Andrew McGregor

August 6, 2008

In recent days thirty fighters from Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have been sentenced to death in special ad-hoc counter-terrorism tribunals created by the Sudanese government. The fighters were taken prisoner during last May’s surprising but ultimately unsuccessful JEM raid on Omdurman. After being sentenced to hang, the JEM guerrillas responded with cries of “In the name of Darfur, God is Great” and “Thanks be to God” (Sudan Tribune, July 31; Reuters, July 31).

JEM Prisoners on Trial, Omdurman

If not considered POWs, insurgent prisoners are still entitled under international law to protection from torture, confinement in secret prisons and summary execution. They may, however, be tried for treason and sedition. Sudan (unlike the United States) is a ratified signatory to the 1977 Geneva Convention Additional Protocol 1, in which section 1.4 states POW status must be given to prisoners from “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” While some may argue JEM prisoners meet this definition, JEM, like the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) of southern Sudan, has always styled itself it a “national liberation movement,” rather than a regional separatist movement.

The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has urged that the JEM prisoners be pardoned. According to Yasir Arman, the SPLM Deputy Secretary General for Northern Sudan, the JEM rebels are clearly prisoners of war (Miraya FM [Khartoum], July 31). In June, the SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum (Cabinet Affairs Minister in the Government of National Unity) also called on the government to treat the rebels as prisoners of war (Sudan Tribune, June 23). During its 22 year war with southern rebels, Khartoum routinely explained the absence of SPLA POWs by denying that any rebels had been taken prisoner.

After claiming POW status for its captured fighters, an official JEM statement declared; “Execution of Prisoners of War is a breach of the International Law and considered an act of assassination and another murder in cold blood” (Sudan Tribune, July 29). JEM spokesman Ahmad Hussein promised the movement would retaliate “at the appropriate time and place” (Afrique en Ligne, July 31). Hussein added; “This is a butchery of justice in Sudan and yet another example of [an] impotent judiciary that is under the influence of the executive branch… This proves there is no genuine judiciary in Sudan to prosecute anyone let alone perpetrators of genocide and war crimes” (Sudan Tribune, August 1).

Defense lawyers for the JEM accused, who must mount appeals in the next few days, say that the special courts are unconstitutional. Once the sentences have been ratified by an appeals court, the execution orders must then be signed by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is himself wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes. The question is whether al-Bashir will commute the death sentences to moderate his image, or fall back on his regime’s customary recourse to quick and decisive punishment of those who challenge its authority. With JEM still operating openly in Darfur and threatening another raid on Khartoum, it will be hard for al-Bashir to resist demonstrating the regime’s willingness to ignore international opinion when it comes to matters of internal security.

This article first appeared in the August 6, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Andrew McGregor

May 15, 2008

Last weekend’s daring raid on greater Khartoum by Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has shaken the regime and effectively disrupted the already morbid peace process in West Sudan. Though often referred to as a Darfur rebel group, JEM in fact has a national agenda, much like John Garang’s Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA), which always maintained it was a movement of national liberation rather than a southern separatist group. Until 2006, JEM was also involved militarily in the revolt of the Beja and Rashaida Arabs of Eastern Sudan against Khartoum.

(The Economist)

The Zaghawa tribe that straddles Darfur and Chad dominates the JEM leadership, marking a major challenge to traditional Arab superiority in Sudan. While some of the leaders of Darfur’s badly-divided rebel groups have fought the rebellion from the cafés of Paris, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim has remained at the front, forging a disparate group of refugees, farmers and ex-military men into the strongest military force in Darfur and the greatest threat to the Sudanese regime.

Greater Khartoum consists of the capital, Khartoum, the city of Omdurman on the western side of the White Nile, and the industrial suburb of Khartoum North on the north side of the Blue Nile. Khartoum itself is protected by broad rivers to the west and north, making assaults from these directions extremely difficult. Despite decades of warfare in Sudan’s provinces, Khartoum has not experienced any fighting in its streets since 1976, when Libyan-trained Umma Party rebels—also from West Sudan—fought running gun-battles in a failed attempt to overthrow the military government.

The once dusty and decaying Sudanese capital has undergone an astonishing transformation in recent years due to growing oil revenues and massive investment from the Gulf, Malaysia and China. Khartoum has increasingly become an island of prosperity surrounded by a vast and impoverished hinterland that now calls for an equitable distribution of the national wealth.

