Arab-Tubu Clashes in Southern Libya’s Sabha Oasis

Posted on April 5, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

April 5, 2012

Following deadly clashes between Tubu and Arab tribesmen in the Libyan oasis of Kufra in February, another round of fighting between the Tubu and Arabs using automatic weapons, rockets and mortars erupted in late March in Libya’s strategic Sabha oasis. Tubu residents in Sabha reported Arab tribesmen torching the homes of Tubu residents or expelling them at gunpoint while Arabs warned of Tubu snipers (Libya Herald, March 28; AFP, March 29).

Tubu Tribal Fighters in Sabha Oasis

Three hundred Transitional National Council (TNC) soldiers arrived in Sabha on March 26, with more arriving in the following days. Without a national army that can be called upon to restore order, the TNC instead called on Arab militias from northern Libya to deploy in Sabha, including militias from Misrata, Ajdabiya, Zintan and Benghazi (Libya Herald, March 28; Tripoli Post, March 29). Though a dispute over a stolen car was said to have ignited the fighting, others have cited rising tensions over the distribution of $4 million earmarked by the TNC for use in Sabha (Financial Times, March 29).

Sabha, a city of 210,000 people about 400 miles south of Tripoli, is the site of an important military base and airfield as well as being a commercial and transportation hub for the Fezzan, the southernmost of Libya’s three traditional provinces. Many of the residents are economic migrants from Niger, Chad and the Sudan, while the Qaddadfa (the tribe of Mu’ammar Qaddafi) and the Awlad Sulayman are among the more prominent Arab tribes found in Sabha. One of the last strongholds of the Qaddafi loyalists, Sabha was taken by TNC militias in light fighting over September 19-22, 2011.

By March 29, the fighting had begun to ebb as tribal elders met to negotiate a ceasefire and the oasis town began to fill with some 3,000 TNC-backed militia fighters from northern Libya (Jordan Times, March 30). The clashes are believed to have left 50 dead and 167 wounded while revealing the continuing fragility of the post-Qaddafi Libyan state (Tripoli Post, March 30).Though active fighting between the Tubu and Zuwaya Arabs in Kufra eased in March, tensions remain high as the Zuwaya claim Tubu from Chad have infiltrated the oasis and supplied weapons to the Libyan Tubu in an effort to take control of the borders and smuggling. Local security officials have warned it would take “only one shot for things to degenerate.” (Now Lebanon, March 22; for Kufra see Terrorism Monitor Brief, February 23). Bashir al-Kabit, the head of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, said the fighting in Kufra was only an isolated incident, blown out of proportion by the media, while suggesting the Tubu were still in the pro-Qaddafi camp: “There are some tribal problems. Some tribes were in favor of the [Qaddafi] regime, and some others were against it. Some skirmishes are taking place. There is also a fifth column that is still active in the country; they belong to the al-Qaddafi group. They are trying to carry out some operations to prove to the world that Libya is not stable” (al-Sharq al-Awsat [Cairo], March 9).

The Tubu are an indigenous Black African tribe following a semi-nomadic lifestyle in what is now southern Libya, northern Chad and northeastern Niger. The fiercely independent Tubu were renowned for their stiff resistance to the encroachments of the French Colonial Army in the late 19^th/early 20^th centuries, often conducted in cooperation with Libya’s Sanusi Sufi order, which had established an anti-colonial Islamic confederation in the Sahara. The Tubu are divided into two groups speaking different dialects of a common Tubu language, the Teda group of southern Libya and the larger Daza group now found in Chad and Niger. Tubu politician and guerrilla leader Goukouni Oueddei (president of Chad, 1979-1982 and son of the derde [chief] of the Teda), was backed by Libyan forces in his struggle for control of Chad in the 1980s against the French-backed Hissène Habré, a member of the Anakaza branch of the Tubu and a former defense minister in Goukouni Oueddei’s government. Qaddafi’s price for this support was control of the uranium-rich Aouzou Strip in northern Chad, which was eventually returned to Chad by a decision of the International Court of Justice in 1994. Many Daza Tubu migrated north into Libya to work in the oil industry with the encouragement of Qaddafi. Arab Libyans continue to identify these migrants as pro-Qaddafi foreigners even though the local Teda Tubu were subject to repressive measures from the Libyan leader, who liked to suggest that the indigenous Tubu had only arrived in Libya during the Italian occupation or later.

During the anti-Qaddafi rebellion, some Tubu formed the rebel-allied “Desert Shield Brigade,” which conducted long-range raids (a Tubu specialty) on Murzuk and al-Qatrun (Ennahar [Algiers], August 20, 2011; AFP, July 23, 2011). The Brigade was led by veteran Tubu militant Barka Wardagou, the former leader of the Niger-based Tubu movement Front armérevolutionnaire du Sahara (FARS), which has worked in cooperation with Tuareg militant groups in the past.

The Libyan Tubu claim that, rather than facilitating the entry of foreign militants, the local Tubu have formed their own border patrols to ensure Libya’s sovereignty in the absence of an effective central authority. According to Tubu representative Muhammad al-Sanusi, “Libya’s borders are a red line” (Now Lebanon, March 1).

Led by Isa Abd al-Majid, some Libyan Tubu organized resistance to the Qaddafi regime in 2007 by organizing the Tubu Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL), though al-Majid emphasized at the time that the movement was not seeking separation, only “the restitution of our rights” (al-Alam TV [Tehran], August 15, 2007). In light of the fighting in Sabha and the clashes between the Tubu and the Zuwaya Arabs of Kufra Oasis in February, al-Majid expressed the exasperation of the Libyan Tubu by announcing “the reactivation of the Tubu Front for the Salvation of Libya [TFSL] to protect the Tubu people from ethnic cleansing… If necessary, we will demand international intervention and work towards the creation of a state, as in South Sudan” (Libya Herald; March 28). With the TNC struggling to establish national institutions, separatist threats have even spread to the TNC’s powerbase in Cyrenaica. In mid-March, 3,000 representatives gathered in Benghazi to form an autonomous region in eastern Libya under the “Congress of the People of Barqa [the Arabic name for Cyrenaica)” led by Ahmad al-Zubay al-Sanusi, the grandson of King Idris al-Sanusi (1951-1969) (Jomhuri-ye Eslami [Tehran], March 22). The new autonomous region would hold about three-quarters of Libya’s known oil reserves.

According to Ahmat Saleh Boudoumi, a Tibesti Tubu and author of Voyages et conversation en pays toubou, “Relations between the Arabs and Tubu have always been bad. To be integrated with the Arabs… he must renounce his identity, [something] that the Tubus have always refused. Hence their marginalization in Libya” (Tahalil [Nouackchott], March 31).

This article was originally published in the April 5, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Mayhem in Mali: Implications of the Military Coup in Bamako

Posted on March 23, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 23, 2012

“Underneath the protests after the massacre of Aguelhok, there was a coup d’etat in the making.” In this way, President Amadou Toumani Touré unwittingly predicted his March 21 overthrow by disaffected troops and junior officers during an International Women’s Day speech on March 8 (Info Matin [Bamako], March 9; L’Indicateur du Renouveau, March 9). The move by a group calling itself the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’État (CNRDR – National Committee for Redressment of Democracy and Restoration of the State) followed weeks of protests by the wives and families of government troops who feared the army was being sent to slaughter without proper arms and equipment. Even before the coup, there were mounting calls for the President to be tried for various offenses, including corruption, patronage, drug trafficking and unenthusiastic pursuit of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Mali Demain [Bamako], March 9; Info Matin [Bamako], March 14).

Defense Minister General Sadio Gassama

A Spontaneous Coup?

The coup began at the Sundiata Keita military base in Kati on March 21 during a visit by new Defense Minister General Sadio Gassama and Colonel Abdurahman Ould Meidou, the highly capable leader of a pro-government Arab militia operating in northern Mali. A formal visit descended into an angry confrontation with soldiers as the Minister tried to explain the delay in obtaining new weapons from abroad. When he followed this by an announcement of new troop deployments against the rebels, troops began throwing stones, eventually seizing the base and its weapons before marching on the presidential palace in nearby Bamako (AFP, March 21; Jeune Afrique, March 21).

Though anger had been brewing in the ranks for weeks over the government’s ineffective military strategy, inferior weapons and shortages of food and ammunition in the frontlines, the coup itself appeared to be somewhat spontaneous rather than carefully planned. Typical of the government strategy that has angered the military was the decision to abandon the well-defended Amachah military camp and airstrip at Tessalit on March 10 after a defense of several weeks. The base and town were promptly occupied by the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) the next day (L’Aube [Bamako], March 15; AFP, March 12). The “tactical withdrawal” was a severe blow to the morale of the army (Jeune Afrique, March 22). On March 20, a youth march in the garrison town of Kati demanded immediate food shipments to troops in the north and carried banners saying “Liberate Tessalit” (Mali Demain [Bamako[, March 20; Le Republicain, March 20). A shortage of ammunition was one of the key factors in the fall of Aguelhok in January and the subsequent slaughter of much of its garrison (L’Indépendant [Bamako], March 16).

The coup leader, Captain Amadou Sanago, is a virtual unknown in Mali, but claims to have received training from the U.S. Marines and American intelligence services. Sanago claims he does not intend to remain in power, but is vague about when he plans to step down (Reuters, March 23). A junta spokesman, Lieutenant Amadou Konaré, said only that democracy would be restored once “national unity and territorial integrity are re-established” (AFP, March 22). Given the current political conditions in Mali, this could be years in the future.

The Military-Political Response

At the moment, the senior leadership of the armed forces seems to have been caught off guard by this junior officers’ coup, but it is unlikely that figures such as chief of general staff General Gabriel Poudiougou (believed to be in Bamako) and chief of army staff General Kalifa Keita (still at the Firhoun ag Alinsar military base in Gao) will accept this junior officers’ rebellion.

President Touré is also not a vanquished force. At present he is reported to be hidden somewhere near Bamako by loyal members of the “Red Berets,” the President’s personal guard of paratroopers. A former general who first took power in a coup, Touré has an insider’s knowledge of the difficulties of forming a military government and will be ready to exploit any weakness he can identify in the hastily formed junta. There are also reports that a counter-coup is already being planned by loyal officers (Xinhua, March 22). It remains uncertain whether the junta will receive the support of two units that do much of the frontline fighting in the north, Colonel Meidou’s Bérabiche Arab militia and a pro-government Imghad Tuareg militia led by Colonel al-Hajj Gamou, a veteran desert fighter.

As the coup leaders promise to restore democracy while forcing the cancellation of April’s elections the undisciplined men under their command likewise reform the government by the drunken looting of government offices, gas stations and shops. Wheeling around Bamako in stolen cars and firing indiscriminately in the streets has somehow failed to inspire public confidence in the new military leaders of Mali. It is this very group that promises to arrest President Touré by force and try him for unspecified crimes along with various other ministers and government officials already under detention. In the meantime coup leader Captain Sanago apparently does not have enough authority over the mutineers to have them obey his order to cease their looting of the capital.

The putschists in Bamako are certainly swimming against the political tide by imagining their new military government will receive international assistance or recognition. Already the World Bank, the African Development Bank and other donor organizations have suspended all aid to impoverished Mali, putting enormous and immediate pressures on the junta. France, the former colonial power, has made it clear the junta will receive no support from Paris. Many civil and military leaders in Mali are angry with France, believing it to be quietly supporting the Tuareg rebellion. A senior Malian officer recently suggested France cut a deal with MNLA military chief Muhammad ag Najim, promising support for an independent Azawad if Tuareg troops and officers would abandon Mu’ammar Qaddafi (Jeune Afrique, March 13). Such perceptions were likely influential in Bamako’s decision against allowing the French to build a military base at Mopti devoted to counterterrorism operations. African Union Commission chief Jean Ping was particularly scathing in his assessment of the coup: “”This rebellion has no justification whatsoever, more so given the existence, in Mali, of democratic institutions which provide a framework for free expression and for addressing any legitimate claims” (AFP, March 22). The African Union charter calls for the suspension of any member nation whose government has been taken over by force.

Iyad ag Ghali

Ansar al-Din’s Islamist Revolution

The MNLA’s Salafist partners in the Ansar al-Din movement do not seem to be getting much play on the jihadi websites, a sign the movement does not fit within the larger global Salafi-Jihadi trend. The movement’s Tuareg leader, Iyad ag Ghali, has little history of being a follower, and will likely take the movement in distinct directions determined only by himself and a small cadre of advisers. Ag Ghali is apparently more interested in implementing Shari’a in northern Mali than in establishing the independence of the new state of Azawad proposed by the MNLA. The coup could hardly come at a worse time for government efforts to suppress the northern rebellion, as reports begin to circulate of divisions between the secular MNLA and the Salafist Ansar al-Din movement (L’Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], March 21). A recent three-day meeting between leaders of the two movements failed to resolve their differences (Info Matin [Bamako], March 21).

The MNLA reportedly tried to shift Ag Ghali away from his intention of creating a Shari’a state in northern Mali, but issued the following statement dissociating itself from ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din after their efforts were rejected: “The republic for which we are fighting is based on the principles of democracy and secularity. There could be possible confusion between our fight and that of a group which aims at instituting a theocratic regime” (L’Informateur [Bamako], March 21). Instead of moving to exploit the split in the rebel alliance, the military is now consumed by its own split, which has also put into question Mali’s continuing role as a partner in regional counterterrorism efforts. Military cooperation with the Bamako junta would seem to be out of the question and the future of the American military training mission in Mali is uncertain. This year’s Operation Flintlock, the ongoing U.S. organized Afro-European counterterrorism exercise was already cancelled because of the unrest in northern Mali.

Regional Implications

Algeria and Mauritania have long been critical of Bamako’s sluggish military response to the creation of AQIM bases in northern Mali, with Mauritania feeling increasingly free to carry out its own military operations in Mali if the local government is unwilling to do so. On March 11, the Mauritanian Air Force struck a vehicle carrying two Timbuktu merchants, wounding them severely, apparently in the mistaken belief that the vehicle contained AQIM operatives (L’Indépendant [Bamako], March 14; L’Aube [Bamako], March 15; Le Republicain [Bamako], March 14). Like the other nations in the region under pressure from AQIM activities, they are highly alarmed by what appears to be a strategic disaster in the making.

Nearly 200,000 refugees have poured out of Mali in the last two months, seeking food, shelter and refuge in neighboring nations suffering from drought and shortages. There are signs, however, that the rebellion in northern Mali may follow them; Aghaly Alambo, a former Tuareg rebel leader and recent commander in the Libyan military, was arrested in Niger on March 20 in connection with an intercepted shipment of over 1,300 pounds of explosives (RFI, March 21; Reuters, March 21).

Conclusion

The mutiny and coup will do nothing to further the fight against Tuareg rebels; on the contrary, the collapse of the military command in the north has led to military units there falling back on the northern city of Gao, unsure of what to do next. Gao, a city of only roughly 86,000 people, is now struggling to support some 18,000 refugees from the countryside (Jeune Afrique, March 22). The MNLA has already announced its plans to use this opportunity to advance on the other disorganized and demoralized garrisons of Gao, Kidal and Timbucktu (VOA, March 23). The mutiny appears to have spread to the garrison in Gao, which arrested their senior officers and began firing wildly in support of the coup, a perhaps unwise method of showing support in a city that may soon be under siege considering lack of ammunition is one of the mutineers’ main complaints (AFP, March 22).

A further ominous sign is the resurrection of the notorious Ganda Iso militia, a loosely organized and largely undisciplined militia formed largely from the black African Songhai and Fulani communities of northern Mali, a development that threatens the outbreak of a squalid ethnic and racial conflict of atrocities and counter-atrocities.

Ongoing efforts to persuade Mall’s military partners of the need for new weapons to counter the revolt in the north will now come to naught, as it is unlikely any nation will provide Mali’s new military regime with weaponry. The only hope now is that the leaders of this relatively unplanned coup with little ideology beyond obtaining better weapons and ammunition will prove susceptible to international pressure as they come to realize the complexity of running a modern state.

The coup has created excellent conditions for al-Qaeda to entrench itself in Mali with minimal interference and is probably the greatest gift possible for those seeking to create the new nation of Azawad. Unless the internal collapse within the armed forces can quickly be reversed, both AQIM and the MNLA will score what may prove to be irreversible gains against a state rendered largely defenseless by its own military.

This article first appeared as a Jamestown Foundation “Hot Issues” Special Commentary, March 23, 2012.

Syrian Free Army Commander Claims Iranian Troops and Hezbollah Fighting in Syria

Posted on March 22, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 22, 2012

While hard evidence of an Iranian or Lebanese Hezbollah military presence in Syria is in short supply, commanders of the opposition Syrian Free Army (SFA) continue to maintain that large numbers of such forces are in the frontlines of the Syrian regime’s efforts to suppress anti-government activism.

On March 1, FSA Brigadier General Husam Awwak (formerly of Syrian Air Intelligence) claimed regime loyalists had been joined by an Iranian armored brigade and Hezbollah fighters acting as snipers, bombers and street-fighters (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 1). According to the Brigadier, the Iranian armored brigade has been deployed since 2007 near Deir al-Ashayir (actually in southeastern Lebanon), close to Palestinian refugee camps controlled by Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Paalestine – General Command (PFLP-GC). Awwak added: “This is the first time that this information is made public.” The alleged armored brigade was quickly inflated into Iranian “armored divisions” in the Israeli press (Israelinationalnews.com, March 1). Awwak also claims Hezbollah has sent three brigades (numbered 101, 102 and 103) to Syria, describing the 103^rd Brigade as a “terrorist Shiite regiment specializing in assassinations and bombings.” Various reports in the Chinese, Israeli, Turkish and Pan-Arab press suggesting 15,000 troops from the Revolutionary Guards’ al-Quds unit have deployed in Syria appear to be without foundation.

Brigadier General Husam Awwak

Hezbollah leader Sayyid Nasrallah has denied the presence of any fighters from his movement in Syria, describing the claims as “an attempt to distort the Resistance’s image” (al-Manar, February 24). Besides the alleged presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces, FSA officer Ammar al-Wawi suggests followers of militant Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr have also joined the Syrian security forces (AFP, March 14).

Iranians travelling or working in Syria are increasingly subject to abduction by FSA forces. At least two parties of pilgrims have been kidnapped. Seven Iranians kidnapped in Homs by the FSA’s “Farouk Brigade” appeared in an FSA video confessing they were snipers who “killed a lot of women and children” under the supervision of Syria’s Air Force Intelligence unit. However, it was observed that the names of five of the seven “snipers” matched those of five Iranian engineers kidnapped in Homs last December after spending two years working on a new power plant (Press TV [Tehran], December 24, 2011; February 10; al-Jazeera, January 27).

FSA financing comes both internally and externally from “Syrian merchants, charities and arms traders” according to Awwak. Some armed support came from Libya, but these fighters have returned to Libya due to “the internal situation” in that country. The FSA is still waiting for promised support from the Gulf nations and Egypt. The Syrian Brigadier also made a strange and nostalgic appeal to the Egyptians, reminding them of the political unification of Syria and Egypt in the short-lived United Arab Republic (1958-1961): “We consider ourselves part of the Egyptian army since the days of Egyptian-Syrian unity during Gamal Abd al-Nasir’s rule. The so-called First Army of the Egyptian armed forces is still in Syria. We are happy with any support that Egypt gives.”

The unification last week of the FSA and the Syrian National Council (SNC), an umbrella opposition group, in a merger facilitated by Turkey appears to be part of an effort to present a united front in order to free up arms supplies from Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 14). However, even as some differences receive a temporary patch-over, new armed opposition movements such as the Syrian Patriotic Army (SPA) and the Syrian Liberation Army (SLA). Some of the many opposition “Brigades” proliferating across Syria oppose the prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the SNC, while others have adopted anti-Shi’a, anti-Alawi Sunni extremism as their guiding principle. Some have even adopted the slogan: ”Christians to Beirut, Alawites to graves” (Independent, March 14). However, based on the Libyan precedent, large quantities of arms from external sources seem unlikely to begin flowing until they can be delivered to a single central authority. SNC leader Burhan Ghalioun has proposed the creation of a Military Council to oversee the distribution of arms to the various armed opposition groups, but does not appear to have the support of the FSA’s Riyad al-Asa’d for such an initiative (Independent, March 14). The Syrian regime is not experiencing the same problems; Russia’s deputy defense minister, Anatoly Antonov, announced on March 13 that Russia will honor its existing weapons contracts with Syria and will continue supplying the Syrian regime with new arms (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 14).

Interestingly, both sides in the struggle for Syria claim that Israel is supporting their opponent. The Syrian government claimed that Israeli and U.S.-made weapons were seized in Homs from al-Qaeda fighters of Lebanese, Libyan and Afghan origin. An FSA commander called the claims a fabrication: “The fact is that Al-Assad family’s regime alone has been the agent of Israel for 40 years. It is starting today to claim that it is the target of an Israeli-American conspiracy and at times claims it is targeted by al-Qaeda organization. We assert there are no foreign gunmen in Syria other than the fighters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah who are fighting alongside this regime for its survival” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 12; al-Watan [Damascus], February 11).

Though the Syrian regime has consistently said that opposition forces are in league with al-Qaeda, some in the FSA command try to associate al-Qaeda with Iran; according to Brigadier Fayez Qaddur Amr: “Al-Qaeda was created by the Iranian regime, and the rumor of an al-Qaeda presence among us has only served the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Iran created al-Qaeda even in Somalia” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 12).

It is difficult to say how much the Syrian regime and the armed opposition believe their own tales of foreign jihadis, al-Qaeda operatives, mysterious armored brigades and electrical engineers who moonlight as snipers. Indeed, many of the crimes attributed by the FSA to Hezbollah appear to be the work of the regime’s Shabiha (“ghost”) gunmen. At the moment the FSA leadership may face more immediate threats; Turkish sources indicate a number of Syrians and Turks were arrested this month by Turkish military intelligence after the latter learned of a plot to kidnap FSA leader Colonel Riyad al-Asa’d and other FSA commanders from their refuge in Turkey. The FSA also claimed to have caught a double agent for Damascus who had joined the FSA (Sabah, March 3; al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 3). It is highly unlikely that this is the only regime agent to have penetrated the FSA’s upper echelons

What is clear is that parallel to the very real internecine Syrian conflict exists a war of words and propaganda as each side struggles to win the battle for international opinion and military support.

This article first appeared in the March 22, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Al-Qaeda Commander Calls for Revolt in Saudi Arabia to Deal with Threat from U.S. and Iran

Posted on March 22, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 22, 2012

In an audiotape address entitled “Do Not Lead toward the Wicked,” the naib (deputy leader) of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) called for a jihad against the Saudi royal family as the best way of addressing the threat posed by a united front of Israel, the United States and Iran (UmmaNews.com, March 13; Ansar1.info, March 13).. Sa’id al-Shihri (a.k.a. Abu Sufyan al-Azdi) focused his attack on the Saudis and the “scholars of sin” of the religious establishment that support them. Al-Shihri especially condemned the royal family for permitting Shiites to live in the Kingdom’s Eastern Province (al-Sharqiyah). The AQAP commander has appealed in the past to the Saudi military to mutiny against the Saudis and usher in an Islamist regime (see Terrorism Monitor, September 9, 2010). Shortly after al-Shihri’s statement was released, the Saudi Embassy in Sana’a warned its staff that al-Qaeda was planning to strike the facility with car bombs (Yemen Post, March 15).

Sa’id al-Shihri

The AQAP naib suggested that Americans and Zionists were combatting Sunni Islam in Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan, while Iran was pursuing an aggressive policy in those areas inhabited by their fellow Shiites. Al-Shihri pointed to a recent clash in the largely Shiite city of Qatif as an example of the failure of the Saudis and the “royal scholars” to reveal the nature of the threat posed to Sunni Islam by the “Iranian-armed Rafidites” of Saudi Arabia. “Rafidites” or “Rawafidh” (rejectionists, i.e. of Islam) is a pejorative term used by Salafists or other anti-Shi’a Sunnis. In the past, al-Shihri has indicated he believes the Zaydi Shiites of Yemen are Iranian-controlled “Rafidites” even though their form of Islam is closer to the Shafi’i Sunnism practiced elsewhere in Yemen than to the dominant form of “Twelver” Shi’ism practiced in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Southern Lebanon, eastern Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East (Sada al-Malahim, Issue 12, February 2010; Aljazeeratalk.net, February 18, 2010).

An extreme view of Shi’ism commonly held by Salafists holds that the Shi’a are polytheists and outside of Islam, though the view of Cairo’s al-Azhar University and the Saudi government (at least officially) is that Shi’ism is a legitimate variation of Islam, thus allowing Shiites to perform the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz. With Saudi Arabia’s international reputation as the homeland of Sunni Islam, it remains little known that some 10 to 15%of the nation’s population follows the Shi’i school, these being concentrated in the oil-producing Eastern Province. Al-Shihri urges “the men of Islam” to gather at the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia to defend the Shari’a of Allah from the Americans and their “puppet henchmen.” He also warns Iran has rallied its own followers “from Bahrain to Syria, and from Qatif to Sa’ada [the north Yemen capital of the Shiite Houthist movement) for a war against Islam.”

Al-Shihri cites a takfiri fatwa from the late Saudi Shaykh Abdallah ibn Jibrin that declared the Kingdom’s Shi’a population had been exposed to the truth of Sunni Islam but had rejected it, thus making them heretics subject to the penalty of death. Ibn Jibrin also declared it was inappropriate to pray for the success of Lebanon’s Hezbollah in its struggle with Israel. (IHT August 3, 2006; see also ibn-jebreen.com). Typical of such Salafist exhortations is al-Shihri’s emphasis on the principle of al-wala’ wa’l-bara, or “loyalty (towards the believers) and disavowal (of the disbelievers).” In this case Muslims are obliged to combat the Saudis as they “have left Islam,” according to the naib.

The city of Qatif and surrounding governorate of Qatif referred to by al-Shihri is almost exclusively Shiite and has been the site of numerous disturbances in the last year involving clashes between protesters angered by the Saudi government’s allegedly anti-Shi’a policies and the inequitable distribution of oil wealth in the Qatif region, which lacks schools and health facilities. Saudi Ministry of the Interior spokesman Major General Mansour al-Turki says there can be no comparison made between the “legitimate self-defense” practiced by Saudi security forces under attack from protesters and the political violence taking place in neighboring nations (Saudi Gazette, February 20; Arab News, February 20). Shaykh Sayyid Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, recently offered his support to the Shiite protesters in the Eastern Province, noting the inequitable distribution of energy revenues: “Protesters there are not calling for toppling the regime, they are rather demanding some reforms, rights and developments in one of the poorest areas in Saudi Arabia, knowing that it is one of the richest areas in oil.” In response, the protesters are met only with “bullets and tanks” (al-Manar TV, February 24; AP, February 25).

A prominent Shiite cleric in Qatif, Shaykh Ghazi al-Shabib, has called for legislation against those who willfully spread sedition by promoting sectarianism and takfir in the Kingdom (Rasid.com, March 12). Similar calls were made last October by Shaykh Faisal al-Awami, who suggested the root of sectarianism was the “misinterpretation of religion and misuse of the manuscripts” in some religious communities (Rasid.com, October 22, 2011).

Yemen’s President Abd Rabbu Mansur al-Hadi has sworn to restructure the army and intensify the fight against al-Qaeda in the midst of allegations that General Ali Muhsin and members of the ex-president’s family are supplying weapons and munitions to AQAP and related Islamist militias (al-Mu’tamar [Sana’a], March 13; al-Mithaq.net [Sana’a], March 12; Jordan Times, March 14).

This article first appeared in the March 22, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Gaza’s HAMAS Enters Rocky Relationship with Egypt as it Tries to Reshape Alliances

Posted on March 8, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 8, 2012

With geopolitical realities surrounding Gaza in flux due to the rise of Sunni political parties in the Middle East, the Syrian meltdown and the Iranian nuclear crisis, Ismail Haniyeh and the rest of the Hamas leadership are in the midst of a strategic reassessment of their alliance with Syria and Iran in favor of stronger ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere. However, Hamas’ historical ties to Shiite and Alawite political movements have led to sharp condemnation by Egypt’s Salafists.

While in Cairo on a recent visit, Haniyeh was roundly denounced in a February 24 statement issued by Egypt’s largest Salafist group, al-Da’wa al-Salafiya (The Salafist Call) that also condemned the Muslim Brotherhood for arranging his visit to Egypt in the first place:

We reject Haniyeh leading the prayer in Egypt’s largext Sunni mosque after he shook hands with the Shiites. Egypt is the country of the Sunni al-Azhar [the world’s preeminent Islamic university] and we do not accept a man who put his hand into the hand that kills Sunnis in Iraq and Syria… What is the difference between Jews, Hezbollah and Iran when they are all gathered in going against God’s word and wish to break down Islam? (Bikya Masr [Cairo], February 25).

During his visit to al-Azhar, Haniyeh declared that his movement’s resistance to Israel so long as that nation persisted in aggressive policies and the occupation of the Palestinian territories (Egyptian Gazette, February 25). The Hamas leader was speaking at an event held in response to recent attacks on Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque by Israeli settlers under police protection (Ahram Online, February 24; al-Jazeera, February 19).

Egypt is in the middle of a somewhat chaotic reassessment of its relationship with the United States that will ultimately have a great deal to do with its approach to Hamas. Some Egyptian Islamists are considering revising Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in the face of American pressure to release 18 American nationals accused of using foreign funds to instigate unrest in Egypt, allegedly under the guise of operating “civil society” NGOs. Washington is threatening to halt its annual contribution of $1.5 billion to Egypt ($1.3 billion of which is earmarked for military aid) unless the detainees are freed. Though the Egyptian leadership is no longer as pliable as it was under Mubarak and his cronies, they have yet to come up with a practical and viable replacement for these funds, which are generally regarded in Egypt as a payoff for maintaining peace with Israel.

Shaykh Muhammad Hassan

Salafist preacher Muhammad Hassan responded to the American “humiliation” of Egypt by introducing an initiative to replace the American aid with local donations: “If America wants to cut military aid, very well; Egypt isn’t less than Iran which is self-dependent when it comes to producing its own military equipment… The Egyptian people will not be broken anymore” (El Nahar TV, February 11; Ahram Online, February 15). Egyptian prime minister Kamal el-Ganzouri and the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Ahmad al-Tayyeb, have both come out in support of Hassan’s initiative (Egypt State Information Service, February 17). However, Hassan’s projection of $1 million in private donations will leave a significant shortfall in making up the lost $1.5 billion in U.S. aid.

Hamas has met unexpected criticism elsewhere in Egypt. On February 22, Egypt’s former interior minister, Habib al-Adly, claimed in court that Hamas and Hezbollah had sent infiltrators into Egypt last year to foment political discontent and manipulate the Egyptian uprising against President Hosni Mubarak. Haniyeh responded to the charges immediately: “Hamas did not interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs, either before the revolution or after” (MENA, February 22; AFP, February 22).

Isma’il Hassan (center) at a Hamas Rally

Hamas has since come out against the Syrian regime as its leadership relocates to Cairo, Doha and Beirut. Hamas, based on the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, found itself in the difficult position of being seen to back the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Hamas deputy leader Moussa Abu Marzouk rejected the Syrian approach to political dissent but noted the Hamas position would have a price: “Our position on Syria is that we are not with the regime in its security solution, and we respect the will of the people… The Iranians are not happy with our position on Syria, and when they are not happy, they don’t deal with you in the same old way” (BBC, February 28). Since 2007, Gaza has relied on Iranian financial aid for its continued existence in the face of Israeli military strikes and an economic blockade designed to force the democratically elected Hamas government from Hamas. With less Iranian funding available, Hamas has been forced to raise taxes on imported goods to raise the difference, despite wide public opposition to such measures. Hamas may seek to replace essential Iranian funding with financial assistance from the Sunni-dominated Gulf states.

Muhammad Mursi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Ḥizb al-Ḥurriya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party) welcomed the relocation of the Hamas leadership: “Egypt is the custodial mother of the Arab nation and the Palestinian cause in particular since the late forties and it’s our duty to support the Palestinians” (Alresalah [Cairo], March 1).

After his return to Gaza, Haniyeh turned on Egypt, blaming it for crippling power shortages that have left many households and businesses with power for only six hours a day. The fuel shortage has led to the repeated shutdown of Gaza’s only power plant and the region’s 13 hospitals are running on generators with fuel provided on an emergency basis by the Red Cross (Guardian, March 1). The energy shortage has also led to a dramatic drop in available water as well as impacting the sewage treatment system. Gaza has suffered energy shortages since 2006, when Israel bombed the region’s lone energy plant.

Currently, Gaza receives much of its fuel through a network of smuggling tunnels. Egypt, however, wants Hamas to import its fuel through the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom border crossing, where the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas imposes import taxes. Besides the loss of revenues, the fuel would cost more than smuggled fuel and its availability would be subject to the whims of Israeli border officials. There are also concerns that the fuel issue is Egypt’s way of pressuring Hamas to accept an Egyptian-sponsored unification with the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority in the West Bank (Reuters, March 2).

This article first appeared in the March 8, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Al-Qaeda Expands to Puntland in Anticipation of Oil Boom

Posted on March 8, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 8, 2012

Under military pressure from Kenyan forces, the African Union Mission in Somalia and various Somali militias and government forces campaigning in its traditional area of operations in southern Somalia, al-Shabaab has announced an expansion into Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia that has so far been better known as a center for offshore piracy than for Islamist militancy. Nevertheless, a dirty, low-level war of assassinations, bombings and clashes between Islamist gunmen and local security forces has been going on for several years.

Puntland Security Forces on Parade

The announcement, which follows last month’s unification of al-Shabaab with al-Qaeda, came in the form of a proclamation from Yassin Khalid ‘Uthman (a.k.a. Yassin Kilwe Yuma), the self-described “Amir of the Mujahideen in the Golis Mountains [an area of caves and rough terrain in northwest Puntland]” that his fighters have joined al-Shabaab and pledged loyalty to its leader, Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr.” The “Amir” was clear that his group was aligning itself with al-Qaeda: “I want to praise God for the unity of our Shabaab brothers with al-Qaeda fighters… I want to declare today that we are joined with our al-Shabaab brothers who are devoted to the jihad in Somalia” (al-Andalus Radio, February 26; al-Kataib Media, February 27). The new al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda chapter in Puntland may have announced its presence in a more material way on March 3, when at least nine people were killed at a Puntland security checkpoint near the commercial capital of Bosasso (25 miles from the Galgala region) during an attack by militants (Reuters, March 3).

Yassin Kilwe is thought to be part of the Galgala militia that operates in the Golis Mountains in a diminished capacity since it was targeted by a three-month military offensive by the Puntland Intelligence Service. [1] The militia, if not a formal part of al-Shabaab, has traditionally operated in sympathy with al-Shabaab’s objectives.

Puntland frequently accuses neighboring Somaliland, with which it has several territorial disputes, of providing support for the Galgala Islamists, while Somaliland accuses Puntland of seeking military dominance in northern Somalia. The known leader of the Galgala militants is Shaykh Muhammad Sa’id Atam, who routinely denies any formal ties between his group and al-Shabaab, assertions that have been confirmed in the past by al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage “Ali Dheere” (VOA Somali Service, July 29). However, it was also Ali Dheere who welcomed the merger of the “Mujahideen in the Golis Mountains” with al-Shabaab (Dayniile, February 27).

Greater Puntland – Includes disputed territories

Yassin Kilwe’s claim to be Amir of the Galgala militants immediately raised speculation regarding the leadership role of Shaykh Atam, who has not made any statement since Yassin Kilwe’s announcement (Raxanreeb.com, February 25). There were reports that many of the Galgala militants were unhappy with the merger with “a terrorist group,” and Kilwe may represent a new faction that has split from the main Galgala group to join al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda (Somalia Report, February 28). A Puntland government spokesman said the merger “doesn’t have any effect on Puntland’s peace and tranquility and the armed forces who already made them weak are ready to fight them” (Puntlandi.com, February 26). The Puntland administration has said that they already knew that the Galgala militants were part of al-Qaeda (a common refrain in government comments on the militants) and security has been tightened in the areas of oil exploration operations (Dayniile, February 27). AMISOM is expected to make a decision within days on whether to deploy African Union peacekeepers from an expanded force in Puntland.

Canada’s Africa Oil Corp. and its Australian partners Red Emperor and Range Resources began drilling in northern Puntland in January, the first oil operations in Somalia for two decades. The Nugaal and Dharoor fields are believed to have as much as 300 million to 4 billion barrels of oil, the first of which is expected to flow within a month (Reuters, February 25; Observer, February 25). There may be much more oil in offshore fields off Puntland’s coast. Galgala and other parts of the Bari region are also above the Majiyahan Ta-Sn Deposit, a zone rich in minerals such as Albite, Quartz, Microcline, Tantalite, Tapiolite, Cassiterite, Spodumene and Muscovite. Somali prime minister Abdiweli Muhammad Ali has promised a cut of his nation’s natural resources in exchange for foreign investment and reconstruction assistance: “There’s room for everybody when this country gets back on its feet and is ready for investment,” though he also noted: “The only way we can pay [Western companies] is to pay them in kind, we can pay with natural resources at the fair market value.” (Observer, February 25). Britain’s BP has been mentioned as the foreign oil company of choice for Somalia’s transitional government, but so far the firm has downplayed rumors it is working on a major deal for the offshore reserves. The British government has also denied charges that its sudden interest in Somalia (hosting international conferences on Somalia, providing humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance, etc.) is part of an effort to gain commercial considerations for British firms in Somalia (Garowe Online, February 27).

Last week, al-Shabaab began sending internet and Twitter messages warning that “Somali oil carries death” (SAPA-AP, March 1). The movement has said that it is canceling the licenses of Western oil and gas firms operating in Puntland, possibly the first step in a new campaign of attacks on Western exploration facilities.

Note

1. See Andrew McGregor, “Puntland’s Shaykh Muhammad Atam: Clan Militia Leader or al-Qaeda Terrorist?,” Militant Leadership Monitor, September 29, 2010.

This article first appeared in the March 8, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

The Battle for Kufra Oasis and the Ongoing War in Libya

Posted on February 23, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 23, 2012

An escalating tribal conflict in the strategic Kufra Oasis has revealed once more that Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) is incapable of restoring order in a nation where political and tribal violence flares up on a regular basis, fueled by a wave of weapons liberated from Qaddafi’s armories. Though this is hardly the first clash between the African Tubu and the Arab Zuwaya tribe that took control of the oasis from the Tubu in 1840, it is certainly the first to be fought with heavy weapons such as RPGs and anti-aircraft guns, an innovation that is reflected in the various estimates of heavy casualties in the fighting.

Map illustrating the strategic position of Kufra (lower right)

Fighting began on February 12 and has continued to the present. Well over 100 people have been killed in less than two weeks, with many hundreds more wounded (Tripoli Post, February 22). Tensions had been running high between the Arab and Tubu communities throughout last year’s political turbulence and the current fighting appears to have been sparked by the alleged murder of an Arab by three dark-skinned men the Zuwaya believe to have been Tubu. The latter have also been affected by a canard promoted by Qaddafi that suggests the Tubu only arrived in southern Libya during the Italian occupation of Libya or later, an assertion that could easily lead to efforts to expel the Tubu from the region. A newly formed goup called the National Rally of Tubus has issued alarming warnings that the clashes in Kufra were part of an effort to cleanse the region of its traditional Tubu presence: “Kufra is a disaster area and what is happening in the town is genocide and the extermination of the Tubu” (AFP, February 15).

The Tubu fighters are led by Isa Abd al-Majid Mansur, who backed the rebel forces in last year’s revolution. Isa Abd al-Majid is head of the Tubu Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL), founded in June, 2007. The TFSL confronted Libyan security forces in a five-day battle at Kufra in 2008 during which the movement threatened to sabotage the important Sarir oil fields in southeast Libya (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 11, 2008). The Zuwaya claim that al-Majid is now supported by mercenaries from Chad and Darfur (Reuters, February 13). Despite playing an important role in the Libyan revolution, the Tubu have experienced little change since the Qaddafi regime, when the Tubu were subject to loss of their Libyan identity cards and were denied access to health and education facilities. Isa Abd al-Majid denies that the TFSL seek to divide Libya: “We are not seeking a separation; we are like all other Libyan opposition movements. We are calling for the restitution of our rights” (al-Alam TV [Tehran], August 15, 2007).

During the Libyan insurrection, the Tubu formed the rebel-allied “Desert Shield Brigade” under veteran Tubu militant Barka Wardougou, conducting long-range raids on Murzuk and al-Qatrun (Ennahar [Algiers], August 20, 2011; AFP, July 23, 2011). Wardagou is the former leader of the Niger-based Tubu movement Front armérevolutionnaire du Sahara (FARS).

Having already been active in armed opposition to the Libya government for some years prior to the 2011 revolution, Isa Abd al-Majid foresaw a time when the rest of the Libyan people would join the struggle against the Qaddafi regime: “We claimed our rights, but [Qaddafi] marginalized us and denied our rights. He even said [the Tubu] are all foreigners. Even when al-Qaddafi visited Qatrun, he said we should be distributed over Bengazhi and the coastal regions and we should leave the border areas [in southern Libya]” (al-Alam TV [Tehran], August 15, 2007). Today, most Tubu live in northern Chad, ranging through the deserts and seasonal pastures surrounding their headquarters in the Tibesti Mountains. Much smaller communities live in eastern Niger and southeastern Libya. Though the latter is a traditional part of the Teda Tubu homeland, some Chadian Tubu have arrived in recent decades and live in shantytowns around Kufra.

