Andrew McGregor

May 10, 2007

Following the introduction of a new two-year plan to eliminate religious-based political extremism in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh made an official visit to Washington from April 30 to May 3. While in the United States, President Saleh discussed security and counter-terrorism efforts with President Bush, FBI Director Robert Mueller, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, CIA Director Michael Hayden and members of the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee. The visit marked an enormous change in U.S.-Yemeni relations since the dangerous days following the September 11 attacks, when a U.S. attack on Yemen seemed imminent. At the conclusion of his stay, President Saleh thanked the United States for its support of Yemen’s counter-terrorism efforts, while President Bush spoke of Yemen’s continuing cooperation in bringing “radicals and murderers” to justice. Nevertheless, while the sometimes-tempestuous U.S.-Yemeni alliance carries on, there are serious differences between the Yemeni and U.S. approaches to counter-terrorism.

Judge Hamoud Abdulhamid al-Hitar

 Reforming Terrorists with Islam

The most unusual aspect of Yemen’s counter-terrorist efforts is a broad effort to reform religious extremism (both Shiite and Sunni) and replace it with a moderate approach to Islam. This task (rooted in traditional Yemeni methods of conflict resolution) has been handed to Yemen’s recently appointed minister for Endowments and Religious Guidance, Judge Hamoud Abdulhamid al-Hitar, who states, “The strategy will be an important factor in treating their mistaken ideas” (Yemen Observer, April 30). As the leader of Yemen’s Dialogue Committee, al-Hitar developed a policy of confronting incarcerated militants in debates designed to expose their misinterpretations of Islamic doctrine and challenge the legitimacy of al-Qaeda-style jihadism. Using “mutual respect” as a basis for the discussions, al-Hitar points to numerous successes in reforming the views of extremist prisoners, some of whom later provided the security apparatus with important intelligence. Hundreds of terrorism suspects have passed through the program. Recidivism is untracked, however, and there are reports that some of those released went to Iraq to fight U.S.-led coalition forces. The list of graduates is closely guarded, and ex-prisoners are warned not to discuss their participation in the dialogues, thus allowing a degree of deniability should graduates return to terrorism.

Within Yemen, al-Hitar is widely believed to be a member of the feared Political Security Organization (PSO). When 23 terrorism convicts escaped from a PSO prison in the national capital of Sanaa last year, their tunnel emerged in al-Hitar’s mosque. The mass escape was clearly assisted by some PSO agents. The fact that the escapees included several convicted of bombing the USS Cole placed a severe strain on U.S.-Yemen relations.

For two years, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Guidance has kept a close watch on unlicensed Quranic schools suspected of promoting political violence, although none have been closed so far. A corps of “religious guides” (both men and women) has been tasked with promoting “the noble values of Islam” and to establish the principles of moderation and tolerance in areas where the government fears extremism is feeding on a lack of religious knowledge (Saba News Agency, April 25). Saleh has challenged the country’s religious scholars and preachers to “clarify the facts” of Islam for the Muslim community, especially in rebellious Sa’dah province, where preachers have a “religious, moral and national duty” to eradicate sedition.

Steps Toward Disarmament

On April 24, Yemen’s cabinet took the unusual measure of ordering the closure of Yemen’s many arms shops and markets, finally acknowledging that the proliferation of weapons and their common use to resolve all types of disputes are continuing barriers to much-needed foreign investment. Heavy weapons are to be confiscated, while possession and sales of sidearms and assault rifles will be subject to licenses and registration. With some 50-60 million weapons in circulation in a country of 21 million people, the cabinet’s order represents only a first step toward changing Yemen’s ubiquitous arms culture. At the moment, there are 18 major arms markets and several hundred gun-shops in Yemen. Some shops will be allowed to reopen for the sale of personal arms under government control (IRIN, April 26). Yemen continues to be an important regional transit point for arms shipments of all types, a lucrative trade that benefits leading members of the regime.

Legislation to regulate the possession of arms continues to be opposed by a number of members of parliament who, like most of their constituents, regard holding one or more weapons as a traditional right. Some of the larger tribes possess stockpiles of heavy weapons that they will be reluctant to part with, given the 22 tribal clashes recorded last year alone. The tribes also regard their weaponry as a means of protecting themselves from government malfeasance.