Across the Desert to Khartoum

On May 8, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reported they had learned of “preparations made by rebel Khalil Ibrahim to conduct a sabotage attempt and a publicity stunt through infiltrating the capital and other towns” as well as noting that “groups riding vehicles” were headed east from the Chadian border (Sudan Tribune, May 8). A JEM commander reported that the column consisted of 400 vehicles and took three days to reach Khartoum (AFP, May 11). Notably absent from the attack were forces from the Sudan Liberation Army – Unity (SLA-Unity), another Darfur rebel group that has operated in a military alliance with JEM for the past two years.

A government spokesman claimed that the armed forces met the rebel column in Kordofan, at a point 75 mi west of the capital, where a portion of the rebel force made a run for Omdurman after most of the column had been stopped by a government attack.

JEM claims to have hit the Nile north of Omdurman, seizing and looting the Wadi Saidna Air Force base, 10 miles north of Khartoum. This claim has not been verified, but eyewitnesses reported seeing an attack on the base (Sudan Tribune, May 11).

On Friday night, May 9, Khartoum’s embassies received calls from the government warning them of a possible rebel attack on Khartoum (AFP, May 10). Despite the incoming reports of a JEM column heading east across the desert, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir continued performing the umrah (the minor pilgrimage) in the holy cities of Saudi Arabia. With Bashir in Saudi Arabia, the acting president was First Vice President Salva Kiir Mayadrit of the SPLA, who maintains he was in constant contact with al-Bashir until his return late on May 10.

Assault on the Suburbs

On May 10, some 150 armored pick-up trucks reached the outskirts of Omdurman. With helicopters in the air, security personnel poured into the streets, setting up checkpoints and securing potential targets. The bridges linking Omdurman to Khartoum across the White Nile were blocked.

Despite bold claims from JEM spokesmen that their forces were “everywhere in the capital,” it appears that few, if any, of the rebels managed to penetrate much farther than the suburbs of northern Omdurman, where their burning pick-up trucks could be seen after the battle. Claims by rebel commanders that their troops had seized the bridges and entered Khartoum appear to have been wishful thinking or an attempt to unnerve the regime.

Throughout the attack, media-savvy JEM field commanders were on the phone to major international media sources, giving progress reports with the sound of gunfire and explosions in the background. A commander called Abu Zumam claimed his forces had entered Omdurman and were preparing to seize the National State Radio building (Radio Omdurman). Another JEM commander named Sulayman Sandal was also in constant contact with media. As the government counter-attacks began to drive JEM fighters from the city, Commander Sulayman insisted: “This was just practice. We promise to hit Khartoum one more time unless the [Darfur] issue is resolved” (AP, May 11). The commander claimed JEM forces had initially seized all of Omdurman, but were beaten off due to the inexperience of JEM troops in urban warfare (AFP, May 11).

Sudan’s official news agency SUNA claimed that JEM’s “military commander” Jamal Hassan Jelaladdin was killed on the outskirts of Khartoum in the morning of May 11. SUNA also reported the deaths of Muhammad Saleh Garbo and Muhammad Nur al-Din, described as the leader of the attack and the JEM intelligence chief, respectively (SUNA, May 11). JEM reported that no one by these names were in the rebel ranks, but claimed Jamal Hassan had been captured and summarily executed after his vehicle broke down (Sudan Tribune, May 12).

What Were the Targets?

JEM spokesman Ahmad Hussein Adam declared that Wadi Saidna air force base was targeted because it was “the base from where all Sudanese military planes go to Darfur” (AFP, May 10). Heavy civilian losses were reported in Northern Darfur in the weeks preceding the raid on the capital. JEM recently accused Khartoum of recruiting 250 Iraqi pilots to carry out bombing missions in Darfur following combat losses and a reluctance by Sudanese pilots to continue bombing civilian targets (Sudanjem.com, May 4).

State radio facilities head the list of desirable targets on any coup-leader’s target list—in this case Radio Omdurman was no exception. JEM may have anticipated that the residents of Khartoum were only awaiting a sign to rise up against the government, but there appeared to be no verifiable instances of tri-city residents offering material support to the rebels. With residents confined indoors by a curfew, parts of the city were remarkably quiet.

When the bridges across the Nile were secured by Sudanese security forces it became impossible to complete JEM’s objectives. There does not appear to have been any backup plan for this fairly predictable circumstance. When asked by the BBC how he plans to deal with this problem in his promised return to the capital, Khalil Ibrahim responded; “I am not empty handed. I took a lot of things from Khartoum—a lot of vehicles, ammunition and money” (BBC, May 12). There are reports that a large quantity of weapons and ammunition were seized at the Wadi Saidna air base.

According to VP Salva Kiir, the rebel targets in the capital included Radio Omdurman, the military headquarters and the presidential palace beside the Blue Nile (Sudan Tribune, May 13).

Mopping Up

When the JEM attack crested in the suburbs of Omdurman many fighters found themselves without any means of escaping the city. Some surrendered while others were reported to have doffed their camouflage gear in favor of civilian clothing. Gunfire continued throughout the weekend as security forces tried to flush out hidden JEM fighters. Reports of gunfire in the center of Khartoum were apparently the result of edgy security men firing on a group of civilians hiding in a building (BBC, May 12). When the fighting had stopped, government forces stated 400 rebels and 100 security men had been killed.

Security forces reported seizing 50 rebel pick-up trucks while battered prisoners were repeatedly displayed on state television. With continuing reports that Khalil Ibrahim had gone into hiding in Omdurman after being injured when his truck was hit by gunfire, Sudanese state television broadcast his photo for the first time, encouraging viewers to report any sightings. A reward of $125,000 for information leading to the JEM leader’s capture was later doubled to $250,000.

Despite the lack of any public support in Khartoum for the rebels, security forces quickly decided that the attack must have relied on a fifth column within the city. This prompted mass arrests of Darfuris in the capital, especially those of the Zaghawa tribe (Sudan Human Rights Organization statement, Cairo, May 13). Some Darfur groups reported the arrest and beatings of thousands of Darfuri laborers working in the capital (al-Jazeera, May 13). Other reports claim dozens of Zaghawa in the city have been executed (Sudan Tribune, May 13). A JEM spokesman described the arrests as “ethnic cleansing” (Sudan Tribune, May 10).

Sudan’s leading Islamist, Hassan al-Turabi, was detained for questioning by security forces due to his former association with JEM. Khalil Ibrahim was once described as a follower of the controversial al-Turabi, but there appear to be few, if any, ties remaining between the two. Turabi and several other members of his Popular Congress Party were quickly released after questioning.

The Role of the Army and Security Forces

The majority of the rank-and-file in Sudan’s army comes from the African tribes of Darfur and Kordofan. They are typically led by Arab officers from the Northern Province of Sudan. Most of the fighting in the capital appears to have been done by government security services and police rather than the military. VP Salva Kiir notes that the army did not intervene until it became clear the rebels had been repulsed (Sudan Tribune, May 13). Some mid-level army commanders are reported to have been arrested after the attack.

Reacting to public criticism of the military’s failure to stop the assault long before it reached Khartoum, a presidential adviser claimed that the military had intentionally drawn the rebels “into a trap” (Sudan Tribune, May 13). Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel-Rahim Muhammad Hussein was roundly condemned by members of parliament who called for an inquiry as to how JEM forces could reach the capital (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 14; Sudan Tribune, May 14). While some MPs called for his resignation, the Defense Minister blamed the U.S. embargo for the lack of surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

Destroyed JEM Vehicle in the Streets of Omdurman

After returning to Darfur, Khalil Ibrahim thanked the neutrality of the Sudanese army, which “welcomed him” (Sudan Tribune, May 13). This statement alone will create chaos in the security structure as the government seeks out real, potential and imagined collaborators.

Reaction of the SPLA

JEM frequently states its commitment to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the southern Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). At the same time, it is vehemently opposed to the idea of southern separation—the CPA calls for a referendum on southern separation in 2011, a position that has interfered with JEM efforts to forge stronger ties with the SPLA. Regarding any attempt to overthrow the government as interference in implementing the CPA, the SPLA’s military commanders offered Khartoum the use of SPLA troops still under Salva Kiir’s command.

Proxy War with Chad?

Last March, N’Djamena and Khartoum signed yet another in a series of worthless peace agreements after an attack by Sudanese-supported rebels nearly deposed the Zaghawa-based government of President Idriss Déby. Khartoum has accused Chadian forces of mounting a diversionary attack on the SAF garrison at Kashkash along the Chad/Sudan border “meant to support the attempt of sabotage of the rebel Khalil Ibrahim” (Sudan Tribune, May 10). The SAF claimed to have successfully repulsed the Chadian troops, forcing them to pull back across the border.

On his return from pilgrimage, Bashir severed relations with Chad and laid the blame for the raid on the “outlaw regime” in N’Djamena: “These forces come from Chad who trained them … we hold the Chadian regime fully responsible for what happened.” Perhaps unwilling to admit the military potential of the Darfur rebels, Bashir claimed: “These forces are Chadian forces originally, they moved from there led by Khalil Ibrahim who is an agent of the Chadian regime. It is a Chadian attack” (AP, May 11). The SAF claimed that most of the prisoners were Chadian nationals. A Chadian government spokesman quickly denied any official involvement in the attack (AFP, May 10).

Chadian officials reported that uniformed Sudanese security forces broke into all the offices of the Chadian embassy in Khartoum, seizing documents and computers (Sudan Tribune, May 11). The Sudanese Foreign Ministry claimed: “We have evidence there was communication between [the rebels and] the government of Chad and the embassy of Chad in Khartoum” (AFP, May 11).

China Stays Aloof

Though China has natural concerns over the effect of a regime change in a country that is now one of its largest foreign oil suppliers, the reaction from Beijing was supportive but muted. JEM has made clear its opposition to China’s oil operations in Sudan, attacking Chinese oil facilities in Kordofan (see Terrorism Focus, September 11, 2007). JEM is also angered by the Chinese supply of arms and warplanes to the Khartoum regime. China was one of the few non-African countries approved by Khartoum for participation in UNAMID, contributing a group of military engineers to the Darfur peacekeeping efforts. In a Foreign Ministry statement, China condemned the attacks but hoped “the Darfur armed rebel group could join in the political process as soon as possible and resume negotiation with the Sudanese government, for the early signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, to realize peace, stability and development in Darfur” (Xinhua, May 11).

What Next for the Regime? For JEM?

Khartoum declared negotiations with JEM to be at an end on May 14, but this will make little difference since JEM was already not part of the ongoing negotiations with other Darfur rebel groups. Presidential adviser Mustafa Osman Ismail promised government retaliation instead: “From this day we will never deal with this movement again other than in the way they have just dealt with us” (Xinhua, May 11). President Bashir has also claimed that Israel funded the assault, calling Khalil Ibrahim “an agent… who sold himself to the devil and to Zionism” (AP, May 14). The government is demanding that JEM be declared an international terrorist organization by the United States and the UN (Radio Omdurman, May 13).

The raid on Khartoum was a reminder to the Northern Arab regime that it might all come crashing down one day and that their continued wealth and power is by no means guaranteed. After the raid, Khalil Ibrahim provided this justification for the attack: “The Sudanese government killed 600,000 people in Darfur and they are living at peace in Khartoum” (al-Jazeera, May 13). Whether the raid results in greater conciliation efforts and distribution of wealth to the provinces is yet to be seen. Past experience suggests that the government’s response will be increased violence and repression. Large-scale retaliation against Chad is virtually inevitable. In the meantime Khartoum may have to deal with a sudden reluctance on the part of international investors to put their money into an uncertain situation.

Khartoum will undoubtedly implement measures to prevent a repeat of the attack, but JEM has also learned several important lessons in this operation. It is difficult to believe that JEM intended to hold and seize the city at this time, but the operation may lay the groundwork for a larger effort in the future. More plausible is Khalil Ibrahim’s claim that he intends to exhaust and divide the Sudanese military by spreading the war far beyond Darfur (AP, May 13). According to the JEM leader, “This is just the start of a process and the end is the termination of this regime” (BBC, May 12).

