf States will continue to shrink. Education and job training programs will have little chance of reversing this trend without the provision of basic nutrition to children and young people.  UNICEF figures indicate almost half of Yemen’s children already suffer from chronic malnutrition, which can have a long-term impact on physical and mental health.

Yet despite these challenges, refugees continue to take their life in their hands to make the perilous trip from Somalia to Yemen.   More will be coming – Somalia’s forests are not growing back and a continuing series of droughts and famines may represent the future of life in the Horn of Africa.

Yemen does have reserves of natural gas that could help replace some of the missing revenues from depleted oil industry, but Yemen’s ongoing political turmoil will delay full exploitation of these reserves, likely leaving a perilous gap between the expiry of the oil industry and the natural gas industry coming online.

The Separatist Option

As in Somalia, where tiny new “statelets” keep emerging as a means of coping with a collapsing state, separatism might present itself as an option for Yemen’s various tribal confederations or geographic groups.  The idea is to minimize the scope of overwhelming problems by making them smaller and seemingly easier to deal with, or by cutting off less prosperous areas to preserve more viable regions.  However, these type of policies would likely invite an interminable war for dwindling resources. Some parts of the country are already effectively self-ruled, such as the largely tribal east and the Houthist north, where the writ of the Sana’a regime has largely evaporated.

Can Yemen survive as a series of statelets, some viable, some not? The biggest challenge facing such statelets is that it will likely prove impossible for these regions to repel the natural gravitation of people to areas with food, water and at least the possibility of employment.

Creating smaller mini-states may sound appealing in theory but in practice these mini-states would be unsustainable. The old city-states of Europe were based on economic prosperity created by trade and manufacturing. The mini-states of Yemen will have little to trade and manufacture nothing. Yemen’s problems also need to be faced with a united front if any progress is to be made. Unlike Somalia, which had only the briefest experience with a unified national government, Yemen has traditions of centralized government going back for thousands of years. This will prove a strong counter-trend to the initial wave of separatism, but its success will depend on the ability of Yemen’s government to act in such a way that it will persuade at least some of Yemen’s many factions that a central or even federalist government is the solution. A unified Yemen will also undoubtedly receive the support of many of Yemen’s tribal and political power-brokers who have benefited from this system in the past. However, if the state is seen as incapable of furthering their own agendas, these power-brokers may begin to seek other options.

Yemen - DemonstrationSecurity Implications

In the struggle for power in the coming post-Saleh era, counter-terrorism will inevitably be a low priority in Yemen. Already we have seen Yemen’s elite counter-terrorism units, trained by the U.S. at great expense, pulled from their duties to provide personal security for the president. Like Saleh, many local leaders will see al-Qaeda as a useful tool to use against their enemies, possibly leading to further incidents such as the withdrawal of Yemeni troops from Zinjibar without opposition to its takeover by al-Qaeda allied militants. The targeting of pipelines and other oil facilities by al-Qaeda and various tribal groups is a continual threat to government revenues and discourages foreign investment.

Declining oil production has also reduced the state’s ability to cover military and security costs and salaries, a problem exacerbated by the vast numbers of so-called “ghost soldiers” in the military, a tradition inherited from the Ottoman administration. Ghost soldiers exist only on paper, allowing corrupt officers to draw salaries, clothing, supplies and arms from the government and then resell such provisions on the open market.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will almost certainly attempt to exploit growing dissatisfaction with a government that finds itself unable to provide for the peoples’ needs. The question is how will a highly armed population react to life-threatening shortages? Again following the Somali example, it is possible that some Yemenis might turn to piracy in the strategically important waters just beyond the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Given the enormous growth trend of Yemen’s population, we must also recognize that many areas that are viable now may not be in the relatively near future under the pressures of their own unsustainable populations, never mind the arrival of refugees from other parts of the country, or from similarly threatened states in the Horn of Africa.

It will be difficult to isolate a deteriorating Yemeni state from its neighbors. Controls along the border with Saudi Arabia are expanding, but conversely, efforts to keep a troubled Yemeni population within Yemen’s borders may be a bit like preventing steam from escaping a boiler; it works for a while, but eventually the boiler will explode with devastating consequences for all those around it.

The vast lands of Africa will almost certainly appeal to Yemenis desperate to flee their homeland, with Yemenis possibly arriving in waves much as their ancestors once did after the collapse of the Ma’rib Dam, helping change the face of East and North Africa. With nothing in the way of coastal defenses or a functioning immigration system, Somalia could easily provide an unregulated gateway for Yemenis, many of whom might seek to make their way north to the Mediterranean coast before arriving in the southern EU states, which are already experiencing enormous problems absorbing migrants from Africa. The number of Yemenis pouring out of a collapsing state could easily reach into the millions in a relatively short period of time, threatening the collapse of some weak states in the Horn of Africa region or the Arabian Peninsula. This kind of effect could quickly threaten regional security and even international security a short time later should these events cause disruptions to energy supplies from the region.

Could larger numbers of Yemenis replace Asian foreign workers in the Gulf States? Of course, but this will only shift the problem elsewhere by increasing problems in the Asian states that currently rely on GCC remittances. More importantly, however, Yemen remains a target of resentment from the GCC states, which remember the Saleh regime’s decision to support Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait, a decision that was followed by the expulsion of 850,000 Yemenis from the Gulf States and the consequent loss of remittances from these Yemenis working abroad. A largely unskilled and often barely literate workforce is unfortunately of little use in the Gulf or elsewhere.

An International Effort to Save Yemen?

Unfortunately, Yemen’s present administration seems almost designed to thwart any efforts at relief, being consumed by levels of corruption that are among the highest in the world. In this environment, local capital seeks safer markets elsewhere and foreign investment is effectively deterred. Yemen’s political system is also based on extensive patronage networks, which raises the question of what happens when oil revenues begin to disappear. Will scarce government funds continue to go to patronage in the interests of self-preservation at the expense of much-needed development projects? Will international aid be similarly redirected? We must also take into account that implementing the reforms that could save Yemen or even slow its precipitous descent will almost inevitably be opposed by stakeholders who will see a threat to their position in such reforms.

Given the economic decline that can be expected as the oil fields dry up, it is plain that no Yemeni state will have the resources to deal with these overwhelming problems. That leaves an international effort, and a large one at that.

Will the Saudis and other GCC states turn their substantial resources towards aiding their Yemeni brethren? So far there is little sign of this. Or will the GCC states turn their resources to a seemingly cheaper option, preventing the spill-out of Yemenis in their direction? Unfortunately, Yemen will have to compete with other nations in the region for aid, reforms and development. Egypt, for one, may soon face its own political, economic, demographic and environmental crises that will take priority over the resolution of Yemen’s problems, even in the Arab world.

Current international economic trends are not in Yemen’s favor. $2 trillion may be needed to right the European economy – there will be little left over for places such as Yemen. The United States may face similar pressures – even in a best-case scenario there is little prospect for the kind of rapid economic expansion that would enable the U.S. to fund massive rehabilitation projects in places like Yemen. Yemen’s pervasive corruption at all levels of government will also make massive international assistance a hard sell. Yemenis may also be asked to change their behavior in ways they might find unpalatable. As food pressures grow worldwide, how likely is it that international donors will step up to provide food to a nation producing families far larger than those found in their neighbors or that prioritizes the production of a recreational drug over food? In addition, international aid efforts are also likely to meet resistance from an insular Yemeni society that distrusts foreign intentions. Regional rivalries will inhibit the rapid creation of mechanisms designed to pull Yemen back from the brink.

Money alone will be unable to resolve the looming multiple crises in Yemen. Similar to post-hurricane Haiti, the infrastructure simply does not exist to absorb and make use of financial aid, even without the real threat of such aid disappearing into private hands.

Conclusion

To sum up, Yemen faces unsustainable population growth, unsustainable exploitation of resources, a system of government that is crumbling and a general lack of will to undertake necessary reforms. There are unfortunately few trends that would indicate Yemen will pull out of this downwards spiral. Desalinization plants and natural gas reserves may provide some temporary help, but perhaps only long enough to apply one or two more patches on the dam before it bursts. Yemen’s current political state gives little hope that it will soon be able to present the kind of united and determined front needed to confront these problems.

As resources shrink, Yemen’s well-armed tribes will increasingly come into conflict over water and pastures, creating an almost permanent state of instability that the government will be unable to resolve. The gradual dissolution of the national army is also placing heavy weapons into tribal hands.

Repeated attempts to patch up or repair the Dam of Ma’rib were not enough to prevent its collapse. Today there are enormous pressures on the Yemeni state that threaten its collapse, a disaster that will not be averted by half-measures.  The social and political transformations that might help delay or prevent the collapse are unlikely to be achieved in the time left, leaving the possibility of a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions with vital implications for regional and international security.