Taliban Spokesman Says Loya Jirga Reveals the Invaders “Sinister Objective” to Occupy Afghanistan

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Andrew McGregor

December 15, 2011

In a recent interview with a Taliban-run news agency, Afghan Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi provided an official response to the recent Kabul Loya Jirga (Grand Council) that approved a continued American military presence in Afghanistan as well as an assessment of the Taliban’s struggle against NATO forces in various regions of the country. [1]

The four-day Loya Jirga produced a nearly unanimous vote in favor of a strategic agreement with the United States that would permit the continued presence of American military bases in Afghanistan after the scheduled pull-out of U.S. forces in 2014. There were, however, conditions attached, including an end to night raids on residential housing, the closure of all prisons operated by foreign forces and accountability to the Afghan justice system for Americans who commit crimes in Afghanistan (Khaama Press [Kabul], November 19).

The Taliban spokesman suggested that the Loya Jirga decision would actually play into the Taliban’s hands: “The people have realized that the invaders are here for sinister objectives. They want to endanger our religion, prestige and other sanctities at the hands of a few traitors and corrupt agents. They want to keep us as an occupied nation and impose their own systems upon us.”

Given the Loya Jirga’s decision, the Taliban spokesman was asked how long the Taliban will continue to fight against a foreign military presence: “Jihad is a religious obligation upon us. We have no specified time framework for it. When the need for Jihad is ceased, the war will naturally come to an end. It totally depends on the invaders.”

ISAF Regional Command – North

The Taliban spokesman also offered an assessment of the military situation in the southern and northern operational theaters:

  • In the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, the site of some of the war’s fiercest clashes, the spokesman admits the Taliban have been driven out of some areas, but attributes this to the occupiers’ complete destruction of orchards and houses in these districts. Otherwise he denies NATO claims that the Taliban are restricted to limited areas in the south of these provinces, insisting that foreign forces are confined to their bases in urban centers while the Taliban conduct attacks throughout the rest of the region at will. Qari Yusuf suggests the inaccurate perception of the situation in the southern provinces is partly due to “the absence of free international media” to observe and report Taliban activities accurately. While attributing this absence to threats against journalists by internal and external secret services, this complaint from an official spokesman demonstrates the Taliban’s growing appreciation for the value of the media in the struggle for Afghanistan. The movement once known for smashing televisions now manages a website in five languages, Twitter and Facebook accounts, radio stations, magazines and a video production company that posts its work on YouTube (Express Tribune [Karachi], December 1).
  • In the northern provinces, particularly Kunduz, a decrease in Taliban activity is blamed on the reluctance of the “mostly non-American” NATO garrisons there “who are fed up with this war” to venture far from their bases, thus reducing the opportunities for Taliban operations. Nonetheless, Qari Yusuf says the Taliban is continuing to increase its presence in the north. The Kunduz Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is one of five PRTs that come under ISAF’s Regional Command-North. With Germany as the lead nation, PRT-Kunduz includes German, Belgian, Armenian and American troops.

Qari Yusuf summed up the rationale behind the Taliban’s continued commitment to a military resolution in Afghanistan rather than entering into political negotiations:

We can never tolerate foreign invasion in our country. We want the strict implementation of Islamic rules and regulations. We want Islamic brotherhood and unity among the countrymen. We want cordial relation with the world on the basis of Islamic principles where no one is harmed. But the enemy is extending the occupation and is dreaming for a prolonged subjugation of our country. In these circumstances we are compelled to insist on a military solution rather than political one because the enemy is not ready to leave our country… and to solve the disputed issues by political negotiations.

Qari Yusuf also stressed that the Taliban’s operational flexibility is a factor in its favor: “When we notice that the public and the mujahideen are both under pressure, simultaneously we open new fronts in other villages and districts. In the same way if one zone is under pressure, we have increased our activities in other zones… We have entered a new phase in the war where we have been able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy and have significantly reduced our own.”

Note

  1. Afghan Islamic News Agency, “Interview of the Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” Ansar1.info, December 4, 2011.

This article first appeared in the December 15, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

 

Assault on Libyan National Army Commanders Convoy Reveals Rifts between Militias

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Andrew McGregor

December 15, 2011

As the murder of General Abd al-Fatah Yunis and two of his aides on July 28 showed, Libya’s new government is still subject to the whims of the diverse armed factions that overthrew Mu’ammar Qaddafi. [1]The uneasy relationship between the various self-styled “Brigades” that emerged victorious in the revolution was demonstrated once again on December 10 when members of the Zintan militia became involved in a firefight with a convoy carrying Major General Khalifa Haftar, a CIA-supported anti-Qaddafi dissident who has taken command of the nascent Libyan National Army in a process that has been poorly received by many of the militia leaders.

General Khalifa Haftar

The clash just outside of Tripoli International Airport came the same day as a national reconciliation conference opened in Tripoli (al-Jazeera, December 11). A military spokesman, Sergeant Abd al-Razik al-Shibahy, characterized the attack as an “assassination attempt,” saying two vehicles had awaited the arrival of the convoy under a bridge before opening fire (al-Jazeera, December 11). 

The commander of the Zintan militia, Colonel Mukhtar Fernana, gave a very different account, saying Haftar’s heavily-armed convoy refused to stop at a checkpoint 3km from the airport and opened fire on the militiamen, wounding two. The Zintan fighters pursued Haftar’s convoy to a nearby military camp where a second gun-battle broke out (AFP, December 11; Reuters, December 12).  Two Zintani fighters were reported killed and two others wounded, with no casualties in General Haftar’s convoy (AFP, December 11). A spokesman for the Zintan Brigade, Khalid al-Zintani, suggested the incident was more of a misunderstanding, saying the army had failed to notify the militia that the general was coming to the airport (AP, December 11). Al-Zintani also expressed some of the militias’ doubts about the so-called National Army led by Haftar: “Until now, we don’t know anything about the Libyan national army. Who is in charge, where are the military bases, what is its chain of command or even how can rebels join it? On the ground, the so-called national army is nothing yet” (SAPA-AP, December 11).

It was unclear if the incident was related to other reports that members of “the national army” had tried to confiscate weapons and take over an airport checkpoint from the Zintan militia that controls the airport, leading to a firefight in which at least two were wounded (AFP, December 10). The militia from Zintan, about 160 km southwest of Tripoli, is thought by many residents of Tripoli to have overstayed their welcome in that city after playing a major role in the battle to expel the Qaddafi regime. The Zintan Brigade is still holding Qaddafi’s son, Sa’if al-Islam, after his capture in the deserts of southwestern Libya. Clashes in the town of Zintan with members of a neighboring tribe have also been reported in the last few days (al-Arabiya, December 14).

Haftar was unanimously approved as commander-in-chief of the yet to be formed Libyan national army on November 17 by a group of 150 ex-rebel officers, though many leading commanders (including Abd al-Hakim Belhadj, the powerful Islamist commander in Tripoli) had no say in the appointment. Many militia commanders have since come out in opposition to the move (AFP, November 19; al-Jazeera, December 11). Haftar has since said he hopes to have an operational army and police force running by the end of March, 2012, but estimates that it will still take three to five years to build an army strong enough to protect Libya’s borders (AP, December 12).

The Soviet-trained Haftar was an original member of the Revolutionary Command Council that overthrew King Idris in 1969. Considered a traitor by Qaddafi after he was captured by Chadian forces during the 1980s struggle over northern Chad, Haftar agreed to defect and create the “Libyan National Army,” a CIA-supported anti-Qaddafi insurgent group formed from captured Libyan troops. After a new Chadian regime expelled the LNA in 1991, the group failed to find permanent refuge elsewhere in Africa and Haftar and several hundred LNA members were resettled in the United States to await deployment against Qaddafi. Two decades later the call finally came, and Haftar and a number of LNA members returned to Libya in March to join the anti-Qaddafi revolt. [2]

The troubles at Tripoli International Airport did not end when the gunfire stopped; on December 13 air traffic controllers walked off the job in an unannounced strike that played havoc with local air schedules (Reuters, December 13). In late November, protesters from the Suq al-Jama’a district of Tripoli demanding an investigation into the deaths of several members of the Suq al-Jama’a militia in Bani Walid blocked a Tunisair Airbus full of passengers from taking off at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, a major target during the NATO air campaign (Reuters, November 27).

Despite protests by local policemen against the continued presence of armed gunmen in the streets of Tripoli, the militias claim they are the only ones capable of protecting the capital against unnamed threats. The military council representing the militias has said the gunmen will only withdraw once a new Libyan national army is created (AFP, December 11). Without a centralized security structure, militias in Tripoli continue to man checkpoints, patrol streets and provide security at Tripoli’s military and commercial airports (Gulf News, December 10). With the cessation of hostilities, the militias are essentially guarding areas of Tripoli from other militias.

Libya faces a number of challenges in developing a modern professional army; its best units supported Qaddafi and are now largely dissolved. Much of the army’s best armor and artillery was destroyed in NATO air attacks and will have to be replaced. The composition of the army will also be a subject of debate. Will former supporters of the regime be allowed to join? Will tribal representation play a role in forming a new national army? Will the military leadership be based on connections or competency? What outside powers will be called upon for training and arms supplies?

In the meantime Libya is in danger of descending into warlordism. The militias are amply armed courtesy of the uncontrolled looting of the government armories and are unlikely to participate in any disarmament effort that does not involve a lucrative role in government and the simultaneous disarmament of all rival groups. Strangely enough, reconciliation with the losers in this conflict must take a back seat to reconciliation between the victors if Libya is to move forward.

Notes

1. For the murder of al-Yunis, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, August 4.

2. For a profile of Haftar, see Derek Henry Flood, “Taking Charge of Libya’s Rebels: An In-Depth Portrait of Colonel Khalifa Haftar, Militant Leadership Monitor, March 2011.

This article first appeared in the December 15, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Egypt’s Gama’a al-Islamiya and the War in South Sudan

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Andrew McGregor

December 9, 2011

In a surprising statement, a leading member of Egypt’s Gama’a al-Islamiya (GI) has revealed members of the militant group had been sent to fight alongside government forces against South Sudanese rebels during the 1983-2005 Sudanese Civil War. The revelation was made by Dr. Najih Ibrahim, a founding member of the movement (al-Rai [Kuwait], November 16).

PDF KhartoumPopular Defense Forces Rally in Khartoum

In the 1990s, Khartoum’s civil war with rebel forces in the South Sudan was given a religious character when the regime declared it a jihad, partly as a means of inspiring, and later enforcing, recruitment to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or the lightly-armed Popular Defense Forces (PDF), which was armed with rifles and Qurans in an unsuccessful effort to destroy the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the most powerful rebel movement in the South Sudan. It was likely during Khartoum’s jihad against what it described as the “communist, tribal and atheist/Christian” SPLA that GI fighters joined the conflict, most probably in the ranks of the PDF, which suffered enormous losses fighting the veteran guerrilla forces of the SPLA on their own turf. Lately, however, there are fears that Khartoum is reviving the rhetoric of jihad to support its offensives against rebels in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile Province (Sudan Tribune, November 1).

The Alexandria-based Islamist ideologue said that GI’s “participation [in the civil war] was a huge mistake that led to what is Sudan’s fate now… The Sudanese regime focused its efforts on Islamizing the south and the Egyptian Islamists considered their participation in the war [was for the cause of] safeguarding Islam.”

From 1992 to 1997, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya waged a pitched war against the Egyptian state, its institutions and its financial underpinnings.  Some 1,200 people died as the group unleashed a wave of assassinations, mass murders of tourists and back-street battles with security forces.  However, the movement went too far in November 1997 when it massacred 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians in a brutal attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut near Luxor. With popular support fizzling away and security forces successful in imprisoning many of the movement’s members, most of the members of the GI agreed to renounce violence, leading to the later release of some 2,000 Islamists from prison. However, some members, including Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, denounced the deal, and fled to Yemen and Afghanistan. Further renunciations of violence by those group members left in prison eventually led to the release of Najih Ibrahim in 2006 after serving 24 years.

The GI’s newly-formed political wing, Hizb al-Bena’a wa’l-Tanmia (Building and Development Party), ran a slate of candidates in the Egyptian parliamentary election after a court overturned a ban on the formation of a political party by the GI (Ahram Online, June 20; al-Masry al-Youm, September 20; MENA, October 10).

A member of GI’s Shura Council, Najih Ibrahim resigned from the council in March, along with Karam Zohid, reportedly as a result of differences that arose within the movement after the release of Colonel Abboud al-Zumar and his cousin Tarek al-Zumar, the GI founder who was imprisoned for three decades for his role in the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat (Ahram Online, March 29).

Both before and after his release from prison, Ibrahim has been a major proponent of the “Revisions” produced by GI and other Islamist militant groups in Egypt. According to Ibrahim, these reassessments of the political use of violence “have revealed the major Islamic jurisprudential errors that al-Qaeda has made, especially with regard to the rulings and the pre-conditions of jihad” (al-Shorfa [Cairo], August 2). Though he regrets the slow pace with which the “Revisions” are penetrating extremist youth circles in Egypt, Ibrahim maintains that there is a major difference between GI and al-Qaeda: “Their aim is jihad, and our aim is Islam” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 14).

This article first appeared in the December 9, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Somalia’s al-Shabaab Explains Its Ban on Foreign Aid Organizations

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Andrew McGregor

December 9, 2011

Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants have provided a detailed justification of their recent and controversial decision to halt the work of 16 foreign aid organizations in areas under al-Shabaab control in drought and famine-stricken southern Somalia. The statement, prepared by al-Shabaab’s Office for Supervising the Affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA), was released to various jihadi websites (Ansar1.info, November 28). The statement allegedly comes as the result of a year-long investigation into what al-Shabaab refers to as “the illicit activities and misconduct” of the foreign aid agencies.

The 16 banned aid organizations include the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and a number of Scandinavian, German and French relief organizations.

The al-Shabaab statement charged the international aid organizations with the following:

  •  The collection of data on Shabaab-held territories “under the guise of demographic surveys, vaccinations reports, demining surveys, nutrition analyses and population censuses.”
  •  Conveying information about the activities of the Mujahideen.
  • Inciting the local population against “the full establishment of the Islamic Shari’a system,” in part by financing and aiding “subversive groups seeking to destroy the basic tents of the Islamic penal system.”
  • Working in league with unnamed organizations to “exploit the country of its natural resources.”
  • Undermining the “cultural values” of Somali Muslims by using corruption and bribery as methods of operation.
  •   “Failing to implement durable solutions” to relieve the suffering of internally displaced peoples.

Some organizations were accused of promoting “secularism, immorality and the degrading values of democracy,” while others were accused of working with “ecumenical [evangelical?] churches” to proselytize Muslim children. In light of these findings, al-Shabaab announced that a committee would perform a yearly review of all aid organizations working in their territory, warning: Any organization found to be supporting or actively engaged in activities deemed detrimental to the attainment of an Islamic State or performing duties other than that which it formally proclaims will be banned immediately without prior warning.”

Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have already fled southern Somalia to Kenya, where many of them live in the world’s largest refugee camp. Kenyan authorities, who regard the refugees as a security risk, are eager to return many of these refugees to new camps in southern Somali territory under the control of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Kenyan Defense Forces now operating in that region (The Standard [Nairobi], November 30).

This article first appeared in the December 9, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

After Pharaoh: The Future of Islamist Militancy in Egypt

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Andrew McGregor

An Address to the Jamestown Foundation Annual Terrorism Conference, December 8, 2011, Washington D.C.

Gazwa al-Sanadiq – “The Conquest of the Ballot Boxes”

Egyptian militancy has reached a turning point following the national elections. Many former militant groups and other potential militant formations have been coopted by electoral success as they will now sit in the parliament they once threatened with violence. It is reasonable to ask if such groups are prepared for the long and difficult work of forming policy through consensus and writing legislation to see such policies through. Nothing in this process will match the instant gratification of producing a short list of demands and striking state targets in an effort to force compliance in the name of Shari’a and Islam. Nonetheless, religious movements that once damned democracy are now pursuing it as an unexpected pathway to power, urged on, in part, by youth factions that want immediate change even if it means dumping decades-old policies of abstaining from party politics.

So far, religious-based militancy in Egypt has proven to be a sure path to self-destruction or exile. The general public distaste for renewed religious and political violence on the scale seen in the 1990s precludes the adoption of violence by any groups seeking serious public support. The Islamist victory certainly reinforces the irrelevance of al-Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda movement, which through decades of indiscriminate slaughter has never been able to achieve the results gained by peaceful demonstrations and political organization. A leading Salafist ideologue, Dr. Najih Ibrahim, has said of al-Qaeda: “Their aim is jihad, and our aim is Islam.”

The Egyptian Revolution took all of Egypt’s Islamist factions by surprise, leaving even the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood caught off guard and without an immediate plan of how to best exploit the political unrest for its own benefit. In the end the movement’s conservative leadership found itself completely at odds with the movement’s youth wing, which took to protests in Tahrir Square and elsewhere against the wishes of the leadership.

While the radical Islamists of nearby Somalia still denounce “the degrading values of democracy,” Egypt’s Islamists have accepted democracy as a kind of revelation, one that revealed its potential in the March constitutional referendum, in which Islamists deployed enough voters to swing the decision their way.

Under the military regime, Egypt’s courts have approved the existence of numerous religious-based political parties, despite a ban on such groups in the existing constitution. Often with little more than a new name for their political wing, the Islamist movements have exploited this new tolerance of formerly banned groups to form a powerful political alliance. The question is how long can an alliance between the Salafist parties and the Muslim Brotherhood last. These two broad factions have numerous political and religious differences that account for a basic lack of trust. The electoral success of the Salafists seems to have actually widened the gulf with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Since a leadership turnover two years ago, the Muslim Brotherhood is now in the hands of a highly conservative leadership that would prefer to explore the possibilities of government even if this means meeting with American diplomats or working with the Egyptian military rather than antagonizing it.  Their triumph at the polls was, after all, the triumph of the reforms that changed the movement from a Qutbist revolutionary movement to a grassroots, social welfare organization willing to assume political power in incremental stages.  Though this approach has caused several rifts in the movement, it has still proved essentially correct, as witnessed by the election results. The catastrophic failure of the Qutb model has been replaced by the model of the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Nevertheless, the former leaders of the movement are watching to see whether the current leadership falters under the pressure they will face to initiate reforms in the Egyptian state.

Dr. Muhammad Badie – Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt

Though the Brotherhood has pledged not to run a presidential candidate, there will inevitably be pressure within the movement, given their electoral success, to skip a stage in the Brotherhood’s long-range plans and run a contender for the post. At the moment the Brothers are trying to persuade the military to approve a new government in which the chief power will lie in parliament rather than the presidency. Should this fail, it will increase pressure on the movement to enter the presidential contest. In the meantime, however, the Brotherhood’s cooperation with the military may backfire if Egyptians begin to view the movement as a collection of opportunists.

Brotherhood and Revolution

If the Muslim Brotherhood assumes a sober and even centrist stance as a responsible presence in government, this may allow the Salafists and fringe Islamic extremists to promote themselves through populist opposition to a conservative movement that, even if willing, will be unable to meet all the expectations of post-revolutionary Egypt.

The ever-pragmatic Brotherhood will not necessarily team up with the generally inflexible Salafists to dominate Egypt’s new parliament; a coalition with willing Liberal groups might be more likely, which could give the new government a more moderate and open tone. The Brothers have observed how the Islamist government of Turkey has managed to reconcile its own beliefs with continued cooperation with the West, to the point of maintaining its role as a vital NATO ally. At the best of times, Egypt is highly dependent on Western aid; with its currently shattered economy, there is little hope that an Islamist government could cut ties with America and the rest of the West unless Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations were ready to step up and make up the financial shortfall that would follow. There are, however, no indications that this will happen in the immediate future.

The Salafists

Salafists have traditionally avoided participation in the political process. There is little doubt they will begin to disassociate themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood and let the Brothers’ inexperience at governance cause the Brotherhood’s followers to drift away to less-nuanced alternatives that promise quick solutions through a stricter observance of Islamic principles.

The Main Salafist Parties

  • Nour (“Light”) Party
  • Asala (“Fundamentals”) Party
  • Islah (“Reform”) Party
  • Al-Fadila (“Virtue”) Party
  • Al-Bena’a wa’l-Tanmia (“Building and Development”) Party (Political wing of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya)

The Nour Party

The Nour Party has formed a coalition with three other Salafist parties; Asalah, Fadilah and Islah, enabling it to win nearly a quarter of the available seats and pose as a major rival to the Muslim Brotherhood. Army spokesmen have denied that General Sami Anan held talks this week with al-Nour Party officials regarding the creation of a new government. Imad Abd al-Ghafour, the chairman of the Nour Party, has suggested that his party may form a parliamentary coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Muslim Brotherhood is more likely to cooperate with liberals and secularists than their Islamist rivals in the Salafist parties.

One economic sector that may be threatened by the new realities in parliament is the vital tourist sector, an important source of hard currency and a lifeline for millions of Egyptians. The Salafists, however, do not look at tourism as an economic bounty, but rather a social and health threat caused by the spread of Western immorality and diseases such as AIDS. For the Salafists the great works of the ancient Egyptians are of no interest as they are works of the jahiliya, the age of ignorance that preceded the introduction of Islam. Potential bans on alcohol and mixed bathing would further devastate the tourism industry.

The Egyptian Military

The first priority of the military is preserving their privileges. The officer corps leads a comfortable life in luxurious officers’ clubs financed by their interests in a large segment of the Egyptian economy. For nearly any new government, a re-examination of military control of much of the nation’s industrial sector would be a top priority; however, it is entirely possible that the military has made a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood to overlook these privileges while the military does nothing to impede the Brothers’ political progress.

While the Army has attempted to be Turkish-style “Guardians of Democracy,” they still sent a strong message to the Egyptian people that their privileges are untouchable when they killed over 40 people in Tahrir Square last month who were protesting the military’s attempt to limit the constitutional authority of future governments over the military. The resignation of Egypt’s military-appointed cabinet that followed was not a promising start for the new Guardians of Democracy.

Though it continues to control the country, the Army is clearly displeased by the criticism it is now receiving. The discomfort of the ruling council has been seen in previously unheard-of activities by the army’s commander, Field Marshal Tantawi, who has gone so far as to take to the TV to explain that the army was not seeking power and even donning civilian clothes to mix with protesters in Tahrir Square. The Army has much at stake, including the annual $1.3 billion dollars it receives from the US for maintaining the peace with Israel. Tantawi and other military figures are also mindful not to end up in court facing charges like their late leader, Mubarak, and will take great measures to ensure their immunity from prosecution.

The military has been buffeted by hostile winds in recent weeks, but increasingly it has the upper hand as Egyptians demand a return to stability. A democratic transition is impossible without the military’s cooperation, and this will come at a price – immunity from prosecution, a continued military presence in the national economy and a constitutional clause removing the military from civilian oversight.

Egypt’s Coptic Christians

Shaykh ‘Abd al-Salam, Nour Party: “The best the Christians have ever been treated was under Islamic rule.”

The Coptic revolutionary youth began ignoring the traditional non-confrontational directives from the Coptic religious leadership in the last few years. Coptic protests against the regime preceded those of Tahrir Square. While many Copts are alarmed at the escalating levels of sectarian violence, many of the youth have pledged to remain and fight for their rights as Egyptians, in the streets if necessary. The Coptic youth have already demonstrated they are no longer easy prey for Muslim mobs and have no interest in seeing the jizya tax on Christians revived. Some observers have noted that systematic discrimination against the Copts would result in two types of response: clashes in the streets and mass emigration.

International Repercussions

Egypt will also be tested internationally in the coming years. A conflict over water with Ethiopia and possibly Sudan is looming yet we know almost nothing about Salafist or Muslim Brotherhood views on issues like this. The West appears to be interested only in how an Islamist government would affect relations with Israel, but Egypt has other neighbors and faces foreign policy challenges that will leave the Islamists scrambling to form positions based on Islamic principles. This is not likely to be a pretty process for groups almost entirely focused on domestic issues and will possibly open the doors for serious divisions within the larger Islamist movement.

Israel

Problems with Israel include a controversial natural gas deal, Gaza, restrictions on Egypt’s military presence in the Sinai and the 1979 peace treaty.

The Muslim Brotherhood is looking for amendments to the 1979 peace deal rather than outright revocation. A similar position is held by most of the Salafist groups. Even if a more radical position was adopted, it would immediately run into some serious realities, including the sure loss of Egypt’s military subsidy from the United States, something not desired by the military. Although nearly all Egypt’s military exercises are focused on “an unnamed country to the northeast of Egypt,” the hard fact is that unlike the battle-hardened army that took the Suez Canal in 1973, the modern Egyptian army has not been involved in any serious fighting in the last four decades and the Air Force is no more likely to meet success against Israeli jets now than it was in 1967 or 1973.

Nonetheless, should Israel and/or the United States attack Iran, it is possible that some elements of the Islamist majority in parliament will flex their new-found muscle and access to the state’s armed forces to agitate for military retaliation of some sort.

The Sinai

The pipeline supplying natural gas to Israel and Jordan has been hit by gunmen eight times since the revolution began, leading Israel to begin seeking alternative sources of fuel. A policeman was killed just two weeks ago at a building used by al-Takfir wa’l-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus), a relatively new militant group using a recycled name. Al-Takfir’s leader, Muhammad al-Teehi (Muhammad Eid Musleh Hamad) was arrested last month along with 16 other suspects, but the continuing grievances of the Sinai Bedouin and the cooperation of some members of their community with smugglers and Gazan militants suggest that the violence in the Sinai is far from over. Israel is constructing a massive 240km fence along its Sinai border with Egypt to counter Egyptian and Palestinian militants, Bedouin smugglers and African migrants trying to enter Israel.

Limits on an Egyptian military presence in the Sinai dictated by the 1979 peace agreement with Israel have hampered Egyptian efforts to cleanse the region of militants. However, some Israeli politicians have suggested that a greater Egyptian military deployment in the Sinai must be regarded as an act of war. Major General Uzi Dayan, the former head of the Israel National Security Council, has recently proposed a third way, urging the creation of an Israeli counterterrorism intervention force for deployment in the Sinai when necessary. Needless to say, this idea is unlikely to receive approval from any political movement in Egypt.

Conclusion

The massive social transformation taking place in Egypt is of the type that usually takes decades to sort out. The upsurge in Islamist political support may just be a phase in this transformation, leaving the possibility open that spurned Islamists might return to militancy. For now, however, the Islamist Parties must make a major change from small, highly disciplined cells designed for armed activities and the larger, less controllable composition of a political party pursuing a democratic process where numbers count. Egypt faces major economic, security and environmental challenges that will not be dealt with by a parliament obsessed with questions of appropriate dress for women and the evils of gender-mixing.

Islamists will focus on the constitution, the key to Egypt’s future direction. There is little question that the Islamist believe their electoral triumph will give them a strong position in the 100 man panel that will revise the constitution, but the Armed Forces have said they will select 80 of the 100 members. The constitutional fight is sure to turn ugly relatively quickly.

Meanwhile the Salafists will be inevitably transformed by their venture into politics, previously a long-taboo realm for the followers of the Pious Ancestors. Though they have eagerly and surprisingly taken to party politics, some residual distaste for mixing politics and religion was expressed when most of the Salafist parties agreed that preachers should not stand for office. The political transition will be hardest of all for the Salafists, who have the least political experience and are the most likely to be intolerant of views differing from their own rather inflexible beliefs. They will, in addition, be hard-pressed to restrain some of the more militant elements of the Salafist movement.

To be honest, there was very little reason to vote for many of the non-Islamist parties in the Egyptian election. They were poorly organized, had not had sufficient time to determine policy or platforms, and would likely have been hard-pressed to draw on sufficient talent to run a government if they did win. In the midst of the social, political and economic chaos that is currently engulfing their country, Egyptians turned to those who could say with confidence that they had the answers to these problems. Nine months after the rush of excitement that came with the overthrow of Mubarak, Egyptians are now tired of the seemingly endless round of strikes, disruptions and demonstrations. The Brothers’ motto is “Islam is the Solution.” The Egyptian public seems willing to give the Islamists a chance to prove it.

Senior Jordanian Member of the Muslim Brotherhood Says “Change and Reform are Inevitable”

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Andrew McGregor

December 1, 2011

A prominent member of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood has given an interview to an Amman daily in which he discusses the differences between the struggle for political reform inside Jordan and events elsewhere in the tumultuous “Arab Spring” (al-Dustur [Amman], November 24). Rahil Gharayibah is the deputy secretary-general of Jordan’s largest single political party, Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (JAI – Islamic Action Front) and a frequent spokesman on its behalf. Founded in 1992, the JAI is generally regarded as the political wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.

 

Rahil Gharayibah

Gharayibah acknowledges that, as part of the Arab world, Jordan is experiencing a “critical stage” in its development. Sharing a common culture and system of values with the rest of the Arab nation, Jordan cannot be isolated or immune from the developments shaking the political structure of its neighbors. According to Gharayibah, however, Jordan was already ahead of other Arab nations in their pursuit of democracy by having already adopted “a model that is closer to democracy than the systems adopted by the other Arab states.” While the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Libya have been conducted under the slogan “Overthrow the Regime,” the Jordanians have raised the slogan “Reform the Regime.”

This has not, however, precluded the participation of the Brotherhood in demonstrations calling for the dissolution of parliament and the resignation of Prime Minister Dr. Marouf Sulayman Bakhit, a former Major-General whose reform efforts were ineffective, leading to his eventual resignation in October after only 8½ months in power. Bakhit’s reluctance to reopen the constitution for major changes was a sticking point with the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks constitutional reform.

For Jordan to move forward, all the influential parties in the process must agree that “reform and change are inevitable.” Describing Jordan’s people and political parties as “extremely mature,” Gharayibah says they are seeking “genuine reform and the establishment of a democratic, civil and modern state of Jordan under a monarchist umbrella.” The existing system is illegitimate as it is based on vote rigging and founded upon “tribal, provincial, geographical and regional bases… The number of those who were elected on political merit can be counted on the fingers of one hand.”

Though the Brotherhood is advocating a type of constitutional monarchy for Jordan, Gharayibah has still been a harsh critic of King Abdullah II’sexisting powers. In a rally held in Amman in September, Gharayibah insisted that Jordanians would “not be slaves or serfs on anyone’s estate… Is [Jordan] an estate owned by one person? Are its people his serfs?” (al-Akhbar [Beirut], September 3).

The Jordanian Brotherhood’s leader, Hammam Sa’id, has demanded the cancellation of the Wadi Araba Agreement, the 1994 treaty that normalized relations with Israel and banned attacks on Israel launched from Jordanian territory (al-Akhbar, September 3). The Jordanian Brotherhood enjoys strong support from Jordan’s Palestinian community but avoids open support for militant groups other than Hamas, the political wing of the Gazan Muslim Brotherhood.  Gharayibah maintains that reform efforts in Jordan do not conflict with the Palestinian liberation project: “Indeed, the two are twins. The Jordanian national reform plan is one of the most important mainstays of the Palestinian liberation project… The birth of the Jordanian reformist national project is the most important strategic step in confronting the expansionist, colonial-style and Zionist plan.”

Regarding the movement’s strategy, Gharayibah says the group will end its participation in the political reform process if it is seen as thwarting progress towards democracy or if it loses the support of the man-in-the-street. Otherwise, “the Islamic movement’s methodology is to participate when that enables it to serve the homeland and the citizen.”

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be closely tied to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and has been very vocal in its support for the opposition Syrian National Council. Though it rejects Western intervention in Syria, it favors an “Arab solution,” including military operations by Arab states, to resolve the Syrian political crisis (Jordan Times, November 24).

This article first appeared in the December 1, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Saudi Shaykh A’id al-Qarni Urges Arabs to Manufacture Nuclear Weapons

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Andrew McGregor

December 1, 2011

Dr. A’id al-Qarni, a popular Saudi religious scholar known for his provocative observations on Islamic society and a series of best-selling books that present Islamic solutions to life’s problems in the “self-help” format common in the West, has now turned his attention in an article published by a pan-Arab daily to the global balance of power, which he sees as dominated by Western nations that recognize “power is the source of all stature and grandeur… The world respects no one but the strong” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 15).

Dr A’id bin Abdullah al-Qarni

For anyone who doubts these realities, al-Qarni points to the five major nuclear states and how they (and the United States in particular) have wielded their nuclear arsenals to achieve political power while calling on others to refrain from joining the nuclear club: “They possess the right to veto decisions and the world bows to them, fearing their reach and power. They preach to other states and advise all nations to be peaceful, transparent and hospitable, urging them not to manufacture nuclear weapons because this constitutes a global threat. In fact, the five major nuclear states do not want other nations to manufacture nuclear weapons so that they can maintain their hegemony, authority and tyranny.”

Al-Qarni mocks the Arab world for appealing to Iran to abandon its military nuclear program “to have mercy on the Arabs and gain heavenly merit for doing so,” saying Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons will ultimately prevent attack from the West once a bomb has been developed. These are the hard lessons of political reality in a world where Shari’a does not govern international relations: “In this life, there is no room for integrity, for integrity and sacredness belong to the heavens, whilst the world’s laws and politics are established on deceit and cunning. As long as people accept to be ruled by current laws without divine legislation, then it is a matter of interests, manoeuvers, usurpation, arrogance, oppression and proving oneself.”

According to al-Qarni, the Arab world has misdirected its energies in cultural pursuits at the expense of its sovereignty and military preparedness: “Preoccupying the Middle East with arts, folklore, and cultural ceremonies at the expense of military factories is an open joke. To produce one tank would be better than a thousand poems, a rocket more useful than a hundred cultural shows, and a bomb more effective than a hundred epic tales to remind us of the glory of our forefathers, and what it used to be like in the old days.”

Unlike traditional Islamist statements that are built on a foundation of hadiths and quoted from the Quran, al-Qarni ventures to quote an observation from the modern Syrian poet and advocate of reform in gender relations in the Arab world, Nizar Qabbani (1923 – 1998). Noting that the West has turned to inter-continental ballistic missiles and atomic bombs to “rule the world and monopolize its wealth,” al-Qarni observes: “We in the Middle East are supposed to be content with reading history and reveling in the glories of the past, but this is only good for students in literacy classes. The poet Nizar Qabbani once said about the Arabs: ‘They have long written history books and they became convinced [of their past glories]. But since when did guns live inside books?’”

Al-Qarni urges the Arabs “to manufacture the nuclear bomb and nuclear weapons in a passage that resembles a Dadaist “anti-art” manifesto: “I urge the Arabs to manufacture the nuclear bomb and nuclear weapons. There are buildings currently being occupied by minor daily newspapers that no one reads, and ‘cultural heritage’ museums housing scrap metal, worn-out rope, blunt axes, and other artifacts. These should all be turned into factories to manufacture tanks, rocket-launchers, missiles, satellites and submarines, so that the world comes to respect us, hear our voice, and appreciate our status.”  The Saudi scholar concludes his commentary with an ominous warning to the Arab world: “Do not let us be fooled by Iran’s honeyed words suggesting that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons only to burn Israel, for this is purely an illusion.”

Shaykh A’id has a doctorate in hadith studies and is a highly active preacher, appearing on TV regularly as well as issuing a series of audio lectures on Islamic topics. His “self-help” approach to written works has proved highly successful, resulting in bestsellers such as Don’t Be Sad and You Can Be the Happiest Woman in the World. Al-Qarni is not new to publishing provocative views on life in the Islamic world. In 2008 he issued a controversial open letter in which he strongly criticized male dominance in Saudi Arabia and the abuse and subjugation of the Kingdom’s women (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 26, 2008)

Unsurprisingly, al-Qarni’s views on the social role of Islam and his methodology have attracted the critical eye of Saudi Arabia’s more conservative religious scholars. Earlier this year, Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Rayis al-Rayis issued a lengthy review of his work entitled “The Statements of A’id al-Qarni: A Presentation and Critique” [1]

Shaykh Awad al-Qarni

A’id al-Qarni experienced some damage to his reputation last year when he was repeatedly mixed-up with his cousin Awad al-Qarni in Egyptian court documents relating to a Muslim Brotherhood money laundering case. The mix-up led to the cancellation of a major lecture at Cairo’s al-Azhar University in what al-Qarni feared was a conspiracy to interfere with his preaching activities in Egypt (al-Hayat, April 26).

Shaykh Awad is a very different character than Shaykh A’id, and is known for his fiery denunciations of the United States and a reputed close association with the Muslim Brotherhood, an association he nevertheless downplays in a somewhat condescending manner that reveals something of the attitude of Saudi religious scholars to Islam as it practiced outside of the Kingdom:  “I [previously] declared that I challenge the Egyptian regime to prove that I have any organizational relation with the Brothers. This is not disregard or contempt toward the Brothers or any of the virtuous sons of the nation. But we in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have a specific feature based on the implementation of the Islamic Shari`a in all aspects of life; therefore, we do not need the organizational work needed by the other Arab peoples to reestablish Islam in their lives” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 26). Awad recently made headlines by offering a bounty of $100,000 to any Palestinian who kidnaps an Israeli soldier. After Awad reported receiving death threats, Saudi Prince Khalid bin Talal raised the bounty to an even $1 million in solidarity (Reuters, October 29).

Note

1. http://islamfuture.wordpress.com/2011/05/28/a-critique-of-the-statements-of-dr-a%E2%80%99id-al-qarni/

This article first appeared in the December 1, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Questions in Tajikistan over Real Target of “Terrorist” Railway Bridge Bombing in Uzbekistan

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Andrew McGregor

November 28, 2011

A mysterious blast on a vital Uzbekistan rail route on November 17 has been followed by an even more mysterious Uzbek disinterest in repairing the damage or sharing details of the investigation into the incident. The Tashkent government formed a commission to investigate the bombing of the railway bridge when news of the bombing first appeared in the Uzbek press two days after the incident (Gazeta.uz, November 19).

The blast, described as a “terrorist act,” occurred at a railway bridge on the line connecting the Termez terminal at the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border and the city of Qurghonteppa in southwestern Tajikistan (Pravda Vostoka [Tashkent], November 19; RIA Novosti, November 19). More precisely, the attack came in the Surkhandarya region between the Galaba and Amu Zang stations along a stretch of line the runs parallel to the Amu Darya River. Afghanistan lies on the southern side of the river. The roughly 250 km rail line is an important commercial outlet for Tajikistan, which has lately had differences with Uzbekistan over the administration of their mutual border.


Termez is the southern terminal of the “Northern Distribution Network” (NDN), the supply network providing for U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in Afghanistan. Supplies must be offloaded from the rail system at Termez and transferred to trucks for the final lap into Afghanistan. The United States negotiated an agreement to use Termez in 2008, though the German military has quietly leased an air base there since 2002.

Attacks by Islamist militants in Uzbekistan have become rare in recent years, partly as the result of a relentless government campaign against any activity that remotely resembles any form of religious extremism. Security services cast a wide net in their search for militants and there are numerous reports from human rights organizations that detention can mean severe treatment and even death. A closed-door trial is currently underway in Tashkent of 16 Muslims charged with participation in “extremist religious, separatist, fundamentalist or other banned organizations” (UzNews.net, November 15). Uzbekistan’s National Security Service (NSS) has even gone so far as to issue a November 12 warning to Uzbekistan’s writers, artists, dramatists and filmmakers to avoid the use of any kind of religious theme in their works (UzNews.net, November 12).

If the bombing was the work of Islamist militants wanting to disrupt the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), their choice to attack the line to southwestern Tajikistan rather than the main line running north from Termez seems odd. The absence of a claim of responsibility if the bomb was indeed the work of Islamist militants is also very unusual. Such groups typically make maximum political value of every attack against the state or its institutions.

Map showing the Termez – Qurghonteppa Rail-line running east from Termez

Though the blast occurred in Uzbekistan, the greatest harm has been inflicted on Tajikistan’s rail system, which incurred losses in finding alternative transportation for stranded passengers in Uzbekistan and now has hundreds of freight cars loaded with goods in Uzbekistan unable to cross back into southwestern Tajikistan. According to a Tajik rail official, the Uzbeks would normally have the capability of repairing such damage within a day. Instead, a Tajik offer of assistance went unacknowledged and no timetable has been set for repairs (Asia-Plus [Dushanbe], November 18). Shipping goods through another line to Dushanbe and then shipping them by truck through mountain passes to southern Tajikistan would be prohibitively expensive, so any prolonged interruption to the Termez– Qurghontepparail line would have a severe effect on the Tajik economy.

Relations between Uzbekistan and the smaller and more isolated Tajikistan have been strained for at least a decade by a number of issues, most notably Tajikistan’s ongoing construction of the massive Roghun hydroelectric dam project, which Uzbekistan claims would damage that nation’s vital cotton production industry.

The latest blow to Uzbek-Tajik relations came on November 13, when an Uzbek border guard was shot and killed by Tajik border guards who were allegedly helping narcotics smugglers bring 3.84 kilograms of heroin into Uzbekistan (Interfax/AVN Online, November 17). Tajik authorities initially denied the involvement of Tajik border guards in the incident, which allegedly involved personnel from the Tajik Main Border Directorate’s Sughd regional department (Regnum, November 17). A spokesman for the Tajik Border Guards later admitted that a Tajik border guard had killed one of his Uzbek counterparts, but only did so after the Uzbeks had crossed into Tajik territory to protect the smugglers. The spokesman insisted that no drugs were found at the scene (RFE/RL, November 15).

Uzbekistan’s NSS has demanded an unbiased investigation by Tajik authorities regarding the Border Guards’ involvement in drug trafficking while warning of tough measures to counter future attacks. The drugs were apparently concealed inside electric heaters and the NSS invited their Tajik counterparts to examine the remaining heaters to see if drugs were concealed within them. Uzbek officials have, however, conceded that the Tajik border guards may have been deceived into helping smuggle electric heaters rather than narcotics, a scenario based on the claim that the guards received a far smaller payment than is normally associated with assistance in drug smuggling (Interfax/AVN [Moscow], November 17).

On the same day as the railway bridge bombing, Tashkent issued a strong warning to Tajikistan to avoid a repeat of the November 13 border incident: “Should the Tajik side act like this again, the Uzbek side retains the right to take the toughest and most resolute measures in line with the norms and practice of international relations in order to crack down on aggressive provocations on the border, to ensure the security of citizens and Uzbekistan’s territorial integrity in full” (Interfax [Moscow], November 17). In Tajikistan, however, there are now suggestions that the railway blast may have more to do with Uzbekistan’s opposition to the Roghun dam project than with terrorism (ImruzNews [Dushanbe], November 21).

This article first appeared in the November 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor. Reprinted in Asia Times, December 2, 2011: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/ML02Ag03.html

Khartoum Besieged? Sudan’s Rebel Movements Unite against the Center

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Andrew McGregor

November 24, 2011

Sudan’s military offensive against rebels in its southern Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan provinces has begun to spill over the new border with South Sudan with potentially devastating results for the region. As Khartoum descends into a severe financial crisis caused, in part, by the loss of three-quarters of its oil-fields to the newly sovereign South Sudan, it is now being challenged by a new alliance of rebel movements from Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and eastern Sudan. The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is contesting the post-independence domination of Sudan’s non-Arab majority by an Arab minority hailing from the banks of the Nile in northern Sudan.

A statement issued at the SRF’s November 11 meeting asserted the alliance’s determination “to overthrow the [ruling] National Congress Party (NCP) regime using all available means, above all, the convergence of civil political action and armed struggle.” [1] As well as a “High-Level Political Committee,” the alliance has established a “Joint High-Level Military Committee” to coordinate the armed struggle: “Its first responsibility is to repel the NCP’s vengeful dry season offensive, which is targeting civilians in war zones, in all the theaters of conflict, including Khartoum…” The statement makes clear that the constituent groups of the SRF believe the time is ripe to topple the regime, claiming it is “presently at its weakest – economically, politically and militarily. The regime is imploding and will vanish, like other corrupt regimes around us that have come to rely on repression to retain power.” [1]

The statement was signed by representatives of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A – N) and three Darfur rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the largely Fur Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdel Wahid (SLM/A – AW), and the largely Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A – MM). The latter’s commander, Minni Minawi, had sided with the government for some time after signing the 2006 Abuja agreement with Khartoum, but has now returned to the rebellion.

The groundwork for the formation of the SRF was laid in August when the SPLM/A-N signed an agreement in the South Kordofan town of Kauda with two Darfur rebel movements pledging to overthrow the central government in Khartoum.The formation of the alliance was quickly condemned by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon as an escalation in tension possibly leading to a new civil war, but the secretary-general’s remarks were challenged by the SPLM-N’s own secretary general, Yasir Arman, who accused the UN leader of supporting “aggressors and war criminals” (Sudan Tribune, November 17).

 

 

Beja Congress Fighters

On November 15, the Beja Congress of northeastern Sudan announced its decision to join the SRF. Founded in 1958, the Beja Congress was originally a political party, but has gradually grown into an armed resistance movement fighting a low-intensity insurgency on behalf of the roughly two million indigenous non-Arab Beja people. The Congress has resisted efforts by Khartoum to “Arabize” the Beja tribes, noting in its announcement that “The misery and suffering of the [Beja] people is increasing due to poverty, starvation and other deadly diseases. The ruling regime in Sudan is subjecting its people to humiliation and tyranny. They are arrogant and killing the marginalized people” (Radio Dabanga, November 16).

The SRF also announced that the Koch Revolution Movement (KRM) had joined the alliance (Radio Dabanga, November 18). Though little is known of the KRF, it is likely based in the Koch County of South Sudan’s oil-rich Unity State, which recently suffered from a local rebellion by a pro-government Nuer militia led by the late Colonel Gatluak Gai (murdered by his deputy in late July; for Gatluak Gai, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, August 12).

Unresolved Issues

Prominent opposition leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party and former Prime Minister of Sudan before being overthrown by al-Bashir in 1989, recently described the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan as a “flawed agreement” that “left behind time bombs,” namely the unresolved status of oil-rich Abyei District, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile Province. The latter two regions lie north of the border between Sudan and South Sudan, but supplied thousands of fighters allied to Southern forces in the 1983-2005 civil war. Al-Mahdi blames the regime for the proliferation of rebel groups in Sudan: “There is no doubt that the ruling regime in Sudan has played an important role in weakening unarmed political parties. In fact during one period they said we do not negotiate with anyone except those who are armed. This tempted a great number of youths to carry arms” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 13).

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has loudly accused South Sudan of preparing a new war against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), claiming to have documented proof of his charges. Saying that Khartoum had already exercised “too much patience and self-restraint,” al-Bashir issued a stern warning to the South: “We tell our brothers in the South that if they want peace, we want peace. If they want war, our army is there… Our message to our brothers in the South is this: you won the South not because you were victorious [in the war], but because of an agreement and a pledge we upheld [i.e. the CPA], so you had better stay in your place” (Sudan Tribune, November 7).

A pro-government news agency in Khartoum reminded the rebels that in a world preoccupied with a number of crises, their cause is unlikely to garner international support: “The engineers of the new alliance might think that they will get support from everywhere, but this is just an illusion because the world is now busy resolving its crises to the extent that there is no time to look on new alliances attempting to topple regimes while the whole world order is collapsing” (Sudan Vision, November 17).

The SPLM/A-N Rebellion

SPLA–N forces have been fighting in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan since June (see Terrorism Monitor, July 1). An SPLA-N insurrection followed in the Blue Nile province, which has now been placed under military control as the SAF drive the rebel fighters south towards the border with South Sudan.

 

SPLA-N Fighters in Blue Nile Province

The SPLA-N rebels in Blue Nile Province suffered a major setback on November 3 when the SAF’s 14th Infantry Division took the town of Kurmuk, a rebel stronghold near the border with Ethiopia, reportedly inflicting heavy losses on the rebels. A spokesman for the rebels insisted that the expulsion was actually a withdrawal undertaken for “strategic reasons” (Reuters, November 4).  SPLM/A-N Secretary General Yasir Arman claimed that the SAF forces attacking Kurmuk had been reinforced by Janjaweed militia from Darfur and fighters belonging to the anti-Juba Jonglei-based South Sudanese militia led by Dinka General George Athor (for Athor, see Terrorism Monitor, May 20, 2010).

On November 22, the SAF announced it had seized the town of Diem Mansour from the rebels (Sudan Tribune, November 22). Diem Mansour is only 25 km from the South Sudan border. Satellite imagery shows that the SAF is installing helipads and lengthening and upgrading runways in Kurmuk and ad-Damazin, moves that would allow the SAF to improve its ability to bomb targets further into the South Sudan (VOA, November 11).

Cross-Border Attacks

Reports from the border between North and South Sudan indicate that al-Bashir’s rhetoric is now being matched by SAF operations in the border region. On November 11, an SPLA spokesman announced that SAF forces and allied militias had been repelled in a seven-hour battle at Kuek, home to an SPLA military base guarding nearby oil fields. The attack was denied by Khartoum, but SPLA spokesmen insisted the battle was proof of Khartoum’s plans to “capture the oil fields” (AFP, November 11; Sudanese Media Center, November 11). There were reports of a similar attack on an SPLA base in Raja County in Western Bahr al-Ghazal Province (Saturday Nation [Nairobi], November 19).

Yida refugee camp in Unity State was bombed on November 10 by one of Sudan’s ancient Soviet-built Antonov cargo planes, used by the Sudan Air Force as makeshift bombers. The attack came a day after a similar bombing of a refugee camp at Guffa in Upper Nile State that killed seven people (Sudan Tribune, November 10; VOA, November 11). Despite estimates that up to 100,000 people may have fled south from the fighting in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile Province, Khartoum maintains that all such camps are actually bases for SPLA-N insurgents.  A spokesman for the Sudanese Foreign Ministry insisted that “There are no camps for Sudanese refugees in South Sudan… only assembly areas for rebel troops” (AFP, November 11).

Sudan has made two complaints to the UN Security Council this year over what it charges is South Sudanese military support for the SPLM/A-N rebels. At the same time, Khartoum continues to ignore a Security Council order to withdraw its forces from the disputed Abyei region. In the South, President Salva Kiir has also complained to the Security Council over threats of a southern invasion coming from Khartoum: “It is surprising that Sudan as a member of the United Nations has arrogated itself to threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan through military invasion” (Sudan Tribune, November 10).

Renewed fighting along the border will make it extremely difficult to restart negotiations between North and South, which had already broken down without making any progress on resolving issues like the status of Abyei, border delimitation and a formula for oil distribution fees. Both Sudan’s find themselves in a tricky situation as most oil is produced in the South but all of it must pass through North Sudan in a pipeline to the Red Sea terminal at Port Sudan.  With peace talks having ground to a halt, the SPLM tried a new gambit to revive negotiations by offering “to assist the north, give them billions of dollars… We are willing to share with them, despite our poverty, in the interests of peace” (AFP, November 18; Reuters, November 18). At the same time, South Sudan president Salva Kiir has been issuing increasingly stronger statements maintaining that the South will preserve its newly-gained sovereignty from attack by Khartoum by force if necessary.

Following the alleged SAF attacks Salva Kiir visited Kampala for urgent security-related discussions. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, a close U.S. ally well on his way to building one of Africa’s strongest militaries, told a joint news conference that Khartoum must end its “aggression” against the South and avoid making the mistake of “managing Sudan as an Arab country [when] it is Afro-Arab” (Saturday Nation [Nairobi], November 19).

China, meanwhile, appears to have decided to continue its support for the Khartoum regime despite its continuing involvement in oil operations in both South and North Sudan. The Defense Ministers of China and the Sudan agreed on November 17 to strengthen military relations and deepen cooperation between their respective militaries (China Daily, November 17).

Conclusion

After decades of conflict, Khartoum seems unable or unwilling to turn to anything other than a military solution in its dealings with internal dissent or in resolving differences with its neighbors. The military buildup along the border with South Sudan suggests Khartoum might like to move on the Southern oilfields, but any such operation would have to quick and decisive; otherwise oil flows would stop and both North and South Sudan would immediately face an economic crisis. The South, having spent roughly 50% of its annual budget on arms and military equipment since 2005, has prepared well for any irredentist attack by Khartoum and the few Khartoum-supported militias operating in the South are unlikely to be enough to distract the South Sudanese Army, now one of Africa’s largest, from repelling a Northern offensive.  In fact, with the creation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, it is now Khartoum that must worry about rebel militias operating in its rear areas. In the event of a third round of war with the South, these Northern rebel movements would soon begin receiving arms and training from the SPLA.

The Shaiqiya, the Ja’alin and the Danagla, the powerful riverine Arab tribes that dominate the Sudanese state, have too much at stake to allow al-Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court on war-crimes charges, to bring down a state which, at least in Khartoum and parts of the northern Nile region, had begun to show signs of prosperity thanks to petro-dollars and investment from the Gulf States.

The creation of the SRF does not mean that rebel fighters will soon be seen in the streets of Khartoum, but it does remind Northerners that peace agreements with empty rebel fronts like the recent deal with Darfur’s Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) are no substitute for negotiations with genuine security threats. The SRF can succeed against the regime through a war of attrition, keeping the Sudanese Army fighting an expensive multi-front counter-insurgency in the midst of a crippling economic crisis. Khartoum will no doubt attempt to apply its proven strategy of dealing with regional opposition by exploiting divisions within the opposition, then offering financial and political incentives for disenchanted factions to join the government forces. Nevertheless, it seems probable that at some point those with vested interests in the survival of the regime and the prevention of the state’s total economic collapse will begin to look for alternatives to al-Bashir in their desire to maintain something as close to the political and social status quo as possible.

Note

  1. Communiqué of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, November 11, 2011; full text available at: http://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com/2011/11/12/communique-of-the-sudan-revolutionary-front/.

 

This article first appeared in the November 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Libya’s Muslim Brothers Emerge from the Shadows

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, November 24, 2011

Political parties continue to multiply in Libya, but few are so well prepared and organized as the National Gathering for Freedom, Justice and Development (NGFJD), the political front of Libya’s long-repressed Muslim Brotherhood and associated Libyan Islamists. Led by Shaykh Ali al-Salabi, the Benghazi-based party is modeled on Turkey’s ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) (Arab News, November 17).

Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader Suleiman Abdelkadir

Formerly based in Geneva, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood held its first post-revolutionary conference on Libyan soil in mid-November. The Benghazi event was attended by several hundred delegates (AFP, November 18). Remarks by the Brotherhood’s leader, Suleiman Abdelkadir, included a call for Libyan factions to unite in the task of rebuilding Libya as it was “not a task for one group or one party, but for everyone…” (Reuters, November 18).  Abdelkadir told the conference the Brotherhood was in favor of a civil state in Libya: “We don’t want to replace one tyranny with another. All together, we want to build a civil society that uses moderate Islam in its daily life” (OnIslam.net, November 18).

The conference included speeches by members of Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda Party and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and was attended by ministers of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC), including Defense Minister Jalal al-Degheili and Islamic Affairs Minister Salam al-Shaykhli. Many of the Brothers at the conference were reported to be highly educated and fluent in English (Reuters, November 17).

NGFJD leader Shaykh Ali al-Salabi, a prominent figure in Libya’s Islamist movement, is regarded as a polarizing individual by many who accuse him of being under the influence of Turkey and Qatar. He is especially disliked in Tripoli, where thousands have gathered in demonstrations against his efforts to bring Shari’a to Libya.

Shaykh Ali al-Salabi

Responding to those in Libya who have expressed their opposition to religious leaders in politics, al-Salabi said: “I believe that Islam covers all, including politics. In the past we were deprived from implementing the principles of Islam. I am a religious person, I am also a Libyan citizen. I have my say with regard to the political issue… We call for a moderate Islam. But you all have to understand that Islam is not just about punishment, cutting hands and beheading with swords” (Reuters, October 10). Al-Salabi maintains that the NGFJD is a nationalist party similar to the moderate Islamist Ennahda party that took recent elections in Tunisia (Arab News, November 17). The party is likely interested in having a large representation in the new government when the crucial question of writing a new Libyan constitution is addressed.

The TNC is planning to hold general elections in June, 2010. It is difficult to gage the degree of support the Islamists have – some observers maintain they would easily win an election, while others, like Ashur Abu Dayyah (founder of the 17 February Free Forum) estimate all the Islamist factions combined do not exceed 10% support in Libya (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8).

The resignation of interim Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Jibril on October 23 helped halt a growing rift between the ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) and al-Salabi, who called for his resignation. Under criticism for his divisive approach at a critical juncture in the Libyan revolution, al-Salabi later noted he had opposed the Prime Minister’s “professional capabilities and performance,” not his religious views (Reuters, October 10). Al-Salabi’s campaign against al-Jibril even failed to get the support of Abd al-Hakim Belhadj, the powerful commander of the Tripoli Military Council, who has unexpectedly joined the NGFJD. Belhadj is a veteran of the war in Afghanistan and a former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group commander who was imprisoned by the Qaddafi regime for eight years before his release in an amnesty for Islamist militants who renounced violence. He is generally regarded as the Qatar-supported leader of the Salafist-Jihadist trend in Libya. Whether Belhadj’s presence in the party will serve to radicalize the NGFJD or to moderate Belhadj remains to be seen. Belhadj is considered a leading candidate to become Libya’s new Minister of Defense (al-Arabiya, November 18; for Belhadj, see Militant Leadership Monitor, September 29; Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 9).

For now, however, Belhadj has downplayed charges of an impending Islamist takeover of Libya:

The Islamists are a principal constituent of the Libyan people, and they have performed very well in rescuing Libya from the things of which the citizens suffered. This does not mean that there is no body other the Islamists who have exerted patriotic efforts for the salvation of Libya… We have been and we will continue to confront exclusion tendencies that always claim that the Islamists impose dangers on the society, and have intentions that lead to instability and to threats to the security of the country and of the region, and so on. These claims are not true. We will not behave in any other way than to further the security of the country first and the stability of the region second, and we will have equal relations with all, which will be based on mutual respect and joint interests (al-Hayat, September 19).

Interim Libyan leader Mustafa Abd al-Jalil, a former Qaddafi justice minister, has declared that “any law that violates Shari’a is null and void legally,” citing in particular the Qaddafi regime’s restrictions on polygamy (NOW Lebanon, October 28). Dr Muhammad Abd-al-Muttalib al-Huni, a prominent Libyan intellectual and former adviser to Sayf al-Islam al-Qaddafi, may be said to represent the largely secular component of Libyan society that finds the TNC’s priorities puzzling: “Mr Mustafa Abd-al-Jalil is an ignorant man who is suitable only to be a Shari’ah registrar of marriages and divorces. On the day of declaring liberation the only thing in his mind was to rescind the law that limits polygamy. This law was not a gracious gift from al-Qaddafi, but it was the result of the struggle by Libyan women for more than six decades.” Al-Huni also mocks al-Jalil’s announcement he will eliminate Western-style banks that practice “usury” in favor of non-interest paying Shari’a-compliant banks, saying Libya’s interim leader forgets “that without national and foreign banks there can never be a prosperous economy, and the unemployed youths will not be able to fulfill their dreams and prosperity, for which they aspire after the revolution” (Ilaf.com, October 27). Even al-Salabi dismissed al-Jalil’s aspirations for Libya’s banking system: “This is his opinion, nothing else” (Arab News, November 17).

Unlike the hastily-organized political parties springing up everywhere in Libya, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has been organizing since its formation in 1949, often meeting underground in Libya or abroad in Europe. Though membership has for these reasons been traditionally small, the party is made up mainly of a dedicated core of educated professionals who are sure to mount a formidable campaign to form the first post-revolution government in Libya so long as it can control rivalries within the party.

This article first appeared in the November 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.