This article first appeared in the May 15, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Commentary (November 2007)

Dr. Andrew McGregor

November, 2007

In 1915 ‘Ali Dinar, the Fur Sultan of Darfur, sent a prominent Arab leader a message in which he called the tribal chief a nafah al-bugr’(‘one who blows under a cow’s tail to induce it to give milk’). To complete the insult the sultan included a pair of sandals the chief could use to run away. The chief, a seasoned desert warrior named Musa Madibbu, retorted that he would soon be watering his horses in the capital. The exchange was typical of the long and contentious relationship between the African Muslim rulers of Darfur (‘land of the Fur’) and their Arab subjects. Today many of their descendants are uniting against a common foe, Khartoum.

Janjaweed on the Move

The weakness of Darfur as a state was always the failure of most of the Arab tribes to ‘buy in’ to the idea of a multi-ethnic Fur-ruled sultanate. Arab tribes were perpetually in rebellion, defying the authority of the Sultan. Despite this, the Arabs and the African Muslims worked closely to make Darfur a wealthy conduit for the shipment of ivory and non-Muslim African slaves. Loyal Arabs formed the Sultan’s cavalry, and individual Arabs from all over Sudan served the regime at the highest levels. All official communications and government documents were written in Arabic. The ruling dynasties of Darfur,like most royal families of the region, held elaborate genealogies tracing their ancestry to the noblest clans of Arabia and Yemen. Yet when the sultanate finally fell in 1916, British-armed Arab tribesmen helped give it a push.

After the British conquered Darfur they devoted a great deal of time to creating maps in which the province was neatly divided into sections according to ethnic groups. In reality the many tribes of Darfur, Arab and non-Arab, have always lived in a wild patchwork of territories held by sedentary tribes,

Criss-crossed by corridors used by the nomads to move their herds to seasonal pasturelands. The local economy depends on the exchange of goods between nomads and farmers, and many Arabs are coming to realize that destroying relations with their African neighbours is not in their best long-term interest. In an unforeseen complication for Khartoum, several Arab and Arab-led militant groups have joined the fight against the government in Darfur. The spokesman for one of these groups rejected the acts of the Arab Janjaweed militia accused of atrocities, “even if they are Arabs… Arabs are part of Darfur, and are merged and inter-married with the people of Darfur.”

On the last point the rebel was absolutely right. The saddest moments of this manipulated conflict have come when Janjaweed killers have had to ask potential victims whether they are Arabs or zurqa (‘blacks’) before deciding to kill them. Most of the anti-Khartoum Arab rebels are drawn from the largely neutral cattle-rearing Baqqara Arab tribes of south Darfur, the Rizayqat, the Ta’aisha, and the Bani Halba. Their camel-rearing cousins in north Darfur are extremely poor and suffer greatly from desertification. After promises of fertile land from Khartoum, the northern Arabs became the backbone of the Janjaweed militias who follow Khartoum’s version of ‘Arab supremacism’. The Baqqara tribes do not see them-selves as subordinate to the Nile valley Arabs who rule in Khartoum; they can recall the time when the Baqqara ruled the entire Sudan from 1885 to 1898. Still there are many in Khartoum’s Arab elite who privately despise the Baqqara as little better than the zurqa..

By their neutrality in the conflict, the Arab tribes of the south have found themselves excluded from the peace settlement. Their leaders recently walked out of a meeting with African Union peace envoy Salim Ahmad Salim when they were informed they could only have five minutes of his time. Many of the Arab rebels claim they took arms against the government when they realized it was the only way to get a seat at the peace negotiations. However, not all Baqqara have avoided the conflict. Rebuffed by the traditional chiefs, Sudanese intelligence has subverted the traditional power structure by enticing younger leaders to join the Janjaweed with gifts of cash and promises of influence. Arab rebels claim that thousands of disenchanted Janjaweed are now joining the fight against Khartoum, though this figure is probably exaggerated. Allegiance to the Janjaweed in the northern Arab tribes remains very strong.

Some Baqqara Arabs suggest they are as impoverished and disenfranchised by the regime as the rebels, on top of which they now find themselves blamed for the savagery of the Janjaweed. After hundreds of years of holding themselves largely distinct from the rest of Darfur society, the Arab rebels now complain of Khartoum’s ‘divide-and-rule’ policy, designed, in their eyes, to keep the people of Darfur from sharing in the new resource wealth of Sudan. There are reports that 30,000 Chadian Arabs have crossed the border with the assistance of Arab leaders in Darfur to settle on lands from which the non-Arab tribes have been driven out. Many of the new arrivals belong to tribes divided by artificial colonial borders. Such a large-scale migration could only be carried out with the knowledge and permission of the Khartoum government. By the time the new UN peacekeeping force is deployed in January, there may be nowhere for the displaced to return to. Even West Darfur’s governor called it “a strategic attempt to occupy land.” In a demonstration of the ‘cycle of violence’ at work, many of the Chadian Arabs are fleeing retribution attacks from African groups originally hit by cross-border raids of the Sudanese Janjaweed. The continuing presence of Chadian Arabs in Darfur will make negotiations on land redistribution almost impossible.

Are Darfur’s Arabs finally ‘buying in’ to the idea of Darfur? Maybe not yet, but self-interest is a great motivator. Darfur’s Arabs have not benefited from their attacks on their African neighbours. Some feel they have been manipulated by an Arabist ideology foreign to Darfur. Identification with the Janjaweed and their violent Arabization of Darfur has brought once proud tribes into international disgrace, including those who have had little involvement in the conflict so far. At the moment the situation in Darfur remains extremely fluid. If significant numbers of Darfur’s Arabs decide their interests lie with their neighbours rather than the Khartoum government, the conflict may take on a very different form by the time UN peacekeepers deploy next January [2008].

This article first appeared in the November, 2007 issue of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies’ Strategic Datalink.

Andrew McGregor

September 11, 2007

A daring rebel raid 200 kilometers into the Sudanese province of Kordofan suggests that the Darfur conflict may actually be spreading, despite the initiation of Darfur peace negotiations in Tanzania last month. At 4 PM on August 29, four columns of fighters from Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) converged on a Sudanese military base at Wad Banda, Kordofan province. The rebels occupied Wad Banda for several hours, leaving before sundown with captured weapons and all the police vehicles. At first, the military denied there was a base at Wad Banda, but later acknowledged that a small group of “renegades” had been driven off by police. Two days later, the government reported 41 deaths as a result of the raid (SUNA, August 31). Both JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and the Khartoum government reported the participation of a faction from the largest rebel movement in Darfur, the Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity (SLA-Unity), but the claim was immediately refuted by SLA military commander Sulayman Marjan (Sudan Tribune, August 31).

JEM Fighters

The raid followed a similar operation in early August in which JEM and a coalition of rebels targeted the garrison responsible for guarding Darfur’s sole rail link to Khartoum. During a brief occupation of the town of Adila, JEM seized numerous vehicles and heavy weapons, many of which were probably used in the Wad Banda raid. Both attacks were led by Abd al-Aziz Ushar al-Nur Ashr, a Darfur field commander who has returned from east Sudan, where JEM carried out military operations against Khartoum in alliance with the Beja Congress. It was not the first such attack on Kordofan; last year, JEM combined with other rebels to raid Hamrat al-Shaykh in northern Kordofan (al-Sahafa, July 4, 2006).

The Sudanese government responded by treating the attack on Wad Banda as part of an external threat to Sudan’s stability. The minister of the interior, Professor al-Zubayr Bashir Taha, told the remaining police at Wad Banda that “plots by the colonial powers” would be defeated. The governor of North Kordofan added that unity was needed to thwart “international conspiracies” against Sudan (Sudansafary.net, September 2). The next day, a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum denied any U.S. links to the rebels, deploring the loss of “innocent life” (Sudansafary.net, September 3). According to the rebels, Wad Banda served as a supply depot for government and militia attacks on civilians in south Darfur. JEM complains that Sudanese MiG-29s and antiquated Antonov bombers continue bombing civilian targets in Darfur in violation of a UN Security Council resolution (particularly following the raid on Adila).

JEM is usually regarded as a Zaghawa-dominated movement, based on the semi-nomadic African tribe that straddles the Chad/northern Darfur border. JEM leaders are probably the most experienced and sophisticated of all the many rebel movements in Darfur, giving the movement a weight unjustified by its numbers. Many Zaghawa became skilled and innovative desert fighters during the Chadian civil war and the campaign against Libyan garrisons in northern Chad. The conflict in Darfur is, in part, a reflection of the growing assertiveness of the Zaghawa, who already dominate the government in Chad. In Sudan, the Zaghawa now present a commercial challenge to Arab dominance of the economy. Zaghawa factionalism, however, has prevented the development of a unified Zaghawa movement. In recent months, JEM has made efforts to broaden its ethnic base, including sacking the group’s military commander, who was accused of favoring the Zaghawa.

Even after signing peace agreements with rebel movements in the south and the east, Khartoum is faced with a deteriorating situation in the west. In an unsettling development, some Darfur Arabs (including janjaweed defectors) have begun to take up arms against the government, forming new rebel fronts or joining existing groups of African Muslim rebels. Combined with JEM’s new military offensive, Khartoum risks losing its grip on Darfur before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping mission in January.

This article first appeared in the September 11, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Andrew McGregor

May 18, 2006

Could a United Nations peacekeeping mission face al-Qaeda fighters in Darfur? According to Osama bin Laden, if a UN force deploys in the region, al-Qaeda will attack UN troops. On April 23, al-Jazeera television broadcast a Bin Laden audiotape in which he called for al-Qaeda fighters to begin traveling to Darfur to prepare for a “long-term war against the Crusaders,” an apparent reference to the UN force (controlled by the United States in Bin Laden’s mind) that could replace the ineffective African Union mission in the region. The commander of the United Nations Mission in Sudan has announced that the UN force is treating Bin Laden’s threat with “whole seriousness” (Sudan Tribune, April 26). The Sudanese government is doing everything possible to prevent a large-scale UN deployment in Darfur, but this sudden offer of al-Qaeda assistance is surely unwelcome in Khartoum.

Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi

Bin Laden in Sudan

Bin Laden’s presence in Sudan from 1991 to 1996 was enabled by Hassan al-Turabi, the country’s leading Islamist, widely regarded at the time as the real (and unelected) power behind the presidency. Times have changed in Sudan, however. Al-Turabi’s influence on the government waned long ago. His one-time deputy has usurped his position, and al-Turabi has spent most of the last few years in prison or under house arrest. To add to his woes, he has been accused of heresy for his recently declared liberal views on the role of women in Islamic society. Al-Turabi made many enemies in his ruthless pursuit of an Islamic state in Sudan, and they will surely now circle in to take their revenge. The government has seen changes as well; under the provisions of the peace treaty with the South, Southern Sudanese Christians now occupy leading positions in the administration. They are no fans of al-Qaeda.

Most Sudanese do not admire the Wahhabist-style Islam espoused by al-Qaeda. Their Islam is based on the proud Sufi lodges, whose form of worship is violently opposed by al-Qaeda. While al-Turabi and others have had some success in their efforts to radicalize the population, most local Muslims will tell you that Sudanese Islam is in no need of improvement by outsiders. Not everyone in the Khartoum regime shared al-Turabi’s fondness for al-Qaeda. When Bin Laden was in Sudan, the suspicious Mukhabarat (secret service) took note of every move and utterance by Bin Laden and his associates. Attempts were made to turn thousands of pages of intelligence over to the United States after Bin Laden was deported in 1996, but the Clinton administration refused to have anything to do with a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

Despite his sojourn in Sudan, the al-Qaeda leader appears poorly informed about the country. He describes the conflict in Darfur as tribal differences cleverly manipulated by the United States to “send crusader troops to occupy the region and steal its oil under the guise of preserving security there.” In doing so, Bin Laden ignores all the environmental, economic, political, ethnic and religious factors behind the current war. His suggestion that “crusader” forces are trying to “steal” Darfur’s oil resources under the pretext of peacekeeping is absurd. Sudan’s main oil industry is located in Upper Nile Province and is already owned by a Chinese-Malaysian consortium. It will take much more than a peacekeeping force to change that. The Sudanese/Swiss ABCO corporation claims that preliminary drilling in Darfur revealed “abundant” reserves of oil, but it appears that the rights may have already passed into Chinese hands (AlertNet, June 15, 2005; Guardian, June 10, 2005).

China has emerged as the Sudanese regime’s protector on the UN Security Council, and may use its veto to prevent the formation of a UN force in Darfur. China has been quietly active in Sudan for decades, developing a close relationship with the current regime. Sudan already provides 10 percent of China’s petroleum imports. Any attempt by the “crusaders” to bring Sudanese petroleum reserves under Western control could cause friction with China.

Bin Laden also claims that the Sudanese government has abandoned Shari’a law, which is surely news to everyone in Sudan. His assertion that the southern separatist/nationalist movement was sponsored by Great Britain after independence defies historical reality. Ironically, in view of his own failure to grasp regional issues, Bin Laden calls on the mujahideen to learn everything they can about Darfur, for “it has been said that a man with knowledge can conquer land while land can conquer the ignorant.”

Unwelcome Jihadis

One of the two main Darfur rebel groups, the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), is allied with al-Turabi, yet even they have rejected Bin Laden’s appeal. A JEM spokesman declared that “Bin Laden is still preaching the theory of an American-Zionist conspiracy when the real problem comes from Khartoum, which is a Muslim government killing other Muslims” (Sudan Tribune, April 23). JEM’s rival group of rebels in Darfur, the much larger Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), has gone even further, declaring that Bin Laden’s intent is to “exterminate the peoples of Darfur.” The Sudanese government dismissed Bin Laden’s appeal, announcing that Sudan would not play host to terrorists. Government spokesmen also declared that a decision to replace African Union forces with UN troops “is not going to be imposed on Sudan” (Sudan Vision Daily, May 8).

The regime of President Omar al-Bashir has bought time to implement its Darfur policy by aligning itself closely with the United States in the war on terrorism. Sudanese intelligence provides valuable information to U.S. security services, knowing that the U.S. desire to protect its homeland overrides human rights concerns in distant states. It is a calculating approach that requires considerable finesse, taking what one can, but never going too far. Allowing al-Qaeda back into the country is not just a step too far, but a jump into the volcano, particularly at a time when Washington appears to be taking a harder line on Khartoum.

It is unlikely that any UN force will be deployed without the permission of the Sudanese government. There will be difficulties in the mission, but the Sudanese government’s aims in Darfur have been largely realized, and it is unlikely that any international force will be entrusted with the job of restoring lands seized by the Janjaweed militias to the dispossessed tribes. The peace agreement’s call for the Sudanese government to supervise the disarmament of the Janjaweed is the main reason for the refusal of Abdul-Wahid Muhammad al-Nur’s faction of the SLA to sign the document (Asharq al-Awsat, May 9).

With desertification sterilizing the traditional grazing lands of the Darfur nomads who supply the bulk of Janjaweed manpower, it will prove nearly impossible to cast the militias and their families back into the desert, regardless of their crimes. Some Janjaweed leaders (like Shaykh Musa Hilal) are already appealing for peace in the interests of consolidating their gains. In the meantime, discipline is breaking down in the African Union force, which has not been paid in two months (Daily Trust, Abuja, May 8). The commander of the AU troops, Major General Collins Ihekire, has called for a quick deployment of UN troops to reinforce the AU mission, whose mandate has been extended until the end of September (IRIN, May 9).

Conclusion

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has displayed little interest in exporting Islamic revolution beyond Sudan. That was al-Turabi’s mission, and the president has already threatened to execute him. Similarly, al-Bashir has no interest in hosting a group of armed foreign Islamists who could threaten his regime and whose presence would isolate Sudan internationally. Bin Laden’s declared aim of disrupting the North-South peace agreement is completely at odds with the aims of the regime. Sudan is exhausted by war, and there is oil to be pumped from the wells of the South. The abandonment of the Sudanese government’s jihad in South Sudan was recognition that war is bad for business.

Bin Laden qualified his offer of support by noting that it was not his intention to defend the Khartoum government, for “even though our interests may be mutual, our differences with it are great.” How can Bin Laden send fighters to aid a regime that he just announced he does not particularly support? What does Bin Laden expect will happen to them once they arrive? If this message is genuinely from Bin Laden, it suggests that the terrorist leader is desperately searching for a cause to sustain his movement. There is a crime in Islam called fitna; it means creating discord among Muslims, and it is one of Islam’s greatest offenses. Bin Laden apparently believes that sending Muslims to disrupt peace treaties negotiated by (and between) other Muslims is a suitable aim for his movement. With or without the peace treaty in the works in Abuja, neither Sudan’s government nor the Darfur rebels desire the assistance of al-Qaeda. Should Bin Laden’s followers head to Darfur, there is no doubt a hot reception awaits them.

This article first appeared in the May 18, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor