Andrew McGregor

August 19, 2011

A leading member of the Yemeni regime has accused prominent opposition leader Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar of responsibility for the June 3 bombing of the presidential palace in Sana’a that nearly killed President Ali Abdullah Saleh. While the President continues to recuperate in Saudi Arabia from serious burns and other injuries, his family is locked in a struggle with the al-Ahmar clan for power in Yemen. Hamid is one of ten sons of the late Shaykh Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar, leader of the Hashid tribal confederacy and founder of Yemen’s powerful and religiously conservative Islah (Reform) Party.

Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar

The accusation was made by the Assistant Secretary-General of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC),Sultan Sa’id Abdullah al-Barakani, who said “There is no longer room for doubt that Hamid al-Ahmar is the prime suspect in the sinful assassination attempt to which the president of the republic and a number of officials were subjected” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 16). Hamid al-Ahmar had earlier suggested it was actually the president’s sons and guards who were responsible for the attack (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 14).

According to al-Barakani, the investigation into the bombing had revealed the use of SIM cards belonging to Sabafon, Yemen’s biggest mobile network operator and majority-owned by Hamid al-Ahmar, who is one of Yemen’s most prominent businessmen. Hamid is also a leader of the Islah Party and is regarded by some in Yemen as Saudi Arabia’s chosen candidate to replace President Saleh in the event of Saleh’s resignation.

Though the evidence might not be described as definitive, the allegations are indicative of the bitterness that now runs between the Saleh and the Ahmar clans, Both sides appear to have left the point of no return in their struggle for power in Yemen. The al-Ahmar clan came out early in favor of Yemen’s opposition movement, but relations with President Saleh deteriorated even further when security forces attacked Hamid’s house in the exclusive Haddah neighborhood of Sana’a with artillery and rockets, killing a reported ten followers of Shaykh Hamid (al-Hayat, June 7).

Hamid al-Ahmar is considered close to Major General Ali Muhsin Saleh al-Ahmar, his next door neighbor and a defector from the government. Ali Muhsin continues to command elements of his former command, the First Armored Division, and proclaims himself the military guardian of the opposition.

When asked about the assassination attempt in a recent interview, Hamid first addressed the “crime” committed by the president and his “oppressive security organizations” in attacking the former home of Shaykh Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar and many other buildings in the Hasbah district of Sana’a during late May – early June clashes between al-Ahmar loyalists and government forces (see Yemen Observer, July 9). However, Hamid then shifted his approach and accused the president’s sons and presidential security forces for the attempted assassination while retaining the connection to the attack on al-Hasbah: “No ruler can enjoy safety unless he is just. This is not the case of Ali Salih, who has continued to shed the blood of Yemen’s sons all along his rule, and his enemies are spread across the entire Yemeni arena. Also I consider his treacherous aggression on al-Hasbah as a suicide operation, as by committing this aggression he provided the justification for the numerous sides that wanted to get rid of him… By committing the al-Hasbah aggression, Salih provided the pretext for those who wanted to target him (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 14).

State media later reported that Hamid had “implicitly declared” his family’s responsibility for the attack on the president by suggesting the attempted assassination was in response to the assault on the home of the family’s late patriarch, Shaykh Abdullah (Saba [Sana’a], August 15).

Asked if his younger brother Hamid was responsible for organizing and financing many of the anti-regime protests in Yemen, his brother Shaykh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the chief of Yemen’s Hashid tribe, replied that Hamid had “warned of a popular uprising if the regime continued with its arrogance and intransigence, closed the doors to dialogue, and refused to meet the people`s demands for change. Following the Tunisia and Egypt revolutions, the Yemeni people rose to demand their legitimate rights. If Hamid is today contributing with all the people`s sons to the success of the peaceful change revolution then this is not an accusation but an honor of which we are all proud” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 17). State media recently reported that the al-Ahmars had intensified efforts to buy the loyalty of political and tribal leaders with cash and were launching a campaign to collect donations to the Islah Party from Yemeni merchants resident in Saudi Arabia (Saba [Sana’a], August 16).

This article was originally published in the August 19, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

August 12, 2011

As if Yemen did not already face enough political, social and economic challenges in the midst of a multi-sided civil war, there are significant and not unreasonable fears in the Yemeni opposition that President Ali Abdullah Saleh has manufactured a new conflict between the state and al-Qaeda in Abyan governorate designed to ensure Western support for his continued rule. Many Yemeni political and military leaders insist the bitter and ongoing battle for the coastal city of Zinjibar (capital of Abyan governorate) is merely the culmination of a decade long policy of manipulating the al-Qaeda threat.

Yemen’s military is badly divided at the moment; some units and commanders have crossed over to the opposition, some units are engaged with Huthist rebels in northern Yemen, some (such as the Republican Guard) are devoted to crushing protestors, and still others, such as the leadership of the embattled 25^th Brigade in Zinjibar, say they are neither pro- nor anti-regime, but will fight to the death to prevent an al-Qaeda takeover.

Saleh’s regime has attempted to capitalize on the seizure of Zinjibar as a warning of what can result from the instability sweeping Yemen as a result of anti-regime protests, describing the militants as “members of al-Qaeda [who] benefit from any instability to establish their Islamic state (Yemen Times, June 2).

The Islamist Takeover of Zinjibar: Betrayal at the Top?

According to official reports, Zinjibar was taken by about 300 Islamist militants (which the government identified as al-Qaeda) in late May after two days of fighting with government forces (AFP, May 29). Residents of Zinjibar reached by Western media provided a different version of events, describing a city abandoned to militants who went on a looting spree (BBC, May 29). Only the 25^th Brigade refused to evacuate the city and was soon surrounded by militant forces. It seems that the original 300 militants received substantial reinforcements before tribal forces recently began cutting the roads into Zinjibar.

Not long after the occupation reports began to appear in the jihadist forums of the proclamation of an “Islamic Emirate of Abyan,” as declared by AQAP (Ansar1.info, March 28; al-Bawaba, March 31). The forces in Zinjibar, however, are gathered under the banner of the newly formed Ansar al-Shari’a (al-Watan [Sana’a], August 4). The exact identity of the Islamist forces in Zinjibar remains uncertain. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has not issued any statements regarding the fighting there, though government statements routinely refer to the forces occupying the city as “al-Qaeda.”

Yemen’s foreign minister, Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi, strongly denied suggestions that the government was using al-Qaeda in Zinjibar to further its own interests and collect Western funding intended for anti-terrorism activities: “It cannot be said that the state that spares no effort in fighting [al-Qaeda], is the one that planted it there” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 29).

Perhaps reflecting the level of suspicion that surrounds the Saleh regime, some commentators in Yemen’s press have rejected the notion that al-Qaeda has anything to do with the events in Abyan (al-Masdar [Sana’a], July 26). Ali Nasir Muhammad, a leading figure in the separatist Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) views the seizure of Zinjibar by Islamist militants as part of an effort to create international concern over the future of south Yemen, tarnishing in the process “the image of the southern peaceful struggle” (Ma’rib Press, July 27). Meanwhile, the Abyan Forum for Reconciliation, Tolerance and Solidarity denounced the “suspicious alliance” between the army and al-Qaeda, which it suggested was impeding “any victory over terrorism” (Aden Press Online, July 31).

The 25^th Mechanized Brigade Besieged

General Muhammad al-Sawmali, commander of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, based on the east side of Zinjibar, has been steadfast in his refusal to abandon Zinjibar in the fashion of the other security services and military units based there. The General caustically remarked: “God bless our colleagues in the Public Security, Police, and Central Security who pulled out of the governorate and left behind all their military equipment and munitions as a gift for al-Qaeda elements… I do not want to go too far and accuse my colleagues of complicity with al-Qaeda against us and I do not cast doubt about them… but we can say that it is cowardice and fear that filled them after the governor, his deputies, and directors of departments left Zinjibar” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

Islamist Militants in Zinjibar

The 25^th Brigade is considered close to Major General Ali Muhsin Saleh al-Ahmar, a powerful commander in the Yemen Army who has thrown his lot in with the opposition. In May, Ali Muhsin joined eight other generals in issuing “Statement Number One,” in which the generals accused the President of “surrendering Abyan [Governorate] to an armed terrorist group” (iloubnan.info – May 29, 2011; AFP, May 29; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 17). An intensified effort by militants to drive the Brigade from Zinjibar began on May 30.

Despite serious shortages of food and water in his garrison, the general maintains that his brigade’s “national, religious and moral duty to our God, homeland and governorate” do not permit his force to evacuate from Zinjibar (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

The Tribes Join the Battle

AQAP was once clearly subordinate to the tribes in the Yemeni power structure, but the occupation of Zinjibar by AQAP-allied militants and the flight of tens of thousands of refugees brought about a realization that the militants were now willing to operate independently of the approval or interests of the tribes. Only days before the tribal intervention in Zinjibar, Yemen’s embassy in Washington claimed that AQAP had only been able to expand its operations in Abyan through the efforts of tribal elders who had offered the militants shelter and protection while refusing to cooperate with government security units (Yemen Post, July 10).

The tribal intervention began when tribal leaders such as Shaykh Abdullah Bal’idi of Abyan’s Bal’id tribe called on members of all the local tribes, especially the locally powerful al-Fadl tribe, to unite against the Islamist militants (Akhbar al-Yawm [Sana’a], July 6). The shaykh’s appeal came from concern for local security, as he pointed out many of the militants were actually natives of Ma’rib and Shabwah governorates. Shaykh Abdullah also accused the authorities of having an interest in prolonging the fighting in Abyan (al-Watan [Sana’a], August 4). Some of the Islamists were reported to have arrived from abroad via Aden Airport as tourists before joining the ranks of the Ansar al-Shari’a (al-Hayat, August 1). General al-Sawmali maintains that many of the Islamist reinforcements in Zinjibar have arrived from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. He described his opponents as “scattered groups from various areas or even from various countries whose concern is to kill. They use religion as a tool while some of them are ignorant to a large extent concerning religion. Some of them are extremists and others are tribal elements that have no objective. They do not have a clear objective or a clear leadership. Many of them are children who have enthusiasm to fight, and some of them have been bought by money” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

By mid-July, tribesmen in the Abyan towns of Mudiyah, Mehfed and Ja’ar began pushing the militants out of their towns after seeing the devastation wrought in Zinjibar and witnessing the murder of tribesmen affiliated with the security forces (AFP, July 17).

On July 17, the Yemen Army launched an offensive involving troops from the 119^th Brigade (based in Lahj governorate), armor and rocket launchers designed to relieve the 25^th Brigade, supported by rocket attacks from naval ships offshore (Reuters, July 17). The offensive, which approached Zinjibar from the west, was joined by roughly 450 tribesmen.

One tribal leader, Shaykh Ahmad al-Rahwi, suggested that the tribesmen were uniquely qualified through local knowledge and traditional fighting techniques to engage and defeat the militants in the same type of guerrilla warfare the militants use (Yemen Online, July 15). In this matter the shaykh has the agreement of the 25^th Brigade’s General al-Sawmali: “We want these tribes to assume their role in the war against al-Qaeda because the people of the area are aware of the circumstances of their area better than the regular forces. They can also distinguish between the armed men and they know from where they have come and to which tribes they belong” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

Yemen’s Defense Ministry claimed two prominent al-Qaeda operatives, Ayid al-Shabwani and Awad Muhammad Saleh al-Shabwani, were killed in fighting on July 20, though both had been reported killed in the past (26 September.net, July 20; Reuters, July 21). At the same time, reports emerged from Zinjibar of a rift between two factions of militants, the Ansar al-Shari’a and a second faction of local Abyan fighters (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 20). Two days later, tribesmen prevented a convoy of militants from reinforcing their colleagues in Zinjibar, killing one militant and arresting ten others on the main highway leading to the city (Reuters, July 22).

Elsewhere in Abyan, tribesmen claimed to have forced al-Qaeda fighters under commander Salim al-Shayabi from the town of Lawdar on July 25, seizing a large quantity of arms and mines in the process (AFP, July 25). The town was taken after the tribesmen gave militants two days to leave (al-Hayat, July 27).  Members of the local al-Awazil tribe had held a lengthy meeting on July 18 during which it was decided to drive armed militants out of the Lawdar district, especially foreign elements (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 20). Lawdar was the scene of heavy fighting between AQAP and government forces in August 2010 (Reuters, August 22, 2010; Sep26.net, August 21, 2010; AFP August 22, 2010; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 15, 2010).

Ten militants killed in a July 25 attack on the 25^th Brigade (al-Masdar [Sana’a], July 25). The next day, a militant leader known as Sa’id Qarnoushh was one of five to ten militants killed in an on the  Brigade (Dawn [Karachi], July 26; Reuters Africa, July 26).Reports later emerged from Zinjibar of the July 27 death of wanted Saudi jihadist Abdullah al-Juwayr (a.k.a. Ibrahim al-Najdi), one of 17 militants killed in a fierce battle with Yemeni forces. Al-Juwayr was reputedly the Amir of AQAP forces in Yemen’s Hadramawt governorate and was a veteran of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was believed to be planning terrorist strikes in the capital of Sana’a (al-Hayat, July 27).

A major setback occurred on July 28 when air strikes by the Yemen Air Force killed 15 to 25 armed tribesmen supporting the military offensive, causing a temporary withdrawal of tribal forces from the battle. The airstrike also killed Lieutenant Colonel Haidara Ali of the Yemeni army. The tribesmen remained on the sidelines for two days before returning with a warning from their field leader, Muhammad al-Ja’adani: “We caution the government’s forces to be careful of another strike on our fighters. Repeating that mistake will lessen the tribes’ desire to help clear out the militants” (Reuters, August 3). Al-Ja’adani had earlier claimed that the tribesmen had given their positions to government forces before the airstrike, adding: “The regime and the al-Qaeda organization are two different sides of the same coin, and it is hard to distinguish between them” (News Yemen Online [Sana’a], July 30). On August 2, al-Ja’adani announced the tribes of the region would soon hold a council to take a determined line against the regime’s “conspiracy” against Abyan (Akhbar al-Yawm [Sana’a], August 2).

By July 20, the 119^th Brigade was involved in overnight battles in the Khamila and Dio districts of western Zinjibar. Brigadier General Ahmad Awad Hassan al-Marmi, the commander of military forces in Abyan, was killed in intense fighting in Zinjibar over July 29-30, less than a week into his new appointment. A number of other officers and tribal leaders were also killed in the battle (al-Hayat, August 1). After yet another “friendly fire” incident that wounded some 20 tribal fighters, the SMM claimed that the Yemen Air Force, U.S. forces and Yemen’s Republican Guard were deliberately targeting the tribes of Abyan using coordinates provided by the jihadis (Akhbar al-Yawm, July 31). Both before and after the incident, leaders of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform accused the regime of trying to dissolve the military-tribal alliance in Abyan to allow the militants to occupy Zinjibar (Akhbar al-Yawm, July 26; al-Sahwah [Sana’a]. July 31).

On August 1 the fighting shifted to the nearby village of  al-Khamila, where 18 militants were killed by air strikes and artillery (al-Masdar [Sana’a], August 1). A day later the 119^th Brigade killed three militants during a battle in Khamila (Xinhua, August 2). The Zinjibar garrison began receiving artillery support from the 39^th Brigade based in neighboring Dawfas, though the 39th has had to repel its own attacks from militants (Akhbar al-Yawm, August 2; al-Mu’tamar [Sana’a], August 3). Militants continue to operate in the Hassan Valley just outside of Zinjibar, with Yemeni intelligence units complaining of difficulty in tracing their movements as the militants have stopped using cellphones to communicate (Xinhua, July 29).

Drone War in Yemen

The United States has been heavily involved in air operations in Abyan, striking terrorist targets with cruise missiles, fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For now, drone operations in Yemen are conducted by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but CIA-directed drone operations are expected to begin soon, operating from a purpose-built base within Yemen or somewhere else in the Persian Gulf expected to be completed by September. U.S. drones currently operate out of the American military base in Djibouti. The U.S. administration appears to be stepping up its drone attacks in Yemen following their success in eliminating much of the militant leadership in northwest Pakistan by this method.

A June 3 American airstrike on Zinjibar killed two important AQAP members, Ammar Abadah Nasir al-Wa’eli, a veteran of Afghanistan, and Ali Abdullah Naji al-Harithi, a veteran of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq currently serving as a commander in the al-Qaeda affiliated Aden Abyan Islamic Army (Inspire 6, Summer 2011; for al-Qaeda’s Aden Abyan Islamic Army, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, November 11, 2010).

July 14 – Another U.S. airstrike on July 14 targeted a police station in the Wahdi district of Abyan, killing at least six militants, possibly including their commander, Hadi Muhammad Ali (al-Jazeera, July 14). One who escaped, however, was Fahd Muhammad al-Qusa, an al-Qaeda operative and veteran of Afghanistan who was released from prison in 2007 after serving part of his sentence for involvement in the attack on the USS Cole. Since then the Yemen government has refused to extradite him to the United States and he survived a drone attack in 2009. Most of the militants in Wahdi were believed to have moved there after being expelled by tribesmen from the Mudiyah district of Abyan.

U.S. drones killed five militants, including a field commander, on July 27 in western Zinjibar (Xinhua, July 27). American drones made a further strike on militants on August 1 near the Wahda stadium, at a site between Zinjibar and Ja’ar, and in the village of al-Khamila, roughly six miles outside Zinjibar, though there were conflicting reports claiming at least one of the three strikes was actually carried out by the Yemen Air Force (Reuters, August 1; Yemen Post, August 1). At least 15 militants were believed to have been killed in the raids, including AQAP commander Nasser al-Shadadi.

The Threat to Aden

Many of the 90,000 refugees from Zinjibar and elsewhere in Abyan have fled to the port city of Aden, which has also been subject to AQAP violence recently, including a bomb that killed a British shipping agent and a suicide attack by a Saudi militant that killed nine soldiers headed to Zinjibar on July 24 (Yemen Post, July 20).  These blows were preceded by a number of other attacks, including the car bomb killings of Colonel Mutea al-Siyani (June 29) and Colonel Khalid al-Hubaishi (June 23). Both men belonged to the 31^st Armored Brigade. Another car bomb targeted armored vehicles on June 13. The attack was carried out by a suspected al-Qaeda operative who had been briefly jailed but was release five months previously without explanation (Yemen Times, July 4; July 25). On June 20, Major General Mahdi Maqwala, the military commander of the Southern military area, narrowly escaped assassination by a car bomb planted in front of his house. Major General Ahmad Mansur al-Sawma’i, who has defected to the opposition, accused General Maqulah of planning the other attacks against the officers, whom he alleges were not on good terms with Maqulah, as part of a conspiracy to “drown Aden in a sea of blood” (Ma’rib Press, July 26).

Aden is only 35 km from Zinjibar; the latter could easily act as a base for operations against Aden if the militants are not expelled. According to General al-Sawmali, only the 25^th Brigade forms a barrier to the Islamist takeover of Aden: “If we pull out or surrender, they will enter Aden the following day and from it they will go to the other governorates” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

So far, it has only been the resistance of the 25^th Brigade in Zinjibar that has saved Aden from a similar occupation by Islamist militants. There are reports from within Aden that security forces have backed away from controlling the streets, encouraging armed individuals to wander around the city at night and hang banners promoting the Caliphate without opposition (Yemen Times, July 25). Yemen’s Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad Nasser Ahmad, admitted in early July that armed Islamists from Abyan had already entered Aden before a military cordon was built around the port (Yemen Times, July 4). As a strategic port city, Aden is normally well defended, but in the current environment it is difficult to gauge the loyalty of the troops based there or to know what orders they are acting under.

Conclusion: A Fragile Alliance

One month into the combined army-tribal offensive only slight progress can be reported. The militants are still far from being dislodged from Zinjibar, though some progress has been made on halting reinforcements from reaching them.

In the volatile political climate that prevails in Yemen at the moment, each faction in the multi-sided fighting has interpreted the events in Abyan in light of their own concerns and suspicions. Lack of a common perception of the forces and their intentions in the conflict will inevitably dissolve opportunities for negotiation and lead to prolonged hostilities.

The tribesmen of Abyan have no love for the regime, which they barely differentiate from the Islamist militants in terms of their malicious intent towards the people of Abyan governorate. While the struggle of the 25^th Brigade in Zinjibar may have aroused some admiration from the tribesmen, it is nonetheless a fact that the tribal elements are only one “friendly-fire” incident from abandoning their new alliance with a badly divided military, leaving the way open for an Islamist assault on Aden.

Though the militants in Abyan are not fighting under the AQAP banner, the large number of known AQAP operatives engaged in the struggle for Zinjibar confirms the militants are at the very least closely affiliated with al-Qaeda.

This article was originally published in the August 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

June 23, 2011

Once a main pillar of support for the regime of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, much of Yemen’s Hamid tribal confederation has now come out in open confrontation to Saleh’s teetering government.  Complicating the new political alignment is the fact that President Saleh and his clan belong to “the people of al-Ahmar,” the most powerful family in the Hashid confederation. The leader of the Hashid, Shaykh Sadiq al-Ahmar, recently told a pan-Arab daily of the reasons for the Hashid’s political turnabout and described a path out of the current turmoil, while advising President Saleh not to return from his current hospitalization in Saudi Arabia.

Shaykh Sadiq al-Ahmar

Shaykh Sadiq is the oldest of ten sons of the late Shaykh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar (d. 2008), the former Hamid chief, Speaker of Parliament and a consistent supporter of the Saleh regime. In February, Shaykh Sadiq resigned from the ruling General People’s Congress.  By March 20, Sadiq was calling for the president to resign from office peacefully (al-Jazeera, March 20).

While describing the support of the Hashid and other Yemeni tribes for the “Yemeni people’s peaceful revolution,” Shaykh Sadiq acknowledged that many of the Hashid continue to support the regime: “There are always individuals benefiting from the regime and its gifts and they are from the Hashid and other tribes.” As for those who have taken lives to defend the regime: “The blood is not forgotten until the killers are punished or pardoned by the victims’ families. Those involved are known to the Yemeni people.”

Nevertheless, Shaykh Sadiq asserts that the anti-regime protests are “a popular youth revolution and [an expression of] divine will.” He praised the discipline of the young people and tribesmen (who have ample access to weapons) in confronting the regime’s violent acts of repression “with bare chests.” However, Shaykh Sadiq has not hesitated to support the “peaceful revolution” with armed force when required. On May 24, intense fighting broke out in the al-Hasbah neighborhood of Sana’a between the shaykh’s tribal supporters and elements of the loyalist Republican Guard. The government responded to the clashes by issuing arrest warrants for all ten al-Ahmar brothers on charges of treason (al-Jazeera, May 26).

According to Shaykh Sadiq, the Hashid confederation abandoned its support of the president and his ambitious son, Ahmad Ali Saleh (commander of the Republican Guard) after it became apparent the regime was prepared to spill the blood of peaceful demonstrators to ensure the succession of the latter. This ended the sharat Mu’awiyah (Covenant of Mu’awiyah) between the Hashid leadership and the regime, which was intended to guarantee that the President’s son would not succeed him, much as the original covenant called for Mu’awiyah (602-680), the first Caliph of the Ummayad Dynasty, to refrain from appointing his son Yazid as his successor (a pledge the Caliph broke).

Threats to Yemen’s integrity from Southern secessionists and al-Qaeda militants were downplayed by the tribal leader in words that echoed accusations leveled by defecting General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar last week: “There are no fears of secession in Yemen or fears from al-Qaeda. All these are tribulations planned and propagated by the regime which turned them into a bogey.” The shaykh also believes that the political change promised by the revolution will succeed in meeting the demands of the Houthi rebels of north Yemen, as they are no different than the calls of other Yemenis for “stability, justice, security and development.”

Shaykh Sadiq would prefer to see a solution to the political crisis through the use of constitutional means (i.e. the succession of Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi in the absence of the president), rather than the establishment of a transitional council. Of the vice-president, a southerner who is unrelated to the governing clan, Sadiq says “all the Yemeni people’s sons and forces are with him. But it seems he is hesitant and we do not know the reason for his hesitation. We are in contact with him, support and back him if he leads Yemen to the shores of safety at this critical stage.”

The shaykh concluded by advising President Saleh not to return to Yemen: “If it does happen… the clashes will increase and the cycle of violence and killing between the Yemenis will widen.”

This article first appeared in the June 23, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Andrew McGregor

June 17, 2011

In a recent interview with a pan-Arab daily, Yemen’s Major General Ali Muhsin Saleh al-Ahmar claimed that President Ali Abdullah Saleh (now receiving medical treatment in Saudi Arabia after being seriously wounded in an assassination attempt) has manipulated the al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen to win international support for his increasingly beleaguered regime (al-Hayat, June 11).

Major General Ali Muhsin Saleh al-Ahmar

News of Ali Muhsin’s defection to the Yemeni opposition on March 21 took many by surprise, not least President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the General’s half-brother. Before his defection to the opposition, General Ali Muhsin was commander of the Northwestern Military Region and commander of the First Armored Division. Widely viewed as one of the most important figures in Yemen’s military and known for his contacts with the Islamist Islah (Reform) Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, the defection of this consummate regime insider was viewed with both hope and suspicion by various opposition members.
According to Ali Muhsin:

The fact is that the al-Qaeda organization served the objectives and aims of Ali Saleh… al-Qaeda took advantage of the state’s weakness and its reluctance to act against them and curb their activities since Ali Saleh wanted to use al-Qaeda as a scarecrow for the outside parties. Everybody will realize after Salah’s departure that the legend of al-Qaeda in Yemen was exaggerated. When Yemen moves to a modern civil state – when the law prevails and justice and equal citizenship are ensured, when the judiciary becomes clean and the national economy becomes firm, developed and successful – al-Qaeda will have no presence in Yemen… The terrorist groups he uses to scare Yemen and the outside world with are supervised by the sons of his brother and the commander of his personal guards, Tariq Muhammad Saleh, and the Deputy of the National Security Apparatus, Ammar Muhammad Saleh.

The general went on to claim al-Qaeda elements were allowed to enter the southern town of Zanjibar without resistance on May 27 to seize weapons belonging to the police and army garrison. Nine dissident generals, including Ali Muhsin, released “Statement Number One,” in which the generals accused the President of “surrendering Abyan [Governorate] to an armed terrorist group” and called on the rest of the army to join “the peaceful popular revolution” (iloubnan.info – May 29, 2011; AFP, May 29).

. Ali Muhsin has survived a number of assassination attempts and some local observers have suggested a struggle for the succession has been ongoing for some time between the general and the president and his son Ahmad Ali, head of the Republican Guard (Yemen Tribune, October 9, 2009). According to a Wikileaks cable from the U.S. embassy in Sana’a, President Saleh tried to have the general killed by asking Saudi Arabia to bomb a compound in northern Yemen that was actually being used by the general as a field headquarters. The Saudis sensed something was wrong with the request and failed to carry out the raid (al-Jazeera, June 5).

There are suspicions that the General’s defection was only part of a strategy to create a favorable post-Saleh environment for Ali Muhsin, possibly as the new head of the military council (al-Jazeera, June 11). Ali Muhsin himself says that, at age 70, he has no personal ambition to rule Yemen. The general says President Saleh “still heaps unjust accusations against us for no reason other than that we in the armed forces announced rejection of any orders to attack the people, because we told him ‘the people demand that you leave so depart safe and sound for there is no need to spill blood and mire Yemen into anarchy and civil war.’”

Ali Muhsin has deployed his forces to defend the compound of Vice-President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, a southerner from Abyan province who was appointed in 1994 as a symbol of north-south unity. There were reports last week that elements of the 1st Armored Division repelled two attacks against the vice-president’s house by tribesmen on June 6 (al-Sahwah [Sana’a], June 7). The vice-president is nominally in charge with President Saleh out of the country, but it is Saleh’s son Ahmad Ali who has moved into the presidential palace and is viewed to have control of the government. Troops under Ali Muhsin’s command are also reported to be preparing defensive positions in Sana’a in preparation for an expected confrontation with forces still loyal to the Saleh regime (Naba News, June 7). While his troops prepare for action, Ali Muhsin was reported to have met with the U.S. and EU ambassadors in Sana’a (Ilaf.com, June 9).

This article first appeared in the June 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor
February 24, 2011

Despite a series of reports suggesting that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Deputy Leader Sa’id al-Shihri (a.k.a. Abu Sufyan al-Azdi) had died in an explosion while manufacturing a bomb on February 9, there are now indications that the veteran jihadist is still alive (for al-Shihri, see Terrorism Monitor, September 9, 2010; January 14, 2011).

Sa’id al-Shihri

A native Saudi, al-Shihri spent six years in the Guantanamo Bay detention center before being released to a Saudi rehabilitation program in 2007. After completing the apparently ineffective rehabilitation, al-Shihri left for Yemen, where he joined up with al-Qaeda elements, soon becoming a high-ranking member of the newly formed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which united Yemeni and Saudi militants.

Initial reports claimed that al-Shihri was killed together with five other members of AQAP (including an unnamed senior figure) while building an explosive device in the Lawdar district of Abyan governorate (Yemen Post, February 12; al-Ittihad [Abu Dhabi], February 12). Lawdar was the scene of heavy fighting between government forces and al-Qaeda fighters last summer (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 16, 2010).

Brigadier Abd al-Razaq al-Maruni, the security chief for Abyan governorate, was quoted by a Saudi daily as having told the paper by telephone that “We have received confirmation that al-Shihri was killed in Lawdar in Abyan.” However, Interior Ministry spokesman General Mansur al-Turki said his ministry had no such information, as did the Yemeni embassy in Riyadh (al-Watan [Riyadh], February 14, 2011).

The next day, Brigadier Abd al-Razaq al-Maruni used the Defense Ministry website to deny reports of al-Shihri’s death (including any statements attributed to him by local media), describing such reports as a likely effort to mislead security forces (26sep.net, February 14, 2011; Saba [Sana’a], February 15, 2011).

A tribal figure from the Lawdar area who works as a mediator between the government and AQAP told a Yemeni daily that al-Shihri’s death was “absolutely not true. We are among them [al-Qaeda] and nothing happened.” The report was also denied by other local residents, who said such an event could not take place without them hearing about it (Yemen Observer, February 15, 2011). AQAP has yet to release a statement on the alleged incident.

Female relatives of al-Shihri scandalized Saudi officials earlier this month when they protested the detention of family members outside the Interior Ministry in Riyadh. The women were unaccompanied by male guardians and authorities promised an investigation into how they were able to travel to the Saudi capital without male relatives as escorts (Gulf News, February 6, 2011).
This article first appeared in the February 24, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Andrew McGregor

January 20, 2011

A leading Yemeni jihadi and veteran of the post-Soviet struggle for power in Afghanistan has assumed the leadership of a possibly government-backed unity “committee” in the southern Yemeni port of Aden, where the Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) has been organizing a campaign to return the South to its former status as an independent state (Marib Press, January 3). In a recent interview, Ali al-Kurdi described the pro-unity plans of his new organization (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 4).

According to al-Kurdi, an electrical engineer by trade, the Popular Committee for national unity that he chairs does not receive any state funds (“the committee does not have ten riyals”), but is supported by those who suffered from the economic consequences of socialist rule in southern Yemen’s People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY – 1970-1990). Al-Kurdi says socialist rule introduced “freedom of debauchery, alcohol drinking and the like” as well as enabling political persecution on the slightest of pretexts. The former mujahid is ambivalent about his relationship with the regime, on the one hand saying it would be an honor to collaborate with President Ali Abdullah Salih, while on the other recalling his numerous clashes with Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO) and a raid on his house that caused his sister to miscarry. He also recalls that it was the entry of Salih’s mixed force of tribesmen, former mujahidin and army regulars into Aden that prevented his execution by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in 1994.

Al-Kurdi has a long history as a mujahid, armed militant and suspected terrorist. After leaving the PDRY’s army in 1989, al-Kurdi says he left for Sana’a and moved on to Afghanistan after rejecting PDRY claims that he had been exposed to in the army that Afghani Muslims were fighting alongside the Soviets to drive out anti-Islamic mujahideen. Al-Kurdi claims to have carried out attacks in Khost, Jalalabad, Lugar and on the periphery of Kabul during his time in Afghanistan prior to his return to Aden in 1992.

Al-Kurdi was also charged but released as a suspect in the USS Cole bombing of 2000. He later complained of “dirty treatment” and beatings by “jailers and Shiite officials” (Yemen Times, February 26, 2006; Marib Press, January 2). Al-Kurdi was also charged with being a member of al-Qaeda in a 2006 trial of 19 alleged al-Qaeda operatives accused of plotting to assassinate Westerners and blow up a hotel used by American visitors to Yemen. The defendants were freed when the judge ruled Shari’a permitted jihad against the occupiers of Iraq (AP, July 9, 2006). Salih has deployed ex-mujahideen against the Southern separatists before, most notably in the 1994 civil war, when thousands of jihadis were recruited to fight Southerners in exchange for special consideration in post-war Yemen.

The ex-mujahid claims that AQAP has “no connection” to the core al-Qaeda organization, but was rather created by Sunnis who experienced persecution at the hands of (Zaidi) Shiites in PSO prisons. He denied any current relationship with al-Qaeda and downplayed its local significance as a militant group: “Al-Qaeda exists as an organization in all countries of the world, but I rule out [this group] undertaking any operations in Yemen” (Marib Press, January 2).

Though his committee may be poorly funded by his own account, al-Kurdi and his followers are prepared to “repulse” SMM loyalists who might opt for violent resistance to the regime, even through the use of “martyrdom-seeking attacks.” Al-Kurdi asserts that “Jihad for Yemen’s unity takes precedence over jihad in Afghanistan and Palestine. And jihad against the SMM takes precedence over jihad against Jews and Christians.”

Al-Kurdi sees the separatist troubles of southern Yemen as part of a larger effort to divide and rule the Islamic world: “There is a conspiracy to divide Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Iraq. Iraq has already been divided and now it is Sudan’s turn. The [conspirators] will then move on to Saudi Arabia and Yemen… Mecca and Medina’s turn will follow because Yemen constitutes the bulwark of Saudi Arabia. Even the Turks who formerly ruled Yemen viewed Yemen as such.

There are indications that a major campaign of assassination of senior Yemeni military officials has begun inside Yemen, with numerous officers and soldiers being killed in Abyan, Shabwah, Hadramawt and elsewhere (al-Hayat, January 9). Al-Turki blamed the officers and soldiers themselves, though not without assigning some blame to the SMM:  “Frankly speaking, these officers and soldiers provide the justification for assassinations and lack of security, because some officers arrest people. When a person goes to prison, he is placed with al-Qaeda affiliated detainees. When such a person gets out of prison, he is angry and seeks revenge on the state. These are revenge acts by some citizens against security personnel. The SMM may be behind some attacks.”

This article first appeared in the January 20, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

November 11, 2010

In an effort to create insecurity in Yemen’s south in anticipation of a major Gulf region sporting event to be held in the area, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has announced the creation of its own Aden-Abyan Army, even though the name has been used by a separate militant organization since the early 1990s (al-Malahim, October 11; al-Watan [Sana’a], October 15). The announcement was made in an audiotape issued by Qasim al-Raymi (a.k.a. Abu-Hurayrah al-San’ani), AQAP’s military commander.

Qasim al-Raymi

Al-Raymi, a former associate of Osama bin Laden, was one of 23 convicted militants who escaped in February 2006 from the Political Security Organization’s (PSO) high security prison in Sana’a (see Terrorism Focus, February 7, 2006). Authorities announced his death three separate times, in August 2007, December 2009 and January 2010.

Yemen’s existing Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) was established in the early 1990s by Abu Hasan Zayn al-Abadin al-Mihdhar. After al-Mihdhar’s execution in 1998, the leadership of the movement passed to Shaykh Khalid Abd al-Nabi (a.k.a. Khalid Abdulrab al-Nabi al-Yazidi), but the militant movement has been relatively quiet since Shaykh Khalid obtained a pardon from the government in 2005 (al-Hayat, October 11, 2005; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, August 5). In a recent interview Shaykh Khalid was guarded on the question of AAIA’s current status, stating, “I cannot say definitively whether [the AAIA] actually exists and is effective or anything else” (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 9).

The AAIA and the new Aden-Abyan Army take their name from an apocryphal prophecy by the Prophet Muhammad that predicts an army will arise from Aden-Abyan in the last days to fight for victory in God’s name. According to the AAIA leader, “No one can say he represents the army of Aden; when God wills, the army will inevitably emerge. As to when this will happen, only God knows” (Asharq al-Awsat, September 26).

The stated aim of AQAP’s new Aden-Abyan Army is to liberate the holy places of the Arabian Peninsula and “purge its land from the Crusaders and their apostate agents [i.e. the Saudi royal family and the Saleh regime in Yemen]” (Yemen Post, October 14). More specifically, the announcement is regarded as a threat to an upcoming international football tournament.

The Gulf 20 Football Championship is scheduled to be held in the volatile Aden-Abyan region between November 22 and December 5. President Ali Abdullah Saleh has pledged 30,000 soldiers and police will form “three belts of security around Aden, Abyan and [the neighboring governorate of] Lahij” (Arab News, October 12; Saba Net, October 23). AAIA’s Shaykh Khalid Abd al-Nabi has denied reports that he was paid by the governor of Abyan to mediate with local jihadi groups to ensure calm during the Gulf 20 championship (Asharq al-Awsat, September 26).

In what may have been a demonstration of AQAP’s seriousness, two bombs killed three people at Aden’s al-Wahda sports center on the same day al-Raymi’s statement was released (Arab News, October 12). No official claim of responsibility was made, but authorities arrested 19 suspects, some of whom are thought to have ties to AQAP.

The AQAP commander cited mujahideen victories in Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Iraq and Somalia in his statement, but also boasted of AQAP’s failed operations, including the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Prince Muhammad bin Nayif and the failed Christmas Day airliner attack by inept “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (for Bin Nayif, see Terrorism Monitor, September 17, 2009). Al-Raymi also described American airstrikes in Yemen (such as the July attack that killed the deputy governor of Ma’rib) as “counterproductive to the Americans and in favor of the Servants of Allah, the mujahideen” (Yemen Observer, October 14).

In his statement, al-Raymi described the formation of two wings in AQAP: one to carry out operations outside of Yemen and another that will engage Yemeni forces in an internal “war of attrition and exhaustion” (Ilaf.com, October 18; Yemen Post, October 14). According to al-Raymi, AQAP’s financial restraints prevent the organization from accepting all “the brothers who arrived to join us.” He urges them instead to prepare for an eventual role by pursuing studies of Shari’a and technical fields such as chemistry, physics and electronics. Al-Raymi’s description of difficulties in accepting recruits was at odds with a July 29 statement from AQAP field commander Muhammad Sa’id al-Umdah Gharib al-T’aizzi who claimed “an army of 12,000 fighters is being prepared in Aden and Abyan” (al-Malahim, July 29).

This article first appeared in the November 11, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

September 16, 2010

Heavy fighting between alleged al-Qaeda forces and government troops near the town of Lawdar in Yemen’s Abyan governorate broke out on the weekend of August 21-22 following a deadly ambush by AQAP fighters, claiming a reported eight to 11 soldiers and at least 14 militants (Reuters, August 22; Sep26.net, August 21; AFP August 22). Yemeni military forces were dispatched to the district to re-establish the government’s writ. Al-Qaeda militants and members of the secessionist Southern Mobility movement were given 24 hours to leave Lawdar or the houses they were staying in would be bombarded. Following a mass flight of civilians and the expiration of the ultimatum, more fighting broke out on August 22, as militants resisted their expulsion. Defense Minister General Muhammad Nasir Ahmad Ali was reported to be leading the security operations in Lawdar District personally (AFP, August 22).

(BBC)

Tribal mediation apparently failed in the conflict around Lawdar, with fatal consequences for one of those involved. A leader of the al-Fadl tribe, Shaykh Hussein Saleh Majdal, was assassinated along with his two bodyguards in an attack on the evening of September 4. The shaykh was described as leading the mediation between security forces and al-Qaeda militants (ArabNews.com, September 5; Yemen Observer, September 7).

Government sources have repeatedly referred to armed elements of the secessionist Southern Mobility movement as fighting alongside al-Qaeda in the struggle for Lawdar District.  They described a plan by Southern Mobility leaders to assemble their followers in a march intended to break the security cordon around Lawdar (al-Watan, September 11). Security authorities also announced the detention of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mansub, an alleged “terrorist subversive element” who was arrested at a roadblock while in possession of documents alleged to detail the cooperation between AQAP and Southern Mobility (al-Siyasah [Kuwait], September 7). Southern Mobility, however, acknowledges it has activists in the region but says they are involved in “peaceful struggle” (Aden Press Online, September 12).

Although Deputy Interior Minister Saleh al-Zuari declared Lawdar District fully purged of “terrorist elements” on August 24, continuing operations revealed that the militant presence was far from vanquished. A day after al-Zuari’s statement, gunmen riding motorcycles targeted a military patrol in a public marketplace in the Zinjibar District of Abyan, killing four soldiers (Yemen Observer, August 28).  On August 27, Yemeni troops took the worst of it in a clash with the militants near Lawdar, leaving 11 dead. Two militants were killed, including (according to security officials) the al-Qaeda second-in-command in Lawdar, Adel Saleh Hardaba (Yemen Observer, August 28).On the same day a 25 year-old al-Qaeda suspect was arrested in northern Abyan while on his way to Lawdar. He was found in possession of an explosives belt and told investigators he had been assigned by al-Qaeda commander Ali Alwi al-Saqqaf to carry out a suicide bombing in Lawdar (Yemen Observer, September 1).

Fighting erupted again on August 31 in which another 12 militants were reported killed. The alleged leader of al-Qaeda forces in the district, Salah Ali Abdullah Al-Damani, was arrested on September 5, though sources vary as to whether he was captured in a night-time raid or seized at a checkpoint (26Sep.net, September 5).

By September 7, AQAP fighters were reported to have largely, but not entirely, pulled out of Lawdar and were heading to nearby Ma’rib and Shabwah governorates, both current hotbeds of anti-government militancy. The director-general of Lawdar District, Ahmad Ahmad Ali al-Qafish, told journalists that the fighters included Saudi, Pakistani, Egyptian, Syrian and Somali elements, though this could not be confirmed (al-Siyasah [Kuwait], September 7). Defense Ministry sources reported three foreigners were discovered amongst the militants slain in the fighting of August 20-21 (26Sep.net, August 21).

This article first appeared in the September 16 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

September 9, 2010

Yemen is not only one of the world’s most heavily armed nations on a per capita basis, but also serves as a regional hub for arms shipments, a lucrative trade that has the approval of Yemen’s government. One of Yemen’s most prominent arms dealers, Faris Manna, had a falling out with his former sponsor, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, after being imprisoned earlier this year on charges of providing arms to the Houthist rebels of northern Yemen. Manna recently gave an interview to an Arabic language daily in which he claimed Saleh’s government was responsible for arming the Houthist rebellion, a claim supported by his brother, the former governor of Sada’a governorate (elaph.com, August 17).

Faris Manna

The 40-year-old Manna, a former organizer for the ruling General People’s Congress, describes himself not as an arms retailer but as a facilitator, arranging deals between Arab and African consumers and foreign suppliers, principally in Russia and Eastern Europe, where he maintains offices. “I conclude arms deals, like other international companies that facilitate deals between states and arms manufacturers… We bring the parties closer together, and help them reach agreements. This is our role, nothing else,” explained Manna. Despite the accusations against him, Manna denies selling arms in local Yemeni markets. “I have never done that. This is what tendentious people say. They spread such rumors. We work in the framework of the Yemeni constitution and law, as well as within the international law,” he stated.

According to the Yemeni arms merchant, who acted as an intermediary in negotiations between the government and the Houthist rebels, it is the state that made room in local markets for the arms trade, which it supplies through stocks discretely removed from military garrisons; “I want to say that there was collusion in certain army garrisons to hand over weapons to the Houthists. It has become clear that their ammunition came from the Army, and all their rifles and weapons came from the Army. There are photographs and documents that prove this. All the proof is available. The matter has become clear and unambiguous.” Manna has useful connections to the Houthists – his brother Hassan Manna was formerly governor of Sada’a governorate, the home of the Houthist rebellion. Faris says his brother resigned as a result of his unjust detention; “How could he go on working when his brother was wrongly and unjustly arrested? He refused to carry on working, but out of respect for the brother president of the republic, may God protect him, and in appreciation of the relations between us and him, we did not publish our resignation.” Several weeks after his brother’s arrest last January, Hassan Manna threatened to reveal the “true source” of the Houthist arms, suggesting that the Ministry of the Interior was heavily involved in shipping arms to the northern rebels, though this accusation was strongly denied by Brigadier General Muhammad Abdullah al-Qawsi, following which Hassan Manna warned the press against publishing any further comments on the issue delivered under his name (Yemen Tribune, February 21).

Manna claims the charges against him were the work of the National Security Agency (NSA), which sought to create a divide between himself and the president, his long-time patron. In June, a supporter of Faris Manna fired on a security convoy carrying him to court from Sana’a rooftops (Yemen Observer, May 11). Manna denied allegations that his family was behind the attack (Yemen Gazette, July 3).

This article first appeared in the September 9, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor