Gulf Co-Operation Council Threatens to Split over Qatar’s Support for the Muslim Brotherhood

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Andrew McGregor

March 20, 2014

Changing political alignments in the Gulf region now appear to threaten the continued existence of the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC), an important six-nation organization designed to further the political interests of the Gulf’s conservative monarchies with an eye to eventual unification. Though tensions have been growing within the GCC for some time, the dramatic rupture in diplomatic relations between Qatar and three other members of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain) over the former’s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood has the potential of dealing a fatal blow to the Council. GCC members include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. Rather than a simple alliance, the GCC is better thought of as a complex network of relationships in which common goals such as security and prosperity are intended to override competing interests.

Gulf Co-operation Council Nations

On March 7, Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood, Syria’s al-Nusra Front, the Houthists of north Yemen, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and a little-known group the edict called “Hezbollah within the Kingdom” to be terrorist organizations. A Brotherhood front organization in Egypt expressed “surprise” at Riyadh’s choice to “continue support for the coup” and to “criminalize opposition to the unjust coup” (Ahram Online [Cairo], March 10). Riyadh also gave 15 days for all Saudi citizens engaged in fighting abroad to return home without penalty. Under a decree issued by King Abdullah on February 3, Saudi citizens fighting in conflicts outside the kingdom will face imprisonment for a term of three to 20 years, with members of extremist or terrorist groups facing even harsher penalties (Ahram Online [Cairo], March 7).

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in early March in an unusual show of dissatisfaction with the policies of a fellow GCC member.  Qatar’s foreign minister, Khalid al-Attiya, responded to the moves by asserting that: “The independence of Qatar’s foreign policy is simply non-negotiable” (al-Jazeera, March 18). Qatar was a strong financial supporter of the short-lived Mursi regime in Egypt, but now has nothing to show for its investment other than growing diplomatic isolation. The Saudis and the UAE, on the other hand, have backed the military government of Field Marshal Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi with massive financial support to keep the regime afloat in a difficult period and can expect their political influence to grow if al-Sisi becomes the next president of Egypt, as expected.

Saudi Arabia is reported to have warned Qatar that it would be “punished” unless it met three demands; the closure of al-Jazeera (accused by Egypt of backing the Muslim Brotherhood), the severance of all ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and the expulsion of two U.S. institutes from Qatar, the Brookings Doha Centre and the Rand Qatar Policy Institute (Qatar News, March 15; AFP, March 15). The promised alternative is a Saudi air and land blockade of Qatar, which not only relies heavily on imports of food and other goods, but is also an important regional transportation hub. The Saudi and Qatari militaries last clashed along their mutual border in 1992.  The UAE has been somewhat less bellicose than the Saudis, given that the Emirates depend on Qatari natural gas for power generation (Financial Times, March 14). Otherwise, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain will find it difficult to apply economic pressure on Qatar, which has broad overseas investments, Asian markets hungry for its natural gas production and does only five percent of its trade with the three GCC partners opposing its policies (Bloomberg, March 13).

Qatar continues to host the Brotherhood’s unofficial leader, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an influential preacher with considerable media skills. Qatar’s ambassador to the UAE was summoned to the foreign ministry in Abu Dhabi in February to explain a sermon broadcast from Qatar by al-Qaradawi in which the shaykh condemned the UAE as a nation that opposes Islamic rule. The remarks came a day after UAE authorities imprisoned 30 Emiratis and Egyptians accused of forming a Brotherhood cell in Abu Dhabi (al-Jazeera, February 2). Qatar has offered refuge to fugitive members of the Brotherhood, while the UAE has imprisoned scores of members of the Brotherhood and its UAE affiliate, the Islah Party (al-Jazeera, March 18).

In recent years, Qatar has grown closer to Iran and Turkey, the latter’s ruling Justice and Development Party also being a strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar’s ties to Shi’a Iran in the midst of an ongoing regional Sunni-Shi’a power struggle are particularly alarming to the Saudis (whose oil-rich Eastern Province has a Shi’a majority) and the Sunni rulers of Bahrain, who are trying to repress simmering discontent in Bahrain’s Shi’a majority.  Kuwait appears to be dismayed by the whole dispute and has offered to act as a mediator. The last member of the GCC, Oman, has an Ibadite majority and has traditionally close ties to Iran as part of a resolutely independent foreign policy. Oman is a strong opponent of Saudi-led efforts to create an economic, customs and defense union within the GCC. Egyptian officials announced Cairo had decided not to close its embassy in Doha because of the large number of Egyptian nationals working in Qatar but would not send a new ambassador (Al-Monitor, March 12).

Qatar’s active role in the Syrian and Libyan rebellions has been a leading element of an increasingly aggressive Qatari foreign policy that has at times alarmed its conservative neighbors. Despite this, there is a tremendous incentive to cooperation within the GCC as its members will all suffer economically if political disputes lead to blockades, closed borders or confrontations in an already compact and volatile region.

This article first appeared in the March 20, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Iraqi President Accuses Qatar and Saudi Arabia of Waging War against the Iraqi Government

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Andrew McGregor

March 20, 2014

As Iraq descends further into a pattern of intensive sectarian violence and terrorist attacks, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has accused Qatar and Saudi Arabia of supporting terrorist groups active in his country, likening this support to a declaration of war:

They are attacking Iraq, through Syria and in a direct way, and they announced war on Iraq, as they announced it on Syria, and unfortunately it is on a sectarian and political basis… I accuse them of inciting and encouraging the terrorist movements. I accuse them of supporting them politically and in the media, of supporting them with money and by buying weapons for them. I accuse them of leading an open war against the Iraqi government… These two countries are primarily responsible for the sectarian and terrorist and security crisis of Iraq (France 24, March 9).

 

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (NPR)

Al-Maliki concluded that he had no intentions of retaliating, but warned the two Gulf states that “support of terrorism will turn against you.” Al-Maliki reiterated his warning at a Baghdad anti-terrorism conference on March 12, saying “the state that supports terrorism holds responsibility for [the] violence faced by our countries” (Shafaq News, March 12). Al-Maliki added that terrorism in Iraq “does not differentiate between Sunni and Shiite” (Iraqi National News Agency [Baghdad], March 12). Over 1800 Iraqis have been killed in the political and sectarian violence already this year (AFP, March 8).

The Iraqi prime minister’s comments came in the midst of campaigning for parliamentary elections next month and a very public dispute with parliament over his decision to carry on disbursing government funds despite failing to get parliament to ratify the budget. Parliamentary speaker Osama al-Nujaifi has accused the prime minister of violating the constitution and described the decision to disburse funds without ratification as “embezzlement” (Iraq Pulse, March 19). Al-Maliki has little support amongst Iraq’s Sunni minority and is also engaged in a dispute with the Kurds of northern Iraq (Gulf News [Dubai] March 14). A range of Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a political and religious groups denounced the prime minister’s remarks as an effort to deflect attention from his failures in Anbar Province, the heart of the Sunni rebellion (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 11).

Riyadh described al-Maliki’s accusations as an attempt to cover up the Iraqi prime minister’s internal shortcomings:  “Instead of making haphazard accusations, the Iraqi prime minister should take measures to end the chaos and violence that swamp Iraq” (Gulf News [Dubai], March 14; Saudi Gazette, March 11).

Saudi allies Bahran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) both reacted angrily to al-Maliki’s accusations against Riyadh, with the UAE summoning the Iraqi ambassador to receive its protest in person (Emirates News Agency [Abu Dhabi], March 12; Arab News [Jeddah], March 13). The Iraqi prime minister’s statement was also condemned by Gulf Co-Operation Council secretary-general Abdullatif al-Zayani, who said the allegations were ”aggressive and baseless” (KUNA [Kuwait], March 11). Beyond their political usefulness for al-Maliki, who appears to be focusing on Iraq’s Shi’a voters for support, the prime minister’s remarks are a reflection of the strains being placed on relations between Arab nations by growing Shi’a-Sunni tensions in the Middle East.

This article first appeared in the March 20, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Al-Qaeda Responds to Sectarian Clashes in the Central African Republic

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Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2014

In a statement entitled “Central African Tragedy… Between Crusader Deceit and Muslim Betrayal,” al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has taken note of the ongoing reprisals against Muslims in the Central African Republic (CAR) being carried out by Christian “anti-balaka” militias, referring to the attacks as “a new episode in the series of spiteful crusades against Islam and its people.” [1] Over 15,000 Muslim civilians live in improvised camps where they are surrounded by armed militias intent on killing them for their alleged support of the largely Muslim Séléka rebel movement that briefly seized power last year (Reuters, February 25).

Troops of the French 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade secure Bangui Airport (MilitaryPhotos.net)

AQIM describes the international peacekeeping forces being sent to the CAR as arriving “only to increase the suffering of Muslims.” France comes in for special attention as “a malevolent colonial crusader… [that] continues to play the role of guardian of the African continent” while fueling conflict and looting wealth “in order to preserve their interests and satisfy their arrogant whims.” AQIM concludes by warning France: “Your crimes will not go unpunished and the war between us and you continues.”

The Islamist movement also condemns the “shameful silence” of the Islamic community, “a nation of one billion.” Noting that some conflicts involving Muslims gain the attention of the Muslim world while others do not, AQIM asks: “Why differentiate between a persecutor and a persecutor and a tragedy and a tragedy?”

The African Union peacekeeping mission in the CAR, the Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA), has some 6,000 troops from Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  There are an additional 600 police officers from the same countries engaged in training local police forces. Part of MISCA’s difficulty in restoring order to the CAR lies in the fact that the mission is trusted by neither the ex-Séléka rebels nor the anti-balaka militias. It has already become clear that the combined forces of the 2,000 man French deployment (locally referred to as “Sangaris” after the name of the French operation in the CAR) and MISCA are far from sufficient to restore order and security in a large nation with little infrastructure or road systems.

MISCA raided the Boy Rab quarter of Bangui, a base for anti-balaka militias, on February 15, detaining a number of important militia leaders, including Lieutenant Konaté and Lieutenant Ganagi Hervé. Another important anti-balaka leader, Patrice Edouard Ngaissona, managed to evade the operation, though arms and ammunition were recovered from his home (RFI, February 15). The detainees attempted to escape Bangui prison on February 23, but were foiled by alert Rwandan MISCA guards (AFP, February 24).

Rwandan Peacekeepers examine amulets on a detained Anti-Balaka militant

The anti-balaka militias are reported to be divided over the CAR’s future political direction. One faction continues to call for the return of deposed president François Bozizé, while a more moderate faction is seeking to lower the intensity of the conflict and to cooperate with the new government of interim-president Catherine Samba-Panza (RFI, February 16). The anti-balaka rebels depend heavily on charms and amulets designed to ward off bullets and other threats.

Many residents of the CAR view the Chadians as biased towards the republic’s Muslims, who are often referred to by the Christian population as “Chadians” regardless of their origins. The arrival in Bangui of the projected EU force of 1,000 troops with heavy equipment is still believed to be a month away. The formation of a planned UN force of 10,000 peacekeepers (which would probably absorb most of MISCA) is opposed by Chad and is likely still six months away from materializing (VOA, March 3).

Chad traditionally regards the CAR region as its traditional backyard, dating back to the days when the Sultanate of Wadai (in present-day eastern Chad) used the region as a source of wealth in the form of slaves, ivory and other goods. In more recent years, Chadians have figured in the CAR as traders, mercenaries and even presidential bodyguards. N’Djamena’s influence on CAR politics is considerable and growing, considering Chad’s expanding and oil-financed military might. Most of Chad’s oil production is in the south of the country, just north of the unstable CAR.

Both the EU and the UN are calling on Turkey to contribute to the EU deployment, with the UN secretary-general even making a personal call to Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for assistance. The likelihood of such a commitment is, however, still uncertain, as Ankara is consumed externally with the Syrian crisis and internally by a corruption scandal and approaching elections (Today’s Zaman [Istanbul], March 2). Turkey is, moreover, heavily involved in the reconstruction of Somalia and may be wary of adding a military role in an unfamiliar area.

French forces currently deployed to the CAR include Alpine troops of the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade, some of whom are specialists in urban warfare, and troops of the 8th Régiment de Parachutistes d’Infanterie de Marine (8e RPIMa), an airborne unit with experience in French Indo-China, Algeria, Chad and Afghanistan.

The French intervention in the CAR is not the first in that nation’s post-independence period; in September 1979, units from the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE – France’s external intelligence service until reorganization in 1982) and the 1st RPIMa seized Bangui’s airport, allowing transports carrying 300 troops to land with the purpose of replacing “Emperor” Jean-Bédel Bokassa with a new president, David Dacko, who helpfully arrived with the French troops.

Notes

1. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, “Central African Tragedy… Between Crusader Deceit and Muslim Betrayal,” February 26, 2014, https://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=47761

This article first appeared in the March 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Egyptian Military Offensive in the Sinai Follows Tourist Massacre

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Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2014

Egyptian security forces have responded to the latest terrorist blow to Egypt’s vital tourism industry with a series of raids that have killed dozens of militants and resulted in the detention of many others.

Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis

On February 16, a bomb on a tourist bus carrying South Koreans making the trip from St. Catherine’s monastery to the resort town of Taba killed three tourists and their Egyptian driver, while a further 13 tourists were wounded (al-Jazeera, February 16). The attack was claimed by militant group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), who claimed the strike was “part of our economic war against this regime of traitors” (AFP, February 19). Tourism accounts for over 11 percent of Egyptian GDP and is an important source of foreign currency. The Sinai was the last part of the politically volatile nation to maintain a healthy tourist trade, but this has now been put in jeopardy. The bombing was denounced by the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, a militant Islamist group responsible for the murder of 58 tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor in 1997 (Ahram Online, February 17).

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) is the Egyptian branch of a Gaza-based Islamist organization. Since its first appearance in the Sinai in the days after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on oil pipelines, a strike on Israeli troops in 2012, the attempted assassination of Egypt’s interior minister in 2013 and the successful assassination of an important National Security Agency investigator the same year (see Terrorism Monitor, November 28, 2013).

The tourist bus bombing led to a number of operations as part of the ongoing Egyptian military response to radicalism in the Sinai Peninsula:

  • During the night of February 19, Egyptian Army helicopter gunships used missiles to attack houses suspected to harbor militants in the Shaykh Zuwayad area, killing at least ten people (AP, February 20).
  • On February 28, the Egyptian Second Field Army (responsible for the Sinai) reported killing six militants (including an alleged member of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) and the arrest of 14 others (Egypt State Information Service, February 28).
  • On March 1, the armed forces reported ten extremists killed and ten others wounded in the Northern Sinai communities of al-Arish, Shaykh Zuwaya and Rafah (Aswat Masriya [Cairo], March 1).

The military also continues to demolish tunnels to Gaza in the border town of Rafah

Militants in the Sinai also continue to attack another sector of the Egyptian economy – gas exports to Jordan. The gas pipeline running through northern Sinai was blown up south of al-Arish for the fourth time this year on February 25 (al-Arabiya, February 26). Most of the bombings of the pipeline (which brought an end to gas exports to Israel in 2012) have been claimed by Ansar al-Maqdis.

This article first appeared in the March 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Are Corruption and Tribalism Dooming Somalia’s War on al-Shabaab Extremists?

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Andrew McGregor

February 21, 2014

After decades of conflict that have nearly destroyed the nation, Somalia now stands poised to make a final drive with international assistance to shatter the strength of radical al-Qaeda-associated Islamists in central and southern Somalia, but there are indications that Somalia’s leaders may be posing an even greater obstacle to Somalia’s successful reconstruction.

Arms Embargoes and Missing Weapons

In mid-February, the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group issued a report to the UN Security Council’s sanctions committee claiming that weapons obtained by the Somali government under a temporary easing of UN arms sanctions were being sold to Somalia’s al-Shabaab extremists in what was described as “high-level and systematic abuses in weapons and ammunition management and distribution” (Reuters, February 13). A UN arms embargo was placed on Somalia in 1992, but in the last year the Somali government has been able to obtain once-restricted small arms and other weapons such as rocket-propelled-grenades under a partial lifting of the embargo designed to help fight al-Shabaab terrorists.

Among the observations contained in the report were the following:

  • Shipments of weapons from Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda could not be accounted for.
  • The Somali government cancelled several UN inspections of armories
  • A key presidential adviser from President Hassan Shaykh Mohamud’s own Abgaal sub-clan was involved in planning weapons transfers to al-Shabaab commander Shaykh Yusuf Isse “Kabukatukade,” another member of the Abgaal.
  • A government minister from the Habr Gadir sub-clan made unauthorized weapons purchases from a Gulf state that were transferred to private locations in Mogadishu for use by a Habr Gadir clan militia.
  • The Monitoring team photographed rifles sent to Somalia’s national army for sale in the Mogadishu arms market with their serial numbers filed off (Reuters, February13; AFP, February 16).

The easing of the Somali arms embargo is scheduled to end in March. Though a final decision on its future has yet to be made, it seems likely that the easing will remain in place until a new report on arms violations is due in October. The Somali government is looking for a complete removal of the embargo, allowing it to obtain heavy weapons and sophisticated military materiel (Reuters, February 14). The Monitoring Group has recommended either the full restoration of the embargo or a heightened monitoring regime to accompany an extension of the partial easement.

Somali security officials have complained that the UN monitors have not provided them with any information regarding the alleged arms sales to al-Shabaab or the alleged activities of Abgaal and Habr Gadir insiders at the presidential palace arranging such arms sales. One security official complained that the UN allegations could not be proven without examining al-Shabaab’s arms: “If they haven’t inspected al-Shabaab’s [arms], how are they arriving at the conclusion government weapons are being sold to al-Shabaab. This is a dangerous and creative position by the UN” (Suna Times/Waagacusub.net, February 18).

General Dahir Aden Elmi “Indhaqarshe”

The head of Somalia’s military, General Dahir Aden Elmi “Indhaqarshe” described the UN report as fabricated, false and without credibility, though he acknowledged an investigation into how al-Shabaab obtains its arms would be worthwhile, as the movement “does not get arms from the sky.” However, the Somali army commander sees darker purposes behind the work of the UN monitors: “The UN Monitoring Group want al-Shabaab to be an endless project in order to gain funds from the world while they are struggling hard to make Somalia’s government weak and nonfunctional” (Raxanreeb, February 17).

Shady Dealings and Economic Challenges

Some light was shed on the murky financial dealings of Somalia’s central government when central bank governor Yussur Abrar quit after only seven weeks on the job following repeated efforts to force her to approve dubious transactions benefiting members and friends of the government. In her resignation letter to Somali President Hassan Shaykh Mohamud, Abrar described corruption and constant government interference in Central Bank operations:

From the moment I was appointed, I have continuously been asked to sanction deals and transactions that would contradict my personal values and violate my fiduciary responsibility to the Somali people as head of the nation’s monetary authority… The message that I have received from multiple parties is that I have to be flexible, that I don’t understand the Somali way, that I cannot go against your [Mohamud’s] wishes, and that my own personal security would be at risk as a result (Suna Times, October 30, 2013).

Turkey has been the main supporter of Somali reconstruction, offering technical support, materials, medical teams, hospitals, machinery and various other means of assistance, including, apparently, lots of cash. A recent Reuters report cited various officials within the Turkish and Somali governments that Ankara had decided in December to stop its direct financial support to Mogadishu, which took the form of $4.5 million in U.S. $100 dollar bills transferred to the Somali central bank every month (Reuters, February 13). However, three days later, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that the payments were in line with procedure in light of the fact Somalia has no banking services and that efforts were “underway to provide budget support to the Somali Federal Government in the year 2014” (Hurriyet, February 16). The Turkish statement did not outline what measures, if any, were taken to trace the end use of these funds, but the potential for abuse is apparent in the absence of verifiable banking and accounting procedures in Mogadishu.

Over two decades of social and political chaos mean that the challenges to Somalia’s reconstruction efforts only begin with the elimination of al-Shabaab:

  • Somalia lacks trade agreements with the West, lacks a proper certificatory regime and is not a member of the World Trade Organization, making exports difficult. The vast bulk of Somalia’s current exports consist of charcoal and livestock heading to the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen.
  • Multiple currencies are in circulation, some of them worthless. Monetary control remains elusive with no new official bank-notes having been printed since the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991, leading to a thriving black market in currency.
  • The national government has begun signing oil and gas deals that are in conflict with deals signed by regional administrations like Puntland during the absence of an effective central government. (IRIN, February 14).

AMISOM Operations: Fighting Somalia’s War

The growing deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), now 22,000 strong, includes troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, as well as police from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

While Ethiopia has continued to mount its own independent military operations in regions of Somalia bordering Ethiopia since its general withdrawal from Somalia in 2009, lack of coordination with AMISOM tended to give al-Shabaab militants space to withdraw and operate elsewhere until Ethiopian operations were concluded. It was therefore regarded as good news when Ethiopia decided to integrate its Somali operations into the AMISOM command in January [Dalsan Radio [Mogadishu], February 18). Ethiopian forces followed their integration by deploying to Beledweyne in Hiraan Region (where they are establishing a new base) and to Baidoa in Bay Region, where they will be responsible for security operations in the Bay, Bakool and Gedo Regions (Shabelle Media Network [Mogadishu], January 28). Uganda, which has roughly 8,000 troops in Somalia, has just rotated in 1,600 fresh troops under Colonel William Bainomugisha (Xinhua, February 14).

The Somali army is about to launch new operations in cooperation with AMISOM forces to re-take Bardhere in the Juba River valley and the last major port under al-Shabaab control, Barawe, which has also acted as an important headquarters and training base for the militants since the loss of Kismayo to Kenyan troops (Garowe Online, February 11; Raxanreeb.com, February 11). If successful, this new offensive would divide Shabaab forces, significantly reduce the area under its control and eliminate the movement’s last major source of revenue. Unfortunately, rather than align for a final push against the militants, some units of the Somali Army in the Lower Shabelle region have been using their new arms to fight each other, based on clan allegiances (Shabelle Media Network, January 28; January 30; Garowe Online, January 29).

According to AMISOM spokesman Colonel Ali Aden Humad (part of the Djiboutian contingent of 960 troops deployed in Hiraan Region), the offensive will suffer from a lack of naval forces (suggesting Kenya will continue its policy of consolidating the area it has taken in southern Somalia rather than move further north) and helicopters, which AMISOM hopes will still arrive from some African Union country. Most important, however, is the failure of the Somali Army to build up a force as large as AMISOM that could not only participate in operations in a meaningful way, but also undertake important garrison and consolidation duties that must now be carried out by AMISOM forces. Colonel Humad admitted it was a mystery that the national army remained small despite years of international training programs and funding: “AMISOM trained many Somali soldiers and equipped some. So, the question is where have they gone? When we train them, we turn them over to the government. So, where do they go? Where are they kept?” (Sabahi, February 7).

Al-Shabaab Leaders Go to Ground

The continuing American drone campaign in Somalia is a major concern for al-Shabaab, which has seen several senior members targeted and killed in the last year. The movement has responded with mass arrests of suspected spies believed to help in the targeting, including a number of al-Shabaab fighters. The drone strikes have also damaged communications within al-Shabaab and restricted the movements of its leaders, with many senior members, including al-Shabaab leader Abdi Godane, believing that contact with mobile communications equipment can be tracked to target drone strikes. Like the Somali army, there is infighting within al-Shabaab, which might divide into smaller groups if Godane is killed. Having narrowly survived at least two recent attempts on his life, Godane is reported to have even grown suspicious of his own bodyguards in al-Shabaab’s Amniyat intelligence unit (Sabahi, February 7). Al-Shabaab has actually succeeded in intimidating a major Somali telecommunications provider to cut internet service in southern Somalia to prevent any type of communications with U.S. or AMISOM intelligence groups (Suna Times, February 10). Last October, the United States began deploying a number of military trainers and advisors in Somalia.

Conclusion

Despite disappearing arms and soldiers and the distractions provided by incessant clan warfare, Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad says that, with international assistance, “The plan is to have al-Shabaab out of the areas that they control by the end of 2014” (Xinhua, February 19). Meanwhile, the continued insurgency continues to wreak havoc across parts of central and southern Somalia. New UN figures indicate that two million Somalis (of 10 million) suffer from food insecurity, with 850,000 of those “in desperate need of food.” Most of the latter have been displaced by fighting and insecurity (Independent, February 19). In recent days, al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and its airport have been on the rise, including a February 13 suicide bomb that killed seven just outside of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde airport, which also serves as a secure base for AMISOM and foreign diplomats (Raxanreeb.com, February 13; Reuters, February 13). Eliminating the Shabaab threat will remain impossible no matter what degree of international assistance and funding is provided so long as service in national and local administrations in Somalia is seen as a means for personal self-enrichment and the furtherance of clan interests at the expense of national interests. Ultimately, the path Somalia will follow will depend not on UN assistance or AU military deployments, but rather on the interest Somalis themselves have in the national project.

This article first appeared in the February 21, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Mali’s Ganda Iso Militia Splits over Support for Tuareg Rebel Group

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Andrew McGregor

February 21, 2014

In a statement issued on February 9 in the Burkina Faso capital of Ouagadougou (host of a series of negotiations between the warring parties in northern Mali), Ganda Iso founder and unofficial leader Seydou Cissé announced that the Malian militia/political movement intended to support the largely Tuareg  Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) in all parts of the peace process being conducted with Bamako. Cissé followed this unexpected declaration of support for his movement’s traditional enemies with the astonishing observation that Ganda Iso made a mistake by not following the MNLA into the 2012 rebellion from the start (L’Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], February 12). Cissé formed the movement from Songhai and Peul/Fulani tribesmen in 2008 during Tuareg disturbances in the region “to maintain social stability” (L’Indépendant [Bamako], August 12, 2010).

Ganda Iso Fighters in Mopti, Mali

From 2008 to 2009, Ganda Iso engaged in a private war with the pro-government Imghad Tuareg militia led by Colonel al-Hajj ag Gamou (see Terrorism Monitor, April 19, 2012). Ganda Iso also clashed with the MNLA several times in March 2012, but fled Gao at the joint approach of the MNLA and Ansar al-Din (L’Indépendant [Bamako], March 20, 2012; 22 Septembre [Bamako], March 19, 2012). MNLA spokesman Moussa ag Attaher said he believed the alliance of the two movements affirmed the will of the people of Azawad (northern Mali) to “conduct the good fight” (L’Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], February 12).

In a response nearly as strange as Cissé’s remarks, Gando Iso spokesman Muhammad Attaib Sidibé issued a statement saying that Cissé “had never been a member of the Ganda Iso movement. On the contrary, Monsieur Cissé is a known member of the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad and resides in Ouagadougou (L’Indépendant [Bamako], February 11; MaliActu.net, February 11). The statement added that Ganda Iso reaffirmed its support for the Coordination des Forces Patriotique de Résistance (CMFPR) under the leadership of Bamako-based lawyer Harouna Toureh.

However, according to the CMFPR, Toureh has not been the chairman of the group since January 14, having been replaced by Ganda Iso president Ibrahima Abba Kantao (22 Septembre [Bamako], January 30). Toureh’s reported absence at nearly all CMFPR meetings led the group to drop him as its spokesman, but Toureh has found other work – the defense of “General” Amadou Sanogo, leader of the 2012 military coup  (Le Scorpion [Bamako], January 30; Les Echos du Parlement [Bamako], November 29). Indicted on charges of conspiracy to kidnap, Sanogo, who exchanged his rank of captain for that of a general shortly after the 2012 coup, has been fortunate in so far evading the more serious charges of complicity in multiple murders facing former defense minister General Yamoussa Camara, former security director General Sidi Alassane Toure, Captain Amadou Konare, the reputed brains behind the coup, and Lieutenant Tahirou Mariko, former aide to Captain Sanogo. The charges relate to the deaths of 21 members of the Malian paratroops/presidential guard who were arrested, displayed on television and then “disappeared” by the military regime after being captured during an unsuccessful counter-coup in April 2012 (for the rivalry between Mali’s “Green Berets” and “Red Berets,” see Terrorism Monitor, February 22, 2013). A mass grave containing the remains of 21 men was recently found near the Kati military barracks outside of Bamako that served as Sanogo’s headquarters and the remains are awaiting DNA testing (AP, February 14). General Camara is alleged to have forged documents claiming the missing men had been sent to the front to fight the Islamists and had been killed there (Reuters, February 13).

The CMFPR styles itself as a group of movements dedicated to driving jihadists and narco-traffickers from northern Mali, though none of these “self-defence” militias played a role of any significance in the military intervention that drove most of the Islamist extremists from northern Mali in 2013, though Ganda Iso military commander Ahmadou Diallo was killed in a skirmish with Islamists in March, 2012.  In the past, such groups often received support from elements of the Malian military in the interest of forming a counter-force to armed Arab and Tuareg movements in the north, but this support appears to have been withdrawn at the beginning of the intervention as the Malian army struggled to re-assert itself. There are reports that Mali’s military thought the militias simply too amateur to be deployed in action (JournalduMali.com, November 14, 2013). The militias are mostly based in Gao region and are drawn largely from the Songhai, Peul/Fulani and other tribes that are traditional rivals of the Arabs and Tuaregs in northern Mali. The militias that have banded together in 2012 under the CMFPR umbrella include:

  • Ganda Iso (Sons of the Land)
  • Ganda Koy (Lords of the Land)
  • Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou (ACRT -Alliance of communities in the region of Timbuktu )
  • Front de Libération des régions Nord du Mali (FLN – Front for the Liberation of the Northern regions of Mali)
  • Force armée contre l’occupation (FACO – Armed force against the occupation)
  • Cercle de réflexion et d’action (CRA – Circle of Reflection and Action)

Despite the effort to present a unified voice for the non-Arab and non-Tuareg communities of northern Mali, continuing dissension within these movements combined with diminished military support will work against these communities having significant representation in talks that will help determine the future of the region.

This article first appeared in the February 21, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Successful Offensive Establishes Houthi Shiite Movement as Political Force in the New Yemen

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Andrew McGregor

February 21, 2014

Since last October, the Zaydi Shiite Houthis of northern Yemen’s Sa’ada governorate have been involved in simultaneous conflicts with the Zaydi Shiites of the Hamid Confederation of tribes in neighboring Amran governorate and Salafist Sunnis concentrated in the town of Dammaj in Sa’adah governorate. Propelled by an apparently new armory of heavy weapons, the Houthists began to push south into neighboring Amran governorate in early January, eventually defeating the powerful al-Ahmar clan, leaders of the Hashid Arab confederation. By the time a ceasefire could be arranged in early February, Houthist forces were in the Arhab region, only 40 kilometers from the Yemeni capital of Sana’a (AFP, January 30).

Qat-chewing Houthist Fighters

The Zaydi, also known as “Fiver Shi’a,” constitute over 40% of Yemen’s population, though only a portion of this total are Houthis. They have traditionally had few major doctrinal differences with Yemen’s Sunni Shafi’i majority, but have run into conflict with the growing numbers of anti-Shiite Salafists in Sa’ada governorate. In the two years since the uprising that deposed Yemen’s old regime, the Houthis have made a dramatic transition from a Sa’ada-based rebel movement to an important and recognized political player in Yemen.

By February 2, the Hashid defensive lines began to collapse, allowing the Houthis to take Khamri, the home of Hussein al-Ahmar (brother of Hashid tribal chief Sadiq al-Ahmar), though not before Hussein ordered his family property to be burned to the ground before evacuating (AFP, February 2). The Houthist offensive was also opposed by a number of pro-government Zaydi Shiite tribes (AFP, January 30).

On February 9, government mediators succeeded in arriving at a ceasefire agreement in Amran governorate between the Houthis and their al-Ahmar opponents. The agreement called for the Houthis to withdraw from the Arhab district, but in turn provided for the expulsion of all non-local Salafists from Dammaj, where many were studying at the Dar al-Hadith Seminary, which has a large number of foreign students (Yemen Post, February 10). However, Yemen’s Salafist political party, the Rashad Union, referred to the “forcible displacement” of Salafists from Dammaj and accused the Houthis of committing “atrocities” and “crimes against humanity” (World Bulletin, January 19). The Houthists in turn have said they had no problem with the Salafist students, only the large number of “armed fighters who were students at the school” (Yemen Times, January 16). Houthists put the Dammaj seminary under siege last October in response to what they viewed as a mounting threat from the Salafists gathering in Dammaj.

Once the ceasefire was in place, troops of the national army’s 62 Brigade began to deploy to checkpoints formerly occupied by the combatants in Arhab (Saba News Agency [Sana’a], February 13). The agreement to expel non-local Salafis from Dammaj sent some 15,000 Salafis streaming south into the Sawan district of Sana’a, where local residents were surprised to see them filling mosques and markets as temporary residences, throwing up tents and setting checkpoints manned by gunmen along roads and alleys (Yemen Times, January 29).

Houthi representative Muhammad al-Bukhaiti has emphasized that the conflict in Dammaj was a reaction to steps taken by the leader of the Hashid confederation: “The ongoing clashes in Hashid are the result of a document signed by Shaykh al-Ahmar in 2010. That agreement stipulated that if anyone from the Hashid tribe joined the Houthis or supported them, they are subject to death and having their property expropriated. Accordingly, several individuals associated with the Houthis in the Danan area were displaced. This is the reason behind the original clashes in Dammaj” (Yemen Times, January 14).

Though the Houthi advance has brought its fighters close to Sana’a, it seems unlikely that the Houthists will attempt to take the capital, knowing such a move could easily ignite a much larger conflict. Besides, as a Houthi spokesman noted, the movement already has a sizable presence in Sana’a that makes further infiltration unnecessary: “There are hundreds of thousands of Houthis in Sana’a and everyone knows it” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 7).

Looking to explain the al-Ahmar collapse and the national army’s failure to intervene, some Yemeni observers have attributed the Houthis’ advance to military support from Iran and diplomatic intervention and intelligence updates from the United States (Yemen Post, February 10). Hadi’s strategy in avoiding a military confrontation with the Houthists appears to have been designed to avoid further escalation of the situation, but has inevitably made him look weak in the eyes of some Yemenis. Business mogul and al-Ahmar clan member Hamid al-Ahmar is among those who have suggested that his clan’s defeat was due to the intervention of Hashid member and ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ordered followers and tribesmen within the Hashid confederation to support the Houthists in retribution for the al-Ahmar clan’s role in deposing Saleh in February 2012 (al-Masder [Sana’a], February 9; AFP, February 2).

Defeated in battle, Sadiq al-Ahmar formed a committee of 60 tribal and religious figures to meet with President Hadi to demand the government halt Houthist expansion and force the Houthis to relinquish their heavy weapons and form a political party (Gulf News, February 11).  The demands were quickly rejected by a Houthist spokesman: “The same religious and tribal figures who would ask Hadi to ask us to hand over our weapons, fought the former government in 2011 with heavy weapons… We are part of a country awash with weapons. No one can force us to form a political party. When we realize that it is in our interest to form a party, we will do it” (Gulf News, February 11).

In a January 13 speech given on the occasion of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi suggested the Houthi breakout was the result of regional insecurity: “When the state is able to protect us as citizens we will not be forced to use our weapons against anyone, but when the government is unable to do that, we will defend ourselves and our society… We really regret every drop of blood, even of those who fight against us” (NationalYemen.com, January 14).

A presidential “Regions Defining Committee (RDC)” formed in January to decide on Yemen’s new federal structure has approved the division of Yemen into six federal regions, with special status for certain regions such as the capital:

  • In the south, the regions of Aden(including the governorates of Aden, Lahj, al-Dhale and Abyan) and Hadramawt (including Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Mahra and Socotra)
  • In the north, the regions of Shebah (including the governorates of al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda), Janad (including Ta’iz and Ibb), Azal (including Amran, Sana’a, Dhamar and the Houthi homeland of Sa’ada) and Tahama (Hodeida, al-Mahwit, Hajjah and Raymah).
  • The capital, Sana’a, would exist independent of any regional authority as a “neutral” space
  • The southern port of Aden would be given “independent legislative and executive powers” (BBC, February 10).

The Houthist political wing, Ansar Allah, quickly objected to the work of the RDC, which will be folded into a new constitution that must be approved in a national referendum. According to Ansar Allah, the new internal borders will divide Yemen into poor and wealthy regions (Press TV [Tehran], February 11).

Houthi representative Muhammad al-Bukhaiti pointed out that Sa’ada had been included into the Azal region, an area with no major natural resources and no access to the sea, while Sa’ada’s stronger “cultural, social and geographic links” with neighboring Hajjah (with access to the sea) and Jawf (east of Sa’ada beside the Saudi border) had been ignored by the RDC (Yemen Online, February 12). Another Houthi leader, Ali al-Emad, predicted that “This form of division will probably cause internal conflicts in the future because it was decided on a sectarian and tribal basis” (Yemen Times, February 13).

This article first appeared in the February 21, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Salafist al-Nur Party Stuggles to Keep Political Islam Alive in Egypt

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Andrew McGregor

February 6, 2014

With former president Muhammad Mursi in prison and the Muslim Brotherhood declared a terrorist organization, political Islam is struggling to survive in Egypt today. With the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) expelled from the political scene, the Islamist torch has passed to the Salafist Nur Party, led by Younes Makhioun. The party, established in 2011 by Egypt’s Dawa al-Salafiya (Salafist Call) movement (a Salafist rival to the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1970s), took nearly a quarter of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections after forming a coalition with three smaller Salafist parties, making it the second-most powerful Islamist party in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP. The party endured a bitter split in December 2012 over the role of al-Dawa al-Salafiya clerics in daily decision-making in the Nur Party (see Terrorism Monitor, January 25, 2013).

Nur Party leader Younes Makhioun

During the short rule of the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP, the Nur (“Light”) Party did not provide the automatic support to the Brotherhood’s initiatives that many expected, preferring to set its own course to avoid being too closely identified with the Brothers. The party was prominent in its support of the military takeover in July 2013, a move taken to avoid political isolation. This political strategy effectively saved the Nur Party from the fate that met the Brotherhood. Party leader Makhioun believes the Brotherhood’s confrontational approach propelled its downfall:

I think that what they did was suicide. They chose the path of confrontation and used     violence. They have not been committed to their ethics, offending many with accusations of apostasy, slander, and indecencies in all forms. There is no doubt that it has become very difficult for them to return to political life, unless they reevaluate themselves and apologize to the Egyptian people for what they did. They must reevaluate their approach and their ideology (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 29).

The Nur Party joined the Grand Imam of al-Azhar and Coptic Pope Tawadros II in calling on Egyptians to participate in January’s constitutional referendum, saying it served “the interests of the homeland and the goals of Islamic law” (Daily News Egypt, January 11). Though the referendum approved the new constitution with an astonishing 98.1 percent of the vote, turnout was only 39 percent, too low for the vote to be regarded as a firm endorsement by the Egyptian people. Campaigning for a “no” vote was officially discouraged and a “yes” vote was presented as the only way to restore stability to Egypt. The vote was boycotted by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and turnout by Nur Party loyalists was low in support of a new constitution that has discarded most of the Islamic language that the party had lobbied for before the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood government. Nur Party support for the new constitution seemed surprising, given that one of its articles bans religion-based political parties, but Yasser Borhami, deputy head of al-Dawa al-Salafiya, insists that the Nur Party is protected by the second article of the constitution, which states that Shari’a is the main source of legislation in Egypt (al-Arabiya, January 9).

Approval of the new constitution is widely viewed as being the first step in a run for the presidency by armed forces commander-in-chief Field Marshal Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. The Nur Party is not expected to field a candidate for the presidency, citing the Brotherhood’s “failed experiment,” though the party is not prepared to support al-Sisi’s candidacy until “fuller explanations” are given of the public bloodshed that followed the military coup, particularly the massacre of Muslim Brotherhood supporters at northern Cairo’s Raba’a al-Adawiya mosque (Reuters, January 23). The government established a commission to investigate the incidents on January 6, though it is not expected to report its findings for six months.

The Nur Party publicly rejects partisan politics and prefers the establishment of strong state institutions over the creation of strongman figures who will inevitably disappoint. Makhioun condemns the Brotherhood’s attempt to monopolize power, favoring a more inclusive style of government:

We have always stated that we will not rule, but we will help govern. After any revolution, no one faction should ever bear the responsibility of all. All who participated in the revolution and the undoing of the former regime should take part in rebuilding the state. Nor should one faction rule alone because it obtained a majority of the vote. All the people must be included in building the state, in case an uprising should take place. Our policy is that we govern, we do not rule. And the difference between ruling and governing is that governing takes advantage of everyone’s talents and expertise; that the right man is put in the right position regardless of ideology or party affiliation (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 29).

The Party avoided any sign of support for Mursi after he was deposed last year and appears to be shifting slightly towards the political center, though such a move risks losing the party’s highly-conservative core supporters. According to Yasser Borhami, deputy head of al-Dawa al-Salafiya: “We have won respect from the people for our moderate positions… Maybe we lost some support from within the Islamic movement, but many have admired the party’s policies” (Reuters, January 23).

Nur Party leader Makhioun nonetheless believes that there is still a potential pool of support for political Islam in Egypt despite the performance of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party:

We felt that we should not employ religion as a tool in a political conflict or frame what was happening as a religious conflict between Islamists and non-Islamists, because that simply was not true. Using religion in this way is unfounded and will lead to conflict, causing us to lose the faith of the Egyptian people… Those who came out [to the mass anti-Mursi protests] on June 30 were not against Islam, religion, or the rule of law, nor were they against the Islamist vision, for they have never truly seen the Islamist vision actually play out (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 29).

This article first appeared in the February 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Berber-Arab Clashes in Algeria’s Mzab Valley

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Andrew McGregor

February 6, 2014

The ongoing Berber cultural revival in North Africa has gone hand-in-hand with a new political assertiveness. In nations such as Libya, Algeria and Mali, this has resulted at times in armed clashes and protests demanding linguistic rights and political recognition of Berber (Amazigh) communities. The latest of these confrontations is ongoing in the south Algerian oasis of Ghardaïa, where Chaamba Arabs have clashed repeatedly with the indigenous Mozabite Berbers, forcing Algiers to send security forces to restore law and order in the region.

Communal violence broke out in May, 2013 following an alleged attempt by Chaamba Arabs to use forged property records to take over a Mozabite cemetery (Algérie Presse Service, May 8, 2013). The dispute degenerated into sword-wielding youth gangs throwing petrol bombs at each other in the streets of Ghardaïa, the largest city in the M’Zab Valley. Shops were also burned in Berriane as the violence spread to the other cities of the M’Zab (El-Watan [Algiers], January 26).

For years, Berbers have accused the Algerian Gendarmerie Nationale of pro-Arab bias and of even encouraging Arab rioters, charges that seemed to have been confirmed when three officers were suspended after a video emerged showing their participation in violence that resulted in the death of a young Berber (AP, January 29). According to a local Mozabite activist, “We are Algerian citizens first. We want justice and the truth to be told about what happened in Ghardaïa and that crimes be punished. Those officers whose bias has been proven need to be punished. We say no to violence, no to impunity, yes to tolerance” (El-Watan [Algiers], January 26).

Violent clashes between the Arab and Berber communities in Berriane began in March 2008 and continued at lesser levels throughout that year until mass violence broke out again in April 2009 (El-Khabar [Algiers], May 20, 2008; Tout sur l’Algerie, April 17, 2009). Heated protests against endemic unemployment in the midst of an oil-producing region were common in the first half of 2013, reflecting growing tensions in the area. Much of the violence has been carried out by youth gangs from the Berber and Arab communities.

ghardaiaGhardaïa

The fighting pits the Chaamba Arabs, who follow the Maliki madhab (one of the four orthodox schools of Islamic jurisprudence) and the Mozabite Berbers, who follow the non-orthodox Ibadite form of Islam. Ibadite Islam is a more moderate offshoot of the early Islamic Kharijite movement, whose advocacy of jihad against rulers they deemed insufficiently Islamic led to nearly two centuries of conflict in the Islamic world. The Ibadite movement retained a socially conservative attitude with an emphasis on the Quran and a more tolerant attitude towards other forms of Islam. Most remaining Ibadites are found in Oman, but smaller communities can be found in isolated oases and islands in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Zanzibar. Mozabite conservatism is now under stress from both young Mozabites who have been educated elsewhere and from new non-Mozabite arrivals in the M’zab Valley. Despite the insularity of the Mozabite community, the Mozabites have nonetheless built a commercial network linking the M’zab with the cities of the Mediterranean coast.

The Berbers of the M’Zab can trace their lineage back to the regional Berber capital of Tiaret in northern Algeria. When Tiaret was taken by the Fatimid Shiites in 933, Ibadi Berbers began to move south, first to Ourgla Oasis, and finally on to M’Zab in the early 11th century.  They were followed by other Ibadi Berbers escaping pressure from new waves of Arab tribesmen arriving from the Arabian Peninsula (particularly the Banu Hillal). Ghardaïa, the largest city in the M’zab with over 90,000 residents, was first settled in 1097. The valley is now home to over 400,000 people. The traditionally nomadic Chaamba began settling in the M’Zab oases one hundred years ago, a process that has been accelerated in recent decades by the growth of the petroleum industry, loss of pastures and government discouragement of nomadic lifestyles. The two communities have never integrated in M’Zab. Whenever communal violence breaks out, both communities typically blame the other. However, despite the sectarian and ethnic differences between the Berbers and Arabs, many residents claim the fighting is actually being fuelled by rivalries between drug smuggling networks working in the area (AFP, January 30).

The M’zab consists of seven cities about 600 kilometers south of Algiers,, including a cluster of five in the south (the “pentapolis”); Ghardaïa, al-Atteuf, Melika, Bani Isguen and Bounoura, with two other more isolated communities, Berriane and Guerrara, lying further north. The strategic location of the M’zab Valley at the upper edge of the Sahara desert made it an important crossroads for various trans-Saharan trade routes. After the arrival of the French in Algeria in the mid-19th century the Mozabites paid a tribute in exchange for autonomy but the entire region was eventually annexed by France in 1882.

Aside from the death of three Mozabites in the latest sectarian violence, the most shocking development was the Chaamba destruction of the tomb of Amir Moussa, a UNESCO designated world heritage site (Agence Kabyle d’Information, January 14). The Amir was a Mozabite leader of the 16th century who is ironically remembered for leading efforts to integrate the Arab nomads into the M’zab community in 1586 (AFP, January 30). The ancient Mozabite cemetery in Ghardaïa was also destroyed by marauding Arab youths.

On January 27, Mozabite activist Dr. Kameleddine Fekhar issued a statement purportedly speaking on behalf of the Mozabite community that demanded the departure of the Abd al-Malik Sellal government and urged a boycott of April’s upcoming presidential election. The statement complains of the “racist aggression” of police-supported militias armed with swords and knives that pillage and burn at will. Arrests followed by torture are determined solely on a racial basis, according to the statement (Siwel – Agence Kabyle d’Information, January 29). Prime Minister Sellal visited M’Zab in January when tensions seemed to be easing, but fighting erupted with new intensity only days after his departure.

This article first appeared in the February 6, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

South Sudan’s Tribal “White Army” Part Two: Arms and the Overthrow of Traditional Order

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Andrew McGregor

January 25, 2014

An unprecedented cattle raid by members of South Sudan’s Murle tribe on the Nuer “holy city” of Wec Deang on January 14, 2012 yielded some 4,000 cattle (with some 15 civilians killed by the raiders), but invited sure retaliation from the Nuer White Army. Wec Deang is without doubt the single most important historical and spiritual site in Nuerland as the burial place of the Prophet Ngungeng and the location of the Bie Dengkur, a massive sacred mound erected in the 1870s by thousands of Nuer under Ngundeng’s direction. The mound was partially destroyed by the British in the 1920s as a symbol of Nuer resistance but was left untouched by unspoken agreement of all sides in the Second Sudanese Civil War.

 

The Bie Dengkur at Wac Deang, c.1902


Reports that the Murle had attacked the mound itself during the January raid led Ngundeng’s grandson, Gai Lel Ngundeng, to issue a religious decree “ordering all Nuer in the world to fight [the] Murle tribe.” [1] A White Army statement said that “The Nuer youth were enraged after hearing [of] the attack of Wec Deang because it is an affront to all Nuer, including Nuer of Ethiopia, that the place of Ngundeng’s pyramid could be attacked by Murle. [White Army military leader] Bor Doang concluded that Murle deserters of the SPLA who did that must pay a price for insulting Prophet Ngundeng.” [2] Prior to the launch of the “Savannah Storm” operation against the Murle, Nuer White Army leaders travelled to Wec Deang to ritually slaughter bulls and receive blessings from Gai Lel Ngundeng. [3] Murle raiders also rely on the blessing of a local alaan ci meeri, or Red Chief, a religious figure who is believed to be in direct contact with the spirits.

The emergence of the White Army was simultaneous with an influx of small arms into eastern Upper Nile Province in the early 1990s and the 1991 split in the rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which left largely Nuer pro-Khartoum forces under Riek Machar (the SPLA Nasir-faction) fighting a civil war within a civil war with the largely Dinka-led SPLA-Torit faction under the late Colonel John Garang. While Machar’s main military support came from SPLA deserters and other pro-Khartoum tribal militias that feared Dinka domination of the South Sudan or preferred Southern separation to Garang’s vision of a “New Sudan,” the loosely organized White Army was raised from the Nuer cattle camps and was never absorbed into the formal hierarchy of any of these groups despite efforts to bring them under one command or another. Part of the problem was that there was no formal or even stable leadership to co-opt. Membership in the White Army was informal and based on availability, civilian status and possession of a modern firearm. [4]

It is likely that most of the arms that made their way into the hands of the White Army and other pro-Khartoum militias originated with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Possession of weapons allowed the Nuer youth to disregard and undermine the authority of traditional community leaders. The militia was formed on an ad hoc basis, usually in response to some real or perceived threat to the Nuer community, though many members clearly saw membership in the White Army as a means of acquiring arms cattle and wives. White Army columns typically coordinate their movements through the bush using Thuraya satellite telephones. These rapidly mobilized groups, consisting largely of Lou Nuer, are usually armed with a mixture of machetes, clubs and Kalashnikov assault rifles.

The absorption of pro-Khartoum militias into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba declaration and the SPLA’s simultaneous disarmament campaigns appeared to put an end to the White Army, at least temporarily. In many places, the disarmament campaign was supported by Nuer civilians who had tired of the arrogance and violence of the Nuer youth affiliated with the White Army. Many elements of the militia were not prepared to disband, however, and ignored Riek Machar’s orders to do so before being destroyed by the professional soldiers of the SPLA in 2006. [5]

Though the White Army is believed to be now operating in sympathy with Riek Machar, a 2012 statement from the militia acknowledged Riek Machar as the founder of the militia in 1992, but asserted that “we do not recognize Riek Machar as a Nuer leader. He is responsible for all the killings we experience today because it was he who armed [the] Murle tribe in 1997 when he signed [the] Khartoum Peace Agreement with Omar Bashir.” The statement, signed by military leader Bol Koang, went on to provide a succinct summary of the militia’s purpose: “We want to state, in no uncertain terms, that the Nuer White Army has no political objective. The primary objective of the White Army is to defend the Nuer livelihood from Murle who carried out attacks against the Nuer civilians.”

Tut Deang, a White Army spokesman, has explained that the militia is a youth organization that rejects the leadership of traditional chiefs (Sudan Tribune, January 6, 2011). However, the  influence of traditional Nuer “prophets” (sometimes styled as “magicians”) remains an important factor in the direction taken by Nuer militias and their blessing is vital before undertaking a campaign. The White Army was revitalized in 2011 when a Nuer prophet named Dak Kueth claimed to have been possessed by spiritual powers and began recruiting thousands of of Nuer youth under the military command of Bor Doang to repress the Murle, who were engaged in local cattle raids and abductions of children (Sudan Tribune, May 31, 2013). Dak Kueth urged Nuer youth to refuse to participate in the government’s disarmament campaign before he escaped the SPLA by fleeing to Nuer communities in neighboring Ethiopia.

Despite the White Army’s apparent focus on combatting the Murle, a late December statement allegedly issued by the militia informed that the White Army was now attempting to form an alliance with the Murle against the Dinka leadership in Juba, a development that reflects the growing political instability of South Sudan:

The problem of Nuer and Murle is now Dinka leadership in Bor and Juba. The Nuer and Murle have a common interest, that is, removal of Dinka government is the only solution to end cattle rustling which was introduced by Dinka… We therefore warn the UN that it is possible for genocide to take place in the coming weeks when we attack Bor town… The solution is for Murle and Nuer to unite to confront the Dinka who have an agenda against both the Nuer and Murle. From today onwards, the Nuer White Army will not fight Murle anymore. The focus is now to topple the Dinka government in Juba. [6]

Notes

  1. Gai L. Ngundeng, “The Grandson of Prophet Ngundeng Criticizes Attack on the ‘Holy City,’ Calls upon Nuer to Fight Murle and SPLA Defectors,” Decree No: 001/1/12, http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/the-grandson-of-prophet-ngundeng-criticizes-attack-on-the-holy-city-calls-upon-nuer-to-fight-murle-and-spla-defectors . For Nuer prophets, see: Douglas H. Johnson, Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997. For the Murle, see: Bazett A. Lewis, The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
  2. “Nuer and Dinka White Army to Launch ‘Operation Savannah Storm’ against Murle Armed Youth,” Leadership of the Nuer and Dinka White Army Media Release, Uror County, Jonglei State, South Sudan, February 4, 2012, http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/nuer-and-dinka-white-army-to-launch-operation-savannah-storm-against-murle-armed-youth
  3. Ibid
  4. Arild Skedsmo, Kwong Danhier and Hoth Gor Luak, “The Changing Meaning of Small Arms in Nuer Society,” African Security Review 12(4), 2003, pp. 57-67.
  5. John Young, The White Army: An Introduction and Overview, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, June 2007, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-05-White-Army.pdf
  6. “Both the Murle and Nuer White armies will work together to remove the Dinka regime,” December 27, 2013, http://ethiopianewsforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=68952