Wad Banda Raid Shows Khartoum Losing Control of Darfur Conflict

Posted on September 11, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 11, 2007

A daring rebel raid 200 kilometers into the Sudanese province of Kordofan suggests that the Darfur conflict may actually be spreading, despite the initiation of Darfur peace negotiations in Tanzania last month. At 4 PM on August 29, four columns of fighters from Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) converged on a Sudanese military base at Wad Banda, Kordofan province. The rebels occupied Wad Banda for several hours, leaving before sundown with captured weapons and all the police vehicles. At first, the military denied there was a base at Wad Banda, but later acknowledged that a small group of “renegades” had been driven off by police. Two days later, the government reported 41 deaths as a result of the raid (SUNA, August 31). Both JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and the Khartoum government reported the participation of a faction from the largest rebel movement in Darfur, the Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity (SLA-Unity), but the claim was immediately refuted by SLA military commander Sulayman Marjan (Sudan Tribune, August 31).

JEM Fighters

The raid followed a similar operation in early August in which JEM and a coalition of rebels targeted the garrison responsible for guarding Darfur’s sole rail link to Khartoum. During a brief occupation of the town of Adila, JEM seized numerous vehicles and heavy weapons, many of which were probably used in the Wad Banda raid. Both attacks were led by Abd al-Aziz Ushar al-Nur Ashr, a Darfur field commander who has returned from east Sudan, where JEM carried out military operations against Khartoum in alliance with the Beja Congress. It was not the first such attack on Kordofan; last year, JEM combined with other rebels to raid Hamrat al-Shaykh in northern Kordofan (al-Sahafa, July 4, 2006).

The Sudanese government responded by treating the attack on Wad Banda as part of an external threat to Sudan’s stability. The minister of the interior, Professor al-Zubayr Bashir Taha, told the remaining police at Wad Banda that “plots by the colonial powers” would be defeated. The governor of North Kordofan added that unity was needed to thwart “international conspiracies” against Sudan (Sudansafary.net, September 2). The next day, a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum denied any U.S. links to the rebels, deploring the loss of “innocent life” (Sudansafary.net, September 3). According to the rebels, Wad Banda served as a supply depot for government and militia attacks on civilians in south Darfur. JEM complains that Sudanese MiG-29s and antiquated Antonov bombers continue bombing civilian targets in Darfur in violation of a UN Security Council resolution (particularly following the raid on Adila).

JEM is usually regarded as a Zaghawa-dominated movement, based on the semi-nomadic African tribe that straddles the Chad/northern Darfur border. JEM leaders are probably the most experienced and sophisticated of all the many rebel movements in Darfur, giving the movement a weight unjustified by its numbers. Many Zaghawa became skilled and innovative desert fighters during the Chadian civil war and the campaign against Libyan garrisons in northern Chad. The conflict in Darfur is, in part, a reflection of the growing assertiveness of the Zaghawa, who already dominate the government in Chad. In Sudan, the Zaghawa now present a commercial challenge to Arab dominance of the economy. Zaghawa factionalism, however, has prevented the development of a unified Zaghawa movement. In recent months, JEM has made efforts to broaden its ethnic base, including sacking the group’s military commander, who was accused of favoring the Zaghawa.

Even after signing peace agreements with rebel movements in the south and the east, Khartoum is faced with a deteriorating situation in the west. In an unsettling development, some Darfur Arabs (including janjaweed defectors) have begun to take up arms against the government, forming new rebel fronts or joining existing groups of African Muslim rebels. Combined with JEM’s new military offensive, Khartoum risks losing its grip on Darfur before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping mission in January.

This article first appeared in the September 11, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

China’s Oil Offensive Strikes: Horn of Africa and Beyond

Posted on August 10, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 10, 2007

In its efforts to expel an Islamist government and capture a handful of inactive al-Qaeda suspects in Somalia, the United States has risked its political reputation in the region through a series of unpopular measures. These include backing an unsuccessful attempt by warlords to take over the country, several ineffective air raids, and finally, the financing of an unpopular Ethiopian military intervention. As African Union peacekeepers struggle to restore stability in the capital of Mogadishu, China has stepped in to sign the first oil exploration deal negotiated by Somalia’s new government. The agreement is the first of its kind since the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 began a long period of political chaos in the strategically important nation.

Chinese Oil Rig in South Sudan (Tong Jiang/Imaginechina)

China’s four major oil corporations have unlimited government support, allowing them to edge out the smaller Western oil companies that traditionally take on high-risk exploration projects like Somalia. Latecomers to the global oil game, the Chinese companies and their exploration offshoots have focused on oil-bearing regions neglected by major Western operators because of political turmoil, insecurity, sanctions or embargoes. China once hoped to supply the bulk of its energy needs from deposits in its western province of Xinjiang, but disappointing reserve estimates and an exploding economy have given urgency to China’s drive to secure its energy future. Twenty-five percent of China’s crude oil imports now come from African sources.

The Somalia deal is part of a decades-long Chinese campaign to engage Africa through investment, development aid, “soft loans,” arms sales and technology transfers. The European Union recently warned China that it would not participate in any debt-relief projects involving China’s generous “soft-loans” in Africa (Reuters, July 30).

Global demand for oil is expected to rise over 50 percent in the next two decades even as prices rise and reserves decline. To meet this demand, China and other Asian countries offer massive infrastructure developments in exchange for oil rights. President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders are regular visitors to African capitals and Chinese direct investment in Africa totaled $50 billion last year.

Oil in Somalia?

Last month a deal was reached between Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China International Oil and Gas (CIOG) to begin oil exploration in the Mudug region of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland (northeast Somalia) (Financial Times, July 17). Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which has yet to secure its rule, is to receive 51 percent of the potential revenues under the deal.

Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf (a native of Puntland) appears to have negotiated the deal in concert with Puntland officials but without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, Ali Muhammad Gedi, who is still working on legislation governing the oil industry and production-sharing agreements. Gedi insists that “in order to protect the wealth of the country and the interests of the Somali people, we cannot operate without a regulatory body, without rules and regulations” (Financial Times, July 17). The agreement with China may become an important test of the authority of the transitional government. China has effectively pre-empted the return of Western oil interests to Somalia, though it is unclear how the Chinese project may be affected by the passage of a new national oil bill. Somali negotiators assured the Chinese firms that new legislation would have no impact on exploration work due to begin in September (Shabelle Media Network, July 17).

Though Somalia has no proven reserves of oil, Range Resources, a small Australian oil company already active in Puntland, suggests that the area might yield 5 to 10 billion barrels (Shabelle Media Network, July 14). Somalia is also estimated to have 200 billion cubic feet of untapped natural gas reserves. Western petroleum corporations, however, conducted extensive exploration of potential oil-bearing sites in Somalia in the 1980s and found nothing worth developing.

Public unrest is already on the rise in Puntland as the local government grows increasingly authoritarian and the national treasury has mysteriously dried up. Discontent has accelerated as leaders of the one-party regime continue to sign resource development deals with Western and Arab companies without any form of public consultation. The new deal with China has the potential to ignite political unrest in one of the few areas of Somalia to have avoided the worst of the nation’s brutal political nightmare.

China’s Strategy in Africa

Last November, Beijing hosted an important summit meeting between Chinese leaders and representatives of 48 African countries. The African delegates gave unanimous support to a declaration endorsing a one-China policy and “China’s peaceful reunification” [1]. China in turn announced a $5 billion African development fund (administered by China’s Eximbank), with a promise of $15 billion more in aid and debt forgiveness to come. In exchange for secure energy supplies, China is also offering barrier-free access to Chinese markets, something Africans have been unable to obtain from the United States or the EU.

While China has had success in securing energy supplies in Africa, its oil offensive is by no means flawless. Chinese corporations working abroad provide little employment for local people and are remarkably tolerant of corruption and human rights abuses. Chinese overseas operations are also notorious for their disregard of environmental considerations. The latter is perhaps unsurprising, considering the environmental devastation afflicting China’s own industrial centers. Yet, the combination of all these factors tends to create unrest in nations where Chinese operations are seen as benefiting members of the ruling elite and few others. What is also notable is that of the five African countries where China is involved in major resource operations, only one, Angola, is not dealing with a major insurgency.

Sudan

China continues to expand its operations in the Sudan, its most successful foreign energy project to date. Oil from southern Sudan currently supplies 10 percent of China’s imported energy needs. Chinese and Malaysian companies operating as a joint venture (with a minority Sudanese share) stepped up to take over the exploitation of Sudan’s vast oil reserves after international pressure forced out the Canadian Talisman Corporation. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) recently announced the acquisition of a 40 percent share in a major exploration site off the Sudanese Red Sea coast. A 1997 embargo prevents U.S. companies from operating in the Sudan.

The Sudanese/Swiss ABCO Corporation claims that preliminary drilling in Darfur revealed “abundant” reserves of oil. These reserves have yet to be confirmed, but it appears that the rights may have already passed into Chinese hands (AlertNet, June 15, 2005; Guardian, June 10, 2005).

Ethiopia

China and Malaysia, partners in the Sudan, are trying to replicate their Sudanese success in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. As a demonstration of goodwill—and to increase the incentives for cooperation—China and Ethiopia signed a debt relief agreement in May worth $18.5 million (Xinhua, May 30). In addition, a new convention center for the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa is being built with substantial Chinese assistance.

Following its usual practice, China imported its own labor to work in the Ogaden projects in preference to hiring local workers. Asian exploration companies tend to arrive in the region with large military escorts after negotiating contracts with the Tigrean-based government in Addis Ababa. The ethnic-Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden region have little input, making the operations a target of the rebel Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). A commando unit of the ONLF attacked a well-guarded Chinese oil exploration facility in northern Ogaden on April 24, killing 65 Ethiopian troops and nine Chinese workers. A further seven Chinese workers were abducted “for their own safety” and released a week later (ONLF communiqué, April 24)

Niger

In Niger the CNPC (already active in two other concessions) appears to be in the lead for the sole rights to the promising Agadem concession, to be awarded sometime this month. With financial support from the Chinese government, CNPC is offering to build a refinery and a pipeline in exchange for the rights, a commitment even Western oil giants like Exxon have shied away from. A Tuareg-based rebel movement in the resource rich north has declared Chinese oil and uranium operations “unwelcome” while accusing China of supplying the Niger army with weapons to pacify the region. Rebels attacked an armed supply convoy heading to a CNPC exploration camp in July, killing four soldiers (Reuters, July 31).

Nigeria

Last year, the CNOOC moved into territory previously dominated by major Western oil companies in the Niger Delta, paying $2.7 billion for a 45 percent share in an offshore oilfield expected to go into production in 2008 (Reuters, April 26, 2006). China is building $4 billion worth of oil facilities and other infrastructure in return for access to other promising Nigerian oil-fields, including the untapped inland Chad basin (BBC, April 26, 2006).

With a growing insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta threatening Nigeria’s oil industry, China has stepped in to supply weapons, patrol boats and other military equipment. Beijing does not share Washington’s reluctance to supply such hardware to a Nigerian military accused of corruption and human rights violations (Financial Times, February 27). The insurgents claim that Chinese, Dutch and U.S. resource companies fail to hire local labor and are devastating the local economy and environment through unchecked pollution. The world’s eighth largest oil exporter, Nigeria is also a major market for Chinese exports.

Angola

Beijing has been wooing oil-rich Angola through promises of aid and development. Its promise of $2 billion in soft loans brought a guarantee of uninterrupted oil supplies to China and offshore exploration rights for CNPC while enabling Angola to avoid Western pressure to restructure a corrupt and inefficient economy.

Competition with the United States

As China intensifies its economic engagement with Africa, the United States has been steadily increasing its military presence in Africa, supplying arms, training troops and opening new bases for U.S. personnel. Efforts such as the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative have brought U.S. forces into many countries for the first time as part of the global effort against al-Qaeda. The creation last February of AFRICOM, a new U.S. regional combatant command for Africa, reflects Washington’s new interest in the area. Despite the anti-terrorism rhetoric, it appears that the main function of AFRICOM will be to secure U.S. energy supplies in a region that is expected to provide a growing share of the United States’ future energy needs.

Ironically, U.S. arms and military training provided under the guise of “counter-terrorism assistance” may ultimately provide Chinese oil interests with the security they need to carry out operations in high-risk areas. An Ethiopian army financed and equipped by the United States for use against “Al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia” is now being used to protect Chinese oil exploration efforts in the Ogaden region through military operations against ONLF rebels and punitive attacks on ethnic-Somali civilians.

Conclusion

So far, a visible disinterest in tying resource development contracts to social or economic reforms has aided China in securing its energy future in Africa. To be fair, this pattern of tolerance for corruption in regimes with desirable natural resources was set long ago by Western corporations and governments. China still employs the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in its relations with Africa, but many Africans are beginning to see China as an exploitive major power supporting corrupt regimes in the same manner as the former Western imperial powers. While China is taking some small steps to correct this impression, problems will persist unless Africans see immediate benefits from the Chinese presence, particularly in the field of employment. China’s success in presenting itself to the Third World as “the largest developing country” will eventually have limited currency if its business operations become indistinguishable from Western corporations. In the meantime, China’s rivalry with the West for control of Africa’s oil is certain to intensify.

Notes

See the full text of the Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, available online at: english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/16/content_6586.htm.

Hybrid Force: The UN’s Peacekeeping Gamble in Darfur

Posted on August 7, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 7, 2007

A close examination of the terms of the Darfur peacekeeping mission approved by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 offers little confidence that the mission will be any more successful than the current African Union deployment. The resolution approves a force of 26,000 men, including the 7,000 AU peacekeepers already in Darfur (Middle East Online, August 6). On Khartoum’s insistence, the bulk of the force must be African in origin. The proposed “hybrid” UN/AU force appears to be little more than a much larger, more complicated version of the ineffective AU operation already in Darfur. Three of the most effective Western militaries (the U.S., the U.K. and Canada) have already stated they will have no role in the force.

AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan: To be replaced by UNAMID (Rob Crilly)

The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a “Chapter 7” peacekeeping force. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter allows for “necessary action,” including force, to protect the mission as well as humanitarian organizations and civilians. In the watered-down version of Chapter 7 negotiated with Khartoum, the Sudanese government must first approve such use of force. UNAMID will be led by Nigerian Gen. Martin Agwai, an experienced peacekeeper and chief of the Defense Staff of the Nigerian Armed Services since June 2006. Agwai has warned that it is unlikely that enough African troops can be raised to fill out the new peacekeeping force. UNAMID is not expected to fully deploy until December 31, probably an optimistic deadline given the composition of the force and the nature of the territory. Financing will be a problem with a mission expected to cost $2 billion in its first year. Despite international pledges of support, existing AU peacekeeping forces in Darfur and Somalia are notoriously under-financed, with very few funds actually reaching the troops in the field. In a road-less environment with no infrastructure, the mission will require an effective system of transport and air support. If trouble erupts, surface routes will become highly dangerous and outposts difficult to relieve or evacuate.

Instead of mandating disarmament, Resolution 1769 only calls for UNAMID to “monitor” illegal arms movements in Darfur. All parties are urged to commit to a cease-fire and the creation of “initiatives” to return the displaced, provide compensation and put new security measures in place. There are no provisions for the arrests of war crimes suspects. During Security Council negotiations on the resolution, China and the three African members of the UNSC (South Africa, Ghana and the Republic of the Congo) succeeded in dropping a key provision calling for “further measures” (i.e., sanctions) to be taken against Sudan if it failed to cooperate with the UN mission.

There is no question of the 2.5 million displaced persons returning home in the near future. The well-armed Arab tribes that have settled on seized lands must first be removed. This is not as simple as returning them to their traditional lands, however, for in many cases their old pastures have become lifeless deserts. Land redistribution or compensation cannot be achieved without the participation of Khartoum and certainly does not fall within UNAMID’s mandate. The traditional land rights system of Darfur was designed to accommodate both nomads and farmers. Some form of renegotiation of this system with the involvement of local scholars and tribal elders would seem to form the best basis for a lasting peace in Darfur. None of this will be possible, however, without a process of disarmament and the demobilization of militias and rebel groups.

Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir and Vice President ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha are consummate political survivors in a country where politics is frequently played for keeps. They will not be looking for an open clash with the UN force, but will do everything else possible to make their stay uncomfortable. The Sudanese leadership will not be easily cowed or forced to relinquish sovereignty in any degree. Its consent to a Chapter 7 UN force comes only after a considerable diplomatic effort by China, perhaps the only world power with an honest claim to influence in Khartoum today. It would be unwise to expect China’s present level of support for the Darfur mission to continue very long after the close of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

The conflict is growing increasingly complicated. Arabs are fighting Arabs over depopulated regions, and former rebels who signed the 2006 Abuja agreement are now fighting their former allies on behalf of the government (al-Sudani, August 2). Just identifying the combatants will be a test for the UN/AU mission; few of the larger tribes share any single political viewpoint and it is often impossible to visually distinguish a Darfuri “Arab” from an “African.” All units will depend heavily on a small pool of translators; the local dialect of Arabic spoken as a lingua franca is poorly understood outside of Darfur. Banditry (including attacks on humanitarian convoys) will continue even through a cease-fire. Any such attack could easily provide an excuse by one party or the other to resume hostilities. With at least 16 rebel factions in the field, the development of a unified leadership is essential to the success of negotiations (Sudan Tribune, August 3).

The experience of the AU force in Somalia, where only 1,500 Ugandan troops showed up while four other countries failed to deploy the balance of the 8,000-man force, does not inspire hope that anything like 20,000 African soldiers can be in Darfur by the end of the year. It is almost inevitable that the projected “hybrid” force will have to be reshaped to include Western contingents just to maintain a presence in Darfur. Real success in restoring peace to Darfur under UNAMID’s current mandate is highly unlikely.

This article first appeared in the August 7, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Khartoum’s Murdered Journalist: A Casualty in Islam’s Theological Civil War

Posted on September 19, 2006 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 19, 2006

The brutal decapitation of Khartoum newspaper editor Muhammad Taha earlier this month was part of a much larger inter-Islamic struggle reaching from the mountains of northwest Pakistan through Darfur, Tunisia, Paris and London. The murder took place against a local backdrop of street clashes between demonstrators and riot police, growing press censorship and calls from Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir for national unity against the “threat” of UN intervention in Darfur.

Muhammad Taha

On the evening of September 5, 50-year-old Muhammad Taha, editor of the Islamist daily al-Wifaq, was abducted from his home by three masked assailants. His body was found in the street the next day, bound and beheaded. Taha was a member of the Sudanese Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), a former member of Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front and traditionally regarded as a friend of the military/Islamist regime. Taha’s relationship with the government was actually much rockier, tested by Taha’s fondness for provocative viewpoints in both the political and religious spheres. In 2000, he survived an assassination attempt after criticizing the ruling National Congress Party, and six months ago arsonists struck al-Wifaq’s offices.

Responsibility for the shocking murder was claimed in an internet statement by Abu Hafs al-Sudani, who purported to lead al-Qaeda in Sudan and Africa (al-Arabiya, September 12). Both the individual and the organization were previously unknown. The name appears to be a variant of a name commonly used by other well-known Islamic militants, such as Abu Hafs al-Misri, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani and Abu Hafs al-Urdani. In the statement, Abu Hafs accused the editor of dishonoring the Prophet, but also referred to Taha as “a dog of dogs from the ruling party.” Abu Hafs said that the killers were safely outside of Sudan, perhaps accounting for the delay in claiming responsibility. Khartoum senior prosecutor Babekir Abdelatif downplayed the possibility of al-Qaeda involvement on September 13 (Sudan Tribune, September 13).

Politicians such as Umma Party leader Mubarak al-Fadil have suggested the al-Qaeda claim was meant to deflect attention from local Sudanese Islamists. The murder would represent al-Qaeda’s first activity in Sudan since Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri urged their followers to attack UN forces in Darfur in an April 23 statement broadcast by al-Jazeera television.

The charges of “dishonoring the Prophet” stem from an obscure anti-Islamic tract serialized in Taha’s newspaper accompanied by commentary by Taha. As the excerpts appeared, al-Wifaq‘s offices were targeted by demonstrations by the Islamist group Ansar al-Sunna. Taha was charged with the capital offense of blasphemy shortly after the articles appeared. Protestors gathered outside the courtroom daily demanding that prosecutors hand over Taha so that he could be killed immediately. In the end, Taha was fined US$ 3,200 and al-Wifaq was shut down for three months. After his trial, Taha continued to irritate the government through criticism of their Darfur policy and price hikes in staples designed to cover a budget shortfall.

Most media accounts of the publishing controversy and Taha’s subsequent death incorrectly maintain that the offensive work in question was authored by the famous 15th century Egyptian historian al-Maqrizi. In fact, it is a recent pro-Christian, anti-Islamic tract entitled al-Majhool fi Hayat al-Rasool (The Unknown in the Life of the Prophet), a poorly researched work whose author uses the pseudonym “Dr. Maqrizi.” The full text was made available at www.alkalema.us, a Christian Arabic website.

The first chapter serialized by al-Wifaq claims that the name of the Prophet’s father was not Abdullah, but Abd al-Lat (Lat was an Arabian pagan god) and suggests that Muhammad was ineligible by his lineage to be a Prophet. During his trial, Taha maintained that his intent in serializing the work and his accompanying commentary was to refute the claims of “Dr. Maqrizi,” describing the charges as “a joke” and politically motivated.

In the meantime, a Tunisian Islamist accused 72-year-old Paris-based Tunisian intellectual al-Afif al-Akhdar of being the anonymous “Dr. Maqrizi.” Rached Gannouchi, leader of the Islamist Harakat al-Nahda group, used the organization’s website (nahdha.net) to accuse al-Akhdar of writing the tract, reveling in his physical disabilities (“punishment from God for heresy”) and issuing a fatwa calling for al-Akhdar’s death for the offense of blasphemy. The book’s claim that the Prophet was guided by Satan and assertions of the superiority of Christianity over Islam in no way resembled al-Akhdar’s well-known intellectual and rationalist approach to Islam, a religion to which al-Akhdar remains deeply attached. Gannouchi issued his call for murder from the safety of British asylum, leaving al-Akhdar to appeal to the British justice system for Gannouchi’s prosecution. The imam was eventually compelled to withdraw the baseless accusations from the website.

The cause for Gannouchi’s scurrilous attack was evident. In October 2004, al-Akhdar joined two other Arab intellectuals in petitioning the UN Security Council to create an international court capable of trying Islamist terrorists for crimes against humanity, including those “scholars of terror” who issued fatwa-s calling for murder. Gannouchi was among those cited by name in the appeal.

In Sudan, eight months of relative press freedom was ended by the regime’s desire to “prevent compromising the Taha investigation.” Heavy censorship was re-imposed, especially on Arabic language newspapers like al-Wifaq, al-Sudani and al-Rai al-Shaab. The press interventions actually seem to have more to do with preventing media support for UN Security Council Resolution 1706, calling for the replacement of the African Union mission in Darfur with 20,000 UN peacekeepers and police, a measure resolutely rejected by the Sudanese government.

The war in northern Darfur has intensified since the May signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement by two resistance factions. Al-Qaeda’s announced intention to intervene in Sudan has supported the government’s assertion that a UN intervention would be self-defeating by actually attracting al-Qaeda militants to Sudan. Regime members from the powerful military and security branches as well as their Janjaweed allies have little desire to see UN forces arresting war crimes suspects for trial by the International Criminal Court.

Both al-Akhdar and Taha were convenient targets in a larger Salafi-Jihadi campaign against Islamic reform, applauded and encouraged by Osama bin Laden in his April message. Basing his argument on the work of 14th century scholar Ibn Qayim al-Jawziya (a disciple of Ibn Taymiya), Bin Laden claimed that “the crime committed by a freethinker is the worst of crimes, that the damage caused by his staying alive among the Muslims is of the worst kind of damage, that he is to be killed, and that his repentance is not to be accepted…” Bin Laden added that many of these freethinkers “are writers in newspapers” and should be killed immediately and “without consultation.”

In a May 2004 address in Beirut on Arab modernity, al-Akhdar’s words seemed to foretell Muhammad Taha’s fate: “The Salafi school instills in the younger generations a religious fanaticism which entails a phobia of dissimilarity and a rejection of the other, to the upper end of approving his or her execution…Muslims other than Salafis are treated as (heretics) or deviators; thus enemies. A student therefore becomes ripe for the execution of all sorts of symbolic and bloody violence; he can burn others with fire… (or) behead those who disagree with him.” Muhammad Taha’s murder remains unsolved.

This article was first published in the September 19, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Subverting the Sultan: British Arms Shipments to the Arabs of Darfur, 1915-16

Posted on June 10, 2006 by McGregor

Dr. Andrew McGregor
June 10, 2006

In recent years the Sudan government has been responsible for pouring weapons into Darfur at a time when territorial and environmental tensions were already high. Rather than encourage and supervise resolutions to these issues the government has chosen to inflame ethnic and racial divisions in the region. The well-known devastation created by this policy has a precedent in British activities in the region in 1915-16 as part of the buildup to the Anglo-Egyptian invasion that brought the independent Sultanate of Darfur under the control of the Khartoum government.

Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan

Darfur’s independence was first shattered by an invasion led by the powerful slave-trader and freebooter Zubayr Pasha in 1874. Zubayr’s conquest was quickly taken from him by the Turko-Egyptian government,[1] which controlled the rest of the Sudan at the time. The Egyptians in turn were expelled by the forces of the Mahdi, whose Islamic movement took control of most of the country except for a small strip of the Red Sea coast.

An Embassy from Sultan ‘Ali Dinar to Khartoum, 1907

(Sudan Archives, Durham University)

After the Mahdist government of Sudan was crushed at Omdurman by the British-led Egyptian Army in 1898 a so-called British-Egyptian Condominium government was created to administer the Sudan. Though a partnership in theory, government decisions were made exclusively by the senior partner, the British. Units of Sudanese and Egyptian troops were available to enforce the government’s writ, but the senior officers were all British soldiers on loan to the Egyptian Army. The Governor General of the Sudan was also exclusively British, creating friction with Egyptian nationalists who justifiably questioned the balance of this ‘partnership’. Added to this were civilians of the Sudan Political Service, powerful and independent men who often worked in isolation from other Europeans for long stretches of time. Almost exclusively drawn from Oxford and Cambridge universities, they were fluent in Arabic and expected to make most decisions in the field without having to refer everything to the Governor General in Khartoum. For over five decades this low-cost and, indeed, low-interest, form of administration worked surprisingly well, in large part because of British willingness to apply overwhelming force to any sign of defiance, especially in the early days of the Condominium.

Darfur remained outside the Condominium. It had been intended that it would form part of the Sudan in 1898, but a member of the Fur royal family, ‘Ali Dinar, beat the British back to the capital of al-Fashir after the battle of Omdurman, deposing a British-supported pretender while re-establishing the Fur Kingdom. The British recognized ‘Ali Dinar as sovereign of distant Darfur in exchange for an annual tribute and a nominal acceptance of the Sudan Government as the suzerain power.

Most of the British inspectors were trained in Arab language and culture, and had little sympathy for what they saw as backwards and ignorant Black Africans, regardless of their skills or achievements. For the Fur these achievements were considerable. For three centuries they had ruled a prosperous trading nation with a rich culture, building political unity from a nearly impossible ethnic and linguistic diversity.

Creating Divisions

The Arabs were never enthusiastic about Fur rule, but the centralized authority of the region created a tense but workable relationship between the tribes and the Sultan, who had recourse to a large professional army. Tribute was usually paid, and a degree of order prevailed between African and Arab tribes who might otherwise raid each other to their mutual impoverishment. What had changed by the late 19th century was the encroachment of European imperialists, the French to the West, and the British to the East. The Arab leaders realized that they now had a new card to play by manipulating this presence to their advantage. A similar phenomenon occurred in the Sultanate of Dar Sila on Darfur’s western border, where the nomadic Arab tribes besieged the French with complaints about the ‘African’ Sultan Bakhit. The Sudan government’s relationship with Darfur began to change in 1914, when the British became interested in using the Arabs against the African tribes who dominated Darfur.

The security of the Darfur border region was placed in the hands of one of the Sultan’s most trusted lieutenants, Khalil ‘Abd ar-Rahman. Determined to put an end to the insolence of the Arabs, Khalil pursued an active policy of force against the tribes, creating an incident in 1913 when he attacked a large party of Zaiyadia Arabs fleeing the Sultan’s troops. The attack took place on the Kordofan (Sudanese) side of the border, causing a great deal of anxiety amongst the handful of British administrators who regarded this as a direct challenge to government authority in the region.

The problem was that there was no uniform policy in dealing with the Arab tribes, especially those that routinely crossed the border to seek refuge from the Sultan or the Khartoum government, depending on the circumstances. The generally pro-Arab inspectors were divided on the timing and degree of support to be offered to the Arabs, while the Inspector-General, Rudolf von Slatin Pasha (who knew ‘Ali Dinar from their mutual captivity in Omdurman during the days of the Mahdist government) favoured a conciliatory relationship with the Sultan. Before the Mahdist revolution Slatin had been governor of Darfur in the old Turko-Egyptian regime. Under the Condominium government Slatin was given nearly total control over the nomadic tribes and the appointment of their leaders, mostly men known personally by Slatin and regarded by him as loyal to the government.

With the outbreak of a European war in August 1914, the Austrian-born Slatin was expelled from the Sudan as a security risk despite having been a member of the Egyptian Army since 1879. No European had such intimate knowledge of the peoples of Darfur as Slatin. Tribal policy in the western Sudan now passed into the hands of less-experienced British officials. In November 1914 the Ottoman government declared war on the Allied Powers, followed soon after by a declaration of jihad for all Muslims by Ottoman Sultan Muhammad Rashad V in his role as Caliph of Islam. From this point on a religious dimension emerged in the deteriorating relations between ‘Ali Dinar and the Khartoum government. Governor-General Wingate (an experienced intelligence hand in the Egyptian Army) began to make funds available to the Kordofan inspectors to mount espionage and other secret operations against Darfur.

Preparing the Grounds for War

The Ottoman Sultan’s proclamation of jihad had no impact on the Arabs of Darfur. The bitter legacy of the Turko-Egyptian 19th century occupation of the region meant that the Arabs had no interest in supporting the Ottomans. The survival and growth of the tribe remained paramount, and the key to this was seen to be cooperation with the British.

With the Kababish Arabs raiding the eastern frontier of Darfur in 1915 the Sultan appealed to the Government for arms and ammunition to defend his territory, a natural request to make of the suzerain power. The Kordofan-based Kababish were the largest nomadic tribe in the Sudan. In 1911 they had been bold enough to strike into western Darfur to raid one of the Sultan’s own caravans carrying a large shipment of arms. The tribe’s loyalty was more important to the Khartoum government than ‘Ali Dinar’s satisfaction, so the Sultan’s request for arms was denied. In the end the British relented to sending 1,000 rounds, a ridiculously small amount. Larger considerations were at play here; ‘Ali Dinar had for years battled French encroachment on his western border and had repeatedly requested arms from the government, only to be denied in every case. The British did not wish to create an incident with their wartime French allies by giving a Fur army the means of defeating a French expedition.[2] The British and the French had already been negotiating the limits of the western border of Darfur before the war, but put off a decision until the war was over.

Rizayqat Herders (Dabanga)

By May 1915 ‘Ali Dinar was sending threatening letters to the leader of the Kababish Arabs. He accused them of joining the infidels but suggested they follow the path of jihad instead. The Kababish chief, ‘Ali al-Tum, immediately dumped the letters on the closest British inspector with a warning that the government should take care of this ‘fanatic’. The British inspectors in Kordofan now began to realize the thinness of their rule, and broached the idea of a pre-emptory invasion of Darfur.

Governor-General Wingate and most of his fellow officers in the Sudan were refused in their applications to transfer to the fighting on the Western Front on the grounds of their experience and irreplaceability in the Sudan. These were all professional soldiers who began to realize that their own efficiency in keeping Sudan quiet during the war was cutting them out of the opportunities for promotion and decorations they could get in Europe. Once planted, the idea of creating a new battleground for the Great War began to take on steam. Rumours of German officers in al-Fashir and diabolical cruelties committed by the Sultan began to circulate. Eventually these rumours and other fantasies were all packed off to London labeled ‘Intelligence’.

Musa Madibbu and the Rizayqat

Normally Arab complaints of the Sultan’s hostility were grounded in the Arab tribes’ own prevarication in paying the annual tribute. Therefore the Government usually responded with a few words of sympathy and a suggestion to pay the tribute more promptly. In July 1915 the Governor-General instructed his agents to advise Musa Madibbu, chief of the Rizayqat tribe, to avoid paying the tribute, advice sure to result in fighting. It was thought that any government invasion of Darfur would benefit greatly from having the Sultan’s army ’embroiled with the Rizayqat’. Wingate, whose experience in intelligence work included what may be called ‘dirty tricks’, suggested that in his correspondence with the Sultan, Madibbu should name any supporters of ‘Ali Dinar in his own tribe as the individuals preventing him from collecting the tribute.

Musa Madibbu was interested in enlisting the aid of the Sudan Government in a growing struggle between his tribe and the Fur Sultan. In 1913 the Rizayqat had narrowly beaten a Fur punitive expedition, but losses were heavy and Madibbu did not believe the Rizayqat could duplicate their win. In September 1915 British Inspector John Bassett offered to loan the Rizayqat arms and ammunition to defend themselves from the Sultan. The total amount came to 300 rifles and 30,000 rounds, enough to turn the Rizayqat into potent challengers to Fur rule. In December a similar loan of 200 rifles and ammunition was made to ‘Ali al-Tum and the Kababish. Musa Madibbu had no intention of taking on the Sultan himself, however, and wrote to the Government that ‘we are poor Arabs and have no power to resist this man’. By this point both the Arabs and the Government were trying to manipulate each other. The dispute grew as the Sultan sent Musa Madibbu a pair of sandals to run away with, while Musa replied that he would soon be watering his horses at the Sultan’s capital of al-Fashir.

The new Government policy was a reversal of its long-standing efforts to disarm the Arab tribes of Kordofan. The region was still awash with 35-year old rifles seized by Mahdist fighters from the ill-fated Hicks Pasha expedition of 1883, but many of these had lost their sights or seen their barrels sawed off to make them easier to carry. Even those still intact commonly used pebbles for ammunition in lead-poor Sudan. The supply of modern weapons and ample ammunition was a dramatic change to the strategic situation in Darfur.

Nomadic Maelstrom

By April 1916 460 Arabs of the Kababish, Kawahla, and other Arab tribes had been deployed in a string of eight posts along the Darfur frontier. All were armed and paid by the Government. The Arabs were ordered to carry out scouting forays into Darfur, but, as one inspector wryly put it, ‘their vigorous interpretation of the term reconnaissance’ took them some 300 miles right across Darfur. The new British-supplied weapons were used by the Arabs to attack their old rivals in French territory, the Bidayat and the Gura’an. There were suggestions that a Government man be sent to the Arabs to reign in their excesses, but eventually it was decided it was better to look the other way, as a government representative would simply be a witness to ‘enormities’ that he could do nothing to prevent.

As the Egyptian Army crossed Kordofan ‘Ali Dinar sent a strange report to Sultan Muhamad Rashad in Istanbul that reflects his agitation and a great deal of wishful thinking besides:

We beg to inform Your Majesty that the Moslems who have abandoned Islam and embraced Christianity have been punished in a miraculous way never heard of on this earth – except during the time of the Prophets… It fell on a tribe called Rizayqat, subjects of ours who had abandoned the light of Islam and followed the advice of the Christians, the dogs – The heaven rained fire on them and they ran to the river and diving therein, turned into black coal – In another place Heaven rained red blood.[3]

‘Ali Dinar failed to meet the British at the border with his army, fearing that if he moved his troops up, Musa Madibbu would sweep in behind him and loot al-Fashir (presumably with those Rizayqat who had not been turned into coal). The Sultan now took on a more friendly tone in his communications with the Rizayqat chieftain. The Sultan announced that he was satisfied with Musa, and in a mix of threat and encouragement informed the Arab chief that the Fur army had already met the Anglo-Egyptian invasion force, and that though each of his men was hit at least ten times by the infidels’ bullets, there were no injuries.

In May 1916 the Sultan’s army was defeated at the battle of Birinjia, followed several months later by the Sultan’s own death at the hands of an Anglo-Egyptian mounted infantry task force. While this put an end to Fur resistance the nomads of Darfur were just getting started. By the middle of 1916 the nomadic African Bidayat, Gura’an and Zaghawa tribes were all raiding from French territory into northwest Darfur. ‘Ali al-Tum led the Kababish against the Berti in northern Darfur, defeating them and seizing their herds on the pretext that they were ‘enemies of the government’. From there they turned to raiding Dar Zaghawa (a territory straddling the Chad/Darfur border). At the same time the Bani Halba of southern Darfur were looting herds without any concern for whether their owners were pro or anti-government.

In October a raiding party of 200 Kababish was in the Ennedi region (modern north Chad) seizing women and children. In retaliation the Bidayat and Gura’an raided the Arabs of northern Darfur in November, then turned south to take 3,500 head of cattle and 50 women and children from the Fur. In December, 1916, a column of the Egyptian Army Camel Corps was sent to northwest Darfur to cooperate with French units against the Bidayat and the Gura’an. The provision of arms had unleashed a storm of retaliatory violence that the government had great difficulty reigning in over the next several years.

Conclusion

The Darfur campaign never achieved recognition as part of the Great War. This was a great disappointment to the expedition’s British officers, but designation as a part of the World War meant that London would be responsible for the costs of the conquest. Although the invasion was justified as a strike against German and Ottoman forces in Africa, the conflict received the official designation ‘Patrol 16 of the Egyptian Army’ making it a purely local affair. This revisionist slight of hand allowed the entire bill to be sent to Cairo instead.

In the end, the Arab tribes contributed almost nothing to the conquest of Darfur. The violence of raid and counter-raid swept across northern Darfur long after the campaign of 1916. Even the Great War had come to an end by the time French and British colonial officials cooperated to bring an end to the destruction of life and property. Like the current situation in Darfur the Sudan government had introduced modern arms into the region while aggravating ethnic and territorial conflicts that were usually resolved by traditional methods of conciliation. As the chaos spiraled out of control the colonial government (like today’s regime in Khartoum) chose to disclaim any responsibility. Unfortunately the lessons of history have little attraction for today’s policy-makers.
Notes

[1]. So-called since the entire ruling class of Egypt at the time was composed of Turks, Circassians, and other races of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish rather than Arabic was the language of both the elite and the military.

[2]. I have used the term ‘Fur army’ in this paper in reference to the Sultans’s forces, but the army was in fact composed of many different tribes and ethnic groups. The two senior commanders were both slaves from the southern hinterland, named Sulayman ‘Ali and Ramadan ‘Ali.

[3]. National Records Office, Sudan: NRO INTELL 2/2/11, pt.2; Letter from ‘Ali Dinar to His Majesty Sultan Muhammad Rashad, 1334 (1916)

This article first appeared on Military History Online, June 10, 2006, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/subvertingthesultan.aspx#

Bin Laden’s African Folly: Al-Qaeda in Darfur

Posted on May 18, 2006 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

May 18, 2006

Could a United Nations peacekeeping mission face al-Qaeda fighters in Darfur? According to Osama bin Laden, if a UN force deploys in the region, al-Qaeda will attack UN troops. On April 23, al-Jazeera television broadcast a Bin Laden audiotape in which he called for al-Qaeda fighters to begin traveling to Darfur to prepare for a “long-term war against the Crusaders,” an apparent reference to the UN force (controlled by the United States in Bin Laden’s mind) that could replace the ineffective African Union mission in the region. The commander of the United Nations Mission in Sudan has announced that the UN force is treating Bin Laden’s threat with “whole seriousness” (Sudan Tribune, April 26). The Sudanese government is doing everything possible to prevent a large-scale UN deployment in Darfur, but this sudden offer of al-Qaeda assistance is surely unwelcome in Khartoum.

Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi

Bin Laden in Sudan

Bin Laden’s presence in Sudan from 1991 to 1996 was enabled by Hassan al-Turabi, the country’s leading Islamist, widely regarded at the time as the real (and unelected) power behind the presidency. Times have changed in Sudan, however. Al-Turabi’s influence on the government waned long ago. His one-time deputy has usurped his position, and al-Turabi has spent most of the last few years in prison or under house arrest. To add to his woes, he has been accused of heresy for his recently declared liberal views on the role of women in Islamic society. Al-Turabi made many enemies in his ruthless pursuit of an Islamic state in Sudan, and they will surely now circle in to take their revenge. The government has seen changes as well; under the provisions of the peace treaty with the South, Southern Sudanese Christians now occupy leading positions in the administration. They are no fans of al-Qaeda.

Most Sudanese do not admire the Wahhabist-style Islam espoused by al-Qaeda. Their Islam is based on the proud Sufi lodges, whose form of worship is violently opposed by al-Qaeda. While al-Turabi and others have had some success in their efforts to radicalize the population, most local Muslims will tell you that Sudanese Islam is in no need of improvement by outsiders. Not everyone in the Khartoum regime shared al-Turabi’s fondness for al-Qaeda. When Bin Laden was in Sudan, the suspicious Mukhabarat (secret service) took note of every move and utterance by Bin Laden and his associates. Attempts were made to turn thousands of pages of intelligence over to the United States after Bin Laden was deported in 1996, but the Clinton administration refused to have anything to do with a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

Despite his sojourn in Sudan, the al-Qaeda leader appears poorly informed about the country. He describes the conflict in Darfur as tribal differences cleverly manipulated by the United States to “send crusader troops to occupy the region and steal its oil under the guise of preserving security there.” In doing so, Bin Laden ignores all the environmental, economic, political, ethnic and religious factors behind the current war. His suggestion that “crusader” forces are trying to “steal” Darfur’s oil resources under the pretext of peacekeeping is absurd. Sudan’s main oil industry is located in Upper Nile Province and is already owned by a Chinese-Malaysian consortium. It will take much more than a peacekeeping force to change that. The Sudanese/Swiss ABCO corporation claims that preliminary drilling in Darfur revealed “abundant” reserves of oil, but it appears that the rights may have already passed into Chinese hands (AlertNet, June 15, 2005; Guardian, June 10, 2005).

China has emerged as the Sudanese regime’s protector on the UN Security Council, and may use its veto to prevent the formation of a UN force in Darfur. China has been quietly active in Sudan for decades, developing a close relationship with the current regime. Sudan already provides 10 percent of China’s petroleum imports. Any attempt by the “crusaders” to bring Sudanese petroleum reserves under Western control could cause friction with China.

Bin Laden also claims that the Sudanese government has abandoned Shari’a law, which is surely news to everyone in Sudan. His assertion that the southern separatist/nationalist movement was sponsored by Great Britain after independence defies historical reality. Ironically, in view of his own failure to grasp regional issues, Bin Laden calls on the mujahideen to learn everything they can about Darfur, for “it has been said that a man with knowledge can conquer land while land can conquer the ignorant.”

Unwelcome Jihadis

One of the two main Darfur rebel groups, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), is allied with al-Turabi, yet even they have rejected Bin Laden’s appeal. A JEM spokesman declared that “Bin Laden is still preaching the theory of an American-Zionist conspiracy when the real problem comes from Khartoum, which is a Muslim government killing other Muslims” (Sudan Tribune, April 23). JEM’s rival group of rebels in Darfur, the much larger Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), has gone even further, declaring that Bin Laden’s intent is to “exterminate the peoples of Darfur.” The Sudanese government dismissed Bin Laden’s appeal, announcing that Sudan would not play host to terrorists. Government spokesmen also declared that a decision to replace African Union forces with UN troops “is not going to be imposed on Sudan” (Sudan Vision Daily, May 8).

The regime of President Omar al-Bashir has bought time to implement its Darfur policy by aligning itself closely with the United States in the war on terrorism. Sudanese intelligence provides valuable information to U.S. security services, knowing that the U.S. desire to protect its homeland overrides human rights concerns in distant states. It is a calculating approach that requires considerable finesse, taking what one can, but never going too far. Allowing al-Qaeda back into the country is not just a step too far, but a jump into the volcano, particularly at a time when Washington appears to be taking a harder line on Khartoum.

It is unlikely that any UN force will be deployed without the permission of the Sudanese government. There will be difficulties in the mission, but the Sudanese government’s aims in Darfur have been largely realized, and it is unlikely that any international force will be entrusted with the job of restoring lands seized by the Janjaweed militias to the dispossessed tribes. The peace agreement’s call for the Sudanese government to supervise the disarmament of the Janjaweed is the main reason for the refusal of Abdul-Wahid Muhammad al-Nur’s faction of the SLA to sign the document (Asharq al-Awsat, May 9).

With desertification sterilizing the traditional grazing lands of the Darfur nomads who supply the bulk of Janjaweed manpower, it will prove nearly impossible to cast the militias and their families back into the desert, regardless of their crimes. Some Janjaweed leaders (like Shaykh Musa Hilal) are already appealing for peace in the interests of consolidating their gains. In the meantime, discipline is breaking down in the African Union force, which has not been paid in two months (Daily Trust, Abuja, May 8). The commander of the AU troops, Major General Collins Ihekire, has called for a quick deployment of UN troops to reinforce the AU mission, whose mandate has been extended until the end of September (IRIN, May 9).

Conclusion

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has displayed little interest in exporting Islamic revolution beyond Sudan. That was al-Turabi’s mission, and the president has already threatened to execute him. Similarly, al-Bashir has no interest in hosting a group of armed foreign Islamists who could threaten his regime and whose presence would isolate Sudan internationally. Bin Laden’s declared aim of disrupting the North-South peace agreement is completely at odds with the aims of the regime. Sudan is exhausted by war, and there is oil to be pumped from the wells of the South. The abandonment of the Sudanese government’s jihad in South Sudan was recognition that war is bad for business.

Bin Laden qualified his offer of support by noting that it was not his intention to defend the Khartoum government, for “even though our interests may be mutual, our differences with it are great.” How can Bin Laden send fighters to aid a regime that he just announced he does not particularly support? What does Bin Laden expect will happen to them once they arrive? If this message is genuinely from Bin Laden, it suggests that the terrorist leader is desperately searching for a cause to sustain his movement. There is a crime in Islam called fitna; it means creating discord among Muslims, and it is one of Islam’s greatest offenses. Bin Laden apparently believes that sending Muslims to disrupt peace treaties negotiated by (and between) other Muslims is a suitable aim for his movement. With or without the peace treaty in the works in Abuja, neither Sudan’s government nor the Darfur rebels desire the assistance of al-Qaeda. Should Bin Laden’s followers head to Darfur, there is no doubt a hot reception awaits them.

This article first appeared in the May 18, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

African Jihad: Al-Qaeda in Darfur

Posted on April 30, 2006 by McGregor

Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Commentary

April 2006

Could a United Nations peacekeeping mission face al-Qaeda’s fighters in Darfur? According to Osama bin Laden, if a UN force deploys in the region, al-Qaeda will attack UN troops. On April 23, al-Jazeera television broadcast a bin Laden audiotape in which he called for al-Qaeda fighters to begin traveling to Darfur to prepare for a “long-term war against the Crusaders,” an apparent reference to the UN force (controlled by the United States in bin Laden’s mind) that could replace the ineffective African Union mission in the region. The commander of the United Nations Mission in Sudan has announced that the UN force is treating Bin Laden’s threat with “whole seriousness” (Sudan Tribune, April 26). The Sudanese government is doing everything possible to prevent a large-scale UN deployment in Darfur, but this sudden offer of al-Qaeda assistance is surely unwelcome in Khartoum.

Bin Laden in Sudan

Most Sudanese do not admire the Wahhabist-style Islam espoused by al-Qaeda. Their Islam is based on the proud Sufi lodges, whose form of worship is violently opposed by al-Qaeda. While al-Turabi and others have had some success in their efforts to radicalize the population, most local Muslims will tell you that Sudanese Islam is in no need of improvement by outsiders. Not everyone in the Khartoum regime shared al-Turabi’s fondness for al-Qaeda. When bin Laden was in Sudan, the suspicious Mukhabarat (secret service) took note of every move and utterance by bin Laden and his associates. Attempts were made to turn thousands of pages of intelligence over to the United States after bin Laden was deported in 1996, but the Clinton administration refused to have anything to do with a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

Despite his sojourn in Sudan, the al-Qaeda leader appears poorly informed about the country. He describes the conflict in Darfur as tribal differences cleverly manipulated by the United States to “send crusader troops to occupy the region and steal its oil under the guise of preserving security there.” In doing so, bin Laden ignores all the environmental, economic, political, ethnic and religious factors behind the current war. His suggestion that “crusader” forces are trying to “steal” Darfur’s oil resources under the pretext of peacekeeping is absurd. Sudan’s main oil industry is located in Upper Nile Province and is already owned by a Chinese-Malaysian consortium. It will take much more than a peacekeeping force to change that. The Sudanese/Swiss ABCO corporation claims that preliminary drilling in Darfur revealed “abundant” reserves of oil, but it appears that the rights may have already passed into Chinese hands (AlertNet, June 15, 2005; Guardian, June 10, 2005).

Bin Laden also claims that the Sudanese government has abandoned Sharia law, which is surely news to everyone in Sudan. His assertion that the southern separatist/nationalist movement was sponsored by Great Britain after independence defies historical reality. Ironically, in view of his own failure to grasp regional issues, Bin Laden calls on the mujahideen to learn everything they can about Darfur, for “it has been said that a man with knowledge can conquer land while land can conquer the ignorant.”

Unwelcome Jihadis

One of the two main Darfur rebel groups, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), is allied with al-Turabi, yet even they have rejected bin Laden’s appeal. A JEM spokesman declared that “Bin Laden is still preaching the theory of an American-Zionist conspiracy when the real problem comes from Khartoum, which is a Muslim government killing other Muslims” (Sudan Tribune, April 23). JEM’s rival group of rebels in Darfur, the much larger Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), has gone even further, declaring that bin Laden’s intent is to “exterminate the peoples of Darfur.” The Sudanese government dismissed bin Laden’s appeal, announcing that Sudan would not play host to terrorists. Government spokesmen also declared that a decision to replace African Union forces with UN troops “is not going to be imposed on Sudan” (Sudan Vision Daily, May 8).
The regime of President Omar al-Bashir has bought time to implement its Darfur policy by aligning itself closely with the United States in the war on terrorism. Sudanese intelligence provides valuable information to U.S. security services, knowing that the U.S. desire to protect its homeland overrides human rights concerns in distant states. It is a calculating approach that requires considerable finesse, taking what one can, but never going too far. Allowing al-Qaeda back into the country is not just a step too far, but a jump into the volcano, particularly at a time when Washington appears to be taking a harder line on Khartoum.

Janjaweed on the Move

With desertification sterilizing the traditional grazing lands of the Darfur nomads who supply the bulk of Janjaweed manpower, it will prove nearly impossible to cast the militias and their families back into the desert, regardless of their crimes. Some Janjaweed leaders (like Sheikh Musa Hilal) are already appealing for peace in the interests of consolidating their gains. In the meantime, discipline is breaking down in the African Union force, which has not been paid in two months (Daily Trust, Abuja, May 8). The commander of the AU troops, Major General Collins Ihekire, has called for a quick deployment of UN troops to reinforce the AU mission, whose mandate has been extended until the end of September (IRIN, May 9).

Conclusion

Bin Laden qualified his offer of support by noting that it was not his intention to defend the Khartoum government, for “even though our interests may be mutual, our differences with it are great.” How can bin Laden send fighters to aid a regime that he just announced he does not particularly support? What does bin Laden expect will happen to them once they arrive? If this message is genuinely from bin Laden, it suggests that the terrorist leader is desperately searching for a cause to sustain his movement. There is a crime in Islam called fitna; it means creating discord among Muslims, and it is one of Islam’s greatest offenses. Bin Laden apparently believes that sending Muslims to disrupt peace treaties negotiated by (and between) other Muslims is a suitable aim for his movement. With or without the peace treaty in the works in Abuja, neither Sudan’s government nor the Darfur rebels desire the assistance of al-Qaeda. Should bin Laden’s followers head to Darfur, there is no doubt a hot reception awaits them.

Terrorism and Violence in the Sudan: The Islamist Manipulation of Darfur, Part Two

Posted on July 1, 2005 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

July 1, 2005

This is the second of a two part series on Islamism and Terrorism in Darfur.

The conflict in Darfur is closely tied to the War on Terrorism, largely because the influence of the U.S. to deter ethnic and political violence in the region has been compromised by its growing security alliance with Sudan’s ruling Islamists. Despite meager popular support, the now divided Islamist faction continues to dominate both government and opposition in Khartoum. The radical racial and religious policies of this group have resulted in a shocking tally of death that far surpasses anything committed by al-Qaeda. The price of security cooperation with Sudan’s rulers is the risk of complicity in the brutal destruction of an ancient culture that once rivaled the kingdoms of the Nile.

Although it has been a decade since al-Qaeda operated within Sudan, the nation has been an important recruiting ground with its pool of young men indoctrinated in the government’s jihadist ideology. For now, the insularity of Sudanese Islamism and a distrust of ambitious foreigners preclude active al-Qaeda involvement in the Darfur conflict, but a sudden break in the security partnership with the U.S. could see a return of foreign militants.

Sudan’s western province is widely viewed in Khartoum as a proxy battle-ground for the continuing struggle by President al-Bashir and the security apparatus against Hassan al-Turabi’s Islamist following. Indeed, the terror that has descended on Darfur reveals a shocking cynicism both on the part of the government and the leading opposition party. The atrocities of the government-backed Janjawid militias have occurred under the cover of negotiations to end the war in South Sudan, which no party (especially the United States after its considerable diplomatic investment) wishes to derail. The growing relationship between the CIA and the Sudanese security chiefs (some of whom were named in Congress as suspects in Darfur war-crimes) has effectively sidelined U.S. influence in Darfur. The main groups involved in the fighting in Darfur are described below.

The Janjawid Militias

The development of the Janjawid is a direct consequence of the ethnic composition of the Sudanese regular army. For decades the regular Sudanese army has been largely formed (60-65%) from Kordofan Nubas and recruits from Darfur. Despite the civil war, the Sudanese army also relies on a large number of troops from the south. For all the rhetoric of jihad in Khartoum, service in the military appeals to few of the Nile-based Arabs who control the political process. With the Darfur troops considered politically unreliable in fighting their kinsmen, the government sought an alternative fighting force in Darfur that could be motivated by racial hatred.

Most Janjawid are drawn from the northern camel-raising Arabs who have suffered most from the disappearance of pasturelands. There are allegations that the Sudanese government has recruited Janjawid from the “Arab” tribes of Chad (such as the Salamat). The Janjawid also recruit from the Fellata population, Muslim migrants from West Africa who are receptive to the message of Islamism. Many Janjawid are simply common criminals, reliable for the dirty work and expendable when international pressure forces a round of arrests. Few, if any, of the Janjawid come from the powerful Baqqara Arab tribes of South Darfur. The Janjawid number about 15,000 – significantly larger than both rebel groups.

Save for the AK-47s and satellite-phones, the horse and camel-mounted Janjawid militias most resemble traditional raiding parties. The tools of the Janjawid (“Devils on Horseback”) include massacres, torture, mutilation and gang-rape. Their main victims are the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa, all of whom once presided over sultanates on the territory of modern Darfur. Janjawid units are expected to pay themselves through the proceeds of looting. Motorized units of the regular army often assist Janjawid raids. Khartoum’s ancient fleet of Antonov bombers has been put to use in Darfur, dropping crude barrel-bombs full of explosives and scrap metal to soften up villages before Janjawid attacks. The use of government helicopter-gunships was common earlier in the conflict before several helicopters were lost to rebel fire.

Janjawid leader Musa Hilal is the son of a leading Jalul Rizayqat shaykh with a long career as a militant/brigand. He was released from prison to take command of the militias. Hilal claimed in an interview with Human Rights Watch that senior officers of the Sudanese regular army led all Janjawid field operations. After being recalled to Khartoum, a reinvented Musa Hilal has emerged as a traveling ambassador of peace and reconciliation, urging Darfuris to unite through intermarriage. This goodwill effort seems tied to attempts to make elements of the Janjawid “disappear” by incorporating members into the police and Popular Defense Forces (a government paramilitary). Undisciplined Janjawid forces are even reported to have engaged in fighting with the regular army.

Rebels: The Sudan Liberation Army/Sudan Liberation Movement

The SLA is composed mostly of Zaghawa and Fur, with representation from the Masalit, Daju and other tribes. The origins of the movement can be found in the self-defense militias created by the Fur in the late 1980s. A Fur lawyer, Abdul-Wahid Muhammad al-Nur, created the Darfur Liberation Front (soon renamed the SLA) in 2002 and armed the group by raiding a police station. Minni Arkou Minnawi, a leader of the secular, left-wing SLA maintains that the movement is not separatist in nature, but has specific demands regarding aid, development, political recognition and the insertion of international peace-keepers. The movement espouses a nationalist approach in which Sudan’s remoter regions would receive the same attention as the Nile corridor.

Unit of the SLA-MM – Note this fighter’s large collection of amulets (Sudan Tribune)

Like most armed groups in the field (including the regular army) the SLA feeds itself at the expense of civilian farmers. Funding for arms comes largely from Fur communities in the Persian Gulf States and other parts of the Sudan. The guerrillas operate in groups of four-wheel drive vehicles mounted with heavy machine-guns over ground they know intimately. The SLA aspires to the highly-mobile tactics used so successfully by the northern tribes of Chad to expel the Libyans, but more closely resemble the low-level military activity of the similarly equipped 1990s Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger.

In early 2004, the SLA joined the National Democratic Alliance, a fractious grouping of the southern SPLA and various northern opposition parties. [1] The SLA also signed a cooperative agreement with the Beja Congress, a long established militant group in Sudan’s eastern region representing Muslim non-Africans complaining of similar underdevelopment and under-representation in the central government. The accord was signed in Eritrea, which has also been accused by Khartoum of providing military assistance to the Darfur rebels.

Rebels: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The government describes the Islamist JEM as the military wing of the PCP, but so far JEM has proved less militarily effective than the SLA. The movement is led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad, a Turabi loyalist and author of The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan, an outlawed manifesto that claims the Nile-based Arabs have dominated the government since independence at the expense of the majority of Sudanese. JEM units cooperated with SLA forces in the opening phase of the rebellion in February 2003. For a time the government tried to negotiate a separate agreement with the SLA, but the SLA demanded that both parties be part of the peace process.

Like the SLA, JEM finds many eager recruits in the refugee camps of Chad. Like the Janjawid, JEM also draws recruits from the Fellata population, which was not granted citizenship until 1989 under an al-Turabi initiative. Islamism has a small but fervent constituency of recent vintage in Darfur. Islam as practiced in Darfur is highly different from the Islamist orthodoxy of Khartoum, incorporating many traditional customs and beliefs. It is unlikely that all of JEM’s guerrillas back the Islamist project, but may have found in the organization the means to obtain the weapons and vehicles needed to take revenge for the loss of farms and families. Most of the JEM funding is believed to come through Turabi’s organization. In early May, both the JEM and the SLA appealed to Muammar Qaddafi for funds and political support. Of late Qaddafi has abandoned Arabism for the cause of African unity and identity.

Conclusion

The Sudanese government has considerable military power that would enable it to restore order in Darfur, but is understandably reluctant to divert its resources from the South until the peace process there has been completed. Offers of peacekeeping assistance from the SPLA have been met with charges of SPLA military aid to the rebels in Darfur. The strategy of the Sudanese security forces in Darfur follows a pattern established in the war in the South; divide the opposition through bribery and the inflammation of ethnic or tribal differences while arming pro-government militias. The resulting death or displacement of the population eventually isolates rebel units from sources of support.

In some sense the people of Darfur are being made to pay the price for the private humiliation of Sudan’s security apparatus, resentful that it has had to come to the negotiating table with the South Sudan’s SPLA. The terms of the peace settlement with the SPLA virtually ensure further revolts elsewhere in Sudan to wring similar considerations from the highly centralized government in Khartoum. Unfortunately, the manipulation of race and Islam is likely to continue to substitute for a willingness to create an equitable distribution of wealth and power.

Notes

Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army, a South Sudanese rebel force commanded by John Garang, not to be confused with the SLA of Darfur.

Terrorism and Violence in the Sudan: The Islamist Manipulation of Darfur: Part One

Posted on June 17, 2005 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

June 17, 2005

The United States has made some strange alliances in the War on Terrorism, but none odder than its growing relationship with the ruling Islamists of Sudan. Once eager hosts of Osama bin Laden, Sudan’s Islamist movement has since split, with the two factions now fighting a proxy war in Darfur. In the 1990s, the U.S. rejected every initiative offered by the Sudanese to cooperate on counter-terrorism issues, including an offer to extradite Osama bin Laden. The Sudanese government’s willingness to share its copious intelligence on al-Qaeda has now bought it some immunity from responsibility for the atrocities in Darfur. The CIA has initiated close contacts with Sudanese intelligence director Major-Gen. Salah Abdallah Gosh, who has also been identified in Congress as a war crimes suspect for his exploits in Darfur. In a sign of growing cooperation many Sudanese prisoners at Guantanamo Bay have been released to Sudanese authorities. Besides intelligence sharing, the U.S. is also keen to protect the peace agreement that will end the North-South civil war and release vast new reserves of oil onto the market.

Dr. Hassan al-Turabi

The Arming of Darfur

During the 1980s the Umma Party government of Sadiq al-Mahdi and private sponsors (including General Swahr al-Dahab, a former President of Sudan) began arming Arab militias in South Darfur known as Murahalin. The object of the militias was to put pressure on the Bahr al-Ghazal heartland of the Dinkas (the leading tribe in the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army), which lies directly south of Darfur. [1] With the arms came a Khartoum-based ideology of Arab superiority. The Murahalin carried out their duties with enthusiasm. Looting, murder, abductions and all manner of atrocities were practiced, all without government responsibility, as the militias were not part of the regular army. The Murahalin would serve as the model for the Janjawid raiders of today.

Arms flooded Darfur as the region became a staging base for armed groups involved in the struggle to control Chad in the 1980s. In the 1970s and 1980s many Darfuri followers of the Umma Party were forced into exile in Libya, where they joined Muammar Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion, a force of Arabs, Tuareg and West Africans. Many of these exiles absorbed heavy doses of the radical Arabist ideology propagated by Qaddafi at the time. Qaddafi proposed the creation of an “Arab corridor” through North Africa, which implied the expulsion or extermination of the non-Arab tribes of central Darfur. Based in Libyan-occupied northern Chad, the Islamic Legion became an important conduit for the cross-border arms trade. Law enforcement vanished and in its absence even peaceful communities were forced to arm themselves.

Ecological pressures began to force the nomadic Zaghawa and the northern Arab tribes into the territory of the Fur, the pre-colonial rulers of the region. Attempts to settle there were opposed by the Fur and fighting broke out after which the army focused its efforts on punishing the non-Arab Zaghawa. The Arab tribes were given a free hand to seize land, resulting in the death of thousands of Fur and the displacement of tens of thousands more. In 1991, an ill-fated attempt was made by the southern-based Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army to open a new Fur-led front in the civil war. The local SPLA leader, Daoud Bolad, was a former member of Hassan al-Turabi’s Islamist National Islamic Front (NIF) but became involved in Fur self-defense militias in the late 1980s. He emerged in 1991 as leader of the new SPLA front in Darfur. Bolad’s brief military success was followed by defeat and death in prison.

In the late 1990s, even as oil money began to pour into Khartoum, funds for government services in Darfur began to dry up. Security was virtually non-existent in the countryside and military garrisons rarely ventured out. Gun-rule made an unwelcome return. In 1998 and 1999, northern Arab tribes began moving their herds into Masalit lands earlier than usual, leading to violence in which the Masalit got the worst of it. Thirty thousand Masalit fled to Chad where they were still attacked by Arab militias.

The Turabi Factor

Former leader of the Muslim Brothers and founder of the National Islamic Front, Hassan al-Turabi’s life-long goal of establishing an Arabized and Islamic state in Sudan has run roughshod over the cultural and religious sensibilities of many Sudanese. His first attempt at introducing Islamic law as Attorney-General, the “September Laws” of 1983, was reviled by Muslims and Christians alike. Its emphasis on huddud (traditional Islamic punishments, including amputations and crucifixion) shocked most Sudanese. As the civil war worsened and then-President Ja’afar Nimeiri’s position became more precarious in coup-prone Khartoum, Turabi and the Muslim Brothers were rounded up and blamed for the rapidly deteriorating security situation.

Nimeiri’s overthrow brought a brief spell of ineffective civilian government until Turabi joined Brigadier Umar al-Bashir in an Islamist coup in 1989. Bashir was installed as President with Turabi as an unaccountable power behind the throne. Strict interpretation of Islamic law returned and a brutal campaign against the non-Arab Nuba of Kordofan in 1991-1992 targeted both Muslims and Christians. Even mosques were destroyed in an explicit rejection of non-Arab Islam. Under the influence of Turabi and his deputy ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha the war in the South became a jihad against disbelievers. The ruling arrangement lasted until 1996 when disagreements between Bashir and Turabi seemed to leave the latter in the ascendance. However Turabi miscalculated in 1999 when he introduced legislation restricting the power of the president. Consequently Bashir reasserted his authority and the NIF split under the resulting pressure. Bashir’s supporters became the governing National Congress Party while Turabi’s followers went into opposition as the Popular Congress Party (PCP). Most of the NIF’s membership in Darfur joined the PCP.

Turabi was arrested in 2001 under emergency laws and sent to Khobar prison. His offence was opening peace negotiations with the SPLA without government approval. Turabi was not only held in solitary confinement, but was judged so dangerous that a wall was built around his cell to prevent any interaction with other prisoners. Eventually he was released to house arrest and freed in October 2003.

On April 15, 2005, a Sudanese court sentenced 21 soldiers and 3 others for mounting a coup attempt in March 2004. Two-thirds of the convicted were members of Turabi’s PCP and many of the leaders were military officers from Darfur. Turabi was re-arrested at the time but not charged, though he accused the government of arming the Janjawid raiders of Darfur and purging Black African officers from the army. Following the alleged coup attempt the government suspended the PCP from political activities, partly on charges of aiding insurrection in Darfur. State prosecutors also alleged participation by Turabi in a second coup attempt in September 2004. Most of those charged were from Darfur and alleged by the government to be PCP members. Again Turabi was not charged even though the Attorney-General claimed to have evidence he “indirectly” planned the coup.

After his release, Turabi denounced the government’s actions in Darfur and called for greater political representation for the region in the central government. He also asserted that the government of Chad was responsible for some of the violence in Darfur. [2] The allegations may refer to military aid provided by the Zaghawa-dominated government in Chad to their Zaghawa cousins in the rebel Sudan Liberation Army.

There are many signs that Turabi uses the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM – the Islamist rebel group in Darfur) as a proxy army in his struggle against the government. Turabi covers his own complicity in the Darfur outrages by blaming the Sudanese government for encouraging militias and tribes to fight each other. According to Turabi, PCP members fighting alongside the JEM do so without his authorization. Turabi is playing a dangerous game and has received clear warning from the President: “It would not be difficult for us to bring in Turabi, to issue a presidential decree and have his head chopped off. We could do it and our conscience would not be bothered” [3]

Arab or African?

While the conflict in Darfur has its ethnic and political dimensions, it is largely sparked by the loss of nomadic pasture-lands to desertification or absorption into fenced-off farmland. The conflict also revolves around the traditional marginalization of Darfur, which is poorly represented in the central government and receives little development assistance. To complicate the issue, Darfur has also become a battleground in the ever-shifting web of political rivalries of Khartoum’s Islamists, bent on exploiting Sudan’s Arab/African identity crisis.

The roots of the conflict run deep in Darfur’s history. For centuries the camel-raising Arabs of north Darfur and the cattle-owning Arabs of South Darfur (the Baqqara) were reluctant subjects of the African Muslim Fur Dynasty. Tribute was often collected from the Arabs by force. Islam was better established in the Fur capital than amongst the nomadic Arab tribes and the Fur Sultan’s monopoly of the slave and ivory trade brought significant wealth to the kingdom.

The ancient sultanate was seized in 1874 by the slave army of Arab freebooter Zubayr Pasha and turned over to the Egyptian government. The Mahdi’s rebellion in the early 1880s brought down the Egyptian regime before going on to conquer most of the Sudan. After the Mahdi’s death, his successor, a Baqqara Arab from Darfur, brought the Baqqara tribes to Khartoum where they dominated all of Sudan. A succession of Fur “shadow-sultans” continued to fight for the restoration of the sultanate. The arrival of Kitchener’s British-Egyptian army in 1898 destroyed the power of the Baqqara Arabs.

Determined to eliminate the Sultan during WWI, the British began arming the Arab tribes of southern Kordofan and Darfur in preparation for an invasion of the Sultanate. The veteran Arabists who dominated British intelligence felt comfortable dealing with the Arabic-speaking nomads but had little regard for the “black” Fur. Encouraged by what seemed the approval of the Khartoum government, the Arab tribes wreaked havoc in Darfur and were only restrained with great difficulty at the end of the campaign. The Sultan’s death marked the end of the once-powerful African tribes as a political force in Darfur. Every effort was made to eliminate the legacy of Fur rule in the region, which gradually became a forgotten outpost, even after Sudanese independence in 1956.

There was always a high degree of mobility in Darfur between ethnic groups and intermarriage was common. Most tribes, both nomadic and sedentary, had sections formed from members of other tribes or ethnic groups. During British rule a great deal of effort was devoted to defining tribal borders in neat patterns that had little to do with the incredibly complex system of seasonal land use. These artificial divisions were then used to allocate dar-s (homelands) to each tribe. In the south, where Baqqara tribes had historically acknowledged land-claims, the system worked satisfactorily, but the Arabs of the north, who wandered with their herds in the pastures between farming communities, were never granted their own dar-s. This early interference in Darfur’s social structure laid the foundation for today’s conflict.

Notes:

The SPLA is not to be confused with the Darfur-based SLA (Sudan Liberation Army)
‘Turabi slams Government’, Sudan Mirror 1(11), March 1-14, 2004.
‘Sudanese president urges opposition party to dump Turabi’, AP, Sept. 27, 2004.

This article first appeared in the June 17, 2005 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Darfur in the Age of Stone Architecture – Index

Posted on December 30, 2001 by McGregor

McGregor, Andrew: Darfur in the Age of Stone Architecture c. AD 1000 – 1750: Problems in Historical Reconstruction, BAR International Series 1006, Cambridge Monographs in African Archaeology 53, 2001

Please note the names from the King-lists have not been included in the index.

Footnotes are indexed for content but not citations.

Aba Kuri: 96(fn.44)

Abalessa: 14, 14(fn.29)

‘Abbasids: 24, 25, 26(fn.39), 28(fn.65), 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 43, 48, 50, 50(fn.64), 51, 52, 55, 56, 128

‘Abd al-Gadir: 38,

‘Abd al-Karim, Sultan: 44, 45, 56, 77-78, 88

‘Abd al-Karim ibn Yame: 28(fn.65), 43

‘Abd al-Majid, Sultan: 44

‘Abd al-Qadir: 68

‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid, Sultan: 96, 96(fn.39)

‘Abdallahi ibn Muhammad al-Khalifa: 62(fn.38)

‘Abdallab Arabs: 50(fn.64), 126

‘Abdullah Gema’a (Jama’a): 126-127

‘Abdullah Wad Hasoba al-Moghrabi: 62(fn.36)

‘Abdullahi Bahur, King: 28

‘Abdullahi Kamteinye, Sultan: 30

Abéché: 45, 77

Abo: 96(fn.44)

Abraham: 36(fn.44)

Abtar: 128(fn.68)

Abu Asal: 88, 95

Abu Delayk: 117

Abu Deleig: 125(fn.37)

Abu al-Fida: 22(fn.4), 23, 52

Abu Garan: 118-119

Abu Hadid: 129, 130

Abu Hamed: 37(fn.46), 124

Abu Hamid al-Gharnati: 38

Abu Haraz: 124(fn.32)

Abu Kundi: 89

Abu’l-Malik: 55

Abu Negila: 116(fn.4)

Abu’l-Qasim: 89, 89(fn.28), 96

Abu Qona’an: 16, 74, 117, 122(fn.6), 123, 128-130, 128(fn.68), 132, 140

Abu Sufyan (Sofyan): 122-124, 127, 127(fn.51), 130, 131, 134

Abu Suruj: 21

Abu Telfan: 23(fn.18), 45, 77

Abu Urug: 125

Abu Zabad: 28

Abu Zayd: 49-52, 52-53, 85

Abu’l-Sakaring Dynasty: 50

Abunjedah: 54

Al-Abwab: 37, 37(fn.46), 129, 129(fn.78)

Abydos: 25

Abyssinia, Abyssinians: 26(fn.38), 38, 111(fn.12), 129, 129(fn.79)

Acien, Kwanyireth Bol: 75

Adams, William Y.: 68, 123, 132(fn.5), 134

Al-Adayk: 49

Addison, F.: 122

Adelberger, J.: 64(fn.57)

Adimo (Dimo): 75

Adindan: 68(fn.97)

Ador, King: 37, 129

‘Agab, King: 85

Agadez: 137

Agadez Chronicle: 130

Agathermerus: 16

Agumbulum: 130

Ahaggar: 13(fn.26)

Ahl al-Awaid: 86

Ahmad Adam: 36

Ahmad al-‘Abbasid: 50

Ahmad Arbaf, Faki: 35

Ahmad Bakr, Sultan: 88-89, 93(fn.10), 95, 96, 96(fn.44)

Ahmad al-Daj: 25, 26, 27, 27(fn.45), 28, 29, 30

Ahmad al-Dia: 29

Ahmad Hamid: 61, 62(fn.37)

Ahmad al-Kabgawi: 27

Ahmad Kanjar: 45

Ahmad al-Ma’qur: 10, 18, 44, 46(fn.31), 49-56, 50(fn.60), 84-85, 87, 112(fn.26), 139

Ahmad al-Turkan: 28

Aidhab: 65

Ainyumba Daifani: 116

Aïr: 113, 130, 137

Akec La, Queen: 75

Akurwa: 75(fn.2)

Alans: 36(fn.44)

Albanians: 74

Albinism: 129, 129(fn.86)

Alexander the Great: 29, 36-39, 36(fns.44-45), 37(fns.51-52),

Alexandria: 126(fn.44)

Algeria: 13-14, 20,

‘Ali, A. Muhammad: 9

‘Ali Ahmad: 119(fn.36)

‘Ali Dinar (Sultan): 4, 11, 11(fn.s 10, 11), 12, 34(fn.26), 34(fn.29), 35, 43(fn.3), 45(fn.23), 54, 57(fn.5), 62(fn.38), 69, 78(fn.14), 96, 96(fn.38), 96(fn.40), 116, 116(fn.1)

‘Ali Dunama: 72

‘Ali Ghaji Zeinama: 72

‘Ali ibn Ahmad, Sultan: 72

‘Ali Korkorat, Sultan: 59, 59(fn.15)

‘Ali Musa: 45

Almásy, László Ede: 127(fn.57)

Almohads: 52

Almoravids: 110(fn.1)

Alwa (Aloa): 37(fn.46), 62(fn.36), 122, 123, 126(fn.44), 127, 131

Ama Soultane: 77

‘Amara Dunqas: 126

Ambus Masalit: 78(fn.14)

Amdang: 86

Aminu, Muhammadu: 16

Ammon: 37, 37(fns.53-54), 38

Ammon (place-name): 128

Amsa, Queen: 72

Amun-Re: 37

Anakim: 128

‘Anaj (Anag, Anak): 48(fn.53), 117, 122, 122(fn.6), 123-131, 123(fn.12), 124(fn.32), 125(fns.37,38), 127(fns.57,58), 128(fns.60,68), 130(fn.92), 140

Andal: 29

Andalus: 48

Anderson, AR: 37(fn.50)

Anedj: 129

‘Angarib, Sultan: 26, 27

Anglo-Egyptian Condominium: 12, 13, 27, 27(fn.52), 62(fn.42), 79, 124

Ani, King: 129, 129(fn.77)

Annok: 36(fn.41)

Anthony: 13(fn.26)

Arab, Arabs: 17, 18, 24(fn.25), 26, 28(fn.65), 31(fn.5), 36(fn.44), 43(fn.6), 44, 44(fn.8), 45, 45(fn.23), 48, 49, 50(fn.60), 53(fn.90), 55, 56, 57(fn.2), 62, 63(fn.47), 72(fn.128), 87, 88(fn.18), 89, 111, 111(fns.11,12), 116, 117, 119, 125(fn.33), 125(fn.37), 126, 128(fn.68), 129, 130, 139

Arabia: 2, 26(fn.38), 27, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 38, 50, 117, 135, 136

Arabic: 11(fn.11), 13, 44(fn.13), 63, 64(fn.54), 71(fn.119), 73(fn.142), 75(fn.7), 77(fn.9), 96(fn.41), 97, 104, 109, 110(fn.1), 111(fn.11), 117(fn.15), 140

Arari: 96(fn.41)

Arin Dulo: 31

Arkell, AJ: 1, 7-9, 12, 16, 20, 21, 23(fn.16), 25, 26, 27, 29(fn.69), 31, 31(fn.6), 33, 33(fn.18), 34, 34(fn.25), 34(fn.30), 36, 36(fn.39), 38, 38(fn.57), 44(fn.13), 45, 45(fn.21), 46, 46(fn.31, 32), 46(fn.35), 47, 48, 50, 53(fn.90), 54, 56, 57, 57(fn.1), 59(fn.9), 60, 60(fn.24), 61, 62, 62(fn.37), 63, 63(fn.49), 64, 64(fn.53), 65, 65(fn.67), 66-69, 68(fn.97), 69(fns.101,102), 70-71, 70(fn.111), 71(fn.118), 72, 72(fn.129), 74, 75, 75(fn.7), 78(fn.14), 91(fns.2,3,7), 93, 93(fn.8), 94, 94(fns.21,22,27), 95, 96(fns.39,41), 97, 97(fn.46), 112, 112(fn.21), 113, 115, 116, 116(fn.4), 117, 118, 122(fn.6), 123, 123(fn.13), 127, 128, 130(fn.96), 132, 134

Arianism: 137

Arlas: 128(fn.68)

Armenia, Armenians: 52(fn.79)

Armi Kowamin: 64(fn.53)

Ary: 129

Asben: 130

Ashdod: 128

Ashmolean: 65

Assyrian: 8, 28(fn.65)

Aswan: 110, 116, 137

Asyut: 5, 125

Atbara: 88, 116, 131

Aule: 63

Aurès: 20

Aurungide Dynasty: 116

Awlad Mahmud: 130

Awlad Rashid: 72(fn.128)

Awlad Sulayman: 44, 63(fn.47)

Axum: 113

Ayesha: 55

‘Ayn Farah: 33, 36(fn.39), 54(fn.99), 56, 57(fn.5), 61, 64-74, 64(fn.60), 65(fn.67), 66(fn.75), 67(fn.86), 69(fn.100), 69(fn.102), 91(fn.3), 112, 122, 127, 131, 132, 134, 137, 139

‘Ayn Galakka: 55, 66(fn,75), 73-74, 73(fns.146,148), 128(fn.68)

‘Ayn Siro: 60(fn.23)

‘Ayn Sirra: 72(fn.129)

Ayyubid: 23

Axum, Axumites: 8

Azagarfa: 96(fn.41)

Al-Aziz, Caliph: 52(fn.79)

Babaliya: 48,

Babylon: 22

Bachwezi: 18

Bacquié, Captain: 134

Badanga Fur: 71

Badar: 136

Badi, Sultan: 87

Badr al-Gamali al-Guyushi: 52(fn.79)

Bagari: 116

Baghdad: 50, 52

Bagirmi: 5, 7, 27(fn.55), 43, 62, 63, 75(fn.3), 88, 95, 111, 111(fn.11), 119, 135

Bagnold, RA: 116

Bahar: 91

Baheir Tageru: 125

Bahnasa: 43(fn.6)

Bahr, Wazir: 89

Bahr al-Arab: 27(fn.55), 75

Bahr al-Ghazal (Chad): 67(fn.86), 73, 74, 132-135, 132(fn.1)

Bahr al-Ghazal (South Sudan): 23, 25, 27(fn.45), 27(fn.55), 29, 31(fn.5), 33(fn.12), 75, 128(fn.68), 132(fn.1)

Bahr al-Jamal: 56

Baiyuda Wells: 124

Balal: 111(fn.11)

Balfour Paul, HG: 1, 8(fn.19), 17, 20, 26-27, 28, 31, 35, 36(fn.41), 38(fn.60), 44, 60, 60(fn.24), 61, 61(fn.29), 62, 65, 66, 66(fns.75,77), 68(fn.92), 69, 70, 72, 95

Banda: 7, 27(fn.55)

Bani Abbas: 48

Bani Habibi: 16

Bani Mukhtar: 16

Bantu: 27(fn.55)

Banu Hillal: 44, 46(fn.31), 48, 48(fn.53), 49, 51, 51(fn.71), 52, 52(fns.79, 80), 52(fn.86), 53, 57(fn.2), 85, 117, 120(fn.46), 129

Banu Sulaym: 52, 52(fn.79)

Banu Ummaya: 64(fn.53)

Bao: 49

Baqqara: 24, 27(fn.55), 44, 50(fn.60)

Barah (Bazah): 129

Barakandi: 31(fn.6)

Barani Berbers: 128(fn.68)

Barboteu, Lieutenant: 48

Barca: 64

Bargala: 57(fn.1)

Bariat: 55

Barkindo, BM: 46, 46(fn.30), 47, 111(fn.12), 136, 136(fn.32), 137, 137(fn.41)

Barqat Umm Balbat: 124

Barquq, Sultan: 111(fn.12)

Barr: 128(fn.68)

Barr ibn Qays ‘Aylan: 38

Barra, Battle of: 54

Barrjo: 31(fn.4), 128(fn.68)

Barth, Heinrich: 5, 43, 43(fn.6), 46, 46(fn.27), 57(fn.2), 111

Basa: 129(fn.78)

Basi: 28(fn.60)

Basigna: 119(fn.37)

Batálesa: 43, 43(fn.6)

Batnan, King: 85

Bayko: 23, 23(fns.17, 19), 25, 25(fn.29), 27(fn.45), 29, 88

Bayko King-List: 42

Bayt al-Mayram: 61, 69, 69(fn.102)

Bazina à degrès: 20, 20(fn. 22), 118(fn.27)

Beaton, AC: 16, 87, 87(fn.9)

Bedariya: 128

Bedde: 63

Befal: 129

Beja: 22, 132

Beliin: 137

Bell, Herman: 130(fn.92)

Bender, Lionel M.: 6, 23, 119(fn.34), 128(fn.60)

Bénesé: 43, 43(fn.6)

Benghazi: 77(fn.1)

Beni – see Bani

Benoit Pierre: 13, 13(fn.26)

Berber, Berbers: 7, 13, 14, 14(fn.29), 16, 17, 17(fn.15), 20, 21, 25, 26, 33, 36(fn.44), 38, 45(fn.25), 46, 46(fn.27, 30, 31), 48, 48(fn.53), 49, 52, 53, 53(fn.90), 57(fn.2), 61(fn.31), 62, 64(fn.53), 70, 72(fn.129), 77, 80(fn.2), 111(fns.11,12), 119, 122, 122(fn.6), 123, 125, 125(fn.33), 128, 128(fn.68), 129, 130, 130(fn.93), 137, 139

Beri: 23

Beringia, Battle of: 45(fn.23), 62(fn.42)

Berre, Henri: 24, 25

Berti: 33, 64, 116, 118-119, 119(fn.34), 120(fn.44)

Bayuda Desert: 125

Bible: 37(fn.52), 128

Bidayat: 27, 48, 48(fns.53, 54), 49, 49(fn.55), 72(fn.128), 117, 128(fn.68), 137

Bidayriya Arabs: 88(fn.18)

Bilaq: 33, 33(fn.22)

Bilia Bidayat: 137

Bilia Bidayat, Sections: 48

Bilma: 46

Biltine: 45

Binga: 7, 27(fn.55)

Bir Bai Depression: 77

Bir Natrun: 22(fn.1)

Birged (Birked): 51, 51(fn.71), 64, 64(fn.54), 88, 120, 120(fn.46)

Birged Sections: 120(fn.46)

Biriara Bidayat, Sections: 49

Birni: 56, 72(fn.134)

Bivar, AH: 11, 67(fn.86), 73(fn.144), 74

Blemmyes: 127(fn.58)

Blue Nile, Blue Nile Province: 7, 62(fn.36), 117

Bochianga: 132, 132(fn.7)

Bora Dulu: 9

Bordeaux, General: 73(fn.146)

Borgu: 135, 136

Borku: 44, 66(fn.75), 73, 74, 77(fn.1), 128, 132(fn.4), 137

Borno (Bornu): 5, 7, 11, 16, 16(fns. 4,7), 26(fn.39), 28, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 36(fn.44), 44, 46, 46(fn.27), 47, 47(fn.43), 48, 50, 50(fn.64), 51, 54, 57(fn.2), 63, 69(fn.101), 70, 70(fns.111,116), 71, 72-73, 72(fns.129,135), 74, 75, 75(fn.3), 77(fn.1), 80(fn.1), 88, 91, 110, 111, 111(fns.11.12), 112, 118, 119, 123, 127, 131, 137, 139

Bosnians: 74

Botolo Muhammad: 119(fn.36)

Brahim (Sultan): 44

Brands: 25, 46(fn.37), 70, 70(fn.107), 72(fn.129)

Braziers: 134

Brett, Michael: 52

Bricks, Brick Construction: 65(fn.67), 66, 66(fn.75), 67(fn.86), 70(fn.109), 72-73, 73(fns.142,143,144,148), 74, 95, 96, 114, 122, 124, 126, 127, 132

Britain, British: 11(fn.10), 13, 45(fn.23), 62(fn.42), 65(fn.67)

British Columbia: 15

Brown, Robert: 111

Browne, WG: 5, 46(fn.37), 114, 130

Bruce, James: 38(fn.58), 89(fn.28)

Brun-Rollet: 52

Buba: 15

Budge, EA Wallis: 127(fn.58)

Bugiha: 137(fn.37)

Bugur, King: 29, 31

Bukar Aji: 136(fn.32)

Bulala: 44, 48, 56, 67(fn.86), 70, 73, 73(fn.143), 110, 111, 111(fn.11), 112, 112(fn.21), 137

Bulgi: 57(fn.1)

Burgu Keli: 57(fn.1)

Burnus: 128(fn.68)

Burundi: 115

Busa: 135

Bussa: 136

Butana: 130

Butr Berbers: 128(fn.68)

Byzacena: 137

Byzantium, Byzantines: 43(fn.6), 135, 135(fn.21), 137

C-Group: 45(fn.21), 132(fn.7), 134

Cailliaud, Frèdèric: 38, 46(fn.37)

Cain: 128

Cairo: 11(fn.9), 52, 52(fn.79), 63, 64, 78(fn.15), 111, 111(fn.12)

Cameroon: 5, 115, 136(fn.32)

Campbell, E.: 60

Canaanites: 128, 128(fn.68), 132

Canary Islands: 37, 130, 37, 130(fn.93)

Cannibalism: 78(fn.14)

Capot-Rey, MR: 132(fn.5)

Carbou, H: 27(fn.54), 44(fn.8), 46(fn.32), 53, 80(fn.1), 111-112

Carrique, Captain: 73-74, 128(fn.68)

Carthage, Carthaginians: 14, 115, 137

Caucasus: 35, 36(fn.44)

Celts: 36(fn.44)

Central African Republic: 27(fn.55)

Chad: 7, 17, 22, 23, 27(fns.54,55), 31(fn.5), 44, 44(fn.13), 45, 48(fn.51), 66(fn.75), 67(fn.86), 72, 111(fn.9), 112, 113, 114, 132-137, 132(fn.7), 140

Changalif: 45

Chapelle, Jean: 44, 48

Chittick, HN: 125-127

Chokhorgyal Monastery: 35

Chosroe II (Chosroes, Khosraw, Kisra): 26(fn.38), 135, 135(fn.25)

Chouchet Tomb: 14, 14(fn.27), 20, 20(fn.21), 77, 118, 118(fn.27), 119, 119(fns.40,41,42)

Christianity, Christians: 8, 11, 23, 33, 36(fn.44), 38, 44(fn.13), 46, 46(fn.31), 46(fn.35), 46(fn.37), 47, 46(fn.37), 62(fn.36), 64(fn.54), 65(fn.67), 66, 67, 67(fn.86), 68-69, 69(fn.102), 70, 72(fn.129), 74, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117, 120, 120(fn.48), 122-123, 124(fn.29), 125-127, 126(fn.44), 130, 131, 132-137, 132(fns.4,6), 137(fn.41), 139-140

Chronicle of John: 137

Circassians: 74

Clapperton, H: 110(fn.3)

Clarke, Somers: 68

Cleopatra: 13(fn.26)

Cline, Walter: 48(fn.47)

Cohanim: 15

Cohen, Ronald: 11

Congo: 27(fn.55), 33(fn.12)

Copts (Egyptian): 111, 112, 123, 126(fn.44), 132, 135

Crawford, WF: 27, 38(fn.58), 123, 123(fn.13)

Crete: 38(fn.58)

Cromlech: 31(fn.10)

Crowfoot, JW: 130

Cunnison, I: 24

Cuoq, Joseph M.: 77(fn.9)

Currie, James: 46(fn.37)

Cyrenaïca: 37, 64, 77, 117

Cyrus the Great: 37(fn.52)

Dagio: 63

Dahia: 29

Daima: 114

Daju: 5, 6, 6(fn.6), 8, 12, 16, 18, 22-42, 22(fn.44), 23(fns.15, 16, 18, 19), 24(fn.21), 27(fn.45), 27(fn.52), 27(fn.54), 28(fn.58), 29, 29(fn.66-67, 71-72), 30, 30(fn.75,77), 31-42, 31(fn.6), 33, 33(fn.18), 34, 34(fn.25), 34(fn.29), 35, 36, 36(fn.45), 43, 44, 45, 51, 53(fn.98), 64, 64(fns.54,60), 72(fn.128), 75(fn.3), 87(fn.9), 91, 110, 112, 118, 118(fn.19), 128, 131, 139-140

Daju Hills: 27, 34, 113(fn.1)

Daju King-Lists: 40-42

Daju Sections: 24

Dak, son of Nyikango: 75

Dakin al-Funjawi: 88(fn.18)

Dakka: 116

Dala Afno (Dali Afnu, Afuno): 44, 70, 75, 91

Dala Gumami, Mai: 72

Dalatawa: 44

Dali: 31, 51, 54, 62-63, 71, 71(fn.118), 75, 75(fn.7), 76, 84, 87, 91, 93, 93(fn.10), 97(fn.45), 112(fn.26), 139

Dalloni, M: 119(fn.42), 130

Damergu: 47, 47(fn.46)

Danagla: 117

D’Anania, Giovanni Lorenzo: 63-64, 71

Danat, King: 29

Daoud al-Mireim, Sultan: 45

Dar Abo Dima: 51, 128

Dar Abo Uma: 51

Dar Birked: 89

Dar Dali (Daali): 62(fn.42), 75(fn.7)

Dar Dima: 75(fn.7)

Dar Erenga: 36(fn.41)

Dar Fertit (Fartit): 29, 112(fn.24)

Dar Fia: 87, 95

Dar Fur (see Darfur)

Dar Furnung: 43, 54, 64, 64(fn.60), 70, 72, 72(fn.129), 75, 86, 139

Dar al-Gharb: 75(fn.7)

Dar Hamid: 119

Dar Hawawir: 125

Dar Humr: 50, 50(fn.61)

Dar Kerne: 95

Dar Kobbé: 27(fn.45), 28(fn.65), 34(fn.25)

Dar Masalit: 30, 36(fn.41), 78(fn.14), 86

Dar Qimr (Gimr): 34(fn.25), 36(fn.41), 44, 45, 95

Dar al-Riah: 75(fn.7)

Dar Runga: 62(fn.42)

Dar Sila: 6(fn.6), 12, 23, 23(fn.18), 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29(fn.72), 30, 34(fn.25), 36(fn.41), 45, 56

Dar Simiat: 33

Dar Sinyar: 44

Dar Tama: 27, 27(fn.45), 29(fn.72), 45, 79

Dar Tokonyawi: 75(fn.7)

Dar Tuar: 50, 34(fn.25), 50

Dar Uma: 75(fn.7)

Dar Wona: 29, 31, 93, 93(fn.10)

Dar Zaghawa: 33(fn.18), 50, 64(fn.53), 112, 112(fn.24)

Dar Ziyad: 44

Daranga Fur: 78(fn.14)

Darb al-Arba’in: 4, 5, 50, 60, 110, 112, 112(fn.25), 122(fn.6)

Dardai: 47, 47(fn.46), 48, 48(fn.51)

Darfur, Administrative Divisions: 75(fn.7)

Darfur, Geography of: 2-4

Darfur, Trade Routes: 4, 73, 77(fn.1)

Darsala: 47, 47(fn.46)

Date Palm Cultivation: 36, 48, 80(fn.2),

Daud Kubara ibn Sulayman: 129

Da’ud al-Mirayn: 77

Dawa: 57

Dawurd al-Miriri al-Modaddan, Sultan: 55

Daza Tubu: 16, 16(5), 34(fn.29), 45, 47, 137

Dazaga (Dazagada): 44(fn.13), 45

De Breuvery, J: 30, 50

De Cadalvène, E: 30, 50

De Lauture, PHS D’Escrayac: 87

De Medeiros, F.: 17

De Neufville, RL: 65, 65(fn.61), 66(fns.74,75), 67(fn.87), 68, 69(fn.100)

Debba: 31, 31(fn.4)

Debeira East: 67

Debeira West: 65, 65(fn.67)

Delil Bahar: 51, 63

Demagherim: 46(fn.27), 54

Dengkur: 34(fn.26)

Denham, D.: 72, 110(fn.3)

Derdekishia: 47-48

Dereiba Lakes: 34-36

Derihurti: 47

Dhu’l-Adh’ar: 39

Dhu al-Manar: 38

Dhu Nowas: 136

Dhu al-Qarnayn (see Alexander the Great)

Diab, Sultan: 45

Diffinarti: 68

Diffusionism: 8

Dilling: 75

Al-Dimashqi: 123

Al-Dinawari: 37

Dingwall, RG: 63, 65

Dinka: 128

Dionysus: 37(fn.50), 38

Dirku: 16

Dirma: 57

Divine Kingship: 35, 113, 139

Diyab: 49

Djelil al-Hilali: 84(fn.3), 85

Djourab: 132

Dolmens: 118(fn.27)

Donatism: 137

Dongola: 23, 43, 52(fn.86), 67(fn.86), 85, 117, 122(fn.6), 123, 129, 134

Dowda: 57, 57(fns.1-2), 60

Drums (see Nahas)

Dukkume, Malik: 87

Dulo Kuri: 57, 91-93

Dumont, Henri J.: 60(fn.18), 118-120

Dumua: 64(fn.60)

Durma: 57(fn.5)

Duros: 47

Edmonds, JM: 123, 125

Edwards, WN: 116(fn.1)

Egypt, Egyptians: 5, 7, 8, 11, 25, 33(fn.22), 38, 43, 52, 52(fn.79), 53, 54, 60, 63, 63(fn.47), 64, 71, 74, 88, 97, 110, 111(fn.12), 112, 112(fn.25), 113, 122(fn.6), 123, 123(fn.16), 125, 127, 128, 128(fn.67), 129, 131, 132, 134, 135

Eilai: 125

England, English: 54

Ennedi: 8, 27, 36(fn.39), 44, 44(fn.15), 46, 48(fn.54), 55, 77, 128, 128(fn.68), 137

Eparch: 38(fn.59)

Equatoria: 33(fn.12)

Erenga: 36(fn.41), 79

Errè: 45

Et-Terge Masalit: 78(fn.14)

Ethiopia: 37, 128(fn.68)

Eunuchs: 20, 57(fn.2), 62, 62(fn.42), 76

Evans-Pritchard, EE: 7, 75(fn.2)

Fara: 54

Faragab: 129

Farafra Oasis: 52(fn.80)

Faras: 38, 67, 69

Fashir: 75(fn.3), 89

Al-Fashir: 5, 9, 11, 11(fn.9), 34(fn.26), 45, 45(fn.23), 50, 62(fn.38), 63(fn.47), 69, 75(fn.3), 78(fn.14), 120(fn.46), 135

Fatimids: 52, 52(fn.79)

Fazughli: 27, 38, 128

Fazzan (Fezzan): 5, 20(fn.22), 45(fn.23), 48, 48(fn.51), 119(fn.41)

Felkin, RW: 34, 86, 87(fn.9), 114

Fella (Fellanga): 64(fn.60), 70

Fenikang: 75(fn.2)

Fentress, Elizabeth: 52

Ferti: 20

Fertit: 27, 27(fn.55), 30

Fez: 62(fn.36)

Fezzan (Fazzan): 63(fn.47), 73, 74, 119

Fiki Khalil: 54

Fiki Muhammad Tahir: 62(fn.38)

Fileil, Sultan: 30

Filga: 59, 94, 95

Fir: 27(fn.55)

Fira: 64(fn.53)

Firat: 27(fn.55)

Fisher, AGB: 111(fn.11), 112, 112(fn.26)

Fora: 51

Forang Aba: 71

Foranga Fur: 71

Forei: 95

Foucauld, Pére: 13

France, French: 13, 30, 30(fn.78), 34(fn.29), 48(fn.51), 63(fn.47), 65(fn.67), 73(fn.146)

Franciscans: 137

Frobenius, Leo: 135

Fuchs, P.: 72(fn.128)

Fugbu (Fugobo): 80(fn.3)

Fulani: 36(fn.44), 72, 119

Funj: 24(fns.21, 25), 25, 31(fn.4), 38, 38(fn.57), 51, 87, 88(fn.18), 89, 95, 112, 126, 128(fn.60), 129, 131

Funj Chronicle: 51, 126, 126(fn.44), 127, 131

Fur: 6-7, 11, 16, 17, 18, 27(fn.55), 28, 29(fn.71), 30, 31, 33, 34, 34(fn.25), 36, 45, 45(fn.18), 51, 53, 55, 57, 57(fn.2), 62, 64, 64(fns.53,54), 71, 71(fns.120,123), 75, 78(fn.14), 79, 86-109, 86(fn.7), 91(fn.5), 123, 139

Fur King-Lists: 97-109

Fur Language: 86, 86(fn.2), 94(fn.22)

Furnung Hills: 60, 60(fn.23), 119(fn.38)

Furogé (Feroge): 27, 27(fn.55), 29(fn.73), 30

Ga’afir Gurmun (Germun), King: 85

Gabir: 64

Gabri: 20

Gaéda: 44, 44(fn.15)

Gamburu: 69(fn.101), 72-73

Gami Kheir, Malik: 116(fn.1), 118

Gao: 110(fn.1)

Gaoga: 33, 110-112, 110(fn.1), 112(fns.21,24,26)

Garamentes: 115, 130

Garoumélé: 73, 73(fn.143)

Garu: 72(fn.135)

Gedaref: 50

Garstang, John: 62

Gath: 128

Gaya: 136(fn.32)

Gaza: 128

Gelti al-Naga: 130(fn.94)

Genealogy: 5, 11(fn.11), 12-15, 24, 47(fn.46), 53(fn.91), 84, 96(fn.41), 97, 111(fn.12), 128(fn.68)

Geneina: 86

Genies (Jinn): 62(fn.38)

German: 64(fn.57)

Gezira: 129(fn.78)

Ghabashat, Battle of: 89

Ghana: 22, 135

Gharbanin: 25(fn.29)

Ghazali: 67, 134

Ghudiyat Arabs: 87

Ghulam Allah ibn ‘Ayd: 28(fn.65)

Ghumsa: 46

Ghuzz: 74

Giants: 31(fn.4), 53-54, 73, 74, 123, 128, 128(fn.68)

Giggeri, Sultan: 88, 95

Gilgamesh: 37, 37(fn.50)

Gili: 78

Gillan, Angus: 7, 35, 35(fn.34)

Gillif Hills: 125

Gillo: 75

Ginsi: 87

Gitar, King: 28

Gitxsan: 15

Glass: 65-66, 65(fn.67)

Gnol: 23(fn.15)

Gobir: 135

Gog and Magog: 36, 36(fn.44)

Gogorma: 95

Gold: 71

Gordon-Alexander, LD: 96(fn.40)

Goths: 36(fn.44)

Greece, Greek: 7, 28(fn.65), 37, 38, 65(fn.67), 126(fn.44), 132, 135(fn.25), 137

Gros, René: 29, 44(fn.17)

Guanche: 130(fn.93)

Gula: 27(fn.55)

Gule: 128(fn.60)

Gunda: 47(fn.46)

Gura’an (Kura’an): 25, 34(fn.29), 56, 132, 137, 137(fn.37)

Gurli (Gerli): 95

Gurri: 95

Gurzil: 37(fn.53)

Haaland, R.: 114

Hababa, Habuba’at: 62(fn.38), 97

Habasha: 22, 23, 33(fn.22)

Hache à gorge axe: 125

Haddad: 113

Hafir: 120, 125, 125(fn.37), 130

Hajang Keingwo: 97, 97(fn.46)

Hajar Kudjuna: 25

Hajar Kujunung: 30,

Hajar Te’us: 28(fn.65)

Hajj ‘Ali: 50

Hajj Brahim Delil: 63

Ham, Hamites: 6-7, 8, 22, 25, 26, 38, 46, 125(fn.33), 128

Hamad ‘Abbas Himyar: 29(fn.73)

Hamaj (Hamej): 128, 128(fn.60)

Hamid bin Abdullah: 96(fn.41)

Hamid Ahmad: 28(fn.64)

Hammad bin Tamr: 119

Harim: 57(fn.2), 62(fn.42)

Harkhuf: 45(fn.21), 116

Harkilla: 135

Harut: 78

Hassaballah, General: 126

Al-Hassar, Sultan: 44

Hausa: 44, 70, 73(fn.143)

Hauya Hoe: 59, 113, 119

Hawara Berbers: 125, 125(fn.33)

Hawawir: 125, 125(fn.33),

Haycock, BG: 113

Haydaran, Battle of: 52

Haykal: 68

Hebrew, Hebrews: 36(fn.44), 128

Hebron: 65, 128

Helbou: 27(fn.31)

Helmolt, Dr.: 77(fn.9)

Henderson, KDD: 29

Henige, DP: 14, 84

Heracles: 37(fn.50)

Heraclius: 135

Herodotus: 11

Al-Hidjr: 28(fn.65)

Hijaz: 27(fn.53), 27(fn.54), 28(fn.65), 49, 78, 136

Hill, LG: 25

Hill Nubian: 120

Himyarites: 18, 26, 26(fns.38, 39), 29(fn.73), 38, 39, 38(fn.61), 49, 111(fn.12), 125(fn.33), 135, 136

Hobbs, Capt. HFC: 35, 35(fn.34)

Hobson, RL: 70

Hoes (see also Hauya hoes): 122, 122(fn.6)

Hoggar Mountains: 13, 20(fn.22),

Holt, PM: 48(fn.53), 51, 51(fn.74), 98

Holy Stones (see Stone Worship)

Houghton, AA: 65, 65(fn.61), 66(fns.74,75), 67(fn.87), 68, 69(fn.100)

Howara: 119

Hrbek, I: 63(fn.47), 71(fn.1244), 112

Huard, P.: 113, 132(fn.7), 134

Huddleston, Major HJ: 35

Hudud al-Alam: 132-134

Human Sacrifice: 78

Hummay, Sultan: 111(fn.12)

Hungarians: 74

Huns: 36(fn.44)

Hurreiz, Sayyid Hamed: 54

Husayn (Hussein) Abu Koda: 78(fn.14)

Husayn Morfaien, Sultan: 30

Ibadites: 137

Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahr: 129

Ibn Abi Zar of Fez: 125(fn.33)

Ibn al-‘Arabi: 23

Ibn Assafarani: 130,

Ibn Batuta: 64(fn.53)

Ibn Hazm: 38

Ibn Kathir: 37

Ibn Khaldun: 23, 38, 52, 52(fn.78)

Ibn Qutayba: 6

Ibn Sa’id: 22, 23, 37, 136

Ibn Selim al-Aswani: 37(fn.46), 62(fn.36), 126(fn.44), 127, 129(fn.78)

Ibn Shaddad: 52

Ibn al-Wardi: 33(fn.22)

Ibrahim (Pretender to the Fur Throne): 78(fn.14)

Ibrahim, Sultan (Fur): 5, 62(fn.38), 96, 116

Ibrahim, Sultan (Tunjur):

Ibrahim al-Dalil (see Dali)

Ibrahim Musa Muhammad: 7, 9, 9(fn.9), 68(fn.88), 70(fn.111)

Ibrahim bin ‘Uthman, Sultan: 110

Idris Aloma, Mai: 70, 70(fn.111), 71, 72-73, 75(fn.3), 123

Idris Ja’l: 87

Idris Katargarmabe (Katarkanabi), Sultan: 112

Al-Idrisi, Muhammad: 17, 22, 33, 45(fn.25), 111, 112(fn.20), 137

Ifriqsun bin Tubba Dhu al-Manar: 38

Ihaggaren Tuareg: 13

Illo: 136

Imam Ahmad: 47

Imatong Hills: 33(fn.12)

India, Indian: 63, 63(fn.47)

Iriba Plateau: 77,

Irima: 64(fn.53)

Iron, Iron-working: 33, 59(fn.13), 62, 70, 93, 113-115, 114(fns.12,16), 119-120, 120(fn.43), 122, 123, 123(fn.16), 140

Irtet: 116

Irtt: 116,

Isabatan: 13

‘Isawi bin Janqal: 89

Islam, Islamization: 11, 12, 18, 28(fn.65), 34, 36(fn.44), 44, 48, 50, 53(fn.90), 55, 62(fn.38), 69, 70-71, 71(fn.124), 72(fn.128), 73, 86-87, 86(fn.7), 89, 95, 97, 110, 111(fn.12), 112, 117, 117(fn.14), 118, 127, 135-136, 139

Isma’il Ayyub Pasha: 75(fn.7), 103-104

Israel: 128

Italy, Italians: 34(fn.29), 54, 63(fn.47),65(fn.67), 110(fn.1)

Iya Basi: 78(fn.14)

Ja’aliin Arabs: 25, 26(fn.39), 28(fn.65), 45, 119

Jackson, HC: 124, 124(fn.32), 125(fn.37)

Jacobites: 137

Jallaba Hawawir: 125(fn.33)

Jalut: 13(fn.25

Janakhira: 27(fn.55)

Janqal (Jongol), Sultan: 88, 88(fn.18)

Japheth: 36(fn.44)

Jarma: 56

Jawami’a: 96-97, 96(fn.41), 129

Jayli: 51

Jebel ‘Abd al-Hadi – see Jebel Haraza

Jebel Adadi: 95, 95(fn.31)

Jebel Afara: 96(fn.38)

Jebel Aress: 48

Jebel Au: 18

Jebel al-Azib: 129

Jebel Bayt al-Nahas: 129

Jebel Belbeldi: 130(fn.94)

Jebel Burgu: 28(fn.65)

Jebel Doba: 31

Jebel Eisa: 60, 118

Jebel Ferti: 59

Jebel Foga: 21, 91, 91(fn.3), 93, 95

Jebel Forei: 93

Jebel Gelli: 50(fn.63)

Jebel Gidera: 36(fn.41)

Jebel Gurgi: 54

Jebel Haraza: 33, 123, 123(fn.12), 129, 129, 129(fn.77), 130-131, 130(fns.87,94), 131

Jebel Hileila: 33,

Jebel al-Hosh: 125

Jebel Hurayz (Harayz, Hereiz): 43, 48-9

Jebel Irau: 126

Jebel Jung: 64(fn.53)

Jebel Kaboija: 117

Jebel Kadama: 45

Jebel Kadjanan: 30

Jebel Kadjano: 25

Jebel Kajanan: 30

Jebel Karshul: 130

Jebel Katul: 129

Jebel Keima: 16, 31(fn.6), 93

Jebel Kerbi: 60

Jebel Kilwa: 28, 30, 31, 33

Jebel Kurkeila: 130

Jebel Kwon: 135

Jebel Liguri: 23

Jebel Mailo: 53

Jebel Maman: 127(fn.58)

Jebel Marra: 1, 7, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25, 27(fn.55), 28, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.66), 31, 33, 34, 36, 36(fn.41), 38, 45, 51, 53, 54, 57(fn.5), 62(fn.42), 66, 78(fn.14), 86, 87-90, 91, 93-95, 94(fn.21), 112, 119(fn.38), 128, 131, 139

Jebel Masa: 59, 72(fn.129)

Jebel Meidob – See Meidob Hills

Jebel Mogran: 117

Jebel Mojalla: 95

Jebel Moya: 130

Jebel Mun: 79

Jebel Mutarrak (Mutarrig): 59-60

Jebel Nami: 54, 94, 95, 97,

Jebel Omori: 113(fn.1)

Jebel Otash: 36

Jebel al-Raqta: 125

Jebel Shalasi: 130

Jebel Si: 16, 20, 53, 54(fn.100), 57, 57(fn.5), 75, 75(fn.3), 86

Jebel Siab: 118

Jebel Silga: 33

Jebel Suruj: 88(fn.18)

Jebel Tageru: 125, 128-129

Jebel Taqali: 50, 50(fn.64)

Jebel Teiga: 60, 122(fn.6)

Jebel Tika: 95

Jebel Tréya (J. Thurraya): 77-78

Jebel Udru: 117

Jebel Um Kardos: 30, 53(fn.98)

Jebel Umm Qubu: 125

Jebel Wara: 33

Jebel Zankor – See Zankor

Jebel Zureiq: 21

Jebelein: 31(fn.4)

Jebelawi (Jebala, Jebelowi) Fur: 86, 87, 89

Jerash: 65, 65(fn.67)

Jernudd, B: 86

Jesus Christ (Nabi Isa): 136

Jews, Judaism: 15, 26(fn.38), 115, 136, 137

Jil Shikomeni: 111

Jinn-s: 79, 117

Joshua: 128

Juba II: 110(fn.3)

Juhayna Arabs: 129

Jukun: 26, 27, 135

Jungraithmayr, H.: 25, 29(fn.67)

Jupiter Ammon: 37(fn.54)

Jur: 23(fn.15)

Jura: 124

Kababish Arabs: 130(fn.96)

Kabbashi: 28

Kabkabiya: 28(fn.65), 88, 90

Kabushiya: 37(fn.46), 129(fn.78)

Kachifor, Sultan: 30

Kadama: 43, 55, 77, 77(fn.6)

Kaderu: 129(fn.78)

Kadmul: 47(fn.45), 48

Kadugli: 23, 23(fn.15), 75

Kagiddi – see Shelkota

Kai: 47

Kaiga: 112

Kaitinga: 25, 29(fn.71)

Kaga: 117

Kaja: 116(fn.4), 117

Kaja Seruj: 122, 123, 127

Kajawi: 123

Kalak Tanjak: 78

Kalamsiya: 38, 38(fn.60)

Kalck, Pierre: 112, 112(fn.26)

Kalga: 34

Kalge: 87(fn.9)

Kalokitting: 66(fn.76)

Kamadugu: 72

Kamal Yunis: 68(fn.88), 69(fn.101)

Kamala Keira: 97

Kamdirto: 119(fn.37)

Kamni: 96(fn.44)

Kamteinyi, Sultan: 28, 33

Kanem: 7, 12, 16, 22, 23, 26, 26(fn.39), 33, 44, 44(fn.8), 44(fn.13), 45, 46, 46(fn.27), 47, 47(fn.46), 48, 53, 56, 62, 63, 63(fn.47), 67(fn.86), 70, 72, 72(fn.130), 73(fn.143), 74, 80, 80(fn.1), 81, 84, 85, 111, 111(fns.11,12), 112, 118, 118(fn.24), 120, 122(fn.6), 128, 135, 136

Kanembu: 44, 44(fn.8), 46, 74, 80(fn.3), 111, 111(fns.11,12), 112, 119-120

Kano: 63, 77(fn.1)

Kanuri: 11, 16, 22(fn.4), 23, 28(fn.65), 44, 44(fn.13), 45, 46, 47, 47(fn.43), 54, 61(fn.33), 72(fn.135), 73(fn.142), 111, 111(fns.11,12), 112, 119, 128, 136

Kapteijns, Lidwien: 27

Kara: 27(fn.55)

Karakit Fur: 7, 86, 86(fn.4)

Karanga: 45, 77

Karanog: 124(fn.25)

Karkour-Nourène Massif: 44

Kas (Kusayr), King: 85

Kashemereh: 77

Kashémerém: 43

Kashmara: 25, 77

Kassala: 50, 52, 127(fn.58), 129(fn.78)

Kassifurogé, King: 30, 53(fn.98)

Katsina: 137

Kauara (Kawra) Pass: 20-21, 57

Kawar: 16, 22, 33, 45, 45(fn.25), 45(fn.25), 46, 46(fn.26), 47, 47(fn.46), 54, 120, 136

Kawka: 22

Kayra Fur: 10, 11, 11(fn.11), 12, 17, 18, 24, 29(fn.66), 31, 34(fn.25), 38, 43, 43(fn.3), 49, 50, 51, 55(fn.111), 59, 59(fn.15), 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 75, 75(fn.3), 84-85, 86-109, 88(fn.21), 91(fn.2), 97(fn.45), 112, 120(fn.46), 131, 139-140

Kebeleh: 18-20, 18(fn.17)

Kedir, King: 27. 28

Kedrou: 129, 129(fn.78)

Kel Innek: 130

Kel Rela: 14, 14(fn.29)

Kella: 14

Kenen (Khanem), King: 85

Kenzi-Dongola: 120

Kerakirit: 75(fn.3)

Kerne: 78

Kerker: 60, 60(fn.18), 65, 118, 119-120, 122(fn.6)

Kerkur: 118(fn.27)

Kernak Wells: 125

Al-Kerri: 75, 75(fn.3), 126

Kersah: 129, 129(fn.78)

Khalaf, Sultan: 29, 29(fn.71), 30

Khamis Mubaju: 31(fn.9)

Kharadjites: 137

Khartoum: 8,

Khazars: 36(fn.44)

Kheir Ullah: 43

Khor Gadein: 123, 130

Khor al-Sidr: 125

Khouz: 73, 74, 128(fn.68)

Khujali bin ‘Abd al-Rahman, Faki: 88

Khuzam Arabs: 72(fn.128)

Khuzaym (Khoués), King: 85

Kilwa: 10

Kinin (see also Tuareg): 34(fn.29), 128

Kira: 47

Kirati (Kurata) Tunjur: 44, 47

Kirsch, JHI: 77

Kisra: 135, 135(fn.25)

Kitab Dali – see Law, Pre-Islamic

Knoblecher, Ignaz: 51(fn.74)

Kobbé: 4, 5

Kobbé Zaghawa: 88

Kobe: 94

Koc Col: 75

Kodoï: 45

Koenig, Dr A-M.: 29(fn.66), 30(fn.78), 88(fn.18), 100

Kolge: 88, 94(fn.21)

Koman: 128(fn.60)

Konda (Kidney feast): 97

Konnoso: 8

Konyunga Fur: 34(fn.25)

Kor, King: 29, 29(fn.66), 51

Kora (Korakwa): 7, 75(fn.3), 86(fn.4)

Kora Mountains: 54

Koran: 36(fn.44), 37, 50, 73, 89, 97

Kordofan: 23, 24, 24(fn.25), 25, 27, 27(fn.55), 28, 28(fn.58), 28(fn.65), 30(fn.78), 34, 49, 50, 50(fn.60), 50(fn.64), 52, 53, 64(fn.54), 66(fn.75), 70, 75, 82, 85, 87-90, 87(fn.9), 96(fn.41), 101, 110, 114(fn.12), 116(fn.4), 117, 117(fn.10), 118(fn.19), 119-120, 120(fns.46,48), 122, 123, 123(fn.12), 124-125, 125(fn.33), 127-131, 129(fn.86), 130(fn.96), 132, 135

Korkurma (Korgorma): 94(fn.21)

Koro Toro: 113, 132, 132(fns.5,7), 134-135, 134(fn.14), 140

Koro Toro Radiocarbon Dates: 138

Koseru (Kaseru), Sultan: 33

Kotoko: 63, 111(fn.11)

Kotor-Furi: 47(fn.46)

Kourdé: 77

Kreish: 8

Kropácek, L: 53, 72, 123

Kufic: 46(fn.37)

Kufra (Koufra): 4, 22, 26(fn.39), 31(fn.5), 77

Kujunung: 28

Kuka: 33, 59, 111-12, 111(fn.11)

Kuli (Kulli): 86, 88

Kulu: 64

Kulubnarti: 38

Kundanga: 78(fn.14)

Kunjara Fur: 45(fn.18), 62, 75(fn.7), 85, 86, 89-90, 97, 139

Kurds: 74

Kuroma, King: 51

Kurra: 59(fn.9)

Kurru: 47, 68, 123, 123(fns.15,16), 127

Kuru (Kurru), King: 28(fn.64), 31, 43, 84, 87, 93, 93(fn.10), 139

Kusbur (Kosber), King: 16, 28, 29, 31

Kush (Cush): 22, 23, 47, 113, 116(fn.4), 119, 123(fn.16), 127

Kush al-Wagilah (Kushah, Kus): 123

Kusi: 59

Kuttum: 9, 29(fn.71), 43, 54(fn.100), 119(fn.38)

Kutul: 117

Kwawang, Kunijwok: 75

Lagowa: 24

Lake Chad: 5, 26, 28(fn.65), 31(fn.5), 72(fn.129), 74, 111(fn.9), 114, 130, 132

Lake Esan: 35

Lake Fitri: 33, 45, 55(fn.111), 56, 110, 111, 111(fn.9), 111(fn.11), 112

Lampen, GD: 117

Lamtuna: 137

Lange, D: 73(fn.142), 110

Lango: 33(fn.12)

Largeau, Colonel: 6(fn.6), 73(fn.146)

Larymore, Constance: 136

Last, Murray: 22

Law, Islamic: 71, 71(fn.118,123)

Law, Pre-Islamic: 71, 71(fns.118,121)

Le Rouvreur, Albert: 36(fn.41)

Lebeuf, JP: 74, 77

Lemba: 15

Leo Africanus: 33, 110-112, 112(fns.20,21,25), 113, 137

Leucaethiopes: 16

Lewicki, T.: 22

Al-Libei, Sultan: 44

Libya, Libyans: 17, 34(fn.29), 37, 37(fn.53), 97

Libyan Desert: 117

Liguri: 23, 24

Litham: 43(fn.3), 45, 45(fn.25), 64(fn.53), 96(fn.44)

Locust Wizards: 34(fn.25)

Lol: 23(fn.15)

Lotuko: 33(fn.12)

Low, Victor: 12, 24,

Luniya Mountains: 136-137

Luwai ibn Ghalib: 26(fn.39)

Luxor: 38

Lwel: 75

Ma’at: 38

Maba: 44, 45, 74, 77(fn.9)

Mabo: 118(fn.28)

Macedonians: 37(fn.51)

Machina: 72

MacIntosh, EH: 27(fn.54), 30, 31,

MacMichael, Harold A.: 5, 12, 16, 22, 24, 27, 29(fn.71), 38(fn.57), 43, 43(fn.6), 49, 49(fns.55, 58), 52(fn.86), 53, 57(fn.5), 60, 62(fn.38), 64(fns.53,54,60), 65, 65(fn.61), 66, 66(fn.75), 67, 68, 70, 72(fn.129), 78(fn.14), 79, 85, 86, 96(fn.40), 116, 117, 120(fn.46), 128, 129(fns.77,86), 130, 130(fn.87)

Mace-heads: 130(fn.87)

Madala: 55

Madeyq: 68(fn.97)

Madi: 33(fn.12)

Magharba: 62, 62(fn.36), 63(fn.47), 70(fn.111)

Maghreb, (Maghrab, Maghrib): 20, 26(fn.38), 38, 39, 52, 62, 62(fn.36), 125(fn.33)

Magumi (Magomi: 16, 111, 111(fns.11,12)

Magyars: 36(fn.44)

Mahamid Arabs: 45, 89

Mahas: 117

Mahdiyya: 11(fn.10), 28, 36(fn.39), 87, 96, 116,

Mahmud al-Samarkandi: 24(fn.25)

Mahram: 16(fn.7)

Mai, King: 28

Mak Husayn: 38

Maiduguri: 74

Mailo Fugo Jurto: 30(fn.74),

Majala: 94

Majians: 128(fn.68)

Makada: 48

Makuria: 123, 140

Malakal: 31(fn.4)

Maledinga: 134

Malha City: 118, 119-120

Malha Crater: 116, 116(fn.1), 118, 118(fn.20), 119-120

Mali: 5, 115, 135

Malik al-Dubban: 97

Malik Kissinga Dora: 97

Malikite Mandab: 71, 71(fn.118)

Al-Mallagi: 125

Malumba: 136(fn.32)

Malwal: 23(fn.15)

Mamluks: 5, 62(fn.36), 129

Manawashi, Battle of: 62(fn.38), 96

Al-Mandar: 95

Mandara: 23, 46, 54, 63, 135-136, 136(fn.32)

Mandara Chronicle: 136, 137

Manjil: 38, 38(fn.57)

Al-Mansur Qala’un, Sultan: 52

Mao: 44, 45, 67(fn.86), 114, 118, 118(fn.24), 119-120, 119(fns.36,42), 120

Maqdum: 36, 36(fn.41)

Al-Maqrizi (Makrizi): 23, 126(fn.44)

Maranda: 22

Marawiyyun: 22

Ma’rib: 26(fn.38), 52(fn.78)

Masalit: 25, 43(fn.3), 64, 78(fn.14), 87

Masmaj: 55

Al-Mas’udi: 39

Matrilineal Succession: 46, 55, 56, 116, 118, 130, 130(fn.93)

Mauny, R: 112(fn.26), 134

Maydon, Major: 117

Mayram: 61(fn.33)

Mayri: 51

Mayringa Fur: 51

McCall, DF: 135, 135(fn.25)

Mecca: 28, 55, 62(fn.42), 71(fn.124), 72, 87, 136

Medes: 37(fn.52)

Meidob Hills, Meidobis: 18, 33(fn.18), 60, 60(fn.18), 116-121, 116(fn.4), 119(fn.38), 120(fns.46,48), 121, 122(fn.6), 128

Meidobi Burial Customs: 117(fn.11)

Meidobi King-Lists: 121

Meidobi Religion: 117-118, 117(fn.14)

Meidobi Sections: 116

Melik – see Malik

Memmi: 63

Merbo: 9

Merga: 46

Meroë, Meroitic: 8, 25, 26, 31, 31(fn.4), 46, 48, 54, 62, 112(fn.21), 113-115, 113(fn.1), 119, 122, 122(fn.6), 123, 124, 124(fn.29), 125, 127, 127(fns.51,56), 130, 132, 134-135, 140

Merri: 35, 36, 36(fn.45)

Michelmore, APG: 72(fn.129)

Missirya (Messiriya) Arabs: 50(fn.61), 72(fn.128)

Mihrab: 61, 66, 68-69

Mima (Mimi): 8, 25, 45, 55, 64, 64(fns.53,54)

Minbar: 68

Minos: 38(fn.58)

Mira: 50

Miri: 33

Misr Muhammad: 49(fn.59)

Mitnet al-Jawwala: 125

Moab: 128

Mockler-Ferryman, Major: 136

Modat, Captain: 112

El-Moghraby, Asim I.: 60(fn.18), 118-120,

Molu: 86, 87(fn.9)

Morocco: 14(fn.29)

Mohammed, Ibrahim Musa: 17, 69, 69(fn.101), 91(fn.5), 96(fn.40), 113, 120(fn.44)

Mondo: 44(fn.8), 80(fn.1), 81, 84, 85

Mongo-Sila: 23, 24

Mongols: 36(fn.44), 50

Morga: 63

Moro: 31(fn.5), 33(fn.12)

Moses: 37, 37(fn.51)

Muglad: 29

Al-Muhallabi: 22, 22(fn.4)

Muhamid Arabs: 55

Muhammad (Daju King): 29

Muhammad (Prophet): 28(fn.65), 71(fn.124), 110, 136

Muhammad ‘Ali: 30(fn.78), 62(fn.36), 73

Muhammad Bakhit, Sultan: 30

Muhammad Bello, Sultan: 36(fn.44)

Muhammad Bulad, Sultan: 27

Muhammad Bulat, Sultan: 88

Muhammad Dawra, Sultan: 88-89, 88(fn.23), 95-96

Muhammad Fadl, Sultan: 96

Muhammad Gunkul, Sultan (see Janqal)

Muhammad al-Hasin, Sultan: 49

Muhammad Husayn, Sultan: 95-96

Muhammad Ibrahim: 52(fn.77),

Muhammad Idris bin Katarkamabe, Mai: 70

Muhammad al-Ja’ali: 50(fn.64)

Muhammad Sayah: 118

Muhammad al-Shayb, Sultan: 44

Muhammad al-Shinqiti: 78(fn.15)

Muhammad bin Tamr: 119

Muhammad Tayrab, Sultan: 55(fn.111), 64(fn.54), 75(fn.3), 89-90, 95, 96, 97, 120(fn.46)

Muhammad Wad Tom, Shaykh: 129(fn.75)

Muhammad Yanbar: 119, 119(fn.36)

Al-Mu’izz ibn Badis: 52

Mujuf: 55

Mukarra (Mukurru): 37(fn.46), 46, 46(fn.31), 46(fn.35), 47, 47(fn.46), 52, 56, 127, 134

Mundara: 130

Munio: 46, 54

Al-Mur, Sultan: 55(fn.111)

Murdock, George Peter: 13

Murgi: 64(fn.54)

Murra: 95

Murtafal: 31(fn.6)

Murtal: 97

Musa, Sultan: 88, 94, 94(fn.21), 96, 96(fn.39)

Musa ‘Anqarib: 88-89

Musa Tanjar: 45, 45(fn.18)

Musa Um Ruddus, Shartai: 54(fn.100)

Musaba’at: 30(fn.78), 33, 49, 84-85, 84(fn.3), 85, 87-89, 97, 101, 103, 123, 131

Mustafa, Sultan: 24

Musulat: 63

Mutansir: 52, 52(fn.79)

Muwalih: 125

Muweileh: 125

Nachtigal, Gustav: 5, 13, 28, 28(fn.65), 31, 34, 44, 44(fn.8), 44(fn.13), 47, 47(fn.43), 49, 50, 53, 53(fn.91), 54, 55(fn.111), 57(fn.2), 57(fn.5), 71, 71(fn.121), 73, 75(fn.3), 75(fn.7), 77, 78(fns.14-15), 80(fn.1), 87(fn.9), 88, 91, 96, 102, 111, 118, 120(fn.46), 131

Nafer, King: 29

Nahas: 62, 62(fn.38), 87, 118

Na-Madu, King: 118-119

Nanku: 64(fn.53)

Napata: 26, 113, 127

Nari: 33

Nas Far’aon: 27, 27(fn.54)

Nassara (Nazarene): 73, 132, 140

Negib Effendi Yunis, Yuzbashi: 118(fn.19)

Nejran: 136

Newbold, D: 16, 61(fn.31), 117, 122, 122(fn.2), 123, 123(fn.13), 124, 124(fn.29), 125, 127(fn.57), 129, 129(fns.74,86), 130(fns.92,94)

N’Gazargamu: 72-73

Ngok Dinka: 23

Nguru: 73

Niamaton: 79

Nieke, Margaret R.: 11

Niger: 115

Niger (River): 110(fns.1,3), 136

Nigeria: 7, 13, 27, 44, 113, 114, 132, 136(fn.32)

Nikki: 136

Nilo-Saharan Language Group: 86

Nisba: 54

Njamena: 23

Nkole: 14

Noah: 28(fn.65), 128

Nobatia: 38

Nobiin: 120

Nok Culture: 114

Northern Rhodesia: 13

Noyo: 94

Nuba: 22, 23, 27(fn.55), 33, 33(fn.22), 50, 117, 118(fn.19), 122, 128-130, 136

Nuba Hills: 27, 120, 128

Nubia, Nubians: 11, 38, 43, 43(fn.6), 44(fn.13), 46, 46(fn.31), 46(fn.37), 47, 50, 52, 52(fn.86), 56, 64(fn.54), 65, 66, 67(fn.86), 68-69, 69(fn.102), 74, 97, 110, 112, 112(fn.21), 116-117, 118, 120(fn.48), 122-123, 123(fn.16), 124(fn.29), 126(fn.44), 129, 130-131, 132, 132(fns.6,7), 134-135, 137(fn.37), 139-140

Nubian Language: 116(fn.4), 120, 130(fn.92), 131

Nuer: 34(fn.26)

Nuh: 22

Nukheila: 22(fn.1), 127(fn.57)

Numan Fedda: 97(fn.45)

Nupe: 135

Nur Angara: 62(fn.38)

Nuri: 123(fn.16)

Nuwabiya: 123

Al-Nuwayri: 52

Nyala: 23, 24, 27, 27(fn.52), 28, 62, 62(fn.38), 75, 86

Nyèri: 45

Nyidor, Reth: 75

Nyikango: 75, 75(fn.5)

Nyolge (Nyalgulgule): 23, 23(fns.15, 19), 24, 29

Al-Obeid: 75, 88(fn.18)

O’Fahey, RS: 46(fn.31), 50, 56, 61(fn.33), 64(fn.57), 112, 112(fn.25)

Ogot, Bethwell A: 134-135

Ogra: 64

Olderogge, DA: 6

Omar Kissifurogé – see ‘Umar Kissifurogé

Omdurman: 62(fn.38), 116, 117

Oral Tradition: 10-15, 31(fn.6), 51(fn.69), 74, 75-76, 113, 129, 135, 139-140

Órre Baya: 57, 57(fn.2), 60, 95

Órre De: 57(fn.2), 60

Osiris: 8(fn.15)

Ostrich Eggs (decorative): 34, 34(fn.26), 36

Ottomans: 5, 24(fn.25), 74

Ounianga: 77

Ouogayi: 73(fn.148)

Oxyrinchus: 43(fn.6)

Paçir: 75, 75(fn.3)

Pahlavi: 135(fn.25)

Palestine: 65, 68, 128, 128(fn.68)

Palmer, HR: 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 33, 46(fn.32), 48, 53(fn.90), 55, 72, 80(fn.1), 112, 112(fn.20), 128, 129, 135, 136, 137

Papadopoullos, T.: 135

Papyrus: 116(fn.1)

Parthians: 26(fn.38), 36(fn.44)

Patwac: 75

Pelpelle: 89

Penn, AED: 122-123, 122(fn.7), 126-127

Perari Kalga: 34

Perron, Dr.: 5

Persia, Persians: 26(fn.38), 37, 37(fn.52), 132, 134-135, 135(fns.21,25)

Petherick, J.: 52

Petracek, Karel: 119(fn.34)

Philae: 8, 33

Phoenicians: 115

Pilgrim Bottles: 124, 124(fn.29), 125, 127, 129, 129(fn.75)

“Platform of Audience”: 60, 61, 62, 65, 119

Pleiades: 78(fn.13),

Pliny the Elder: 16, 110(fn.3)

Pomponious Mela: 16

Pontiphar: 49(fn.58)

Potagos, Panyotis: 23

Pottery: 70, 122(fn.7), 123, 124, 124(fn.32), 132, 132(fn.5), 134, 134(fn.13), 140

Pre-Islamic Religion: 34, 86-87, 87(fn.9), 96(fn.38), 97, 117-119, 117(fn.14), 123, 136, 137

Prisons: 66, 66(fn.76), 93

Prophecy: 35

Ptolemy, Ptolemies, Ptolemaic Period: 16, 38, 43(fn.6), 127

Qalaun, Sultan: 129

Al-Qalqashandi: 111(fn.12)

Qaqu: 22

Qarri (Querri, Gerri): 122, 125-127, 126(fn.44), 127(fn.46), 131

Qayrawan: 52, 125(fn.33)

Qays ‘Aylan: 38

Qelti al-Adusa: 129, 129(fn.73)

Qibla: 95

Qihayf, Battle of: 89

Qimr: 36(fn.43), 88

Qubba-s: 36(fn.41), 69, 95, 96

Quran – see Koran

Quraysh: 26(fn.39), 50, 50(fn.64), 102, 111(fn.12)

Radcliffe-Brown, AR: 7-8

Al-Rahad: 50

Rahaman: 26(fn.38)

Red Sea: 38, 63(fn.47)

Redjem: 118(fn.27)

Reisner, George A: 123

Reth: 75, 75(fn.2)

Reygasse, Maurice: 13-14, 20(fn.21), 118(fn.27)

Richards, Audrey I: 13

Rifa’a: 51

Rikabiya Ashraf: 130

Rizayqat Arabs: 89

Rizik (Rézik), King: 85

Ro-Kuri Region: 53, 95

Robinson, AE: 28, 29(fn.66), 38(fn.58)

Rodd, Francis R.: 130

Rome, Romans: 14, 26(fn.38), 37, 37(fn.52), 74, 114, 135, 137

Ronya: 59

Rosen, Georg: 77(fn.9)

Royal Platform: 59

Royna: 59(fn.12)

Rugman, Lady: 66-67

Rwanda: 115

Ryan, Bimbashi: 124(fn.32)

Sa’ad, Sultan: 44

Sabaloka Gorge: 126

Sabula: 57

Sabun: 75(fn.7), 91

Saccae: 63

Sadaqah: 97

Safia: 130

Sagava: 63

Saifawa Mai-s: 71

Salah, Sultan: 29

Salf (Zalf), King: 30

Salih (prophet): 28, 28(fn.65)

Salih ibn ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abbas: 28(fn.65),

Salt Collection, Salt Trade: 116, 118, 120

Salt, Sir Henry: 86(fn.2)

Salua: 94

Al-Samarkandi: 50

Samarra: 65(fn.67)

Sambei: 27, 34(fn.25)

Sambella (Sambellanga): 64(fn.60)

Sania Kiri: 57

Samna: 33

San’a: 15

Sanam: 123(fn.16)

Sandstone Rings: 129–130, 130(fn.87)

Sanhaj Berbers (Sanhaja): 48, 125(fn.33), 128, 128(fn.68)

Sania: 123

Santandrea, P. Stefano: 29(fn.73)

Sanussis: 34(fn.29), 73, 73(fn.146), 74, 128(fn.68)

Sao: 31(fn.5), 63, 72, 111(fn.11)

Sarsfield-Hall, EG: 87, 117(fn.14)

Sassanids, Sassanians: 26(fn.38), 135

Sau: 55

Sa’ud: 28(fn.65)

Savonnier: 80(fn.2)

Sawwar bin Wa’il bin Himyar: 125(fn.33)

Sayf ibn Dhu Yazan: 26(fn.38), 111(fn.12)

Sayfawa: 16(fn.7), 111, 111(fns.11,12)

Schmidt, Peter R: 14

Scythians: 36(fn.44)

Sebakh, King: 129

Selatia: 62(fn.38)

Seleukos I Nikator: 37(fn.51)

Seligman, CG: 6, 7, 75(fn.2), 130(fn.87)

Selima Oasis: 46, 46(fn.37), 134

Seliquer, Captain: 132

Sendi Suttera, Iya Basi: 89

Serbung Masalit: 87

Serengiti: 60(fn.18), 118, 119

Sergitti: 79

Serra East: 68(fn.97)

Serra West: 67

Shabaka, King: 129(fn.79)

Shadow Sultan (see Kamni)

Shaffai Boggarmi, Dardai: 48(fn.51)

Shaheinab: 8

Shari’a – See Law, Islamic

Shartai: 34(fn.25)

Shatt: 23, 23(fn.15), 24, 29

Shau al-Dorsid, Sultan: 16, 27, 30, 30(fn.74), 44(fn.15), 48, 50, 51, 53-54, 56, 57-64, 57(fn.5), 59(fn.15), 61(fn.32), 62(fns.36-37), 70(fn.111), 72, 75, 75(fn.3), 84-85, 87, 96(fn.41)

Shaw, WBK: 123-124, 124(fn.25), 127(fn.57)

Shelkota Meidob: 116, 116(fn.4), 121

Shendi: 27, 27(fn.53), 28(fn.65), 30(fn.78), 125(fn.37)

Sherkayla: 50

Shilluk: 8(fn.15), 34(fn.26), 75, 75(fn.2), 123

Shimir: 55

Shinnie, Peter: 11, 13, 67, 67(fn.86), 73(fn.144), 74, 113, 113(fn.1), 127, 127(fn.56), 132, 135

Shirim: 88

Shoba: 90

Showaia: 96(fn.38)

Showunga Tunjur: 59

Shu (Egyptian God): 54

Shuqayr, Naum; 89

Shuwa Arabs: 44

Si Dallanga: 54

Siesa: 71

Sigato: 119

Sikar: 91

Simiat Hills: 33

Sinnar (Sennar): 5, 27, 27(fn.55), 28(fn.65), 30(fn.78), 38(fn.58), 43, 87, 88(fn.18), 89(fn.28), 126, 126(fn.44), 129

Sira al-Hilaliya: 49

Sitting Burial: 31(fn.5), 119(fn.42)

Sira al-Hilaliyya: 49

Sirma: 59

Slatin Pasha, Rudolf: 1, 29, 51, 78(fn.14)

Slaves, Slavery: 27(fn.55), 34, 71, 87-89, 96, 120(fn.46), 140

Snakes in Religious Rites: 78-79

Soba: 62(fn.36), 65(fn.67), 66, 122, 123, 124, 124(fn.29), 126-127, 126(fn.44), 127(fns.47,56), 131

Sobat River: 31(fn.4), 75

Solomon: 39

Songhay: 135

Songs: 80

Sopo River: 23

South Africa: 15

South Sudan: 35

Spain, Spanish: 54, 110, 137

Spaulding, Jay: 50, 64(fn.57), 112, 112(fn.25)

Stevenson, RC: 23

Stewart, Andrew: 38

Stone Circles: 118(fn.27), 124, 129

Stone Worship: 61(fn.30), 72, 72(fn.129), 86, 87(fn.9), 117-119, 139

Suakin: 127(fn.58)

Subhanin: 25, 25(fn.29)

Sudan Notes and Records: 7, 8

Sudan Political Service: 7, 8

Sufyan, King: 85

Sufyan al-Thawri: 37

Sulayman (founder of Bilia Bidayat): 48

Sulayman al-Abyad: 89

Sulayman Solong (Sliman, Solongdungo), Sultan: 43, 55(fn.111), 59, 59(fn.15), 70, 70(fn.111), 78(fn.14), 87-88, 89, 93, 93(fn.10), 94-96, 96(fn.41), 118, 120(fn.46), 131, 139

Sun Worship: 77(fn.9)

Sunghor (Sungor): 36(fn.41)

Suni Valley: 94

Supreme Court of Canada: 14-15, 15(fn.33)

Syria. Syrian: 50, 68

Taberber: 28(fn.64)

Taboos: 96(fn.38)

Tabun, Shartai: 31

Tagabo Hills: 116-119, 119(fn.36), 119(fn.38)

Tahir, Basi: 28

Tahrak, King: 129

Taiserbo: 31(fn.5)

Taitok: 14, 14(fn.29)

Tageru Hills: 128

Taharqa, King: 129(fn.79)

Tajia (Tagia): 38(fns.57-58)

Tajuwa: 22-23, 33, 112(fn.20)

Takaki (Tekaki): 66(fn.76), 71(fn.120)

Tari: 134

Al-Taka: 129, 129(fn.78),

Takamat: 13-14

Tama: 27(fn.31), 36(fn.41), 45(fn.21)

Tamachek: 45(fn.25)

Tamurkwa (Tamurka) Fur: 86, 86(fn.4), 87

Tanit: 14

Tanjak: 55

Tanjikei: 36(fn.41)

Tanzania: 10, 115,

Tar Lis (Tarlis): 112

Tari: 132

Taruga: 114

Tartari: 135

Tatars: 36(fn.44)

Al-Tayeb, Shaykh: 29(fn.66), 99

Tchertcher Mountains: 128(fn.68)

Tebeldi Trees: 3-4, p.3 (fn.5)

Teda: 16, 16(fn.5), 22, 22(fn.4), 34(fn.29), 45, 47, 47(fn.45), 48, 48(fn.47), 119, 128

Tedagada: 45

Tedjeri (Tejeri): 119(fn.41)

Teiga Plateau: 117

Tamaragha Doka, Shaykh: 129(fn.81)

Temeh: 45(fn.21)

Ten Tribes of Israel: 36(fn.44)

Termit: 113

Terninga, Sultan: 27

Teqaqi: 71

Tesseti Dynasty: 116

Thamud: 28(fn.65)

Thelwall, Robin: 117, 120

Thurro: 75

Thutmosis III: 46, 46(fn.35), 134

Thutmosis IV: 8

Tibesti (Tu): 5, 8, 16, 20, 31(fn.5), 45, 45(fn.23), 46(fn.32), 47, 47(fn.46), 48, 48(fn.51), 54, 64(fn.58), 113, 119, 128(fn.68), 130, 136-137

Tibet: 35

Tidikelt: 14(fn.29)

Tidn-Dal Language: 116

Tié: 67(fn.86), 73, 73(fn.144), 74

Tifinagh: 14, 70, 70(fn.108)

Tilho, Commandant: 77, 132, 132(fn.4)

Timsah: 28(fn.64)

Tin Hinan: 13-14 13(fn.25), 14(fn.29)

Tine: 88, 94(fn.21)

Tirga umm sot: 33, 33(fn.18),

Tit: 20(fn.21)

Tiv: 13

Togoland: 5

Togonye, Togoinye: 34, 34(fn.25)

Tong Kilo: 94, 97(fn.46)

Tong Kuri: 93

Tongoingi (Togoingi): 34(fn.25)

Tora: 16-21, 31, 33, 44, 53, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 90, 91, 91(fn.5), 94, 95, 95(fn.31), 97, 119, 123, 126, 127, 128, 128(fn.68), 131

Toronga Kuroma: 16, 17-18

Torti Meidob: 116

Toschka: 134

Tounjour Wells: 132, 132(fn.6)

Tow: 54

Transmogrification: 86,

Treinen-Claustre, F: 134

Tréya (see Jebel Tréya)

Trigger, Bruce: 8, 120

Tripoli: 4, 60, 63(fn.47), 70(fn.111), 77, 77(fn.1), 117, 137

Tuareg (see also Kinin): 13-14, 34(fn.29), 36(fn.44), 43(fn.3), 45, 46(fn.32), 64(fn.53), 128, 130, 130(fns.93,96)

Tubba Kings: 38, 111(fn.12)

Tubiana, J.: 43, 63

Tubu (Tibu, Tibbu): 16, 27(fn.54), 34(fn.29), 44, 44(fn.8), 45, 46, 46(fn.27, 30, 31), 47(fn.46), 48(fn.51), 49, 56, 64(fn.53), 75(fn.3), 117, 130, 137, 139, 140

Tubu Genealogy: 47(fn.46)

Tukl: 20, 61(fn.31), 65-66, 69

Tumaghera: 45-48, 45(fn.25), 46(fn.26), 46(fn.31, 32), 47-48, 47(fn.43), 47(fn.46), 48(fn.51), 54, 113, 140

Tumaghera of Tibesti, Sections: 47, 47(fn.46)

Tumam Arabs: 8

Tumsah (see Tunsam)

Tuna: 59

Tunis: 20, 36(fn.41), 44, 49, 50, 52, 63, 77(fn.1), 80

Tunis (Kanem): 80(fn.1)

Tunisia: 20(fn.22), 52, 73, 74

Al-Tunisi, Muhammad ‘Umar: 5, 27(fn.55), 28(fn.65), 37(fn.54), 43, 57(fn.2), 64(fn.53), 72(fn.134), 77(fn.9), 120(fn.46)

Tunjur: 5, 10, 12, 16, 18, 25, 26, 28, 28(fn.64), 28(fn.65), 29(fn.71), 30, 30(fn.74), 31, 33, 34(fn.25), 36(fn.41), 43-85, 43(fn.6), 44(fns.8, 15), 45(fn.18), 45(fn.19), 46(fn.31), 47(fn.46), 48(fn.47), 48(fn.53), 48(fn.54), 51(fn.71), 52(fn.86), 53(fn.90), 55(fn.111), 57(fns.2,5), 59(fn.15), 62(fn.37), 62(fn.42), 63(fn.47), 72(fn.128), 75(fn.3), 77(fn.6), 80(fns.1,2), 84(fn.3), 87, 88, 88(fn.21), 91, 95, 97, 111, 111(fn.11), 112, 113, 118, 119, 120(fn.46), 131, 132, 132(fn.6), 134, 139

Tunjur, Sultan: 30, 43

Tunjur-Fur: 43, 64(fn.60), 70

Tunjur of Kanem, Sections: 44(fn.13)

Tunjur King-Lists: 81-85

Tunjur Language: 44(fn.8), 63, 64(fn.54)

Tunjur Sections (Darfur): 43

Tunjur Wara: 59

Tunsam (Tumsah), Sultan: 28(fn.64), 31, 49, 70, 84, 87, 89, 93, 93(fns.8,10), 139

Tura: 47

Turco-Egyptians: 12, 62(fn.36)

Turi: 54, 57(fn.1)

Turks (see also Ottomans, Turco-Egyptians): 36(fn.44), 63, 70(fn.111), 74

Turkish Language: 74, 77(fn.9)

Turra: 16, 18, 27, 53, 57, 59, 69, 70, 91(fns.2,3), 93(fn.8), 95-97, 96(fn.43), 97(fn.45), 97(fns.46,47), 99

Turra Hills: 91

Turti: 35

Turrti Dynasty: 118, 121

Turuj: 8, 27(fn.55), 33

Turza: 120(fn.46)

Al-Tuwaysha: 119

Ubangi River: 110(fn.3)

Udal, John O.: 75, 75(fn.3)

Uddu: 86

Ufa, King: 29

Uganda: 14, 18

Um Bura: 64(fn.53)

Um Bus Masalit: 78(fn.14)

Um Daraj (Durraj): 129-130

Um Kurdoos: 28

Umangawi: 78(fn.14)

‘Umar, Daju King: 28

‘Umar, Tunjur Sultan: 77

‘Umar ‘Ali: 45

‘Umar Kissifurogé: 28, 29-30, 33

‘Umar Lel, Sultan: 27, 89, 95

‘Umar ibn Muhammad Dawra – see Muhammad Dawra

Umm Kiddada: 119

Umm Harraz: 94

Umm Harot: 125

Umm Shaluba: 73(fn.148), 77

Ummayads: 48, 49, 51

Umunga Fur: 33

Upper Nile Province: 34(fn.26)

Uri: 27, 28(fn.64), 44, 56, 57, 57(fns.2,5), 59, 60-64, 60(fn.23), 60(fn.24), 61(fn.30), 62(fn.37), 63(fns.46,47), 64(fn.58), 65(fn.65), 68-69, 70, 70(fn.111), 72, 73, 74, 93, 112, 112(fn.21), 119, 119(fn.38), 122(fn.6), 139

Urimellis: 64

Urti Meidob: 116, 121

Venda: 15

Vansleb, JM: 64, 112(fn.25)

Vantini, G: 134

Vatican: 137

Veil – see Litham

Venice, Venetian: 63, 63(fns.47,49)

Vienna Manuscript: 51(fn.74)

Vogel, Dr. Edward: 78

Wadai: 5, 8, 21, 25, 26, 27, 27(fns.54,55), 28, 28(fn.65), 28(fn.65), 33(fn.18), 34, 36(fn.41), 43, 44, 45, 45(fn.21), 46, 48, 48(fn.53), 48(fn.54), 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57(fn.2), 59, 62, 64(fns.53,54), 71, 72(fns.128,129), 74, 75(fns.3,7), 77-79, 77(fns.1,6), 83, 86, 88-89, 95, 110, 111, 111(fn.11), 112(fn.24), 120(fn.46), 128, 132, 134, 135, 140

Wadai, Aboriginal groups: 25

Wadi Abu Dom: 134

Wadi Abu Hashim: 125

Wadi Abu Sibaa: 124

Wadi al-Anaj: 127(fn.57)

Wadi Barei: 94(fn.21), 95

Wadi Golonut: 118

Wadi Halfa: 8, 68(fn.97)

Wadi Hawar (Howar): 4, 9, 47, 125

Wadi Howa: 77

Wadi Jeldama: 95

Wadi Jugtera: 64(fn.53)

Wadi Magrur: 117

Wadi al-Melik (Milk): 4, 117, 122(fn.6), 123, 125, 127

Wadi al-Mukaddam (Muqaddam): 117, 125

Wadi al-Sabt: 38

Wadi Tunsam: 93

Wadi Umm Shaluba: 44

Wadi Uri: 64(fn.58)

Wahb bin Munabbih: 6, 37, 37(fn.52)

Al-Wahwah: 37(fn.46)

Walool: 126

Walz, Terrence: 54

Wamato: 119(fn.37)

Wandala: 136(fn.32)

Wansborough, John: 11

Wara: 33(fn.18), 43, 45, 55, 59, 74, 77-79, 77(fn.6)

Wastani: 36(fn.41)

Wathku: 23

Wau: 23(fn.15)

Wawat: 8

Western Field Force: 1-2

White Nile: 31(fn.4), 50

Wickens, GE: 18-20

Wirdato Meidob: 116, 118

“Wise Stranger” (see also Ahmad al-Ma’qur): 10, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 46, 48, 49-52, 50(fn.64), 56, 87, 119

X-Group: 124(fn.29)

Yahia: 27(fn.31)

Yame: 28(fn.65), 43

Yao: 111(fn.11)

Ya’qub ‘Arus, Sultan: 88

Ya’qub Bok Doro, Sultan: 30

Al-Ya’qubi: 22, 128

Yaqut bin ‘Abd Allah al-Hamawi: 22(fn.4)

Yasir: 39

Yemen: 25, 26, 26(fn.38), 29(fn.73), 37, 38, 49, 111(fn.12), 125(fn.33), 136

Yér: 27(fn.55)

Y’nk: 128

Yusuf, Prince: 89

Yusuf As’ar Yath’ar (Dhu Nuwas): 26(fn.38), 136

Zaghawa: 22, 22(fn.4), 23, 23(fn.8), 25, 27, 29(fn.71), 36(fn.41), 49(fn.55), 50(fn.67), 63-64, 64(fn.53), 72(fn.128), 77, 88, 89, 112(fn.20), 114(fn.16), 119, 136

Zaghay: 23

Zakaria: 69

Zalaf, King: 28, 29

Zalingei: 86

Zanata Berbers: 49,

Al-Zanati, Khalifa: 49

Zanj: 22, 23, 23(fn.8)

Zankor: 66(fn.75), 122-123, 122(fns.2,6), 123(fn.13), 127, 127(fns.53,56), 130, 131, 134

Zarroug, Mohi al-Din Abdalla: 127

Zayd: 36(fn.41), 51

Zayadiya Arabs: 36(fn.41), 51

Zayn al-‘Abidin de Tunis: 77(fn.9)

Zeltner, Jean-Claude: 44

Zenata: 128(fn.68)

Zeugatania: 137

Zeus Ammon: 37-38

Zhylarz, Ernest: 46(fn.35), 120(fn.48)

Ziegert, H: 9

Zingani: 137(fn.37)

Al-Zubayr Pasha: 11(fn.10), 12, 62(fn.38), 87, 96

Zurla: 63

Aberfoyle International Security

Category Archives: Sudan

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