Chad’s Military Takes the Lead in Campaign against Boko Haram: Can Nigeria’s Embarrassment Equal Multinational Military Success?

Andrew McGregor

From Tips and Trends: The AIS African Security Report, March 2015

Chad Troops in MaliChadian Troops in the Field in Mali

In a six-week campaign, Chad’s military has mounted an air-supported ground offensive against Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants that has crossed into both Nigeria and Cameroon. In the process, Chad has shattered Boko Haram strength in the Lake Chad border region but now finds further progress stalled as Abuja denies permission to pursue the fleeing gunmen further into Nigeria. With Chadian operations having scored major successes against Boko Haram, there is now a danger the still inefficient Nigerian military will attempt to take over operations on its own territory to bolster the electoral chances of Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, who faces an election on March 28.

Chad’s Military Intervention in Nigeria

A brigade size group (1500 to 2000 men) was sent with some 400 military vehicles to the Lake Chad border region on January 16, 2015. The legal framework for Chadian intervention in the region was already established by the 1998 agreement between Chad, Nigeria and Niger to form a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to combat cross-border crime and militancy. Since their arrival in January, Chad’s military has reported a series of spectacular, if numerically unverifiable victories, including a battle at Gambaru in which the army reported the death of 207 Boko Haram militants to a loss of one Chadian soldier killed and nine wounded (Reuters, February 25, 2015) [1]. Nonetheless, the poorly coordinated offensive is still taking a toll on Boko Haram, reducing its strength and expelling it from towns (and economic support bases) taken in recent months. Boko Haram counter-attacks persist, but most are driven back without great loss.

  • On January 29-30, Chadian forces crossed into Nigeria for the first time, using jet fighters and ground forces to drive Boko Haram fighters from the village of Malam Fatori in Borno State after a two-day battle (ThisDay [Lagos], February 1, 2015; Daily Trust [Lagos], January 30, 2015; al-Jazeera, January 30, 2015).
  • On January 31, 2015, Chadian forces reported killing 120 Boko Haram fighters in a battle in northern Cameroon centered around the town of Fatakol and used two fighter jets (most likely Sukhoi Su-25 recently obtained from Ukraine) to bomb the Nigerian town of Gambaru (Reuters, January 31, 2015; AFP, January 31, 2015).
  • On February 3, Chadian troops backed by armored vehicles took Gambaru after a fight of several hours (Independent, February 4, 2015). One Chadian battalion commander who took part in the attack on Gambaru had little praise for the Boko Haram fighters that had resisted months of Nigerian operations in the area, saying “yesterday’s offensive made us realize that the fighters of the sect, mainly composed of minors, are only cowards” (Alwhihda [N’Djamena], January 30).

The rapid success of Chadian forces against Boko Haram fighters in the border region revealed the sham war that Nigeria’s military has mounted against the Islamists – Malum Fatori, for example, had been held by the militants since October, even though it fell to the Chadians in one day. Chad has succeeded by using aerial bombardments on Boko Haram targets prior to massive assaults with ground troops and armor. These tactics stand in contrast to those of the Nigerian military, which has become notorious for poor ground-air coordination and failing to press attacks, often citing inferior arms or ammunition shortages. Nigerian warplanes were blamed for the death of 36 civilians when two fighter-jets attacked a funeral party in the Niger border town of Abadam on February 17 (Reuters, February 18). [2]

Nigeria – No Longer a Regional Military Power

Nigeria’s foreign minister, Aminu Wali, has tried to explain why Nigeria requires international assistance in combatting Boko Haram:

It is not that the Nigeria army isn’t fighting, it actually is. But in the context of an unconventional war, that is something else. The same thing applies to the war on terror. So the conventional armed forces aren’t adapted to this kind of conflict. We have to retrain them so that they will be capable to fight this particular conflict that they’ve never known before (RFI, January 30, 2015).

In October 2014, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon agreed to coordinate their military efforts against Boko Haram, though follow-up was slow. Nigerian relations with Cameron have been historically strained by rival claims to the Bakassi Peninsula in the resource-rich Gulf of Guinea, which was eventually awarded to Cameroon through international arbitration in 2009. Since then, Cameroonian oil infrastructure in the region has been subject to attacks by a hybrid criminal/separatist movement seeking unification with Nigeria.[3]

Since the joint offensive began, Nigerian military performance has improved, which the government chalks up to newly purchased arms and Special Forces reinforcements being sent to help the ill-equipped, poorly-led and occasionally mutinous Nigerian 7th Division, which took over responsibility for the sector from the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) in August 2013 (at one point troops of the 7th Division’s 101st Battalion fired at former division commander Major-General Ahmadu Mohammed, who only narrowly survived – see ThisDay [Lagos], May 16, 2014). The retaking of Baga by Nigerian troops on February 21 deprived Boko Haram of a major base and gave a boost to the political fortunes of President Goodluck Jonathan, but the town could have been taken weeks earlier if the Nigerian Army had not rebuffed Chad’s offer of a joint offensive, according to Chadian Army spokesman Colonel Azem Bermandoa (Reuters, March 3, 2015). Baga was the scene of a firefight in April 2013 in which the JTF and Boko Haram displayed a callous disregard for the lives of civilians in the town, killing over 185 people. The town was taken by Boko Haram in January 2015 when fleeing Nigerian troops allowed the militants to massacre hundreds of civilians (BBC, February 2, 2015).

Northeast Nigeria MapNortheast Nigeria – Zone of Chadian Operations

Colonel Bermandoa has likewise complained that Chadian forces took the ancient Nigerian town of Dikwa in mid-February but were ordered by the Nigerians to evacuate it so the Nigerians could launch an airstrike on the community. Chadian forces were compelled to retake the town on March 2 at a cost of one dead and 34 wounded (AFP, February 19, 2015; Reuters, March 2, March 3, 2015; Premium Times [Lagos], March 2, 2015; RFI, February 3, 2015).

Cameroon and Niger have played secondary but important roles in the offensive, pouring their forces into their border regions where they have repulsed attacks, cut supply routes and prevented Boko Haram fighters from slipping away across the borders.

Why Chad is Fighting in Nigeria

Landlocked Chad’s main trade routes cross through areas of Nigeria and northern Cameroon that have been blocked by Boko Haram occupation and operations, leading to shortages of goods (including food from Nigeria), interruption in the important export trade in Chadian cattle and rapidly rising prices for most goods (Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2015).

Economic effects have also been felt in northeastern Nigeria, where the important supply of smoked fish from Lake Chad has been disturbed as a consequence of trade routes being cut by the militants and the fear of fishermen on the Nigerian side of the lake that they will be conscripted into Boko Haram, resulting in shortages and soaring prices for fish in Nigeria (AFP, February 25, 2015).

Boko Haram leader Abubakr Shekau threatened to launch a war against Chad, Cameroon and Niger in a January 2015 video in retaliation for their alleged pro-French sympathies. The Boko Haram leader also took the opportunity to mock the Nigerian military, which has long complained a lack of equipment and arms is preventing them from properly engaging Boko Haram:

All this war equipment that you see being displayed in the screen are gotten from [the captured Nigerian towns of] Baga and Doro. Your army kept deceiving the world that you can’t fight us because you have no arms. Liars! You have all that it takes; you are just coward soldiers (Premium Times [Abuja], January 21, 2015).

In late January, Boko Haram spokesman Abu Musab al-Barnawi used a video to issue new threats to Chad and its MJTF partners:

We say to Niger and Chad that if they stop their assault on us and we will stop our assault on them; otherwise, just as you fight us we will fight you. We will inflame a war of which you have not before tasted its bitterness. Withdraw your soldiers before you regret what will come soon and you have no time to regret. (Premium Times [Lagos], January 28, 2015).

Boko Haram made its first attack on Chadian soil on February 13, using motorized canoes to set a fishing village on fire before being repulsed by Chadian soldiers in what the local Chadian governor described as a “publicity stunt” (Reuters, February 13, 2015).

Most Boko Haram members, including its leaders, belong to the once powerful Kanuri community whose former Bornu Empire straddled the modern borderland between Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Though most of Boko Haram, including its leadership, are Kanuris, most of the militant group’s victims have also been Kanuri, dispelling any notion that the Islamist movement somehow represents the Kanuri community. Nonetheless, it is clear that Boko Haram members have been able to utilize family ties and other types of kinship to facilitate the cross-border movement of arms, supplies and personnel across local borders. Given this cross-border movement, it seems likely that Chadian security forces will have a close look at the local Kanuri community in southern Chad during their deployment in the region.

Keeping the military busy in the south may also appeal to the Déby regime; the last attempt by factions of the military to mount a coup was less than two years ago, while Déby himself came to power in a 1990 coup. However, continuous deployment to various theatres runs the risk of internal military breakdown and Chad is already committed to maintaining 1,000 men of its small army in Mali as part of UN peacekeeping operations.
Aware of the danger of reciprocal attacks from Boko Haram, Chad’s security forces have stepped up security, mounting roadblocks, securing the entrances to the capital, N’Djamena, guarding assembly points such as schools, markets and places of worship and rounding up suspected Boko Haram sympathizers in N’Djamena. Many of those arrested belong to the Kanuri community, though Interior Minister Abderahim Bireme Hamid insists that “The arrests are not targeted at a particular social group or community, but those suspected of being close to Boko Haram” (Xinhua, January 28, 2015).

Prior Performance in Military Interventions

Chad’s expeditionary force in Mali performed well in 2013 and did much of the fighting to expel the various armed Islamist groups that had seized northern Mali. However, heavy losses from ambushes and suicide bombings compelled President Déby to announce he was withdrawing the Chadian contingent because “The Chadian army does not have the skills to fight a shadowy, guerrilla-style war that is taking place in northern Mali” (Reuters, April 14, 2013).

Some observers have contrasted the Chadian military’s performance in Mali with their more controversial intervention in the Central African Republic from 2013-2014, where they were accused of political manipulation, arming the Séléka [4] rebels and brutality towards the non-Muslim population that culminated in the massacre of 30 unarmed civilians and the wounding of 300 others when they opened fire on a crowded Bangui market without apparent provocation. [5]

While there was much that was questionable and even indefensible in the performance of Chad’s army in the CAR, it must be recognized that the troops were carrying out N’Djamena’s own agenda in the country, which both modern Chad and pre-colonial sultanates in that region have always regarded as a political and economic hinterland (and prime source of slaves for Chad’s pre-colonial Islamic sultanates) whose rulers were determined by their northern neighbors. In this case, Déby pursued an agenda that involved installing a pliant, Muslim-dominated government in the CAR that would secure the oilfields of southern Chad and prevent opposition forces from using the CAR as a staging-post. Ultimately, pursuit of this policy led to large-scale protests against the Chadians in Bangui and the withdrawal of the Chadian mission.

Chad – A Growing Military Favorite of France and the United States

Chad’s more serious approach to military development and reform has attracted the support of the United States, which now finds serious flaws in its former Nigerian security partner. U.S. training programs and arms sales have broken down in recent years as a result of American concerns with human rights abuses, corruption in the officer corps, infiltration of the Nigerian security forces by Boko Haram and the failure of Nigerian forces to act on U.S.-supplied intelligence (New York Times, January 24, 2015). American concerns with infiltration are not unjustified; a number of senior Nigerian officers have been charged with divulging intelligence to Boko Haram.

Chad is currently host to Flintlock 2015, this year’s version of Flintock, a U.S.-led multinational military exercise conducted by Special Operations Command Forward – West Africa in the interests of improving cooperation and capacity in Saharan counter-terrorism operations. The three-week exercise, which began on February 16, involves more than 100 soldiers from the U.S. 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as well as trainers from a number of Western nations.

Though President Déby was publicly musing about expelling all French troops from Chad only a few years ago, there has since been an about face on this policy, with Chad welcoming a boost in French forces as part of France’s major redeployment of its military forces in Africa, a shift in focus to mobile counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency units and bases known as Operation Barkhane. As part of this redeployment, French forces in Chad were boosted from 950 to 1250 men, with N’Djamena providing the overall command center at Kossei airbase, with two smaller bases in northern Chad at Faya Largeau and Abéché, both close to the Libyan border. Chadian opposition parties and human rights organizations were dismayed by the new agreement, which appears to legitimize and even guarantee the continued rule of President Idris Déby, who has held power since 1990 (RFI, July 19).

France is currently mounting reconnaissance missions in the Lake Chad border area and is supplying intelligence, fuel and munitions to the military coalition as well as providing ten military specialists to help coordinate military operations from Diffa in Niger (Reuters, February 5, 2015).

Despite the presence of roughly 200 ethnic groups in Chad, the military continues to be dominated by members of President Déby’s northern Zaghawa group despite being only somewhere between 2 to 4% of the population. This situation, however, seems to trouble President Déby more than it does his French and American allies.

The MJTF is slated to be replaced by an expanded and African Union-mandated version of 8750 men that will include troops from Benin as well as Chad, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon. Logistical and intelligence support will be supplied by France and the United States. Command of the new force will rotate amongst member nations, beginning with Nigeria. The force is proposed to include the following contributions of troops: Nigeria 3500; Chad 3500; Cameroon 750; Niger 750; Benin 250 (BBC, February 25, 2015). A mandate for the mission from the UN Security Council is being sought with French support; this would provide greater funding and access to equipment and training.

Conclusion

If Chad succeeds where Nigeria failed, the result might be a collapse in confidence in Nigeria’s federal government leading to a further break-up of the country as various regions and ethnic groups seek to provide for their own security. The trick will be how to integrate Nigerian forces into the multinational group’s operations despite a well-deserved lack of confidence in the Nigerian military’s ability to mount operations or safeguard intelligence, especially in the midst of a Nigerian presidential campaign pitting a northern Muslim against the southern Christian incumbent. At the moment, there is little cooperation between the various militaries in the Lake Chad region as each continues to operate largely independently – a state of affairs Abuja appears to favor. This appears to be a Nigerian vote in favor of continuing the regional status quo, in which multilateral cooperation is lacking, trade minimal and effective transportation networks so absent that it is impeding the struggle against Boko Haram. As one recent report noted, “it is still easier to fly to Europe from Nigeria than to any of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.” [6]

Given the resilient nature of Boko Haram, its appeal to local religious extremists and its growing connections to the international jihadi community, it is worth asking whether the Chadian deployment will have to be open-ended in order to prevent a Boko Haram revival even in the event current operations destroy existing militant formations. Nigeria’s military will not become reliable or capable overnight regardless of what types of weapons the government obtains during its current buying campaign from international illegal arms markets. An extended stay will be expensive for N’Djamena, which is suffering from a sharp decline in oil prices, but if the costs are covered by the West and compensation is offered in terms of French and American advanced training and arms for the elite corps of the Chadian military, the prospect might take on a greater appeal for Déby and his Zaghawa-dominated regime. However, Chad’s army remains small, and the current tempo of operations cannot be maintained for long. There is a window of opportunity now for the destruction of Boko Haram, but it is slowly being shut by political considerations in the Nigerian capital.

Notes

1. Boko Haram spokesman Abu Musab al-Barnawi recently described the Hausa-language term “Boko Haram” (loosely translated as “Western education is forbidden”) as a media invention designed to denigrate the Islamist movement, which he insisted be described in future using its full and official name: “We say that we did not name ourselves “Boko Haram. “Our call is not limited to prohibiting foreign schools and democracy. We are Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah Lil Dawa wal Jihad. Therefore, this name [Boko Haram] is an attempt to bury the truth. We carry out the support for the Sunnah and establish governance of Allah in the land” (Premium Times [Abuja], January 21, 2015).

2. An amateur video purporting to show a hot firefight between Chadian troops and Boko Haram fighters can be seen at a pro-Chadian government news-site: http://www.alwihdainfo.com/L-armee-tchadienne-enchaine-d-ecrasantes-victoires-le-Nigeria-predit-la-fin-de-Boko-Haram_a15031.html Though there is the continual sound of gunfire it is difficult to tell whether any of the rounds are actually incoming. There are no apparent Chadian casualties despite the failure of many of the soldiers to seek any kind of cover; at one point a soldier crosses in front of the Chadian firing line without suffering harm. More credible video of Chadian operations in Nigeria can be seen at: http://www.france24.com/en/20150219-video-chadian-army-clashes-with-boko-haram-nigeria/

3. For the Bakassi dispute, see: Andrew McGregor, “Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 8(43), November 24, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37208&no_cache=1#.VPDWei5cvfY

4. Séléka was a coalition led by the now-exiled Michel Djotodia and composed of the following groups: Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC – led by General Abdoulaye Miskine [real name Martin Koumtamadji], a career rebel/freebooter in the Chad/CAR border region); Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP); Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement, UFDR; Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Kodro (CPSK); and the Alliance pour la renaissance et la refondation (A2R).

5. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Press briefing notes on Central African Republic and Somalia, Geneva, April 4, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14471&LangID=E

6. Onyedimmakachukwu, “It’s Time for Lake Chad Countries to Move from War Comrades to Business Partners,” February 24, 2015, http://www.ventures-africa.com/2015/02/its-time-for-lake-chad-countries-to-move-from-war-comrades-to-business-partners/

Prophet under Arms: A Profile of the Niger Delta’s “Ex-General” Reuben Wilson

Andrew McGregor

July 31, 2014

Reuben Wilson, a former commander in the loosely organized and allegedly disbanded Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), is threatening to block oil production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria if the current president, Goodluck Jonathan, is prevented from running for a second term in February 2015 (see Terrorism Monitor, July 10). MEND was an umbrella organization for various Niger Delta militant groups fighting the Nigerian central government and targeting the region’s oil industry before the movement’s leaders accepted an amnesty in 2009. Despite this, disparate groups of militants in the Delta region continue to operate under the MEND banner, allegedly in response to continued environmental degradation and inequitable distribution of oil revenue.

NEOFEAD3/DESKTOP/PHOTO/ATEKE3Reuben Wilson

Wilson, like other ex-militant leaders, has tied his fortunes to those of Jonathan, who as vice president under the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, negotiated the amnesty and compensation payments that brought the former MEND leaders out of the creeks in 2009. Since then Nigeria has resumed something close to normal oil production in the region. Nigeria is plagued by its inability to secure the vast network of pipelines in the Delta. Last year alone, $11 billion were lost due to damaged pipelines and oil theft, which presidential spokesman Reuben Abati described as “an aspect of global terrorism” (Middle East News Agency, March 24).

Pastor Reuben Wilson (also known as “Ex-General” Reuben Wilson) was born in Koluama, a coastal community in the oil-rich Bayelsa State. A number of coastal communities in the Southern Ijaw region of Bayelsa State were recently wiped out by an ocean surge that locals and government officials blamed on Chevron’s offshore exploration activities (Nigerian Times, July 8). Koluama was among the worst affected, losing an important fishery terminal in the surge. The community was wiped out by a similar surge in 1953 that local leaders blamed on the exploration activities of Shell D’Arcy, the predecessor of Shell Nigeria (Vanguard [Lagos], June 20). While remarking on the latest surge, Wilson recalled the earlier destruction of Koluama as one of the reasons he took to the creeks:

I am from Koluama in Southern Ijaw. We don’t have money. We don’t have roads. From Yenagoa to my place is three hours with speed boat and when you go there, you see flames [gas flares] everywhere. That is a place that was once flooded and the people wiped out. As I talk to you now, water has gone back there and the people’s existence is being threatened. This was part of why we had to take up arms to attract government attention (The Nigerian Voice, January 29, 2012).

Wilson is a self-described “prophet” of the so-called “White Garment Church,” part of the Aladura (“praying people” in Yoruba) spiritualist movement in Nigeria. After coming in from the creeks of the Delta in 2009, Wilson founded a peace advocacy group known as the Leadership, Peace and Cultural Development Initiative (LPCDI), which soon included most of the militant leaders who had accepted the federal government’s amnesty.

Rebel Life in the Creeks

In 2006, Wilson took to the creeks of the Delta to join an insurgency targeting both the federal government and oil industry operations in the region. Wilson displays little nostalgia for his time there, describing it as a time of great hardship:

When we were in the creeks, we would not go out to the town. We would only leave our camp to the nearby riverine communities and then back to the camp. The only thing we were enjoying in the creeks was fish. Anytime we needed fish, we had enough… Then, we were in bondage, fighting with mosquitoes every day. To drink water, we would dig holes for water to come out. If you saw our skin then, you would pity us… We were there for like three years and could not see our wives (Nigerian Voice, January 29, 2012).

Wilson provides a somewhat glowing review of his leadership during his time in the creeks, saying the chiefs and elders “cherished me. I was not greedy; I shared whatever I have with them… My mode of operations attracted a very large followership” (The Tide [Port Harcourt], October 31, 2009). When asked to explain how a man of the cloth could take up armed rebellion against the state, Wilson replied: “I am a prophet in the church and for a prophet’s anger to rise to the point of carrying arms, then it is really serious and intolerable. When I saw the condition of my community and nobody was ready to do something, I carried arms” (The Tide [Port Harcourt], April 22). According to Wilson, his group always prayed before operations and never actually killed anyone: “If anything like that happened, it must have been by mistake. We never intended to kill anybody” (The Tide [Port Harcourt], October 31, 2009).

Niger DeltaHowever, there were lucrative aspects to Wilson’s time in the creeks with MEND and financial potential in the amnesty, as he recounted to a journalist in 2013:

When I was in the creek… We see money easily. We would call an oil company and say: ‘If you don’t give us this, we will blow up this facility,’ and they would send money to the camp. Anything we said we need, they would send to us… By the grace of God, the oil company will give me a major contract to supply chemicals and equipment so in two or three years when you come back maybe you will see me in a big mansion (BBC, May 1).

Wilson soon discovered, however, that a reconciled militant no longer enjoyed the easy extortion of oil companies practiced in the creeks, naming Chevron in particular as a reluctant target: “When you approach them for anything, they will say ‘we are dealing with government and we have paid money to them. It’s government that will take care of your problems’” (The Tide [Port Harcourt], October 31, 2013).

A Reconciled Militant

Shortly after accepting the amnesty, Wilson began to complain that the payments from the federal government were “not enough to take care of myself and family. I need a steady job; even being a contractor will not be bad. I should be given [a] surveillance job. This is important so that some of the boys could be engaged in safeguarding the oil installations in my area” (The Tide [Port Harcourt], October 31, 2009).

Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State, has become known for the enormous mansions built by reconciled former militant leaders who have benefited from access to government and oil industry contracts as well as from their customary deductions from amnesty-related payments to former members of these former leaders’ groups. The lives of these past MEND leaders contrasts sharply with those led by their former comrades in the creeks, who continue to face challenges such as oil industry-related pollution, the lack of infrastructure, an absence of educational opportunities and widespread unemployment.

In recent years, Wilson has dedicated himself to visiting militant commanders still fighting the Nigerian government, such as General Lato, General Mammy Water and Commander Koko, to convince them to abandon their armed struggle, though the expiration of the federal government’s amnesty program complicates these efforts (Nigerian Voice, January 29, 2012).

In June, the Wilson-led LPCDI warned it was prepared to take action against contractors that had failed to carry out projects commissioned by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), a growing complaint in the region. Wilson emphasized the LPCDI had other means than violence to force the contractors to act:

The same way we were able to fight the federal government and forced them to remember the Niger Delta, that same way, we will go after fraudulent NDDC contractors and force them to execute every job faithfully. We will not use guns, because we have surrendered them. But we will devise our own way of peacefully compelling all NDDC contractors to do what is right (Leadership [Abuja], June 30).

Ongoing Trouble in the Creeks

Despite Wilson’s claim he has put violence behind him, there are signs that former members of his group are still armed and pursuing their own agendas in Bayelsa State. In May 2013, five former members of Wilson’s militia, including his younger brother Benaibi Wilson, were killed in a shootout with a rival group in the Southern Ijaw region of Bayelsa State (AFP, May 5, 2013). Wilson denied that “his boys” had returned fire during the attack, believed to be connected to young ex-militants who have seen little or none of the amnesty allowance they were promised in 2009 (Reuters, May 5).

Other militants still active in the Delta creeks have a different perspective on the amnesty program. On October 22, 2013, a group claiming to be MEND attacked the Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Company, setting it ablaze. In a statement of responsibility, the group warned that peace would be elusive in the region so long as the president placed his faith in an “unsustainable and fraudulent” amnesty program (RealNewsMagazine.net [Lagos], November 11, 2013). While authorities claimed the fire was an accident, Wilson castigated those who claimed responsibility, insisting that MEND could not be responsible as it had ceased to exist when the amnesty was accepted in 2009 (RealNewsMagazine.net [Lagos], November 11, 2013).

In April 2013, a number of ex-militants killed 12 policemen in an ambush claimed a group claiming to be MEND in the creeks of Bayelsa State but believed to actually be part of a dispute generated by alleged illegal deductions from monthly amnesty payments made by the militants’ leader, Comrade Kile Selky Torughedi (a.k.a. “Young Shall Grow”) (Reuters, May 5, 2013). The policemen were on their way to provide security at the funeral of Torughedi’s mother at the time they were attacked (Sahara Reporters, April 7, 2013). Wilson rejected the MEND claim and suggested that such violence could be avoided if the ex-militant leaders maintained better communications with their followers rather than abandoning them in the creeks:

When we accepted amnesty, the federal government made lots of promises to the [militant] leaders. Because of the failures on the part of the federal government, the leaders were deducting the allowances of the boys. But if the Federal Government reached out and treat the leaders with respect and fulfill the promises, I don’t think any leader will make such illegal deductions (Guardian [Lagos], April 8, 2013).

In April 2013, Lawrence Pepple, head of the Amnesty Committee’s Reintegration Department, told a group of ex-militants (including Reuben Wilson) that the murder of the 12 police officers was tied to the work of “anti-Jonathan forces” in Bayelsa State. If approached by such forces, Pepple urged the ex-militants “please take their money and do not execute the destruction they want you to do,” while noting ominously that the U.S. Congress must be told that “if they support these anti-Jonathan forces, we cannot guarantee internal security in the Niger Delta” (Sahara Reporters, April 22, 2013).

In February 2013, six foreign sailors (Ukrainian, Indian and Russian) were abducted from the offshore supply tug Armada Tuah 101 by Bayelsa-based gunmen. A ransom of $1.3 million was demanded, but the men were released nine days later without any ransom being paid (Reuters, February 27, 2013; Interfax, February 26, 2013; Maritime Bulletin, February 18, 2013). Wilson claimed he and other former militant leaders went back to the creeks to negotiate the release of the hostages and suggested that there was no justification for such kidnappings since the federal government was implementing the amnesty program:

We took the pains to go into the creeks that we left some years back to look for and rescue all the abducted foreign workers because for us, it was shameful and degrading that some disgruntled elements are still thinking of kidnapping people in times like this when the amnesty program has been on course… Our message to those elements is that they must stop the rubbish. There is nothing to gain in engaging in this kind of venture (Eagle Online [Lagos], March 1, 2013).

Conclusion

Wilson has been especially vocal on what he sees as a widespread campaign combining political activity and Boko Haram terrorism to discredit President Jonathan, who, like Wilson, is an Ijaw from Bayelsa (see Terrorism Monitor, July 10). Wilson believes that Jonathan will win the presidential election easily, even taking a large number of votes in the Muslim north, which is generally perceived as hostile to the southern-born president:

Forget what the elite are doing. The masses who will go to vote know the truth. I can assure you that many people will be so disappointed because the common man on the street knows the truth and when the time comes, he will gladly give his vote to President Jonathan. I, Ex-General Reuben Wilson, a former Niger Delta freedom fighter, am telling you that Jonathan will return to office in 2015 and he will do so in style (Daily News Watch [Lagos], May 1).

According to Wilson, the president’s northern opponents seek to prevent his re-election so they can “take charge and continue to enslave us as was the case for decades. We will not fold our arms and watch a section of the country which believes that it is their birthright to rule Nigeria to chase Mr. President out of office” (Punch [Lagos], September 6, 2013).

This article first appeared in the July 31, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor.

Ex-Militants Use Oil as a Political Weapon in the Niger Delta

Andrew McGregor

July 10, 2014

Former Niger Delta militants have threatened to cut off Nigerian oil production in the event beleaguered Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan is prevented from seeking re-election in 2015. Jonathan has been under intense criticism from northern politicians who cite incompetence in dealing with Boko Haram and other issues in their demands that the president decline to run for a second term. The declaration came out of a meeting in Akwa Ibom State of some 600 former militants who had accepted amnesty under the federal government’s Leadership, Peace and Cultural Development Initiative (LPCDI) in 2009 as part of a national effort to bring an end to militant activities in the Niger Delta region that were preventing full exploitation of the region’s abundant energy reserves.

Vandalized Pipeline in the Niger Delta

The leader of the ex-militants, Reuben Wilson, described a wide campaign in Muslim north Nigeria to discredit and distract the president, who is of southern and Christian origin:

You will agree with me that the Niger Delta people are sustaining the economy at great inconveniences and pains to its people and the environment. It is the only time that the region has had the privilege of producing a president for the country. It is unthinkable that the North will be plotting against our son, intimidating him with bomb blasts here and there and causing the untimely death of scores of innocent Nigerians, all because they want to take back power. We have always seen the need for us to live together as one indivisible country and this is what Mr. President believes in. However, with the way things are going, we have been pushed to the wall and we cannot but react. Accordingly, the former freedom fighters have agreed that all the routes through which the north has been benefiting from crude oil finds coming from the Niger Delta will be cut off, if they insist on forcing Mr. President out of office. (This Day [Lagos], July 1).

The declaration was reinforced by a pledge from the Niger Delta Youth Movement (NDYM) to organize a “million-man march” of Niger Delta youth in Abuja to condemn the “distraction” of President Jonathan from his development program by the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. NDYM leader Felix Ogbona insisted the movement would stop oil flows from the Delta if Jonathan is prevented from running for president in 2015 (Daily Independent [Lagos], June 29). According to the former militants, it was Jonathan (as vice-president) who visited the militants in the creeks of the Delta and convinced them to sign on to the amnesty in exchange for promises of development (Information Nigeria, May 2, 2013). The ex-militants see Jonathan’s efforts to develop the Delta being diverted by Boko Haram activities in the north and are certain such efforts will be dropped if a new president is elected from the northern Muslim communities in 2015.

Elsewhere, former Niger Delta militants belonging to the Ijaw people of the Delta demanded Jonathan (an Ijaw) declare his intent to run in 2015, saying in a statement:  We, therefore, call on you to contest the seat of the President. And if for any reason you fail to contest come 2015, you should not come back home but remain in Abuja forever” (Vanguard [Lagos], June 29).

Mansion Belonging to a Former Militant Leader in Yenagoa  (BBC)

While attacks in the Niger Delta and elsewhere continue to be claimed by “MEND spokesmen,” those militant leaders who accepted amnesty insist MEND ceased to exist in 2009: “Nobody should hide under the guise of a so-called MEND to sabotage the nation’s economy… We restate that the amnesty program of the Federal Government is working and those of us that are beneficiaries are happy that we were given the privilege to come out of the creeks to contribute to the peace and development of the country” (Vanguard [Lagos], October 24, 2013).

The amnesty has been granted to roughly 30,000 people since it began, promising each of them at least $410 per month to keep the peace in a program that costs upwards of $500 million per year (BBC, May 2). While lower-level militants have been offered job-training as they collect often-sporadic payments, there is abundant evidence that some former militant leaders have used access to major oil industry-related contracts to build enormous personal wealth that is typically flaunted through the construction of rambling mansions (Leadership [Abuja], June 30). The militant leaders who once targeted the Delta’s pipelines for oil theft or destruction now seek lucrative government contracts to provide security for these same pipelines (Information Nigeria, May 2, 2013).

Residents of the Niger Delta have complained for years that they see little benefit from the massive revenues generated by oil production in their region while enduring industrial pollution, poor infrastructure and a shortage of employment opportunities.

This article first appeared in the July 10, 2014 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Attack on Chinese Company in Cameroon Drags Yaoundé into Campaign against Boko Haram

Andrew McGregor

May 30, 2014

An assault on a Chinese road-building camp in northern Cameroon is the latest in a series of regional attacks on Chinese workers and facilities. The camp with 52 staff was run by a Sinohydro engineering unit involved in road improvement as part of a joint World Bank/Cameroon government project. Close to the camp is an oil exploration site run by Yan Chang Logone Development Holding Company, a subsidiary of China’s Yanchang Petroleum (Reuters, May 20). The exploration group is working in the Logone-Birni basin in north Cameroon.

The night-time attack, believed to have been the work of Nigeria’s Boko Haram movement, overcame resistance from a much-diminished Cameroonian guard force before the attackers seized ten Chinese employees, wounded another and lifted ten Sinohydro vehicles as well as blasting equipment used in road construction (Xinhua, May 18). China has expressed concern over the possibility of military action to rescue the hostages: “We urge the Cameroonian authorities not to put the lives of the Chinese nationals missing in danger if actions to liberate them are launched” (China Daily/Xinhua, May 19). France quickly offered its assistance to China in finding the ten missing workers (AFP, May 18).