Israel to Assist Kenya in Battle against al-Shabaab

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Andrew McGregor

November 24, 2011

Kenyan reports say Israeli personnel will help secure potential targets in Kenya from terrorist attack. The Israeli security experts are expected to start work in the next few weeks. According to Israeli ambassador Gil Haskel: “Israel is willing to send consultants to Kenya to help Kenya secure its cities from terrorist threats and share experience with Kenya because the operation in Somalia is very similar to Israel’s operations in the past, first in Lebanon and then in Gaza Strip” (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 18). Since the Kenyan operation in Somalia began in mid-October, terrorists have struck the Kenyan cities of Nairobi, Garissa and Mandera. More attacks are feared as the operation progresses as al-Shabaab leaders call for major terrorist attacks within Kenya.

Kenyan Troops in SomaliaKenyan Troops in Somalia

A statement from the office of Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga said that Israel had agreed to help “rid its territory of fundamentalist elements,” with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserting that “Kenya’s enemies are Israel’s enemies.” The statement also said that the Israeli prime minister had pledged to help create a “coalition against fundamentalism” in East Africa together with Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Tanzania (BBC, November 4). The Kenyan prime minister’s four-day visit to Jerusalem concluded with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on internal security issues (Jerusalem Post, November 15). Various arms deals are expected to follow, with Kenya seeking patrol vehicles and maritime surveillance equipment. The latest meetings follow up on a Kenyan mission to Jerusalem last year to request Israeli military assistance in countering al-Shabaab threats (Shabelle Media Network, February 14; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 11, 2010).

Al-Shabaab is reported to have responded to the initiative by sending agents from mosque to mosque to announce Israel had now joined the Christian Crusaders to destroy Islam in Somalia (Daily Nation, November 18). Referring to the terrorist strikes already carried out inside Kenya, al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mahmud Raage warned Kenya that “things have not begun in earnest yet and it is now a month on. You still have a chance to go back to your border (Nairobi Star, November 17). Shabaab spokesmen also insisted the world’s Muslims had a responsibility to aid the Somali Islamists now that Israel was joining the struggle against them.

Israel has lately intensified its diplomatic efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. A recent meeting between Netanyahu and South Sudan president Salva Kiir was soon followed by visits from Kenyan Prime Minister Odinga and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, who actually bumped into each other in Jerusalem unaware of each other’s presence (Nairobi Star, November 18). Israel indicated last year that it was prepared to recognize the breakaway territory of Somaliland as an independent nation (Golis News, February 11, 2010). It is believed that Israel has an interest in establishing a military outpost in the Somaliland port of Berbera (Shabelle Media Network, February 14, 2010).  However, new complications in Israeli naval access to the Suez Canal since the Egyptian Revolution may put such plans on hold.

The question now is whether the Israeli-Kenyan agreement will provide the necessary fuel to sustain a successful al-Shabaab recruitment campaign in Somalia at a time it is hard pressed on several fronts and awaiting yet another potential military intervention by Ethiopia. TFG cooperation with the Kenyan offensive will also be easily interpreted by Somalis as cooperation with Israel, a development that would present a major setback for international efforts to restore security in the Horn of Africa region. Discussions regarding Kenya joining the existing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) could further complicate the local credibility of American-backed African Union efforts to destroy al-Shabaab.

This article first appeared in the November 24, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Rebellion without Reason: The Strange Survival of Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army

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Andrew McGregor

November 23, 2011

After decades of carrying out unspeakable atrocities and thousands of kidnappings in Central Africa, the elusive commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Joseph Kony, appears to have narrowly escaped capture by the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) twice in recent weeks, with the UPDF emerging from the bush with only some of his clothing and his wash basin to show for their efforts (Daily Monitor [Kampala], October 16).

LRA Commander Joseph Kony

Following in the footsteps of the George Bush administration (which once announced elimination of the LRA as an administration priority), President Barack Obama has turned the attention of his administration towards eliminating the LRA by sending roughly 100 Special Forces and other military specialists to aid Ugandan/South Sudanese/Congolese efforts to destroy the dispersed LRA groups still living in the bush of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  The deployment has been described as a short term effort that is expected to use lessons learned in the U.S. aided 2009 Operation Lightning Thunder fiasco to protect isolated communities from the LRA while military forces hunt down the group’s estimated 200 remaining fighters.  The new weapons to be used against the LRA and its erratic commander, Joseph Kony, are improved communications and military coordination. Villagers will be provided with high-frequency radios to report LRA movements and military commanders from the DRC, South Sudan and Uganda will be given U.S. intelligence gleaned from communications intercepts and satellite imagery (Los Angeles Times, October 25). In addition, both military and civilians will be able to follow the militia’s movements through the “LRA Crisis Tracker” website, funded by U.S. charities (BBC, October 4). [1]

The Acholi Alienation

Kony’s LRA has its roots in the conflict between the Acholi tribe of northern Uganda and other tribes in Uganda’s south that began during the regime of Idi Amin Dada (1971-1979). The Acholi are a sub-group of the Luo people of South Sudan’s Bahr al-Ghazal region who migrated to northern Uganda several centuries ago.

The troubles in Acholiland may be traced back to 1971, when Ugandan president Idi Amin conducted a ruthless purge of Acholi troops in the Ugandan Army. Many of the survivors went into exile, returning to Uganda in 1979 as part of the Tanzanian forces that expelled Idi Amin. A young Ugandan rebel from western Uganda’s Banyankole tribe named Yoweri Museveni was also part of the invading force. A year later Milton Obote returned to power in Kampala, only to preside over atrocities that surpassed anything committed by Idi Amin. Obote unleashed the Acholi troops in the Luwero Triangle region north of Kampala, where they quickly gained a reputation for looting, rape and murder.

By 1985 Uganda was on the verge of collapse, and Obote was overthrown by an Acholi commander, General Tito Okello with the help of fellow Acholi, Brigadier Bazilio Olara-Okello. The general’s rule was short-lived, however, as Museveni broke a pact with his government and seized power, leaving the Acholi troops to flee north to their homeland. Southern troops happily took retribution in Acholiland for the atrocities committed in the Luwero Triangle. By the late 1980s, most Acholi military formations had folded or joined the new religiously inspired Holy Spirit movement led by Alice Lakwena (a.k.a. “The Messenger,” a.k.a. Alice Auma). The young Joseph Kony, who had dropped out of school to become a traditional healer, was also attracted to the movement.

With a mix of pagan and Christian beliefs, Alice Lakwena promised redemption to the Acholi soldiers while organizing them into local defense forces. Ritual observances were intended to make the men bullet-proof, while Lakwena arranged to have them assisted in battle by snakes, bees and legions of spirits while they attacked their enemies in a cross formation. Strategic decisions were often taken while Lakwena was possessed by spirits, including that of an Italian soldier who had been dead for 95 years. On her way to take Kampala, Lakwena was defeated near Jinja. She escaped and died at a refugee camp in Kenya in 2007, aged 50. [2]In the meantime the Acholi and other northern tribes were forced into IDP camps which have helped neutralize the armed opposition to the Museveni regime, but also maintain a high degree of hostility among displace northerners living in miserable conditions towards the government.

With little of coherence emerging from the LRA in terms of political aims and beliefs, it has been left to Acholi living in the international diaspora (especially London) to provide an intellectual/political framework for the LRA’s activities. These exiled supporters of the movement maintain, like Kony, that atrocities are the work of UPDF troops in disguise with the intention of discrediting the LRA. While their statements contain criticism of Museveni’s “one-party rule” and call for Ugandan federalism, free elections and political reform, the Ugandan government has been more successful in providing a counter-narrative that characterizes the LRA leadership as erratic, purposeless and obsessed with bizarre religious beliefs. [3]

The LRA and the Bush Kingdom of Joseph Kony

Kony is known for rapid and continual changes of mood. It is clear that he regards most peace negotiations as a trap or a cover for attack. The barely literate LRA commander is known for delivering a steady stream of convincing sermons with creative interpretations of bible verses that justify his violence. Like his Acholi predecessor, Alice Lakwena, Kony is frequently possessed by spirits.

Kony turns to the Bible for precedents to vindicate his preference for polygamy, abductions and amputations. In particular he cites Matthew 5, 29-30 to defend the common LRA practices of severing limbs, lips and noses: “If your right eye is your trouble, gouge it out and throw it away! Better to lose part of your body than to have it all cast into Gehenna [i.e. hell]. Again, if your right hand is your trouble, cut it off and throw it away! Better to lose party of your body than to have it all cast into Gehenna.” LRA massacres are intended to show that government security forces are incapable of defending the populace. Kony’s three main stated objectives may be described in the following way:

  •  Impose the Ten Commandments on Ugandan society
  •  Restore Acholi culture
  • Overthrow the Museveni regime.

Kony’s dreadlocked warriors are forbidden to smoke or drink alcohol. The consumption of mutton, pork (Kony considers pigs to be ghosts) and pigeon are all prohibited. There are also a number of standing orders concerning water, such as a prohibition on shouting while crossing rivers. Total obedience to Kony is mandatory for his fighters but excellent performance in carrying out his wishes is rewarded by the presentation of kidnapped girls. Pre-pubescent girls are a favorite target for abduction due to the belief they are less likely to be infected with AIDS. Male children are abducted to replace fallen fighters, their youth providing a clean slate for Kony to impose his own vision of morality. In the fashion of most religious cults, the LRA now provides these youth with family and purpose. Adults are used for forced labor and may be released or killed when no longer needed – some in the region have been subject to multiple abductions. Due to battlefield losses, desertion and the movement’s extended absence from north Uganda, it is probably safe to say that most members of the LRA now have no connection to the Acholi people.

The local Acholi often support the LRA to earn cash by selling the group marked-up goods or out of concern for abducted relatives. Others support the LRA’s opposition to Museveni, who has very little support in northern Uganda. Supplies of food, arms and other materiel from Khartoum as part of a proxy war with Uganda allowed the LRA to grow in the bush to a force of over 10,000. From their bases in South Sudan the LRA were encouraged to make local attacks against South Sudanese civilians and even to cross the Ugandan border to attack South Sudanese refugee camps there.  Thanks to the patronage of Khartoum, the LRA found itself well-armed with a variety of Soviet/Russian made equipment, including recoilless rifles, anti-tank weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines and the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle. At the height of the struggle between Khartoum and the Ugandan-backed SPLA, Kony’s group was even allowed to open offices in Juba and Khartoum. [4]

Life is precarious in the LRA, dependent entirely upon Kony’s moods and the current state of his paranoia. The LRA commander killed one of his chief lieutenants, Alex Otti Lagony, in 1999, opening the door to a series of murders of top LRA commanders who no longer had Kony’s full trust. According to Ugandan journalist Billie O’Kadameri, “When you are with him, it’s like he cannot kill a fly, yet he has a reputation as the deadliest of all commanders. He would give orders to kill as if he was giving orders to serve food.” [5] At the same time, however, many ex-members of the movement, including abductees, have spoken of the sense of purpose they found through a movement that gave them ranks and rewards they could never achieve otherwise.

Operation Iron Fist

In 1999, Sudan and Uganda reached an agreement to stop supplying each other’s rebel factions in their long-standing proxy war. However, Sudan’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) continued to supply Kony as Khartoum sought to keep its options alive.

With serious negotiations finally underway in Sudan in 2002 to bring an end to the two-decade old Sudanese civil war, Khartoum gave the Ugandan military permission to pursue the LRA across the border and attack their bases in South Sudan. The operation was not a success, however, with Kony fleeing to the remote Imatong Mountains where his forces massacred 400 people. LRA activities in northern Uganda actually intensified during Operation Iron Fist.

Unable to defeat the LRA in the field, Kampala referred Kony’s case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in December, 2003. The ICC eventually charged Kony and four others (Okot Odhiambo, Vincent Otti, Dominic Ongwen and Raska Lukwiya) with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The move was opposed by many in northern Uganda who preferred traditional methods of conflict resolution and Kony has repeatedly cited the ICC’s charges of war crimes as the main issue preventing him from coming in from the bush. Once the ICC becomes involved, however, it is nearly impossible to ask it to abandon its prosecution efforts. Under ICC rules, Kampala cannot request the suspension of arrest warrants once issued, even if Uganda were to reverse the ratification of its agreement to sign on to the ICC. In the meantime, attrition seems to be taking care of at least some of the problem; Odhiambo and eight other commanders were massacred by Kony in April 2008, Otti and a number of his followers were killed in a gunfight with Kony loyalists in October, 2007, and Lukwiya was killed by the UPDF in August, 2006. Despite committing a series of horrific crimes, Ongwen (a.k.a. “The White Ant”) has received support from various academics in the West as a “victim” who is not responsible for his actions since he was abducted and integrated into the LRA while only ten-years-old. [6]

Riek Machar meets with LRA Commanders

Operation Lighting Thunder

After the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) took effective control of South Sudan in 2005, it became a priority for the acting government in the southern capital of Juba to drive the LRA out of South Sudan. Kony’s surrender seemed tantalizingly close in April 2008 following several years of efforts by South Sudanese vice president Riek Machar to bring an end to LRA rampages. Kony, however, failed to show up for the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) after keeping Machar and a number of dignitaries and observers waiting for days in a bush clearing in Western Equatoria (see Terrorism Monitor, April 16, 2008).

In February 2009, Kony led some 200 followers into the southeastern Central African Republic (CAR). With this area effectively out of the control of the weak central CAR authorities the UPDF was invited in to eliminate Kony’s group, which had begun using a base at Gbassiguri for raids into South Sudan’s Western Equatoria province (New Vision [Kampala], February 27, 2009; September 7, 2009). The LRA was also quick to attack its new neighbors, abducting over 100 children and adolescents from the CAR village of Obo in March, 2009 (Daily Monitor [Kampala], March 12, 2009; April 10, 2009). Fighting in Western Equatoria between the LRA and the local “Arrow Boys” self-defense groups became increasing brutal. With the LRA short on ammunition, Kony’s fighters used amputations and mutilations to terrorize the local population while the Arrow Boys began treating LRA captives in kind (Sudan Tribune, March 6, 2009).

Like the earlier Operation Iron Fist, Operation Lightning Thunder only succeeded in making things worse. Backed by American advisers working out of Uganda, the operation was a major undertaking by the armed forces of Uganda, South Sudan and the DRC. As the shattered LRA scattered into the thick bush the pursuing militaries lost most of the tactical advantages provided by better arms and equipment, finding themselves reduced to splitting up into platoon-sized groups hunting even smaller groups of LRA through the DRC’s Garamba Forest. Groups of LRA fugitives expressed their displeasure at being chased by their usual methods of massacre, mutilation and abduction in the isolated communities of the eastern DRC. As the operation ground to a close in mid-2009, it was generally recognized as a setback in the elimination of the LRA rather than a triumph, despite the elimination of most of the LRA’s bases and several of its leaders.

The SPLA, however, had not given up on the hunt for Kony, and decided to deploy its Special Forces in the hunt for Kony. In Juba it was widely believed that the ruling Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) was continuing to provide covert aid and assistance to the LRA (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 4, 2009; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 10, 2009). In December, 2009 LRA forces under the command of Dominic Ongwen are believed to have been responsible for the massacre of roughly 300 civilians in the DRC village of Makombo after locals objected to acts of rape, murder and hundreds of abductions carried out by the group (New Vision, March 28, 2010; Daily Monitor, March 29, 2010). [7]

Conclusion

Kony’s forces no longer fight on behalf of the Acholi, nor do they fight in their interests.  Forced from Uganda and their bases in Sudan, the sole remaining cause of the LRA is the preservation of the LRA.  The vague ideology of the movement has always served as little more than a mask for the personality cult surrounding Joseph Kony despite the efforts of some to cloak the movement in the guise of Acholi liberation. To fight, to murder, to mutilate – these are ways to satisfy Kony and live to kill another day. The rewards for loyalty and success are tangible, while the penalty for failure and disloyalty is an ever real threat.

Despite being one of the world’s most incommunicative rebel leaders and never having shown particular indications of ideological brilliance, Kony has nevertheless survived by masterfully manipulating those who would seek to use him, whether as a pawn in Sudan’s civil war or as a means of maintaining just the right amount of insecurity in the expanding military state of Uganda.  American military cooperation for the Ugandan effort against the LRA will further cement ties between the two militaries, which already cooperate closely in Somalia.

Both the war in Uganda and the aid programs that sustain it have become a kind of industry. The Ugandan Army is very much a profit-making institution, whether through diverting public funds to provide for thousands of “ghost soldiers” (in which arms, food, clothing and salaries for non-existent troops are collected by corrupt officers for resale, sometimes to the LRA), or through the exploitation of natural resources in areas where the Ugandan Army operates, such as the teak wood of South Sudan or the minerals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Efforts have even been made to tie the LRA to the wider global “War on Terrorism” in an attempt to tap U.S. funding for counterterrorism campaigns; according to Robert Masolo, the Directorf-General of Uganda’s External Security Organization (ESO), Osama bin Laden trained “the LRA into killer squads in Sudan, along with other al-Qaeda terrorists…” (New Vision, June 12, 2007).

The continuing threat posed by Kony’s LRA helps preserve the Museveni regime and the Ugandan military budget. Northern victims of the LRA now gathered in IDP camps have never supported Museveni or his party, so there is little political cost inside Uganda for a prolonged counter-insurgency. Peace talks have often been interrupted by government attacks or offensives, often on the grounds that Kony was using the talks to regroup or re-arm. Kony has also walked out of many negotiations, some of which seemed frustratingly close to bringing an end to the LRA’s depredations. However, the introduction of new tracking technology and military assistance from U.S. Special Forces may soon spell the end of Joseph Kony unless the “spirits” that possess him can once more save the LRA leader from imminent destruction.

Notes

1. http://www.lracrisistracker.com/.

2. Heike, Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits, War in Northern Uganda, 1985-97, Ohio University Press, 2000.

3. Mareike Schomerus, “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview,” Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2007.

4. Matthew Green, The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa’s Most Wanted,: London, 2008, p. 175.

5. Quoted in Green, 2008, p.186

6/ See the statement of University of British Columbia professor Erin Baines, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56XadQ32lkw, and “Complicating victims and perpetrators in Uganda: On Dominic Ongwen,” Justice and Reconciliation Project Northern Uganda/ Liu Institute for Global Issues Field Note, 7 October 2008, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/JRP_dominicongwen.pdf.

7. See http://lracrisistracker.theresolve.org/media/video/makombo-massacres.

This article first appeared in the November 23, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor.

The Fatimid Return: Shi’a Politics in Post-Revolution Egypt

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, November 17, 2011

Dr. Ahmad Rasim al-Nafis, a 59-year-old physician and university professor, has formed a Shiite political party in overwhelmingly Sunni Egypt. Known as al-Tahrir (Victory) Party, the group is still awaiting approval from Egyptian authorities to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Religious-based political parties are banned under Egyptian law, but several Sunni and Salafist movements have managed to gain official endorsement for new religiously-inspired political formations. Though no official figure is available, there are believed to be between 15,000 to 20,000 Shi’a Muslims in Egypt, though some sources put the number as high as 60,000.

Fatimid 1Dr. Ahmad Rasim al-Nafis (al-Bawaba)

In a recent interview, Dr. al-Nafis denied that his party was sectarian in nature, claiming to have support from certain liberals, communists, Copts and Sufis (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 13). According to al-Nafis, “If you want to classify us, we might call [al-Tahrir] a democratic, left-leaning, Islamic party… that calls on Egyptians to unite, follow the path of resistance and cut off the hand of American and Western hegemony in the region.”

News of the party’s formation has nonetheless angered Egypt’s Salafist community, which opposes the Shi’a as “a deviant group which believes in the hidden Imam,” as well as other various theological offenses. Salafist leader Dr. Gamal al-Marakibi has claimed the Tahrir Party will be controlled by Iran and act solely in its interests (Aljewar.org, May 25). However, a number of Egypt’s Salafist groups have been accused of receiving funds from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, with Salafists coming under criticism after Saudi flags were raised during a massive Salafist rally in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in late July (Ilaf.com, August 3).

Iran is eager to use the Egyptian Revolution as an opening for enhanced relations between the two countries, though Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad recently warned that “Enemies are concerned about the closeness of Iran-Egypt relations since they know there would be no place for the hegemonic powers if they stand by each other” (Bikya Masr [Cairo], November 8). Al-Nafis maintains that Egypt’s relations with Muslim Iran should at least be at the level of Cairo’s relations with Israel: “We should not be accused of treason because of our striving for this.”

Al-Nafis downplays the growing political rift between Sunnis and Shiites that has evolved into a type of Cold War between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran: “The matter of the Shiite minority and the Sunni majority does not occupy our minds. We are Egyptian Muslims. We are proud of our Islam and our Egyptian-ness. We are proud of our position in the community, a position that does not spring from sectarian affiliation.” Nonetheless, sectarian tensions in Egypt have worsened as the result of a small but growing number of Egyptian Sunni Muslims converting to Shi’ism, partly as a result of the appeal of Lebanon’s Shi’a Hezbollah movement after its successful defense of southern Lebanon against Israeli invasion in 2006. Al-Nafis has firmly denied receiving Iranian funds to help spread Shi’ism in Egypt and claims such charges are only attempts to divide Egyptians through sectarianism.

Twelver Imami Shi’ism (al-Shi’a al- Imamiyah al-Ithna Ashariyah) was recognized as “a school of thought that is religiously correct to follow in worship” by the Shaykh of Cairo’s al-Azhar University, Mahmoud Shalut, in 1959 (al-Sha’ab [Cairo], July 7, 1959). Under pressure from senior Saudi Wahhabi scholar Sa’ad bin Hamdan al-Ghamdi over his recognition of Shi’ism as an acceptable form of Islam, Shalut’s successor at al-Azhar, Shaykh Ahmad al-Tayeb, reaffirmed the University’s position on Shi’ism in 2010. Nonetheless, Egypt’s growing Salafist movement is unlikely to take a positive view of the creation of a Shi’a-based political party in Egypt.

Fatimid 2Egypt was once one of the world’s most important centers for Shi’ism when the Isma’ili Shi’a Fatimid dynasty of Tunisia took power in Egypt in 909 C.E. Following the overthrow of the Fatimid Caliphate by the Sunni Ayyubids in 1171, many Egyptian Shiites fled to southern Egypt or Yemen. Most Shi’a in modern Egypt are “Twelver” Imami Shiites settled along the Red Sea coast, descendants of immigrants from Lebanon and Iran.

Muhammad al-Darini, an oft-imprisoned leader in the Egyptian Shi’a community (and a convert from Sunni Islam), told U.S. Embassy officials in 2009 that Iran should not be equated with Shi’a Islam, noting that “Iran looks after its national interests first, not Shi’a interests.” In this sense, he suggested that Iran was more likely to deal with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood than Egypt’s Shi’a community (WikiLeaks; U.S. Embassy Cairo cable of March 31, 2009, released on August 20, 2011).

This article first appeared in the November 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.  

Syrian Opposition Statements Disagree on Approaches to Resistance

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, November 17, 2011

The Syrian revolt against the Assad regime has been particularly intense in the city of Homs, as has been the regime’s violent response. Homs-based opposition leader and self-described “field coordinator of the revolution in Homs” Husayn Iryan recently described resistance operations in Homs in an interview with a pan-Arab daily (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 12). An industrial city of 1.5 million, Homs is located 160 km north of Damascus. The majority of its residents are Sunni Muslims, though there are significant minorities of Alawis and Christians. Armed clashes began in Homs in May, with the anti-regime Free Syrian Army launching operations in Homs in October.

Homs 1Iryan presents an optimistic evaluation of the resistance efforts in Homs despite the daily “horrible crimes and massacres” perpetrated by the regime in that city: “Homs has managed in the last weeks to exhaust the Syrian regime and to weaken it to the extreme limits through non-stop protest movements despite all the restrictions, the siege and the massacres that the regime commits in the city against its sons.”

Iryan explains the viciousness of the regime’s crackdown on the opposition in Homs by pointing to four factors:

  • The city’s proximity to Lebanon and the government’s fears that this might enable Homs to become “like Benghazi” and slip from the regime’s control.
  • The Khalid bin al-Walid battalion of the armed opposition was formed in Homs, where splits in the regular army first occurred. The battalion, named for the 7th century Arab conqueror of Syria, is active in resisting the ongoing siege by loyalist forces. The formation of a second battalion of defectors called the Ali bin Abi Taleb Battalion (under the supervision of the Khalid bin al-Walid Battalion) was announced in the Homs Province city of Houla in late September (al-Jazeera, September 27).
  • Homs was the first city to initiate civil disobedience, with citizens refusing to pay taxes and civil servants refusing to carry out their work.
  • Revolutionary forces in Homs have inflicted casualties on the army, the intelligence services and government-sponsored “thugs” in the last few months.

For this resistance, Iryan says Homs, al-Qusayr and other towns and villages in the Homs Province had collectively suffered over a thousand dead, many of these consigned to mass graves. According to Iryan, even flight from Homs has become impossible due to the government cordon around the city: “Those who enter Homs can consider themselves doomed and those who manage to leave it consider that they have been given a new life.”

Unlike the militancy of the Homs opposition, a vastly different assessment of the Syrian revolution came in an interview with Hasan Abd-al-Azim, the general coordinator of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change in Syria. Al-Azim’s committee represents some fifteen political parties, including Arab leftist groups and some Kurdish political parties: “We have parties whose hands are not covered in blood and corruption. We are hoping to have a pluralistic, parliamentary, and democratic state and a new system that satisfies all the aspirations of the Syrian people…”

Homs 2Syrian Government Patrol in Homs, 2013 (BBC)

Al-Azim, whose movement favors an “Arab solution” and opposes foreign intervention or the imposition of a no-fly zone, speaks of a “peaceful revolution in Syria which has not used weapons or violence as Al-Asad’s regime is claiming” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 11). In asserting the possibility that real change can be brought about in Syria by peaceful protest, al-Azim overlooks numerous reports of violence and the attempted assassination of the Yemeni president to cite “the peaceful Yemeni revolution that has entered its tenth month without the people using weapons, though weapons in Yemen are available in all houses and streets.”

A veteran of various left-wing Arab nationalist parties, Abdul Azim has rejected a militant approach to the resistance, backing a moderate package of reforms leading to democracy that does not necessarily involve overthrowing the Assad regime (al-Akhbar [Beirut], September 21).

The disparate approaches to revolution in Syria in these two statements reflect the wider divisions that have plagued the Syrian opposition, differences that boiled over when some Syrian opposition figures were assaulted by other opposition members when they tried to enter the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo for a meeting with the League’s secretary-general (al-Quds al-Arabi, November 11).

 

This article first appeared in the November 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.  

Was al-Shabaab’s Mogadishu Withdrawal a Strategic Retreat in the Style of Moscow or Kabul?

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Andrew McGregor

November 10, 2011

A review of the strategy behind al-Shabaab’s August withdrawal from Mogadishu that recently appeared on jihadi websites has compared the pull-out with Russia’s scorched-earth withdrawal into the Russian interior during Napoleon’s invasion and the Taliban withdrawal into the mountains from Kabul in 2001 (ansar1.info, October 25).

Ugandan AMISOM Soldier on Patrol in Mogadishu

In an article called “Mogadishu… the New Kabul!” author Abu Abdul Malik notes that prior to the withdrawal, al-Shabaab had seized 95% of Mogadishu, but the main facilities of the city, including its port, airport and presidential palace remained under the control of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

High security and inaccessibility prevented al-Shabaab from taking control of the military bases of TFG and African Union troops. In this situation, “a nucleus of the enemy remained which would enable them to grow through the importation of new weapons and more soldiers and training Somali hirelings from abroad.”

Al-Shabaab’s failure to eliminate these bases led to the further intervention of “foreign advisors from France and America, as well as mercenary Blackwater forces.” The Somali militants concluded that “prolonging this course of action did not serve the interests of al-Shabaab in any way…”

Following the failure of al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive in Mogadishu, the perceived solution was to abandon the long urban warfare campaign and turn to guerrilla warfare in areas controlled by AMISOM by forgoing the occupation of the city. This move allowed al-Shabaab to once more resume the offensive initiative by allowing it to determine when and where it wished to engage the enemy and in what numbers. While AMISOM forces were concentrated in a square kilometer of Mogadishu they were almost unassailable; however, forcing the undermanned African Union mission to attempt to occupy the whole of Mogadishu drew the normally reticent AU troops from their bases and spread them out across a city rife with opportunities for ambush. The result has been at least one highly successful attack on patrolling AMISOM forces (see Terrorism Monitor, November 3). According to Abu Abdul Malik: “Mogadishu has become what Moscow became to Napoleon. Just let the enemy come out, he will fall in the great Mogadishu trap! … Let them become intoxicated as Napoleon was intoxicated by Moscow and as the Russians and Americans were by Kabul…”

This article first appeared in the November 10, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Kenya’s Navy Joins Counter-Terrorist Operations Off Somalia

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Andrew McGregor

November 10, 2011

Kenya’s navy has joined the Kenyan military offensive in Somalia with operations designed to end al-Shabaab or third-party resupply or arms, fuel and other materiel to Shabaab-held territories in southern Somalia, secure Kenyan waters from terrorist infiltrators and prepare conditions for a two-pronged land and sea assault on the Shabaab-held port of Kismayo. Kenyan forces crossed the border into southern Somalia on October 16 as part of Operation Linda Nchi

The main objective of the Kenyan campaign is to seize the port of Kismayo, a vital source of revenues for al-Shabaab as well as a connection between the Islamist movement and the wider world. With al-Shabaab’s loss of the lucrative Mogadishu markets last August and a summer long drought that created massive out-migration from al-Shabaab-held regions of southern Somalia, the loss of Kismayo would represent a severe body-blow to the Somali militants. Kenyan military sources have indicated that the Kenyan navy will play an important part in the attack on Kismayo (Daily Nation [Nairobi], October 30). Kenyan jets have already started bombardment of the port region. Kenya’s navy possesses an amphibious assault vessel, though a risky amphibious assault on Kismayo would be ambitious for a nation still in the early days of its first extraterritorial operation.

Kenyan Naval Ensign

Kenya’s small navy consists largely of a handful of small British-built missile boats, Spanish-built patrol boats and a number of American and Spanish-built inshore patrol vessels (IPVs). In recent years the Kenyan Navy has come under local criticism for failing to do enough to tackle the problems of piracy, narcotics smuggling and illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Kenyan waters (Nairobi Chronicle, February 11, 2009). However, Kenya’s Navy has been hampered in carrying out deep-water operations by deficiencies in its fleet. The fleet’s two Spanish-built patrol boats (Shuja and Shupavu) have had unexpected range and sea-handling problems, while another ship designed for long-range patrols, the KNS Jasiri, has sat in a Spanish dock since its completion in 2005 due to an unresolved dispute between Kenya and the European contractor (Nairobi Chronicle, December 16, 2008; DefenceWeb, July 4).

Nonetheless, Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia has been greatly aided by the return of the missile boats Nyayo and Umoja from an over two-year refit in Italy. The two 1987 vintage ships had their Otomat missiles removed as part of the refit but were otherwise extensively modernized. Their return has given the Kenyan military greater confidence in their ability to control the southern Somali coastline during the ongoing operations.

On November 2, a Kenyan patrol boat in Somali waters sank a ship they claimed was transporting fuel and al-Shabaab fighters to Kuday in the Bajuni coral islands off the southern Somali coast. Military spokesmen claimed all 18 al-Shabaab militants aboard the ship were killed (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 3; Capital FM [Nairobi], November 3; The Standard [Nairobi], November 4).  [1] The Bajuni coral islands of Kuday, Ndoa, Chuvaye, Koyama, Fuma Iyu na Tini and Nchoni were traditionally inhabited by the non-Somali Bajuni culture, speaking a dialect of Swahili. Somalis began forcing the Bajuni from the islands during the Siad Barre regime, a trend that actually worsened after the collapse of his government in 1991 as many Bajuni sought refuge in Kenya.

A second ship was sunk on November 4, when a Kenyan ship opened fire on a vessel coming from the region of Ras Kamboni in southern Somalia. According to Kenyan military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir, “The boat was challenged to stop for identification but continued to approach the Kenya Navy at high speed, and consequently they fired on it” (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 4).

Kenyan Sailors on Parade

Soon after the attack, however, Kenyan fishermen in the Magarini district claimed that the eight killed were local fishermen. According to the three survivors, the unarmed fishermen had identified themselves and surrendered before the Kenyan ship opened fire, though the commander of the Kenyan ship denies any such surrender took place. [2] A district commissioner later affirmed the identity of the survivors as local fishermen (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 4). Kenyan officials say the government has issued clear instructions to fishermen that fishing off northern Kenya must be done in the daytime while fishing in Somali waters is prohibited (The Standard [Nairobi], November 4).

Kenya’s military has also warned merchant ships in the Indian Ocean against helping foreign fighters in Somalia to escape to Yemen. Kenya claims foreign fighters have gathered in Barawe and Marka to escape from the Kenyan offensive (Daily Nation [Nairobi], November 4).

Notes

1. For video see http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/11/18-shabaab-killed-as-kenya-sinks-boat/.

2. See Nairobi TV interview, November 7, 2011:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBke-R0FEXo.

This article first appeared in the November 10, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Al-Shabaab Counteroffensive in Mogadishu Threatens African Union’s Military Gains

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Andrew McGregor

November 3, 2011

The cautious consolidation of its control over Mogadishu by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) encountered a pair of serious setbacks in late October as al-Shabaab Islamists ambushed a Burundian patrol on October 20 and mounted a suicide attack on Ugandan troops in their base at the German Metal Factory near Mogadishu Stadium.

ugandan soldier draggedBody of Ugandan Peacekeeper Dragged by Somalis Through the Streets of Mogadishu (Feisal Omar)

A statement from al-Shabaab describing the “Mogadish Bloodbath” claimed two “martyrdom seekers” disguised as Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops infiltrated the camp housing Ugandan troops and forces of Somalia’s TFG and set off their bombs, killing themselves and a number of Ugandan soldiers. This much is acknowledged by AMISOM; the Shabaab statement, however, describes a more complete victory obtained when mujahideen followed the blasts by raiding the base, securing all access routes in and out and massacring all Ugandan and TFG forces contained within. [1] Al-Shabaab spokesmen later claimed at least one of the two suicide attackers was an American citizen who had joined the Somali mujahideen (AFP, October 30). Uganda’s Lieutenant General Katumba Wamala claimed the Ugandans had suffered only three killed and two wounded in the attack, though some reports have suggested far greater losses (Sunday Nation [Nairobi], October 30). Nevertheless, sources in Mogadishu have confirmed that gunmen wearing TFG uniforms rushed the camp after the bombings, killing at least ten soldiers (AP, October 29; Reuters, October 29). Following the attack, a senior AMISOM officer promised that the African Union forces would soon “destroy” al-Shabaab (Shabelle Media Network, October 28; Horseed Media, October 28).

Corpses Alleged to be those of Burundian Soldiers Put on Display by al-Shabaab

Though al-Shabaab claimed to have killed anywhere from 76 to 150 Burundian troops in the earlier ambush in Dayniile district and displayed dozens of bodies wearing AMISOM gear afterward, the real figure appears to be closer to 50. Burundian authorities have claimed a much lower figure of ten killed, but this figure appears intended to ward off domestic opposition to the mission in politically volatile Burundi.The Bujumbura government reaffirmed its commitment to the AMISOM mission after the clash, urging its troops to “double their efforts and vigilance” while calling on the international community to supply the African Union peacekeepers with enough “hardware” to carry out their mandate (PANA Online [Dakar], October 27).

Al-Shabaab now describes their sudden August withdrawal from most of Mogadishu not as a sign of weakness, but rather as a strategic operation designed to focus efforts on causing as much damage to AMISOM as possible without having to defend ground. According to the Shabaab statement on the Dayniile clash of October 20, “The recent battles have lured the AU forces, who previously sought refuge behind their heavily fortified bases and underground bunkers, out into the open; thereby exposing their intense vulnerabilities and proving their inability to fight in an urban area” (Ansar1.info, October 24; Mareeg Online, October 24; Africa Review [Nairobi], October 25).  Al-Shabaab’s general withdrawal from Mogadishu has presented the undermanned African Union mission with the dilemma of how to occupy and consolidate its gains in Mogadishu without spreading AU forces too thin. According to AMISOM spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Paddy Ankunda: “The outer north and eastern fringes of the city must still be cleared, but key ground and buildings are no longer under the control of the extremists” (AFP, October 11). The Shabaab strategy also has the benefit of freeing up forces to fend off Kenyan occupation of the Shabaab-held port of Kismayo, which would constitute a crippling financial loss to the Islamist movement.

Note

  1. Press Office, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, “The Mogadishu Bloodbath – 80 Ugandan Soldiers Killed,” October 29, 2011.

This article first appeared in the November 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Discusses Future of Egypt and Relations with the United States

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Andrew McGregor

November 3, 2011

A series of once inconceivable meetings between U.S. representatives and leaders of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood [MB] in October presented a triumph for the Brothers’ efforts to establish themselves as responsible partners in the post-Revolution democratic transition. In the wake of these developments, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s leader, Dr. Muhammad Badi, discussed the implications of these discussions and the Brotherhood’s role in Egypt’s political transition (Akhbar al-Yawm [Cairo], October 30).

 

Dr. Muhammad Badi, Leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Regarding the movement’s recent contacts with U.S. representatives, MB General Guide Dr. Badi recalls that not long ago the United States regarded such contacts as “100% taboo” and urges Washington to deal with new political realities in the Middle East: “The U.S. Administration has to understand well the lesson of the Arab spring revolutions. We hope it will deal with the peoples not rulers because rulers are bound to go. Consequently the interests of the Americans are not guaranteed with the rulers. So I hope they will deal with the Egyptian people as being the source of the powers. The people are the side to wager on now.”

Though the Brotherhood has emphasized it is not seeking a majority in the new parliament and is not running a presidential candidate to mute claims the Brothers are seeking to take control of Egypt, the Brothers’ political wing, Ḥizb al-Hurriya wa al-’Adala (Freedom and Justice Party – FJP), has nonetheless emerged as the strongest political faction in the current political environment. Badi insists that this is not a sin or crime for which the movement should seek forgiveness: “. It is the harvest of jihad and struggle and of having stood in the face of injustice for tens of years. We paid a dear price for it. Suffice it to mention that over the past 15 years alone 40,000 MB members were detained.” Nonetheless, Badi maintains that reforming Egypt will take a broad, unified effort: “We cannot run Egypt, live in Egypt, or win in the elections except through accord. This is a foregone conclusion, for we know that Egypt’s problems are too heavy to be borne by any single faction under any circumstances.”

However, deliberately avoiding responsibility for the inevitable failings (real or perceived) of the new government may well be a practical political strategy for the MB. As Badi notes, those who are demanding a new government must realize that such a government will face a host of problems accumulated over thirty years: “[The new government] will face problems and those who demanded its appointment will go down to Tahrir Square to call for its downfall. This is why we must realize that we are in a transitional period.”

Despite the Brotherhood’s insistence it is not seeking to take power in the new government, the movement is taking measures to make sure its MPs are among the most effective and least tainted by corruption in the new government by excluding all candidates involved in unethical behavior or financial irregularities. According to Badi, an educational camp has been set up for the training of all MB candidates

While observers have noted a proliferation of new MB offices in nearly every district of Egypt since the Revolution, Badi rejects accusations that the movement was suddenly in possession of funds from abroad: “Not a single cent entered our pocket from any funds or financing. We are the people most concerned about transparency and integrity because we fear Allah. We can never accept any funds from any quarter under any circumstances.” Dr. Badi warns that the Revolution is under threat from both “vested interests” inside Egypt and external interests that used to benefit from the pliable nature of the former regime, which was always ready to respond positively to foreign demands.

Like most of the MB’s leadership, Badi is a veteran of repeated terms in Egypt’s prisons, but he believes that the detentions of the movement’s leaders gives the group credibility among the Egyptian masses and provided an opportunity to reflect on the correct course for Egypt: “While we were in prison we were thinking of what is in Egypt’s interest, like Prophet Joseph who entered jail on a false charge but despite this kept thinking about how to save Egypt.”

Last month Dr Muhammad Sa’d al-Katatni, the secretary general of the FJP met with an official from the U.S. National Security Organization and the First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo at the FJP headquarters in Cairo (Bikya Masr [Cairo], October 6). Shortly thereafter, a delegation of assistants to U.S. House representatives met with MB Secretary General Dr. Mahmud Husayn and movement spokesman Dr. Mahmud Ghazlanon October 18.

In an interview with a pan-Arab news agency, al-Katatni downplayed the significance of the unprecedented dialogue with official American representatives: “The United States has interests in the region, and if observers see that the FJP is close to power, then it is natural that the Americans should hasten to initiate dialogue with it to know its inclinations. This falls also within diplomatic norms and not only within reconciliation” (Ilaf.com, October 3).

According to MB spokesman Dr. Ghazlan, the MB leaders assured the Americans that the movement had set a ceiling of acquiring only a third of available parliamentary seats and would not run a candidate for president “because the Brotherhood was used as a scarecrow in the past,” adding that the Americans’ understanding of Islam “included frivolities, distortions and misconceptions. We explained to them the status of non-Muslims in the Islamic State and that they have the freedom of belief and worship and to apply the rules of their religion in dealings and to perform their rites in full freedom” (al-Hayat, October 21).

This article first appeared in the November 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Egyptian Police Strike is Latest Challenge to National Security

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Andrew McGregor

October 28, 2011

While Egypt’s military not only survived the January 25 Revolution, but succeeded in taking complete control of all government functions, the internal collapse of the nation’s Interior Ministry continues (see Terrorism Monitor, April 7, 2011; Terrorism Monitor Briefs, July 22).  Responsible for Egypt’s domestic security and policing, the Interior Ministry was blamed for much of the violence inflicted on demonstrators during the Revolution. Former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly is now facing charges connected to the deaths of protestors, as are a number of other police officials. However, many police never returned to work after the Revolution, while others have engaged in anti-Ministry protests and arson attacks on police facilities. Now a series of police strikes has broken out across Egypt that threatens to bring an end to the Egyptian Interior Ministry in its current form.

Striking Egyptian Police, Cairo

Demoralization is the dominant trend in Egypt’s police forces since the Revolution, with many fearing prosecution by the nation’s new military rulers. The police strikes are also part of a larger wave of labor unrest that continues to sweep Egypt since the Revolution, with damaging effects on the national economy and the nation’s tourism industry, an important source of jobs and foreign currency.

The police strikes began on October 24. Thousands of police have gathered in a camp outside the gates of the Interior Ministry headquarters in Cairo, while in the Red Sea Province city of Hughada, striking police stormed the local police headquarters and destroyed the office of its director. Police at Cairo’s international airport have erected tents in the airport’s arrivals hall (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 26). Most importantly, the strikers’ have threatened not to provide security for Egypt’s November 27 parliamentary elections.

Though he was regarded as an unpopular choice within the ministry, new Interior Minister Mansur Essawy took office last March by pledging he would restore security and reduce the role played in Egyptian life by the security services (Ahram Online, March 23; al-Jazeera, March 7). However, since the revolution police are rarely seen on the streets and Egyptians have been urged to take measures to ensure their own security. Crime rates are soaring and car-theft has become an epidemic as police fail or refuse to respond to complaints (Ahram Online, October 26).

Many of the protestors’ grievances predate the Revolution, but complainants at that time were routinely met with investigation, punishment or dismissal. Though the nature of the exact grievances differs according to local circumstances, most can be grouped into the following categories:

  • Calls for the resignation of Interior Minister Mansur Essawy.
  • Higher wages, though some police have said this does not necessarily entail greater funds from the public purse, only the proper distribution of funds now stolen by senior police officials.
  • Access to police hospitals, which in practice are only open to senior police officers and their friends and families.
  • Improved working hours and coverage of transportation expenses.
  • The dismissal of a number of police generals known for corruption and their close ties to former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly.
  • An end to military trials for policemen. Some striking policemen claim it was fear of military trials for disobedience that was responsible for their brutal treatment of protestors during the Revolution (Bikya Masr [Cairo], October 25; al-Masry al-Youm, October 24, October 26).

Some demonstrating policemen have complained their representatives have emerged from discussions from senior ministry officials with raises for themselves, but nothing for their comrades (Daily News Egypt, October 25).

Civilian ministry workers have also joined the protests, claiming they are treated worse than the policemen, although demands such as institutionalized recruitment of their sons and daughters for ministry jobs seem to reflect the ways of the old regime (Daily News Egypt, October 25).

On October 25, the ministry issued a statement saying it had agreed to most of the strikers’ demands, but warned that it would not tolerate any threats to the security of the November parliamentary elections (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 26). Deputy Interior Minister General Abd al-Latif al-Bidiny offered some observations on the strike on state TV on October 26, acknowledging the legitimacy of the strikers’ demands while suggesting the entire structure of the Interior Ministry needed to be replaced, but only after the political and security spheres had stabilized (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 26).

This article was first published in the October 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Former Deputy Commander Describes Work of Russia’s Alpha Counter-Terrorism Unit

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Andrew McGregor

October 28, 2011

The former deputy commander and 15-year veteran of Russia’s elite Alfa counterterrorist unit, Sergey Goncharov, has shed some light on various controversial operations carried out by his former unit in a wide-ranging interview carried by a Russian magazine (Itogi, October 10). Goncharov is currently head of the Alfa Veteran Association which has engaged in anti-Yeltsin political activism in the past but is mainly concerned now with providing protection to Russian “VIPs.”

Alfa’s participation in incidents such as the January 1991 massacre of Lithuanian civilians in Vilnius has left some Alfa veterans open to prosecution (see Rian.ru, July 22). Nonetheless, Goncharov maintains that Alfa Group does not act as an enforcement team for politicians: “We have never been afraid to disagree with decisions imposed from above. And when some kind of TsK [Central Committee] member, who has never held anything other than a hunting rifle, orders us to resolve a problem in a particular way, he needs to be politely sent away. And they have been sent away.”

Goncharov defended the Alfa Group’s role in the 2002 Nord-Ost Theater crisis (in which 129 hostages were killed by poison gas released by Russian Special Forces) and the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis (in which 334 hostages and 21 security men were killed in a bungled rescue operation): “Both operations are black marks on both the unit and on the history of Russian antiterrorist efforts. Nonetheless, in the first one, in my opinion, the tactic that was selected was the only possible solution to avoid an enormous loss of life. Of course, it is a great pity that hostages were killed and died from [gas] poisoning, but the use of the so-called “laughing gas” was just about the only solution available at that time… The use of the gas allowed us to enter the auditorium and with precise sniper fire neutralize the terrorists, without incurring huge losses [to Alfa forces]. But at Beslan actually there was no assault. There the guys saved the children, and did not kill the terrorists. They drew fire on themselves as they covered the students with their own bodies.”

In 2005, Goncharov made the surprising claim, against all available evidence, that the assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar was carried out by American Special Forces rather than Russian agents (Pravda, August 20, 2005; for the assassination see Terrorism Monitor, May 17, 2005).

However, Goncharov advocates the “targeted elimination of terrorist leaders,” suggesting that the Alfa group has an important role to play in such operations: “[Assassination] is one of the most effective methods of combating terrorism under contemporary conditions. Using medical terminology, the ‘Alfa’ group is a sharp scalpel, a direct action instrument, and the final argument when pills and enemas do not help.” Goncharov notes, however, that such operations can only have a limited effect: “If someone thinks that the elimination of a single leader will result in the destruction of an entire command, this is not correct. Terrorism is an enormous business, in which many countries are engaged. This business is passed on as a legacy, from one killed leader to another.”

Turning to the ongoing conflict in the North Caucasus, Goncharov maintains that the struggle there is financed by external sources: “Fighting in our North Caucasus has been going on so long not for an ideal, but only because combat operations are so lavishly financed. And by whom? One can only speculate. But I personally think this: no matter how hard we try to become friends with the Americans, we will never become friends with them. We can only be fellow travelers with them up until the time they use us for their own purposes. And then they will continue on their own way. And instability in the North Caucasus plays into their hands.”

This article was first published in the October 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor