Category Archives: Pakistan

U.S. Drone Attack in Bajaur Tribal Agency Riles Pakistan

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Andrew McGregor

May 20, 2008

A missile attack by a CIS-controlled Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on May 14 has created a political firestorm inside Pakistan that threatens to derail ongoing peace negotiations between frontier region tribal militants and the Islamabad government. The missiles struck a two-room hujra (male guesthouse) in the Bajaur Agency village of Damadola where around 30 militants—reportedly including locals, Mahsud Waziris, Mohmandis and Arabs—had gathered for a dinner (News International [Islamabad], May 16; Daily Times [Lahore], May 17). A series of explosions are reported to have followed the attack, suggesting the hujra was being used to store arms or explosives (Geo TV [Karachi], May 16). The strike has reinforced Pakistani perceptions that the United States opposes local peace negotiations that may ultimately free tribal militants to cross the border to aid allied Taliban groups in Afghanistan. The attack was the fourth of its type this year, but the first since Pakistan’s new democratically elected coalition government took power six weeks ago.

Bajaur agencyLocal Security: The Bajaur Scouts

Identification of the dead is difficult due to the physical damage caused by the missiles and the fact that the site was secured by a throng of militant tribesmen until the bodies of suspected militants were carried off for secret burial elsewhere. Civilian bodies were left for local funerals, at which angry tribesmen shouted anti-American slogans. Claims for the number of fatalities from the attack range between eight—the Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) estimate, which may include only militants—and 30. A Pakistani government official suggested a mid-level Arab militant may have been killed in the strike (Reuters, May 17). The brother of Mohmand Agency Taliban leader Khalid Umar was also reported among the dead (Daily Times, May 17; Dawn, May 15). Some politicians have claimed that only innocent tribesmen were killed or injured (News International, May 16).

TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar denied that any foreigners or senior Taliban leaders were present at the dinner, while warning: “The Taliban never forget their enemy, which must be clear to everybody” (News International, May 16).

Large protests demanding the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States followed the attacks in Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies (Daily Times, May 17). Bajaur Agency parliamentarians warned U.S.-led NATO forces to cease attacks on Pakistan or face retaliation (Daily Times, May 16). North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Owais Ahmed Ghani described the strike as an “attack on the sovereignty of Pakistan” (Associated Press of Pakistan, May 16). The strike was also condemned by new Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani.

Inter-Services public relations director Major-General Athar Abbas announced the Pakistani military’s opposition to the attack: “The U.S. did not take permission or inform us before carrying out the strike… We have protested to the U.S. authorities in the strongest possible manner” (BBC, May 16).

The locally powerful Jamaat-e-Islami political party suggested that the strike could bring the collapse of peace talks with the central government intended to end a wave of devastating suicide attacks (News International, May 16). Sirajul Haq, the party’s provincial leader, asked: “What use are the atom bomb, more than one million soldiers or scores of aircrafts when we can’t stop a country from violating our geographical frontiers and killing our people?” (Daily Times, May 16).

Following the attack, the body of a kidnapped soldier of the Bajaur Scouts was found near the site with a note attached explaining that the trooper had been killed to avenge the Damadola missile attack. Pakistan’s regular forces have no presence in Bajaur Agency at the moment.

This article first appeared in the May 30, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

 

Taliban Commanders Accused of Blowing Up NATO Oil Tankers Released on Bail

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Andrew McGregor

April 23, 2008

Four Taliban commanders arrested for organizing the destruction of nearly 40 oil tankers at the entrance to the Khyber Pass on March 23 have been released on bail. The tankers were carrying fuel for NATO forces in Afghanistan when six bombs ripped through the parking lot where they were awaiting clearance to pass through the Torkham border crossing. As part of the terms of their release, the South Waziristan Taliban commanders agreed to return 50,000 gallons of fuel and two oil tankers to Khyber Agency merchants and to release two abducted drivers (Daily Times [Lahore], April 17).

JavedJaved Ibrahim Paracha (Photo – Arshad Mahmood Virk)

The bail conditions were arranged after a jirga, or council, composed of Waziristan Taliban leaders—including Mir Qasim Janikhel and Ishaq Wazir—and Zakhakehl and Qambarkhel elders met to decide the case. The four accused Taliban commanders all hail from the Janikhel Wazir sub-tribe and include Khalid Rehman. The jirga was held at the home of Javed Ibrahim Paracha, who stated he had been asked to host the meeting by Interior Affairs Advisor Rehman Malik and Interior Secretary Kamal Shah (Daily Times, April 17). The Zakhakel and Qambarkhel elders agreed to withdraw their testimony against the suspects after initially charging them with terrorism.

Paracha was an interesting choice to head the jirga. A lawyer by trade, Paracha has aided many Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects and created support networks for the families of convicted terrorists. Paracha has been imprisoned twice by Pakistani President Musharraf for his political activities and claims to have been tortured by the FBI while incarcerated. According to Paracha, they were unable to coerce him by physical means so they offered him half a million dollars to become a “bridge” between the United States and the Taliban and al-Qaeda (New Yorker, January 28). He was a member of the national assembly from 1997 to 2002 on the ticket of the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) and has built two madrassas, where the students are taught that “only Islam can provide the justice they seek” (New Statesmen, March 28, 2005). Paracha is also responsible for promoting sectarian attacks on the tiny Shiite community in his hometown of Kohat and neighboring villages (Daily Times, February 11, 2006).

There are other reports that Paracha was approached by the United States in 2005 to use his links with the militants to act as a conduit between Washington and the Taliban. At first, Paracha confirmed meeting to discuss this with State Department Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes and several U.S. military officials at an Islamabad hotel, but later stated that his visitors were “American businessmen who did ask me to help the U.S. ‘reconcile’ with al-Qaida and Taliban leaders in Afghanistan. The businessmen sought my help against anti-American feelings and for a safe exit of U.S. troops from Afghanistan under an agreement” (Daily Times, November 17; 2005; Dawn [Karachi], November 17, 2005; UPI, November 22, 2005).

Meanwhile the main highway supplying Coalition forces in Afghanistan from Pakistan continues to suffer interruptions, the latest being a six day closure last week due to fighting between Lashkar-i-Islam militants and Korikhel tribesmen resisting the militants’ attempt to impose “moral reforms” in the region (The News [Islamabad], April 19).

This article first appeared in the April 23, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Iraqi al-Qaeda Trainer in Waziristan Releases Video

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Andrew McGregor

April 16, 2008

An important but elusive al-Qaeda operative based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region has released a videotape calling for jihad against the United States and its allies until final victory (The News [Islamabad], April 9). The veteran Iraqi jihadi, Abu Kasha—also known as Abdur Rahman al-Iraqi, Abu al-Marajel, and Arab Malang—has so far been known for his secretive ways, refusing to be photographed or to give interviews to media. Addressing a group of disguised jihadis in Arabic, Abu Kasha praises Osama bin Laden during the video and warns that the death of each mujahid will be avenged by the killing of 10 Coalition troops.

Reportedly operating from Mir Ali in North Waziristan and Afghanistan’s Kunar province, Abu Kasha runs a training camp for would-be jihadis, including special instruction in suicide bombings. Al-Qaeda has vowed revenge for a strike on Mir Ali by a CIA Predator UAV earlier this year (Al-Sahab Media, February 6; Al-Jazeera, February 7). Abu Kasha has a small command of his own under two local sub-commanders, Imanullah and Haq Nawaz Dawar (Daily Times [Lahore], January 9, 2007). He is also reported to have close ties to a breakaway faction of Uzbek fighters formerly under Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader Tahir Yuldash. A Pakistani military operation against Mir Ali last summer killed 15 jihadis, including 10 Uzbeks, but failed to kill its probable target, Abu Kasha (South Asia Terrorism Portal, August 19, 2007).

This article first appeared in the April 16, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Ahmadzai Wazir Tribesmen Negotiate Return of Taliban Commanders

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Andrew McGregor

April 9, 2008

The Afghanistan Taliban are mediating ongoing negotiations for the return of Taliban commanders and Uzbek militants to the Wana region of South Waziristan after they were forcibly expelled last year by Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen under the command of rival Taliban commander Maulvi Nazir.

Maulvi NazirMaulvi Nazir

The negotiations will likely result in the return of the expelled Taliban commanders, but while Maulvi Nazir appears to have softened his stance towards the Uzbeks, their return remains strongly opposed by Ahmadzai tribal elders despite guarantees of their “good behavior” by the Afghan Taliban (Daily Times [Lahore], April 4). The Uzbeks have turned down offers to resettle in Taliban-controlled areas of Helmand and Zabul provinces, where they could be targeted by ISAF forces (Dawn [Karachi], April 5, 2007).

The Taliban commanders seeking to return—Ghulam Jan, Maulvi Abbas, Haji Muhammad Umar, Maulvi Javed Karmazkhel and Noor Islam—were all commanders under Nek Muhammad, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2004. They were well known for harboring the Uzbek militants whose predilection for violent activities—including contract assassinations—created major rifts with the tribesmen who had initially offered them refuge after being driven out of Afghanistan in late 2001. The Utmanzai Wazirs of North Waziristan have joined the Ahmadzai in their attempts to expel the Uzbeks from the region (The News [Islamabad], April 5). The Uzbeks are hardened veteran fighters who cannot easily be eliminated by any one party. They are mostly veteran members of Tahir Yuldash’s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), though rival leaders have emerged during their long exile from Uzbekistan.

As part of a peace agreement with the Pakistan government in early 2005, Maulvi Abbas, Haji Muhammad Umar and Maulvi Javed Karmazkhel were issued massive cash payments from the secret service fund to repay money they claimed al-Qaeda had advanced to finance attacks on Pakistani security forces (Dawn, February 8, 2005). Noor Islam is a Wana-based Taliban commander closely associated with Uzbek and Arab elements while Ghulam Jan is a strong opponent of Maulvi Nazir (Daily Times, January 9, 2007). Haji Muhammad Umar and Noor Islam belong to the powerful Yargulkhel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai; Maulvi Nazir is from the much weaker Ghulamkhel sub-tribe but wields considerable influence in the area due to his skills as a fighter.

At a meeting two weeks ago between Maulvi Nazir and his local rival, Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander Baitullah Mehsud, the latter told Nazir that he would not expel the Uzbek militants from the region as he had been asked to harbor them by Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani and the day-to-day commander of the Haqqani network (The News, April 5). Due to tribal animosities, the Ahmadzai and Mehsud have maintained separate Taliban commands.

 

This article first appeared in the April 9 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Fatwa in Tribal Pakistan Declares Taliban “Out of Islam”

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Andrew McGregor

March 25, 2008

A new fatwa (religious ruling) issued in the Pashtun Darra Adam Khel region of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province declares the Taliban to be “out of Islam” as a result of their violence, failure to follow Islamic teachings and takfiri ideology (the latter referring to the Salafist-jihadi practice of declaring fellow Muslims “infidels” if they oppose jihadist dogma). According to the fatwa’s author, Mufti Zainul Abidin, “The Taliban leaders consider themselves and their directives as superior to true Islamic principles and directives as ordained by Almighty Allah” (The Nation [Islamabad], March 23). The Mufti invites other members of the ulama (scholars of Shari’a law) to denounce the “inhuman and immoral” acts of the Taliban.

GunsmithsGunsmiths of Darra Adam Khel

 The fatwa singled out the pronouncements of Mufti Khalid Shah, a Taliban religious leader of dubious credentials who has attacked established Islamic scholars in a series of Taliban-issued CDs. Khalid Shah issued a statement in December 2006 urging attacks on local NGOs “promoting the agenda of the Jews and Christians” (Dawn [Karachi], December 23, 2006). This was followed by an Urdu language fatwa pasted at night on the walls of Darra Adam Khel declaring a jihad against the Pakistan government (Daily Times [Lahore], May 3, 2007). Darra Adam Khel is notorious for its thriving arms bazaar and was the scene of heavy fighting between Taliban militants and the Pakistan military earlier this year.

Islamic scholars in the region have been reluctant to oppose the Taliban publicly since the still unsolved assassination of Maulana Hassan Jan in 2007 after he declared the practice of suicide-bombing “un-Islamic” (The News [Karachi], September 16, 2007; PakTribune, September 15, 2007).

This article first appeared in the March 25, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

South Waziri Tribesmen Organize Counterinsurgency Lashkar

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Andrew McGregor

January 14, 2008

Four days after the murder of nine members of a government-sponsored peace committee in the Pakistani region of South Waziristan, tribal leaders have vowed to organize a special force of tribesmen to expel foreign militants from the region. The deceased were involved in an attempt to broker a ceasefire between government forces and local militants (PakTribune, January 7). The killings are part of a continuing rash of nighttime assassinations of tribal elders who refuse to cooperate with the Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgency against Pakistan’s central government that began in 2004. The growing violence marks the collapse of the conciliatory “Waziristan Accord” negotiated by regional governor Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai in September 2006. Orakzai resigned on January 6.

South Waziristan 1Maulvi Nazir (AP)

Maulvi Nazir—a 33-year-old tribal leader also known as Mullah Nazir—is leading the effort to take retribution for the slayings. Most of those killed in the attacks were loyal to him. A former Taliban commander believed to have connections to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), Nazir has publicly accused Baitullah Mahsud of the killings. Baitullah, appointed as the leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan coalition late last year, has also been blamed by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf for the assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, a charge Baitullah has denied. Baitullah’s ascendance as leader of Pakistan’s Taliban began with the death of militant leader Nek Muhammad in a U.S. Hellfire missile attack in June 2004. As a result of Baitullah’s alleged involvement in the murders, members of his Mahsud tribe have also been targeted by Nazir’s followers, who are members of the rival Ahmadzai Wazir tribe. The Ahmadzai are particularly strong in the western part of South Waziristan, where they control the passes and trade routes into Afghanistan. Vehicles mounted with loudspeakers have been driving around the Wana region, ordering Mahsud tribesmen to leave the area (Daily Times [Lahore], January 9). Shops and markets in the area remain closed in anticipation of renewed violence.

The killings were the result of two separate rocket attacks on the evening of January 6. The first, in the regional capital of Wana, killed three; the second, at the office of Maulvi Khanan—a close aide of Maulvi Nazir—in nearby Shakai, killed six and wounded five (Dawn [Karachi], January 8). Immediate retribution took the form of one Mahsud tribesman killed and four abducted the next day (Daily Times, January 9).

Forming the Lashkar

Thousands of angry tribesmen assembled in a jirga (a tribal meeting to consider important issues) on January 9. Malik Ghaffar, a tribal chief, declared that one man from each house should gather the following day to plan a course of action (Dawn, January 9; Daily Times, January 10).

A lashkar is a body of tribesmen formed as a war party to deal with a particular incident. This may be in response to a family feud, a tribal clash or in reaction to a specific government policy. The size of the lashkar is in proportion to the perceived degree of threat [1]. In this case the lashkar will be formed from 600 armed tribesmen. According to tribal elder Meetha Khan, “The lashkar will give two options to those sheltering the foreigners, either to stop sheltering them and return to their tribe, or face the eviction of their families from the area” (AP, January 10).

Situation in South Waziristan

South Waziristan is one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of western Pakistan, a region where the central authority of Islamabad is very weak. The region was also highly resistant to British colonial rule, has little infrastructure and is difficult to reach or travel through.

Despite the presence of at least 80,000 soldiers from the regular army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps in the region, government control remains light, and is administered through a series of colonial style political agents. Sharia law is enforced through self-appointed leaders like Maulvi Nazir. Technically the area is officially subject to the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a colonial holdover that still incorporates the concept of collective responsibility, which has long been abandoned in most parts of the world. The Ahmadzai, for example, were fined $95,000 in 2004 for failing to stop rocket attacks on federal security forces (BBC, March 4, 2004). Demolition of homes, closure of businesses and seizure of vehicles remain common punishments regardless of the guilt of the individuals so affected. Homes in the region are built like small fortresses, increasing the difficulty of rooting out militant suspects. Violation of the integrity of these homes is regarded as a major offence, while the death of an individual in security operations inevitably leads to a vendetta (badal).

The IMU in South Waziristan

The Ahmadzai believe that the assassins of the elders are Uzbek militants from the community of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters who crossed into South Waziristan from Afghanistan in 2001. Led by Tahir Yuldash, the Uzbeks had been allowed by the Taliban to take refuge and set up training camps in Afghanistan after a number of setbacks in their Central Asian jihad. Initially trained and led by Uzbek veterans of the Soviet armed forces, the Uzbeks are skilled fighters who have taken on security duties for the al-Qaeda leadership in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Since their arrival the Uzbeks have established successful farms and businesses as well as integrating into the local community through intermarriage. By doing so, the Uzbeks have availed themselves of the powerful local custom of melmastia (“hospitality”), which involves the protection of the host party against all attempts to harm or seize the guest. At the same time the Uzbeks have become involved in local vendettas as guns-for-hire and are blamed for much of the violent crime in the region. This has resulted in a number of violent battles between tribesmen and Uzbek fighters in recent years. Already well-known in Afghanistan as a Taliban commander, Maulvi Nazir made his reputation locally by leading tribesmen in successful attacks against the Uzbeks last year, driving most of them from the Wana Valley in April 2007. The Uzbeks have developed especially close ties to members of the Mahsud tribe but are no longer united under a single leader.

Tribal Differences and Rivalries

There are indications that the murders of the Ahmadzai leaders may be part of an intra-clan struggle for leadership of the Ahmadzai. According to one report, Maulvi Nazir’s brother and rival, Noorul Islam, has claimed responsibility for the attacks as retaliation for Maulvi Nazir’s alliance with the government and his initiation of a war against the Uzbeks. According to Noorul, “Maulvi Nazir is the government’s agent and he will pay a heavy price for killing mujahideen” (Udayavani, January 10). Not all members of the Mahsud tribe support Baitullah’s growing feud with the Ahmadzai: a jirga of 80 Mahsud elders met with Baitullah’s followers on January 8 to try to defuse a potentially devastating tribal war.

Nazir is a member of the small Kakakhel sub-clan of the Ahmadzai and achieved dominance over larger and traditionally stronger groups within the tribe such as the Zalikhel clan and the Yargulkhel sub-clan through the political and military support of the Afghan Taliban and the ISI. There are other local Taliban leaders, however, like Hajji Umar—a Yargulkhel and brother of the late Nek Muhammad—who oppose Maulvi Nazir.

Conclusion

Even though Baitullah Mahsud has denied involvement in the assassinations of the Ahmadzai elders, his men continue to attack Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan. A rocket attack on a security post at Chugmalai on January 7 killed one and injured three. Three security men were abducted the next day near Mouli Khan Sarai (Daily Times, January 9; Udayavani, January 10). Security forces responded with mortar attacks on Mahsud targets. Militants have also cut off food and water supplies to the security forces’ fort at Laddah (Dawn, January 8). Interim Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz announced that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and the Pakistani army have begun a joint operation to take Baitullah Mahsud alive in order to “trace his accomplices,” but denied rumors that foreign agencies would take part in the hunt (Daily Times, January 8). There have been reports in U.S. newspapers in the last few weeks that the Bush administration was considering inserting U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives into the tribal regions of Pakistan (NYT, January 5; Washington Post, January 6).

It would be a mistake to regard Maulvi Nazir as either pro-Washington or pro-Islamabad. Nazir acts in his own interest, those of his clan and those of his tribe and will ally himself with anyone he perceives may further those interests. His extended family owns property on both side of the Afghan-Pakistani border and he travels freely between the two without interference from the Afghan Taliban. The apparently impending explosion of violence in the Waziristan frontier region will only create further instability that can be exploited by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Note

  1. Sher Muhammad Mohmand, The Pathan Customs, Peshawar, 2003, p.42

 

This article first appeared in the January 14, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Pakistan Launches New Offensive in Balochistan

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Andrew McGregor

June 27, 2006

Since the forcible annexation of the Baloch Khanate of Kalat by Pakistan in 1947, the Balochistan region has seen a succession of revolts against political centralization and resource exploitation. Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, but is sparsely populated with only six million people. A low-level insurgency in the last two years has seen a mixture of indiscriminate bombings and targeted attacks on the region’s energy and transportation infrastructure. The nationalist militants are divided into several factions, the largest of which is the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Balochistan mapThe region is a strategically important territory with considerable mineral, gas and petroleum wealth. Little of the wealth now produced in Balochistan has found its way back into the province, which remains badly underdeveloped and faces a major financial crisis even as new natural gas discoveries continue. As a result, pipelines and other energy installations have been primary targets of Baloch nationalists. President Pervez Musharraf’s government has recently committed large sums for development projects, but some distrustful Baloch nationalists view these as further efforts at “colonization.”

Although Islamabad’s accusations of foreign assistance to the Baloch insurgents typically omit naming suspect countries, Pakistani security services apparently fear the intervention of agents from their traditional Indian rival, as well as others from certain Gulf states said to be unhappy about the opening of a new port in the Baloch coastal town of Gwadar. Balochistan’s society is remarkably insular, however, and is unlikely to fall under the thrall of what Balochis call “outsiders.”

The Dera Bugti and Kohlu regions are the centers of the insurgency and government counter-terrorism operations. The latest outrage was a June 12 terrorist bombing in the city of Quetta that killed five and wounded 17. Nearly all of the casualties were Balochis. The provincial governor suggested the involvement of “foreign hands” and vowed that he would not compromise with opponents of Pakistan’s “national integrity” (APP, June 12). In response to the attacks, helicopter gunships are again being deployed in the region, painful reminders of the havoc caused by these weapons on the civilian population during the bitterly fought 1973-1977 insurgency. Many of the region’s politicians are calling for their withdrawal.

On June 15, 12 members of the BLA were arrested on charges of terrorism. They are alleged to have carried out a series of bombing and rocket attacks under the direction of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, an important chieftain (Daily Times, June 16). Jets and helicopter gunships followed up with attacks on armed tribesmen in the Kohlu region. Gunbattles between insurgents and security forces were also reported in the Dera Bugti region (Dawn, Karachi, June 15). Nawab Bugti claimed that the government attacks killed 17 civilians but no militants (Pajhwok Afghan News, June 14).

Balochi fighterBalochi Fighter (Friday Times)

Government plans to build military bases in Balochistan to secure valuable energy resources are seen as the imposition of a foreign occupation force (Balochis are a rare element in Pakistan’s armed forces). The former commander of Pakistan’s armed forces, General Jehangir Karamat, has warned that a prolonged military presence in Balochistan would be “counter-productive” (Dawn, June 4). The leader of the Pashtun minority political party, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, claims that the presence of the army and Pakistan’s ISI has turned Balochistan into “a prison cell.”

The Karachi regime has hit back on the political front. An arrest warrant has been issued for the leader of the Balochistan National Party, Sardar Akhtar Khan Mengal, who is accused of kidnapping government intelligence agents. The BLA was declared a terrorist organization (under the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act) on April 10. General Musharraf has denounced all talk of Baloch “rights” or “sovereignty” as “provocations” (PakTribune, May 23).

There are also government fears that Balochistan is being used as a transit point for foreign militants on their way to join al-Qaeda or Taliban forces active in Pakistan’s northwest frontier. Four Turks and one Afghan were arrested on June 22, attempting to cross from Balochistan into the neighboring province of Waziristan, home of a fierce tribal/Islamist insurgency against Pakistani security forces. The five detainees are accused of ties to the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda terrorists (Pajhwok Afghan News, June 23). After their interrogation, another 11 Afghan nationals were arrested for “possible links” to “al-Qaeda sleeper cells” (Daily Times, June 24).

The Baloch nationalist movement still suffers from tribal and personal enmities and has failed to present a united front. Although accusations have been made that al-Qaeda suspects are harbored in Balochistan, the region has never been known for religious extremism, unlike neighboring areas to the north. The Baloch “liberation movement” still retains a nationalist focus. The Musharraf government appears willing to discuss economic and development issues, but is unwilling to tolerate any discussion of separatist aspirations. Despite this, many local politicians are still eager to open a dialogue with the leading militant nationalists, rather than risk another debilitating civil conflict.

 

This article first appeared in the June 27, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus