Category Archives: Iraq

Russia Threatens Hit-Squads after Murder of its Diplomats in Iraq

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Andrew McGregor

July 13, 2006

The brazen Baghdad kidnapping of four Russian embassy employees took place on June 3, only 400 meters from the Russian embassy. Violating the embassy’s own security protocols, an embassy vehicle stopped at a local grocery store (on an unauthorized alcohol run, according to Kommersant on June 27), where it was immediately blocked on both ends by other vehicles containing machine-gun-firing assailants. Vitalay Titov, a security official, was killed in the attack, while the third secretary of the embassy, Fedor Zaitsaev, and three embassy employees, Anatoli Smirnov, Oleg Fedoseev and Rinat Agluilin (a Muslim), were packed into a minibus that fled the scene. U.S. troops from the adjacent Green Zone headquarters of the U.S. military arrived with Iraqi police within minutes, but were unable to pick up the trail of the kidnappers.

green zoneBaghdad’s Green Zone

The kidnapping was well-organized. The stop was anticipated, implying previous surveillance of the targets and their habits. The lone security agent was quickly identified and neutralized with the entire scene cleared of assailant vehicles, personnel and hostages within moments. A safe-house and its security arrangements were arranged in advance. In all, it was a highly professional operation followed by a puzzling lack of communication from the kidnappers. There was no claim of responsibility, no political demands and no ransom requirements. In the meantime, Iraqi and coalition forces failed to find any trace of the kidnappers.

A Chechen Connection?

Styling themselves as Iraq’s “lions of unification,” the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) issued a statement on June 19 claiming responsibility for the kidnapping and threatening to kill the hostages unless Russia withdrew its military from Chechnya and released all Muslims from prison within 48 hours. On June 21, the MSC, an umbrella group of anti-coalition/Iraqi government insurgent groups that includes al-Qaeda in Iraq, stated that all the hostages had been killed after Russia failed to comply with their demands. When a video of the beheadings was released on June 25, it was surprisingly dated June 13, six days before the MSC released its demands. An al-Qaeda logo was prominently stamped on the video footage as a voice-over declared that “God’s verdict has been carried out.” The video showed the beheadings of two hostages and the shooting of a third. The video did not include the murder of the fourth hostage.

Russian DiplomatsFrom the MSC Video (AP)

Since the September 11 attacks, Russia has had limited success in portraying itself as a victim of an al-Qaeda plot to establish an Islamic Caliphate on Russian territory. In the scenario painted by the Kremlin, Chechnya’s Muslim separatists are a terrorist cohort operating under the orders of Osama bin Laden. The impossible demands issued by the MSC reinforced this perception, creating an all-important al-Qaeda-Chechen “link,” days prior to the Moscow-hosted G-8 conference. It should be noted that it is impossible to verify the authenticity of the MSC statements. Strangely enough, the leader of the MSC, Abdullah bin Rashid al-Baghdadi, issued communiqués on June 16 and July 1, neither of which referred to the kidnappings despite their international importance.

Chechen leaders of the region’s Russian-backed government responded angrily to the demands. The speaker of the lower house of parliament, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, protested “the use of the name of the Chechen people by terrorists of various hues in their criminal aims…Russia is our homeland and its troops are located where they should be located” (Interfax, June 20). Russian-backed Chechen President Alu Alkhanov condemned the kidnapping as a provocation and an “encroachment on the Chechen Republic and its people.” The rival separatist government also roundly denounced the kidnappers’ demands while insisting on the release of the hostages. According to the Chechen separatist foreign minister, Akhmed Zakaev, the kidnapping was “a provocation by Russian special services designed to implicate the Chechen struggle in international terrorism.”

Russia’s “Islamic Card”

Shortly after the kidnappings, Co-Chairman of the Council of Russian Muftis Nafigulla Ashirov suggested that the abductions were the work of Western intelligence agencies. He said, “Political analysis and common sense would suggest those who are dissatisfied with Russian policy, which runs counter to the hegemonic intentions of the U.S. and the Western world.” Ashirov’s comments were supported by Abdul-Wahid Niyazov (a powerful Russian politician and convert to Islam), who alluded to the work of the same “special services that started the war in Iraq” (Interfax, June 9). Russia’s leading mufti, Talgat Tadjuddin, suggested that the kidnapping “serves the interests of the enemies of Iraq” (Interfax, June 21). Tadjuddin, who was very close to the Saddam Hussein regime, has in the past referred to President George W. Bush as “a drunken cowboy” and “the anti-Christ of the world.”

At one point, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman presented a revisionist portrayal of Russian/Islamic history: “Russia is a multifaith country in which representatives of two great religions—Orthodoxy and Islam—have lived in peace and accord for centuries.” The spokesman added that the abductees “are representatives of the Russian people, which has never waged war anywhere against Islam” (Interfax, June 21; RIA Novosti, June 21). In Shiite Iran, where Russia is assisting in nuclear development projects, the foreign ministry offered to use its influence in Iraq to help free the hostages (RIA Novosti, June 25).

Murder and Response

In Russia, there was widespread criticism that the federal government had displayed little interest in the rescue of the hostages. FSB head Nikolai Patrushev announced a US$10 million reward for information leading to “a result” in the hunt for the murderers, but retired General Leonid Ivashov described the attitude of the authorities as “criminally negligent” (Ekho Movsky Radio, June 26). The Russian Duma passed a unanimous statement declaring that the deaths were the result of the coalition “losing control” in Iraq (Itar-Tass, June 28). Suggestions of U.S. culpability through the insufficient provision of security in Baghdad became the focus of a heated exchange between Condoleezza Rice and her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov at the G-8 foreign ministers’ meeting.

There was also considerable media speculation on the role of U.S. secret services in the affair. Iraq’s former ambassador to Moscow, Abbas Halaf, declared on Russian radio that the murders were intended to punish Russia for its stand against “American aggression” in Iraq and its support for the Palestinian people (Ekho Movsky Radio, June 26). The current Iraqi ambassador, Abdulkarim Hashim Mostafa, described the MSC as foreign-led representatives of the Iraqi Baathist regime while describing his government’s interest in Russian training for Iraqi security services (the usual practice in pre-war Iraq) (Interfax, June 28). In some quarters, the abductions have been interpreted as a warning to Russia to limit the activities of their secret services in Iraq and to temper Russian posturing as a non-threatening friend of the Iraqi government, in contrast to the “colonial ambitions” of the United States.

The Kremlin’s response to the deaths was dramatic, with President Putin ordering Russia’s secret services to “destroy” those responsible. FSB head Nikolai Patrushev promised that these instructions would be carried out “no matter how much time and effort is required” (Interfax, June 28). Putin immediately issued a resolution that called for granting Russia’s president the right to deploy armed forces and special-purpose units outside Russia to prevent “international terrorist activity.” Despite opposition concerns of a return to Stalinist tactics, the Russian Duma passed the legislation unanimously on July 5, followed by the unanimous approval of the upper house on July 7. There is no expiration date for the extraordinary powers. According to the chairman of the council’s Defense and Security Committee, Viktor Ozerov, the special services will conduct their operations abroad in secret, with the president having the option of revealing such activities to the Russian public “when necessary” (Itar-Tass, July 7).

President Putin claims that the new legislation is in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which refers to “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Bush administration legal experts have cited the same article as permitting “anticipatory” self-defense and used it to justify the assassination of al-Qaeda member Ali Qaed Sinyan al-Harthi in Yemen in 2002. Putin added that the charter does not say that the aggression must originate with another state (RIA Novosti, July 7). Russia first announced a new policy of using pre-emptive military force against external threats in October 2003.

Besides the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency), another candidate for the job of eliminating the murderers is a subunit of the Foreign Intelligence Service known as Zaslon (Shield), created in 1998 and composed of at least 300 military veterans (Izvestia, July 4). Both Zaslon and the GRU had a presence in Baghdad before the 2003 U.S. invasion and have ties to former members of Iraqi intelligence. There is no reason to attribute special skills to Russia’s present secret services in this type of operation. Their last attempt in this field, the successful assassination of Chechen ex-president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in 2004, was nevertheless so ineptly handled that the agents responsible were quickly arrested and considerable international embarrassment resulted for Moscow.

Conclusion

Is this merely a case of pre-G-8 summit posturing on Russia’s part? Aiming hit squads at Iraq would risk a great deal, with only a remote chance for success. Interference in a U.S. theater of operations could threaten relations with the United States, relations that Russia seeks to modify, not destroy. Indeed, as Putin awaited approval of his new powers, he spoke of Russia and the United States together bearing “special responsibility for world security” (Itar-Tass, July 6). Tactical mistakes could also jeopardize Russian influence in Iraq and Iran. Once in Iraq, how long would the presence of Russian Special Forces be tolerated? Clearly, such activities would come into conflict with coalition operations unless carefully coordinated; for instance, there could be a repeat of what occurred on July 4, 2003 when U.S. soldiers detained and hooded a team of Turkish special forces in Iraq, an incident that infuriated Turkey. On the other hand, coordination with Russian operatives would inevitably be regarded as international approval for extra-territorial operations by Russia’s security agencies.

Infiltrating Iraq’s fluid and complex web of resistance groups will be a far different task than assassinating the unprotected Yandarbiyev. If the Russians are serious, they will need to recruit and depend on Iraqi operatives. Russian agents would be even more conspicuous in Iraq than in Qatar, where the local security service monitored every move and phone call made by the Russian assassins from the moment they stepped off the plane. Russia’s legalization of retribution is a simple matter compared to operational demands in Iraq and the need to deal with the consequent international implications.

 

This article first appeared in the July 13 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Azhar, Egyptian Islam and the War in Iraq

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Andrew McGregor

June 16, 2004

The recently replaced flag of Iraq has three stars in its middle band, representing a stillborn alliance between the great Arab nations of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Though the wave of post-colonial Arab nationalism that sparked the would-be alliance is today no more than an episode of history, the three nations remain bound by a common religion, language and cultural identity. Of the three, Egypt alone has been a firm ally of the United States for 25 years, despite the general opposition of Egyptians to America’s support of Israel, its campaign in Afghanistan, and the current war in Iraq. Egypt has only recently emerged from a vicious struggle between state security forces and Islamists seeking to overthrow the government through a campaign of terrorism and assassination. In the fight for Egyptian “hearts and minds” the regime has traditionally relied on the scholars of an ancient institution in the heart of Medieval Cairo.

al-Azhar 2Al-Azhar Grand Shaykh Muhammad al-Sayyid Tantawi

Al-Azhar (“The Brilliant”) was founded in 970 AD as a Shi’ite mosque and center of learning by the ruling Shi’ite Fatimid dynasty. After Saladin expelled the Fatimids in 1171, the university’s scholars began to act as guardians of an orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam. Since the beginning of the 19th century, however, the institute’s refusal to consider the implications of rapid modernization outside its walls led to a growing alienation from a ruling elite unable to ignore these changes. This dichotomy grew until Gamal Abdel Nasser brought the independence of al-Azhar to an abrupt end by placing the university under the direct control of the president’s office. The president would henceforth select the Grand Shaykh, and all the university’s scholars became state employees on the government payroll.

The transformation of al-Azhar into an institution whose role is simply to give religious approval to government decisions has not been without opposition. To some extent the growing militancy and independence of the institution’s junior scholars has been channeled into social issues. When called upon, however, the university’s leadership has been ready with approval of controversial political actions, such as the signing of the Camp David accords and participation in the Gulf War of 1990-91. Though cosmetic changes have been made to the curriculum in recent years, al-Azhar’s rigid orthodoxy and compliance to the state fails to appeal to either Egypt’s secularists or militant Islamists. The result is a reputation greater beyond Egypt’s borders than within.

The university has been at the front of anti-colonial struggle once before. Shortly after Napoleon took Cairo in 1798 the city erupted in a rebellion centered on al-Azhar. The revolt was led by a number of lesser shaykhs and imams while the great shaykhs of the university held back, waiting to see how things went before committing themselves. After French artillery finished the rebellion scores of rebels and scholars were executed while Napoleon gave public forgiveness to the great shaykhs. Though much criticized for this gesture by his own men, Napoleon still sought the approval of the university’s leaders for his posture as Guardian of Islam. Quiet encouragement of the revolt was as close as al-Azhar’s leadership ever came to opposing the governing authority in Egypt.

The division in 1798 between al-Azhar’s militant junior scholars and a more cautious leadership is similar to the rifts in al-Azhar today as the university struggles to respond to calls for rulings on the legitimacy of the anti-Coalition jihad in Iraq. It is a role the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Muhammad Tantawi, has declined, for reasons closer to Egyptian state policy than Koranic interpretation. Since his appointment, Tantawi has been heavily criticized for his close ties to the state and failure to assert the independence of al-Azhar. The schism between Tantawi and less pliant scholars of al-Azhar often takes the form of competing fatwas, creating confusion for Muslims seeking guidance from the institution.

The Egyptian regime regards public demonstrations as a threat to order, and the angry protests at al-Azhar earlier this year against Israel and the United States (the “originators of terrorism” according to the chants) led to the arrest of 54 Islamists, mostly members of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood. One of the charges against the Brotherhood was that they were preparing to send members to Iraq and other conflicts in order to gain military experience. [1] The death of a leading member of the Brotherhood from injuries suffered in detention has revived fears of renewed state repression of the Muslim Brothers and other independent Islamists. In an effort to keep individuals and organizations from tapping into the great wave of popular anger over Egypt’s alliance with the United States, authorities have clearly stated that “legitimate support for the Palestinian and Iraqi resistance” will not be allowed to threaten the stability of the state.

In the opening days of last year’s Iraq campaign, the government found itself faced with thousands of Egyptians demanding an opportunity to join their Arab brothers to drive off the coalition of “unbelievers.” The government assured the volunteers that nothing would stand in their way. Tantawi also gave his approval, saying that “Combating injustice is a religious duty… We do not prevent anyone from going to help those who are facing injustice.” [2] Those who followed government instructions were given forms to fill out, rather than weapons. In the end, most of the volunteers added a sense of betrayal to their anger as the government buried their attempts to fight in the red tape of Egypt’s formidable bureaucracy.

Those few Egyptians who succeeded in going to Iraq were ultimately disillusioned by their experience. Many complained of being placed in exposed positions, a climate of defeat, and outright hostility from most Iraqis. In some cases the Iraqi army abandoned Arab volunteers, leaving them to fend off American tanks with light arms. Others were forced to defend themselves against Iraqi fire. [3]

In March 2003 Shaykh ‘Ali Abu al-Hassan, the chairman of al-Azhar’s fatwa committee, ruled that it was obligatory to fight Coalition forces in Iraq, and that the blood of American and British soldiers was “permitted.” After representatives from the U.S. and UK embassies visited al-Azhar with concerns over the statement, Tantawi fired al-Hassan, who, two years earlier, had called for all Muslims to give armed resistance to U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan. Only a few days later, however, the University’s Islamic Research Center urged Muslims to take up jihad against a “Crusader invasion.” Tantawi read and approved the fatwa, but did not sign it. Al-Azhar later issued a “clarification,” asserting that “Islam was not and will not be at war with Christianity.” [4] Nevertheless, Tantawi continued to make verbal calls for jihad in Iraq by all means (including suicide operations), but no longer gives encouragement to Egyptian fighters eager to join the conflict.

al-Azhar 3Egyptian Grand Mufti Shaykh ‘Ali Guma’a

It is important to note that in the many calls to jihad from Egyptian and other Middle Eastern sources there is often an important qualification. There is agreement between most Sunni scholars that since the creation of state armies in the Islamic world, the conduct of jihad has become a state responsibility. Calls for jihad therefore no longer imply a mass movement of armed individuals to the zone of conflict, but may take the form of material, financial and spiritual support to a state or to fighting groups in a region of war. In the opinion of the Chief Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh ‘Ali Gum’a, “the one with the right to declare jihad is the one with the flag. The one with the flag in our day is the president of the state.” [5] It is a point hotly disputed by a new generation of radical scholars, who have revived the moral imperative of individual responsibility to carry out armed resistance in areas where Islam is threatened. [6]

In August 2003, Azhari Shaykh Nabawi al-Eish issued a fatwa banning recognition of the Iraqi Governing Council. After a well-publicized meeting with the American ambassador, Tantawi dismissed el-Eish and insisted the ruling was only “a personal opinion.” Although the fatwa had the support of many Islamic scholars, Tantawi insisted al-Azhar had no right to interfere in the affairs of other nations. Tantawi’s unexpected rejection of al-Azhar’s traditional role as a center of spiritual guidance for the entire Islamic world did immense damage to the university’s reputation. Many Azharis supported al-Eish, and the affair was followed by another demonstration at the university in support of the Iraqi resistance.

One reason for President Hosni Mubarak’s reluctance to have thousands of Egyptian Mujahideen fighting in Iraq was revealed on June 11, when Egypt received an additional $300 million dollars in U.S. aid as compensation for economic damage of the Iraq war and as encouragement for liberal reforms. Despite the failure of the privatization campaign, Egypt was also given U.S. loan guarantees for an additional two billion dollars. As the second largest recipient of U.S. aid (after Israel), Egypt already receives $2 billion per year in exchange for its peace treaty with Israel.

The President is in a precarious position, in absolute need of the American aid that threatens his credibility within Egypt and restricts his attempts to restore Egypt’s position as a leader of the Arab world. The Islamists reject American aid, but have little to replace it with, other than “God’s protection.” Mubarak, like the Saudi royal family, fears that George Bush’s Middle East reform initiatives will target America’s allies as well as enemies.

 Conclusion

To this point Mubarak has succeeded in keeping the lid on Egypt’s political boiler, to the great relief of Coalition forces. Ironically the means of doing so, the pervasive presence of a paternal/military government in every aspect of Egyptian life, may be among the first targets of a regional democratization process. Mubarak is no Gorbachev; like most of the regime, he views political dissent as a threat to the stability of Egypt and its ability to obtain American aid. While most of the gunmen of the 1990s have been eliminated or driven out of Egypt, the government’s failure to more effectively resist U.S. operations in Iraq threatens to revive the militant faction of Egyptian Islam. The confusion spawned by conflicting opinions out of al-Azhar only serves to inspire Egyptian Islamists to look for leadership elsewhere. If Westerners have difficulty interpreting the rulings of al-Azhar it is due in part to different definitions of common terms; according to Tantawi, “Jihad is sanctioned by God to either defend religion, money, soul, land, honor and freedom, or to support those who are subject to injustice. Terrorism, by contrast, refers to acts of imperialism, the killing of civilians, the destruction of homes, and aggression against civilians.” [7]

The usefulness of al-Azhar for Islamic confirmation of government policy is also in question, again a consequence of the regime’s own insistence on controlling all political voices. For many Egyptians, the impression that al-Azhar now consults with the American ambassador on its rulings has destroyed Tantawi’s remaining credibility. Anything short of a meaningful transfer of power to Iraqis on June 30 will provide extremists with further ammunition in their campaign to topple an “apostate” Egyptian regime.

Today Egypt stands at the brink, its leaders attempting to satisfy the conflicting demands of its foreign partners as well as its secular, Islamist and military constituencies. Azhari professor ‘Abd al-Azim al-Mut’ani warned shortly after 9/11 that “Even if the present [Arab] regimes support America, these regimes are only passing clouds. They do not enjoy stability; stability is in the hands of the people…” [8] Exposed daily to horrific images of suffering and brutality from the Iraq campaign and the Palestinian conflict that are rarely broadcast in North America, many Egyptians are experiencing a groundswell of anger against their American patrons. A descent into a renewed cycle of terrorism and repression may be only a videotape away.

Notes:

  1. Gihan Shahine, ‘The Brotherhood’s latest challenge’, Al-Ahram Weekly Online: 3-9 June 2004; Isssue 693, weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/693/eg5.htm
  2. Shaden Shehab, ‘On the road to Baghdad’, Al-Ahram Weekly Online: 10-16 April 2003; weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/633/eg9.htm
  3. A collection of interviews with these fighters from the Arab press can be found in Steven Stalinsky, ‘Arab and Muslim Jihad Fighters in Iraq’, MEMRI Special Report – no.19, July 27, 2003, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi
  4. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), March 20, 2003. It is interesting to note the growing number of Muslim scholars who now assert that both Christians and Muslims alike oppose the Bush government’s conduct in the Middle East, often citing statements by both the Coptic and Roman Catholic popes.
  5. ‘The new Egyptian Mufti – Dr. Sheikh ‘Ali Gum’a: Opinions about jihad, supporting suicide bombings, and forbidding Muslims in the U.S. military from fighting other Muslims’, (Interview with Al-Haqiqa, Egypt), MEMRI Special Dispatch Series no. 580, October 1, 2003, memri.org/bin/articles.cgi
  6. One of the most forceful adherents of the idea that armed jihad is fard ayn (individually obligatory) was Shaykh ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, the spiritual founder of al-Qa’idah. See: Andrew McGregor: ‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone: ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and the Islamist Revolution, Journal of Conflict Studies 23(2), Fall 2003, pp.103-104
  7. Gihan Shahine, ‘Debating Jihad: Jihad need not imply a war of religions’, Cairo Times 7(26), 4-10 September 2003
  8. Moussa Hal, ‘Islamic clerics in Egypt declare war on America’, www.lailatalqadr.com, October 11, 2001, available in English at memri.orgbin/articles.cgi

This article first appeared in the June 16, 2004 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

The Saddam You Know and the Devil You Don’t

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Andrew McGregor

Ottawa Citizen Commentary

May 8, 2002

A banker with a spotty record, a handful of nervous generals in exile and a couple of war criminals – meet the leaders of the Iraqi opposition, one of whom will soon take the prize as the American-sponsored alternative to Saddam Hussein. U.S. strategy in Iraq favours the replacement of Saddam Hussein by another Sunni Muslim strongman through a coup d’état, but the efficiency of Iraq’s security services continually puts Saddam several steps ahead of the CIA. Unable to mount a coup, the United States has squandered millions on ineffectual and corrupt Iraqi exile “leaders” who are no closer to a popular insurgency now than they were 10 years ago.

The leading contender is a wealthy Iraqi Shiite mathematician, Ahmad Chalabi, who is said to have escaped Jordan in the trunk of a car after his mathematical skills failed to prevent his Petra Bank being closed down for “irregularities.” Mr. Chalabi convinced several U.S. congressmen to propose him as leader of an Iraqi opposition coalition in 1991. He wanted to unite the disparate opposition groups under one umbrella – the Iraqi National Congress (INC) – with himself as leader and paymaster, of course. Through the early 1990s, the opposition parties met at CIA-funded affairs that the participants believed were paid for through Mr. Chalabi’s allegedly embezzled millions.

The problem with Mr. Chalabi is that he is virtually unknown inside Iraq and his credibility is hopelessly compromised by years of association with the CIA. Even within the Iraqi National Congress, Mr. Chalabi is widely disliked. The joke in Washington is that Mr. Chalabi has more influence on the banks of the Potomac than on the banks of the Tigris. The September 11 attacks postponed yet another Washington investigation into Mr. Chalabi’s questionable accounting practices as Iraqi National Congress leader.

Under the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, the U.S. government is allowed to fund seven different opposition groups ranging from Iranian-backed Shiite Islamists to constitutional monarchists. Each has its own agenda, and there is little chance of long-term co-operation under the Iraqi National Congress umbrella.

The idea of using the Iraqi National Congress as a type of Northern Alliance ground army [as in Afghanistan] supported by American air power comes on the heels of years of neglect of the military capabilities of the INC. Small in numbers, inexperienced in combat, poorly armed and in all likelihood riddled by Iraqi intelligence agents, it would take an amazing transformation to turn the INC into a reliable fighting force.

There is no question that many Iraqi officers are ready to turn against Saddam, but they will not do so based on an air campaign. Saddam’s regime has survived 10 years of sporadic bombing, only to emerge with Saddam more powerful than ever. A previous INC attempt to seize power in 1995 ended in disaster when the U.S. withdrew its support in favour of an internal military coup.

Two Kurdish factions provide most of the INC troops. Now co-operating with each other after years of civil war, they have no incentive to renew the fight against Baghdad. The Kurdish north is enjoying unprecedented autonomy, a revived economy thanks to the United Nations oil-for-food program, and protection from the U.S. Air Force. The Kurdish minority knows it will never be able to seize power in Baghdad as the Tajiks have done in Kabul. Many Kurds have felt betrayed by the CIA in the past and are wary of new involvement, knowing that Turkey, a vital U.S. NATO ally, would oppose full independence.

Lately, some elements within the U.S. administration transferred their support from the INC to another contender, Ayad Alawi and his Iraqi International Accord (mostly defectors from the Iraqi military), though Mr. Alawi is also unknown to a generation of Iraqis. Others favour Nizar Khazraji, one of Saddam’s generals until his defection several years ago. The ex-general is now under house arrest in Denmark, accused of being responsible for war crimes and participating in the 1988 gas attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja. Many of Mr. Khazraji’s fellow exiles suspect the general is a double agent for Iraqi intelligence.

Though broad generalizations about Iraqi democracy are made for public consumption, the concept is given short shrift in closed-door discussions in Washington. The United States still fears that a politically liberated Shiite majority in Iraq might choose to join their religious brethren in Iran, creating a type of Shia super-state inimical to American interests. The deep enmities between Iraq’s Arab Shiites and the Iranians that developed during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s are overlooked in this vision of the future, but, like the Mafia says, why take a chance?

Put simply, in the event of a U.S. attack on Iraq, the work of seizing the oil fields and sites of possible deployment of weapons of mass destruction would be far too important to be left to the Iraqi National Congress. These tasks will need to be done quickly without any room for error.

There is a growing feeling in Washington that the use of proxy forces to fight its battles in the region was a mistake. Since the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on covert attempts to depose Saddam Hussein, with nothing to show for it but some INC assurances that victory is only a few more million away.

When Saddam enjoyed American support in the 1980s, it was because of his success in holding Iraq together and containing revolutionary Iran by concentrating power within the ruling Sunni minority. His successor will be expected to carry out the same missions. It is only Saddam who has worn out his welcome, not Iraq’s secular dictatorship. Faced with crippling fragmentation or a brutally enforced unity, it is little wonder that Iraqis fear the future more than Saddam.

AIS UPDATE – December 2016

What happened to the main candidates to lead post-Saddam Iraq?

Ahmad Chalabi

After channeling massive amounts of false “intelligence” regarding Iraqi WMDs to the Bush administration and the New York Times, Chalabi fell out with the Americans after he was accused of fraud and theft.  In June 2004 he was accused of supplying U.S. state secrets to Iran. Counterfeiting charges and an alleged assassination attempt followed. Following ten years in Iraqi politics, Chalabi died in 2015.

Ayad Alawi

Shiite politician Ayad Alawi supplied questionable “evidence” of Iraqi WMDs to the UK that played a major role in obtaining public support for the in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Allawi was made interim Prime Minister of Iraq in 2004-05 and served as Vice-President of Iraq in 2014-2015.

Nizar al-Khazraji

The former general wanted for war crimes created a political scandal by escaping house arrest in Denmark in 2003. He is believed to have fled to the United Arab Emirates. Nothing was heard from him until 2014, when a memoir of his military service during the Iran-Iraq War was published in Qatar.

Unmasking the ‘Axis of Evil’: Iraq, Iran and North Korea are no angels. But they are no al-Qaeda sympathizers, either.

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Andrew McGregor

Ottawa Citizen Commentary

February 19, 2002

In his state of the union address, American president George W. Bush repackaged the “rogue nations” of the Clinton era as the more threatening “axis of evil,” a new target in the war on terrorism. Prime Minister Chretien said last week that “the question of the production of unacceptable armaments in Iraq is a problem that is under the authority of the United Nations, and it is completely different than the problem of terrorism,” a statement that could easily be applied to Iran and North Korea. Does the axis play a role in international terrorism, or is the American administration taking care of some unfinished business while it is mobilized for war? For an answer, let’s look at the involvement in terrorism of each of these states.

Iraq

The prime minister [of Canada] and Russian president Vladimir Putin last week both said there was insufficient evidence to connect Iraq to Islamist terrorism. The secular Iraqi leadership prefers to support secular splinter groups of the PLO rather than Islamist groups. Osama bin Laden detests Saddam Hussein so much that he offered during the Persian Gulf War to raise an army of Arab veterans of Afghanistan to fight Iraq on behalf of Saudi Arabia.

Most allegations of Iraqi collusion with Islamist groups come from defectors to the United States who are seeking citizenship and money in return for information that invariable comes without substantiating evidence. Iraq continues to harbour Mujahedeen Khalq, an Iranian terrorist group opposed to the current Iranian regime and responsible for a number of assassinations. Baghdad continues to host the ailing and inactive Abu Nidal, but, like Osama bin Laden, Saddam’s support for Palestine is mostly rhetorical.

Iraq does have an active chemical and biological weapons program (developed with U.S. and British assistance), but it is highly unlikely to provide such weapons to terrorist groups for fear of retribution. Saddam has nothing in common with Islamist groups, and his commitment to the Palestinians does not include endangering his own position.

Iran

Shiite Iran was a bitter enemy of the Shiite-hating Sunni Taliban, supplying arms to the Northern Alliance and nearly going to war with the Taliban in 1998. Al-Qaeda’s anti-Shiite extremists are unlikely recipients of Iranian aid. Iran condemned the September 11 attacks and, in recent days, Iran claims to have arrested 150 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters and family members who fled to Iran after escaping Afghanistan via U.S. ally Pakistan, a long-time supporter of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Iran remains a patron of the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah organization, which made a successful strategic transition from classic terrorism to guerrilla operations against Israeli military targets in its battle to drive Israel from Lebanon. Hezbollah is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S., a definition not completely accepted elsewhere. Iran also supports the Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups of militants within Palestine, regarding the liberation of Palestine as a religious obligation. The shipment of arms intercepted by Israel was probably less an attempt to aid terrorist attacks than to give the Palestinians the means to adopt the proven methods of the Hezbollah.

Iran has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, but considers itself a victim of terrorism by Mujahedeen Khalq attacks and likes to remind the U.S. that its unconditional support for Israel undermines the war against terrorism.

Iranian intelligence forces have been implicated in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, but there have been no major incidents of direct Iranian terrorism since the election of moderate president Mohammad Khatami in 1997. Democratization and westernization are ongoing processes in Iran, but moderates seeking engagement with the West are being pushed into the camp of the conservative clergy by the “axis of evil” speech.

North Korea

North Korea’s terrorist acts have traditionally been organized by state security groups and have been almost exclusively directed at South Korea. Despite this, it is reconciliation-seeking South Korea that has protested most strongly at the inclusion of North Korea in the axis.

North Korea’s major acts of terrorism occurred in 1983 and 1987, during the presidency of the late Kim II-Sung. With American urging, North Korea has since signed five anti-terrorism conventions and is in the process of ratifying two more. But its refusal to surrender members of the now moribund Japanese Red Army (responsible for a 1970 hijacking) to Japan has placed North Korea on the U.S. list of terrorist states.

Nevertheless, there are no pressing “terrorism” concerns that involve North Korea (though a Tamil Tiger video shot last year is alleged by some to show North Korean equipment in use by the Tamils). There is no evidence that North Korea has ever been involved with Islamist terrorist groups.

Each of the axis countries has a historical association with terrorism (a large club), but may be regarded as uncooperative or hostile to the aims of al-Qaeda. The axis appears to be a revision of the list of rogue states, conceived as possible sources of nuclear-armed missile attacks on the continental United States. The $60 billion scheme intended to defend the U.S. from this possibility, the unproven National Missile Defense (NMD), should not have survived September 11 when it was demonstrated that expensive and provocative ballistic missile programs were unnecessary to inflict major damage on the U.S. Currently, none of these nations is close to being able to target the U.S. with missiles. Unable to protect the U.S., the missile defence shield is an expensive gift to the defence industry.

Even if a strike on the U.S. were successful, none of the axis states has arrived at a solution to a variant of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) that we might term AD, Assured Destruction.

But while the Americans fret about the “axis of evil,” two of the world’s largest states remain poised inches away from nuclear annihilation in Kashmir. The al-Qaeda leadership remains at large, Afghanistan remains a ruinous breeding ground for violence, Saudi Arabia and Egypt remain unaddressed hotbeds of Islamist extremism and the Israel/Palestinian conflict is escalating. In the meantime, the “victory” over the primitive Taliban is taken as proof that Pax Americana can be imposed on all the U.S.’s enemies at once.

An attempt to replace any of the axis regimes would require a serious commitment of U.S. ground forces, especially with coalition support falling by the way. In the meantime, Americans are left asking; Whatever happened to that Bin Laden fellow?