Category Archives: Somalia

Somali Islamists Target Army Chief in Assassination Attempt

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Andrew McGregor

January 14, 2010

Somalia’s al-Shabaab movement attempted to kill General Muhammad Gele Kahiye, the new leader of the government’s military forces, on January 7 in a pre-emptive strike.  The assassination attempt comes before a much-anticipated government offensive to retake Mogadishu from the Islamist militants who now control most of the city. Kahiye escaped the blast in Mogadishu’s Hodon district, but two bodyguards were killed and six others wounded (Horseed Media, January 7). Somali police spokesman Abdullahi Hassan Barise later denied Kahiye was in the car when it was hit by the mine (Radio Simba, January 7).

General Yusuf Hussein DhumalGeneral Yusuf Hussein Dhumal

Colonel Kahiye replaced General Yusuf Hussein Dhumal as commander of the Somali Armed Forces on December 6 after several weeks of debate at the highest levels of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad (Raxanreeb, December 6, 2006; Reuters, December 6, 2009). The move finally came three days after a suicide bomber killed three government ministers and many others at a Mogadishu graduation ceremony. National security minister Abdullahi Muhammad Ali remarked at the time, “This is a part of a national plan to activate the army and the security institutions ahead of intended government military operations to restore law and order” (AP, December 6, 2009).

Al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Dheere claimed responsibility for the attack, saying the group’s intention was to kill the military’s commander. “We wanted to kill the military chief to counter government planned offensives on our positions in Mogadishu and its environs” (Radio Gaalkacyo, January 7; Garowe Online, January 7). On the same day, a spokesman for al-Shabaab’s Islamist rivals, Hizb al-Islam, denounced the government at a Mogadishu press conference for what he described as an impending government military offensive designed to retake Mogadishu, which several TFG ministers have promised to do by the end of the month (Shabelle Media Network, January 7). The spokesman, Shaykh Muhammad Moallim Ali, suggested that the government forces planned to begin with assaults on Mogadishu’s Bakara arms market and the Elasha Biyaha settlement south of Mogadishu (Mareeg, January 7).

Several hours after the failed assassination, al-Shabaab militants launched a mortar attack on the presidential palace in Mogadishu. Government forces retaliated with artillery fire directed at Mogadishu’s Yaqshid neighborhood, a reputed al-Shabaab stronghold (AFP, January 7). Some 20 civilians were killed in the shelling, which was reported to have hit a number of houses and some children playing soccer (Mareeg, January 7; AFP, January 7).

This article first appeared in the January 14, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Opposition Group Promises Attacks Following Sanctions on Eritrea for Support of Terrorism

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Andrew McGregor

January 7, 2010

Tensions continue to rise in the volatile Horn of Africa as Eritrean insurgent groups promise a new wave of political violence following the imposition of UN sanctions against Eritrea for its alleged support of terrorism in the region. Eritrea is strategically located on the Red Sea, sharing borders with Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti. A former Italian colony, Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia in 1962, sparking a long and bitter struggle for independence that concluded in 1991 with the expulsion of Ethiopian forces. According to the 1997 constitution, Eritrea is supposed to be a parliamentary democracy with an elected president, but the constitution has not been implemented and elections have never been held. In practice, Eritrea is a one party state, ruled by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) under President Isaias Afewerki, an Orthodox Christian and former leader of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Afewerki has been the nation’s sole president since 1993.

Eritrea 1Ethnic Map of Eritrea

The Security Council Sanctions

The text of the December 23 Security Council resolution accuses Eritrea of “efforts to destabilize or overthrow” the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. The resolution also calls on Eritrea to withdraw its troops from the border with Djibouti, where they are deployed to pressure Djibouti in a longstanding territorial dispute, calling their deployment “a threat to international security.”  Resolution 1907 was approved with 13 votes in favor, one vote against (Libya), and one abstention (China). The sanctions provide for travel restrictions for Eritrean political and military leaders, the freezing of Eritrean assets abroad and an arms embargo on Eritrea. An earlier Security Council resolution, no. 1862, followed fighting between Eritrean and Djiboutian forces in June 2008 and called on Asmara to withdraw its forces from the disputed region along the border, but no action was taken by Eritrean military forces to comply.

The new resolution was drafted by the Ugandan government. Uganda is the main source of troops for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is now nearly the only armed support of consequence for the TFG. Isaac Musumba, the Ugandan Minister for Regional Cooperation, said Eritrea “provided sanctuary to international criminals. It is a rogue state” (New Vision [Kampala], December 29).

According to Dr. Ilmi Ahmad Du’alem, the UN envoy to Somalia, the sanctions were based “on proof that Eritrea supports terrorism… Eritrea supports [terrorist groups opposed to the Somali government]. Arms, material and moral support to these groups are delivered through Eritrea. Eritrea is the headquarters, and most of the [Somali] opposition is still in Eritrea… There were resolutions before the current one, warning Eritrea to end these actions” (Radio HornAfrik, December 29, 2009).

Eritrea’s Role in Somalia

Islamist opposition group Hizb al-Islam (composed largely of the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia led by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys), a former partner of al-Shabaab, condemned the sanctions, noting that while other countries were intervening in Somalia, no sanctions had been imposed on them (Mareeg.com., December 24, 2009).

An Ethiopian government spokesman suggested the “international delinquent state of Eritrea” was “promoting and abetting terrorist forces in the region.” A statement from the Eritrean Foreign Ministry described the resolution as a “brazen act” based neither “on fact nor on the provisions of international law. It constitutes a travesty of justice and amplifies the dangers inherent in a unipolar world.” The statement identified Britain, the United States and Uganda as the principal forces behind the resolution:

“It must be stressed that the accusations against Eritrea for involvement in Somalia have never been substantiated or verified… Indeed, how can Eritrea provide logistical support to armed groups in Somalia when it does not have a contiguous border with that country? Eritrea has neither the political will nor the financial clout to bankroll armed groups in Somalia… The United States has simply employed its preponderant influence to ram through unjustifiable sanctions against a small country” (Shabait.com, December 23, 2009).

The Eritrean ambassador to the UN, Araya Desta, said, “The Security Council has decided to impose sanctions on Eritrea based on fabricated lies, mainly concocted by the Ethiopian regime and the US administration” (New Vision [Kampala], December 28).

Strangely enough, the sanctions imposed on Eritrea for supporting al-Shabaab came after senior Shabaab member Shaykh Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur” issued a threat to Asmara in October, saying Eritrea opposed the implementation of Shari’a law in Somalia because its leaders were not Muslims. The shaykh added that the non-Muslim regime was ruling the Muslim majority in Eritrea by force (AllPuntland.com, October 31, 2009). It is difficult to assess the reasoning behind this threat, though there are several possibilities:

• Eritrea has ended its support to al-Shabaab in favor of rival Islamist group Hizb al-Islam.

• Al-Shabaab may be doing a favor to the Eritrean regime by publicly denouncing it before the sanctions proposal could be introduced at the UN Security Council.

• The threat may be yet another in a series of self-defeating moves by the increasingly fanatic Shabaab movement.

Eritrea’s envoy to the United Nations described the allegations of military support for groups fighting in Somalia as “lies and propaganda,” indicating that it is archrival Ethiopia that is responsible for fueling the conflict in Somalia, as well as causing instability in the region by occupying lands belonging to its neighbors, including Eritrea (Dayniile, December 20; AllPuntland, December 2, 2009).

Eritrea 2DMLEK Leader Cornelius Osman

Eritrea’s Armed Opposition Threatens the Regime

One of the many Eritrean opposition groups saw an opening in the UNSC sanctions. Cornelius Osman, leader of the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunama (DMLEK) said, “This is a good opportunity for us. We are preparing our military forces to launch more attacks. We are inside Eritrea and will hit selected targets and institutions.” The DMLEK chief added that the freeze on foreign assets and travel ban on Eritrean political and military leaders would isolate the regime and “deter it from receiving the hundreds of millions of dollars it gets” annually from the Eritrean diaspora (AFP, December 29, 2009).

DMLEK is a member of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), an opposition umbrella group based in Ethiopia. The movement, based on the Kunama people, was formed after Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1991.The Kunama are a Nilotic people related to the Nilotic tribes of South Sudan, but in Eritrea they represent only 2% of the population. The Kunama live near the Ethiopian border between the Gash and Setit rivers, an area that has placed them between opposing Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. Another even smaller Nilotic group known as the Nara has formed its own opposition movement – the Eritrean Democratic Resistance Movement Gash-Setit, under Ismael Nada.

DMLEK has claimed a number of small attacks against Eritrean government forces or facilities. Some sense of the scale of these attacks can be gained from examining DMLEK statements:

• In November 2007, DMLEK forces attacked a military outpost at Melezanai, claiming to have killed 15 soldiers and wounding five others. An administrative office at Shambaco was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade (DMLEK Military communiqué, November 8, 2007).

• In January 2008, DMLEK claimed to have destroyed the government’s agricultural office in the town of Binbilina along with goods stored in a warehouse. In the same operation, a water truck and tanker were set ablaze in the town of Barentu (Walta Information Center, January 30, 2008).

• In March 2009, DMLEK claimed to have destroyed a military hospital in the southwest region of Gash-Barka with RPGs, hand grenades and small arms (Sudan Tribune, March 23, 2009).

A North American-based Kunama group has undertaken a campaign to depose Cornelius Osman as the movement’s leader. The group accuses Osman of “kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing and killing a lot of innocent, educated and knowledgeable Kunama” and acting as an agent of the Eritrean government. They claim many Kunama fighters have deserted the organization. [1] Osman addressed the accusations in a Paltalk discussion with members of the Eritrean diaspora. While he did not deny the extra-judicial killings, he identified the victims as “rogue elements” working for the PFDJ regime to sabotage the Kunama movement (Awate.com, November 8, 2009).

The Armed Opposition

There are strong regional, religious, cultural and linguistic divisions in Eritrea. This situation is reflected in the many national and diaspora opposition groups. The Eritrean regime is dominated by members of the Tigrinya ethnic group, who form 50% of the population in Eritrea. Most Tigrinya are Christians, though a minority are Muslims. Many of the opposition groups are based on ethnic minorities that feel excluded from the Eritrean power structure, such as the Afar, the Kunama and the Nara. Regardless of the extent of their military activities, all such opposition groups are termed “terrorists” by the Asmara regime. Most opposition groups oppose what they regard as the “Tigrinization” of the country as well as the nationalization of lands traditionally held by ethnic minority groups.

The large number of opposition groups has so far prevented the emergence of an effective armed opposition to the Asmara regime, but lately this problem has been addressed by the formation of three larger coalitions (Gedab News/Awate.com, February 25, 2007). Last June, DMLEK joined the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO) to form the Democratic Front of Eritrean Nationalities (DFEN). At the conclusion of a two-day congress, DFEN declared its intention to work under the umbrella of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) and called on all of Eritrea’s armed opposition groups to coordinate their efforts. The new alliance also called on Eritrea’s Tigrinya to turn against the regime (Gedab News/Awate.com, June 19, 2009). The three main opposition coalitions are preparing a unity conference in Addis Ababa with the intention of forming a single armed opposition front with the aid of Ethiopian authorities (Nharnet, December 25, 2009; Sudan Tribune, December 30, 2009).

Eritrea maintains a massive defense establishment at considerable cost. Universal conscription of both men and women is used to provide the numbers that the government feels necessary to maintain in expectation of a further conflict with Ethiopia. Nevertheless, conscription is unpopular and desertion is common. DMLEK maintains that the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) have been “weakened by the economic and political crisis in the country as well as internal resistance” and are fleeing to neighboring countries whenever they get the chance (Walta Information Center, November 21, 2007). There are roughly 180,000 Eritrean refugees living in Sudan, which occasionally sends some asylum seekers back to Eritrea (Sudan Tribune, September 25, 2008).

Conclusion

Opponents of the government make regular efforts to tie the regime to Iran and its alleged support for terrorism in an effort to depict Eritrea as a regional threat (see Terrorism Monitor, April 3, 2009).  Typical of this is a recent and unconfirmed story carried on an Arabic-language opposition website that described the offloading of a weapons cargo from an Iranian ship in the port of Massawa under the supervision of representatives of al-Shabaab, the Houthist rebels of northern Yemen and an unnamed Djiboutian insurgent group (Adoulis, December 24). Such efforts are likely to increase as the opposition seeks international support beyond the usual support it receives from Addis Ababa.

For the moment, none of the Eritrean insurgent groups or coalitions appear strong enough to topple the PFDJ government, which has built a strong security structure to ensure its survival. If the opposition succeeds in forming a single front, it may receive military and financial support from the many enemies of the Eritrean government. An outbreak of political violence and even civil war in Eritrea has the potential to drag in Eritrea’s neighbors (particularly Ethiopia) and further inflame the conflict in Somalia and the low-level Afar insurgency in Djibouti, the site of a major American military base.

This article first appeared in the January 7, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Fallout from Mogadishu Graduation Bombing Ripples through Extremists and Government Alike

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Andrew McGregor

December 23, 2009

The sight of the black flag of the highly feared al-Shabaab organization being burned in the streets of Mogadishu by enraged Somalis was not something the leaders of the radical Islamist group hoped to see at this stage of their struggle for control of Somalia. The street demonstrations against al-Shabaab that followed the brutal December 3 suicide bombing of a graduation of medical students in Mogadishu were unprecedented in a nation where the only political opinions taken seriously are those expressed by gunmen.

RaageAl-Shabaab Spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage (Center)

One protest leader remarked, “Everybody assumed [al-Shabaab members] were fighting foreigners and the government, but we realized on Thursday [December 3] that they are at war with us; it was the last straw. They are killing our best and brightest. They are the enemy” (IRIN, December 11).

The attack by a suicide bomber dressed as a woman that killed 23 people, including badly needed medical graduates, parents, professors, journalists and three cabinet ministers of Somalia’s hard-pressed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), may be the start of a reversal of fortunes for the Islamist rebels of al-Shabaab, who have diverted resources from their assault on the TFG to fight Sufis and fellow Islamists alike over the last year. The movement is increasingly seen as an occupation force, with news of its imminent arrival in a certain town or region inevitably preceded by a rush by civilians to leave the area first.

Soon after the bombing came the dismissal of the TFG’s police commander, Abdi Hassan Awale, and the TFG military commander, Yusuf Hussein. Kenyan police have intensified their patrols of Nairobi’s largely ethnic-Somali suburb of Eastleigh, with reports of over 80 arrests in two days (Reuters, December 6).

Though few in Somalia doubt al-Shabaab’s responsibility for the attack, noting that al-Shabaab is the only Somali group using suicide bombers, the movement’s spokesman, Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage (a.k.a. Shaykh Ali Dheere), quickly blamed the government itself for the attack, which appears to have been designed to kill the three TFG cabinet ministers. “We have no relation to this attack – it is from the enemy… We know that some so-called government officials left the scene of the explosion just minutes before the attack. That is why it is clear that they were behind the killing… We do not target innocent people” (Raxanreeb.com, December 4; al-Jazeera, December 3).

Local investigations revealed that the suicide bomber was a 26-year-old Copenhagen native and Danish citizen of Somali descent named Abdurrahman. Formerly known for nightclubbing and playing football, Abdurrahman began to change his behavior several years ago, withdrawing from his friends and former activities before deciding to return to Somalia in June 2008 “to study Islam” (Somaliweyn Media Center, December 10).

According to the TFG Speaker of Parliament, Shaykh Adan Muhammad Madobe, “It is unfortunate that a child whose parents escaped Somalia’s conflict and raised him in Europe came home with extremist ideologies and blew himself and innocent people up” (Reuters, December 11). Abdurrahman left his pregnant wife behind in the Somali coastal town of Marka, an al-Shabaab stronghold (Mareeg Online, December 11; Somaliweyn Media Center, December 10).

There are also reports of a change of leadership within al-Shabaab, but these remain unconfirmed. Djibouti’s Foreign Affairs minister, Mahmud Ali Yusuf, told an al-Sharq al-Awsat reporter on December 8 that Comoros Islands native and long-time al-Qaeda operative Fazul Abdullah Muhammad had taken over control of al-Shabaab from Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane (a.k.a. Abu Zubayr), who has been less visible than usual since he was seriously wounded in a suicide bomb-training incident in May (Garowe Online, December 8; Mareeg Online, December 8). Though Fazul Abdullah may have stepped up in the organization after the death of fellow al-Qaeda operative Salah Ali Nabhan in a September U.S. missile strike, it seems unlikely that the leadership of al-Shabaab could be taken over by a non-Somali. The movement has not confirmed the report or made any announcement regarding a change in leadership.

 

This article first appeared in the December 23, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

African Union Peacekeepers Warn of al-Qaeda Presence in Somalia

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Andrew McGregor

December 15, 2009

The hard-pressed Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are the last line of defense for Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which now controls only a few neighborhoods of Mogadishu. With the recent defeat of rival Islamist militia Hizb al-Islam, the radical al-Shabaab movement has emerged as the main challenger to the TFG.

AMISOMAMISOM Armor in Somalia

The African Union’s special representative for Somalia, former Kenyan MP Wafula Athanas Wamunyinyi, has issued dire warnings of an al-Qaeda takeover of Somalia, “considering the grip they have on the country” (New Vision [Kampala], December 3). Wamunyinyi says al-Shabaab has recruited 1,200 fighters in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and the United States. “With the involvement of foreign fighters, we need to adopt a new approach towards the conflict in Somalia, away from the perception that these are clans fighting.” Kenyans are reported to represent half this force, being recruited from the same ethnic-Somali community in northeast Kenya that the TFG is also drawing on for recruits (New Vision, December 4).

Wamunyinyi claims that al-Qaeda is operating training camps in Somalia, and named several foreigners who now hold leading positions in al-Shabaab:

• Saudi Arabian Shaykh Muhammad Abu Fa’id is the group’s financier and “manager.”

• Abu Musa Mombasa is a Pakistani who has replaced the late Saleh Ali Nahbhan as the head of security and training operations for al-Shabaab.

• The American Abu Mansur al-Amriki heads the finance and payroll department of the foreign mujahideen.

• Sudanese national Mohamoud Mujajir is in charge of suicide bombing operations (New Vision, December 3).

A Ugandan AMISOM officer, Major Bahoku Barigye, reported that he had personally spoken to three al-Shabaab members from Uganda, who said they knew where he lived in Kampala and threatened his family. One of the militants told Major Barigye he was a member of the Alliance of Democratic Forces, an Islamist militant group that has operated along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 1996 (see Terrorism Monitor, December 5, 2007).

AMISOM commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha (Uganda), is less emphatic regarding al-Qaeda’s physical presence in Somalia. “I think there’s a relationship between activities here and al-Qaeda… There’s mutual support and I think the way they behave is similar” (AFP, November 28).

The question is whether reports of a substantial al-Qaeda presence are intelligence-driven or politically inspired as a means of obtaining greater military and financial support for a mission that is badly undermanned and underfunded. Still 3,000 troops short of its mandated force of 8,000, AMISOM will soon receive reinforcements from Djibouti; but Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and Sierra Leone have yet to send the units they promised.

This article first appeared in the December 15, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Whose Islam? Factionalization in the Somali Islamist Movement

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Andrew McGregor

 A speech delivered at the conference – “The Changing Strategic Gravity of al-Qaeda,” National Press Club, Washington D.C., December 9, 2009

There are many forces at work in Somalia today that are intentionally or unintentionally tearing the country apart. Already afflicted by the scourges of clanism, tribalism, and separatism, Somalia is now being divided by the one factor that has always united it in the past – religion.

President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmed (Reuters)

With some exceptions, such as the Muslim Brothers, political Islam in Somalia is social activist rather than intellectual in nature. None of the militant Islamist movements in Somalia have produced any comprehensive statement of ideals and methods, least of all al-Shabaab, whose internal and external political program appears to consist largely of issuing threats against their opponents and neighbors. President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad appears to be one of the most thoughtful of Somalia’s Islamists, yet he has been strikingly unsuccessful in presenting a political program capable of capturing the imagination of Somalis. His implementation of Islamic law in Somalia means little so long as the TFG [Transitional Federal Government] controls only a few neighborhoods in Mogadishu.

In Somalia, the application of Islamic law in all legal matters is a major innovation. Until recently Somalis followed a customary law known as “Heer,” administered by elders rather than the government. Shari’a was reserved for family and inheritance cases. The imposition of Shari’a thus represents an extension of central authority into an essentially stateless society. The hasty implementation of Shari’a, however, has been done without the establishment of any consensus regarding the school of Islamic jurisprudence to be followed, among many other unsettled issues. Islamic law in south Somalia remains in the hands of the gunmen of the various armed opposition groups, who apply their own interpretation of Shari’a on an improvised basis.

Al-Shabaab’s Islam is of the Takfiri variety – in other words it seeks out all those who disagree with its crude variety of Salafism and condemns them as infidels. Needless to say, this is very polarizing and creates more enemies than friends, particularly in a country in which Salafism is a recent and unfamiliar intruder. This inflexibility in matters of religion is the main reason al-Shabaab has not yet taken Mogadishu and expelled the Transitional Federal Government. Instead of taking the capital last year, al-Shabaab chose to carry out a series of needless and unprofitable provocations against the vast Sufi religious community in Somalia, sparking the creation of a formidable Sufi militia dedicated not so much to the preservation of the TFG, as to the eradication of al-Shabaab. The Sufi militias are the militant expression of those Somalis who reject the introduction of the unfamiliar and untraditional Salafism promoted by al-Shabaab’s leaders.

Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys (Biyokulule)

The Takfiri approach of declaring a Muslim an apostate is based on a 13th century fatwa by Shaykh Ibn Taymiya, which declared an approaching but nominally Muslim Mongol horde as insincere in their allegiance to Islam, giving the Mamluk regime of Egypt and Syria the license they needed to combat fellow Muslims.  Al-Shabaab uses the apostate designation liberally, compelling Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader of rival Islamist movement Hizb al-Islam, to condemn the “careless” and “detrimental” use of the term after al-Shabaab began applying it to Hizb al-Islam leaders. According to one such leader in the Juba region [Shaykh Abdinasir Serar], “al-Shabaab are after us because they regard us as infidels and they believe that anyone who opposes their policy has deserted the religion.”

In Sufi-dominated Islamic societies it is customary for the graves or tombs of noted Sufi shaykhs to become shrines and even places of pilgrimage for members of the Sufi orders. Salafists condemn this practice as un-Islamic and a violation of monotheism. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has engaged in the destruction of tombs belonging to venerated Sufi “saints.” In early December, 2008, al-Shabaab destroyed the tombs of several Sufi shaykhs in Kismayo, claiming Somali Sufis were worshipping the dead rather than God.

Again this year, just as al-Shabaab seemed ready to expel the TFG, it turned against its ally, the Hizb al-Islam Islamist militia, breaking its power-sharing agreement in the port of Kismayo. When the larger Hizb al-Islam movement objected, al-Shabaab began diverting resources to a new conflict with their former partners. A large al-Shabaab offensive in South Somalia in recent weeks has driven many Hizb al-Islam fighters out of the Juba valley across the border into the ethnic-Somali region of northeast Kenya. At the same time, the Sufis have mounted their own offensive against al-Shabaab in the adjacent Gedo region.

What separates al-Shabaab from the other movements in Somalia is the relentlessness of its attacks; Shabaab assassins are everywhere, tossing grenades into meetings of its rivals, gunning down politicians or driving bomb-laden vehicles into various security headquarters with devastating results. Two attempts have been made on the president this fall alone. Even mosques have become the target of bombs and grenades, a disturbing trend that follows patterns already seen in Iraq, Pakistan and Sudan. This ruthless tactical approach, which takes little heed of the lives of innocents, is beginning to resemble the worst excesses of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq – an explosion of almost senseless brutality inflicted on fellow Muslims.

In mid-November, Hizb al-Islam officials met with senior religious scholars in Mogadishu to examine ways of having the scholars play a more active role in resolving the conflict. The meeting was something of a breakthrough, since Hizb al-Islam is only one of a number of Islamist factions, including al-Shabaab, that have routinely ignored the fatwa-s of the religious scholars calling for an end to the fighting in Somalia. Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys, has given the TFG a list of demands to be met if Hizb al-Islam is to join a coalition government, an action sure to incite his partners in al-Shabaab, who refuse to have anything to do with the government in Mogadishu. Unfortunately for the shaykh, his power base is melting away as his followers turn their weapons over to al-Shabaab or flee to Kenya.

While al-Shabaab has received the verbal support of the core al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi, there are others in the Salafi-Jihadi movement who have cautioned al-Shabaab about their divisive approach.

After Hizb al-Islam and al-Shabaab came to blows over custody of two French intelligence agents snatched from their hotel in Mogadishu earlier this year, jihadi websites carried a long posting from so-called “Honest Scholars of Islam” advising the mujahideen to avoid disagreements and internal divisions. In their words; “Nothing is more harmful to jihad than division and conflict… You should know that uniting your ranks, words, and groups is more effective against the enemies of God almighty than dozens of operations… Beware of being lured into side battles that will exhaust you, weaken your power, disperse your efforts, and distract you.” The focus should remain on preparing for victory and empowerment. The scholars ask the Somali mujahideen to look to the future; if division and conflict occur now over the ruins of Mogadishu, “Imagine what will happen if you start fighting over money, leadership and power…?”

Shaykh Hamid al-Ali

Kuwait’s Shaykh Hamid al-Ali, one of the leading voices of Salafist ideology, says that the mujahideen must make greater efforts to win the Somali people over to their side. They must inform the people of their aims, and assure them that they are merely the continuation of the Islamic Courts Union, that ruled briefly in 2006, with, as Hamid al-Ali says, “reason, wisdom and righteousness.” Addressing al-Shabaab’s tendency to resolve all disputes by force, al-Ali reminds them that; “Power is used when it is needed and wise political action also has its place.”

Hamid al-Ali insists the transitional government of Shaykh Sharif is only an “Islamic façade” for a regional American plan. The president has added Islamic figures to his government, but these scholars either do not know the truth about him or have deceived themselves into thinking they will find the solution to Somalia’s troubles within “the framework of the ‘Muslim-American’ plan,” as he calls it. He compares the African Union force protecting the president to the NATO forces that guard the palace of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. According to the Shaykh, the president’s implementation of Shari’a was only an attempt to buy time until AFRICOM can achieve its objectives in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Jordanian Salafi-Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the former mentor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, condemns Shaykh Sharif as an agent of the Antichrist [al-Masih al-Dajal] whose version of paradise is an “American hellfire of AIDS, moral deterioration, economic corruption, social ruin, and rejection of God`s laws.” The remarks followed the Somali President’s attack on the terrorist and takfiri tendencies of al-Shabaab. According to al-Maqdisi, the American campaign against terrorism is nothing less than “a war on Islam and jihad.” He rejects criticism of al-Shabaab’s unpopular implementation of severe hudud punishments for violation of Islamic law, citing a saying that applying one hudud sentence is better for the people than a week’s worth of rain. He goes on to describe the Saudi Wahhabi scholars who reject the “exaggeration and extremism” of al-Shabaab’s version of Islamic jurisprudence in favor of a faith of mercy and compassion as advocates of the Khawarjite ideology of deception and distortion. In al-Maqdisi’s view, Shaykh Sharif has irrevocably tainted himself through association with non-believers, calling on Muslims in Somalia and elsewhere to announce their support for al-Shabaab.

Earlier this year, Osama bin Laden issued an appeal to the people of Somalia to rise up and overthrow the government of Shaykh Sharif. There are other Islamists, however, who question these short-sighted calls for political violence. A leading member of Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood [Dr. Kamal al-Hilbawi] said, “We want to know the form of government that bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri want in Somalia. They are neither satisfied with HAMAS, nor the Muslim Brotherhood organization, or the moderate leader, Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad.” Somalia’s Muslim Brothers have in turn been criticized on Salafist web forums. The Muslim Brothers opposed the Islamic Courts Union and all the active militant Islamist groups, favoring gradual and moderate Islamic reforms over political violence. One jihadi ideologue [Dr. Akram Hijazi] suggested the Brothers’ peaceful approach was designed to allow them to conserve their strength before sweeping in to seize power from other Islamist movements that have exhausted themselves fighting foreign interference.

The chairman of the Somali Sufi movement [Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Muhieddin] recently described al-Shabaab as “misguided people who have misunderstood the true values of Islam.” By contrast the Ahlu Sunna wa’l-Jamaa Sufi movement is defending a way of life threatened by, as he put it, “al-Shabaab’s madness.” For now the Sufi movement promises to lay down arms as soon as al-Shabaab is eliminated, but armed movements tend to take on a life of their own. The Sufi militants are looking for military support and training, but complain none has been forthcoming. Despite this, the Sufis have a formidable nationwide network and are determined to avenge al-Shabaab’s destruction of the tombs and shrines of their saints.

One of the most egregious examples of sectarian violence in Somalia came in August when five Pakistani preachers were killed and two wounded in an attack on a mosque in central Somalia [Galkayo]. The preachers were recently arrived members of the Tablighi Jamaat, an international conservative Islamic movement based in Pakistan. The growth of the socially conservative Tablighi Jamaat in Somalia has come largely at the expense of the local Sufi orders, but the Sufi Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a denied being behind the murders, as did al-Shabaab. For the Tablighis, the incident was a bitter reminder of the Ethiopian slaughter of 11 Jama’at members at a Mogadishu mosque in 2008.

And what about the loyalties of the actual gunmen? Continuing defections from one group to another suggest that, in typical Somali fashion, clan identification, belonging to the political group in the ascendance and a steady income are more important factors than ideology. The TFG claims to have received a number of defecting senior al-Shabaab commanders in recent weeks, as a result of these officials having come to the conclusion that the TFG is indeed an Islamic government. President Sharif has acknowledged his government is doing everything possible to widen the rift between Hizb al-Islam and al-Shabaab, though the unintentional result of this policy may be a stronger al-Shabaab.

This sudden explosion in Islamic sectarianism in Somalia will almost certainly extend the ongoing conflict and will present a formidable roadblock to a negotiated settlement, virtually the only hope for resolution in a nation where no single force seems capable of assuming control.           

Perspectives on the Future of the Somali Jihad

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Andrew McGregor

November 13, 2009.

For nearly a year now, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has been waging a life or death struggle for survival against the repeated assaults of a radical Islamist opposition; an opposition that remains unsatisfied with the appointment of a fellow Islamist as president and the implementation of Shari’a as the law of the land. Led by the former leader of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, the TFG has little effective control over the country outside of a few Mogadishu neighborhoods, despite backing from the United States, the United Nations and the African Union (AU). Members of the TFG work under the constant threat of assassination, keeping many parliamentarians outside of the country. The Islamist militants demonstrated their reach in a bombing that killed the Minister of Security, Colonel Umar Hashi Adan, in Hiraan province last June (al-Jazeera [Doha], June 19; al-Arabiya [Dubai], June 18). Possible directions for the future of the Islamist insurgency in Somalia are offered below.

Somali JihadAl-Shabaab

Leadership of Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen

The leadership of Somalia’s Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (Youth Mujahideen Movement) appears to be in a state of flux at the moment. The movement’s reclusive leader, Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” (a.k.a. Ahmad Abdi Aw Muhammad, a.k.a Shaykh Mukhtar “Abu Zubayr”), was seriously wounded in May when a suicide bomb went off prematurely in a safe house where an al-Shabaab meeting was being held (Garowe Online, May 18, May 20; Waagacusub.com, May 18). Little has been heard of him since. Only days after the blast, the public face of the movement, Shaykh Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur,” was replaced by Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage (a.k.a. Shaykh Ali Dheere) (Radio Simba, May 21; Shabelle Media Network, May 22). No explanation was offered for the sudden change and Mukhtar Robow briefly faded from public view before reappearing with a statement threatening the administrations of semi-autonomous Puntland and Somaliland, a self-declared independent state (AllPuntland.com, October 31). He was then reported to have appeared at an anti-Israel demonstration in Baydhabo, where he announced that there would be a hunt for anyone who holds Israeli citizenship or who might be Jewish (Puntland Post, October 31). Though there are no public signs of enmity, there is always the possibility that Godane’s death or prolonged incapacitation could set off a power struggle within the Shabaab leadership.

Factionalism in the Islamist Opposition

The Hizb al-Islam movement, led by Shaykh Dahir Aweys, is the successor to Shaykh Aweys’ earlier organization, the Eritrean-based Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia – Asmara (ARS-Asmara). While Hizb al-Islam is larger than al-Shabaab, the latter is better organized and possibly better equipped. At the moment, Hizb al-Islam operates as an ally of al-Shabaab in the fighting in Mogadishu, though there are differences between the two groups that could erupt into open warfare at any moment. There have already been skirmishes between the groups.

Al-Shabaab’s Salafist orientation has brought it into conflict with Somalia’s Sufis, who have responded to the desecration and destruction of their shrines and places of pilgrimage by forming their own formidable militia, the Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a. With Sufis rather than Salafists representing mainstream Islam in Somalia, al-Shabaab has created a determined enemy that is unlikely to cease fighting until the radical Islamists have been defeated.

Internationalization of the Somalia Conflict

Reflecting its narrow vision of what constitutes righteous rule, al-Shabaab has, in the last year, threatened all of its neighbors as well as Burundi, Uganda, Ghana, Israel and the United States. The conflict already has an international element, with Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deeply involved in the active defense of the TFG, Ethiopian troops conducting cross-border incursions after a lengthy and costly occupation of Somalia, and U.S. airstrikes being launched on terrorist targets. The TFG has also issued appeals for neighboring countries, including Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen, to send troops to Somalia to bolster the government (al-Jazeera, June 22).  It is clear that the TFG has little local support it can rely on and would quickly collapse without international backing.

Al-Shabaab is active in fundraising and recruitment of Somali diaspora groups in Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and the United States (NRC Handelsblad, November 13).  While these activities have not yet escalated to politically-motivated violence, the possibility exists, particularly as al-Shabaab becomes more vocal in its threats to Western states. The recent arrest of three Somali men accused of targeting a military installation in Australia with a suicide attack has alarmed other nations hosting large Somali communities (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, August 7).

Al-Shabaab has pledged retaliation against the United States in response to the mid-September airstrike that killed al-Qaeda suspect Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan (Daily Nation [Nairobi], October 8). Though direct retaliation is probably beyond the means of al-Shabaab, it is entirely possible that its agents in the American diaspora could arrange some kind of internal attack by young people sympathetic to the Islamist cause in Somalia. Al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Abdi Ahmad Godane has made clear the international ambitions of the movement: “We will fight and the wars will not end until Islamic Shari’a is implemented in all continents in the world and until Muslims liberate Jerusalem…” (AFP, May 13). For the moment these goals may exceed the grasp of a movement that has yet to take Mogadishu.

What Will Happen in Somalia in the Event of a Shabaab Victory?

•    Popular support for the movement (which is difficult to gauge but certainly does not include a majority of Somalis) would inevitably diminish due to the movement’s ordinances against popular pastimes such as watching soccer or chewing qat, as well as the movement’s affection for hudud punishments for violations of Shari’a, such as stonings, amputations, beheadings and whippings. Though Shari’a law has already been implemented in Somalia, al-Shabaab is only interested in its own interpretation, one not shared by a majority of Somalis.

•   Shabaab’s foreign connections will work against them. Shabaab’s international ties are all with non-state actors, none of which will be of any assistance in running a state. On the contrary, these ties will invite embargoes and other sanctions. International isolation and the suspension of humanitarian aid are likely outcomes for an organization which has referred to UN aid agencies as “enemies of Islam.”

•   The movement’s revanchist program to establish a “Greater Somalia” places it immediately at odds with every one of Somalia’s neighbors. Any attempt to expand Somalia’s borders as part of the development of an Islamic Caliphate in the Horn of Africa would require full national support, in the absence of which disaster would surely befall the movement and the nation. Al-Shabaab’s revanchism would quickly mobilize regional opposition.

•   Civil war with Puntland and Somaliland would quickly follow an al-Shabaab victory in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks on autonomous Puntland and self-declared independent Somaliland have already introduced political violence into these pockets of Somali stability. Shabaab’s declared intention is to bring both regions under the control of an Islamist caliphate, a program with almost no popular support in these two regions. With Puntland and Somaliland already embroiled in a bitter and occasionally violent border territorial dispute, the possibility of a three-sided civil war exists.

•   Continued fighting with Ahlu wa’l Jama’a would be a near certainty with al-Shabaab hardliners appearing to have won the internal debate over the wisdom of deliberately antagonizing Somalia’s vast Sufi community through the continued destruction and desecration of Sufi shrines, graves and places of pilgrimage.

•   Though al-Shabaab has cooperated with Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys’ Hizb al-Islam militia on the Mogadishu battleground, the Shabaab leadership has serious differences with the ambitious Shaykh Aweys and would likely prefer to exclude him from any Islamist administration. If Shaykh Aweys could keep his fighters from going over to al-Shabaab, further intra-Islamist fighting could be expected.

•   Having very little influence with Somalia’s tribal elders, the movement has little expectation of resolving existing clan disputes or preventing the eruption of new ones, leaving little hope that the movement could impose stability without a massive increase in violence.

•   Without a core of technical experts or experienced administrators, the inability of al-Shabaab to carry out the basic administrative functions of a national government would inevitably lead to the collapse of the regime, leaving Somalia in perhaps an irreparable state.

•   The return of Ethiopia’s military would be a real possibility. The rise of Islamist forces in Somalia is likely to increase ethnic-Somali resistance to Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden region. If Addis Ababa has a choice between fighting the war in Somalia or their own in eastern Ogaden province, it will choose Somalia, especially if further U.S. arms and training are made available. The United States would like to act through a proxy in Somalia rather than open a new front in the War on Terrorism through direct military intervention.

•   The possible effect of an al-Shabaab victory on the piracy situation is difficult to gauge. In the past al-Shabaab has expressed its opposition to piracy, even attacking a party of pirates at one point, though this was just as likely to be inspired by clan rivalries or a dispute over distribution of ransom money. Since most pirate activity emanates from Puntland, an al-Shabaab victory in Mogadishu might have little impact unless the movement acts to invade Puntland and end its semi-autonomous status. This would bring al-Shabaab into direct contact with the armed forces of neighboring Somaliland and an almost inevitable confrontation that would stretch al-Shabaab’s supply lines and capabilities in a region where they have little influence.

•   An al-Shabaab victory would represent a major blow to African Union (AU) peacekeeping efforts. The AU mission to Darfur could be described as having a mixed record at best – in Somalia it has only been through the commitment of Uganda that AMISOM has survived. Though the mission has been bolstered by the addition of Burundian troops, it is still severely undermanned and subject to greater stress than ever since the AMISOM mandate was changed to provide for military action against the insurgents in Mogadishu. In the event of a TFG collapse, AMISOM troops and equipment (including artillery and armor) would have to be quickly evacuated, a capability the AU does not possess. With little peace to keep, the AU peacekeepers face daily combat losses and are subject to suicide bombings even in their own camps, such as the one that killed 17 Ugandan and Burundian soldiers on September 17, including the mission’s second in command, Major General Juvenal Niyoyunguruza of Burundi. The attack was retaliation for the U.S. airstrike that killed al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan (New Vision [Kampala], September 17; Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 18). ).

•   An al-Shabaab victory would present jihadis in other theaters with a temporary morale boost, but a large scale movement of jihadis to Somalia is still unlikely. Somali clannishness and factionalism are anathema to hardcore jihadis, who are in the habit of placing organizational needs and group identity over personal or tribal needs and identities. Lack of infrastructure and modern communications will inhibit rather than enhance international operations based in Somalia. The prevailing xenophobia of many Somalis does not offer the same sort of welcome and refuge al-Qaeda found in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. Southern Somalia also offers a possible trap for global jihadis, as seen from the experience of the ICU in December 2006, when Ethiopian troops on land and U.S. ships at sea squeezed the ICU fighters towards a reinforced Kenyan border. Getting out of Somalia could be much harder than getting in if an international effort is mobilized against al-Shabaab.

•   A mass exodus of Somali civilians would surely follow an al-Shabaab victory, leading to a further humanitarian crisis that might require international intervention. Already parts of Mogadishu have been largely depopulated and Somali refugees make desperate attempts to reach Yemen daily on craft that are barely seaworthy. With most land borders closed to refugees, smuggling people out of Somalia has become one of the few growth industries in Puntland, the closest point to Yemen.

•   In the event of an al-Shabaab victory, the movement may ironically rely on Somali factionalism for its survival. Much the same way as the TFG only survives due to the inability of the Islamist opposition to unite effectively, al-Shabaab could survive for an extended time because of the inability of the anti-Islamist opposition to unite.

Conclusion

Despite international support, the TFG of President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad appears to have little chance of survival. Almost continuous pressure from the armed Islamist opposition threatens to undermine the current administration, sending it to the same fate as the failed administrations of former President Abdullahi Yusuf and the earlier Transitional National Government (TNG) of Abdiqasam Salad Hassan. With little hope of relief from the apparently incessant warfare in south and central Somalia, there are signs that further attempts will be made to carve out independent, locally-ruled mini-states along the lines of Puntland and Somaliland. Combined with the entrenchment of clan rivalries and interference from neighboring states, regional interests and international powers, prospects for the establishment of a united Somalia at peace with its neighbors are disappointingly slim.

This article first appeared in the November 13, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Shabaab Blamed for Assassination of Military Commander in Disputed Somali Region of Sool

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Andrew McGregor

November 6, 2009

Violence in the strategically located Somali city of Las Anod continues to threaten a new round of warfare in a region that has largely evaded the interminable fighting consuming Mogadishu and southern Somalia. Las Anod is the administrative capital of Sool region, one of three Somali regions at the center of a territorial dispute between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and the autonomous Somali region of Puntland.

Las AnodColonel Osman Yusuf Nur, commander of Somaliland’s 12th infantry division, was killed in a November 1 roadside bombing that appeared to target his vehicle (Shabelle Media Network, November 1). The Colonel was on his way to visit the scene of an earlier explosion in Las Anod when a remote-controlled bomb blew up his vehicle, killing as many as five other members of his entourage. There were reports that troops rushing to the scene opened fire on civilians gathering at the scene of the bombing (Garowe Online, November 2).

The bombing came at a time of high tension in Las Anod as the dispute between Somaliland and Puntland over the regions of Sool, Sanaaq and Cayn (SSC) heats up, with reports of clashes between Somaliland forces and Puntland militants in Sanaag region at the end of October (Waaheen, October 29). Hundreds of Las Anod residents have also taken to the streets to protest the presence of Somaliland troops, who were reported to have fired on the stone-throwing demonstrators in response, wounding two (Shabelle Media Network, November 2; Garowe Online, November 2; Mareeg Online, November 2). The town was placed under curfew and over 20 individuals arrested in connection with the bombing.

The day before the assassination, former al-Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur” threatened Somaliland and Puntland with invasions by al-Shabaab due to their failure to implement Shari’a (AllPuntland.com, October 31). It was the first statement from Mukhtar Robow since he was replaced as the movement’s spokesman in May (see Terrorism Monitor, June 4). Only three days before the attack, Somaliland’s president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, called for war against al-Shabaab, which is led by Somaliland native Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr.”

To date, there has only been one claim of responsibility for the bombing, coming from one Burale Yusuf, who claimed the act was carried out by a heretofore unknown anti-Somaliland group, the Jabarti National Movement. Burale escaped an early morning raid on his house in Las Anod by Somaliland police forces, though tribal elders quickly organized a press conference to reveal Burale is known as an insane person in the community and was completely incapable of organizing such an attack (Somaliland Press, November 3).

While suspicion has fallen on al-Shabaab, the radical Islamist group is far from the only suspect in the bombing. Besides the radical Islamists, there is also the Northern Somali Unionist Movement (NSUM), which opposes the secession of Somaliland and its control of the SSC region (n-sum.org, May 14).

There is also the Somali Unity Defense Alliance (SUDA) of Colonel Abdi Aziz “Garamgaram” Muhammad, a pro-Puntland militia which has committed several attacks on Somaliland security forces since its formation earlier this year (Garowe Online, November 9).  Garamgaram is a former commander in the militia of notorious warlords and accused war criminal General Muhammad Said Hersi Morgan, known as “the Butcher of Hargeisa (the capital of Somaliland)” for his brutal campaign in the region in the late 1980s against opponents of dictator Siad Barre. SUDA has been described as the military wing of NSUM (Maanhadal.com, November 19, 2008).

Another armed pro-Puntland group determined to liberate the disputed territories from Somaliland’s rule was formed in Nairobi in October by Puntland politician Saleban Ahmad Isse and Colonel Ali Hassan Sabarey (Jidbaale.com, October 11; Somaliland Press, November 2). In January 2008, former Puntland president Adde Musa Hersi declared his government’s intention to resume control of Las Anod (Somalinet, January 15, 2008).

Though the SSC region falls within the boundaries of the former British Somaliland, which Hargeisa used in determining the borders of Somaliland, the majority of its citizens belong to the Darod/Dhulbahante clan, which has close ties to Puntland. Hargeisa’s rule over the regions has proven increasingly unpopular since it sent its troops in 2007 to expel Puntland forces that had been present in the area since 2003. The Dhulbahante made a brief effort in 2008 to form an autonomous state from the three regions to be known as the Northland State of Somalia, though some members of the clan support Hargeisa’s rule.

This article first appeared in the November 6, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Somali Militants React to U.S. Airstrike with Threats and Roundup of “U.S. Spies”

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Andrew McGregor

September 25, 2009

Fallout from the September 14 U.S. Special Forces raid on an al-Shabaab convoy in southern Somalia continues, with various Islamist factions vowing revenge strikes while pro-government militias approved of the killing of al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and a number of senior al-Shabaab members.

NabhanSaleh Ali Saleh Nabhan

Convinced that an inside source directed American helicopter gunships to the convoy, al-Shabaab organized an emergency meeting of its leadership in Mogadishu, where they decided to launch an investigation of anyone suspected of having links to Western countries. This could develop into a divisive obsession, as many of al-Shabaab’s fighters and leaders have not only lived in the West, but have also obtained citizenship in these countries.

Shaykh Hassan Abdullah Hirsi al-Turki announced to media sources in the Islamist stronghold of Kismayo that 15 Islamist fighters had been arrested for spying on behalf of the United States and other Western countries. Mu’askar Ras Kamboni, an Islamist insurgent group closely tied to al-Shabaab, claimed to have discovered a substantial Western intelligence network that had penetrated the Islamist insurgent groups. Digital cameras and other items were seized from a number of fighters (Radio Gaalkacyo, September 16).

On September 16, al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage (a.k.a. Shaykh Ali Dheere) declared that the group would strike U.S. government targets in retaliation for the raid, saying the strike would only provide the movement’s fighters with increased motivation. Two days later, two vehicles bearing UN markings drove unchallenged into the heart of AMISOM’s main base in Mogadishu. When the suicide bombers detonated their payloads, 9 AU peacekeepers and TFG soldiers were killed, with the toll later rising to 21 as the seriously injured succumbed to their wounds.  Among those who lost their lives were 12 Ugandans, five Burundians and four Somalis (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 18; Daily Monitor [Kampala], September 22).  Gun battles broke out in several places in Mogadishu after the blast. Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Shabaab. “We have got our revenge for our brother Nabhan. Two suicide car bombs targeting the AU base, praise Allah” (al-Jazeera, September 18).

The leader of Hizb al-Islam, Shaykh Hassan Dahir al-Aweys, said of the raid, “The enemy of Allah is targeting Muslims all over the world, it is not only Nabhan that they killed recently but they are targeting many others. Such attacks will only increase hate and violence” (AFP, September 20). Al-Aweys, whose militia is fighting side by side with al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, also called for an increase in suicide attacks.

Not all Somalis were sorry to hear of the airstrike. A spokesman for the Sufi-based Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a militia (a bitter enemy of al-Shabaab) announced that the group’s leadership was very pleased with the death of Nabhan and several senior members of al-Shabaab, adding that God had punished them. A Somali army spokesman also applauded the airstrike and called for further targeted killings of insurgent leaders (Radio Gaalkacyo, September 16).

This article first appeared in the September 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Somali Mujahideen Confirm al-Qaeda Suspect Abu Talha al-Sudani Killed Last Year

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Andrew McGregor

September 10, 2008

In a 24-minute audio statement, Salih al-Nabhan (a.k.a. Abu Yusuf), the leader of Somalia’s Shabaab al-Mujahideen movement, has confirmed the death of alleged leading al-Qaeda member Abu Talha al-Sudani (al-Sahab Media, August 31). Al-Nabhan is a Kenyan-born suspected al-Qaeda leader wanted for involvement in a Kenya hotel bombing in 2002 and an attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner in Mombassa.

Nairobi Bombing1998 US Embassy Bombing in Nairobi

Abu Talha ranked near the top of the American list of wanted terrorists since his alleged involvement in the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya, and a 2003-2004 plot to attack U.S. forces at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonier. Abu Talha was a resident of Somalia since 1993 and was married to a Somali woman. He is alleged to have played a major part in arranging financing for al-Qaeda operations in East Africa.

Al-Nabhan confirmed the death of Abu Talha al-Sudani but provided few details: “A leader was martyred while he was leading one of the battalions of the mujahideen more than one year ago: Abu Talha al-Sudani, the leader of the mujahideen in Somalia. This is the first time that we have made this public.” Though no official claim for his death was made by American officials, Time learned last year from an anonymous Pentagon official that U.S. and Ethiopian intelligence had learned months later of his death during Ethiopian airstrikes along the Somali-Kenyan border in January 2007 (Time, November 29, 2007). Abu Talha had escaped an earlier targeted attack by U.S. AC-130 gunships (Independent, January 13, 2007).

The admission of his death came in an audiotape intended to attract African Muslims to the ranks of the Somali mujahideen, especially recruits from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Chad, and Nigeria: “Here are the training camps in Somalia and elsewhere that have opened their doors so that you join them. Hence, be truthful with God, answer the call of jihad, and prefer the lasting over the perishing and the next life over the present life.” The tape opened with a greeting from al-Nabhan to “the courageous commander and my honorable leader, Shaykh Osama bin Laden.”

Referring to the recent death of Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayro in a May 1 airstrike, al-Nabhan denounces American and Ethiopian attempts to target Somali resistance leaders: “They think, may God fight them, that the martyrdom of a commander shakes the pillars of jihad. They do not know that we are longing for death; the death of the martyrs.” Al-Nabhan claims the Somali mujahideen are awaiting reinforcement from Sudan and Yemen to combat the “Abyssinian [Ethiopian] rabble” occupying Somalia.

Al-Nabhan’s exhortations to the Somali people bear some of the ruthless approach to jihad found in the writings of the late Palestinian jihadist Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), the inspiration for al-Qaeda: “It is not possible that the tree of jihad becomes steady on its trunk, except by sacrificing heads and souls cheap in the path of Allah, and the edifice of glory is not constructed, except with skulls and limbs, and indeed forfeiture, humiliation and degradation is in leaving jihad and succumbing to the colonialist Crusaders or contentment with fair [i.e. negotiated] solutions.”

The greeting to Bin Laden contained in the opening of the message raises new questions about Somali insurgent ties to al-Qaeda. Contrary to many reports that allege Somalia’s militants are closely tied to al-Qaeda if not controlled by them, U.S. ambassador to Somalia Michael E. Ranneberger has expressed reservations about a direct line of command from the al-Qaeda leadership to the Islamist militants in Somalia: “There are indications of a fairly close Shabaab-Al Qaeda connection, though it’s not clear to what extent they’ve been operationalized… Shabaab taking orders from Al Qaeda? I would say no. They are still running their own show” (Mareeg Online, September 2).

This article first appeared in the September 10 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Islamists Warn France against Military Role in Somalia

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Andrew McGregor

September 10, 2009

With al-Shabaab extremists threatening to try a captured French security advisor in Somalia under their version of Islamic law, the radical Islamist movement appears ready to provoke a French military intervention. The man is one of two Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) agents abducted in a July 14 raid on a Mogadishu hotel (see Terrorism Monitor, July 30). The other agent claims to have escaped his captors on August 26.
France - Somalia 1

DGSE Agent Marc Aubrière after His Escape (NYT)

Shaykh Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal, chairman of the Islamic Council of Amal (Hope), a former leading member of the ICU and al-Shabaab, condemned France’s military and security support for Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) on August 29, adding that any other French officials coming to Somalia will be kidnapped (Daily Nation [Kampala], August 31). On August 28, an al-Shabaab official announced that the remaining French hostage would be sentenced for spying under Islamic law.  Two days later Shaykh Bilal told Iranian TV that al-Shabaab was ready to execute their prisoner (Press TV, August 30).

The agent who escaped, identified as Marc Aubrière (probably not his real name), provided a dramatic but highly improbable account of navigating his way by the stars to Mogadishu’s Presidential Palace after escaping his Hizb al-Islam captors and evading armed gunmen shooting at him for five hours in Shabaab-controlled neighborhoods (Shabelle Media Network, August 26; Somaliland Times, August 29). More likely are reports circulating in Mogadishu that Aubrière was released after the French government agreed to a ransom. The second DGSE agent is being held by al-Shabaab, which has assured reporters that the man is heavily guarded and unlikely to escape (AFP, August 28).

A senior al-Shabaab official described the agent’s tale as absurd and accused the movement’s Hizb al-Islam allies of accepting money for the agent’s release. “Even if he escaped, how was it possible for him to walk all the way to the presidential palace without being noticed by the mujahideen?” (Hillaac, August 26). Al-Shabaab may feel it necessary to deal harshly with the French prisoner to preserve its image in light of their Islamist ally’s alleged perfidy in releasing their prisoner in exchange for a ransom (as is widely believed in Mogadishu).

France - Somalia 2

5e Régiment Interarmes d’Outre-Mer Training in Djibouti (Ministére de la Défense)

150 of an expected 500 TFG soldiers are now in Djibouti receiving military training from the 5e Régiment Interarmes d’Outre-Mer (5e RIAOM), a mixed-arms Marine regiment permanently stationed in Africa. There are reports that some of the TFG recruits were returned to Somalia for being too young (Libération, August 28). The government of Djibouti has also announced its readiness to send an estimated 500 soldiers with French assistance to Somalia to join the badly undermanned African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force (Garowe Online, September 2).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy has indicated France will not be deterred by hostage-takings. “We will mobilize to support Africa faced with the growing threat from al-Qaeda, whether in the Sahel or in Somalia… France will not let al-Qaeda set up a sanctuary on our doorstep in Africa. That message, too, must be clearly heard” (AFP, August 27).

 

This article first appeared in the September 10, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor