Andrew McGregor

August 5, 2010

In a recent interview with a pan-Arab daily, Shaykh Khalid Abd al-Nabi (a.k.a. Khalid Abdulrab al-Nabi al-Yazidi), the leader of Yemen’s Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), condemned the Southern secession movement as the work of “Jews and Christians,” while claiming he was the victim of accusations by “atheistic communists” who had infiltrated the Sana’a government (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 9, 2009).

The AAIA was established in the early 1990s by Abu Hasan Zayn al-Abadin al-Mihdhar. When al-Mihdhar was executed in 1998 for his role in the deaths of four Australian and American tourists, al-Nabi took over leadership of the group (al-Hayat, October 11, 2005). A member of the Yafa’i tribe and a native of the al-Yazid district of Lahaj Governorate, al-Nabi left socialist-ruled South Yemen in the 1980s for religious training in Saudi Arabia. In 1994 he received military training from the Taliban in Afghanistan but returned to Yemen to participate in the civil war against the South Yemen socialists. After this he became a senior member of the AAIA. By 2003 al-Nabi was leading his followers in clashes against government forces in the Hutat Mountains of Abyan Governorate. According to al-Nabi, the “atheistic communists” of South Yemen had merely been dispersed rather than defeated in the civil war. “Some remained in Yemen as members of the opposition, others became members of the opposition outside Yemen, and some donned the garb of the state and joined the ruling [General People’s] Congress Party. Outwardly, these people pretended to owe allegiance to the Congress Party but inwardly they owed their allegiance to the socialist party,” stated al-Nabi.

In 2005, al-Nabi turned himself in to authorities and received an official pardon. He was released to his farm where authorities maintained he was leading a peaceful life despite numerous reports he was raising and training an Islamist militia. Al-Nabi has repeatedly denied having ties to the government, especially Major General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the president’s brother and commander of Yemen’s First Armored Brigade (Asharq al-Awsat, April 4, 2006; January 8).

The AAIA takes its name from an apocryphal prophecy by the Prophet Muhammad that predicts an army will arise from Aden-Abyan in the last days to fight for victory in God’s name. Al-Nabi believes in this prophecy, though he stops short of claiming to represent its fulfillment. According to him, “The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) preached about this army and about the fact that such an army will emerge either now or in the future. When this will happen exactly, only God knows. I believe that the global prophecies of our Prophet (p.b.u.h.) will inevitably take place. No one can stop them or interdict them… [Regarding the AAIA] I cannot say definitively whether it actually exists and is effective or anything else.”

Al-Nabi claims his difficulties with the government are inflated by those seeking revenge for their defeat in 1994. “For instance, the authorities may receive information that I am carrying arms in a certain location. Now this is not a big deal. The majority of the Yemeni people carry arms and even the women carry arms these days,” he said. Al-Nabi also complains that the strength of the AAIA was consistently exaggerated in the past to the point where a band of some 20 followers was treated as the equal of the national army. According to him, “The media inflated the issue because, as you know, more media coverage means more U.S. support and aid in the name of fighting terrorism.”

Al-Nabi continues to defend al-Mihdhar’s murder of four Western tourists in 1998, saying, “I believe… he was killed unjustly because, at the end of the day, even the killing of thousands and thousands of Christian unbelievers is not equal to one drop of blood of a believer.” He points to a fatwa by Shaykh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi, who ruled in his book Al-Burkan fi Nasf Jami’at al-Iman that the tourists “had come in war and were spies and corrupters on earth.”

The AAIA leader holds a conspiratorial view of Yemen’s political violence, claiming the Houthist rebel movement in north Yemen is a creation of the state supported by the United States, though he does not explain how this would benefit either party. He believes the southern secession movement is likewise the work of “Jews and Christians,” saying it is “certain that the United States and Britain are involved.”

Though resolute in his advocacy of national unity, al-Nabi has elsewhere acknowledged there are numerous problems facing the people of southern Yemen, including “injustice, racism, usurping the money of the people, looting the land, oppression, barbarism, the use of violence and force, a corrupt judiciary, corrupt security, and many other reasons. In fact, if we look at the situation of the people in the southern regions, you might excuse them for demanding secession” (Asharq al-Awsat, January 8).

This article first appeared in the August 5, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

July 15, 2010

A small governorate of roughly 150,000 people, Ma’rib was once the heart of the great Sabaean civilization of pre-Islamic times, a land made prosperous by the construction of great irrigation works. Its wealth figured in the legends surrounding reputed rulers like Queen Sheba. When the Great Dam of Ma’rib collapsed in the 6th century, many of its people spread across North Africa and the region entered a long decline, enjoying a slight revival with the discovery of oil in the mid-1980s and the construction of a new dam funded by the late ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan al-Nahyan. Political violence entered the region, however, and the ruined Awam (Moon) temple of Ma’rib became the scene of an al-Qaeda suicide bombing in 2007 that killed eight Spanish tourists and two Yemenis (France 24, June 7).

Awam Temple in Ma’rib

Though Yemen’s reserves of oil (never substantial by Arabian Peninsula standards) are quickly diminishing, al-Marib remains home to vast oil and gas reserves, making it a hub for the regional energy industry that provides 90% of government revenues, with vulnerable pipelines connecting the region to export terminals on the southern coast. These pipelines were cut by attacks 60 times last year (Elaph, June 13).

Like most of Yemen, the population of Ma’rib is largely tribal-based with a certain degree of de-facto independence from the state. Government is as much tolerated as respected. Most notable among the Ma’rib tribes are the Abidah, the Murad, the Jahm, the Jad’an and the Ashraf Ma’rib.

The Killing of Jabir Ali al-Shabwani

On May 24, what appears to have been an American unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fired a missile at a home in Ma’rib’s Wadi Abieda area (Yemen Post, June 19; Al-Quds al-Arabi, June 27). The home belonged to a wanted al-Qaeda operative, Muhammad Sa’id bin Jardane, who was wounded in the strike but managed to escape. However, the strike did not miss Ma’rib Deputy Governor Jabir al-Shabwani and his four bodyguards, who were all killed. Al-Shabwani had been negotiating Bin Jardane’s surrender for a week and had gone to his farm to finalize the terms (AFP, May 25).

Outraged by what they believed was a plot to kill a notable tribal leader, tribesmen of the Shabwani clan and the larger Abidah tribe began attacks on government facilities and military outposts. Tribesmen destroyed parts of the Ma’rib city center, even attacking the city’s air defense camp (Yemen Observer, May 29). A targeted assassination of a senior military officer carried out in Ma’rib several days later by members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) further inflamed the region as a military offensive sought revenge.

Al-Qaeda Activity in Ma’rib

According to security authorities, in the last three years al-Qaeda has killed 37 military and government officials in Ma’rib from a list of 40 targets. A new list has allegedly been compiled by the militants (Saba, June 13). AQAP leaders Nasser al-Wuhayshi, Sa’id al-Shihri and Qasim al-Raimi were reported to be in Ma’rib in June. Authorities speculated they were fleeing a government offensive in the Abidah region of Ma’rib (Yemen Observer, June 17). Later there were unconfirmed reports that AQAP leader Ali Sa’id bin Jameel was killed by a military bombardment (Okaz.com, July 4; Saudi Gazette, July 4).

AQAP is believed responsible for the June 5 ambush and killing in Ma’rib of General Muhammad Salih al-Sha’if (commander of the 315 Brigade), though an AQAP statement denied responsibility, saying the murder was a government ploy to legitimize attacks on the local tribes (Marebpress.net; June 5; Yemen Post, June 19). Vowing revenge, government forces concentrated their search for suspects in the Abidah region of Ma’rib, focusing on Hassan Aridan and 28-year-old Hasan Abdullah Saleh al-Aqili, described as an al-Qaeda commmander in Ma’rib.

Twelve security men and 11 tribesmen were injured during a June 9 shootout with Abidah tribesmen at al-Aqili’s home in Ma’rib’s al-Madina district, but the militant and his followers escaped (Yemen Observer, June 9).  The fighting began after soldiers destroyed the homes of several al-Qaeda suspects and then began shelling the entire area, according to a local official (Xinhua, June 9).

Resorting to Traditional Mediation

At this point both sides resorted to the traditional Yemeni mediation methods that forever keep Yemen at the brink of disaster rather than falling off the precipice. Unable to allow Ma’rib’s energy industry to slip from its control, Yemeni authorities issued an apology for the airstrike and President Saleh formed a special president’s committee including leaders of the Abidah tribe to investigate (al-Hayat, June 9).

Eventually the Yemeni press published a statement from the late deputy governor’s father, Shaykh Naji al-Shabwani, apologizing for the Abidah tribe’s “moment of anger” following his son’s “assassination.” The elder Shabwani was invited to a personal meeting with the president and agreed to accept tribal mediation, thus helping defuse open rebellion in the region over the killing of his son. Addressing the belief in the Abidah tribe that Jabir Ali al-Shabwani was the victim of a plot at the highest levels, the shaykh added, “If the president was behind the killing of my son, then he should confess and I, on my part, will forgive him” (al-Masdar, June 6; al-Quds al-Arabi, May 31). Confessions, however, were not forthcoming, and there were reports that other Abidah shaykhs had rejected the arbitration. Even as progress was made on defusing this issue the government’s broad hunt for the killers of General Muhammad Salih was intensifying the violence in the region.

A Ma’rib arbitration committee decided to take sworn oaths from Yemen’s leaders testifying that they had no prior knowledge of the airstrike that killed al-Shabwani. The state additionally agreed to pay blood money in the amount of one billion riyals (approximately 4.5 million dollars) (Al-Quds al-Arabi, June 27). The procedure effectively removed all responsibility from the Yemen government and left the United States solely to blame for the attack. Locally this also had the effect of relieving Yemeni officials of any personal responsibility, with all the consequences of tribal vendetta that would follow (al-Quds al-Arabi, May 31).
The Counterterrorist Offensive Meets Tribal Resistance

A leading member of the local tribal structure, Alawi al-Basha bin Zaba, secretary-general of the Alliance Council of the Ma’rib and al-Jawf tribes (al-Jawf is a neighboring governorate) told a London-based Saudi daily that the military operations in Ma’rib and their resulting collateral damage threatened to turn Ma’rib into “another Sa’dah,” referring to the simmering rebellion in north Yemen that has posed one of the Yemeni state’s most serious challenges. The operations in Ma’rib “will pull the tribes into confrontation with the state. We have warned of such a situation and said that it must be handled in a completely different way. ” Of particular offense was the practice of demolishing the homes of al-Qaeda suspects by firing mortars and Katyusha rockets from a range of some kilometers, inevitably destroying the homes of people with no relation to the militants. Bin Zaba saw a darker purpose behind such tactics; “Some officials might be seeking to push the tribes towards allying with al-Qaeda… Some officials and shaykhs are benefiting from keeping the situation as is,” he said (Elaph, June 13). The tribal leader suggests official reports regarding the presence of al-Qaeda in Ma’rib are exaggerated and designed to increase foreign aid to the state.

Fighting threatened to grow out of control as Yemeni armor began to roll into Ma’rib and tribal allies of the Abidah and the Shabwani clan began to pour into the region from neighboring governorates. Attacks were made against the local Republican Palace, military outposts and power stations. Pylons carrying electric power to Sana’a were brought down and al-Jad’an tribesmen blocked the road between Sana’a and Ma’rib. Gas pipelines were destroyed and technicians prevented from making repairs. When planes of the Yemeni Air Force began flying over the region the Abidah tribesmen responded by firing antiaircraft weapons. The Alliance Council of the Ma’rib and al-Jawf tribes described the government offensive as “terrorist acts” and warned that if political intervention was not forthcoming, “the tribes will abandon their responsibilities and allow al-Qaeda to take control of Ma’rib Governorate” (Ma’rib Press, June 11).

A June 12 meeting between shaykhs of the Abida tribe and Interior Minister Major General Mutahar Rashad al-Masri produced an agreement in which the tribe vowed to stop harboring al-Qaeda suspects, condemned sabotage and agreed to dismantle roadblocks and allow repairs to the pipeline (AFP, June 13). Al-Qaeda had different plans, however. In mid-June, AQAP released a statement in response to what it described as attacks on “women, children and brothers” in the Wadi Abidah region of Ma’rib. The group appealed to the shaykhs of Abidah and the shaykhs of Ma’rib to distance themselves from the “Crusader campaign” and President Ali Abdullah Saleh stated, “With permission from God, [we will] set the ground alight under the feet of the tyrant infidels from the regime of Ali [Abdullah] Saleh and his aides – the agents of America” (al-Jazeera, June 19). There has been speculation that the devastating June 19 AQAP attack on the Aden offices of the Political Security Organization (PSO) was intended as revenge for the assault on the Abidah region and was part of an effort to ingratiate themselves with tribal leaders who had agreed to expel al-Qaeda elements from their territories (Al-Ahali, June 22).

Destroying Ma’rib’s Main Pipeline

On June 12, a bulldozer was used to destroy the main pipeline carrying oil to the Hodeida governorate port of Ras Issa, the third attack on the pipeline in less than a month. Ministry of the Interior sources said the attack was the work of the Hatik sub-tribe of the Abidah, angered by the military offensive. Ministry of Defense sources claimed that the attack had actually been the work of Saudi AQAP deputy leader Sa’id al-Shihri (26sep.net, June 14; Okaz, June 16; Yemen Post, June 28). Al-Hatik leaders denied any participation in the attempt to break the pipeline (al-Taghyir [Sana’a], June 17).

Local sources told a pan-Arab daily that those who attacked the pipeline were tribesmen with no ties to al-Qaeda seeking revenge for an entire family that was killed by army shelling during operations in the Abidah region. The tribesmen were also angered by an attempt to arrest Shaykh Nasir Qammad bin Durham, who was accused of harboring al-Qaeda operatives. The shaykh evaded security authorities but his home was destroyed by artillery. The bulldozer attack on the pipeline was said to have created a huge fire with a smoke column that could be seen 40 km away (al-Hayat, June 13).

More violence broke out in Ma’rib as tribes began fighting over control of the local oil fields. Government forces did not intervene in recent clashes between the Abidah and the Bal-Harith that killed 18 during fighting over an oil field near the border with Shabwa governorate (Yemen Post, June 24; al-Tagheer, June 24).

Conclusion

A recent study of the political role of Yemen’s tribes stated that the often abrasive relations between the tribes and central government had been tempered by President Saleh’s attempts to improve the relationship. The tribes now dominate both parliament and the Shura Council, resulting in some tribal conventions being integrated into national legislation. However, the hereditary nature of tribal authority and the dominance of tribal chiefs have led to the exclusion of tribesmen from political involvement. An estimated 85% of Yemenis belong to tribes, most of which are well-armed. [1]

Despite evidence to the contrary, Ma’rib Governor Naji Bin Ali al-Zaidi prefers to maintain that al-Qaeda members in Ma’rib are not natives of the area, but are rather “strangers who are exploiting the hospitality of the Ma’rib people to hide and plan for their terrorist operations.” The governor points to the wild terrain and nomadic nature of the local people as draws for a terrorist group seeking safe havens. Al-Zaidi warns that al-Qaeda “are targeting the whole world through our province, because Yemen, several Arab and foreign countries all have interests in this province” (Yemen Observer, March 9). Regardless of the governor’s claims, there appears to be continued sympathy for local al-Qaeda members in the region. Recently two AQAP members wanted for attacks on military and security forces, Mansur Saleh Dalil (a.k.a. Salel Salim Dalil) and Mubarak al-Shabwani, surrendered to authorities in Ma’rib.  Attacks on security checkpoints quickly followed the death penalties handed down to the men on July 7 (Saba, June 15, July 11; Yemen Post, June 15).

By accommodating American requests for direct strikes against al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen, government authorities are left to deal with consequences that can quickly spin out of control in a highly volatile environment. There are estimates that the cost of lost oil revenues, repairs to the power supply and compensation to the tribes in Ma’rib will exceed the annual amount of U.S. aid to Yemen. The military response to the assassination of senior officers seemed to invoke the tribal principle of collective responsibility, with the counterterrorist offensive in Ma’rib making little differentiation between the guilty and the innocent. Coming at the same time as the airstrike that killed a noted Abidah leader, the rapid escalation in violence and its potential to spill into neighboring governorates provided a warning that some areas of Yemen are perilously close to breaking with the government and accepting an al-Qaeda presence. The heavy-handed military tactics that helped break the Houthi rebellion (at least temporarily) during “Operation Scorched Earth” will not necessarily work in other regions. Traditional mediation efforts appear to have subdued the violence, but the risk remains that in the current environment apologies, compensation and mediation may not be effective next time, particularly if the tribes are convinced to accept al-Qaeda operatives (their relatives and fellow tribesmen) as their protectors and avengers against a state they perceive as working for foreign interests.
Note

1. See Adel al-Sharbaji et al., Palace and the Divan, the Political Role of Tribes in Yemen, Observatory for Human Rights/International Development Research Center. For a summary, see Yemen Times Online, April 7, 2010.

This article first appeared in the July 15, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

July 8, 2010

A series of interviews conducted by the pan-Arab newspaper Asharq al-Awsat have revealed a number of perspectives from leaders of the South Yemen separatist movement. One such was provided by Abd al-Hamid Talib, a member of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP – al-Hizb al-Ishtiraki al-Yamani). The YSP was founded in 1978 as an umbrella group for an array of various southern political parties and movements and formed the ruling party in South Yemen before unification in 1990. The party has struggled since the central government emerged victorious from the 1994 civil war, confiscating the party’s facilities and resources. In opposition, the party has adhered to its platform of secular socialism and pan-Arab nationalism.

Pre-Unification Yemen

Contrasting the current breakdown of law and order in Yemen with the rule of law that existed in South Yemen prior to unification, Abd al-Hamid says Yemen could be described as a “failed unity state,” except that “Yemen is not a state, as this concept [in Yemen] usually means but a gang ruling Yemen, with the full meaning of the word ‘gang’” (Asharq al-Awsat, June 21).

Abd al-Hamid traces most of the South’s misfortunes to its loss in the 1994 Civil War. Of particular importance was the decision to disband the Southern Army rather than integrate it with national forces, leading to wide unemployment and dissatisfaction with the regime:

They [the regime] could have, for instance, reinstated the army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen to military service. In one of his interviews, the brother president [i.e. President Ali Abdullah Saleh] gracefully called for Saddam’s army to be reinstated to military service following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. For that matter, he should have reinstated the army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen to service following his invasion of the South! Moreover, as he advised the Palestinians to open the door for dialogue between Palestinian factions, he should have engaged in a dialogue with the southerners, specifically with the YSP (Asharq al-Awsat, June 21).

The YSP leader claims the regime is doing everything in its power, including infiltration, to draw the YSP into an armed conflict, knowing its superiority in arms and numbers will allow it to destroy the movement; “They are prepared to destroy the South completely to remain in power” (Asharq al-Awsat, June 21). Yet Abd al-Hamid believes that time is on the side of the secessionists, as the power of the authorities will inevitably deteriorate as the beleaguered economy begins to collapse. While international support for the separatist movement has yet to materialize, the international community is still able to see that there is no progress being made by Saleh’s government to stabilize the domestic situation in Yemen.

Abd al-Hamid was recently released from detention after having been charged with supporting the Southern Mobility Movement (SMM), a new separatist umbrella group that appears to have supplanted the YSP as the leading separatist movement. However, Abd al-Hamid suggests the party is as relevant as ever, claiming more than 80% of the members of the SMM were originally in the YSP.

Though clashes have occurred between pro-independence protesters and security forces at several rallies in the South, the SMM maintains it is a peaceful rather than armed political movement. Authorities routinely describe the SMM as a “terrorist militia” in the pro-regime press and accuse it of armed attacks on government institutions and military facilities (Naba News Online, June 21; June 22). Many SMM activists are demobilized members of the former army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen [i.e. the old socialist regime in the South]. The movement is strongest in the governorates of al-Lahij, al-Dali and Abyan, while support in the largest urban center, Aden, has diminished due to the more cosmopolitan makeup of the population in the port city (Asharq al-Awsat, July 2).

This article first appeared in the July 8, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

March 18, 2010

As head of the Yemeni Army’s Moral Guidance Directorate and editor-in-chief of the Ministry of Defense’s 26 September Weekly Political Review (www.26september.info), Brigadier General Ali Hasan al-Shatir is one of the most influential figures in Yemen’s security structure. In a recent interview with pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, Brigadier al-Shatir described al-Qaeda infiltration methods and activities in Yemen and the response of the security apparatus (Asharq al-Awsat, March 11).

Brigadier General Ali Hasan al-Shatir

According to the Brigadier, al-Qaeda members regularly cross the border between Saudi Arabia and northern Yemen, where they are assisted by members of the Zaydi Shiite Houthist rebel group. The accusation appears to be an effort to tie the Houthist rebellion to al-Qaeda, a suggestion that has not been supported by evidence in the past. Al-Shatir, however, now claims that this information was obtained in the interrogation of Muhammad al-Awfi, an alleged al-Qaeda operative who surrendered last year (Marebpress.net, February 17, 2009):

He revealed that there is cooperation and coordination between the al-Qaeda organization and the Houthists, because both sides know they are united by one goal and that is to undermine the stability and security of Yemen and [carry] out their destructive sabotage plans.

The Brigadier says the cooperation between al-Qaeda and the Houthists has also been confirmed by Tariq al-Fadhli, whom he describes as “one of the main members of the al-Qaeda organization who now leads part of [Southern] Mobility in the south” (al-Thawra, July 31, 2009; Yemen Post, August 2, 2009). Al-Fadhli, a son of the former Sultan of Abyan, fought in Afghanistan’s anti-communist jihad in the 1980s but has long been a close ally of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh and a member of the ruling General People’s Congress party. Their close relationship was recently severed when al-Fadhli joined the Southern Mobility secessionist movement—an act that landed the former jihadi on the government’s list of al-Qaeda activists and led to an assault on his compound by security forces earlier this month (Alflojaweb.com, April 18, 2009; Yemen Post, March 2).

In early February, al-Fadhli raised the American flag over his compound while blaring the “Star Spangled Banner” from a sound system. A relative told reporters al-Fadhli was indicating his opposition to terrorism and had been approached by the U.S. embassy in his role as a leader of the southern secessionist movement. The latter information remains unconfirmed (Adenpress, February 5). Al-Shatir also accuses al-Fadhli of agitating for the return of British occupation (which ended in 1967) to southern Yemen. “Is it rational for a Yemeni national to ask for the occupation to return to his country?”

The size of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been greatly exaggerated by the European and American media, according to Brigadier al-Shatir, who believes this is part of a deliberate effort to prepare “international public opinion that Yemen will be the third front after Afghanistan and Iraq in the war against al-Qaeda.” When pressed for an estimate of the actual size of AQAP, al-Shatir responded: “They may be in the dozens; there is no exact figure.”

This article first appeared in the March 18, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

December 3, 2009

An al-Qaeda videotape showing the execution of a Yemeni military intelligence chief began circulating throughout Yemen by Bluetooth technology on November 26. The video was produced by al-Malahim Establishment for Media Production, the media wing of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Entitled “The Demise of Traitors 1,” the videotape addressed al-Qaeda’s view of Muslims who “collaborate” with the West before proceeding to give a practical lesson in the fate of such “collaborators” in the form of Lieutenant Colonel Bassam Sulayman Tarbush al-Sharqabi, the intelligence chief for Marib Province, who was captured by al-Qaeda last June.

Though not mentioned explicitly, a large part of the tape appears devoted to warning off Yemenis from providing intelligence to U.S. forces that would allow them to target al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen with missile strikes from Predator drones. Given the tactical success of drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen and Saudi Arabia may naturally be concerned about being targeted in a similar manner. Colonel Tarbush was widely believed in Yemen to have provided the intelligence that allowed a U.S. Predator to kill local al-Qaeda leader Ali Qaed Sunian al-Harithi (a.k.a. Abu Ali) in 2002.

The videotape warns of “mercenaries” who collaborated with the Jews and Christians for money. “The lowest and vilest of these collaborators are the spies, who continue to help the enemies of the nation of Islam: the rulers, collaborators and allies of America.” The tape then shows footage of an infrared strobe light of the type used to mark targets for night attacks. Viewers are warned of spies who plant such instruments on targets designated for air strikes.

Colonel Tarbush, who appears blindfolded at all times in the video, is described as an individual who spied on Muslims and the mujahideen. “He oversees a network of spies, and recruits clan members to spy on Muslims.” Tarbush was an expert in the intricacies of clan politics in Marib region, where he spent the last ten of his 14 years in the security services. His experience also allowed him to build a local intelligence network, though he admits in the video that he has revealed the names of all his agents to al-Qaeda interrogators.

Clearly under pressure from his questioners, Colonel Tarbush agrees that the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh is a collaborationist government that sets up “security forces with the authority and capabilities to suppress the mujahideen, according to American requests.” He also acknowledges that Yemen’s legal code “violates Shari’a.” Asked if he has any advice for young Yemenis, Colonel Tarbush advises them to avoid being “pulled in by American intelligence and [Israel’s] Mossad.”

After being led before a firing squad of masked men, the image cuts out and only gunfire is heard, followed by footage of the apparently dead body of Colonel Tarbush. China’s Xinhua news agency later said senior Yemeni security officials had confirmed the Colonel’s death (Xinhua, November 26).

The apparent execution of Colonel Tarbush follows an earlier AQAP warning to the “infidel” rulers of Yemen, who “opened bureaus to spy on the mujahideen and even on the Muslims in general” (Audio statement of Shaykh Abu al-Zubayr Adil al-Abbab, Al-Malahim Establishment for Media Production, October 22). A posting on a jihadist website said the execution videotape gave “special solace to all those family members of those mujahideen who were tortured, handicapped and in many cases killed under the supervision of these [security] officials” (ansarnet.info, November 27).

This article first appeared in the December 3, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor