Sinai Bedouin Reject Egypt’s “Military-Islamist Alliance”

Posted on February 10, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

The Sinai’s well-armed but marginalized Bedouin community has accused Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of “treason” and has threatened a general insurgency if SCAF continues to ignore their quest for greater political representation, return or compensation of land expropriated for tourist developments and the liberation of hundreds of Bedouin men who were arrested without charge in 2004-2007, Bedouin representatives have suggested that Egypt’s new Islamist-dominated parliament is designed to serve the military that created it. According to Ahmed Hussein, a leader of the Qararsha tribe of South Sinai, the Bedouin will not recognize a parliament without Bedouin representation and will reject the “alliance between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and a certain Islamic party [i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood]” (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 17).

Tribal Map of the Sinai

The Sinai’s Bedouin community has been at odds with government security forces following the latter’s heavy-handed response to a series of bombings in Sinai tourist resorts between 2004 and 2006. Thousands of young Bedouin men were arrested and tortured, with many remaining in Egyptian prisons today without trial or even charges having been laid. Though there were expectations this situation would be rectified after the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the military government has done nothing to date.

On February 5, a blast in North Sinai severed the pipeline carrying Egyptian natural gas to Israel and Jordan. The pipeline has come under attack at least 12 times since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February 2011 (Reuters, February 5). The pipeline has become a symbol of the corruption of the Mubarak regime, with many Egyptians believing the unusually low price of the gas provided to Israel in a 20 year deal was the result of behind-the-scenes payoffs to the Mubarak family and their business associates. The Egyptian loss on the deal is estimated at $714 million.

Jordan has been forced to raise electricity prices this month to cover the cost of imported fuel needed to replace the interrupted Egyptian gas supply. Jordan agreed last October to a substantial increase in payments and Israel may soon be asked to do the same (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 5). The pipeline currently provides 40% of Israel’s gas requirements. Most electricity in Israel is now generated by natural gas and the loss of gas supplies means more expensive diesel and fuel oil must be substituted at an additional cost of nearly $3 million per day (Ahram Online, January 24).

Most of the pipeline bombings appear to be the work of Islamist militant groups operating in the northern Sinai. One such group, Ansar al-Jihad, claimed responsibility for the latest attack, describing it as retaliation for the death in prison of their leader, Muhammad Eid Musleh Hamad (a.k.a. Muhammad Tihi). Hamad was arrested on November 13 in connection to previous pipeline bombings (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem]/Reuters, February 5).

Ansar al-Jihad announced its formation on December 20, 2011, pledging to carry out the work begun by the late Osama bin Laden (Sinam al-Islam, December 20, 2011). The group further proclaimed its full support in January of current al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a veteran Egyptian jihadist (Sinam al-Islam, January 24; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 26).

The latest pipeline attack was only one of a series of incidents in the last few weeks that indicate a growing unrest in the Sinai region and a greater willingness on the part of the Bedouin community to resort to arms to achieve their aims:

On January 24, dozens of Bedouin gunmen seized the Aqua Sun, a Red Sea hotel, as part of an effort to reclaim traditional lands lost in the 1990s when the Egyptian government sold coastal properties to private developers. Well-armed with automatic weapons, the gunmen demanded that the hotel owners either return the land or buy it from the Bedouin. Egyptian military authorities did not respond to the hotel management’s pleas for action to retake the property and release the employees held hostage by the gunmen, saying they could not undertake military operations in the area without Israeli approval (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 24).
On January 26 masked gunmen in two 4X4 vehicles tried to plant explosives on a North Sinai natural gas plant. Their arrival appears to have been known beforehand to soldiers and local guards at the site, who engaged the attackers in a gun battle (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 26).
A wave of bank robberies in the Sinai by well-armed Bedouin has shocked many in Egypt, where such crimes have been extremely rare. In one such incident on January 28, two Egyptians and one French tourist were killed in the gunfire that followed a police ambush on a band of armed Bedouin that had just robbed a bank in Sharm al-Sheikh of L.E. 2 million. With a further two tourists injured in the crossfire, the robbery struck a further blow to Egypt’s faltering tourism industry.
On January 31, a group of armed Bedouin seized 25 Chinese workers from a Sinai cement factory with the intention of holding the group hostage until the Egyptian government released five relatives of the gunmen who were originally detained in 2004 after an attack on the tourist resort of Taba (AFP, February 1). The abducted Chinese workers were released within 15 hours, suggesting concessions were made by the military government, though details of what prompted the release remain scarce (Xinhua, February 1; Bikya Masr [Cairo], February 1). One of the demands made for the release of the 25 Chinese workers called for a halt to gas exports to Israel (al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo], February 2-8).
On February 3, two American women were abducted by Bedouin gunmen on their way from St. Catherine’s monastery in the south Sinai to the resort of Sharm al-Sheikh. The gunmen, apparently members of the Qararsha tribe of South Sinai, were seeking the release of two detained relatives whom police described as drug dealers apprehended in a violent arrest on January 28 which saw three police officers wounded and one Bedouin killed. The women, who reported they were well treated during a brief captivity, were released after several hours when police promised to review the case of the two Bedouin detainees (Reuters, February 3; AP, February 4).

In light of the growing unrest in the region, Israel is intent on accomplishing three goals along the Sinai border: 1) Seal off the tunnel network used to smuggle goods and arms into Gaza, 2) Prevent further infiltration of the border by African refugees and drug traffickers, and 3) Insulate Israel from the growing insecurity in the Sinai without having to approve the deployment of larger numbers of Egyptian troops in the region, as required by the Camp David Accords. To accomplish these goals, Israel is constructing a massive border fence and a secondary defense line several kilometers back. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is awaiting financial approval to deploy remote control gun systems in a series of pillboxes along this line. Reservists normally deployed on border security duties have been replace by Israeli regulars (YNet News, February 6).

On the other side of the border, Egyptian police have adopted a hardline “shoot first” policy to prevent Africans from attempting to cross into Israel. Two Africans killed at the border on January 21 were among dozens killed by Egyptian border guards in the last few years (Bikya Masr [Cairo], January 21).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Revolutionary Roadshow: Libyan Arms and Fighters Bring Instability to North and West Africa: Part Two: Libyan Arms Enable New Tactics and Strategies

Posted on February 9, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 9, 2012

Some observers have noted a change in Tuareg tactics in the current rebellion in a switch from their usual adherence to guerrilla methods to attacks in strength and attempts to seize and hold settlements in northern Mali. The effort to carve out a new Azawad nation may well be fuelled by the rebels’ possession of superior weaponry obtained during the Libyan collapse (Le Republicain [Bamako], January 30). The assaults on small towns in the north may be a means of testing the strength of the Malian army before the Tuareg rebels mount attacks on larger centers like Gao and Timbuktu.

However, not all Mali’s Tuareg fighters have joined the insurrection. Malian military operations in the north are currently under the command of Colonel al-Hajj Gamou, a loyal Tuareg officer who has served in the Malian army since 1992. A loyalist unit of Tuareg in Kidal Region led by Muhammad ag Bachir has also backed government security forces by arresting a number of individuals suspected of supporting the MNLA, including Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga, a veteran Tuareg rebel leader who had threatened to restart the Tuareg insurgency if Bamako did not fulfill the conditions laid out in the 2008 Algiers Accord (Jeune Afrique, January 24; El Khabar [Algiers], July 15, 2010; see also Terrorism Monitor, September 2, 2010). Other former Tuareg members of the Libyan military resettled at Menaka were reported to have joined in efforts to repulse the MNLA attack of January 17 (Jeune Afrique, January 24).

The rekindling of the Tuareg insurrection in Mali appears to be provoking a resurrection of the notorious Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso militias, loosely organized self-defense units formed from the black African communities (primarily Songhai and Fulani) in the largely Tuareg and Arab northern provinces of Mali, a development that threatens to turn the northern conflict into a more general civil war. The Bérabiche Arabs of northern Mali are also reforming their militias, which have cooperated with government offensives against Tuareg rebels in the past (Le Combat [Bamako], January 31).

The Response from Algiers

Algeria responded to the Tuareg attacks in Mali by raising its security alert to the highest level. Algiers has long been unhappy with Mali’s failure to secure its northern regions, which now provide bases for the Saharan offshoot of the Algerian-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Ilaf.com, January 20; al-Quds al-Arabi, January 20). Le Pouvoir, the Algerian political/military/business elite that controls most aspects of Algerian life, fears instability above all else and has tried to shut down any effort within Algeria to emulate the revolutionary unrest in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. A series of so-far uncoordinated riots in Algerian cities has no doubt alarmed Algeria’s elite. Algiers fears that this wave of unrest is intended to pave the way for foreign intervention in North Africa, but many Algerians worry that the government’s inability to extinguish AQIM’s low-level insurgency is a means of justifying Le Pouvoir’s tight grip on Algerian politics and maintaining high levels of spending in the military and security services.

Unable to rein in AQIM, Algiers has chosen to fight AQIM’s shadow, sentencing the commander of AQIM”s Sahara/Sahel branch, Abd al-Hamid Abu Zeid (a.k.a. Muhammad Ghidr) to life in prison, a sentence applied in absentia. Abu Zeid is the leader of the Tariq Ibn Ziyad unit of AQIM, which uses kidnappings and murder as their main tactics. Another Algerian court is still hearing the in absentia case against AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar for the deaths of two Algerian soldiers (NOW Lebanon, January 22).

Algeria, which played an important part in resolving previous Tuareg insurrections in Mali, has indicated that it views AQIM and the MNLA rebellion as “two different issues” and has undertaken mediation efforts between the rebels and Bamako. Prior to the outbreak of the latest Tuareg rebellion, Algeria attempted to aid Malian counterterrorism efforts by sending a small group of military trainers to provide instruction in anti-terrorist techniques (L’Aube [Bamako], December 22). However, the recent withdrawal of Algerian military trainers from Mali and a freeze on further shipments of military equipment was intended by Algiers to force a political settlement to the current conflict (El Khabar [Algiers], January 28). An MNLA spokesman said that the Tuareg attack on Tessalit came only after Algerian military personnel were withdrawn as the attackers did not wish to involve Algeria in the fighting (Reuters, January 27). Algeria is also aware of other less obvious threats to Mali’s security and recently shipped 3,100 metric tonnes of food to address Mali’s increasing difficulty in feeding its population (L’Independant [Bamako], January 31).

Algeria is facing parliamentary elections in May in which Algerian Islamists are expected to do well as an alternative to the existing power structure under which unemployment and housing shortages have flourished (Reuters, January 31).

The Response from Bamako

With presidential elections on their way in April, President Amadou Toumani Touré appears to be ready to apply the military option to the Tuareg problem, particularly since he must now deal with the Tuareg insurgents without recourse to the mediation of the late Colonel Qaddafi. Bamako also appears prepared to take extraordinary measures to save the situation in the north. Mohamed Ould Awainatt, a member of northern Mali’s Arab community and one of the main suspects on trial in the notorious 2009 Boeing 727 shipment of cocaine to northern Mali that ended with the traffickers torching the aircraft, was suddenly and quietly released from detention on January 19. His release in a case that severely embarrassed Mali was reportedly obtained as the result of a demand from a group of young Arabs the government of Mali was trying to enlist in the fight against their Tuareg neighbors (22 Septembre [Bamako], January 23; AFP, January 23).

In Timbuktu there are constant rumors of an imminent attack on the city and widespread fear of a Tuareg attack on the city’s Arab community (L’Independent [Bamako], January 24; Le Pretoire [Bamako], January 30). In the capital of Bamako there is talk of Western conspiracies, French “hatred” of independent Mali, malicious plots devised by Mauritanian generals and the alleged operations of foreign spies working hand-in-hand with al-Qaeda to divide Mali. Some Malian media sources have suggested that France and possibly other Western nations had persuaded many Tuareg fighters to abandon Qaddafi’s forces during the Libyan uprising with promises of support for an independent Azawad (Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako], January 24; L’Aube [Bamako], December 22, 2011). Local media is almost unanimous in its calls for a hardline approach to the latest Tuareg rebellion, with one columnist even advocating the use of nuclear weapons in Mali’s barren north (Le Pretoire [Bamako], January 30; L’Aube [Bamako], January 30; Le Potentiel [Bamako], January 31).

Libyan Arms Flow in All Directions

The availability of looted Libyan arms may allow new armed groups to form in West Africa with greater ease than usual. One such group may be the Jamaat Tawhid wa’l-Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa – MUJWA), led by Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (a.k.a. Abu Qumqum) and dedicated to the spread of Shari’a throughout West Africa. According to a video released by the movement, MUJWA broke away from AQIM due to the domination of the movement’s leadership by Arab militants from Mauritania and Mali. MUJWA appears to be a black African Muslim reaction to the traditional domination of all al-Qaeda branches by Arab Muslims, and their video has a specifically African character by using Hausa and English as well as Arabic to praise a number of important West African Muslim empire builders of the 19^th century (AFP, December 22). In a video released in early January, Kheirou said his movement had declared “war on France, which is hostile to the interests of Islam” (AFP/NOW Lebanon, January 3). Though the group has only carried out one kidnapping operation so far, the spread of Salafi-Jihadist militancy into relatively unaffected West African Muslim communities would be an alarming development. Just by kidnapping European aid workers from a Polisario camp of West Saharan refugees in Algeria, MOJWA has helped inflame the difficult security situation in the region. Polisario operatives are now searching for Kheirou and his three European hostages.

In light of the tense political situation in Egypt, news that Egyptian border guards had prevented smugglers from bringing a shipment of machine guns, sniper rifles and ammunition into Egypt through the Libyan Desert was an disturbing development in Egypt’s unfinished revolution (MENA [Cairo], January 24; January 18).

Conclusion

The West’s poorly considered support of a spontaneous Libyan rebellion lacking common aims, ideology or even basic organization has secured the present reality. Clearly, the restoration of security in Libya is an essential first step in stabilizing the region. Unfortunately, the ability of Libya’s Transitional National Council to either project force or promote conciliation seems to be diminishing rather than increasing. If Libya is unable to make progress on disarmament and unification issues, the stage may be set for the emergence of a strongman ready to enforce his will on Libya, perhaps in the form of an ambitious young colonel with fresh ideas about remaking the Libyan state…. but then we’ve already been down that road. Nonetheless, both the West and Africa must now confront the security fallout from the rash decisions made a year ago.

This article first appeared as a Jamestown Foundation “Hot Topic” Special Commentary, February 9, 2012.

Revolutionary Roadshow: Libyan Arms and Fighters Bring Instability to North and West Africa: Part One: The Libyan Pandemonium

Posted on February 8, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 8, 2012

A year after the eruption of Libya’s spontaneous revolution, there are few signs of progress towards establishing internal security or a democratic government. Real power lies in the hands of well-armed militias with little inclination to disarm or demobilize and the ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) has been reduced to holding its meetings in secret to avoid bottle-throwing, grenade-hurling demonstrators. Amidst this turmoil come increasingly louder demands for a Shari’a regime as the old regime’s looted armories and former soldiers fuel new insurrections in the Sahel/Sahara region. Even as neighboring Mali descends into a new round of rebellion that threatens to become an all-out civil war, Niger and Algeria are struggling to find ways to break the wave of violence at their borders.

The alarming developments on the Libyan periphery inspired a special two-day meeting of foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs from Mali, Algeria Mauritania and Niger in Nouakchott in late January. These officials also invited their counterparts from Nigeria and Burkina Faso to discuss the rising “terrorist threat” in the Sahel/Sahara region and the possibility of ties between AQIM and Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants (AFP, January 23; PANA, January 24; Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], January 24).

Libya’s Political Chaos

In some ways it is proving difficult to distinguish between the new and old regimes in Libya as reports emerge of widespread torture and consequent deaths in detention centers run by the new military security agency and various militias. The UN estimates some 8,500 Libyans are held in militia-run prisons in and around Benghazi that have no external supervision (Telegraph, January 26). Libyan and UN authorities admit that they do not even know where all the detention centers are in Libya (AFP, January 25).

The ruling TNC has been forced to meet in secret after their Benghazi offices were stormed by protesters who tossed home-made grenades, set part of the building on fire and pelted TNC chairman Mustafa Abd al-Jalil with empty bottles (NOW Lebanon, January 22; al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 25). Only days earlier, the TNC deputy leader, Abd al-Hafiz Ghoga, was verbally abused and manhandled by protesters who questioned the sincerity of his defection from the Qaddafi regime (NOW Lebanon, January19). Ghoga’s subsequent resignation was rejected by the TNC (AFP, January 30). The fact that these incidents occurred in Benghazi, the TNC’s supposed stronghold, do not auger will for the future success of the interim government. The TNC already acknowledges it has little control over most of the country, which continues to be largely administered by well-armed militias. A campaign on Libyan social media seeks to undermine the transitional government with calls on Facebook and Twitter for the overthrow of the TNC, which is described in the messages as working for the return of the Qaddafi dictatorship (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 25).

Libya’s Muslim Brothers have already demonstrated their political savvy in the creation of the new Libyan government by successfully demanding that two-thirds of the new assembly’s seats be reserved for candidates from political movements, a regulation that virtually guarantees the Muslim Brotherhood a dominant role in the new government as one of Libya’s only well-organized political movements (AFP, January 28). Restrictions on the participation of former members of the government in the electoral process automatically eliminate much of the Brotherhood’s opposition in contesting seats for the assembly. Thousands of Libyans have joined street demonstrations in Benghazi demanding the immediate implementation of Shari’a and its incorporation into a new Libyan constitution (AFP/NOW Lebanon, January 21).

Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib has recently warned of the danger posed by Qaddafi loyalists who had escaped the Libyan revolutionaries: “This is a threat for us, for neighboring countries and our shared relations” (Reuters, January 20). However, recent reports that pro-Qaddafi fighters had attacked a militia occupying the southern city of Bani Walid reveal how easily these fears can be manipulated to repress political opposition.

Though militia statements indicated the Bani Walid fighters were Qaddafi loyalists, the violence was in reality the result of anger over thefts and arbitrary arrests committed by May 28 Brigade members that boiled over when a number of armed Bani Walid residents arrived at the Brigade’s base to demand the release of a local arrested by the militia. The Warfallah tribe, Libya’s largest and the dominant group in Bani Walid, demanded that the Brigade be disarmed and brought under Defense Ministry control (AFP, January 27). Though various militias had gathered around Bani Walid for a major assault on the city’s alleged “pro-Qaddafi” elements, the TNC declined to open a new round of fighting and instead sent Defense Minister Osama al-Juwali (himself a commander in the Zintan Brigade militia) to negotiate a settlement (Jordan Times, January 26). Libyan Interior Minister Fawzi Abdelali later clarified the situation by denying the uprising against the thwar (Libyan revolutionaries) was the work of pro-Qaddafi militants (NOW Lebanon, January 23). The talks led to TNC recognition of a tribal-based local government in Bani Walid, which should set an interesting precedent for decentralized government as the TNC attempts to extend its influence in post-revolutionary Libya.

Jordan is trying to alleviate the problem of rogue militias by undertaking the training in Jordan of some 10,000 thwar as preparation for their integration into Libya’s new military and security services (Jordan Times, January 20). However, it may prove difficult to convince the gunmen to abandon their new powerbases at a time when their armed presence will guarantee them a share in the considerable revenues of a new, oil-rich administration. Alternatively, Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, has offered to help Libya disarm its militias and integrate them into the new national police and military units (BBC, January 8). Al-Bashir received a warm welcome from the TNC in a mid-January visit to Libya, despite being wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in neighboring Darfur (Le Monde, January 19).

Pro-Qaddafi Tuareg Fighters in Libya

A New Tuareg Rebellion

The overthrow of the Qaddafi regime has had an enormous impact on Libya’s southern neighbors, most notably in Mali. Much has changed in Mali’s arid north since the leading Tuareg rebel, Ibrahim ag Bahanga, was killed in mysterious circumstances on August 26, 2011 (see Terrorism Monitor, September 16, 2011). [1] A prominent opponent of the political and military domination of Mali by the Bambara (one of the largest Mandé ethnic groups in West Africa), Ag Bahanga had been harbored by Qaddafi’s Libya after his defeat by Malian forces aided by Arab and Tuareg militias in 2009 (see Terrorism Focus, February 25, 2009). At the time of his death, it was widely believed in Mali that Ag Bahanga was preparing a new rebellion with weapons obtained from Libyan armories (Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako], August 17, 2011; Ennahar [Algiers] August 27, 2011). Ag Bahanga publicly opposed the “intolerance preached by the Salafists” of AQIM and at one point even proposed that his men be used as a mobile counterterrorist strike force (El Watan [Algiers], August 29, 2011; see also Terrorism Monitor, November 4, 2010). Ag Bahanga was an active recruiter for Qaddafi’s loyalist forces but later described the Libyan strongman’s death as an opportunity to advance Tuareg efforts to create a new state, Azawad, composed of the three northern territories of Mali; Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.

Since Ag Bahanga’s death, a new Tuareg independence movement has been formed from a mixture of veteran rebels, defectors from the Malian Army and the recently returned Tuareg veterans of the Libyan Army who arrived in northern Mali in several heavily-armed convoys. The military commander of the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA – National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) is Colonel Muhammad ag Najim, a Malian Tuareg formerly of the Libyan Army (Proces-Verbal [Bamako], January 30). According to one report, each of the three major MNLA units is commanded by a pair of officers, one a veteran of the Libyan army, the other a defector from the Malian army (Jeune Afrique, January 24).

The military base at Aguel Hoc (Kidal Region) was attacked by the MNLA on January 18 and again on January 24 (L’Essor [Bamako], January 26). Unlike the raids that characterized past Tuareg rebellions, the intent this time was to take and hold the town. As the MNLA poured reinforcements into the fighting the government forces ran out of ammunition, forcing a complete withdrawal from the town on January 27 (Reuters, January 27). Similar attacks occurred simultaneously at Menaka and Tessalit. According to a Malian military source, the assailants in Menaka were equipped with Katyusha rockets, courtesy of the looted Libyan armories (AFP, January 19).

The MNLA appears to be conducting joint operations with a new Tuareg Islamist movement. Iyad ag Ghali, one of the leaders of the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s has formed a movement demanding the institution of Shari’a in Mali (Info Matin [Bamako], January 12; 22 Septembre [Bamako], January 12). By doing so, Ag Ghali, who remains powerful in Kidal Region, has introduced an Islamist element to the traditional ethnic-nationalism that has fueled past Tuareg uprisings. Ag Ghali claimed it was his new Islamist movement, Harakat Ansar al-Din, that was most responsible for the January 18 seizure of Aguel Hoc (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January 19).

It may have been Ag Ghali’s group that Mali’s Defense Ministry was referring to when it claimed units of AQIM jihadis had joined the MNLA in the assault on Aguel Hoc (AFP, January 26; al-Jazeera, January 27). By the end of January, Bamako was claiming the attack on Aguel Hoc was the combined work of AQIM, the MNLA and “a group linked to religious fundamentalists” (most likely Ag Ghali’s Ansar ad-Din) (L’Essor [Bamako], January 30). A Paris-based representative of the MNLA, Moussa ag Acharatoumane, told journalists that he rejected the government’s claim his movement had been joined by AQIM jihadis: “We’ve heard all this before. Every time Mali finds itself unable to battle our fighters, the Malian government tries to link us to terrorists. We reject all forms of terrorism. Our intention is to get rid of the drug traffickers and AQIM from our soil” (AP, January 27; Reuters, January 27).

A Malian army counterattack directed from the Gao headquarters of General Gabriel Poudiougou succeeded in briefly driving off the Tuareg occupying Aguel Hoc and Tessalit, with the reported loss of 45 to 50 insurgents including Colonel Assalat ag Habbi, a deserter from the Malian military, to the loss of two dead government soldiers (L’Essor, January 23; Maliba Info [Bamako], January 19). [2] However, the army’s success was short-lived, as it was not long before MNLA fighers returned to the towns, inflicting heavy losses on government forces.

The Tuareg widened the rebellion on January 26 by attacking tow ouposts more than 500 miles apart; Anderamboukane in the east and Lere in Mali’s northwest, taking the latter without a fight after a small government garrison was withdrawn (AP, January 26; Reuters, January 27). Reeling from Tuareg attacks, the Malian military withdrew to Niafunke, which was then promptly attacked and taken by the MNLA (Le Combat [Bamako], January 31).

With thousands of Tuareg and Arab refugees crossing into neighboring Niger, there is alarm in the Nigérien capital of Niamey that the rebellion in Mali may spread to the Tuareg community of northern Niger, which has a similar volatile mix of well-armed, disaffected Tuareg returnees from the conflict in Libya. Niger’s president, Issifou Mahamadou, appealed for an end to the ethnic divisions that have plagued the Sahara/Sahel region: “Let us cease shooting each other in the foot; let us stop stabbing one another. Let us stop dividing ourselves, taking recourse to our ethnic groups, to our region” (Tele Sahel [Niamey], January 24).

Note

1. For a profile of Ibrahim ag Bahanga, see Andrew McGregor, “Rebel Leader Turned Counter-Terrorist?: Tuareg’s Ag Bahanga,” Militant Leadership Monitor, March 30, 2010.

2. Both the MNLA and the Malian Army issue reports of massive losses to their opponents while reporting only minimal or no casualties to their own forces.

This article first appeared as a Jamestown Foundation “Hot Topic” Special Commentary, February 8, 2012.

Gaza Salafists Claim to “Widen War” with Nevada Forest Fires

Posted on January 26, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 26, 2012

A Gaza-based Salafist militant group, the Ma’sadat al-Mujahideen, has made a surprising claim of responsibility for igniting a series of devastating forest fires near Reno, Nevada. The claim was made in a statement from the group entitled “Declaring War on America by Setting Fire to Nevada Forests” that was carried on a number of jihadi websites (Ansar1.info, January 21).

The Work of the Gazan Mujahideen?

According to the statement, a group of “brothers from the lions of Ma’sadat al-Mujahideen set the fires on January 19 as part of an effort to widen “the area of war” by transferring it to locations inside America and elsewhere. The Salafist movement declares that fighting against the civilians and military of Israel, America and their allies to be fard ayn, or individually obligatory on all Muslims until “the liberation of Palestine” is achieved. The Salafists also issue a warning:

We give the enemies of Islam and the allies of the Jews who occupy the land of Palestine three months beginning from the date of this statement to disown [themselves] from the Jews who occupy the land of Palestine, and their actions against our Moslem brothers, and we demand the end of their alliances that oppress our rights as owners of the land, or we will be forced to extend our war until it spreads in all the lands that plot with our enemies.

Demanding that the Jews “return from whence they came since they have no place among us,” the movement points out the ease with which damaging attacks can be inflicted on nations such as America from within. Referring to the alleged setting of the Nevada forest fires, the message encourages similar actions by other Muslims: “Here you see with our own eyes what simple materials can do, that are cheap in your enemy[‘s homeland], and how much damage it can inflict in them.” The brush fire in a valley between Carson City and Reno consumed more than 3,000 acres and forced the evacuation of more than 4,000 residents (Los Angeles Times, January 19). The Gazan Salafists did not provide any evidence of their claim, the veracity of which remains highly questionable at the moment.

Though it has been impossible to confirm the role of Ma’sadat al-Mujahidin in a number of incidents of suspected arson to which the movement has made claim, the group seems rather fixated on the use of fire as a tactical weapon in an asymmetric jihad. Last December the group issued a statement entitled “Setting a Fire in Factory on Materials and Chemical Fertilizers,” and a year earlier claimed to have started the fires in the forests of the Mount Carmel mountain range in northern Israel that killed more than 40 people.

Led by Shaykh Abu Ubaydah al-Ansari, the Ma’sadat al-Mujahideen is heavily influenced by the Salafists’ intellectual hero, Shaykh Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), and have declared it their duty to “liberate our [Muslim] lands and sanctuaries, not out of patriotism, but as a compulsory Islamic duty” (Shabakat al-Tahadi al-Islamiya, February 16, 2010). The movement is highly critical of Hamas for its alleged failure to fully implement Shari’a in Gaza, its failure to confront “the Jews” militarily, and its alleged “apostacy” (see Terrorism Monitor, March 4, 2010).

This article first appeared in the January 26, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Afghanistan’s Taliban Declare Victory as Peace Initiatives Get Under Way

Posted on January 26, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 26, 2012

The opening of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan office in Qatar as the first step in a Qatar-backed Afghan reconciliation process has been interpreted by the Taliban as a sign of the movement’s “victory” in Afghanistan. A January 15 statement entitled: “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Formal Proclamation of Islamic Emirate’s Victory” said the development had “proved to the world that the Islamic Emirate is deeply rooted internally in the Afghan nation and externally in the whole Islamic Ummah. Militarily successful resistance against a gigantic international alliance, full presence on the whole soil and overall perseverance are the signs and secrets of the Islamic Emirate.” (Ansar1.info, January 15).

According to the Taliban, the Islamic Emirate has overcome “the claims of Karzai and America” and demonstrated it is “a well-organized political power besides being a political power… The Afghans and Taliban are not a trivial phenomenon but an ideological and national movement which should be acknowledged as a political fact.”

The Taliban used the statement to express their pleasure with the choice of Qatar for the opening of a formal office, noting that Qatar has balanced relations “with all sides and a prestigious status in the Islamic world.” The movement outlined why several alternatives would be less desirable; Pakistan (referred to here only as a “neighboring country”) would have allowed the Karzai regime to continue its propaganda efforts to describe the Taliban as being under the control of Pakistan’s security services; Saudi Arabia was out of the question due to its close bilateral relationship with Pakistan, and Turkey was also unsuitable due to its membership in NATO. Some reports state the United States is considering a proposal to allow five Taliban leaders to leave confinement at Guantanamo Bay for Qatar as a confidence-building measure (The Nation [Lahore], January 24; January 25).

Another Taliban statement responded to images circulated in the Western media of U.S. troops urinating on the bodies of recently killed Taliban fighters by calling for the UN and other human rights organizations to bring an end to “such inhumane acts” (Shahamat.com, January 13). The statement charged American soldiers with committing torture, abusing the Quran, killing women and children and desecrating the dead, alleging that these were “only a small fraction of the crimes which are perpetrated by the American soldiers.” The statement concluded by warning U.S. troops would have to face “the consequences of such actions and will have to confront the extra wrath and hatred of the Afghan masses.”

While the Taliban proclaims victory in its struggle against U.S. and NATO forces, there are signs that U.S. authorities have begun a wider effort to initiate peace talks with all the major insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. Dr. Ghairat Baheer, a representative of Afghan warlord and former U.S. ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has reported having talks on behalf of Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami movement with CIA director General David Petraeus, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and U.S. Marines General John Allen (AP, January 25; The Nation, January 24). Hekmatyar has been a U.S. “specially designated global terrorist” since 2003.

There are also reports that the United States is exploring the possibility of including the notorious Haqqani Network in the peace talks. Working in close alliance with the Taliban, the cross-border Haqqani Network has been identified as a major threat to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Express Tribune [Karachi], January 9; AP, January 25). Earlier this month, the UN added the names of two Haqqani Network members to its list of proscribed Taliban associates; Fazi Rabi, a Haqqani Network financier involved organizing suicide attacks, and Ahmed Jan Wazir, described as a key commander in the network and a deputy to Sirajuddin Haqqani (United Nations, January 6, 2012: www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/215627.pdf).

This article first appeared in the January 26, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Taliban Condemns President Karzai on U.S.-Run Prison and Continued Night Raids

Posted on January 12, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 12, 2012

Bagram Air Base

A recent statement issued by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) has criticized Afghan president Hamid Karzai for his dependence on a small number of warlords to maintain power and his subsequent inability to combat corruption or assert Afghanistan’s sovereignty. [1]

[Karzai] speaks of national sovereignty and of the welfare of people but practically, we see that there are thousands of Afghan detainees who have been suffering in the Bagram Air Base and other American bases now for years, and without a trial. But this does not prick his conscience to feel the need of a national sovereignty!

On the same day as the Taliban statement was released, President Karzai announced the creation of an investigative commission to look in to the Bagram issue while issuing a demand that control of the U.S.-run prison be turned over to the Afghan government within 30 days (al-Jazeera, January 5). However, one Afghan daily suggested that national authorities are incapable at this time of taking control of Bagram Prison or similar facilities based on their record in recent years:

Mass escape of prisoners- most of them Taliban prisoners – from Kandahar prison, escape of a number of dangerous prisoners from Pol-e Charkhi prison, strikes and riots in different prisons of the country including in Pol-e Charkhi prison, increase of prisoner numbers in the country, lack of sufficient environment for keeping inmates, [lack of] legal professional capabilities of prison guards in Afghanistan, the overwhelming problems in regards to handling of prisoners cases, all these reveal the capabilities of the Afghan government in maintaining and controlling prisoners (Daily Afghanistan [Kabul], January 7).

Bagram is the largest U.S. run detention center in Afghanistan, with over 1,000 prisoners, though only a minority of these have been charged. Though both Karzai and the Taliban have identified U.S. control of the facility as a national sovereignty issue, there are fears that mass breakouts of Taliban prisoners might follow an exchange of control (Tolo TV [Kabul], January 9).

Karzai was also condemned in the Taliban statement for failing to prevent the night raids “conducted by the invaders, noting that even members of the administration and family members had been killed or harmed during night raids. Karzai actually began to demand an end to night-raids by NATO forces in December, 2011, but received a negative response from U.S. and NATO officials, who described the night-raids as an efficient, low casualty method of rounding up suspected militants (Khaama Press [Kabul], January 8; AP, December 19, 2011).

The Taliban used the statement to describe the Kabul government as one where corruption “is at its climax. It is apt to say that bribery and drug trafficking have become part and parcel of the daily life of the venal officials of the government. Obviously, this is the result of the Karzai mismanagement of governance…”

According to the Taliban, Karzai’s willingness to do the bidding of warlords and other corrupt individuals is preventing his administration from playing an independent or constructive role in providing a solution to the occupation of Afghanistan: “Though he has tried to deceive the people by pleasant and emotional assertions… the people have now come to know his anti-Islamic and anti-national intentions…” With increasing indications that the United States is now prepared to negotiate directly with the Taliban, it seems likely that Karzai’s demands are part of an effort to reassert his influence and prevent his exclusion from peace talks.

Note

“Karzai’s Anti-National and Pro-Warlord Demeanor,” Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, January 5, 2012.

This article first appeared in the January 12, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Struggle between North and South Sudan Increasingly Tied to Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Posted on January 12, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 12, 2012

In late December, South Sudan president Salva Kiir made a state visit to Israel, meeting with President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. The visit alarmed many in the traditional Khartoum power structure, including former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, who described the visit as “devilish” and part of an Israeli effort to find new allies after alienating Turkey and losing the cooperation of the Mubarak regime in Egypt (Sudan Vision, December 26, 2011).

President Salva Kiir Mayardit

A spokesman for the Sudanese Foreign Ministry said the government was studying the national security implications of Kiir’s visit to Israel, citing Israel’s leading role in an international campaign to “foment” the conflict in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2011).

Also on the agenda was the fate of an estimated 15,000 Sudanese refugees in Israel, many of them Muslims from Darfur and Christians from the South Sudan that the Israeli government would like to return in order to preserve the Jewish character of Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu likened the arrival of these refugees to “a nationwide plague – in the economy, society, homeland security. There is no obligation to take in illegal infiltrators. This is no longer a matter of making a decision – it’s a necessity, an imperative… Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state must be secured” (YNet News, December 27, 2011).

After Kiir’s visit, Israel announced it would send a delegation to South Sudan to investigate means of assisting the new nation. Kiir is reported to have asked for greater cooperation in the fields of technology, agriculture and water development (DPA/Reuters, December 20).

Rolf Steiner in Biafra

Israel’s interaction with South Sudan goes back to the Anyanya rebellion of the 1960s, when it provided covert training and arms supplies to Southern guerrillas in an effort to open a new front against Khartoum and prevent the deployment of Sudanese troops along the Suez Canal as part of the Arab alliance against Israel. German mercenary Rolf Steiner, fresh from exploits in the Congo and Biafra, attempted to join the Anyanya forces, but was forced to join another separatist faction after what he believed were Israeli objections to his service with Anyanya based on his experience as a teenaged Jungvolk commander in Nazi Germany in 1943-44. [1]

Right on the heels of the South Sudan president’s visit to Jerusalem came the first official visit to Sudan by the Hamas prime minister of Gaza, Ismail Haniya. After arriving in Khartoum on December 27, the Hamas leader predicted the “Arab Spring” would eventually bring victory to the Palestinian resistance and thanked the Sudanese people for their support (Sudan Vision, December 31, 2011).

Haniya was joined in Khartoum by Khalid Mesha’al, the exiled Hamas leader, and Hamas co-founder Mahmoud Zahar as the delegation sought financial support for its reconstruction following the 2008 Israeli attack on the territory as well as political support for recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state (AFP, December 29). Mesha’al was reported as warning the Sudanese president that Israeli authorities were trying to ethnically cleanse Jerusalem by “Judaizing” the city (Elnashra [Beirut], December 29, 2011; Jerusalem Post, December 30, 2011).

Meanwhile, both the Sudanese and Israeli press have been full of unverified stories alleging Israeli military incursions and airstrikes in the Red Sea coast region of Sudan. In an attack said to have occurred in November, Israeli aircraft were reported to have struck two vehicles in the Wadi al-Allaqi area of northern Sudan near the disputed Hala’ib Triangle region along the Sudanese-Egyptian border (Haaretz, December 25, 2011; December 27, 2011). A second incursion was reported by Sudanese media to have taken place on December 15, involving Israeli Apache attack helicopters landing near a Sudanese radar installation and even Israeli submarines operating off the Sudanese Red Sea coast (YNet News, December 26, 2011). Sudanese officials denied reports that Israeli aircraft had carried out strikes on targets in eastern Sudan on December 18 and 22 (al-Bawaba, December 25, 2011). A pro-government daily reported that the men killed in a convoy of six Toyota Land Cruisers attacked by Israeli aircraft on December 18 were “gold prospectors” (Alintibaha [Khartoum], December 24, 2011).

Most of the reports display some confusion over the actual dates and some apparently different reports may refer to the same incident. Colonel Sawarmi Khalid Sa’ad, a spokesman for the Sudanese Army, was adamant that no trace of an aerial incursion had been detected by Sudanese radar and air defense systems (Haaretz, December 25)

Israeli claims that Iran was shipping arms through Sudan and overland through Egypt to Gaza emerged in 2009 just prior to an earlier series of mysterious airstrikes in Sudan’s Red Sea coast region (Jerusalem Post, March 3, 2009).

Note

Scopas S. Poggo: “Politics of Liberation in the Southern Sudan, 1967-1972: The Role of Israel, African Heads of State, and Foreign Mercenaries,” The Uganda Journal, Vol. 47, November 2001, pp. 34-48; Rolf Steiner: The Last Adventurer, Boston, 1978, pp. 178-210; Edgar O’Ballance: The Secret War in the Sudan 1955-1972, London, 1977, pp. 126-130.

This article first appeared in the January 12, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Turkish-Egyptian Naval Exercises Recall Muslim Dominance of the Eastern Mediterranean

Posted on December 22, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, December 22, 2011

The combined fleets of the Ottoman Sultan and his Viceroy in Cairo once dominated the eastern Mediterranean. Beginning in the 19^th century, the forces of European imperialism and Arab nationalism began to drive apart the two anchors of Muslim supremacy in the region. Political separation and defeats at sea were followed by a steep decline in naval capacity in both nations. Now, however, new political trends are bringing the Turkish and Egyptian navies together again to restate their military potential in the face of challenges posed by new rivals such as Israel and Iran.

The Ottoman Navy

The naval exercises, code-named “Sea of Friendship 2011,” began December 17 and are scheduled to finish on December 23 (Turkish Radio-Television Corporation, December 15). Turkey is acting as the host nation and the exercises will take place in Turkish waters of the eastern Mediterranean. Egypt’s contribution in terms of ships and personnel is the largest yet in the series of three Turkish-Egyptian annual naval exercises. According to Turkish sources, the Egyptian force will consist of two frigates, two assault boats, one tanker, a helicopter and an underwater assault team, while the Turkish contingent will consist of two frigates, two assault boats, a submarine, a corvette, a tugboat, two fast patrol boats and an underwater assault team (Anatolia News Agency, December 15).

Despite growing tensions between Egypt and Israel, the commander of the Egyptian Navy, Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish, publicly insisted that the naval exercises are not directed towards anyone, but were rather part of an ongoing effort by Turkey and Egypt to maintain peace and security in the region (Ahram Online, December 15). A Turkish press release emphasized the development of mutual cooperation and interoperability between the Turkish and Egyptian fleets (Turkishnavy.net, December 15).

The naval exercise with Turkey follows the Egyptian Navy’s biggest live ammunition war games in its history on October 30 in the seas off the coast of Alexandria. Aside from a number of coordinated operations between the navy’s air and sea assets, the games also provided an opportunity to introduce new speedboats to the Navy (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], October 30).

In August, Turkey pulled out of a scheduled naval exercise with Israel and the United States for the second year in a row following the Israeli attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara in May, 2010 (Jerusalem Post, August 6). In September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a decision to increase Turkey’s naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean in light of the attack on the Mavi Marmara and Israeli gas exploration operations in Cypriot territorial waters disputed by Turkey. At a conference held in Tunisia, Erdogan said “Israel will no longer be able to do what it wants in the Mediterranean and you’ll be seeing Turkish warships in this sea” (AFP, September 15). Ankara is also challenging the legality of Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.

There have also been suggestions that the exercises will present a show of force to Iran as it pursues an aggressive Middle East policy. Turkish friction with Iran over the conduct of Syria’s repression of its growing internal political opposition has increased in recent weeks, with Iranian leaders suggesting that the Turkish government’s Islamist model is unsuitable for the Arab world (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 15). Threats from Iranian military leaders that NATO air defense system bases in Turkey would be attacked in the event of an Israeli/American strike on Iran have further aggravated relations between the two regional powers.

Egyptian Yonca-Onuk MRTP-20 Fast Interceptor

Egypt is in the process of taking delivery of the first of six Turkish-built Yonca-Onuk MRTP-20 (Multi Role Tactical Platform) fast interceptor boats. Some of the boats are being built in yards in Istanbul, while others are being built in Alexandria with technology transfer agreements. Egypt is the fifth country to purchase the MRTP-20, which features the ASELSAN – STAMP weapons system (STAbilized Machine gun Platform), a remote-controlled system which its builders say is designed to defend against asymmetric threats on land or sea-based platforms.

The Egyptian Navy is also preparing to take delivery next year of four Fast Missile Craft being built in Pascagoula, Mississippi by the VT Halter Marine company under a Foreign Military Sales deal worth $807 million. The missile ships will each carry a 76mm gun, Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles designed for use in littoral waters, MK49 Rolling Airframe surface-to-air missiles and a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) for self-defense (UPI, October 27; AP November 1). Capable of doing 34 knots per hour with a crew of 40 sailors each, the ships are intended for use in the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the coastal waters of the Mediterranean.

As Turkey’s former strategic alliance with Israel begins to fade away, Ankara appears to be turning towards the new Arab regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to strengthen its expanding role in the Middle East. Efforts to increase military cooperation through exercises such as “Sea of Friendship” represent important steps in spreading Turkish influence and exerting a more independent post-Mubarak foreign policy in Egypt.

Note:

For STAMP, see: Undersecretariat of Defense Industries Export Portal, International Cooperation Department, http://defenceproducts.ssm.gov.tr/Pages/ProductDetails.aspx?pId=71 .

Salafists Target Works of the Ancient Egyptians

Posted on December 22, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, December 22, 2011

Egypt’s Salafist parties, which did surprisingly well in the first round of parliamentary elections with 24% of the vote, have tried hard to present themselves as compatible with modern norms, so long as they fit the moral standards established by Islam’s earliest generations. Youssry Hamad, a leader of al-Nur (The Light) Party, the leading Salafist movement in Egypt, has protested claims that the Salafists wish to turn back the clock in Egypt: “We are surprised to find that the liberal and secular current, which rejects the doctrine of Islam, distorts our image in the media through lies and speaks about us as if we came from another planet… We will not tell people to ride camels, as others have said about us. We want a modern and advanced Egyptian society of people” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], November 19).

Youssry Hamad

Egypt’s rapidly expanding population is facing a host of major problems that will require the attention of any new government. There have been fears, however, that an Islamist-dominated parliament might devote itself to social issues such as reforms directed at dress, gender mixing and alcohol consumption at the expense of more pressing concerns. While the Muslim Brotherhood continues to keep its distance from suggestions it might have a radical Islamist agenda, many Salafists have embraced the opportunity to express extremist interpretations of Islam in the post-Mubarak environment. Some Salafist preachers have suggested it is time to put an end to the “idolatry” encouraged by the monuments of Ancient Egypt. Though the last known worshipper of the ancient Egyptian religion converted to Christianity in the fourth century C.E., these Salafists have suddenly decided to address the alleged danger posed to Islam by these monuments, suggesting their destruction or concealment as a solution.

A Salafist leader and al-Nur Party candidate for parliament in Alexandria, Abd al-Moneim al-Shahat, described the civilization of ancient Egypt as a “rotten culture” that did not worship God (Ahram Online, December 2). While al-Shahat has not called for their complete destruction, he has suggested that the ancient works be covered with wax to prevent their worship (Reuters, December 9). Al-Shahat has also voiced his concerns over the literature of Egyptian Nobel Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz, denouncing it for inciting “promiscuity, prostitution and atheism” (Ahram Online, December 2). Though running in an Islamist stronghold in Alexandria, al-Shahat lost the run-off election last week to an independent candidate supported by the Muslim Brotherhood after Copts and Liberals banded together to defeat the controversial al-Nur candidate (Reuters, December 8).

Abd al-Moneim al-Shahat

The growing signs that the newly ascendant Salafists might begin a campaign against Egypt’s vast archaeological and cultural legacy, one of the most impressive in the world, have sent shock waves through Egypt’s tourism industry. The legacy of the ancient Egyptians represents the nation’s principal source of foreign currency and over a tenth of Egypt’s gross domestic product.

In response to the Salafists’ verbal attacks on the ancient remains, a group of roughly 1,000 protestors gathered in Giza near the site of the Great Pyramid to denounce the Salafists’ remarks (Reuters, December 9; Ahram Online, December 10). Al-Shahat’s suggestions for dealing with the issue of idolatry in Egypt were later soundly refuted by Shaykh Mahmoud Ashour, the former deputy leader of Cairo’s al-Azhar University, the most respected center of Islamic scholarship in the world. Referring to the great Caliphs and other respected Islamic leaders who had ruled Egypt, Ashour noted that neither the 7^th century Muslim conqueror of Egypt and companion of the Prophet Muhammad, Amr ibn al-As, nor any of the other Islamic rulers of Egypt “had a problem with ancient Egyptian monuments or thought they have to be destroyed or that they are against Islam” (al-Arabiya, December 12; Bikya Masr [Cairo], December 13). Abd al-Nour, a former leader of the Wafd Party and current Minister of Tourism in the interim government, blasted the Salafists’ approach to tourism, saying that the “rejection of God’s blessings [such as Egypt’s] unique location, a shining sun and warm water, is tantamount to atheism” (Ahram Online, December 10).

To counter fears that an Islamist government could mean the end of Egypt’s vital tourism industry, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hizb al-Hurriya wa’l-Adala (HHA – Freedom and Justice Party) and the Salafist al-Nur Party both announced they would hold “tourism conferences” to promote the industry. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood have shaken hands with tourists in Luxor and visited the Giza Pyramids to show their support for tourism based on Egypt’s ancient monuments. A Nur Party spokesman, however, has said his party supports tourism, but prefers a type of “Halal tourism” that would ban immoral conduct and be consistent with Salafist ethics (Bikya Masr, December 12).

In some ways the modern Egyptian Salafists appear to be opposed to the views of the early Arab Muslims they emulate, Muslims who were very familiar with the civilization of Ancient Egypt after centuries of Arab migration to Egypt (there is ample archaeological evidence of some of these Arabs adopting the religion of ancient Egypt in the pre-Islamic era). Though the Arab Muslim conquerors that arrived in the Seventh Century were avid treasure hunters and not above stripping pyramids and other monuments of useful building materials, early Islamic scholars from across the Islamic world visited Egypt to investigate its monuments, culture and history in the interest of expanding knowledge of the world and recording the monuments as evidence of the Holy Scriptures in which they are mentioned. [1]

Note:

See Okasha El Daly, Egyptology: the Missing Millennium. Ancient Egypt in Medieval Arabic Writings, London, 2005.

“The Notion of Spring Does Not Exist in the Arab World”: Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelleh Wards Off the Arab Spring

Posted on December 22, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

December 22, 2011

In a recent interview with a French-language African news magazine, Djibouti’s head of state, Ismail Omar Guelleh, was asked if “the great wind of the Arab Spring” had “blown as far as Djibouti?” Guelleh, leader of Djibouti since 1999, quickly dismissed the notion: “The Holy Koran talks of ‘summer and winter voyages.’ The notion of spring does not exist in the Arab world” (Jeune Afrique, December 10). [1]

President Ismail Omar Guelleh

The importance of Djibouti to American strategic planning was reinforced this month by a visit to the small African nation from U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who said partnerships with nations such as Djibouti were essential to the American counterterrorism effort (AP, December 13). Djibouti is home to the American Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a mission of over 3000 troops engaged in counterterrorism, anti-piracy, surveillance and humanitarian missions. The Task Force is centered on Camp Lemonnier, a former Foreign Legion installation leased by the United States in 2001. The U.S. facility also serves as a base for CIA-operated drones carrying out missions over Somalia and elsewhere.

Government in Djibouti has been dominated by the ruling Rassemblement populaire pour le Progrès (RPP – People’s Rally for Progress).since independence in 1977. After serving as chief of the secret police, Guelleh succeeded his uncle, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, as the nation’s second ruler in 1999. Opposition leaders are routinely jailed before or after elections, leading to election boycotts in 2005 and in 2011 after Guelleh amended the constitution to allow for a third six-year term. Guelleh had previously promised his second term would be his last. The president justifies his reluctance to share power by citing an excuse used frequently by authoritarian rulers: “This time round, I will not change my mind. I did not want this last mandate. It is a forced mandate, because the people felt there was no one ready to take over” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Djibouti’s Strategic Importance

Djibouti, a small, hot and otherwise insignificant country of 8500 square miles nevertheless occupies one of the most strategic pieces of real estate in the world. Close to many of the major oil-producing regions in the Middle East, Djibouti occupies the western side of the Bab al-Mandab, the southern entrance to the Red Sea and ultimately the Suez Canal. Djibouti is also the place where the great east African Rift Valley meets the Gulf of Aden. The deep, fifty-mile-long Gulf of Tadjoura, protected by the Musha Islands at its entrance from the Gulf of Aden, provides an excellent natural harbor for naval and commercial ships, a fact quickly noted by the French imperialists who arrived in the region in 1862, acquiring the port of Obock from local Sultans as a foothold in the region. The modern port of Djibouti City lies on the southern side of the Gulf of Tadjoura and has historically played a major role in projecting French force and influence into Asia. [2]

Djibouti has played a military role in both world wars, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, the Suez War of 1956 (as part of France’s Operation Toreador), the Gulf War of 1991 (as a base of French operations) and now the current conflict in Somalia (including anti-piracy operations).

Until recently, Djibouti was home for 49 years to one of the world’s most famous fighting forces. The 13^th Demi-Brigade of the French Foreign Legion was formed in 1941 from legionnaires who rallied to the Free French cause. The unit was initially created to participate in the attack on Narvik in Norway, but later served in heavy fighting on more familiar desert turf in Syria, Eritrea and most notably in Libya at the Battle of Bir Hakeim. During its nine post-war years in Indo-China the unit took terrible losses, particularly at the 1952 Battle of Hoa Binh and the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. After service in Algeria the 13^th was assigned to permanent residence in Djibouti in 1962. After deploying from Djibouti to missions in Somalia, Rwanda and the Côte d’Ivoire, the 13^th left Djibouti last June for a new French base in the United Arab Emirates. (Defense.gouv.fr, June 20).

Djibouti is also home to another unique military formation, the 5^e Régiment interarmes d’outre-mer (5^e RIAOM), the last combined arms (infantry, artillery and armor) regiment in the French army. The 5^e RIAOM is the successor of the 5^e Régiment d’infanterie de marine (RIMa – colonial infantry), which deployed one company of troops to protect the newly acquired port of Obock in 1890. The unit in one form or another had already participated in the assault on Russian forts in the Baltic Sea during the Crimean War as well as colonial campaigns in China, Mexico and Vietnam. In the 20^th century the unit was disbanded and recreated several times under slightly different names while participating in campaigns in the Great War, World War II and the Indo-China War. The unit was re-established as the 5^e RIAOM in 1969 with the mission of guarding French interests in Djibouti and being available to support French military operations in Africa or the Middle East. The RIAOM is supported by a section of Gazelle and Puma military helicopters.

An agreement reached in May 2010 allowed the Russian Navy to use port facilities in Djibouti but did not provide for the establishment of a land forces base or permanent Russian naval facility. The agreement allowed Russia to deploy warships in the region on anti-piracy or other missions without the necessity of using supply ships (Shabelle Media Network, May 17; 2010; Interfax, May 17, 2010; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, May 28, 2010). The first ever visit to Moscow by a Djiboutian Foreign Minister in October highlighted the growing relations between Djibouti and Russia (Buziness Africa [Moscow], October 20; Agence Djiboutienne d’Information, December 13).

Japan has also identified Djibouti as an important asset in the protection of its vast commercial shipping fleet. A Japanese naval base and an airstrip for Japanese Lockheed P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft opened in July as a port for ships of Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). Japan typically deploys a pair of destroyers on rotation in the Gulf of Aden on counter-piracy operations as well as members of the Special Boarding Unit (SBU), a Hiroshima-based Special Forces unit patterned after the U.K.’s Special Boat Service (SBS) (Kyodo News, July 31, 2009; AFP, April 23, 2010).

Djibouti and the Winds of the Arab Spring

Protests against the regime in Djibouti calling for Guelleh’s resignation began at roughly the same time as the Tunisian revolution and the beginning of the Egyptian revolution in late January 2011. Mass arrests of demonstrators quelled the demonstrations by March, but the problems behind the protests remained unresolved (al-Jazeera, February 18; Reuters, March 4). Though Djibouti is not an Arab nation, its proximity to Yemen, its Muslim majority and its membership in the Arab League mean that developments in the Arab world are often influential in Djibouti’s political development.

Guelleh denies the protests had any political motivation, suggesting they were simply an “expression of a purely social malaise, which some big-wigs of the opposition wanted to transform into a revolution… very quickly, it all degenerated into looting… It was, in a much reduced form, the equivalent of [the London riots] in early August. The only difference is that over there, if the media are to be believed, the British police simply restored order when confronted with the urban riots, whereas here we were said to have savagely quelled the peaceful protests” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

A lingering insurgency by the ethnic-Afar Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy – FRUD) has survived the 2001 peace agreement that brought an end to a ten-year civil war, with some Afar militants still set on deposing President Guelleh (see Terrorism Monitor, September 25, 2009). The Afar (also known as Danakil after their home territory in northern Djibouti) form roughly a third of the nation’s population, with the majority of the population formed from Somali clans, including the majority Issa (a sub-clan of the Dir) and smaller groups from the Isaaq clan and the Gadabursi, another Dir sub-clan. Religion is not a divisive force in Djibout, with 96% of the population practicing Sunni Isam. The government is dominated by the Issa and to a lesser extent by the Isaaq and Gadabursi, with the Afar having only a small representation in the cabinet. For a time in the 1960s, Djibouti was known by the name “Territoire français des Afars et des Issas,” reflecting a short-lived desire to build a post-independence partnership between the two peoples.

President Guelleh has been accused of repressing dissent and an independent press, but denies these charges: “It is not a problem of censorship, but a problem of money. In Djibouti, there are neither investors nor advertisers in this [media] domain, and the potential readership is very much reduced. Here, people prefer to talk endlessly” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Guelleh regularly derides the opposition in Djibouti as immature and incapable of participating in the democratic process: “In Djibouti the conception of democracy that these gentlemen have is as follows: either one is the head or one seeks to topple the head. They have neither the patience nor the will to take care of the rest” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Development in Djibouti

The majority of Djiboutians live in the port city while the rest tend to live as nomadic pastoralists in the harsh conditions of the countryside. Unemployment ranges between 40% to 50% and provides a source of dissatisfaction with the regime. Other than its strategic location, Djibouti has little to trade on; both resources and industry (other than a small fishing sector) are nearly non-existent.

Djibouti has launched an ambitious $330 million plan to triple its port capacity by 2014 by enlarging the existing container terminal and constructing two new cargo terminals. The port is currently managed by Dubai’s DP World. Much of the new commercial traffic is expected to arrive through a modernized rail line from Addis Ababa and a new rail line from Mekele. Since the loss of Eritrea, land-locked Ethiopia has increasingly relied on a traditional commercial route through Djibouti to the sea. Some 70% of the traffic passing through Djibouti originates in Ethiopia. The main stages in the new rail line from Addis to Djibouti are being built with Chinese financing by the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) (Reuters, December 17).

Chinese firms are expanding their interests in Djibouti, particularly in the still-nascent energy sector. There is also speculation that Djibouti could be developed as an outlet to the sea for South Sudan (possibly including the shipment of oil products from Chinese companies working in South Sudan) as an alternative to using Port Sudan on the Red Sea in the now separate north Sudan. President Guelleh suggests that China is attentive to Djibouti’s needs in a way that the rest of the international community sometimes is not. Describing Djibouti’s search for assistance in the terrible drought experienced this year, Guelleh notes: “We were asking for $30 million. Four months later, only China made a contribution of $6 million. The rest? They are pledges without any hope of fulfillment” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Djibouti has also obtained Kuwaiti and Saudi funding for the construction of a new container terminal on the north side of the Tadjoura Gulf to relieve congestion in the port of Djibouti and enable the handling of greater traffic from Ethiopia (Agence Djiboutienne d’Information, December 13).

Although Djibouti has not been directly affected by piracy, the phenomenon has led to many ships refusing to come to Djibouti, preferring to use alternative ports to avoid both pirates and rising insurance premiums. Guelleh has urged the international community to address this situation on land in Puntland and Somaliland rather than at sea, where years of international naval activity have failed to deal effectively with the problem (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Djibouti and Somalia

On December 14, Djibouti held a ceremony to mark the long-awaited dispatch of a unit of 850 men and 50 instructors of the 3,500 man Forces Armées Djiboutiennes (FAD) to Somalia to join the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The force, the first Djiboutian military unit to serve outside of the homeland, is under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Osman Doubad Sougouleh (Agence Djiboutienne d’Information, December 14).

Al-Shabaab has been angered by Djibouti’s hosting of French and American training for troops of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and has promised retaliatory strikes within Djibouti should FAD troops arrive in Somalia to aid AMISOM operations (Garowe Online, September 18, 2009). President Guelleh says the nation is remaining vigilant, but “on the other hand, I am not overestimating the Shabaab’s capacity for causing harm; a 2,000 km stretch separates us from their Baidoa stronghold.” Guelleh says he is seeking French military assistance to make Djibouti capable of defending itself, being well aware that French troops do “not want to die for Ras Doumeira [the border territory disputed with Eritrea]” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

President Guelleh has expressed his sympathy for the task set for the TFG in building a new government in an ungoverned nation: “They have nothing. To try to establish one’s authority over a country at war, without revenue, to be constantly solicited [and] harassed by a suffering population is not an easy task” (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Regional Relations

Guelleh is one of the most prominent defenders of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity related to the government’s repression of the insurgency in Darfur. According to Guelleh:

Al-Bashir is not what they say he is. He is the only Sudanese leader who has had the courage of negotiating with the south, going as far as amputating his country in the name of peace. Do remember the way those who are opposing him today were treating southern Sudanese as slaves, beginning with [former Sudanese Prime Minister] Sadiq el-Mahdi! They threw this Darfur wrench in [al-Bashir’s] works by inventing a scarecrow of a pseudo-genocide. It was a fable concocted by evangelists and pro-Israeli lobbies (Jeune Afrique, December 10).

Al-Bashir attended Guelleh’s inauguration in May alongside the French Cooperation Minister and the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Karl Wycoff (Sudan Tribune, May 8). As a signatory of the ICC Statute, Djibouti was required to arrest al-Bashir but, like Chad and Kenya, Djiboutian authorities have declined to do so.

Djibouti has clashed twice with Eritrea (most recently in 2008) over respective claims to ownership of the Ras Doumeira peninsula along the Eritrea-Djibouti border. In the 2008 border fighting, French troops supplied logistical, medical and intelligence support to Djibouti under the terms of their common defense pact (BBC, June 13, 2008). The opposing forces are now separated in Ras Doumeira by a small Qatari buffer force.

Conclusion

Though Djibouti’s external security is assured by its French patron and the presence of an American military base, internally the situation is different, and the heavy-handed response of the security services seems at odds with the president’s casual dismissal of last spring’s protests as nothing more than “the expression of a social malaise.” It also seems likely that Djibouti’s new commitment to the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia will invite some type of retaliation from al-Shabaab terrorists who have proven capable of carrying out operations as far afield from their southern Somali base as Kenya, Uganda, Puntland and Somaliland. It seems improbable that Guelleh will be able to survive his new six-year term without substantial internal opposition, though a retaliatory strike by al-Shabaab might play into the regime’s hands, allowing mass arrests and new measures of political repression to ensure Guelleh’s eventual succession, if not by himself, then by other members of his family or the ruling RPP.

Notes

Guelleh refers here to the Surat Quraysh, the 106^th chapter of the Quran, which refers to journeys by the Quraysh tribe (that of the Prophet Muhammad) “in winter and summer.”
Charles W Koburger, Naval Strategy East of Suez: The Role of Djibouti, Praeger Publishing, 1992.

This article first appeared in the December 22, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.