Alleged Connection between Boko Haram and Nigeri’s Fulani Herdsmen Could Spark a Civil War

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Andrew McGregor

May 15, 2014

In recent weeks, Nigerian security forces have claimed that some groups of semi-nomadic Fulani herdsmen engaged in bitter and bloody conflicts with farmers in several Nigerian states are actually composed of members of Boko Haram. A statement from Nigerian Director of Defense Information Major General Chris Olukolade claimed the potentially dangerous identification came during the interrogation of Fulani herdsmen arrested after a series of killings and arson attacks in Taraba State (Vanguard [Lagos], April 23; Leadership [Abuja], April 24; Nigerian Tribune, April 24). Reports of Boko Haram members (who are mostly members of the Kanuri ethno-cultural group) disguising themselves as Fulani herdsmen while carrying out attacks in rural Nigeria are common. Though many of these reports may be attempts to deflect responsibility from Fulani herders for attacks on sedentary farming communities throughout north and central Nigeria, even the perception that the Fulani herdsmen have joined forces with Boko Haram could propel Nigeria into a new and devastating civil war.

Fulani Herder

Conflict between Fulani Pastoralists and Nigerian Agriculturalists

With origins in the Senegambia region, the Fulani now stretch across some 20 states in West Africa and the Sahel belt, ranging from Guinea-Conakry to Sudan. Though the Fulani herders once existed in a symbiotic relationship with sedentary agriculturalists in this region (involving the fertilization of fields by cattle who fed on the vegetative debris left over after crops had been taken in and the exchange of meat and milk for grain and other agricultural products), this relationship has been disturbed in recent years by environmental changes that have driven the herders further south, massive growth in the size of Fulani herds, the growth of practices such as agro-pastoralism, the expansion of farmland into traditional corridors used by the herders and the general collapse of customary conflict-resolution methods.

Many Fulani now tend to reach for automatic weapons to resolve disputes with agricultural communities. This has in turn led to the development of “self-defense” forces in the agricultural communities and the growth of cattle-rustling. Vigilante groups are often more trusted than the Nigerian security forces, which are often suspected of collusion with the herders and/or Boko Haram. Farmers routinely accuse the Fulani herders of allowing their animals to feed on still-growing crops and contamination of community watering-places. The rape of non-Fulani women by herders is also identified as a growing source of conflict and prevents women from carrying out traditional and necessary roles in gathering food and water. The herders in turn accuse the farmers of denying them access to grazing areas when alternatives cannot be found.

The conflict between herders and farmers is not solely a Nigerian problem, but is now common across the Sahel. The fact that the Fulani are nearly exclusively Muslim and the agricultural communities are largely Christian in Nigeria adds the disturbing possibility that this bloody conflict could shift into a sectarian conflict that could be easily exploited by Boko Haram extremists. The increasing number of recent attacks on Nigerian churches by Fulani gunmen or militants posing as such is an unwelcome trend. Pastoralist-sedentary agriculturalist violence is now common in a growing number of Nigerian states, though Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau states remain the most affected.

The Fulani herders, however, often find themselves on the receiving end of communal violence or attacks by government forces. On April 3, a uniformed group alleged to be Hausa-speaking Nigerian soldiers arrived at a Fulani settlement in Nasarawa State in armored personnel carriers (APCs) and killed over 30 Fulani, most of them elderly members of the community who were too slow to run away. The attack came only 24 hours after Fulani herders had signed a peace agreement with local Tiv agriculturalists. Military authorities would only say they were “investigating” whether the attackers were actually Nigerian troops (Premium Times [Lagos], April 3; April 9; Nigerian Tribune, April 4). Within days, Fulani herders were carrying out mass attacks on Tiv agricultural communities in Benue State while nearby security forces failed to respond (Vanguard [Lagos], April 12). Following a massacre of 15 Fulani mourners by security forces in Nasarawa State, Nigeria’s Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC) issued a statement that placed the herder vs. farmer conflict in the context of a larger and more dangerous sectarian conflict:

Cattle-grazing is not new in this country and it had been very peaceful in the past. But recently there appears to be a kind of organized resistance and stereotyping of the Fulani herdsmen. This is what we find disturbing. Witnesses have reportedly confirmed that efforts at reconciliation between Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors have always been frustrated by external forces who perpetrate fresh killings just when peace accords have either been signed or were about to be signed… Any hostile act against the Fulani is therefore an indirect attack on Muslims. Genocide aimed at the Fulani is indubitably mass killing of Muslims. It is war against Islam (SpyGhana.com, April 22).

After enduring attacks that killed over 50 people and destroyed nine villages in southern Taraba State, the mostly Christian Jukun people’s Jukun Development Association of Nigeria announced:  “We earlier thought the crisis is having [the] Fulani’s face, but when we saw the type of weapons the attackers possessed, we are convinced that the sudden attack on Jukunland has political undertones” (Osun Defender, April 25). Suggesting that the Jukun people may be targeted for a genocide similar to that experienced in Rwanda, association president Benjamin Bako warned: “We want the world to know that the Jukun people, as warriors, do not shy away from fighting which is our heritage… we the people will have no other option than to resort to any means to defend ourselves” (Codewit.com, April 22; Vanguard [Lagos], April 25).

The conflict between herders and farmers, like the Boko Haram conflict, has already shown signs of spilling across national borders. On April 22, Fulani herdsmen fleeing clashes in Nigeria’s Taraba and Benue states responded to demands from villagers in northern Cameroon to leave the area by killing at least 20 people and displacing thousands more as they torched schools, housing and crops (Osun Defender, April 25). The Nigerian military has denied targeting the Fulani, insisting its operations are non-partisan and non-sectarian (The Nation [Lagos], April 9).

A Kanuri Jihad?

Just as the early 19th century military/religious reform movement led by Uthman Dan Fodio is often called “the Fulani Jihad,” the activities of Boko Haram are increasingly called a “Kanuri Jihad” against the powerful Hausa-Fulani community in north-central Nigeria. The modern Fulani (a.k.a. Peul, Fulbe) are regarded as a pastoral group separate from the Fulani who integrated with the Hausa following the Fulani conquest of north-central and north-western Nigeria.

The traditional Kanuri religious leader, the Shehu (shaykh) of Borno Alhaji Kyari Garbai al-Kanemi, has rejected Boko Haram and has himself been the target of attempts on his life by the Islamist radicals. While the late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf and current movement leader Abubakr Shekau are both Kanuris, the movement itself cannot be accurately described as a Kanuri project as many of the victims of Boko Haram operations have been Kanuri. Mohammed Wakil, a Borno politician currently serving as Nigeria’s Minister of State for Power, recently noted that the Boko Haram crisis is “inflicting enormous damage on the Kanuri nation” (Daily Post [Lagos], April 21).

The heavy-handed response of the Nigerian Army and the large number of Kanuri civilian casualties inflicted in the military’s efforts to tackle Boko Haram in the north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe (all currently under emergency rule) have led to calls from some members of the political elites in these states for the removal of the army. Most notable of these was a memo issued by Adamawa governor Vice-Admiral Murtala Nyako (former Nigerian Chief of Naval Staff) to his fellow northern state governors calling for the withdrawal of the Nigerian Army from these states on the grounds that the Army is carrying out a government-sponsored “genocide” in the region. Nyako also made a connection between the Boko Haram crisis and the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70, claiming that Jonathan, “the Adolf Hitler of Nigeria,” was intent on continuing a campaign by the southern Igbo to establish dominance over the Hausa-Fulani of northern Nigeria (This Day [Lagos], April 27; Leadership [Abuja], April 19; Punch [Lagos], April 20). Nigeria’s information minister described such remarks from a former military leader as an attempt to incite the public against the national military and “the height of irresponsibility” (Leadership [Abuja], April 19).

The Kanuri-Fulani Rivalry in Northern Nigeria

The Kanuri people are found mainly within the borders of the old Borno Empire (1380 – 1893), which now spread across Borno and Yobe States in Nigeria, northern Cameroon, south-western Chad and south-east Niger, a territory that now matches Boko Haram’s operational zone. Nigerian security operations have encouraged Boko Haram to develop cross-border refuges and supply-lines that extend into neighboring Kanuri communities. Boko Haram also recruits non-Kanuris, though these recruits tend to be used for suicide operations rather than Kanuri members of the group. Numbering about five million people today, the Borno Kanuris originally came into conflict with the Fulani during the Fulani jihad of Islamic reformer Uthman Dan Fodio in the early 19th century. The Fulani jihadists eventually merged with the Hausa community of northern Nigeria to form a powerful and partly urbanized Hausa-Fulani community based on the Sokoto Caliphate, which entered into a long rivalry with the Kanuri of Borno, whose power and influence has declined steadily.

The Fulani herders do not have an established political structure and tend to be represented by various cattle breeders associations. Alhaji Bello Abdullahi Bodejo, the leader of one of the largest of these groups, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, claims that most of the attacks attributed to the Fulani herdsmen are actually carried out by “terrorists” who have infiltrated the Fulani to carry out violence (Leadership [Abuja], April 25). The association has also explained that many of the clashes between herdsmen and farmers were caused by the encroachment of the latter on traditional cattle routes (Daily Sun [Lagos], April 18).

In early April, the governor of Niger State expelled recently-arrived Fulani herders on the grounds that insurgents would pose as herdsmen to carry out attacks on local residents, saying he did not believe the Fulani herders were behind the attacks on civilians in Nigeria, but added that he would “prefer to be accused of dislodging people than to be counting corpses on the roads” (This Day [Lagos], April 11).

The ongoing conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists has attracted American attention, with U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria James Entwistle emphasizing the need for peace in the north-central region of Nigeria before the 2015 elections (Channels TV [Lagos], April 9).

Conclusion

While it is still difficult to determine whether Fulani gunmen are now joining forces with Boko Haram (as alleged by Nigerian security forces) or Boko Haram militants are using the pastoralist-agriculturalist conflict as a cover for their own activities, it is apparent that the two conflicts are beginning to converge, intentionally or not. The Kanuri-Fulani rivalry inhibits but does not prevent the eventual cooperation between militants from both groups, particularly as the pastoralist-agriculturalist conflict begins to take on sectarian overtones. If Boko Haram is to succeed in its goal of establishing a Salafist caliphate in northern Nigeria, it must expand its base beyond the Kanuri community. The Fulani herders are already well—armed and engaged in a bitter struggle with the Christian and non-Salafist Muslim agricultural communities of Nigeria, making expansion into the aggrieved Fulani communities an excellent place to start the necessary broadening of Boko Haram’s base. If the continuing conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists cannot be contained and resolved in the near future, there is every possibility that Nigerian could once more descend into a nation-wide struggle for dominance that will ultimately be of little benefit to anyone other than the extremists.

This article was published in the May 15, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Plan to Ship Israeli Gas to Egypt Raises Political and Security Concerns

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Andrew McGregor

May 15, 2014

Only two years after public opposition and attacks by militants brought an end to Egyptian gas shipments to Israel, there is a new proposal to begin shipping Israeli natural gas to Egypt.  Texas-based Noble Energy signed a non-binding letter of intent with Unión Fenosa Gas (UFG – a Spanish-Italian joint venture) on May 5 calling for the shipment of 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas from Israel’s offshore Tamar gas field over 15 years. The gas would be liquefied for export at Unión Fenosa’s Damietta liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant (20 percent owned by Egypt) before shipment to foreign markets by tanker, though the Egyptian government announced two days later that it had not yet issued the necessary authorization required for any imports of gas from Israel. Egypt’s Oil Ministry has said that any such deal would need to “serve the national interest of the country” (Wall Street Journal, May 6; Haaretz/Reuters, May 7).

The Tamar gas field is located 50 miles off the Israeli coast in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean and began production in March 2013. The largest partner in developing the gas field is Noble Energy, with a 36 percent share. Other partners include Israel’s Isramco Negev 2, two subsidiaries of Israel’s Delek Group and a subsidiary of Israel’s Dor Alon Group. The Tamar partners have already signed smaller deals to supply gas to the Palestinian Authority and Jordan’s Arab Potash Company and Jordan Bromine Company but have otherwise failed to find international markets for Tamar’s production. Turkey remains a potential customer for Tamar gas, but any deal with Turkish energy firms would come with its own political baggage, given the strained relations between Turkey and Israel.

Leviathan, a second Israeli offshore gas field, is owned by the same partners as the Tamar field. With twice as much gas reserves as Tamar, Leviathan is expected to go online in 2017 though financing has yet to be arranged due to the absence of large, long-term contracts with buyers. The Leviathan partners are expected to announce an export deal with foreign partners within three months. Tamar and Leviathan are expected to meet Israel’s domestic energy needs for at least the next 25 years.

The last natural gas deal between Egypt and Israel ended badly, with both parties entering arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) this year to resolve outstanding financial claims. In this earlier case, natural gas exports from Egypt to Israel were repeatedly interrupted by attacks by militants on the al-Arish to Ashkelon pipeline. The attacks began shortly after the January, 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak and continued even after the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) and the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) terminated their agreement with Israel’s East Mediterranean Gas (EMG) over a payment dispute following an Egyptian declaration of force majeure they claimed would excuse them from meeting their supply obligations.[1] By this time, there was massive popular opposition to continuing a deal to supply Israel with gas at below market prices that many Egyptians viewed as a prime example of the corruption that permeated the Mubarak regime.

There has been some discussion of using the existing pipeline to carry Israeli gas to Egypt until a proposed undersea Tamar to Damietta pipeline has been completed, though it seems likely the pipeline would again be the target of Bedouin and Islamist militants operating in the Sinai (al-Jazeera, May 8). Residual anger over this earlier contract is likely to help generate opposition to any new Egyptian gas project involving Israel. However, if the deal goes through, militants will have much greater difficulty interrupting the submarine pipeline than the exposed pipeline running through the Sinai Peninsula.

Egypt is trying to deal with severe energy shortages during a politically sensitive time. Natural gas is used to generate most of the nation’s electricity and blackouts have become common since the 2011 revolution. With steadily diminishing production and an inability to attract sufficient investment to develop remaining reserves, Egypt is finding it impossible to meet both heavily subsidized domestic demand and its export commitments (Reuters, May 6; al-Bawaba, May 7). Several gas-producing Gulf nations supporting Egypt’s political transition have supplied Egypt with $6 billion in free fuel to ward off potential popular unrest created by energy shortages this summer (Reuters, May 6).

With Egyptian natural gas now being diverted to the domestic market, UFG’s Damietta plant has been offline since December 2012 (al-Jazeera, May 8). A second Egyptian LNG plant located at the Mediterranean port of Idko is operated by the British-owned BG Group, the losing bidder on the Tamar gas deal. Like the Damietta plant, the Idko plant is also running well below capacity due to supply shortages and was unable to export any gas during the first quarter of 2014. The Egyptian government’s decision to divert natural gas supplies to the domestic market is estimated to have cost Unión Fenosa and the BG Group billions of dollars in lost revenue and has prevented both firms from meeting their commitments to customers in Europe and Asia.

Following the U.S. imposition of sanctions on Russia, European countries dependent on Russian gas imports are now seeking alternative supplies, mainly from nearby Algeria. After Egyptian negotiations with Algeria’s government-owned Sonatrach were halted when European markets began expressing interest in Algerian gas following the Crimea crisis, Egypt turned to Russia’s Gazprom Company for supply, reaching an agreement to import Russian liquefied natural gas beginning this summer (Daily News Egypt, May 13). The favorable payment terms offered by Russia may be viewed as part of its effort to re-establish influence in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East.

It remains uncertain whether any of the Israeli gas exported to Egypt would find its way to gas-hungry Egyptian markets or what the reaction of the Egyptian public might be to such a development. In the meantime, Unión Fenosa has brought its own complaint before the ICC over the Egyptian failure to maintain contracted payments as per its agreement and it is possible the BG Group will follow suit with reference to Egypt’s failure to supply its Idko LNG facility with natural gas. The BG Group has already declared force majeure for its Egyptian operations because of the government’s gas diversions and a $4 billion debt owed by the Egyptian government. Egypt has already faced 19 arbitration cases from international energy firms since the 2011 revolution, with most of these remaining unsettled. In the meantime, factories, businesses and retailers are all forced to reduce their hours of operation, damaging an already struggling economy. Alternatives to gas are being sought to supply Egypt’s energy needs as the high consumption summer months approach, including the use of coal and low-grade polluting petroleum products (Zawya [Dubai], April 15).

Note

1. Force Majeure refers to a party to a contract being relieved of their obligation to fulfill terms of a contract due an event or circumstance beyond the control of the party concerned that has resulted in the party failing or delaying its contractual obligations in circumstances that could not be prevented or overcome by the standard of a reasonable or prudent person or party. It excludes such relief (normally intended to be only temporary) in cases of negligence or malfeasance.

This article was published in the May 15, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Algeria Fighting a Two-Front War with Islamist Militants

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Andrew McGregor

May 15, 2014

The continuing break-up of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb into northern and southern factions under rival commanders Abd al-Malik Droukdel and Mokhtar Belmokhtar has presented Algerian authorities with the necessity of fighting a two-front war against factions interested in establishing their dominance by striking security targets within the country.

Algerian Security Forces on Patrol in Southern Algeria

Algerian security operations along the border with the Kidal region of northern Mali led to the death of a dozen Islamist militants in the southern Tamanrasset region (Algeria’s 6th military district). The May 5 military operation by the Algerian Armée nationale populaire (ANP) took place in the Taoundert Commune, some 80 kilometers west of the border town of Tin-Zouatine, a regional smuggling center. Recently re-elected Algerian president Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika later claimed that the group of 20 to 30 militants were attempting to infiltrate Algeria and included elements from Mali, Libya and Tunisia, though its exact destination and purpose remain unknown (Reuters, May 7).

The operation provided some measure of revenge for the ANP after at least 11 Algerian soldiers were killed in an ambush carried out by AQIM on a military convoy in the mountainous Tizi Ouzou region east of Algiers (Algeria’s 1st military district) on April 19 (BBC, April 20). The troops were returning to base after having secured polling stations in Tizi Ouzou for the presidential election.

According to Algerian security sources, much of the seized weaponry was traced to Libyan military stocks looted by NATO-backed Libyan rebels in 2011. Arms and other materiel recovered after the clash included Kalashnikov assault rifles, anti-tank mines, mobile phones, three all-terrain vehicles, two motorcycles, satellite phones, GPS equipment, solar plates, grenades, a grenade launcher and a shotgun (Echorouk [Algiers], May 5). [1]

At roughly the same time, security forces in the Djanet district (Algeria’s 4th military district) close to the border with southwestern Libya uncovered another cache of what appeared to be weapons looted from Libyan armories, including 87 Russian S-5KO rockets, a relatively inaccurate Russian-made rocket designed for use by aircraft and helicopters but re-adapted for use from a truck-bed or a man-pad system in Libya (Algeria Press Service, May 6). Found buried in the sand with the rockets was an improvised rocket launcher (al-Watan [Algiers], May 7). A further gun battle near Tin Zaouatine resulted in the death of two militants, bringing the death toll up to 12 (Naharnet.com, May 12).

The April 30 pledge of allegiance by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (in which he called al-Zawahiri “our Amir”) and his recognition of the legacy of Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam appears to be yet another demonstration of his rejection of the leadership of AQIM leader Abd al-Malik Droukdel (AFP, May 1). At the moment, Droukdel’s AQIM and Belmokhtar’s Libyan-based al-Murabitun movement seem to be engaged in a bitter rivalry at the moment, though so far their contest is being carried out through attacks on Algerian targets rather than group-on-group clashes like those witnessed between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the al-Qaeda sponsored al-Nusra Front in Syria. With Droukdel’s faction operating in northern Algeria and Belmokhtar’s faction operating in the remote south, such inter-Islamist clashes appear unlikely in Algeria.

Though the United States has opened the possibility of supplying Algeria with surveillance drones to help monitor the vast desert wilderness of southern Algeria, it has refused to supply Algeria (or other nations, for that matter) with attack drones of the type deployed by the CIA and the U.S. Department of Defense (al-Jazeera, May 9). Meanwhile, Algeria has denied a U.S. proposal delivered by Secretary of State John Kerry to set up a base for drone operations in southern Algeria (al-Jazeera, May 11).

Notes

1. Ministère de la Defense Nationale d’Algérie: “Neutralisation de terroristes à Tamanrasset / Bilan de l’opération,” May 6, 2014, http://www.mdn.dz/site_principal/index.php?L=fr#terro06052014

This article was first published in the May 15, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Crisis in South Sudan Part Two: Civilian Massacres Mark Struggle to Control Oil Industry

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Andrew McGregor

May 2, 2014

Government of South Sudan (GoSS) forces are battling rebels under the command of former South Sudan vice-president Riek Machar for control of Paloch in Upper Nile State, home of the nation’s largest oil installation. The rebels have said they intend to take control of all of South Sudan’s oilfields to prevent President Salva Kiir from “using the oil revenues to finance his war and hire foreign mercenaries” (Sudan Tribune, April 23; Reuters, April 24). However, according to Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) spokesman Colonel Philip Aguer, it is “the dream of Riek Machar and his forces to either destroy the oil industry or control it or divert it. To whom, we don’t know” (VOA, April 24).

SPLA Forces on the Move near Bentiu

The civilian population of the oil-rich Greater Upper Nile region (which includes Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states) has been targeted by both rebel and government forces battling for control of the oil fields. Bentiu, the capital of Unity State, was taken over by rebel forces (including the notorious Nuer “White Army”) on April 15. The occupiers then launched attacks on civilians who had gathered in hopes of safety at the local hospital, the Catholic Church, the vacated World Food Program compound and the Bentiu mosque. According to UNMISS, more than 200 civilians were killed and over 400 wounded at the mosque alone. The mission also condemned the use of Radio Bentiu FM to “broadcast hate speech” and calls for mass rape during the opposition’s investment of the city (Sudan Tribune, April 21). During the attacks, gunmen demanded that their captives identify their ethnicity and origin and then killed all Dinkas and Darfuris. Many of the latter were traders operating from nearby Darfur.

A spokesman for the rebels’ so-called “SPLM-In-Opposition” claimed government forces had massacred the Dinka and Darfuri population of Bentiu before evacuating it. The bodies were then collected and piled in “sensitive” places to “make it look like organized executions by the incoming opposition forces.” The spokesman further claimed the dead Darfuri civilians were actually Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) fighters from Darfur who had changed into civilian clothes during the fighting for Bentiu. [1] Elsewhere, however, the commander of the SPLA’s 4th Division (a largely Nuer unit now fighting on the rebel side), Major General James Koang Chol, said the alleged JEM fighters “were in military uniform and participated in active combat against our forces… We would not have killed innocent Darfur civilians. We don’t see them as our enemies” (Sudan Tribune, April 24).

JEM denies any involvement in the South Sudan conflict, but Koang claims the movement is concerned for its supply lines running from their current bases in north Kordofan to South Sudan (Radio Tamazuj, January 2). Opposition forces claimed to have killed a JEM Major-General and a Brigadier while inflicting a recent defeat on JEM forces in Unity State (Sudan Tribune, April 25). [2] JEM and the GoSS have long-standing ties, but the degree of their military cooperation has always been a matter of some contention.

The Bentiu massacre was followed two days later by an attack by gunmen armed with RPGs on Nuer refugees in the UN compound in Bor, capital of Jonglei State. Peacekeepers from India, Nepal and South Korea were unable to prevent the slaughter of at least 46 Nuer, with hundreds more wounded (South Sudan News Agency, April 22; BBC, May 1). Bor was the scene of a massacre of some 2,000 Dinka civilians by Nuer forces under Riek Machar’s command in November, 1991.

Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta has warned that Kenya will not stand by and allow the situation in neighboring South Sudan to descend into genocide. [3] Uganda is providing military support to the GoSS and the evacuation of these forces is one of the primary demands of the opposition. Uganda appears eager to accommodate this demand as soon forces from the eight-nation Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are ready to deploy in South Sudan to protect oilfields and strategic towns. Three battalions totaling 2500 troops from Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda are expected to have a UN-authorized mandate to use greater force to protect civilians. The deployment has been delayed due to the opposition of Riek Machar’s forces.

In the face of atrocities by both sides, the UN Security Council is re-examining the mandate of UNMISS on the assumption that the GoSS is no longer a reliable partner (Reuters, April 24). China, the largest investor in the South Sudan’s oil industry, is naturally concerned about supply interruptions and has even taken the unusual measure of offering its services as a mediator (BBC Chinese, January 8). With government troops poised to retake Bentiu, there are fears of new killings targeting the thousands of Nuer civilians who have taken refuge in the town’s UN compound.

Notes

1. James Gatdet Dak, Spokesperson of the chairman of SPLM-In Opposition: “Response to allegations of massacres in Bentiu,” April 25, 2014, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50778

2. Brigadier General Lul Ruai Koang, Directorate of Information & Moral Orientation, Office of Military Spokesperson for SPLA in Opposition, Press Release no. 53, April 24, 2014.

3. Kenya Presidency (Nairobi), Statement on South Sudan by President Uhuru Kenyatta, Chairman of the East African Community and Rapporteur of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), April 25, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201404251580.html.

This article was published in the May 2, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Crisis in South Sudan Part One: Shake-up in Military Leadership Reflects Tribal Crisis

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Andrew McGregor

May 2, 2014

As the security situation in the Sudan continues to deteriorate, Government of South Sudan (GoSS) president Salva Kiir Mayardit has overhauled the nation’s military leadership with a pair of controversial appointments. The dismissal of General James Hoth Mai, a Nuer, as chief-of-staff of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) has been interpreted as part of the president’s efforts to surround himself with Dinka veterans of the civil war as the political dispute that began in December evolves into a general Dinka vs. Nuer struggle for dominance in South Sudan. Defections from the SPLA, both individual and en masse, continue to cause instability in the Army (Radio Tamazuj, April 25).

General James Hoth Mai

GoSS Information Minister Michael Makuei Lueth said Mai’s removal was “a normal release and retirement” that had “nothing to do with the performance matters or anything linked to politics” (Sudan Tribune, April 25). It was the second major shake-up of the SPLA’s military leadership this year; in January, Kiir dismissed all six of General Mai’s deputies and replaced them with newly promoted officers (Sudan Tribune, January 22).

General Mai urged the people of South Sudan not to use his dismissal for political purposes: “I thank our people and urge them to not use my relief as a reason to prolong the war. I always say war cannot be a solution to anything. Dialogue is always the best option to resolve differences” (Sudan Tribune, April 24).

Mai joined the SPLA rebellion in its early days in 1983 and became a bodyguard to the SPLA commander, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, who later sent Mai for military training in Cuba, Ethiopia and the United States. When the SPLA split along ethnic lines in 1991, Mai refused to join the largely Nuer faction under Riek Machar and instead remained loyal to Garang and the Dinka-led original SPLA. Given that Machar and the Nuer dissidents were eventually compelled to rejoin the movement, Mai could argue he made the right choice, but he has since been viewed with suspicion by many Nuer who see him as irrevocably pro-Dinka. Mai replaced Oyai Deng Ajak (currently under detention on coup charges) as chief-of-staff in 2009 and became a full general the following year. Mai was the most prominent Nuer in the South Sudan military and administration.

General Paul Malong Awan Anei

Mai was replaced by General Paul Malong Awan Anei, the Dinka former governor of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state. The new chief-of-staff helped direct the operations in Juba in December that launched the conflict and is regarded as a Kiir loyalist with a strong pro-Dinka agenda. Malong was a senior SPLA commander during the civil war and was appointed governor of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state in March 2008. Malong’s personal conduct as a SPLA commander led to friction with late SPLA leader John Garang, leading to his arrest in 1991 (Sudan Tribune, November 17, 2013). Malong is widely believed to be illiterate, but claims he can read and write Dinka (Sudan Tribune, March 26).

Malong’s authoritarian style made him unpopular in many parts of North Bahr al-Ghazal, but his personal loyalty to Kiir allowed him to evade discipline for defying Kiir’s orders in 2013, with a forgiving Kiir saying: “Malong is not the first official to break the law. He is not the first official to fail to implement directives from my office” (Sudan Tribune, March 26, 2013). In December 2013, residents of Aweil (the capital of North Bahr al-Ghazal state) called for Malong’s removal, charging him with embezzlement of public funds, theft of medical supplies and arbitrary rule: “The Governor puts himself in a position of prosecutor and/or a judge in the State. He orders the arrest and release of individuals according to his wishes” (Sudan Tribune, December 4, 2013). Malong is also accused of recruiting a tribal militia of 15,000 in Bahr al-Ghazal region, a move that is believed to have been opposed by General Mai (Nyamile News, April 23).

The new chief-of-staff has promised to take an aggressive stance in bringing the rebellion to an end:

I will go to Upper Nile region and fight there myself. I will need to get that so called Riek Machar and fight him. He either has to catch me or I will catch him. I had a secure job before I accepted this new role. I don’t want people to be killed mercilessly like this by the rebels. I will finish this rebellion and bring this crisis to an end (Upper Nile Times, April 24).

At the same time, President Kiir relieved Major General Mac Paul Kuol (a Dinka) from his duties as head of military intelligence. Mac Paul appears to have brought his termination about when he failed to support the government’s official description of the December events in Juba that launched the conflict as a “coup attempt” while testifying as a prosecution witness at a related treason trial, suggesting the violence began as the result of a disagreement between factions of the presidential guard, a more likely interpretation of events (Radio Tamazuj, April 24).  Mac Paul had run-ins with the regime before becoming head of military intelligence – in July 2012, he was arrested along with 15 other officers on charges of planning a coup against Salva Kiir, though Kiir later dismissed the charges, describing them as the result of a fabrication created in Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, July 31, 2012; Radio Tamazuj, August 2, 2012).

Mac Paul’s successor as head of military intelligence, General Marial Nuor Jok, a Dinka and former Director of Public Security and Criminal Investigations, is a surprising choice based on his record. While supposedly in charge of public security, Nuor was accused of torture, extortion, extra-judicial killings, the creation of illegal detention centers and the arming of a personal tribal militia (Upper Nile Times, December 14, 2011). Nuor was arrested in August 2013 in connection with the disappearance of Engineer John Luis Silvio following a land dispute. Nuor was given leave to seek medical treatment in Nairobi during his trial. He did not return as scheduled and the proceedings appear to have been abandoned.

In 2012, General Mai noted that Mac Paul and Marial Nuor were “controversial figures. Their names have always appeared in illegal detention and torture of their opponents” (Radio Tamazuj, August 2, 2012). The shake-up in the SPLA leadership was not welcomed by the rebel camp; a spokesman for Riek Machar’s factionof the SPLA said the changes marked the beginning of “an imminent bloodbath, escalation and regionalization of the conflict” (Sudan Tribune, April 25).

This article was published in the May 2, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

In a Shifting Political Landscape, Hezbollah Repositions itself as the Anti-Terrorist Defender of Lebanon

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Andrew McGregor

April 18, 2014

The growing perception in the Arab Middle East that Syria’s military has recently gained the upper hand in Syria’s civil war over an armed opposition that includes a number of politically dangerous extremist groups is leading to a number of new diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the Syrian crisis in a manner that will ensure security and stability for its neighbors. In Damascus there is a new confidence, with preparations underway for presidential elections in July and the war expected to finish by the end of the year. In the Hezbollah headquarters in southern Beirut, movement leaders are working on efforts to overcome the party’s politically-damaging military intervention in Syria by repositioning Hezbollah as Lebanon’s first line of defense against Syrian-based jihadists and terrorists. According to Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, “The problem in Lebanon is not that Hezbollah went to Syria, but that we were late in doing so” (al-Jazeeera, March 29).

Intervention in Syria

Hezbollah entered the Syrian conflict in 2012 by sending small numbers of fighters to protect the Shrine of Sayida Zaynab (revered by Shiites) in south Damascus. The Hezbollah deployment escalated sharply in April 2013 as the movement played a major role in the battle for al-Qusayr (al-Jazeera, April 6).

Inside the Shrine of Sayida Zaynab, Damascus

Militarily, the movement has had a number of notable successes in Syria in recent weeks, ranging from the mid-March capture of the rebel stronghold at the strategically vital town of Yabroud, close to Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley, to the April 9 capture of the Syrian border town of Rankous, part of an effort to consolidate control of the Damascus to Homs highway. Both operations were conducted in cooperation with forces of the Syrian national army. These successes permit Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces an opportunity to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border from further suicide bombings and other attacks by Sunni jihadists operating in Syria. Syrian opposition forces crossing the Lebanese/Syrian border are already restricted to using the most difficult mountain routes to cross the frontier (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 11).

Hezbollah is currently cooperating with the Lebanese Army in a security crackdown in the Beka’a Valley, home to a significant number of Shiites (Daily Star [Beirut], April 11). The region has witnessed numerous retaliatory attacks by Syrian opposition forces on Hezbollah operatives since the Hezbollah intervention began. There have also been a number of incidents of sectarian violence in northern Lebanon (particularly the port city of Tripoli) that the Lebanese Army is working to eliminate. Lebanese security forces have also warned of a recent infiltration by al-Nusra Islamist fighters into the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, where they are able to avoid ongoing security sweeps and plan bombings within Lebanon and Syria (Daily Star [Beirut], April 3).

Hezbollah deputy leader Shaykh Na’im Qasim says the recent battles in Syria have left the international community with a choice:

Either have an understanding with Assad to reach a result, or to keep the crisis open with President Assad having the upper hand in running the country… America is in a state of confusion. On the one hand it does not want the regime to stay and on the other it cannot control the militants which are represented by ISIS and al-Nusra. This is why the latest American position was to leave the situation in Syria in a state of attrition (Fars News Agency [Tehran], April 10).

Elsewhere, Qasim has noted that Assad retains the support of Syria’s religious minorities and suggests that political realities in the region must be addressed: “There is a practical Syrian reality that the West should deal with – not with its wishes and dreams, which proved to be false” (Fars News Agency [Tehran], April 12).

The Intervention and Hezbollah’s Domestic Standing

The former head of the opposition Syrian National Council, Dr. Burhan Ghalioun, predicts that Hezbollah will soon pull out of Syria due to heavy combat losses and growing dissent within the movement (al-Watan [Abha, Saudi Arabia], April 10). While possible, Ghalioun’s prediction runs counter to Hezbollah’s determination to preserve the Assad government for various reasons vital to the movement’s future success and overlooks Tehran’s importance in encouraging further Hezbollah operations in Syria. Nonetheless, Hezbollah has adapted its tactics to reduce battlefield losses by emphasizing reconnaissance and secure communications (AP, April 13).

Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah believes there is a growing recognition within Lebanon and even his own movement of the necessity for Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria: “We do not face a problem with our people about our participation in Syria, on the contrary, there was a group that was hesitant, but it has settled its choice with us… I can say that some [anti-Assad] March 14 partisans support our involvement in Syria to protect Lebanon from terrorist takfiri groups” (Daily Star [Beirut], April 7).

Already strong in its military and social service divisions, Hezbollah is now seeking to expand its political influence in Lebanon beyond its representatives in parliament.  Nonetheless, Hezbollah pulled out of Lebanon’s national dialogue in March after President Michel Sulayman criticized the movement’s involvement in Lebanon. Shaykh Na’im Qasim has stated that the movement will rejoin the talks only if four conditions are met:

  • All parties must recognize that Israel is a threat to Lebanon
  • No single group can monopolize power in Lebanon
  • Political parties must resist linking the fate of Lebanon to the regional crisis
  • Presidential and parliamentary elections must be held on schedule (Daily Star [Beirut], April 5).

Hezbollah has also emerged as a major player in the selection of a new Lebanese president. The candidate of the Christian Lebanese Forces Party (part of the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition), Dr. Samir Geagea, is a traditional opponent of Hezbollah and Syria (with the latter being behind his 11 years spent in solitary confinement in a windowless basement cell). However, Geagea is now seeking a more collaborative relationship with Hezbollah, which he insists should abandon its weapons and become a full-fledged political party. A former militia leader, Geagea does not agree with Hezbollah’s argument that it must retain its weapons so long as the Lebanese Army is incapable of defending the nation against Israeli incursions:

They are not the ones to make that decision. Lebanon will be an effective state that makes decisions or it will cease to exist. They cannot make decisions on our behalf. Hezbollah cannot assume that weapons are the best way to protect Lebanon… Talking about resistance is no longer convincing… If you take a look at the military’s weapons capabilities as it currently stands, the military is more than 50 times better armed than Hezbollah… The military’s Special Forces (the Marine Commandos, Mountain Commandos and Strike Force) outnumber Hezbollah’s Special Forces two to one or more. Hezbollah’s constituency will be the greatest beneficiaries of a stable, secure state that will allow the Lebanese economy to recover and create new opportunities for development projects (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 9).

Hezbollah, however, is supporting the as yet undeclared candidacy of Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and former Lebanese Army commander General Michel Aoun for president (the office is restricted to Christians under Lebanon’s national pact; Aoun is a Maronite Christian). The movement is expanding its political role in Lebanon by building alliances with the Shiite Amal movement and other elements of the pro-Syrian March 8 coalition (which includes both Hezbollah and the FPM). Sayyid Nasrallah insists his movement is seeking a “made-in-Lebanon” president, chosen without foreign interference (al-Akhbar [Beirut], April 8).

The Anti-Terrorist Agenda

A generally pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily’s description of the movement’s current security role provides some idea of how Hezbollah is positioning itself as Lebanon’s first line of defense against “takfiri” terrorists:

The Lebanese army cannot succeed in its current and future plans without at least moral support from Hezbollah. It would not be possible to eliminate terrorist and takfiri groups in Syria without the party. Security actors are aware of the important intelligence role played by the party in uncovering bombs and networks aiming to terrorise Lebanon and ignite strife. The party and its allies form a heavy political force, making it impossible to take any major national political decision against the party or without it (al-Akhbar [Beirut], April 11).

According to Sayyid Nasrallah, Hezbollah is not a substitute for the state, “even in the matter of resistance. When the state becomes capable and strong enough to defend Lebanon, we in the Resistance will go back to our schools and our universities and affairs” (as-Safir [Beirut], April 8). There are few signs, however, that anyone in the Hezbollah leadership believes that time is near. In the meantime, movement officials emphasize the movement’s success in closing a number of car-bomb factories threatening Lebanon during recent Hezbollah military operations in Syria’s Qalamun region, close to the Lebanese border.

The Shifting Diplomatic Landscape

There are indications that Iran and Saudi Arabia are beginning to develop contacts with the goal of eventual discussions on the Syrian issue (al-Akhbar [Beirut], April 9). Nasrallah has stated he supports reconciliation between the two nations (as-Safir [Beirut], April 8). Iran is reported to be proposing a ceasefire, the formation of a national unity government, gradual transfer of presidential powers to a national government and finally presidential and parliamentary elections (al-Akhbar [Beirut], March 31). There is little doubt that Hezbollah would welcome any steps towards finding a Syrian solution; the movement’s participation in the conflict has come at an enormous human and financial cost to Hezbollah’s Lebanese constituency.

While the movement’s leadership maintains support for their role in Syria is actually increasing, it is also clear that Hezbollah’s commitment in Syria cannot be open-ended. While Nasrallah sees a turn-around in the fortunes of the Assad regime, he is also aware the conflict is entering a dangerous phase for his movement if no settlement is in sight: “In my opinion, the phase of bringing down the regime or bringing down the state is over… [The armed opposition] cannot overthrow the regime, but they can wage a war of attrition” (as-Safir [Beirut], April 7).

Hezbollah’s relations with Egypt also appear to be thawing after a complete breakdown during the rule of former Egyptian president Muhamad Mursi. With the discredited Muslim Brotherhood out of the way, Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy met with Hezbollah MP and Industry Minister Hussein al-Hajj Hassan on March 20. Hassan is said to have explained Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria as a response to the dangers posed by cross-border terrorism (al-Akhbar, March 31). While the groundbreaking meeting was far from an Egyptian endorsement of the movement, it did represent an important, if tentative, step towards improving relations and developing a more cooperative policy on the Syrian issue (Egypt opposes Hezbollah’s military intervention). With Egypt working closely with Saudi Arabia, its main financial backer during the political transition, and Hezbollah working closely with the Iranian regime, further talks could be the beginning of a gradual reduction in the dangerous tension between the often overlapping Shiite and Sunni spheres of the Middle East.

The Anti-Israeli Resistance

Hezbollah is aware that its military commitment in Syria could be interpreted as an opportunity by the Israeli military and has therefore remained active along the border with Israel to demonstrate it can still mount operations against Israel while supporting the Assad regime within Syria. Israeli strikes such as the air attack on two Hezbollah trucks carrying missiles in late February are politically useful to the movement, which characterizes such strikes as attacks on the Lebanese nation that confirm Israel’s “aggressive nature” (Daily Star [Beirut], February 27).

A Hezbollah attack on an Israeli unit in the disputed Shaba’a Farms region on the border was carried out on March 14 in response to an Israeli Air Force raid a week earlier (Jerusalem Post, April 11). Nasrallah said the attack “sent a message that the Resistance is still capable of fighting Israel” and added that the operation was “about deterrence” (as-Safir [Beirut], April 8).

Financial Distress?

There are signs that Hezbollah is undergoing financial stress at the moment due to several factors, most notably cuts in funding due to Iranian austerity measures. While the movement continues to receive financial assistance from the independent budget of Supreme Guide Ayatollah Khamenei, funding from the Iranian Foreign Ministry is reported to have stopped five months ago (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 9).

A bipartisan bill before the U.S. House of Representatives, the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act (H.R. 4411), is designed to “cripple” Hezbollah and eliminate its threat to Israel by extending new financial sanctions, penalizing satellite providers carrying Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV and dual designations as a narcotics trafficking organization and transnational criminal organization  (Daily Star [Beirut], April 6). [1] Economic investments and an expanding commercial element are important sources of revenue for Hezbollah that may be threatened to some extent by the proposed U.S. legislation.

Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria is also a financial drain on the movement. While Iran covers the costs of the actual military deployment, the costs of responding to associated attacks by Sunni militants within Lebanon are borne by the movement, which also provides $50,000 in cash to the families of each Hezbollah member killed in Syria, as well as housing for those families who need it. The result has been cutbacks in various Hezbollah programs, especially allocations to media groups belonging to allied Sunni and Christian currents (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 9).

Donations from the Lebanese Shi’a diaspora are another important source of funding, but this source is also under duress. On April 8, German authorities banned what they described as a Hezbollah front organization that had raised $4.5 million in Germany since 2007. The ban was accompanied by a series of raids as Interior Minister Thomas de Maziere explained: “Organizations that directly or indirectly from German soil oppose the state of Israel’s right to exist may not seek freedom of association protection” (Daily Star [Beirut], April 9).

Conclusion

Hezbollah is confident it can regain the respect and influence it had in the region after it repulsed the Israeli military in 2006 by positioning itself as not only an anti-Israel resistance movement but also a shield against (Sunni) jihadist groups preparing cross-border terrorist attacks in Lebanon. Overlooked in Hezbollah statements is the fact that it is Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria that attracts many (though by no means all) of these attacks. Though the movement is undergoing great stress from its military campaign in Syria and Western efforts to interrupt its funding, the movement has demonstrated great resilience in the past and is likely to support diplomatic efforts to end the costly conflict in Syria. Resolution in this sphere promises to bring greater regional acceptance for the movement and will enable it to continue its move from Lebanon’s political periphery to its political center in Beirut.

Note

1. See Rep. Mark Meadows, “Cut Off Hezbollah’s Lifeline to International Financing,” Washington Examiner, April 10, 2014, http://washingtonexaminer.com/cut-off-hezbollahs-lifeline-to-international-financing/article/2547025; Rep. Paul Cook, “Rep. Paul Cook Cosponsors Bills to Sanction Hezbollah, Block Terrorist from Entering the United States,” Press Release, April 9, 2014, http://cook.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-paul-cook-cosponsors-bills-to-sanction-hezbollah-block-terrorist

This article first appeared in the April 18, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Is Resolution Close in Northern Iraq’s Pipeline War?

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Andrew McGregor

April 18, 2014

Baghdad is worried about the political and economic consequences that could follow energy sales conducted independently of the central government, which insists it still has the right to control all Iraqi oil sales and the distribution of energy revenues according to the Iraqi constitution. The administration of Kurdish northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), interprets the constitution differently, claiming it has the right to sell oil without the consent of the central government in Baghdad. According to Iraqi deputy prime minister Hussein al-Shahristani, “The most prominent challenge is that we have not reached a national agreement to extract and market oil from all of Iraq’s territory… We have a grey area – we do not know how much oil the [Kurdistan] region is extracting, what price they are selling at and where the revenue goes” (Fars News Agency [Tehran], April 14). With the KRG now pumping oil directly to Turkey through a converted gas pipeline and the central government withholding budget transfers to the north, there is still some optimism that Baghdad and Erbil will come to a mutually profitable agreement to avoid economic and political collapse.

Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki is determined to assert Baghdad’s control over national oil revenues and is resolutely opposed to Kurdish attempts to make their own deals with foreign consumers like Turkey (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 8). To enforce the central government’s role, al-Maliki’s government suspended Kurdistan’s annual budget allocation – a loss of billions of dollars to a government that may be pumping oil, but is not yet making any money from it due to Baghdad’s threats to launch legal action against anyone purchasing oil it considers to have been “smuggled” from Iraq.

After signing six energy contracts with Turkey in December, KRG authorities opened the flow of crude oil through a new pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in late December 2013 (Xinhua, January 2). Shipping 300,000 bpd through the pipeline to start, the oil is being stored for now at the Ceyhan terminal rather than being sold and shipped abroad as Turkey refuses to allow its sale without Baghdad’s approval.

Genel Energy Operations in Northern Iraq

The new pipeline (actually a converted natural gas pipeline) connects the Taq Taq oilfield operated by Anglo-Turkish Genel Energy to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at the Fishkabur pumping station near the Kurdish border, thus bypassing the regions affected by sabotage on the Baghdad-controlled Kirkuk-Ceyhan line and enabling the KRG to stop the piecemeal export of oil by tanker truck (Reuters, April 17). The KRG announced plans in October 2013 to build a second pipeline to Turkey within two years that will ship a million bpd to Turkey (Bloomberg, November 8).

Turkey has proposed that revenues from the sale of oil shipped through this proposed pipeline and the existing pipeline that opened in January be handled by a Turkish state bank that will distribute funds according to the formula in the Iraqi constitution that calls for an 83 percent share to Iraq’s central government and a 17 percent share to the KRG (Xinhua, January 2; Rudaw, February 12, 2013). Turkey has emphasized its wish to conduct all such dealings with transparency, but Baghdad still favors full control over oil exports with revenues being deposited to the Development Fund for Iraq account in New York, as is the current practice. Ankara’s role in allowing shipments of Kurdistan-sourced oil to Turkish facilities without the consent of the Baghdad government indicates Turkey’s eagerness to diversify its energy sources (particularly its strategically dangerous overreliance on Russian natural gas) and its intention of pursuing a deepening economic relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan that has both economic and security payoffs.

Baghdad’s suspension of government transfers to Kurdistan to punish its independent oil policy brought an angry response from KRG president Masoud Barzani earlier this month:

I consider depriving the Kurdistan Region of means of livelihood to be a declaration of war. It could be a crime that is worse and more dangerous than shelling Halabjah with chemical weapons. We will wait for the outcome of [U.S.] mediation, but I say for sure that the region will not remain silent on this measure if it continues and will not stand idly by. We have a program and a plan that we will implement (al-Hayat, April 5).

In a recent meeting with the head of the Democratic Socialist Group in the EU parliament, President Barzani maintained that the main problem in Iraq was not the oil issue or the failure to pass a national budget, but was rather Baghdad’s insistence on making the Kurds “followers” rather than “partners” (National Iraqi News Agency, April 7). Kurdistan’s economic security adviser, Biwa Khansi, warned that further delays in oil shipments to Turkey would “negatively affect economic relations between Iraq and Turkey” as well as threatening development projects and the ability to form a workable state budget (National Iraqi News Agency [Baghdad], April 12).

Oil flow through the main Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline ceased on March 2, when suspected Islamist militants blew up part of the line in the Ayn al-Jahash desert of northwestern Iraq, a region where anti-government Sunni militants are active. Since then, saboteurs have struck the line three more times and have mounted deadly attacks on repair crews sent to fix the damage (Hurriyet [Istanbul], April 1). Military escorts have failed to prevent such attacks and there is little reason to believe Iraqi claims that the pipeline will be back in action within days (Reuters, April 10). Controlled by the Iraqi central government, the Kirkuk to Ceyhan pipeline carries about 20% of Iraq’s total oil exports. Nineveh governor Ethel al-Nujaifi admitted that security forces in his governorate were “powerless” to provide the protection necessary to enable repair crews to bring the pipeline to Turkey back on-line (Zawya [Dubai], April 13). Baghdad is looking to export over one million bpd through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline by the end of the year and is also looking to build a new 200 kilometer pipeline to Turkey to help expand exports (al-Arabiya, April 9).

This article first appeared in the April 18, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Libya Purchases Bloodless Return of its Eastern Oil Facilities

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Andrew McGregor

April 18, 2014

In a move that may help restore revenues to a desperate national government in Tripoli, Libya’s ruling General National Council (GNC) has come to a costly agreement with eastern Libyan gunmen that will enable the resumption of oil exports from Libya’s most productive oilfields, facilities blockaded by their former guards since July 2013. Numerous blockades of oil facilities across Libya since the 2011 revolution have cost the nation billions in revenue, effectively denying it the funds it needs to create the kind of security structure that could prevent gunmen from holding the national economy hostage.

 Ibrahim Jadhran

According to the April 6 deal between the government and Cyrenaica federalists (Cyrenaica is the traditional eastern province of Libya) led by former Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) commander Ibrahim Jadhran, the eastern rebels are to hand over two occupied terminals this week, with two more following within a month.  The status of Libya’s oil terminals and production facilities continues to be fluid, but the current situation at the major installations is as follows:

  • Zawiya: This west Libyan terminal was closed again by Berber protesters on April 10 (al-Arabiya, April 11; Libya Herald, April 12). The protest was short-lived, however, and the terminal was set to re-open on April 14, though officials acknowledged there were “continuing issues” with protesters in the area (Reuters, April 13).
  • Al-Sharara: Oil facilities in the southwestern oil field holding an estimated 3 billion barrels has been occupied repeatedly by various groups of gunmen and protesters. Al-Sharara plant has been inoperative since March.
  • Hariga: This terminal is open and loading tankers after the PFG took control of the port on April 9. Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC) lifted the force majeure the next day (LANA [Tripoli], April 10). Hariga has a capacity of 110,000 bpd.
  • Zuwaytinah: This terminal is set to re-open, but was recently still in the hands of supporters of Ibrahim Jadhran.
  • Ras Lanuf:  This terminal is still blockaded, but is set to be turned over to the government within a month.
  • Al-Sidr – Libya’s largest terminal, with a daily capacity of 450,000 bpd, remains occupied but is set to re-open within a month.
  • Al-Buri and al-Jurf – These oilfields off western Libya’s Mediterranean coast continue to function without interruption.

Jadhran’s official demands included autonomy for Cyrenaica, a greater share of oil revenues and an investigation into corruption in the Libyan oil ministry. While the GNC agreed to the investigation, there were no commitments on the other issues (al-Jazeera, April 11).

Petroleum Facilities Guard

The secret negotiations behind the agreement nearly broke down at one point, with Jadhran having apparent difficulty in persuading his lieutenants to support a deal. Seven members of Jadhran’s Cyrenaican Political Bureau resigned to protest Jadhran’s monopolization of the talks (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 6). The Bureau is an unelected body that has positioned itself under Jadhran’s leadership as the administration of an autonomous Cyrenaica (or Barqa in Arabic), though the movement has backed off somewhat from earlier talk of outright secession. Jadhran appears to have jeopardized his local popularity with his failed attempt to arrange the covert sale of eastern Libyan oil by means of a North-Korean flagged tanker in early March.

According to pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat, the agreement also contained secret clauses calling for the formation of a committee to supervise a referendum on federalism in Cyrenaica, the return of state institutions to the region and a more equitable distribution of national oil revenues.  These clauses are supposedly contingent on both parties implementing the present agreement without delay or further amendment (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 10). However, much of the agreement appears to be financial in nature, with Tripoli pledging an undisclosed sum of money to cover the “back pay and expenses” of the former Petroleum Facilities Guards who took control of the facilities they were supposed to guard last July (al-Jazeera, April 11). The cash payments and amnesties behind the deal are unlikely to help discourage future occupations and blockades, leaving the national economy in the hands of any of the hundreds of armed groups in Libya ready to seize part of the nation’s poorly protected energy-producing infrastructure.

In a televised video statement from Tripoli’s Hadba Prison, Sa’adi al-Qaddafi, the recently extradited son of the late Libyan leader, claimed that he had been working through intermediaries with Ibrahim Jadhran to sell Cyrenaican oil on the international market in order to purchase weapons and equipment for Libya’s remaining Qaddafists. Jadhran immediately refuted the damaging allegations on his own TV station while indicating he would sue those involved in broadcasting Sa’adi’s statement (Libya Herald, April 2). No evidence was provided to support Sa’adi’s statement from prison, which comes at a time when a relatively powerless government is interested in discrediting one of its most powerful opponents.

The oil blockades have crippled Libyan efforts at reconstructing the state and re-imposing national security. Oil exports account for nearly all government revenues and their disruption has threatened the government’s ability to meet its payroll as well as various subsidies based on oil revenues. Most importantly, it prevents the GNC from building a national army capable of enforcing its writ. Though there is discussion of Moroccan and/or Turkish involvement in training a new army, the army’s current powerlessness was best displayed when the Zintan militia controlling Tripoli’s airport seized an incoming shipment of weapons destined for the Libyan national army (Los Angeles Times, April 13).

This article first appeared in the April 18, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

New Offensive Expected against Mai-Mai Militias in Mineral-Rich Katanga

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Andrew McGregor

April 3, 2014

With combined UN-Congolese Army operations meeting some success in their efforts to clear armed militant groups from the Nord-Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it is almost certain that these forces will turn their attention next to the politically sensitive but mineral-rich southern province of Katanga, where rebel activity has destabilized the region while displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Most affected is a region in north Katanga between the towns of Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto known as “the Triangle of Death” (Radio Okapi [Kinshasa], March 28).

Martin Kobler, the head of the UN’s mission in the DRC, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en RD du Congo (MONUSCO), described the situation in the south as “a humanitarian catastrophe”: “I feel an element of guilt when I think of Katanga because we have concentrated our military activity on the [north and south] Kivus but it is important not to neglect Katanga” (Guardian, January 30).

Kuyunga Mutanga Gédéon

Much of the insecurity experienced in Katanga can be ascribed to two bush militias with shadowy connections to regional politicians, the Mai Mai Gédéon (led by Kyungu Mutanga Gédéon) and the Kata Katanga (Kiswahili for “cut Katanga off [from the DRC]”), led by Ferdinand Tanda Imena. The two movements are often conflated in media reports. Mai Mai groups are typically named after their commander (Bakata Katanga being an exception). “Mai Mai” is a term applied to a wide variety of militias that often have little in common other than a nominal emphasis on indigenous rights. The Mai Mai gather for large operations like the occupation of Lubumbashi, but usually operate in smaller groups, terrorizing villagers, looting food, engaging in mass rapes, killing village elders and combatting FARDC patrols (IRIN, February 7). Many Mai Mai groups have ties to officers of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and some are known to wear FARDC uniforms that they doff during attacks, which they typically carry out naked. [1]

After terrorizing the Katangan countryside from October 2003 to May 2006, Gédéon surrendered to UN peacekeepers in May, 2006. In 2008, Gédéon claimed innocence when facing charges of war crimes, insurrection and murder before a military tribunal in Kipushi (35 kilometers southwest of Lubumbashi) (Radio Okapi [Kinshasa], February 20, 2008). Despite being sentenced to death in 2009, Gédéon was able to flee the Lubumbashi prison during a mass jail-break engineered by his followers that freed roughly 1,000 prisoners. Immediately after his escape, Gédéon formed the Mai Mai Gédéon and resumed his earlier campaign of rape, robbery and murder. Meanwhile, Bakata Katanga commander Ferdinand Tanda Imena was arrested by Zambian authorities in 2004 and transferred to Kinshasa, where he was eventually released.  Bakata Katanga is said to be responsible for two attacks on Katanga Airport in the last year (Radio Okapi [Kinshasa], January 14).

Both the Mai Mai Gédéon and the Bakata Katanga call for Katanga to secede from the DRC, but also condemn what they perceive as an unequal distribution of wealth between north Katanga and south Katanga, where the largest resource extraction operations are located. Cobalt, copper, tin and coltan (an important element in electronics) are all found in abundance in Katanga. A good part of the national budget relies on mineral exports from Katanga.

Katanga’s natural wealth led to a much earlier post-independence secession movement in 1960 that relied on Belgian military assistance and foreign mercenaries, quickly becoming part of the larger international Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union before the ultimate defeat of the secessionists in 1963. However, secessionist efforts were unpopular in parts of northern Katanga, where the local Baluba tribe was strongly divided over the issue.

Mai Mai Fighters in the DRC

President Joseph Kabila’s fortunes are very much tied to the stability and prosperity of Katanga, with much of the DRC’s political elite hailing from that province and having substantial business interests there. Kabila’s father, the late president Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was a member of an anti-secession Baluba militia in Katanga in his youth, having had a Baluba father. The Baluba, mostly from northern Katanga, had a long history of rebellion against Belgian authorities that saw many Baluba prisoners being sent as forced labor to the mines of southern Katanga. Historically and economically, Katanga has closer ties to nearby Zambia than the more distant regions of the northern DRC. Northern Katanga, the home of the Baluba, remains largely impoverished and undeveloped compared to the more prosperous southern half of Katanga.

The powerful Katangan politicians in Kinshasa used to be handled by presidential advisor Katumba Mwanke (from southern Katanga), but since his death in a 2011 accident, Kabila has encountered difficulties in managing this influential group, which has in turn become dissatisfied with the president’s inability to provide security in Katanga or sufficient electrical power to supply southern Katangan mining operations (Oxford Analytica, February 15, 2012). Unemployment caused by mine shutdowns or slowdowns only exacerbates the security problem as former workers take to the bush. There are persistent rumors that Gédéon’s Mai Mai and the Bakata Katanga are secretly backed by Katangan politicians, with the UN accusing former national police chief John Numbi of supplying arms to Bakata Katanga and allowing the movement to use his farm outside Lubumbashi as a base (IRIN, February 13). Kabila must also contend with Moïse Katumbi, the popular governor of Katanga, who makes a public show of support for the president but tends to run his own show in private.

Much of the anti-government anger in Katanga is related to Kabila’s failure to implement the decentralization elements of the 2006 federal constitution that call for the provinces of the DRC to retain 40% of mining revenues. The decentralization plan would also see Katanga divided into four smaller provinces. The proposed move, recently revived by Kabila, would ensure a flow of wealth to the Katangan south while ignoring the impoverished north. The decentralization plan has met with strong opposition from the Baluba of northern Katanga as well as the provincial governor, who also hails from northern Katanga.

On March 23, 2013, the Katangan capital of Lubumbashi was occupied by fighter from Bakata Katanga who raised the old flag of independent Katanga in the city’s main square. More embarrassing for Kinshasa was the composition of the force that so easily occupied the DRC’s second-largest city – a group of fewer than 300 fighters (some of them children) largely armed with machetes and bows and arrows and covered with charms and amulets to ward off bullets (AP, March 24, 2013; BBC August 11, 2013). After a battle with security forces that killed 35 people, the militants forced their way into a UN compound where 245 of them surrendered. Though the army had been able to defeat the militia in a relatively short time, the occupation nonetheless raised concerns in Katanga over the government’s ability to establish and maintain security in the region. MONUSCO presently maintains a 450-man brigade from Benin in Katanga, which was reinforced in 2013 by an Egyptian Special Forces unit. The Congolese army maintains only one battalion in the area, far from enough manpower to begin restoring order.

Lubumbashi was occupied again on January 26, this time by fighters belonging to Mai Mai Gédéon who were defeated after an eight-hour battle (BBC January 7, Reuters, January 7). Some 26 soldiers and rebels were killed before the militia was driven roughly 25 kilometers from the city

Amnesties and attempts at assimilating Mai Mai fighters into the FARDC often come to naught as the life of a soldier in the Congolese is not necessarily better than the life of a bush fighter. In many cases, the DRC has simply failed to provide demobilized fighters the promised means to return home or start new lives (IRIN, February 7). The customary brutality of the militias precludes the development of popular followings of any significance, leaving the groups with little other option than replacing losses through abductions of young people. Bakata Katanga has kidnapped hundreds of children, some as young as eight-years-old (al-Jazeera, August 17, 2013).

In one sense, the secession issue provides political cover to criminal groups like Kantanga’s Mai Mai militias, which otherwise have little in the way of a political ideology and do little to gather popular support as a legitimate secession movement might be expected to do. Though evidence has not been produced, there is a general feeling in the DRC that the Katangan militias are manipulated by local politicians to pressure the Kabila regime. Given the importance of Katanga both to the DRC’s economy and the personal political fortunes of President Kabila, it is likely that a major offensive will soon begin in the region involving FARDC forces backed by elements of the recently formed UN Intervention Brigade (IBDE), a capable group of 3,000 troops drawn from the militaries of Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa. This combined force may gather intelligence through the use of UN-owned drones currently deployed in Nord-Kivu province.

Note

1. “The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi killers or self-defense forces?” September 6, 2012, http://congosiasa.blogspot.ca/2012/09/guest-blog-mai-mai-lumumba.html

This article first appeared in the April 3, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Coalition of the People of Azawad: New Rebel Movement Declared in Northern Mali

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Andrew McGregor

April 3, 2014

On March 18, a statement issued from the “military base of Hassi Labiad” in the name of the political and military cadres of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), notables and the religious and traditional leaders of Azawad (i.e. northern Mali) proclaimed the establishment of the Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad (CPA). [1] The self-described “politico-military” organization claims a strength of “nearly 8,000 veteran fighters” and pledges the group’s commitment to negotiations with the Malian government and “the fight against terrorism in the Azawad and transnational crime.” Ag Assaleh was one of four Turareg rebels to have Bamako lift a warrant for his arrest in October, 2013 in the interests of furthering national reconciliation (Jeune Afrique/AFP, October 29, 2013).

Ibrahim ag Muhammad Assaleh

The new movement is led by its chairman, Ibrahim ag Muhammad Assaleh, the former external affairs representative of the MNLA, and a bureau of 32 members, overwhelmingly consisting of Tuareg leaders despite the movement’s claims to represent a broad spectrum of individuals from the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani and Songhai communities of northern Mali. CPA leader Ag Assaleh has made reference to fighters joining the CPA from the “tribes of Ansongo Cercle,” likely a suggestion the movement was being joined by Songhai fighters from that region, which straddles the Niger River south of Gao (Koaci.com, March 20). However, one of the individuals named as an executive member of the CPA, Baye ag Diknane (a founding member of the MNLA), issued an open letter expressing his surprise at being named a top official of the CPA while reaffirming his commitment to the MNLA (Azawad24.com, March 25).

Ag Assaleh was not present at the proclamation in Hassi Labiad, a village 350 kilometers northwest of Timbuktu, as he was in Niamey for talks with various representatives from northern Mali. The announcement was presided over by the CPA’s external relations official, Muhammad Ousmane ag Mohamedoun, in front of 700 attendees, including the Defense Attaché of the Algerian Embassy in Burkina Faso and the first adviser of the Algerian ambassador to Burkina Faso (Le Quotidien [Bamako], March 23). Ag Assaleh maintained that the event was also attended by representatives of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA) and the largely Tuareg Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) as well as various representatives of the Songhai and Peul/Fulani peoples (Jeune Afrique, March 19; Journaldumali.com, March 19).

The CPA has divided northern Mali (or Azawad) into four military zones, with a commander appointed for each. Tahha ag Alfaki is responsible for military affairs in the western zone, Assaleh ag Muhammad Rabah (a former MNLA negotiator in the Ouagadougou peace talks) is responsible for the southern zone, Mossa ag Ahmedou (former MNLA communications director) is responsible for the eastern zone and Issouf ag Erfal is responsible for the northern zone.

Negotiations appeared promising last summer, when the Tuareg rebels signed the Ouagadougou agreement with Malian authorities on June 18 to allow the July general elections to proceed. However, after the elections, Bamako lost interest in meeting other provisions of the agreement, leading the rebels to suspend negotiations with the government on September 26, 2013 (AFP, October 6, 2013). Insisting that direct negotiations with Bamako are impossible, Ag Assaleh says he has sent requests to the government requesting new talks through mediators from Algeria, Burkina Faso and the Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Mali (Reuters, March 25).

Bilal ag Acherif (Jeune Afrique)

One reason for the split in the MNLA is the growing impatience of some members with the leadership of MNLA secretary-general Bilal ag Acherif, particularly his hardline approach to talks with Bamako and his preference for Morocco as a new mediator in the peace talks. With apparent Algerian support for the creation of the CPA, it now appears that the Algerian-Moroccan cold war is now finding Malian proxies, complicating progress in an already difficult peace process  (for growing Algerian-Moroccan tensions, see Terrorism Monitor, November 28, 2013).

Ag Assaleh suggests that ag Achérif is involving the Tuareg in Morocco’s struggle with Algeria, noting that while there are no Tuareg communities in Morocco, Algeria, by contrast, is the home of Tuareg groups closely related to those in northern Mali.

If there had been no French colonization, there would be no border between Azawad and Algeria. Our people are located on either side of this boundary… Listen, I’m very independent towards Algerian interests and we are autonomous in our fight. If you think I am close to Algeria, I would respond,”Yes, we are [close] geographically and socially. The majority of southern Algeria is occupied by Tuareg. I could even say I’m 50% Algerian (Jeune Afrique, March 10).

While Ag Assaleh maintains that the independence of Azawad has not been on the agenda since the Ouagadougou Accords, he has also insisted on the full implementation of the Accords’ provisions and warned that: “If the ceasefire is not respected by the Malian side, we will have to return to war” (Jeune Afrique, March 10).

Note

1. “Déclaration de création de la Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad (CPA),” 22 Septembre [Bamako] March 24, 2014, http://maliactu.net/declaration-de-creation-de-la-coalition-du-peuple-pour-lazawad-cpa/

This article first appeared in the April 3, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.