In 1895 the leadership of the Sanussi Brotherhood relocated to the oasis to avoid entanglements with the Ottoman authorities in northern Libya. The Sanussis transformed the oasis into an anti-colonial bastion until its conquest by a massive column of heavily armed Italian troops in 1931. Kufra’s strategic importance and airstrip meant that Italian occupation was short as Free French colonial troops and British forces from the Long Range Desert Group took the oasis in 1941, transforming Kufra into a base for long range strikes across the desert on Italian and German forces in northern Libya. Though the Libyan garrison declared itself for the rebels early in last year’s revolution, loyalist forces retook the oasis at one point during its campaign to establish control over the all-important oil and water resources of Libya’s southern deserts (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, May 8, 2011). Some 40,000 people live in Kufra (roughly 10% of them Tubu), which dominates a number of trans-Saharan trade routes.

The Zuwaya claim the Tubu are being helped by hundreds of “mercenaries from Chad” – one local government official described 40 4X4 vehicles full of soldiers attacking the “May 5 military camp” at Kufra and warned that if military aid from Benghazi was not forthcoming, Kufra would be forced to declare independence (Reuters, February 13).

General Yusuf al-Mangush

TNC military chief General Yusuf al-Mangush has denied reports of foreign fighters in the region and urged elders from the Zuwaya and Tubu to meet (Reuters, February 18). TNC chairman Abd al-Jalil, a former Qaddafi loyalist, has claimed that the fighting in Kufra was started by Qaddafi regime loyalists who were “seeding sedition” (AFP, February 21). Sources within the Zuwaya have confirmed the TNC has been shipping arms and fighters to the Kufra Arabs to combat what a TNC spokesman described as “smugglers helped by foreign elements” (Daily Star [Beirut], February 15). A Zuwaya source confirmed that a plane carrying weapons and fighters had landed at Kufra airport on February 13 to aid the Arab fighters there (AFP, February 14).

The Libyan Defense Ministry has promised military intervention if the fighting does not end soon, but has otherwise taken no action to end the conflict so far (Reuters, February 20).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 23, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Desperate Measures: Somalia’s al-Shabaab Joining al-Qaeda

Posted on February 23, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 23, 2012

In what he described as “good news” that would “annoy the Crusaders,” al-Qaeda leader Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the incorporation of Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants as an official new chapter of al-Qaeda on February 9. [1] Al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” appeared in the 15-minute videotape to pledge his movement’s obedience to al-Zawahiri and promised to follow “the road of jihad and martyrdom, in the footsteps that our martyr Osama bin Laden has drawn for us.”

The merger may be the first step in an al-Qaeda effort to ensure the survival of the movement by expanding into the larger Islamic world through the creation of official al-Qaeda affiliates without the so far apparent and unstated requirement for an Arab leadership.

Al-Shabaab Rally Celebrates Merger with al-Qaeda in Wilayet, Lower Shabelle

Faced with increasing military opposition and severe blows to its revenue streams, al-Shabaab faces the options of gradual annihilation in the field or scaling back operations to a more asymmetric model based on a diminished interest in holding territory and a greater use of terrorist tactics in an expanded zone of operations that would certainly include Somalia’s neighbors and possibly reach to the foreign supporters of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The announcement was remarkably ill-timed, coming only days ahead of an international conference in London in which many Western countries were already expected to announce some increase in their levels of military and economic support for the TFG and AMISOM. The al-Qaeda merger will almost inevitably result in greater levels of support than donor nations may have originally intended. The timing of the announcement seems inexplicable, unless al-Qaeda has started to believe its own propaganda efforts and actually believes such an announcement will send the TFG’s international supporters reeling in fear and dismay. The timing of the merger is also unlikely to meet with universal approval from Shabaab commanders and will exacerbate existing fissures within the movement’s leadership. TFG minister of information Abdikadir Husayn Muhammad suggested the unification could be a good thing for Somalia: “When Ayman al-Zawahiri described the merger between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda as ‘good news,’ it is also ‘good news’ for us, and the time when al-Shabaab terror group used to disguise itself as a Somali Islamic organization has come to an end” (Jowhar.com, February 10).

The February 23 conference, hosted by the UK government, has been convenedto address political instability and piracy in Somalia. There have been claims in Somalia, particularly from al-Shabaab, that the conference will discuss the “re-colonization” of Somalia, but TFG officials have urged Somalis to wait for the outcome of the meeting (Shabelle Media Network, February 11). According to al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage: “It’s the imperious nature of the Brits that sees them meddling in Islamic affairs in the hope of reviving a hopeless dream of a British Empire” (AFP, February 14). In a recent speech in Mogadishu, TFG president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad insisted al-Qaeda were the colonialists and everyone in Somalia was required to do their part in “liberating” Somalia from their grasp (Shabelle Media Network, February 13). There is also speculation in Somalia that the African Union peacekeeping mission may be taken over by the UN following the London conference, possibly even in a mission led by Turkey (Dayniile Online, February 10).

Al-Shabaab ordered businesses and schools in areas under its control to close for a one-day celebration of their merger with al-Qaeda (Radio Simba [Mogadishu], February 13; Shabelle Media Network, February 13). At one such rally in Afgoye, Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage promised “mujahideen fighters worldwide” that “the unification is a sign of the return of the Islamic caliphate worldwide” (AFP, February 13).

The existing cooperation between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab over the last few years has yielded little for either group: al-Qaeda does not possess the weapons, funds or military assets to tip the conflict in al-Shabaab’s favor, while Somalia’s crumbling infrastructure, prevailing xenophobia and isolation provides a poor safe haven for terrorists operating in the global arena. Non-Somali jihadists generally find Somalia an unattractive theatre and unification is unlikely to change this. The merger will also endanger al-Shabaab’s diaspora fund-raisers, recruiters and volunteers who have had some success so far in meeting terrorism-related charges with claims they were inspired solely by nationalism and not the Salafist-inspired global jihad. U.S. drones operating out of Djibouti can be expected to increase surveillance missions and targeted attacks of al-Shabaab leaders within Somalia.

Kenya is scheduled to increase its Somali commitment from the existing 2,000 men deployed in southern Somalia to 4,700 men under AMISOM command in the Middle and Lower Juba regions of Somalia, though Kenyan authorities maintain the KDF must complete Operation Linda Nchi before Kenyan troops can join AMISOM (East African [Nairobi], February 14). Uganda and Burundi are also preparing to increase their deployment to a total of 12,000 troops from the current level of 9,500.

KDF spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna noted international anti-terrorist protocols can now be applied against al-Shabaab and claimed that al-Shabaab’s revenue stream has been “totally disrupted” since the Kenyan incursion into southern Somalia: “In our own assessment, 75% of revenue collection of al-Shabaab has been disrupted” (KTN Television [Nairobi], February 11; AFP, February 11).

Somalia may now be faced by more al-Shabaab terrorist attacks such as the Mogadishu suicide bombing on February 8 that killed 16 civilians and severely wounded 30 more (al-Andalus Radio [Afgoye] , February 8; Africa Review [Nairobi], February 8). Somali MP and former information minister Tahir Muhammad Gili speculated that the merger would result in al-Shabaab changing its tactics to “carry out more bombings and transfer battles outside Somalia, particularly to Somalia’s neighboring countries, since those countries have troops inside Somalia at the moment. (al-Jazeera, February 12).

Note

1. “Glad Tidings: Announcement of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen Officially Joining al-Qaeda,” As-Sahab Global Media Front, shamikh1.info, February 9.

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 23, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

The Strange Death of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and the Future of the Darfur Insurgency

Posted on February 10, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

Khartoum scored a major victory in its nearly nine-year-old conflict with Darfur rebels with the December 24 killing of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, leader of Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the best armed and most organized of the Darfur rebel groups. Khalil rose to the top of Sudan’s most-wanted list after his fighters made an audacious cross-country raid on Khartoum/Omdurman, bringing Sudan’s civil war to the national capital for the first time. Though the raid was repulsed in the streets of Omdurman, the bold attack and the military’s failure to rally to the regime left the government badly shaken. [1]

Rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The JEM leader’s death will most likely represent a major setback for the newly formed Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a broad-based armed opposition movement that includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A – N), the Beja Congress of east Sudan and three Darfur rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the largely Fur Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdel Wahid (SLM/A – AW), and the largely Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A – MM).

Who Killed Khalil Ibrahim?

Government sources reported Khalil was killed along with 30 of his men in the Wad Banda area of Northern Kordofan during a clash with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) The SAF claimed to have been chasing a JEM force of 300 fighters and 140 vehicles since December 19 (Sudan Vision, December 25, 2011; Sudan News Agency [SUNA], December 25, 2011). SAF sources said the final clash was preceded by a battle at the village of Um Jar near the border between North Kordofan and North Darfur. JEM forces then passed through Wadi Hawar before engaging in fierce fighting with Kababish Arabs near Um Badir in northern Kordofan. Local officials claimed the surviving JEM forces were trying to southeastward to South Sudan through the Bahr al-Arab region (Sudanese Media Center [SMC], January 2).

However, ccording to senior JEM filed commander Sulayman Sandal Hagar, Khalil and a bodyguard were killed by a precision strike by three rockets while the JEM leader was sleeping in his vehicle (Sudan Vision, January 2). A leading JEM official, Mahmoud Suleiman, said the movement did not yet want to expose the parties behind the assassination, but were in possession of “threads of the plot and our knowledge of the countries involved in the conspiracy and the plane that shot the lethal missile” (Sudan Tribune, December 31, 2011). The one party that could be ruled out, according to Suleiman, was the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which did not have the technical capacity or capability of launching a jet-fighter missile strike of such precision. Suleiman also described reports of battles between the SAF and Khalil’s column of 140 vehicles just prior to his death as “novel lies,” insisting that no fighting had taken place before the assassination. The JEM official suggested that JEM would take steps to open “a criminal case against those who participated in the planning and executing the plot,” leading to the “identification of the real perpetrators or those implicated and involved in the heinous crime.”

Khalil’s interim successor, al-Tahir al-Faki also suggested that “all indications point to the act being non-Sudanese,” noting that at one point, a JEM group came under intensive fire from Sudan’s ancient Antonov bombers (actually Soviet-era cargo planes converted to carry crude bombs) for six weeks while suffering only a single minor injury (al-Hayat, December 30). Sudan’s small inventory of Chinese and Russian-made jet fighters is not known to operate at night. There is some evidence that Sudan operates a number of small Chinese and Iranian reconnaissance/surveillance drones, but does not operate tactical UAVs with weapons systems.

The purpose of the large movement of JEM fighters under Khalil’s personal command was not immediately clear. A London-based JEM spokesman, Jibril Adam Bilal, announced that the convoy was on its way to the capital to make another attempt to forcibly topple the regime led by President Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2011). While JEM claimed that Khalil was leading his forces in a strike on Khartoum at the time of his death, Khartoum claimed the JEM leader was actually leading his forces into South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2011).

SAF spokesmen stated on January 3 that the SAF had detected 79 JEM vehicles carrying 350 combatants crossing into South Sudan on December 28, a claim that brought denials from Juba (Sudan Vision, January 6). The JEM forces were allegedly allowed to set up a training camp in Bahr al-Ghazal while the South Sudanese provided treatment for their wounded (Sudan Tribune, January 3). Juba has denied all such reports and reiterated its position that no members of any rebel group fighting against the Khartoum government were on South Sudanese soil (Sudan Tribune, January 19). State-backed media sources claimed in mid-November, 2011 that 400 JEM rebels had arrived in South Sudan after receiving “intensive military training” in Israel but provided no evidence (Sudan Vision, November 13, 2011). Khartoum later charged Israel with supplying JEM with weapons and vehicles transferred to France and Chad (SMC, December 27, 2011). Khartoum perceives the deep involvement of many international Jewish organizations in Darfur “anti-genocide” campaigns to be orchestrated by Israel as part of an attempt to create insecurity in the Arab world.

JEM serves a political purpose for Khartoum as a tool in pressuring the newly independent South Sudan through complaints to the United Nations Security Council. Allegations that the SPLM is harboring JEM rebels provides some justification for Khartoum’s sponsorship of Southern dissident movements. Khartoum has also made two previous complaints to the Security Council against South Sudan for allegedly supporting military units of the SPLM/A-N, which operates in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

The Reaction

In Khartoum, government officials raised security levels and used teargas to drive away crowds of mourners who were gathering at the home of Khalil’s family in suburban Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, December 25). The government also closed two newspapers, al-Wan and Rai al-Shabb, for publishing interviews with Khalil or Jibril Ibrahim or publishing statements of support for Khalil from members of Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP), where Khalil Ibrahim began his political career (Sudan Tribune, January 14). The PCP recently drew the attention of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) over its production of a document outlining various scenarios for regime change in Sudan, including the possibilities of a military coup or a nation-wide popular uprising (Sudan Tribune, January 8).

Muhammad Bahr Hamdin

Always eager to promote internal dissension in the ranks of the rebels, government sources provided unconfirmed reports that prominent JEM members from the Masalit and Erenga tribes of West Darfur had been “liquidated” for expressing satisfaction at the death of Khalil Ibrahim while other commanders were arrested on charges of complicity with JEM dissident Muhammad Bahr Hamdin (SMC, January 7). Hamdin was dismissed as the deputy leader of JEM in September, 2011 after being charged with planning a coup against the JEM leadership (Radio Dabanga, September 25, 2011). Elements of JEM from the Masalit, Erenga, Meidob and Berti tribes were fiercely repressed in January 2008 after they took arms to protest the exclusion of members of these tribes from the JEM leadership dominated by members of the Kobe Zaghawa, particularly cousins and other relatives of Khalil Ibrahim.

Dr. Qutbi al-Mahdi, an official of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), said JEM was a “moribund” group after Khalil’s death and called on JEM members to abandon their arms and join the Doha peace agreement forged in July 2011 with a number of lesser rebel movements under the umbrella of Dr. Ibrahim al-Sisi’s Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) (Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2011; Sudan Vision, December 25, 2011).

President Omar Hassan al-Bashir described Khalil’s death as “a divine punishment for the crimes he perpetrated against the country and the people, for insisting on war to terrorize the innocent civilians and for his rejection of negotiations to achieve peace,” noting that “parties driven by foreign agendas” did not understand the consequences of the important changes that had taken place in the region, including the normalization or relations between Sudan and Chad that eliminated JEM’s rear bases in Chad, the fall of the Qaddafi regime and the conclusion of the Doha peace agreement between Khartoum and a number of second-level insurgent groups in Darfur (SMC/Sudan Vision, January 2).

The Succession

Despite Khalil’s sudden death, the mechanism for a JEM leadership change operated fairly smoothly, with the London-based head of the JEM legislative council, Dr. al-Tahir al-Faki, taking over as interim leader as specified in JEM’s protocols (Sudan Vision, January 2). Though al-Faki presented a public picture of unity, the fissures within the movement were already beginning to appear.

JEM announced in late January that a two-day congress in South Kordofan (scene of an SPLM/A-N insurgency against Khartoum) had selected Khalil Ibrahim’s brother Jibril as the new JEM leader over Ahmad Adam Bahkhit, an experienced field commander. Jibril, who has no military experience, had been teaching in London and serving as JEM’s foreign relations chief at the time of his selection (AFP, January 26; Khalil’s half-brother, Abd al-Aziz Nur Ushar, awaits execution in Khartoum after being captured in the May 2008 JEM assault on Omdurman). Officials in Khartoum claimed the congress was held, not in Kordofan, but in the South Sudan city of Bor (capital of Jonglei State), where it was attended by South Sudanese military and political officials. These sources also claimed that Jibril Ibrahim had reached Bor carrying a passport issued by the South Sudan (al-Hayat, January 27).

The JEM leadership followed Jibril’s appointment with a display of bravado, announcing the next day that the movement still intended to enter Khartoum and al-Bashir’s regime (al-Hayat, January 27).

Defections

Though the core leadership of JEM is largely limited to the Kobe branch of the non-Arab Zaghawa, a pastoral tribe straddling the Chad-Darfur border that has increasingly challenged Arab supremacy in Sudan, the movement is host to a range of factions and non-Zaghawa tribesmen that united under Dr. Khalil’s leadership. Unlike the other Darfur rebel groups, JEM has also presented itself as a pan-Sudanese opposition movement, even mounting hit-and-run guerrilla operations in east Sudan in cooperation with the Beja Congress.

Defections from JEM or any of the other Darfur insurgent groups are not unusual and JEM, like many of the other movements, has been able to survive the merry-go-round of field commanders who generally respond to any dispute with their leadership by forming their own movement or joining a rival group. Nevertheless, there has been a severe escalation in the number of prominent JEM members who have left the movement since Khalil’s death.

Some JEM members were reported to be ready to quit the movement and join the SLM/A-Democracy movement of former SLM/A-Unity and SLM/A-Minnawi commander Ali Karbino in dissatisfaction with the interim leadership of al-Tahir al-Faki (who hails from Kordofan rather than Darfur and thus lacks tribal support) (SMC, January 8).

A group of JEM members led by Zakaria Musa Abbas “Dush” left the movement in mid-January to form yet another offshoot – the Justice and Equality Movement – Corrective Leadership (JEM – CL). The main grievance of the group is the dominance of Khalil Ibrahim’s family and the Kobe Zaghawa in the JEM leadership. According to their founding statement: “The movement has turned into a family company to oppress revolutionaries in neighboring countries to strengthen dictatorial regimes; in addition to silencing mouths calling for reform within the institutions of the Movement. A certain group from one family has dominated big decisions to consolidate narrow tribalism and racism” (Sudan Vision, January 14). Another member of the “corrective leadership,” Maulana Yusuf Issa Hamid Mukhair, said that JEM had alienated many members of the movement by arresting 12 members and imprisoning them in a Juba facility controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM – the ruling party in the new nation of South Sudan), further alleging that the prisoners had been tortured for three months. A JEM spokesman responded by acknowledging the movement was detaining 12 members who are being investigated regarding their possible collaboration with JEM’s former commander in Kordofan, Muhammad Bahr Hamdin, but denied all allegations of torture or the involvement of the SPLM, insisting that the men were being detained in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, January 13). JEM-CL has indicated it is ready to sign on to the Doha Agreement.

Another member of the new group and a former JEM executive member, Omar Abdullah Karma, told a Khartoum press conference the JEM had fought for the Libyan regime of Mu’ammar Qaddafi (who was harboring Khalil Ibrahim after his expulsion from Chad) and lost many of its commanders there (Sudan Vision, January 18). Khartoum had insisted from the beginning of the Libyan revolution that JEM units were involved in the defense of the Qaddafi regime, though there is little evidence of the participation of large numbers of JEM fighters.

JEM military commander-in-chief General Bakhit Abd al-Karim Abdullah announced on January 2 that he had decided to leave JEM and sign on to the Doha agreement (SMC, January 5). On February 4 government sources reported that JEM fighters in the Jabal Marra region under the command of Al-Toum Ababkr had left the movement in protest against the “lack of justice and transparency” in the process used to select Jibril Ibrahim as the new JEM commander (SMC, February 4).

Conclusion

Sudanese defense minister General Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Husayn has promised the armed forces would go on the offensive to smash the remnants JEM and then eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance in Darfur (al-Sahafah [Khartoum], January 15). President Bashir would be happy to be relieved of the threat JEM poses to his regime as he tries to deal with unrest and insurgencies in other parts of the country. Even Sudan’s Islamists, a traditional power base for the military/Islamist government, are showing signs of dissatisfaction with the regime; a memo signed by one thousand former Islamist mujahideen (i.e. volunteers in the civil war against South Sudan) denounced the ruling NCP’s corruption and poor governance (Sudan Tribune, January 17).

The change in leadership will undoubtedly send JEM in a different direction. Negotiation seems more congenial to Jibril’s temperament than the desperate cross-country raids perfected by Khalil Ibrahim’s columns of experienced desert fighters. A much weakened JEM may face a choice of joining the Doha Accords or suffering further defections. The choice of a foreign-based university lecturer as the new military and political commander of the movement appears to be a major mistake that will only reinforce the claims of JEM dissidents that the leadership is the monopoly of a single family that is unwilling to tolerate dissent within the movement. While JEM still has significant military assets, Jibril Ibrahim is unlikely to make good use of them before more JEM commander come to the conclusion that it is better to accept the amnesty and benefits offered by signing on to the Doha agreement than to remain in a movement that no longer has the personnel and resources to present a realistic challenge to Khartoum. The decline or collapse of JEM would likely result in potentially unendurable pressure on the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the other leading insurgent group in Darfur. The collapse of the resistance in Darfur would likely make the Sudanese Revolutionary Forces alliance yet another failed attempt to unite Sudan’s armed opposition. After years of warfare in Darfur, Khartoum (possibly through a mysterious benefactor) may have finally achieved its goals there with the death of one man. The question is whether the regime can survive other threats long enough to witness the breakdown of the Darfur insurgency and the success of Khartoum’s diplomatic and military efforts there despite international condemnation and indictments from the International Criminal Court.

Note

1. For a profile of the late JEM leader, see: Andrew McGregor, “Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, Darfur Rebel Challenges Sudan’s Power Structure” Militant Leadership Monitor, January 30, 2010, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2862

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Captured Boko Haram Spokesman Undergoes “Intense Interrogation”

Posted on February 10, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

After enduring strong criticism over the last two years for repeated intelligence failures in its struggle against Boko Haram militants, Nigeria’s State Security Service (SSS) appears to have scored a major intelligence coup with its capture of the Boko Haram spokesman, popularly known as “Abu Qaqa,” who is now said to be providing “very useful and verifiable information to his interrogators (Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Abu Qaqa

The 42-year-old Boko Haram spokesman was retrieved from under his bed and arrested in an early morning raid in the city of Kaduna on February 1 after security services began tracking his mobile phone. After his arrest, Abu Qaqa was flown to Abuja for questioning at the SSS headquarters (Punch [Lagos], February 2). Abu Qaqa is unlikely to have an easy time in SSS captivity after threatening to kidnap or kill family members of agency personnel shortly before his arrest (Nigerian Tribune, February 12).

Wary of announcing his capture before his identity could be confirmed, the SSS initially denied making the arrest, but announced their man was indeed Abu Qaqa after the detainee “buckled under intense interrogation,” according to a source in the security services (Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Some of the confusion appeared to have been caused by the wide number of aliases used by the Boko Haram spokesman, including Muhammad Shauibu, Muhammad Bello, Abu Tiamiya, and Abdulrahman Abdullahi. Reflecting Abu Qaqa’s success at covering his identity, interrogators also discovered that their suspect was actually a member of the Ebira tribe of Kogi State rather than an Igala as they had thought earlier.

A member of Boko Haram claiming to be Abu Qaqa confirmed that a leading member of the movement had been arrested, but insisted it was actually the group’s chief of “public enlightenment” Abu Dardaa. Security services are convinced that “Abu Dardaa” is simply one of Abu Qaqa’s many aliases (AFP, February 3; Nigerian Tribune, February 4).

Following confirmation of the spokesman’s arrest came bombings in Kano and Maiduguri, where units of Nigeria’s elite Joint Task Force (JTF) are engaged in bitter street battles with Boko Haram fighters (al-Jazeera, February 6; This Day [Lagos], February 7; Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Sources said to be close to the interrogation claim the Boko Haram spokesman has revealed ethnic divisions within the movement, with the Hausa-Fulani members observing that Kanuri members are rarely arrested in comparison to the large number of arrests of Hausa-Fulani members. Suspicion of betrayal by the Kanuris threatens to split the movement, according to Abu Qaqa: “Some of us, the non-Kanuri… were worried at the trend of arrests of our members. It is either that the security agents were so good at their job or some of our members were moles giving us out. The worrying aspect was that most of our key members arrested were non-Kanuri…” (This Day [Lagos], February 7; The Nation [Lagos], February 6).

Abu Qaqa is also reported to have told interrogators that internal criticism of Boko Haram attacks on civilians was ruthlessly repressed by the movement’s leader: “Before I was arrested, some of us had already shown signs of tiredness. Most of us were tired of fighting but we couldn’t come out to say so because of fear of reprisal from the leader, Imam Shekau, on dissenting members. Several of our members that denounced the violent struggle were slaughtered in front of their wives and children. Seven were killed recently” (Nigerian Tribune, February 7; This Day [Lagos], February 7).

Abu Qaqa is best known for announcing Boko Haram’s responsibility for the brutal Christmas Day, 2011 bombing that killed 37 people and a series of attacks in Kano in January that resulted in the deaths of 186 people (Reuters, February 1). Qaqa recently told the Guardian in an exclusive interview that Boko Haram members were spiritual followers of al-Qaeda and the late Osama bin Laden. The spokesman further said that Boko Haram leader Muhammad Abubakr Shekau had met al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August and was able to obtain from al-Qaeda whatever financial and technical support the movement needed. Recruits from Chad, Cameroon and Niger had joined Boko Haram, according to its spokesman, who also promised that all Nigerians would need to follow the group’s inflexible version of Shari’a should the movement take power: “There are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you don’t abide by Shari’a, we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you.” (Guardian, January 27).

Nigerian reports suggest several Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, are now assisting in the hunt for the fugitive Boko Haram leader, Imam Muhammad Abubakr Shekau, who is believed to be hiding in a village in Cameroon, close to the Nigerian border, after having abandoned an earlier refuge in a village in Niger. After Abu Qaqa’s arrest, Shekau is said to be relying solely on trusted couriers to remain in communication with his movement (Nigerian Tribune, February 6).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.