Reforming the Security Apparatus

Apart from the military, Yemen’s security is handled by three civilian agencies, at least two of which are believed to include Salafi and Baathist sympathizers at the highest levels. Most important of these is the PSO. A number of PSO officials have been dismissed in the last few years in an attempt to eliminate corruption and Islamist sympathizers from the organization as it is reshaped to take the lead in Yemen’s counter-terrorism effort. The PSO reports directly to the president and its upper ranks are composed exclusively of former army officers. The Ministry of the Interior runs the Central Security Organization (CSO), a paramilitary force of 50,000 men, equipped with light weapons and armored personnel carriers. The smaller National Security Bureau (NSB), founded in 2002, reports directly to the president as well. The NSB may be designed to be in competition with the PSO. The United States currently offers counter-terrorist training to members of Yemen’s security forces and is involved in helping build a new national Coast Guard (a project that also includes contributions from the United Kingdom and Australia).

The CSO’s elite Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU) is trained jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom. As a relatively new organization formed in 2003, the CTU is expected to apply innovative strategies to counter-terrorism work, while avoiding the corruption ingrained in more senior security groups. The Interior Ministry is also engaged in a campaign to decrease the size of both official and unofficial corps of bodyguards employed by public figures in Yemen. Some groups of bodyguards now approach the level of private militias, enforcing the will of local sheikhs and tribal leaders (Yemen Observer, April 24).

Arbitrary arrests and extended detentions without charge or trial continue to be preferred methods of the security services. The PSO, CSO and many tribal sheikhs operate their own extra-judicial detention centers. Relatives of militants are routinely imprisoned to put pressure on wanted individuals to surrender. At a recent judicial symposium, it was suggested that there are as many as 4,000 innocent citizens being held in the prisons of the security services (Yemen Observer, April 28). Regular use of torture in Yemen’s prisons and other judicial abuses have been documented in the U.S. Department of State’s annual report on human rights (Yemen Times, March 14).

The ongoing rebellion in Sa’dah province has the advantage, at least, of keeping the army busy while Saleh attempts to repair relations with Washington. Many in the officer corps were trained in Baathist Iraq and deeply oppose the U.S.-led intervention there. Dissatisfaction in the ranks has not yet become disloyalty, however, and Saleh has placed a number of family members in crucial command roles to ensure that it stays that way. These include his son Ahmad (a possible presidential successor and presently commander of the Republican Guard and the Special Forces), his brother Ali Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the Air Force) and half-brother Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar (commander of the northwest region and a long-time Salafi sympathizer). Two of the president’s nephews serve as commanders of the CSO and the NSB.

U.S. diplomats in Yemen have frequently been targeted by Salafi extremists, although Yemen’s security services have preempted several such operations. Typical of the “revolving door” approach to terrorism prosecutions that irks the United States is the case of two Yemenis convicted of trying to assassinate U.S. Ambassador Edmund James Hull (an important official in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts) in 2004. Only days after Saleh’s return from Washington, the two convicts had their sentences reduced from five years to three on appeal (AFP, May 7).

Shaykh Muhammad Ali Hassan al-Moayyad

Yemeni Prisoners in the United States

During his visit to Washington, President Saleh asked for the repatriation of Shaykh Muhammad Ali Hassan al-Moayyad, a Yemeni religious scholar extradited from Germany to the United States (along with his assistant Muhammad Za’id), where he is serving a prison term after being convicted of supporting Hamas (but acquitted of supporting al-Qaeda). Yemeni human rights organizations are agitating for the shaykh’s release on the grounds of declining health. The head of a national committee to free al-Moayyad (who is popular in Yemen for his charitable work) notes that, since “Europe and the whole international community are (now) dealing with Hamas as an independent entity, why is it forbidden for al-Moayyad?” (Yemen Observer, April 25).

Saleh also discussed the case of Yemeni citizens held in Guantanamo Bay. Although official Yemeni sources claim that Saleh requested the release of all the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay prisoners, there are signs that Yemen’s government is not overeager for their repatriation. In a March visit to Yemen, Marc Falkoff, a lawyer for 17 of the Yemeni detainees, revealed that he had obtained documents from the Pentagon showing that many of the Yemeni prisoners had been eligible for repatriation as far back as June 2004. The Yemeni government justifies its inaction by claiming that the citizenship of some of the Yemeni detainees is under question. According to Falkoff, “Fully one-third of the Saudis are back in Saudi Arabia, more than half of the Afghanis are home with their families and every single European national has been released from Guantanamo. Yet, more than 100 Yemenis remain at the prison—sitting in solitary confinement on steel beds, deprived of books and newspapers, slowly going insane” (Yemen Times, March 11).

U.S. officials claim that there are 107 Yemeni prisoners at Guantanamo, while human rights activists cite as many as 150, but there is no doubt that Yemenis form the largest single group of foreign nationals detained at the facility. Although the government may be in no hurry for their return, reports of alleged torture practiced on Yemeni detainees in U.S.-run detention centers have inflamed anti-American sentiment in Yemen.

The Case of al-Zindani

Saleh also requested that the U.S. drop Yemen’s controversial Shaykh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani from its list of designated terrorists. Believed by U.S. intelligence services to be an important link to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the sheikh’s terrorist designation has been an unrelenting irritant to U.S.-Yemeni relations. The sheikh is a powerful member of the Islamist Islah Party and has close ties to Saleh’s administration. Yemen’s parliament recently rescinded a decision to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) system, largely because of the fear of Islah Party MPs that the ICC could be used as a tool to extradite and try al-Zindani on terrorism charges (al-Thawri, May 2). Apparently, Shaykh al-Zindani has lately joined the call for religious scholars to correct the mistakes in Islamic interpretation that promote dissension and political violence (Yemen Observer, May 2).

Conclusion

Security issues and concerns with government reforms led donor states to suspend economic aid to Yemen two years ago, but President Saleh’s reform efforts appear to have regained the confidence of the international donor community. Despite the detention of political activists and opposition candidates during the 2006 election campaign, Saleh’s new seven-year term as president is regarded as a sign of stability. European aid is flowing once again, and in February the Bush administration announced that Yemen was once more eligible to receive funds from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (tied to progress in governance). Of the $94 million released by the MCA, $59 million is dedicated to the military and security sector (Saba News Agency, May 3). The aid represents vital assistance to Yemen’s weak economy. Unemployment persists at about 40 percent, there is little development and Yemen’s small petroleum industry does not enjoy the bountiful reserves found in its prosperous Arabian Peninsula neighbors.

While Saleh cannot ignore the general discontent within Yemen regarding U.S. foreign policy, he also recognizes that cooperation with the United States is the best method of ensuring the survival of his regime. Methods such as the “dialogue with extremists” and the “revolving door” of the judicial system allow Saleh to keep a lid on Sunni radicalism, while at the same time posing as a vital ally of the United States. Despite the apparent success of Saleh’s visit to Washington, there is still much to concern the United States in its relationship with Yemen. Reforms to the security services have notably involved purges of al-Qaeda sympathizers at only the lowest levels. Yemeni extremists continue to join anti-coalition forces in Iraq and have been involved in terrorist operations in several countries as President Saleh continues his search for a “third option” in the war on terrorism.

This article was first published in the May 10, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

April 6, 2007

Despite being designated by the United States and the United Nations as a “global terrorist,” Yemen’s Shaykh Abdul Majid al-Zindani continues to be protected by the Yemeni government. Most recently, Sultan al-Barakani, chairman of the ruling General People’s Congress Caucus, said that the U.S. government had failed to send the Yemeni government information incriminating al-Zindani in terrorism, stating that, “we don’t have any evidence that Shaykh al-Zindani was involved with al-Qaeda” (Yemen Times, April 2).

Shaykh Abdul Majid al-Zindani

Shaykh al-Zindani is one of the most perplexing characters to emerge from the war on terrorism. Politically powerful and revered by some as one of the Islamic world’s leading educators, al-Zindani’s alleged ties to al-Qaeda have brought him to the attention of international counter-terrorism authorities. Despite his official U.S. and UN designations as a “global terrorist,” the red-bearded scholar remains free and highly active in the political, religious, educational and medical fields, the latter representing a new and somewhat questionable addition to al-Zindani’s career. Al-Zindani is a leading member of the opposition al-Islah Party, although in Yemen’s complex political structure al-Zindani and the nominally oppositionist al-Islah frequently work closely with Yemen’s ruler, President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Shaykh’s real political enemies are found in the ranks of Yemen’s secular Socialist Party. Al-Zindani recently declared that both the socialists and the unity constitution are “infidel” (al-Thawri, March 8).

Al-Zindani is also a leading exponent of the scientific basis for Islam, as outlined in various passages of the Quran that the Shaykh interprets as descriptions of everything from black holes to photosynthesis. Last December, al-Zindani, a former pharmacist, claimed to have developed a cure for HIV/AIDS. Unlike other HIV/AIDS medicines, the Shaykh’s discovery allegedly has no side effects while eliminating the disease in men, women and even fetuses. Al-Zindani asserts that he will reveal the herbal formula for “Eajaz-3” once a copyright has been obtained. Although the Shaykh claims the inspiration of his creation “came from God,” no proof of the cure’s effectiveness has yet been presented (Yemen Observer, December 19, 2006). In the last few months, five Libyan children receiving treatment for HIV at al-Zindani’s al-Iman University have been deported in response to allegations of Libyan assistance to Shiite rebels in Yemen’s Sa’ada province (Yemen Observer, March 6).

According to a statement from the U.S. Treasury Department, al-Zindani’s involvement with al-Qaeda includes recruiting, purchasing weapons and acting as a spiritual leader for the movement, as well as acting as a contact for Kurdish Iraq’s Ansar al-Islam. [1] The Yemen government has ignored appeals from Washington for the arrest of the Shaykh and the seizure of his assets (Arab News, February 24, 2006). Al-Zindani was recently identified in a U.S. federal court as the coordinator of the October 2000 suicide attack in Aden harbor on the USS Cole. A two and a half year-old lawsuit filed in Virginia by the families of the 17 servicemen killed in the bombing has recently finished by finding the country of Sudan responsible for the attack, opening the way for compensation payments from the US$68 million in Sudanese assets frozen by the U.S. government. The suit also alleged that al-Zindani selected the two suicide bombers that carried out the strike, although the Shaykh was never charged by Yemeni authorities with complicity in the attack (The Virginian-Pilot, March 12). Yemen’s minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, welcomed the decision, ignoring the alleged role of al-Zindani, while declaring the verdict proof that Yemen was in no way involved in the attack on the U.S. destroyer.

There is no indication that al-Zindani will lose the protection of Yemen’s government in the foreseeable future. While the controversial Shaykh continues to hold radical Islamist views, al-Zindani has lately made a slight retreat from the Islamist global arena, focusing on domestic politics while assuming a lower international profile, no doubt with the encouragement of President Saleh (who continues to represent himself as an ally in the war on terrorism). Shaykh al-Zindani appears to be trying to create a more respectable international image for himself through his unlikely claim to have developed a cure for HIV. This effort may quickly backfire if it turns out that the Shaykh has fraudulently treated HIV sufferers who may have sought more useful and proven medical treatments elsewhere.

Note

1. http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js1190.htm

This article first appeared in the April 3, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Andrew McGregor

July 26, 2006

In Yemen’s “war on terrorism,” the legal merry-go-round continues. On July 12, a dozen officers from Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO) received sentences between eight months and three years and indefinite suspensions from work for collusion in the sensational escape of 23 al-Qaeda suspects from a Sanaa PSO prison in February. The defendants, however, remain entitled to retirement benefits (26September.com, July 14). The suspects were tried in a military court, although Yemen’s National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms protested that the court had no jurisdiction since security employees were part of the civil service (NewsYemen, July 17).

Nine of the 23 escapees have been captured, but none of the 13 who were convicted of involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole (including their leader, Jamal al-Badawi) are currently detained. With the exception of Ahmad al-Raimi, all those recaptured have since been released for lack of evidence. The same cause has been cited in the release of 315 al-Qaeda suspects in recent months (26September.com, May 31). The PSO, like many institutions in Yemen, is thoroughly infiltrated by Islamists, some of whom are sympathetic to the aims of al-Qaeda. The Islamists are also well represented in the parliament by the Islah Party, which, despite its opposition status, is closely tied with the ruling General People’s Congress. With al-Badawi and his colleagues still on the loose, the PSO convictions will do little to mollify the U.S. administration, which views the escape as a major setback in U.S.-Yemen cooperation in the war on terrorism.

Perhaps indicative of the current mood in Yemen was the unlikely acquittal earlier this month of 19 men charged with the possession of weapons and explosives intended for attacks on U.S. interests in Yemen. Sanaa Primary Court judge Muhammad al-Badani ruled that the defendants (14 Yemenis and five Saudis) had only been charged because of their participation or intention to participate in jihad in Iraq under the direction of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and that the prosecution had failed to prove that the arms were not meant for that purpose. In a move sure to be applauded by Yemen’s Islamists, the judge relied on Sharia law in ruling that “when the enemy collects its forces to occupy a part of the defender’s homeland and seeks to occupy the whole land, so jihad is a duty for all Muslims to break off the occupation” (NewsYemen, July 9). The defendants remain in prison as the decision is being appealed in the Court of Criminal Appeals by state prosecutors, who have suggested that the acquittals “undermined trust in justice” (Arab News, July 13).

With a presidential election coming up in September, there is considerable speculation within Yemen that President Ali Abdullah Saleh is courting Yemen’s considerable and influential Islamist constituency. His main challenger will be Faisal ‘Othman bin Shamlan, a vocal opponent of al-Qaeda running on an anti-corruption platform (Yemen Times, July 8).

U.S. operations in Iraq are a daily sore-point for much of Yemen’s population, making President Saleh’s cooperation with the United States politically dangerous. Yemen’s army had especially close ties to the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein, many of whose ex-members now form the core of the Iraqi resistance. U.S. support for Israel’s current attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip has brought thousands into the streets in protest and calls from some members of parliament for the expulsion of U.S. Ambassador Thomas Krajesky. Other MPs have called for a portion of the country’s oil revenues to be dedicated to Palestinian and Lebanese resistance to Israel (Yemen Observer, July 18). Simmering anti-U.S. sentiment may soon endanger the already tenuous security links between the United States and Yemen.

This article first appeared in the July 26, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Andrew McGregor

May 4, 2006

Any observer of Yemen’s political scene cannot help but notice that Yemen appears to be awash with al-Qaeda suspects. Mass trials follow mass arrests as hundreds of suspects flow through Yemen’s legal system. Some are selected for execution and others for lengthy prison sentences, but many avail themselves of early release or periodic amnesties. The system seems designed to weed out those who present a direct threat to Yemen or its regime, while relieving U.S. pressure in the war on terrorism by offering a constant demonstration of activity. In the wings of this performance is the constant threat of an insurgency led by Yemen’s powerful Islamist movement.

The Legal Frontline

A continuing irritant in Yemen-U.S. relations is the status of Shaykh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, the country’s most prominent Islamist and leader of the Iman University in Sanaa. In February 2004, the U.S. Treasury Department identified al-Zindani as a “specially designated global terrorist” (Terrorism Monitor, April 6). The U.S. would like to see the Shaykh extradited for his al-Qaeda connections and possible involvement in the USS Cole bombing, but al-Zindani enjoys the personal protection of Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who describes him as “a moderate.” The president called such extradition attempts “unconstitutional” and noted that “we are not the police of any other country” (Yemen Observer, March 1)

The Shaykh met in early April with Khaled Meshaal, the Syrian-based leader of Hamas. At a fundraising event for the new Palestinian government (which has lost nearly all foreign aid from the West), al-Zindani referred to Hamas as “the jihad-fighting, steadfast, resolute government of Palestine” (UPI, April 14). Al-Zindani is a leading member of Yemen’s Islah Party, an Islamist opposition party that often works closely with the government. The leader of Islah is Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar, chief of the powerful Hashed tribe. President Saleh and many other government figures are members of the Hashed. Al-Ahmar is close to the Saudis, and it is partly through his mediation that many long-standing territorial and security disputes have been resolved in the last few years.

Al-Zindani is one of many Yemeni “Afghans,” the term used for veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Rather than alienate the so-called Afghans, Saleh’s regime has used them to eliminate opponents of the government, most notably in the assassination campaign against members of the Yemen Socialist Party in the period 1990-94. Others are reported to have been deployed against Zaidi Shiite militants in Northern Yemen.

Meanwhile, Saudi-born Mohammad Hamdi al-Ahdal is facing the death penalty in another U.S.-related prosecution. A veteran of conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya, al-Ahdal is charged with being a leading member of Yemen’s al-Qaeda network, raising funds and organizing bomb attacks on U.S. interests in the country. He has admitted to collecting over one million Saudi riyals to buy the allegiance of Yemeni tribesmen in the Ma’rib region. Nineteen security men were killed in a three-year pursuit of al-Ahdal that ended in 2003. Al-Ahdal used his chance to speak in court to charge Saudi and U.S. authorities with pressing Sanaa for a conviction. Al-Ahdal’s onetime superior in al-Qaeda, Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, was killed in Ma’rib in 2002 by a U.S. unmanned Predator aircraft.

Nineteen men currently on trial in Sanaa are accused of planning attacks against U.S. interests as revenge for the killing of al-Harthi. The suspects, including five Saudis, are accused of operating under the instructions of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the al-Qaeda faction in Iraq (Yemen Times, April 16). Two of the accused have admitted to possessing arms and explosives for use in training fighters for Iraq and Afghanistan, but proclaimed that their war was with the United States, not Yemen (Yemen Observer, March 4).

In an interesting case that attracted little attention, a group of former Iraqi army officers were acquitted on appeal in March on charges of plotting to attack the U.S. and UK embassies in Sanaa. Other former Iraqi officers are reported to have found employment in Yemen’s military. The two armies cooperated extensively in the Saddam Hussein era, and a large part of Yemen’s military received training in Iraq. The Iraqis have spent three years in prison, but appealed to be allowed to stay in Yemen over fears for their safety in Iraq.

Furthermore, on April 19, a group of 13 Islamists led by Ali Sufyan al-Amari were handed prison terms of up to seven years for plotting attacks against political and security officials in Yemen. Prosecutors announced in late April that 60 more suspected members of al-Qaeda are being brought to trial (26September.com, April 25).

Though the mass prosecutions suggest Yemen is mounting a successful campaign against Islamist militants, hundreds of convicted extremists have found a quick route to freedom through cooperation with Yemen’s Dialogue Committee, which engages the prisoners in a Quran-based rehabilitation program. Other convicted Islamists are released in periodic amnesties, while suspects with political connections are often never brought to trial. Over 800 Zaidi Shiite rebels were freed in March in order to resolve the 2004-2005 conflict that erupted in the mountains of Northern Yemen. While the “revolving door” system of Yemeni justice frustrates U.S. security agencies, dispute resolution, mediation and reconciliation are all traditional art forms in Yemen’s fractious social framework. They are what prevent the state from disintegrating, and Saleh’s proficiency in these skills keeps the regime afloat.

Hunting Fugitives

Yemeni security forces continue the hunt for the 23 Islamists who escaped prison in Sanaa in February 2006. The facility was run by Yemen’s leading intelligence service, the Political Security Organization (PSO). Particularly distressing to the U.S. was that many of the fugitives had been involved in terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, while some were making their second escape from PSO prisons. Eight of the escapees have surrendered or been captured, but the two most prominent fugitives, Jamal al-Badawi and Jaber Elbaneh, remain at large. Al-Badawi was sentenced to death in 2004 for planning the attack on the USS Cole, while Elbaneh was one of the so-called “Lackawanna Six,” a terrorist cell based in upper New York state. Of the six, five are serving sentences in U.S. prisons, but Elbaneh escaped to Yemen where Yemeni police eventually detained him.

Security forces are reportedly using tribal and religious leaders in negotiations with the other fugitives for their surrender (Yemen Observer, April 3). Several PSO prison governors were put before a military tribunal on April 27 on charges of “inadequate conduct” in relation to the escape. The PSO is widely believed to include Islamists in its ranks, and there were serious questions raised at the time of the escape regarding PSO assistance to the escapees.

The escape has created barriers to the release of over 100 Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay. The Yemen government maintains that 95 percent of these prisoners have no involvement in terrorism. According to a government study, most of the captive Yemenis worked in Afghanistan as teachers of the Quran or the Arabic language (26September.com, March 21). Nevertheless, some prisoners already released from Guantanamo Bay have been charged in Yemen with membership in al-Qaeda. One Yemeni prisoner who is unlikely to be released anytime soon is Shaykh Muhammad Ali Hassan al-Muayad, who is serving 75 years in a Colorado prison for financing terrorism. The Shaykh was a member of the Shura Council of the Islah Party and imam of the main mosque in Sanaa before he was arrested in Germany in 2003 and extradited to the U.S. Al-Muayad complains of mistreatment in the U.S. and his family is appealing to President Saleh to intervene.

Yemen and the War in Iraq

U.S. intelligence has identified Yemen as a leading source of foreign fighters in the war in Iraq. The leader of the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (one of Yemen’s largest Islamist militant groups), Khalid Abd al-Nabi, has complained that members of his group were arrested by PSO officers and then taken before U.S. operatives for interrogation regarding plans to fight coalition forces in Iraq (Yemen Times, April 4). The Islamic Army was formed in 1994 from “Afghans” who had helped Saleh’s regime defeat Southern Yemen’s socialists. They are accused of maintaining ties with al-Qaeda while sending fighters to join al-Zarqawi’s network in Iraq.

In 2002, the government mounted a largely ineffective assault with heavy artillery and helicopter gunships on the group’s training camp in the mountains near Hatat in Abyan district. Abd al-Nabi surrendered to the government, but was only briefly detained before being released without charges. Convicted Islamist militants released through the Dialogue Committee program agree to avoid further militancy within Yemen, but there is no mention made of Iraq.

Conclusion

A report released in April by Yemen’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation revealed that 41 percent of Yemenis are below the poverty line and lack access to basic health and educational services (Yemen Times, April 25). Rising food prices, a 17 percent unemployment rate and a general lack of opportunity for Yemen’s youth provide a pool of dissatisfied recruits for Islamist organizations.

The number of Yemenis currently fighting in Iraq is probably not large, but the presence of the conflict provides an external outlet for Yemen’s most militant Islamists, much like Afghanistan once did. With the Islamist opposition forming the largest political force in Yemen outside of the current government, the United States will continue to find it difficult to leverage the Saleh regime. Any U.S. intervention at this point would present serious consequences for the stability of the region. For now, Yemen will remain a troubling ally in the war on terrorism.

This article first appeared in the May 4, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

March 7, 2006

The war on terrorism is fought in Yemen in the press and courtrooms as well as in the mountains and deserts. Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is a veteran political survivor, but a tug-of-war with the U.S. over a leading opposition figure accused of supporting terrorism is threatening the president’s delicate web of political alliances.

Abdul Majid al-Zindani

Abdul-Majid al-Zindani, a veteran of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, was named by the U.S. Treasury Department as a “specially designated global terrorist” in February 2004. The sheikh is accused of obtaining arms and funds for al-Qaeda and acting as a spiritual advisor to Osama bin Laden. He has since been added to the UN Security Council’s list of terrorism suspects.

The 56 year-old Islamist is a powerful man in Yemen and enjoys a wide power base. He is the head of the Shura Council of the Islah Party and president of al-Iman University in Sanaa, maintaining a strong presence in both the political and intellectual life of the country. A resolution of the UN Security Council has called for the seizure of the sheikh’s assets and a ban on travel to foreign countries. Neither measure has yet been implemented in Yemen; in fact, al-Zindani accompanied Saleh to Mecca for a summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference last year, a mission noted in a recent letter from President Bush to President Saleh (published by a defense department website, 26September.com, March 4).

The letter expressed President Bush’s “disappointment” in Saleh’s handling of the al-Zindani case and expressed doubt in Yemen’s “commitment to the war on terrorism.” According to 26September, the message was followed by a telephone call to President Saleh from a U.S. anti-terrorism official who demanded al-Zindani’s arrest. Yemen is asking for more definitive proof of the sheikh’s guilt.

Al-Zindani has lately targeted three of Yemen’s journalists for offending the Prophet Muhammad by publishing the Danish cartoons. The sheikh is raising money to try the journalists, but has run into an unexpected wall of solidarity from Yemen’s journalist community. An embarrassing development was the revelation that copies of the cartoons had been made and distributed at the sheikh’s own al-Iman University (NewsYemen, March 3).

There may be deeper reasons for al-Zindani’s antagonism toward local media. The sheikh blames his problems with the U.S. on malicious portrayals in the Yemen press, invented for “political reasons.” He describes U.S. allegations of ties to terrorism as similar to the charges of Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction in that they lack proof or evidence (NewsYemen, March 3).

Al-Zindani is eager to avoid extradition to the U.S. and, to the surprise of many, has even publicly praised the efforts of his political rival, President Saleh, to remove his name from the U.S. list of terrorism supporters. The sheikh may already be a target of an unknown party, as an investigation has been opened into two recent incidents of alleged interference with al-Zindani’s car. In the first, a tire exploded while he was driving, and in the second a tire flew off his vehicle (Yemen Times, March 4).

One member of the Islah Party’s Shura Council, Muhammad ‘Ali Hasan al-Muayad, is already in U.S. detention after his extradition from Germany in November 2003. Demands for the arrest or extradition of al-Zindani could threaten the fragile balance that keeps President Saleh in power. While Saleh’s methods frequently puzzle and exasperate the State Department, he is still regarded as an important ally of the U.S. in the war on terrorism. President Saleh has expressed his reluctance to extradite any citizen of Yemen: “We are not the police of any other country. We are independent and have sovereignty” (Yemen Observer, March 1). It remains now to be seen if the U.S. will press the issue.

This article first appeared in the March 7, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focua

Andrew McGregor

February 7, 2006

Yemen’s U.S.-sponsored fight against al-Qaeda suffered a severe blow last week with the escape of 23 convicts from a high security prison in the capital of Sana’a. Among the escapees were 13 al-Qaeda suspects imprisoned for their roles in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole and the 2002 attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. On February 5, Interpol issued a global alert that described the fugitives as a “danger to all countries.” The prison break came only one day before the trial date of Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal and 14 other al-Qaeda suspects. Al-Ahdal is accused of directing the Cole bombers, but was to be tried on charges of financing terrorism. That trial has now been postponed indefinitely.

Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal

The escape took place February 3 from the Sana’a national headquarters of the Political Security Organization (PSO), Yemen’s leading intelligence agency. The possibility of inside help for the mass escape from Yemen’s most tightly guarded prison has raised the question of whether the state security services harbor agents sympathetic to al-Qaeda. The prison’s previous commander and deputy were dismissed just two weeks ago after two Zaydi militants escaped. Government sources initially claimed that the al-Qaeda fugitives escaped through a 70-meter tunnel that emerged in a nearby mosque (http://www.26sep.net, February 4). Later reports suggested that the tunnel was 140 meters long and was dug from the mosque into the prison.

Unlike Yemen’s three other major security agencies, the PSO leadership is recruited solely from military officers and reports directly to President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Like the army, the PSO is believed to include many Salafists and Baathist sympathizers, a legacy of Yemen’s broad support for the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and a long alliance with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Gulf States Newsletter, December 9, 2005). The U.S. war in Iraq is widely opposed in the officer corps, many of whom were trained in Iraq. The PSO has been accused within Yemen of mass extra-judicial arrests made in an effort to flush out al-Qaeda members. In July 2002, the home of PSO Vice Chairman Ali Mansur Rashid was attacked by armed men seeking the release of “173 Mujahidin” (al-Ahram Weekly, August 15-21, 2002).

Jamal al-Badawi

The escapees included two notable figures. Jamal al-Badawi was charged as one of the main plotters in the strike on the Cole. President Saleh commuted the sentence of death that followed al-Badawi’s conviction to a prison term of 15 years. In politically volatile Yemen, prosecutions are often dependent upon the political consequences of a conviction, and occasional commutations and amnesties are part of maintaining Saleh’s presidency. Al-Badawi was one of 10 al-Qaeda members who escaped from an Aden prison in April 2003. Like the prison in Sana’a, this facility was also run by the PSO.

The other fugitive of note is Fawaz al-Rabihi, another leading al-Qaeda figure in Yemen. Al-Rabihi came to the attention of the FBI in early 2002, when the agency issued a warning that al-Rabihi had left Afghanistan with the intent of striking U.S. interests in Yemen or the U.S. homeland. Al-Rabihi struck in October 2002, attacking the Limburg with a primitive bomb-boat under the alleged direction of al-Ahdal. The explosion killed one sailor, and the consequent three-fold increase in maritime insurance for the area severely damaged Yemen’s economy. In an outburst after receiving the death sentence from a Sana’a court, the Saudi-born al-Rabihi claimed he had given his pledge to Osama bin Laden to kill Americans. The escapees may be heading to Salafist strongholds in Shabwah, Marib or al-Jawf provinces

This article first appeared in the February 7, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focua

Andrew McGregor

February 1, 2006

Yemen is preparing to try a number of prisoners who are accused of being associated with al-Qaeda terrorist activities in Yemen and abroad. The most notable prosecution involves Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal (also known as Abu Asim al-Makki) and his associate Ghalib al-Zaidi, who have been held since December 2003. Al-Ahdal is described as a veteran of fighting in Chechnya and Afghanistan (where he lost a leg) before returning to Yemen to conduct terrorist operations. He is a former deputy to Sinan al-Harthi, an al-Qaeda operative killed by an American drone aircraft in 2002.

Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman al-Bahlul

U.S. lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights visited Yemen last week to meet with families of the men being held at the Guantanamo Bay prison. A lawsuit is being prepared on behalf of 60 Yemeni citizens still held in the Cuba-based prison. On January 23, it was announced that four men released from Guantanamo a year ago will be tried on charges of being al-Qaeda members. It had been widely expected that the men would be released for lack of evidence. A fifth suspect released from Guantanamo is being tried in a separate action on charges of drug trafficking. Karama Sa’id Khamsan was arrested near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border by Pakistani police and was turned over to U.S. forces in 2001, although it is now alleged that he was there to take delivery of two tons of hashish bound for Yemen (Gulf Times, January 24, 2006).

In addition, 19 people suspected of planning the assassination of U.S. officials and planning other terrorist acts in Aden have been delivered for prosecution. The 19 are accused of having returned from jihad in Iraq with orders from Iraqi al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to begin operations in Yemen.

There are conflicting reports about the whereabouts of Yemeni businessman and member of the ruling General People’s Congress Abdul Sala’am al-Hilah. Last week, Amnesty International reported that al-Hilah was now in Guantanamo Bay, but the Yemeni Foreign Ministry claimed he was still in a prison in Afghanistan. Al-Hilah told Amnesty that he was kidnapped in Egypt in September 2002 before being transported to prisons in Azerbaijan and Afghanistan (Yemen Observer, January 21, 2006).

Also at Guantanamo, another Yemeni was put on trial by U.S. military authorities this month, one of the first two prisoners to face a military commission. In a 10 minute speech before the commission, Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman al-Bahlul denounced American support for Israel, declined the services of his court-appointed U.S. military lawyer (who faced four prosecutors) and declared a boycott of the entire proceedings. Al-Bahlul was a media specialist for Osama bin Laden who created a video lionizing the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. Additional charges of conspiring to carry out terrorist activities means al-Bahlul could face a life sentence. The trial has been adjourned until May 15.

The government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been one of the United States’ staunchest allies in the war on terrorism. Yet, while the Yemeni government cracks down on Sunni terrorism, it faces renewed fighting from Zaidi Shiite rebels in the mountainous north of the country. The insurgents, who ambushed an army column on January 19, are believed to be ex-followers of preacher Husayn al-Huthi, who was killed along with many supporters in battles with security forces in 2004. The renewed attacks are sure to disappoint the government, which has made concerted efforts at reconciliation with the restive North.

This article first appeared in the February 1, 2006 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus