Hezbollah Denounces Alleged Attempt to Turn Lebanon into a ‘New Iraq’

Andrew McGregor

November 15, 2006

Three months after the end of the Israeli/Hezbollah war, there is growing tension between Hezbollah and the “March 14” anti-Syrian political coalition that dominates the Lebanese government. In an October 31 interview with al-Manar TV and al-Nur Radio (Hezbollah-owned media sources), Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah offered his perspective on the current political and security situations.

NasrallahHezbollah Leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah

According to Nasrallah, the United States intends to make Israel the dominant country in the Middle East. Nasrallah goes on to suggest that speeches from the U.S. administration on human rights, democracy and freedom are mere deception, designed to disguise its true intention—to seize control of regional resources. This plan is currently “in a state of collapse and a state of decline,” while U.S. efforts in Iraq represent “a clear military failure,” a view no doubt reinforced since by the result of U.S. mid-term elections and the resignation of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Iraqi resistance to the United States and its coalition is “legitimate and correct,” but the Hezbollah leader refutes the extremism practiced by certain factions (without naming them); Hezbollah makes “a distinction between military actions that target the occupation forces and the criminal actions that target innocent people and Iraqis and that shed blood citing illegitimate justifications.” Drawing on the examples of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Nasrallah warns collaborators of the fate suffered by the South Vietnamese and South Lebanese Army when they found themselves abandoned by their patrons: “They will leave them to face their fate, as they did with all those who wagered on them in the world and throughout history.”

Nasrallah notes the inactivity of the Lebanese Army in disarming Hezbollah. The army is what the sheikh describes as a “national [wataniyah] institution…Consequently, the Lebanese Army moves only in the area indicated by the army commander…the area of consensual national will.” The comments suggest that the Hezbollah leadership is satisfied with the army’s restraint on disarmament in defiance of the wishes of the Lebanese government. Nasrallah even claims it was Hezbollah and Shiite political party Amal (led by Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri) that requested the presence of the Lebanese Army and a beefed-up United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon.

Throughout the interview, Nasrallah accuses the March 14 coalition of seeking a multinational military deployment in Lebanon acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VII asserts the right of the UN Security Council to invite the armed forces of member states to intervene militarily “to maintain or restore international security” (Article 42). The coalition’s alleged intention was to permit a multinational force (“I do not want to call them by their real name, the NATO forces”) under U.S. or French command (outside of UN control) to enter Lebanon. The multinational force would deploy along all the borders and throughout the country, effectively acting as an occupation force in the interests of Israel, the United States and Lebanon’s March 14 coalition. Nasrallah claims that when the conflict began on July 12, the Lebanese government contacted Hezbollah to inform them that meeting three conditions was the only way to avoid a war that would severely damage Lebanon and ultimately destroy the Shiite movement. The first condition was to allow a Chapter VII deployment; second, to disarm the Islamic Resistance (the armed wing of Hezbollah); third, to hand over the Israeli prisoners unconditionally. In Nasrallah’s view, it is only the willingness to fight displayed by the Islamic Resistance that has allowed Lebanon to avoid a humiliating post-colonial occupation of the country. The sheikh warns that a Chapter VII deployment would turn Lebanon into “a new Iraq.”

Despite warnings from UNIFIL’s French commander that French forces might fire on Israeli overflights of Lebanon made in violation of the cease-fire agreement, the Israeli Air Force continues to fly unopposed over Lebanon. According to Deputy Minister of Defense Efraim Sneh, Israel’s “reconnaissance flights” will continue until the two Israeli soldiers are released and Israel receives confirmation that arms shipments from Syria have ceased (Zaman.com, November 2). There is no doubt that the sonic booms of Israeli warplanes over Beirut are meant to provide a political message to Lebanon’s leaders as well as intelligence for Israel’s military.

Throughout the interview, Sheikh Nasrallah stressed the role of Hezbollah as a nationalist rather than a sectarian movement, capitalizing on the inter-faith solidarity that developed in some (but not all) quarters during the weeks of Israeli air and ground attacks. “What difference is there between me and the Sunnis in order to raise the issue of sectarianism? How do I, as a Muslim, differ from the Christian who cares for the oppressed people and for the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in the same way as [a Muslim] cares for the al-Aqsa Mosque? He also wants Lebanon to be strong, independent, master of itself and free.” Nasrallah’s suggestion that the March 14 alliance is still trying to transform UNIFIL to a non-UN multinational occupation force usefully places Hezbollah at the forefront of the Lebanese struggle for independence and self-determination. Hezbollah’s armed wing is described as “a resistance, not a militia,” in other words, a national element serving the defense of Lebanon from external aggression. While the Lebanese Army has the courage and will to resist aggression, “it does not have the required facilities, the required tanks and the needed anti-armor missiles, nor does it have anti-aircraft missiles.” Aside from tanks, Hezbollah has all these weapons in abundance.

Nasrallah’s opponents in the March 14 alliance continue to assert that Hezbollah is nothing but a tool of Syrian regional ambitions. Nasrallah, of course, has no desire to see any kind of international military force deploy along the Syrian-Lebanese border, where Syrian and Iranian military supplies continue to flow to Hezbollah with little hindrance from the Lebanese Army. At present, there are no signs that UNIFIL or the Lebanese Army will attempt to disarm Hezbollah under the conditions of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

Sheikh Nasrallah refutes claims that Hezbollah and its Amal and Christian allies seek to mount a coup against the present regime: “In matters of blood, we are at the forefront. In matters of power, we do not seek authority.” Greater representation for the Shiites in the Lebanon government is nevertheless inevitable, given their military strength, growing numbers and organizational skills.

This article first appeared in the November 15, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus.

 

Support for Hezbollah in Egypt Threatens Mubarak’s Stability

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Focus, September 7, 2006

The success of Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement in battle against Israel’s armed forces has reminded Egyptians of their own military difficulties against Israel in three major conflicts (1948, 1967 and 1973). The Egyptian government of President Hosni Mubarak (like Jordan and Saudi Arabia) was quick to label Hezbollah’s activities as “adventurism,” but as the conflict raged on through mid-summer, popular opinion in Egypt began to rally behind Lebanon’s Arab Shiites, with many political leaders rebuking the Egyptian government for failing to support fellow Arabs. The conflict appears to have been an unwelcome surprise for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who was already occupied with arranging the succession of his son, Gamal, as president, despite widespread opposition.

al-AzharAl-Azhar Mosque, Cairo

Months before the war started, Mubarak made clear his suspicions of Arab Shiites, declaring in a television interview that their loyalties were to Iran rather than to their native states (al-Arabiya, April 8). As the battle in Lebanon continued, the government’s attitude toward Hezbollah, deeply at odds with popular opinion, began to change. Hezbollah was recognized as an integral part of the Lebanese social and political structure and the victim of a “disproportionate response” by Israel. By early August, Mubarak was denouncing Israel’s “deluded” actions in Lebanon and the “failed” Middle East policies of the United States.

Forty-three year-old Gamal Mubarak is clearly being groomed for succession to the presidency, despite sullen resistance in the ruling National Democratic Party and the more vocal disapproval of the political opposition. On August 8, Gamal was a last-minute addition to an Egyptian delegation to Beirut, a move designed to give the younger Mubarak some political currency. Egypt’s peculiar election laws will ensure that there will be little opposition to a Gamal Mubarak candidacy for president in May 2007. The “fundamentalist threat” presented by the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliament may be used to stave off international opposition to a Mubarak family succession in the presidency.

After the cease-fire in Lebanon was implemented, Mubarak reminded his critics that the interests of the Egyptian state came before pan-Arab solidarity: “Some people tend to forget that safeguarding Egypt’s strength provides the greatest guarantee for Arab security and regional security” (Arabic News, August 25). The president also spoke of Egypt’s “clear and frank” support of Lebanon (rather than Hezbollah), while rejecting calls for Egypt to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Staying well clear of providing military support to Hezbollah, Egypt offered humanitarian assistance, including a field hospital in Beirut with 50 medical personnel. Egyptian Air Force C-130s flew in medicine and food, and Egyptian Navy ships carried water and other relief supplies.

Popular Egyptian support for Hezbollah would be a given, except for the traditional Sunni scorn for Shiite Islam. Egypt is the time-honored intellectual heartland of Sunni Islam (epitomized in Cairo’s al-Azhar University, the Sunni world’s preeminent theological school), but Arab nationalism is also a potent force in Egypt, and the stubborn resistance offered by Hezbollah’s small Shiite guerrilla force gained support from large parts of the population.

Friday demonstrations at the al-Azhar mosque that began with the Israeli incursion into Gaza in June continued to grow through the summer. On July 14, worshippers clashed with riot police following Friday prayers, the first of several such confrontations. The message in sermons like those given by al-Azhar’s Sheikh Eid Abdulhamid was unequivocal: “God give victory to Hezbollah, and inflict defeat on the Jews” (Daily Star [Egypt], August 5). By July 21, a broad mix of Egypt’s opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasserists and the political left, was represented in a mass protest. Proclaiming solidarity with Hamas and Hezbollah, the protesters targeted President Mubarak and his son Gamal before Egyptian security forces waded in with sticks and batons (al-Ahram Weekly, July 27-August 2). Similar demonstrations occurred in Alexandria, Assyut and elsewhere. Newspaper articles criticizing Egypt’s response to the conflict appeared daily in the once-submissive Egyptian press, and the Egyptian Press Syndicate organized a series of pro-Hezbollah events.

Popular Cairo imam Safwat al-Higazi took to satellite network al-Nas to issue a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill all Jewish Israelis with firearms, knives and poison. Al-Azhar responded by suspending al-Higazi from preaching at Friday prayers and issuing its own fatwa that visa-holding Israelis in Egypt could not be killed. As Egypt’s government-appointed grand mufti ‘Ali Guma’a explained, the visa amounted to an inviolable “safe-conduct” pass (al-Masri al-Yom, August 22). ‘Ali Guma’a denounced descriptions of Hezbollah “terrorism,” describing their role as simple defense of their country (MENA, July 28). The mufti praised Hezbollah for teaching the Arabs “how to fight honorably and fairly,” but also aired the old canard that Jews make matzo (unleavened bread) with human blood, describing the Israelis as “bloodsuckers” (al-Ahram, August 7).

The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Mahdi Akef, announced that the organization was prepared to recruit and send 10,000 members to combat Israel, hearkening back to 1947-48 when guerrilla formations of Egyptian Muslim Brothers fought in the front lines against Israel. Akef suggested that the Arab leaders were bigger threats to the Arab world than Israel, and that the Brotherhood had only refrained from killing them because they were Muslims (AFP, August 27). The Brotherhood called on all Muslims to offer material and religious support to Hezbollah, rejecting anti-Shiite statements coming from Saudi Arabia’s religious leadership.

Tensions between the Brotherhood and the government were already high when the Lebanon war began. Akef denounced efforts to turn the presidency into an “inheritance,” and the Brothers were subject to mass arrests after a wave of anti-government demonstrations in March. On August 25, the secretary general of the Brotherhood, Mahmoud Ezzat, was arrested along with 16 other leading members of the organization at a meeting in Egypt’s Nile Delta region. In 2005, the Brothers ran a slate of independent candidates for election to Egypt’s parliament (the organization has been banned since 1954), taking 20% of the seats. They are now the largest single opposition bloc in the legislature and have been surprisingly effective by concentrating on human rights and corruption issues rather than religious reform.

Other political movements also opposed the government’s Lebanon policy. Hamdeen Sabahy, the leader of Egypt’s small left/nationalist Karama party called for the “Arab nation” to “end the existence of Israel” (Karama [party newspaper], August 21). The secular political reform movement Kefayah (Enough) urged the government to cut Egyptian energy supplies to Israel.

Given the United States’ unwavering support for Israel’s “battle against terrorism,” it is plain that Mubarak wants to avoid any action or statement that might antagonize his U.S. patrons, whose financial and military aid is essential to the survival of the regime. The Egyptian government also has serious concerns about the growing influence of Iran in the Middle East, particularly in the form of militant groups like Hezbollah, whose political unorthodoxy threatens the region’s stable (if not stagnant) Arab regimes. The emergence of a “Shiite bloc” through Iran, Iraq and Lebanon would pose a threat to Egypt’s traditional leadership role in the Muslim Middle East.

This article first appeared in the September 7, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Hezbollah’s Rocket Strategy

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, August 11, 2006

Rockets are not new weapons, nor are they strangers to Middle East warfare. Size, range and destructive power are all factors in the development of rocket-based strategies, the ultimate of which was the “Mutually Assured Destruction” of the Cold War. The rockets used by Hezbollah in the ongoing conflict with Israel are much smaller and are usually integrated elsewhere within the tactics of the battlefield. Hezbollah is known for innovation, however, and has developed new strategic uses for their unguided rockets, employing them as political, economic and psychological weapons. As stated by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres on August 6, “Nobody understands why they started to attack, what the purpose of the attack was and why they are using so many rockets and missiles.”

Hezbollah RS 1Hezbollah Fighters with Katyusha Rocket Emplacement (AP)

“Little Kate” (The Katyusha)

The chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee described why Hezbollah has been able to keep the rockets flying despite extreme military pressure from Israel: “Hezbollah separated its leadership command-and-control system from its field organization. It created a network of tiny cells in each village that had no operational mission except to wait for the moment when they should activate the Katyusha rocket launchers hidden in local houses, using coordinates programmed long ago” (San Francisco Chronicle, July 21).

The 122mm Katyusha (range: 20-25 kilometers) is the mainstay of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal. “Katyusha” is somewhat of a generic term today, covering a wide variety of small, unguided, solid-fuel rockets produced by a number of countries, including Iran. The Katyushas all have a common origin in the Soviet BM-8 and BM-13 truck-mounted rocket launchers that were used against the German army in 1941. Fired in short-range volleys of as many as 48 rockets at a time, they had an immediate military and psychological impact on German troops.

Hezbollah usually fires their version of the Katyusha one at a time from improvised launching facilities. Some Katyusha-type multiple-rocket launching systems were specifically designed to be dismantled into single units for guerrilla use. In 2001, the first truck-mounted launching systems were reported in Hezbollah’s arsenal, making more effective volley-launches possible. There are some recent instances of volley-firing, such as the attacks on the Israeli town of Acre on August 3.

Once in the air, the cheaply-made Katyushas are remarkably difficult to stop. A few years ago, Israel and the United States cooperated in a joint project to develop a “Tactical High Energy Laser” (THEL) to bring down such rockets by igniting the warhead in mid-air through the use of a high-energy chemical laser. In tests the system successfully destroyed several Katyusha rockets, but mobility difficulties and technical concerns related to the chemical fuel led to a cut in funding for the project in 2004. Research is underway on a more-portable version with an electrically powered laser, but production of this costly system is still years away.

The unguided Katyusha is not intended to strike a specific target. Rather, it is designed to be fired with 16 or more of its kind in a salvo that rains destruction upon a certain area, preferably a troop concentration, massed armor or fortified emplacements. By firing Katyusha-type rockets singly (often into sparsely occupied parts of Israel) Hezbollah has forgone the tactical use of this weapon for strategic purposes. Here Hezbollah signals its mastery of media warfare; the media covers wars like a sporting event, with the scorecard being the most important element in determining who is winning. Besides the daily updates of the number of troops killed, the number of civilians killed and the number of air-raids launched, the media also dutifully records the daily tally of rockets fired. Despite causing insignificant physical damage, each rocket arrives like a message of defiance, a signal to the Arab world that Israel is not invincible. Hezbollah routinely looks for new uses for existing weapons in its arsenal, and in this case they have transformed a battlefield weapon into a means of political warfare.

Bringing Tel Aviv in Range

The introduction of longer-range Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets (also known as the Ra’ad, or by the Hezbollah name “Khaibar”) has given the conflict a new dimension, with Hezbollah no longer restricted to hitting the thinly populated Israeli north. The 240mm Fajr-3 has a range of 45 kilometers and carries a 45 kilogram warhead, while the 333mm Fajr-5 has a range of 70-75 kilometers and carries a 90 kilogram warhead. Both systems are usually truck-mounted. The Fajr-5 was first used in the July 28 attack on the Israeli town of Afula, then again in an attack on the West Bank town of Jenin on August 3. At the extreme limits of their range, the Fajr-type rockets are accurate only to within a one kilometer radius.

Hezbollah RS 2An Iranian official recently confirmed that Zelzal-2 rockets, with a stated range of 200 kilometers (although this figure may be significantly exaggerated), had been provided to Hezbollah by Iran for use “in defense of Lebanon” (Haaretz, August 5). The 610mm Zelzal-2 is a 3,500 kilogram rocket with a 600 kilogram high-explosive warhead, first delivered to Revolutionary Guard units in Lebanon in 2002. Israeli intelligence believes the missile is capable of reaching the northern suburbs of Tel Aviv. Although the rocket is unguided and difficult to use, the threat from the Zelzal-2 is taken seriously, with U.S.-made Patriot anti-missile systems deploying near Netanya to guard Tel Aviv. The Patriot system is useful only against larger, longer-range rockets, with no effectiveness against the smaller Katyusha types.

On August 3, Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah made a televised offer to Israel to stop firing Hezbollah rockets in exchange for an end to Israeli air strikes in Lebanon. The Shiite leader warned, however, that Hezbollah would fire its rockets at Tel Aviv if the Israeli Air Force attacked Beirut (al-Manar TV, August 3). It is possible that Hezbollah requires Iran’s permission to attack Tel Aviv. The largest weapons in Hezbollah’s missile arsenal are likely to be at least partially manned by members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

Grapes of Wrath Revisited

The current Israeli operation bears a great similarity to Israel’s 1996 “Grapes of Wrath” operation: a massive military response to Hezbollah’s launching of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel despite the occupation of the Israeli “security zone” in southern Lebanon. Proclamations that it was time to end the “Katyusha menace” came to nothing as the offensive had little effect on Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities and took few Hezbollah lives at a great cost to Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah rocket launches were carefully tallied by the Lebanese public as a measure of the movement’s success on the battlefield. The Shiite movement was strengthened politically through armed resistance to Israel, while the Israeli government of Shimon Peres lost the next election.

Following the 2000 evacuation of the south Lebanese security zone, Israel refrained from responding directly to Hezbollah provocations along the border in mid-2001 and spring 2002. The Israeli government was aware that targeting Hezbollah would bring a flurry of rockets across the border, followed by an inevitable escalation and probable re-occupation of a region that Israel had just evacuated. For a time, at least, renewed war in south Lebanon carried too high a political price.

Conclusion

Hezbollah’s rocket strategy has successfully disrupted all activities in northern Israel, forcing 300,000 Israelis into shelters or refugee camps, and impressing upon Israelis that building a wall around their country is not enough to ensure permanent security. Israel’s war is incredibly expensive, and the deployment of the reserves creates an economic drain that is difficult for a small state like Israel to sustain. As long as Hezbollah can continue to send rockets across the border, it strikes an economic blow on its enemy. Continuing to fire the rockets also goads Israeli ground forces into military confrontation with the guerrillas on ground that Hezbollah has prepared for six years.

The size of Israel’s proposed security barrier keeps changing with the realization that even an occupation up to the Litani River (a zone 28-35 kilometers deep) will keep only Hezbollah’s short-range Katyushas from reaching Israel. A measure of this reality (and the importance of the “scorecard”) was reflected in the August 1 televised remarks of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: “I believe one can say today…that there is no way to measure this war according to the number or range of the rockets being fired at us. From the very first day, neither I, nor the defense minister, nor the Israeli government, nor the military leadership—and this is to its credit—ever promised for even one moment that when the fighting ended, there would be absolutely no rockets within firing range of the State of Israel. No one can make such a promise” (Israel TV Channel 1, August 6).

The resistance of Hezbollah fighters, the severity of the Israeli bombing campaign and the inability of Israel to halt the rockets has resulted in unusually broad popular support for Hezbollah both in Lebanon and a politically frustrated Arab world. When ceasefire negotiations begin, it will now be difficult for the Arab regimes that opposed Hezbollah at the beginning of the conflict (particularly Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to ignore Hezbollah’s calls for at least diplomatic support from the Arab states. In the meantime, Hezbollah’s rocket campaign continues to destroy little militarily while it accomplishes much politically, economically and psychologically.

This article first appeared in the August 11, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Hezbollah’s Tactics and Capabilities in Southern Lebanon

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Focus, August 1, 2006

With its attack on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Israel is fighting on terrain that has been prepared by the Shiite movement for six years since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers have described finding a network of concrete bunkers with modern communications equipment as deep as 40 meters along the border (Ynet News, July 23). The terrain is already well-suited for ambushes and hidden troop movements, consisting of mountains and woods in the east and scrub-covered hills to the west, all intersected by deep wadi-s (dry river beds). Broken rocks and numerous caves provide ample cover. Motorized infantry and armor can only cross the region with difficulty. Use of the few winding and unpaved roads invites mines and ambushes by Hezbollah’s adaptable force of several thousand guerrillas (The Times [London], July 21).

Hezbollah Tactics 1Israeli Merkava Tank – A victim of Hezbollah missiles

Hezbollah emerged in 1985 with more enthusiasm than tactical sense, relying on wasteful frontal assaults and more effective suicide attacks on Israeli troops. With training provided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah’s highly-motivated military wing developed into a highly effective guerrilla force. Iran continues to provide specialized training, funds and weapons to Hezbollah through the Revolutionary Guards organization. Various reports suggest Iranian volunteers are being recruited and sent to Lebanon to assist Hezbollah, but these reports remain unconfirmed (Alborz News Agency, July 18; Mehr News Agency, July 17).

Hezbollah’s military leadership has rethought much of the strategic and tactical doctrine that led to the repeated defeat of Arab regular forces by the IDF. The top-down command structure that inhibited initiative in junior ranks has been reversed. Hezbollah operates with a decentralized command structure that allows for rapid response to any situation by encouraging initiative and avoiding the need to consult with leaders in Beirut. The military wing nevertheless answers directly to Hezbollah’s central council of clerics for direction.

The fighters are armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, typically assembling in small teams to avoid concentrations that would draw Israeli attention. The preparation of well-disguised explosive devices has become a specialty of Hezbollah. The uncertainty created by such weapons takes a heavy psychological toll on patrolling soldiers.

Hezbollah has improved its night-vision capabilities, although they do not compare with Israel’s state-of-the-art equipment, which includes UAVs, helicopters and jet-fighters equipped for night warfare. Hezbollah fighters are well-trained in the use of complex weapons systems. Air defense units use SA-7 missiles and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns on flatbed trucks.

The guerrillas rigorously examine the success or failure of each operation after completion. Tactics change constantly and new uses are sought for existing weapons. The use of mortars (81mm and 120mm) has been honed to near perfection. Hezbollah fighters have developed efficient assault tactics for use against armor, with their main anti-tank weapons being AT-3 Saggers and AT-4 Spigot missiles. Four tanks were destroyed in two weeks in 1997 using U.S.-made TOW anti-tank missiles (these missiles traveled from Israel to Iran as part of the Iran-Contra affair before being supplied to Hezbollah).

Hezbollah Tactics 2Israeli Troops with Captured Hezbollah Flag

Hezbollah leaders believe that their fighters have a perspective on conflict losses that gives them an inherent advantage; according to Naim Kassem, deputy leader of Hezbollah, “[The Israeli] perspective is preservation of life, while our point of departure is preservation of principle and sacrifice. What is the value of a life of humiliation?” (Haaretz, December 15, 1996). With no hope of overwhelming Israel’s well-supplied military, Hezbollah fighters concentrate on inflicting Israeli casualties, believing that an inability or unwillingness to absorb steady losses is Israel’s strategic weakness.

Hezbollah has also mastered the field of information warfare, videotaping attacks on Israeli troops that are then shown in Israel and around the world, damaging public morale and degrading the myth of IDF invincibility.

Hezbollah is believed to have as many as 10,000, unguided 122mm Katyusha rockets (range 22 km) (Arutz Sheva, August 1). The Second World War-style Katyushas are easily obtained on the international arms market and inflict greater economic and psychological damage than physical damage. Their chief advantage is their portability; launchers can be easily mounted on a truck that can dash into position, fire its rockets and take off to a prepared refuge before a retaliatory strike can be launched. Sometimes automatic timers are used on the launchers, allowing the crew to escape well in advance.

The weapon used in an attack against an Israeli warship that killed four commandos was identified by the Israeli military as an Iranian-made C802 Noor radar-guided land-to-sea missile (range 95 km). Most other missiles used by Hezbollah are Iranian-made, including the Raad 2 and 3 models (used against Haifa), the Fajr-3 and 5 and, allegedly, the Zelzal-2, with a range of 200 km.

Hezbollah is unlikely to have used the most potent weapons in its arsenal. Hanging on to them provides both strategic and psychological advantage. It is typical Hezbollah strategy to view war as a progression, rather than to use everything it has in the early stages of a conflict. While Israel may have a timetable of several weeks for this campaign, Hezbollah is prepared for several years of fighting. Disengagement may prove more difficult for Israel than it assumes. At some point, however, Hezbollah may become short of weapons and supplies. Normal supply lines from Syria have already been cut and Hezbollah has no facilities capable of producing arms or ammunition.

Israel has never been able to get the upper hand in the intelligence war with Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s military wing is not easily penetrated by outsiders, but has had great success in intelligence operations against Israel. Nearly the entire Shiite population of south Lebanon acts as eyes and ears for the fighters, so it is little surprise that Israel initially concentrated on eliminating regional communications systems and forcing the local population from their homes in the border region.

Israel’s air strikes have revealed the limitations of conventional air power in coping with mobile forces with little in the way of fixed installations or strategic targets. The 18-year war against the Israeli occupation (1982-2000) has, on the other hand, given Hezbollah an intimate knowledge of Israeli tactics. While some 3,000-4,000 Israeli Air Force air-raids in the last few weeks have killed hundreds of civilians, Hezbollah admits to only a few dozen of its own fighters killed (although Israel claims it has killed 300 Hezbollah fighters).

According to Ali Fayyad, a member of Hezbollah’s Central Council, the movement’s strategy is “not to reveal all its cards, to impose its own pace in fighting the war and to prepare for a long war” (Bloomberg, July 27).

This article first appeared in the August 1, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Hezbollah’s Creative Tactical Use of Anti-Tank Weaponry

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Focus, August 15, 2006

As the world waits to see if the UN-brokered ceasefire in Lebanon holds, the Israeli army will begin assessing its disappointing performance against Hezbollah guerrillas. Among the many aspects to be investigated is the vulnerability of Israel’s powerful armored corps to small, hand-held, wire-guided anti-tank weapons. Indeed, Hezbollah’s innovative use of anti-tank missiles was the cause of most Israeli casualties and has given the small but powerful weapons a new importance in battlefield tactics.

Hezbollah Anti Tank 1Israel’s Merkava Main Battle Tank

In a recent statement, Hezbollah’s armed wing, al-Moqawama al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance), described Israel’s main battle-tank as “a toy for the rockets of the resistance” (al-Manar TV, August 11). Hezbollah’s anti-tank weapons consist of a variety of wire-guided missiles (usually of Russian design and manufactured and/or supplied by Iran and Syria) and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). The missiles include the European-made Milan, the Russian-designed Metis-M, Sagger AT-3, Spigot AT-4 and the Russian-made Kornet AT-14. The latter is a Syrian supplied missile capable of targeting low-flying helicopters. Iraqi Fedayeen irregulars used the Kornet against U.S. forces in 2003. The most portable versions of these weapons are carried in a fiberglass case with a launching rail attached to the lid.

On July 30, the Israeli army published photos of various anti-tank missiles they claim to have found in a Hezbollah bunker (see: www.hnn.co.il/index.php). The weapons include Saggers and TOW missiles. The TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) missile is a formidable weapon first produced by the United States in the 1970s. These missiles were of interest as their packing crates were marked 2001, suggesting that these were relatively new additions to Hezbollah’s arsenal and not part of the shipment of TOW missiles from Israel to Iran that was part of the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986 (the shelf-life of the TOW is roughly 20 years). On August 6, Israeli Major-General Benny Gantz showed film of BGM-71 TOW and Sagger AT-3 missiles he reported were captured at one of Hezbollah’s field headquarters (Haaretz, August 6).

The primary target of Hezbollah’s battlefield missiles is the Israeli-made Merkava tank. The Merkava was designed for the maximum protection of its crews, with heavy armor and a rear escape hatch. The emphasis on crew survival is not simply a humanitarian gesture; the small country of Israel cannot provide an endless number of trained, combat-ready tank crews if casualties begin to mount. The tank is also designed to be easily and quickly repaired, a specialty of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The modular armor plating can be easily replaced if damaged, or replaced entirely with upgraded materials when available. The first generation of Merkavas was built in the 1970s and was soon deployed in Lebanon in 1982. The much-improved Merkava Mk 4 has been Israel’s main battle-tank since its introduction in 2004.

Hezbollah Anti Tank 2AT-3 Sagger Missile System

Current battlefield reports suggest that Hezbollah fighters are well-trained in aiming at the Merkava’s most vulnerable points, resulting in as many as one-quarter of their missiles successfully piercing the armor (Yediot Aharonot, August 10). Hezbollah attacks on Merkava tanks during the November 2005 raid on the border town of Ghajar were videotaped and closely examined to find points where the armor was susceptible to missile attack. While some of their missiles have impressive ranges (up to three kilometers), the guerrillas prefer to fire from close range to maximize their chances of hitting weak points on the Merkava. Operating in two- or three-man teams, the insurgents typically try to gain the high ground in the hilly terrain before selecting targets, using well-concealed missile stockpiles that allow them to operate behind Israeli lines (Jerusalem Post, August 3).

Without artillery, Hezbollah has adapted its use of anti-tank missiles for mobile fire support against Israeli troops taking cover in buildings. There are numerous reports of such use, the most devastating being on August 9, when an anti-tank missile collapsed an entire building, claiming the lives of nine Israeli reservists (Y-net, August 10). Four soldiers from Israel’s Egoz (an elite reconnaissance unit) were killed in a Bint Jbail house when it was struck by a Sagger missile (Haaretz, August 6). TOW missiles were used effectively in 2000 against IDF outposts in south Lebanon before the Israeli withdrawal. There are also recent instances of anti-tank weapons being used against Israeli infantry in the field, a costly means of warfare but one that meets two important Hezbollah criteria: the creation of Israeli casualties and the preservation of highly-outnumbered Hezbollah guerrillas who can fire the weapons from a relatively safe distance.

It was suggested that the IDF helicopter brought down by Hezbollah fire on August 12 was hit by an anti-tank missile. Hezbollah claimed to have used a new missile called the Wa’ad (Promise), although the organization occasionally renames existing missiles (Jerusalem Post, August 12). At least one of Israel’s ubiquitous armored bulldozers has also fallen prey to Hezbollah’s missiles.

The Syrian-made RPG-29 was previously used with some success against Israeli tanks in Gaza. Hezbollah also uses this weapon, with a dual-warhead that allows it to penetrate armor. On August 6, the Israeli press reported that IDF intelligence sources claimed that an improved Russian-made version of the RPG-29 was being sold to Syria before transfer to the Islamic Resistance (Haaretz, August 6). In response, Russia’s Foreign Ministry denied any involvement in supplying anti-tank weapons to Hezbollah (RIA Novosti, August 10). The IDF reports that anti-tank missiles and rockets continue to cross the border into Lebanon from Syria, despite the destruction of roads and bridges in the area (Haaretz, August 13).

The Merkava tank has assumed an important role as a symbol of Israeli military might. Their destruction in combat has an important symbolic value for Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s tactical innovations and reliance on anti-tank missiles over more traditional infantry weapons will undoubtedly prompt serious introspection on the part of the IDF in anticipation of renewed conflict along the border.

This article first appeared in the August 15, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus