African Troops Pour into Central African Republic to Halt Rebel Advance

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Andrew McGregor

January 11, 2013

African troops from several nations have begun to arrive in the Central African Republic (CAR) in an effort to save the embattled regime of President François Bozizé Yangouvonda. The latest threat to the Bozizé regime began on December 10, 2012, when a coalition of three rebel movements known as “Seleka” began an offensive in the north of the country, covering 500 km over rough terrain in only 19 days before halting close to the capital of Bangui.

The rebels met only minimal resistance from government troops (the Forces armées centrafricaines – FACA) and troops belonging to the Mission de consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine (MICOPAX), an international force of over 500 troops from Chad, Gabon, Cameroon and the Congo. Bozizé has dismissed his own son, Jean-Francis, from his post as Defense Minister over the failure of the army to offer any resistance to the rebel advance (PANA Online [Dakar], January 4). For now the rebel advance has halted outside Damara, roughly 100 miles from the capital of Bangui as both parties head to talks in the Gabon capital of Libreville.

The CAR has abundant reserves of uranium, diamonds and timber, but continued insecurity and corruption have left the landlocked nation one of the poorest and most underdeveloped on earth. The military often goes unpaid for months at a time and has occasionally relied on emergency shipments of cash from France to prevent new rounds of mutinies. As a result, the poorly trained and ill-led force has come to resemble yet another bandit group that rarely conducts operations of any size outside the capital. The Presidential Guard is largely composed of Chadian mercenaries.

The rebel coalition is composed of three groups that came to terms with the government in the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement; the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR), the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) and the Front démocratique du people centrafricain (FDPC). These groups accuse Bozizé of failing to meet the terms of the agreement over the last five years and now demand his ouster. Seleka is under the nominal command of Michel Djotodia, a founding member of the UFDR and is represented in Paris by Eric Massi, the son of Charles Massi, a former government minister and CPJP leader who was killed in mysterious circumstances after his arrest in 2009. Seleka’s military chief is Aubain Issa Issiaka. Though the coalition is united in their hatred of Bozizé, they appear to be unable to agree on little else (Jeune Afrique, January 2). Despite the unwillingness of the international contingent to confront the rebel advance so far, Gabonese MICOPAX commander General Jean-Felix Akaga has warned Seleka that “We will not give up Damara, this must be clear. If the rebels attack Damara, this will mean that they have decided to take on the ten countries of Central Africa” (Jeune Afrique, January 2).

The CAR’s Territorial Administration Minister, Josué Binoua, claims that the rebel groups are in fact composed of rebels from Darfur and the remnants of Mahamat Nouri’s Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique (ANCD), a relatively inactive Chadian rebel group since it lost the backing of Khartoum in 2010 (for the collapse of the Chadian rebellion, see Terrorism Monitor, October 28, 2010). The ANCD has denied any involvement in the rebellion (AFP, January 4). According to Binoua, the leaders of the rebellion studied in Saudi Arabia and Qatar and intend to impose Wahhabist beliefs on the CAR (Jeune Afrique, January 7). Though many of the rebels are indeed Muslims from the northern CAR, these claims seem designed to rally international support behind the Bozize regime by raising the specter of a takeover by Salafi-Jihadists similar to that in northern Mali.

Several nations have responded to an appeal for more troops from Chadian president Idriss Déby Itno, chairman of the Communauté économique des Etats d’Afrique centrale (CEEAC), the multinational body sponsoring MICOPAX. Congo-Brazzaville has committed 120 troops, as has Gabon and Cameroon. These forces are expected to join the 400 Chadians deployed at Damara, the last outpost before Bangui (PANA Online [Dakar], January 1; RFI, January 2; January 4; AFP, December 31, 2012). The reinforcements will operate under the command of MICOPAX. However, Gabonese Defense Minister Ruffin Pacome Odzonga has made it clear that “the mandate of the Gabonese troops is provide a buffer and not to fight the rebels” (RFI, January 2). CEEAC is composed of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tomé and Principe.

South Africa is also sending 400 members of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to the CAR on a limited deployment ranging from January 2 to March 31. Whether these troops would participate in operations against the rebels remains uncertain, as their mandate mentions only assisting FACA with “capacity building” and assisting in the “planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration processes” (SANews [Tshwane], January 7).

A detachment of several hundred French troops in Bangui as part of Operation Boali (intended to support the CAR military and international forces of the CEEAC) have been detailed to protect French nationals and diplomatic premises in the CAR capital. [1] CEEAC forces are expected to replace local vigilante groups in the capital known as Kokora. Armed with machetes and bows and arrows, these groups have detained or abused Muslims in the capital whom they accuse of being a fifth column for the rebels (AFP, January 2; January 5).

Note

1. France Diplomatie, December 27, 2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/central-african-republic-188/france-and-the-central-african/political-relations-6283/article/central-african-republic-q-a For Operation Boali, see http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/operation-boali-rca/dossier/les-forces-francaises-en-republique-centrafricaine.

This article first appeared in the January 11, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor

Islamist Groups Reconfigure in Northern Mali as Intervention Looms

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Andrew McGregor

January 11, 2013

Just as the days of cooperation between the three Islamist groups that seized control of northern Mali last year seemed to be over, the three groups appear to have mounted a joint push southwards towards Malian Army lines near Mopti and Sévaré. The move may be intended to present a united front before peace talks resume in Ouagadougou on January 19, though the exact composition of the force remains uncertain. The advance may also offer an opportunity to test the resolve of the Malian Army and its allied militias, which have been talking tough but showing little sign of mounting an offensive against the Islamists any time soon.

TimbuktuIslamist Fighters in Timbuktu

In the last few weeks, a combination of internal racial and religious tensions between the Islamist groups has been exacerbated by a perceived need to reconfigure alliances in the region to prepare for an inevitable external military intervention. The largely Tuareg Ansar al-Din movement commanded by Iyad ag Ghali (a.k.a. Abu al-Fadl) also appears to be making efforts to consolidate a leading role amongst the militant groups. Important changes are afoot in the command structure of the other Islamist groups in northern Mali which have, until now, been dominated by Mauritanian and Algerian Arab commanders.

In an interview with an Algerian newspaper, Shaykh Awisa, a leading member of Ansar al-Din’s military command, referred to the movement’s shift away from an alliance with the largely Black African Islamists of MUJWA (Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa) in favor of closer ties to its former partner, the Tuareg nationalist MNLA: “Our relations with the MNLA are very good. We have a common enemy [i.e. MUJWA]. There are no problems between our movement, Ansar al Din, and the MNLA” (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 27, 2012). The MNLA fought a fierce battle with MUJWA on November 16, 2012.

MUJWA has identified a replacement for Hisham Bilal, believed to have been the first sub-Saharan individual to command an al-Qaeda-associated jihadist combat unit. Bilal and a number of his men returned to his native Niger and surrendered to authorities there on November 8, 2012, complaining that the Arab commanders of MUJWA viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white” (AFP, November 9, 2012). Bilal’s successor is a Beninese national using the nom de guerre “Abdullah.” The new commander is reported to speak Yoruba, a major language in Nigeria as well as Benin, and may have been responsible for contacts between MUJWA and northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram movement (Radio France Internationale, December 31, 2012).  According to one report, MNLA leader Bilal ag Acherif was in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in mid-December, trying to convince authorities there that his movement could, with Nigerian arms and logistical support, provide a bulwark against the expansion of Boko Haram (Jeune Afrique, December 16, 2012).

MUJWA speaks of itself as an alliance between native Arab, Tuareg and Black African tribes and various muhajirin (“Immigrants,” i.e. foreign jihadists) from North and West Africa. According to MUJWA, their “war” against the MNLA was sparked not only by the Tuareg nationalists’ refusal to adopt Shari’a as the law of the land, but also by their racial attitudes, suggesting that in the MNLA, “the Black has no rights, while the White has rights” (in Malian usage, “white” is applied to Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians). [1] To further its official position on race relations, MUJWA cites a familiar hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) recorded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855 C.E.): “An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over a black, nor does a black have any superiority over a white except by piety” (Musnad Ahmad 22391).

On January 2, MUJWA’s Salah al-Din Brigade announced it had decided to leave MUJWA and join Iyad ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din movement. The decision by Brigade leader Sultan Ould Badi (a.k.a. Abu Ali) to swear allegiance to Ag Ghali apparently came after lengthy efforts by Ansar al-Din leaders to unify the Islamists. Most of the fighters in the Salah al-Din Brigade are reported to hail from Gao and Kidal (Sahara Media, January 2).

A leading member of the MNLA and its provisional Azawad government denied rumors of dissent within his movement while warning at the same time that any member of Ansar al-Din who allies himself with MUJWA will be treated as a MUJWA fighter (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 10, 2012). At the moment there are no hostilities between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din, both primarily Tuareg rebel movements who have been engaged in joint peace talks being held in Ougadougou and Algiers despite their conflicting goals. However, on January 3, Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali announced that his movement would no longer abide by its offer to end hostilities with the Bamako government due to the latter’s failure to bring anything of substance to negotiations in Ougadougou and its decision to recruit mercenaries from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire to fight in northern Mali (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January 3; AFP, January 3).

Within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Mauritanian, Muhammad al-Amin Ould al-Hassan Ould al-Hadrami (a.k.a. Abdallah al-Shinqiti), is reported to have been appointed the new amir of the Furqan Battalion to replace Yahya Abu al-Hammam, who took over as amir of AQIM’s Sahara command (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 18, 2012). Al-Shinqiti finished a degree from Nouackcohott’s Higher Institute for Islamic Studies and Research in 2006 while serving a 14-month prison term before joining AQIM (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], December 31, 2012). AQIM’s penchant for cigarette and drug smuggling has created friction with Ansar al-Din, which has vowed to eliminate the trade in areas under its control (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 29).

In order to broaden its base, Ansar al-Din now appears to be abandoning its strict adherence to the non-native Salafism that brought the movement into conflict with many residents of northern Mali. In negotiations being held in Burkina Faso, Ansar al-Din has backed away from its insistence that Shari’a be applied throughout Mali rather than just northern Mali (Azawad). Movement leaders such as Iyad ag Ghali and Algabass ag Intalla have been meeting with local religious leaders and tribal chiefs to assure them Ansar al-Din does not intend to interfere with the traditional form of Islam practiced in the region (Jeune Afrique, December 21). By doing so, the movement hopes to marginalize the foreign Salafists commanding AQIM. If Ansar al-Din is to have any success in the ongoing negotiations with Bamako it must be able to demonstrate some degree of popular support and thus cannot afford to continue alienating local Muslims. Such moves also help bring Ansar al-Din closer to the MNLA, which rejects the introduction of Islamist extremism into the region.

Meanwhile, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), who split from AQIM after a dispute with the movement’s leadership in November, is reported to have relocated with a detachment of loyalists and MUJWA fighters equipped with dozens of vehicles armed with heavy machine-guns to al-Khalil, an important transit point for smugglers and legitimate traders alike near the Algerian border (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 26, 2012; for Belmokhtar’s split, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, November 15; November 30). The occupation of al-Khalil gives Belmokhtar an opportunity to control fuel smuggling in the region as well as shipments of food and other goods to northern Mali. [2]

While northern Mali was once neatly divided between the three armed Islamist groups in the region, Ansar al-Din has now moved its forces out of Kidal into Timbuktu and Gao regions, once the preserves of AQIM and MUJWa, respectively. AQIM appears to have responded to this move by creating a new brigade to operate in Kidal, the Katibat Yusuf bin Tachfine, led by a Kidal Tuareg named Abu Abd al-Hamid al-Kidali (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 3, 2012). In the current environment of mistrust in northern Mali, a joint operation may be the only way of preventing an outbreak of clashes between the sometimes cooperative, sometimes antagonistic Islamist movements operating in the region.

Note

1. Statement from the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, Gao, November 23, 2012

2. For al-Khalil, see Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 2012.

This article first appeared in the January 11, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor.

Islamist Groups Mount Joint Offensive in Mali

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Andrew McGregor

January 10, 2013

Just as the days of cooperation between the three Islamist groups that seized control of northern Mali last year seemed to be over, the three groups appear to have mounted a joint push southwards towards Malian Army lines near Mopti and Sévaré. The move may be intended to present a united front before peace talks resume in Ouagadougou on January 19, though the exact composition of the force remains uncertain. The advance may also offer an opportunity to test the resolve of the Malian Army and its allied militias, which have been talking tough but showing little sign of mounting an offensive against the Islamists any time soon.

Ansar al-DinAnsar al-Din Fighters (al-Jazeera)

In the last few weeks, a combination of internal racial and religious tensions between the Islamist groups has been exacerbated by a perceived need to reconfigure alliances in the region to prepare for an inevitable external military intervention. Also, the largely Tuareg Ansar al-Din movement commanded by Iyad ag Ghali (a.k.a. Abu al-Fadl) appears to be making efforts to consolidate a leading role amongst the militant groups. Important changes are afoot in the command structure of the other Islamist groups in northern Mali which have, until now, been dominated by Mauritanian and Algerian Arab commanders.

In an interview with an Algerian newspaper, Shaykh Awisa, a leading member of Ansar al-Din’s military command, referred to the movement’s shift away from an alliance with the largely Black African Islamists of MUJWA (Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa) in favor of closer ties to its former partner, the Tuareg nationalist MNLA: “Our relations with the MNLA are very good. We have a common enemy [i.e. MUJWA]. There are no problems between our movement, Ansar al Din, and the MNLA” (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 27, 2012). The MNLA fought a fierce battle with MUJWA on November 16, 2012.

MUJWA has identified a replacement for Hisham Bilal, believed to have been the first sub-Saharan individual to command an al-Qaeda-associated jihadist combat unit. Bilal and a number of his men returned to his native Niger and surrendered to authorities there on November 8, 2012, complaining that the Arab commanders of MUJWA viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white” (AFP, November 9, 2012). Bilal’s successor is a Beninese national using the nom de guerre “Abdullah.” The new commander is reported to speak Yoruba, a major language in Nigeria as well as Benin, and may have been responsible for contacts between MUJWA and northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram movement (Radio France Internationale, December 31, 2012). According to one report, MNLA leader Bilal ag Acherif was in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in mid-December, trying to convince authorities there that his movement could, with Nigerian arms and logistical support, provide a bulwark against the expansion of Boko Haram (Jeune Afrique, December 16, 2012).

MUJWA speaks of itself as an alliance between native Arab, Tuareg and Black African tribes and various muhajirin (“Immigrants,” i.e. foreign jihadists) from North and West Africa. According to MUJWA, their “war” against the MNLA was sparked not only by the Tuareg nationalists’ refusal to adopt Shari’a as the law of the land, but also by their racial attitudes, suggesting that in the MNLA, “the Black has no rights, while the White has rights” (in Malian usage, “white” is applied to Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians). [1] To further its official position on race relations, MUJWA cites a familiar hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) recorded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855 C.E.): “An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over a black, nor does a black have any superiority over a white except by piety” (Musnad Ahmad 22391).

On January 2, MUJWA’s Salah al-Din Brigade announced it had decided to leave MUJWA and join Iyad ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din movement. The decision by Brigade leader Sultan Ould Badi (a.k.a. Abu Ali) to swear allegiance to Ag Ghali apparently came after lengthy efforts by Ansar al-Din leaders to unify the Islamists. Most of the fighters in the Salah al-Din Brigade are reported to hail from Gao and Kidal (Sahara Media, January 2).

A leading member of the MNLA and its provisional Azawad government denied rumors of dissent within his movement while warning at the same time that any member of Ansar al-Din who allies himself with MUJWA will be treated as a MUJWA fighter (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 10, 2012). At the moment there are no hostilities between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din, both primarily Tuareg rebel movements who have been engaged in joint peace talks being held in Ougadougou and Algiers despite their conflicting goals. However, on January 3, Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali announced that his movement would no longer abide by its offer to end hostilities with the Bamako government due to the latter’s failure to bring anything of substance to negotiations in Ougadougou and its decision to recruit mercenaries from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire to fight in northern Mali (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January 3; AFP, January 3).

Yahya Abu al-HammamYahya Abu al-Hammam

Within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Mauritanian, Muhammad al-Amin Ould al-Hassan Ould al-Hadrami (a.k.a. Abdallah al-Shinqiti), is reported to have been appointed the new amir of the Furqan Battalion to replace Yahya Abu al-Hammam, who took over as amir of AQIM’s Sahara command. Al-Shinqiti finished a degree from Nouackcohott’s Higher Institute for Islamic Studies and Research in 2006 while serving a 14-month prison term before joining AQIM (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], December 31, 2012). AQIM’s penchant for cigarette and drug smuggling has created friction with Ansar al-Din, which has vowed to eliminate the trade in areas under its control (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 29).

In order to broaden its base, Ansar al-Din now appears to be abandoning its strict adherence to the non-native Salafism that brought the movement into conflict with many residents of northern Mali. In negotiations being held in Burkina Faso, Ansar al-Din has backed away from its insistence that Shari’a be applied throughout Mali rather than just northern Mali (Azawad). Movement leaders such as Iyad ag Ghali and Algabass ag Intalla have been meeting with local religious leaders and tribal chiefs to assure them Ansar al-Din does not intend to interfere with the traditional form of Islam practiced in the region (Jeune Afrique, December 21). By doing so, the movement hopes to marginalize the foreign Salafists commanding AQIM. If Ansar al-Din is to have any success in the ongoing negotiations with Bamako it must be able to demonstrate some degree of popular support and thus cannot afford to continue alienating local Muslims. Such moves also help bring Ansar al-Din closer to the MNLA, which rejects the introduction of Islamist extremism into the region.

Meanwhile, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), who split from AQIM after a dispute with the movement’s leadership in November, is reported to have relocated with a detachment of loyalists and MUJWA fighters equipped with dozens of vehicles armed with heavy machine-guns to In Khalil, an important transit point for smugglers and legitimate traders alike near the Algerian border (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 26, 2012). The occupation of In Khalil gives Belmokhtar an opportunity to control fuel smuggling in the region as well as shipments of food and other goods to northern Mali. [2]

While northern Mali was once neatly divided between the three armed Islamist groups in the region, Ansar al-Din has now moved its forces out of Kidal into Timbuktu and Gao regions, once the preserves of AQIM and MUJWa, respectively. AQIM appears to have responded to this move by creating a new brigade to operate in Kidal, the Katibat Yusuf bin Tachfine, led by a Kidal Tuareg named Abu Abd al-Hamid al-Kidali (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 3, 2012). In the current environment of mistrust in northern Mali, a joint operation may be the only way of preventing an outbreak of clashes between the sometimes cooperative, sometimes antagonistic Islamist movements operating in the region.

Notes 

  1. Statement from the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, Gao, November 23, 2012.
  2. For In Khalil, see Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 2012.

This article first appeared in the January 10, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Sudanese Regime Begins to Unravel After Coup Reports and Rumors of Military Ties to Iran

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Andrew McGregor

January 7, 2013

The Sudanese capital of Khartoum is currently the center of a web of intrigue involving an alleged coup attempt, bitter divisions in the Islamist movement, a mysterious airstrike on the capital by Israeli warplanes and what appears to be a possible shift in foreign policy that would involve greater military and diplomatic cooperation with the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis.”

Most worrisome for the ruling Islamist/military alliance led by President Omar al-Bashir is the alleged coup attempt, which reflects growing divisions within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Rather than being the work of outsiders to the power structure, the attempted coup appears to have been the work of a combination of members of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Islamist officers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and possibly a number of Islamist politicians and businessmen. With an ailing Bashir possibly ready to step down later this year after 24 years of rule, there is a growing tendency for political contenders to act peremptorily to secure their accession to power in a nation roiled by multiple rebellions and the economically devastating separation of South Sudan in 2011.

“Corruption and Deviance from the Islamic path”

National Congress Party officials disclosed that 13 individuals had been arrested in a November 21 NISS round-up on charges of planning the overthrow of the government, including some of the most powerful men in the country. Most of the detainees may be characterized as hardline Islamist military and intelligence officers who are said to oppose the “corruption and deviance from the Islamic path” of the current regime. The alleged plotters are charged with targeting “the stability of the state and some leaders of the state” (AFP, November 29). The suspects face repercussions ranging from a presidential pardon to death sentences, though the latter would certainly be seen as provocative by many within the Islamist power structure (al-Mashhad al-An [Khartoum], December 6, 2012).

Nafi Ali NafiNafi Ali Nafi

Among the suspects are:

  • Former Presidential advisor and former NISS director Lieutenant General Salah Abdallah Abu Digin (a.k.a. Salah Gosh). Well known throughout Sudan, Salah Gosh was national intelligence director until he was sacked in 2009 following the failure of the Sudanese intelligence forces to discover and deter an attack by Darfur rebels on the national capital. He then served as a presidential advisor for security affairs for three years until losing that position in a 2011 power struggle with NCP vice-chairman Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi. Privately, Gosh’s family is reported to have claimed Nafi Ali Nafi is behind the charges against the former NISS director (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012). Following his surprise dismissal, Gosh went into business by opening a number of trading companies but was still reputed to be influential in regime circles. Gosh was taken to hospital with heart problems shortly after his arrest, where he underwent successful heart bypass surgery (AFP, November 29, 2012; al-Watan [Khartoum], December 2, 2012; Akhbar al-Yawm [Khartoum], December 6, 2012). Despite U.S. sanctions, Sudanese intelligence worked closely with its U.S. counterparts during Salah Gosh’s time as intelligence chief, with Gosh regarded as Sudan’s point man for contacts with the CIA. It was reported that Sudanese intelligence took a closer look into Gosh’s activities after noting he had gradually moved 25 members of his family to the United States earlier this year (al-Akhbar [Khartoum], November 24, 2012). Since his arrest, Gosh has had his immunity from prosecution revoked and his assets frozen by the Central Bank of Sudan.

Salah GoshFormer NISS director Lieutenant General Salah Abdallah Abu Digin (a.k.a. Salah Gosh)

  • Brigadier General Muhammad Ibrahim Abd al-Jalil (a.k.a. Wad Ibrahim), a veteran of 12 years of fighting in the South Sudan and once considered the Amir of the “Mujahideen” movement in Sudan, dedicated to transforming the Sudanese civil war into a “jihad” against Christians and animists in the South. Known for his modest lifestyle and so far untainted by charges of corruption, Wad Ibrahim is reputed to be a popular figure in the Sudanese officer corps. He was in charge of the president’s security for seven years.
  • NISS Major General Adel al-Tayib, a cousin of Wad Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune, November 22; al-Intibaha [Khartoum], November 29, 2012).
  • Former commander of the Sudanese-Chadian Border Force Colonel Fath al-Rahim Abdallah Sulayman, who is alleged to be the go-between for Wad Ibrahim and Salah Gosh.
  • Khalid Muhammad Mustafa, a former mujahideen commander operating in the Blue Nile region. Khalid is believed to be close to Wad Ibrahim.
  • Businessman Mustafa Nur al-Dayim, who is alleged to have ties to Dr. Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], November 29, 2012; December 6, 2012).
  • Lieutenant Colonel Amin al-Zaki, a well-known Islamist and deputy director of the NISS in White Nile Province.
  • Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Mumtaz of the Signal Corps, based in White Nile province and thought to be an associate of Wad Ibrahim (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], November 29, 2012).
  • Colonel Muhammad al-Zaki of the Armored Corps.
  • Colonel Hassan Abd al-Rahim of the Armored Corps. Abd al-Rahim is alleged to have provided contacts between the plotters and the Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], December 6, 2012).
  • Dr. Ghazi Salah al-Din – Head of the NCP bloc in parliament and formerly a close advisor to the president, entrusted with important files such as the Darfur issue. Ghazi Salah al-Din is a leader of the reform movement within the NCP that has mobilized behind the issues of corruption and economic deterioration (al-Akhbar [Khartoum], November 24, 2012).
  • Major General Musa al-Amin (al-Ahram al-Yawm [Khartoum], December 4, 2012).
  • General Abd al-Mula Musa Muhammad Musa – The retired general and commissioner of the White Nile State was arrested on December 3 after his name emerged during interrogation of the other suspects (al-Ahram al-Yawm [Khartoum], December 4, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012).

Two prominent politicians have been implicated in the plot, though solid evidence has not been presented and both men remain free for the moment. Both men have a history of antagonism to the regime and could be considered to fall into the “usual suspects” category whenever Khartoum is faced with political disturbances:

  • Dr. Hassan al-Turabi: The leader of the Islamist Popular Congress Party and former leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF). Though Turabi was not specifically named in connection to the coup, presidential advisor Nafi Ali Nafi’s reference to the plotters receiving assistance from “Islamists who have personal ambitions” was widely thought to be a reference to al-Turabi (Sudan Tribune, December 2, 2012). Dr. Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi was the first Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, but underwent a split with the faction led by President Omar al-Bashir in 1998, leading to the formation of al-Turabi’s Islamist opposition party, the Popular Congress Party (PCP).
  • Sadiq al-Mahdi, a former two-time Prime Minister of Sudan (1966-1967, 1986-1989) was overthrown by the military/Islamist alliance of Colonel Omar al-Bashir and Dr. Hassan al-Turabi in 1989. Sadiq is the great-grandson of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, the 19th century Sufi leader who overthrew Egyptian rule of the Sudan in 1885. Sadiq is the Imam of the Ansar Sufi movement and leader of its political wing, the Umma Party (a.k.a National Umma Party – NUP).

After meeting with the Sudanese press during a visit to Cairo, al-Mahdi was initially quoted as saying Salah Gosh had met with him over dinner to ask the Umma Party leader to head the post-coup regime, though al-Mahdi later claimed he had been quoted out of context (al-Sudani [Khartoum], December 4, 2012; al-Qarar [Khartoum], December 5, 2012; Sudan Vision, December 31, 2012). Presidential Assistant Nafi Ali Nafi asked: “Is it logical that Sadiq al-Mahdi [would] disclose what went on between him and Gosh in the past without meaning it?” (Sudan Tribune, December 15, 2012).

Al-Mahdi has also been described as having extensive contacts with the rebel Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition by media sources unfriendly to the NUP. Presidential advisor Nafi Ali Nafi has said he is “confident that the Umma party knew the zero hour [of the coup attempt]” (Sudan Tribune, September 22, 2012). NUP leaders and members of al-Mahdi’s Ansar religious movement have warned against attempts to implicate al-Mahdi in the alleged coup (Sudan Tribune. December 3, 2012; Akhbar Alyoum [Khartoum], December 4, 2012). A recent sermon by the leader of the Ansar council decried the presence of foreign UN and AU troops in the country, the absence of democracy and the alleged usurpation of the nation’s resources by the ruling circle (al-Sudani [Khartoum], December 22, 2012).

While the regime has attempted to implicate the opposition, the episode instead suggests the military/Islamist coalition that has ruled Sudan since 1989 is experiencing another split as the coalition’s strongman, Bashir, begins to show signs of physical weakness that could imperil his grip on the regime. Bashir has also suffered political blows in recent years by being indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and failing to triumph in the battle against Southern secession.

Jockeying for Political Supremacy

Within the so-called “loyalist” faction of the NCP there are several possible successors to President-Field Marshal Bashir, who is expected to resign later this year or by 2015 at the latest:

  • Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi – NCP vice-chairman, former major-general and current presidential advisor. Nafi is one of the most powerful men in Khartoum and is regarded as being extremely close to the president. As a former Iranian-trained chief of military intelligence, Nafi was entrusted with overseeing controversial security operations in Darfur and South Kordofan that have been described by observers as crimes against humanity. Nafi emerged as the victor in a power struggle with Salah Gosh when the latter was dismissed as NISS director. Nafi is seen by some as al-Bashir’s bulwark against the ambitions of First Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. Nafi and al-Bashir are both members of the riverine Ja’aliyin tribe.
  • First Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha – A leading member of Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) and a former Turabi loyalist who abandoned his mentor when the latter fell out with Bashir. Taha was rewarded with the vice-presidency and often acts as the public face of the government while building a powerful constituency as the deputy chairman of the NCP. Taha is a lawyer and judge by profession and a member of the Shaiqiya, one of the three riverine Arab tribes (Shaiqiya, Ja’aliyin and Danagla) that have monopolized power in Sudan since independence.  Taha is deeply implicated in unleashing the Janjaweed forces of Musa Hilal in Darfur. A two-time Amir of the Sudan Islamic Movement (SIM), Taha is an NCP insider regarded as a frontrunner and will likely have the backing of the SIM’s new leadership in any run at the presidency.
  • Speaker of the National Assembly Ahmad Ibrahim al-Tahir – A leading hardline member of the NCP who has described the late Osama bin Laden as “a holy warrior” and describes the separation of South Sudan as an “international conspiracy” (al-Ra’y al-Aam [Khartoum], June 26, 2011; Sudan Tribune, May 3, 2011).
  • Lieutenant General Bakri Hassan Salih – Minister of Presidential Affairs and former Minister of Defense, General Bakri is deeply implicated in the abuses committed by pro-government militias and government security forces in Darfur. He has been close to al-Bashir ever since he played a crucial role in the 1989 coup that brought al-Bashir to power.

Divisions in the Sudanese Islamic Movement

The growing differences between factions of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) began to erupt in January with the release of a memo calling for urgent reforms and an end to institutionalized corruption. The memo was signed by a thousand party members and associates (Sudan Tribune, January 11, 2012).

Splits in Sudan’s Islamist movement between those favoring the political status quo and those seeking political reform emerged at the 8th General Conference of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) in November. With the resignation of Sudanese vice-president Ali Osman Muhammad Taha as SIM chairman, a struggle emerged for control of the movement. The conference quickly deteriorated into a confrontation between Bashir regime loyalists and those seeking substantial reforms within the failing Sudanese administration. Among those groups in the SIM calling for reform was al-Saihun (“the Travelers”), an NCP-associated faction based upon a core of veteran military officers and paramilitary jihadists embittered by the loss of South Sudan after a long and bloody civil war. Some NCP loyalists maintain that al-Saihun is a front for members of the PCP (Alwan [Khartoum], November 29, 2012). Al- Saihun and PCP leader Hassan al-Turabi backed NCP parliamentary leader Ghazi Salah al-Din in an unsuccessful bid for the leadership of the SIM. However, NCP loyalists assumed control of the movement with the election of economist al-Zubayr Ahmad al-Hassan as the new secretary-general of the SIM after Ghazi withdrew from the contest. Ghazi was accused a short time later of being one of the alleged coup plotters. Under al-Zubayr’s leadership, many Islamists contend the SIM has now been reduced from an advisory body to the NCP to a movement whose views will be dictated by the regime. SIM reformers were ultimately unable to push through their demands that the movement be separated from the NCP.

After the conference, al-Saihun issued a statement calling for the dismissal of Minister of Defense Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussein. The reformers cited the minister’s disputes with senior army officers (some ending in dismissals), failure to respond to alleged Israeli attacks on Sudan and an inability to provide Sudanese troops and paramilitaries with the means to end rebellions in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile Province. The statement followed an earlier appeal in January, 2012 by 700 officers of the Sudan Armed Forces calling for an end to corruption in the arms procurement process, citing as an example the purchase of over 100 defective Ukrainian tanks in 2010 (Sudan Tribune, January 20, 2012). The officers also called for a greater degree of separation between the NCP and the Army command structure.

Motivations for Overthrowing the Bashir Regime

Speculation is rife in Khartoum over the motivation of the alleged putschists, with some suggesting the move was meant to preempt other attempts to seize power (a common justification for coup attempts in the Sudan). Speculation on the future of the regime has been fuelled by rumors that the president may be terminally ill. Al-Bashir has had two tumor-related surgeries on his throat in Qatar and Saudi Arabia since August, 2012 despite international sanctions against his travel connected to an ICC indictment for war crimes (BBC, November 30, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012).

There is also the possibility that the alleged plotters represented an Islamist faction within the military that felt that Khartoum’s ongoing military campaigns against various rebel movements were suffering from government corruption and the policies of Defense Minister Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussein. Besides the seemingly intractable conflict in Darfur, fighting has again flared up along the border of the South Sudanese state of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (Sudan Tribune, December 10, 2012). Khartoum maintains that Juba continues to command and control troops of the SPLA-Northern Command now fighting the NCP regime in Sudan’s Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan provinces.

A Khartoum daily considered close to the Bashir regime provided details of the videotaped confessions presented by NISS director Muhammad Atta and Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi to a select group (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], December 6, 2012). According to the report, Wad Ibrahim and other coup plotters confessed to organizing the coup in cooperation with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur-based rebel movement that came close to seizing the capital and deposing Bashir in 2008 and has remained a regime bogeyman ever since. [1]  JEM’s participation was made conditional on the deportation to Europe for trial of the “List of 51,” a UN-generated sealed list of 51 Sudanese citizens suspected of war crimes in Darfur that was handed to the ICC in 2005. By mutual consent the coup would take place while Bashir was out of the country for medical treatment in recognition of the popularity of the president in some quarters and the difficulty of ultimately deporting Bashir to face his own ICC indictment. The detainees described Wad Ibrahim rather than Salah Gosh as the intended leader of a 15-member post-coup command council. Salah Gosh’s confession was not shown, raising questions as to whether the former intelligence director has in fact made a confession.

The videotaped confessions apparently included that of a “sorcerer” said to have been engaged by one of the generals involved in the plot to cast an immobilizing spell over certain regime figures. Pressed as to why he did not report the incident, the “sorcerer” claimed a dream revealed the coup would be unsuccessful, so he felt no further action was necessary.

Muhammad AttaNISS Director Lieutenant General Muhammad Atta al-Mawla

Dealing with the “Traitors”

Having rounded up the coup suspects, the regime is now divided as to how to deal with them, a new dispute that is proving as divisive as any of the others facing the regime. The Director of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), Lieutenant General Muhammad Atta al-Mawla, described the plotters as “traitors” who had even drafted a proclamation announcing themselves as “counter-revolutionaries” who intended to supersede the “Salvation Revolution” of 1989. Al-Atta has pledged that the suspects will face justice without leniency (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012; Sudan Vision, December 7, 2012). Vice-President Taha says that the suspects will be prosecuted without special treatment: “We have no double standards… the way with us is working within the ranks, not treachery and treason and destabilizing the ranks” (Sudan Tribune, December 2, 2012). Presidential advisor Nafi Ali Nafi has been especially vocal in his demands that the suspects face trial, saying some of them had already been detained on similar charges in the past. This time, according to Nafi, there is ample evidence to mount a full prosecution (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012). A group of Khartoum lawyers led by government critic Nabil Adib has pledged to form a committee to defend the suspects while some NCP members have warned that action against the alleged plotters would be “costly” (Sudan Tribune, November 24, 2012; November 26, 2012).

On the other hand, prosecuting the still influential suspects could tear the ruling NCP apart at a time it can ill afford disunity in the ranks. According to the Sudan Tribune, an al-Saihun Facebook page claimed NCP parliamentarians organized a candid meeting between al-Bashir and the leading detainees on December 19 that ended with “hugging and tears,” though this could not be verified (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012). Bashir has been placed in a difficult position as prosecutions would likely generate new attempts to depose him. It might well be to the ailing president’s benefit to offer a grand gesture of forgiveness, with the quiet promise that further such dissent in the NCP will not be endured with magnanimity.  However, with the prospect that Bashir might be president for only a short time longer, other ranking figures in the regime such as Taha and Nafi may see a purge as a means of reshaping the NCP going into the post-Bashir era.

Meanwhile, the streets of Khartoum have been the scene of massive and occasionally violent student demonstrations in recent weeks. The protesters, who call for the overthrow of the regime, initially flooded into the streets following the apparent murder of four students from Darfur by NCP members on December 7 (Sudan Tribune, December 10, 2012; Al-Sahafah [Khartoum], December 9, 2012).

The net continues to be cast wider and wider in the aftermath of the initial interrogations with the arrests of dozens of Saihun members as well as two “Islamist” media members, one a cameraman for al-Jazeera, the other an employee of the al-Fida Media Center, which used to produce videos promoting the jihad in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012).

The fallout from the alleged coup attempt has even reached various research centers, cultural centers and NGO’s active in Khartoum that are now alleged to be engaged in actions “prejudicial to national security” financed by foreign sources. Prominent among these are institutions receiving funds from the American National Endowment for Democracy, whose financing originates with the U.S. State Department The pro-government newspaper Akhir Lahzah reported in its Sunday’s edition that the authorities would launch a broad campaign against a number of “research centers, and those labeled cultural centers” (Akhir Lahzah [Khartoum], December 22, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 29, 2012; Reuters, December 31, 2012).   Dr. Nafi recently criticized American NGOs for their alleged contacts with rebel forces in Sudan, claiming that three American Jewish organizations had held meetings with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) to identify ways in which they could help the rebels overthrow the Khartoum government (Citizen [Khartoum], December 23, 2012).

A statement from al-Mahdi’s religious followers, al-Ansar, saw a more nefarious intent behind the security crackdown: “We doubt there was a coup attempt to begin with, and we believe it was an attempt to liquidate rivals and a move aimed at pre-empting dissent from the disgruntled youth of the Islamist movement” (Sudan Tribune, December 4, 2012). The post-coup crackdown seems to have had little success in restraining the growing number of calls for political reform and changes to the leadership. Al-Turabi’s PCP called for the president to step down, citing the government’s claim that Sadiq al-Mahdi and the National Umma Party were behind the coup attempt as “the last card” of a desperate regime (The Citizen [Khartoum], December 4, 2012).

The regime has also been embarrassed by the late December release on jihadi websites of video footage of the June 2010 escape by tunnel from Sudan’s most secure prison of four Islamist militants sentenced to death for the 2008 murder of a U.S. Agency for International Development official and his Sudanese driver (GIMF/al-Hijratain Media, Ansar1.info, December 28, 2012). [2] Apparently inspired by the similar escape of al-Qaeda militants from a Yemeni prison in February 2006, the chained convicts were apparently able to dig a 38 meter tunnel to freedom without interference from prison staff. [3]

Economic pressures in the wake of South Sudan’s separation are fueling growing discontent with the Khartoum government. Oil revenues have declined steeply, inflation is at over 40%, food supplies are soaring in price, professionals are fleeing the country and currency reserves are drying up. Khartoum continues to devote much of its spending to the repression of various uprisings in parts of the country.

Iranian Ships in Port Sudan

In the early hours of October 24, 2012, the Yarmuk small-arms factory in a southern suburb of Khartoum was attacked by Israeli fighter jets in what appeared to be a relatively risk-free practice run for an Israeli airstrike on Iranian targets. Israel has justified previous attacks on Eastern Sudan by claiming Iran ships arms through Sudan to Gaza, though even a basic knowledge of the distances involved, the exposed, waterless terrain and the fact that such overland shipments would require bypassing tight Egyptian border controls before crossing through several restricted military zones on the Egyptian Red Sea coast suggest that such claims have no basis in reality. [4] There are now claims from Israel that the Yarmuk arms factory was controlled by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and was engaged in producing arms for Hamas that were then shipped by the improbable overland route through Egypt to Gaza. Though new Egyptian president has adopted a more supportive stance towards Gaza than his predecessor, the overland arms route is alleged to have existed through several years of the Mubarak regime, which had no interest in arming the Gaza militants.

In the aftermath of the Yarmuk attack, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry said production at the factory had no connection to Iran, describing Israel as “an outlaw state… trying its best to pass fabricated information through different sources that have a link with Israel” (AFP, November 27, 2012; al-Arabiya/AFP, October 30, 2012). Opposition parties pointed out that the ease with which the Israelis were able to strike the capital confirmed Sudan’s military capacity was dedicated to the suppression of opposition movements rather than the defense of the nation (Sudan Tribune, October 30, 2012).

In light of the Israeli accusations, a visit to Port Sudan on October 28 by Iran’s “22nd Fleet” generated further speculation over the nature of relations between Tehran and Khartoum. Consisting of the supply ship Kharg (with three antiquated Sea King helicopters) and the Admiral Naghdi corvette (launched in 1964), the 22nd Fleet docked in Port Sudan after carrying out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Mandab Strait. After three days in port the Iranian ships left on October 31 (Suna Online [Khartoum], October 31, 2012; Mehr News Agency [Tehran], December 9). Though uneventful, the visit was heavily criticized in the Saudi Arabian media as a threat to regional security and a danger to Sudan’s relations with Gulf countries. The Iranian ambassador to Khartoum rejected assertions from Tel Aviv that the mission of the Iranian ships was to offload containers of weapons intended for Hamas, pointing out that the ships were open to the public on all three days of their visit to Port Sudan (al-Watan [Khartoum], November 1, 2012).

Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karti, who has opposed greater cooperation with Iran on the grounds it would come at the expense of good relations with Arab Gulf countries, later revealed that his recommendation to reject a visit by Iranian ships in February, 2012 was accepted and acted on by the government, but the attack on the Yarmuk defense factory appeared to have produced a dramatic reversal in this policy (Sudan Tribune, November 27, 2012).

A second Iranian visit to Port Sudan came from the 23rd Fleet on December 8, though Sudanese officials maintained the visit was pre-planned and routine. The detachment included the supply ship Bushehr and the guided missile frigate Jamaran, the domestically-built pride of the Iranian Navy (though described inaccurately by Iran as a destroyer). Sudanese naval commander Abdallah Matari took the occasion to urge expanded Iranian-Sudanese military cooperation (Fars News Agency [Tehran], December 8, 2012).

The Sudanese Foreign Ministry insisted the visit was pre-planned and not intended as a reaction to the Israeli airstrike on Khartoum, though some Sudanese questioned the wisdom of allowing a second Iranian naval visit so shortly after the controversy generated by the first visit (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012; al-Ayam [Khartoum], December 10, 2012). Foreign Minister Ali Ahmad Karti confirmed divisions within the regime over Khartoum’s apparently growing relations with Iran when he revealed he had not been informed of the arrival of the two Iranian warships, saying he would have opposed the visit if he had been aware of it (al-Sudani [Khartoum], November 4, 2012; Sudan Tribune, November 4; The Citizen [Khartoum], November 5, 2012).

Since 2008, the Iranian Navy has been expanding its presence in the region through anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, deployments to the Indian Ocean and the dispatch of two ships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean in February 2011. Taking his inspiration from remarks made by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear-Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, has described the role of a “Strategic Navy” in securing Iranian waters, protecting Iranian shipping in international waters and projecting influence abroad (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, November 29, 2012). Sayyari has emphasized Iran’s growing regional importance, noting that the Islamic Republic was now “a decision-maker in South Asia” that has reached a point where “no world power can ignore its influence in the region” (Fars News Agency [Tehran], December 12, 2012). Admiral Sayyari has elsewhere responded to alarmist news reports of the Iranian Navy’s activities by insisting that access to international waters belongs to all the people of the globe (IRNA, December 3, 2012). According to a major pan-Arab daily, Tehran offered Khartoum an alliance designed to “protect the Red Sea,” but Foreign Minister Ali Karti denied any knowledge of such a proposal (al-Hayat, November 2, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 13, 2012). Karti is alleged to have opposed the alliance at a heated meeting of the NCP’s foreign relations committee.

Nevertheless, in defending the two visits by Iranian warships as “routine,” Karti claimed that American warships had made a similar stop in Port Sudan in November (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012). However, the Foreign Minister’s claim was challenged by U.S. Navy spokesmen, who insisted they “didn’t have any record” of American ships visiting the Sudan in November (Sudan Tribune, December 6, 2012).

A spokesman for the Darfur-based rebel Justice and Equality Movement (always eager to embarrass the regime) claimed that Khartoum and Sudan had discussed a deal to build an Iranian naval base, a base that some Israeli journalists fancifully maintain already exists in Sudan, allegedly employing hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards offloading arms shipments for Hamas from Iranian cargo ships with to Iranian-run warehouses (Hurriyat [Khartoum], December 11, 2012; al-Rakoba [Khartoum], December 9, 2012, December 11, 2012; Yedi’ot Aharonot [Tel Aviv], October 25, 2012). The alleged Revolutionary Guards’ base in Port Sudan presumably cooperates with other phantom Iranian naval bases claimed to be in Eritrea. [5] Following the allegations, Sudanese foreign ministry undersecretary Rahmatallah Uthman asserted that Khartoum has a policy of not allowing foreign military bases on its soil, adding that Iran was “no exception” (The Citizen [Khartoum], December 10, 2012).

Israeli businessman are engaged in establishing an economic base in newly independent South Sudan, another point of contention with Khartoum, which has no desire to see Israeli influence grow in a neighboring nation, particularly one still as closely tied to (north) Sudan as South Sudan. Israel has a long but covert relationship with South Sudan, having begun providing military training to South Sudanese insurgents shortly after the nation gained independence in 1956.

Conclusion

If the alleged coup is grounded in fact, it would not be the first attempt to overthrow al-Bashir in the 24 year history of his regime and possibly not the last. It is the first, however, to be mounted by figures so close to the president and until now considered to be among the pillars of the regime.  Democracy has never quite taken hold in Sudanese society, which remains afflicted with a tendency for certain individuals to decide it is they alone who have the answer to Sudan’s complex problems. The nation is in dire need of financial assistance but recent efforts to obtain financial aid from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been unsuccessful. Iran is also suffering financially from economic sanctions against it, but a demonstration by Khartoum that it is considering closer ties to the Islamic state (such as hosting Iranian warships) may be one way of putting pressure on the Sunni states of the Gulf to reconsider their position. Khartoum is also in need of military assistance, having blown its chance to make significant upgrades to its military by indulging in a corrupt procurement process. China once seemed a promising partner in this regard, but the separation of the South Sudan now means that Beijing must maintain cordial ties with both north and south Sudan to ensure the continued flow of oil from Chinese owned wells in the south to the export terminal in the north. The Iranian dalliance is a dangerous gambit, however, as it poses both internal and external risks that may be greater than the possible benefits from a closer alliance with the Islamic state.

After 24 years of Islamist/military rule in Khartoum, the secular and non-Islamist opposition has been effectively marginalized, but emerging divisions within the Islamist camp will make it more difficult for the regime to resist the armed groups that threaten to tear the remaining state apart. A divided security structure also presents opportunities for Salafist-Jihadist cells (such as the one dismantled in Dinder National Park in December) to exploit the situation to their advantage. For the moment, the likelihood of a democratic succession in the Sudan appears increasingly remote

Andrew McGregor is the Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues in the Islamic world.

Notes

1. For the raid on Omdurman, see Andrew McGregor, “Darfur’s JEM Rebels Bring the War to Khartoum,” Terrorism Monitor, May 15, 2008) http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374172 and Andrew McGregor, “Traitors or POWs? Khartoum Sentences JEM Rebels to Death,” Terrorism Focus, August 6, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5105&tx_ttnews[backPid]=246&no_cache=1

2. For the trial of the assassins, see Andrew McGregor, “Alleged Assassins of U.S. Diplomat Claim Khartoum Regime Incites People to Jihad,” Terrorism Focus, February 6, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34508

3. For the “Great Escape” in Yemen, see Andrew McGregor, “Al-Qaeda’s Great Escape in Yemen,” Terrorism Focus 3(5), February 7, 2006, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369888 and Andrew McGregor, “Yemen Convicts PSO Members Involved in February’s Great Escape,” Terrorism Focus 3(29), July 25, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=847

4. See Andrew McGregor, “Strange Days on the Red Sea Coast: A New Theater for the Iran-Israel Conflict?” Terrorism Monitor 7(8), April 3, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34807&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1

5. For Eritrean reaction to such claims, see “Eritrea: Phantom Israeli and Iranian Military Bases,” Eritrean Centre for Strategic Studies, December 27, 2012, http://www.capitaleritrea.com/eritrea-phantom-israeli-and-iranian-military-bases/

Sufi Militia Joins Somali Government Forces while Ras Kamboni Militia Distances Itself

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Andrew McGregor

December 14, 2012

Somalia’s new national government continues to make slow but steady progress in bringing the southern and central parts of the embattled nation under unified rule. An important step was taken on December 1 when the Sufi Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a militia officially joined federal government forces.

Ahlu sunnah wal JamaaFighters of the Ahlu wa’l-Sunna

The Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a (ASJ) militia, approximately 1,000 to 2,000 strong, has its basis in a Sufi umbrella group formed in 1991 to defend traditional Somali Sufi Islam. The movement took to arms in 2008 when the Salafist al-Shabaab movement began to demolish Sufi shrines and the tombs of Sufi masters in the interests of banning the “un-Islamic” practice of “worshipping the dead” (see Terrorism Monitor, April 2, 2010) Two years later the ASJ aligned itself with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TNG), though differences between the movement and then-TFG president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad prevented al-Shabaab from obtaining the level of representation in government it felt was its due. The movement found more willing patrons in the Ethiopian military, which has provided it with arms, money and training as well as working alongside it in military operations against al-Shabaab in central Somalia.

Under the new Somali government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud joint operations with Somali government troops have increased. In order to further cooperation with the government, the ASJ will now open an office in the capital, Mogadishu (Raxanreeb, December 1, 2012). ASJ members now hope to receive the same benefits as members of the national army though the exact method of integration has yet to be announced.

Shaykh Mahmud Hasan Farah was re-elected as the chairman of the movement’s executive committee in November (Bar-Kulan Radio [Nairobi], November 21, 2012). Shaykh Mahmud insists that the movement rejects all forms of “clan-ism and tribalism,” but must play some role in the new state: “We are telling the new government that Ahlu Sunnah has no culture of opposing governments and we welcome it, but a government, in which we don’t have someone to represent us cannot purport to represent us. We must have a representative in the government” (Radio Kulmiye [Mogadishu], November 18, 2012). The chairman’s words were echoed by senior ASJ official Shaykh Ali Shaykh Ibrahim: “We ask the government, as Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a, to give special consideration to its relationship with Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a because Ahlu Sunnah has not taken up arms to fight the government but to defend Islam, after our clerics were killed, our saints tombs desecrated, and our mosques destroyed” (Radio Kulmiye, November 16, 2012).

However, it appears that the ASJ is no less fractious than the rest of Somalia, with a number of the militia’s leaders in central Somalia resisting the appointment of Shaykh Mahmud as chairman and the new leadership council in Mogadishu on the grounds that they had not been consulted while their own leadership candidates were not considered (Dayniile Online, November 19, 2012).

The movement recently vowed to launch new operations in central Somalia to “remove al-Shabaab remnants from the country” (Gaalkacyo Radio, November 17, 2012; November 24, 2012). Somali intelligence officials believe al-Shabaab has been receiving arms shipments from Libya and Yemen as it organizes a return to guerrilla warfare in rural areas after having been expelled from most of the urban areas it only recently controlled (Raxanreeb.com, November 5, 2012). Though al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared jihad in Somalia obligatory on “every Muslim who is capable,” there is growing evidence that many of the foreign fighters in Somalia have left for more promising battlefields in Yemen (AFP, November 6, 2012).

Somalia’s Internal Affairs and National Security Minister Abdikarin Husayn Guled has said that the new government is also trying to integrate the southern Ras Kamboni militia into government forces, but at the moment the rift between Ras Kamboni and Mogadishu is growing rather than narrowing (Shabelle Media Network, November 29, 2012).

Ras Kamboni organized demonstrations in Kismayo against the new federal government in November that claimed the president was preventing the economic development of the Juba by preventing the export of the charcoal stockpile and called for Mogadishu to leave the creation of a new administration in the Juba region to the eight-nation Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) (Dhacdo.com, November 9, 2012).

At the center of the dispute was the disposition of some four million bags of charcoal that was stockpiled in Kismayo before al-Shabaab had an opportunity to export it. The charcoal was worth an estimated $25 million to $40 million in Middle Eastern markets (Africa Review [Nairobi], November 4, 2012).  Much of the Somali charcoal trade is dominated by businessmen with close ties to al-Shabaab and the trade was a major source of financing for the Islamist militants before they lost Kismayo in September (see Terrorism Monitor, November 18, 2010). The rapid and ongoing deforestation of southern Somalia by the charcoal industry has been described as an “ecocide” and threatens the long-term viability of the entire region.

Charcoal exports have long been illegal in Somalia and a further international ban on the Somali trade was imposed by the UN Security Council in February, these measures and an order to temporarily close the port of Kismayo from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud have all failed at preventing Ras Kamboni and local businessmen from exporting much of the stockpile under the supervision of Kenyan troops belonging to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  Nairobi and IGAD both support the continuation of the charcoal trade, the most lucrative industry in southern Somalia.

Ras Kamboni fighters shot up much of Kismayo on November 21 in the alleged “pursuit” of an unknown attacker who hurled a grenade at the home of Ahmed Madobe (Bulshoweyn.com, November 21, 2012). Only days later a powerful bomb went off outside a district administration office where Ras Kamboni officials were having a meeting (Mareeg Online, November 25). The Ras Kamboni militia was recently identified by Somali MP Abdullahi Hussein Ali as the source of the ongoing robberies and general insecurity that is plaguing Kismayo (Mareeg Online, November 13, 2012). The militia did little to enhance its reputation in Kismayo when it rounded up over 400 residents in an operation designed to catch a few militants by dragging a large net. The operation was defended by Ras Kamboni spokesman Abdinasir Seeraar: “I think there are some [detainees] who have connections with al-Shabaab and some innocents, but how can we know unless we make some arrests and conduct investigations;  that’s when we can know who is the Shabaab member and who is not” (BBC Somali Service, November 2, 2012).

Ras Kamboni had previously ruled Kismayo jointly with al-Shabaab after the city was taken by the Islamists in 2006. The movement joined the now defunct Hizb al-Islam movement in 2009, but the following year it underwent a split, with one faction formally joining al-Shabaab (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, February 4, 2010). While still an Islamist movement, Ras Kamboni now fights Shabaab extremists under Kenyan patronage. Nairobi views Ras Kamboni as a pliant local partner in its efforts to establish a Nairobi-supported buffer administration named “Jubaland” in southern Somalia under the nominal rule of Mogadishu.  The plan has the backing of ethnic-Somali politicians in Kenya who have cross-border clan connections. ASJ has inserted itself into the debate, insisting any effort to form a new administration in the Juba region without consulting them would ultimately fail (Radio Risala, November 19, 2012).

There are also persistent rumors that influential Islamist and former Hizb al-Islam leader Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys is seeking to abandon al-Shabaab and join the government forces but is being held under close watch by al-Shabaab to prevent his escape (Dhacdo.com, November 23, 2012). Shaykh Aweys merged his movement with al-Shabaab in December 2010.

This article originally appeared in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor

Sudanese Security Forces Raid Islamist Training Camp

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Andrew McGregor

December 14, 2012

A raid earlier this month on what was described as a Salafi-Jihadist training camp in a remote part of Sudan’s Dinder National Park indicated Sudan’s growing vulnerability to armed Salafist groups ready to take advantage of the Sudan’s deteriorating political conditions.

dinderDinder National Park

Sudanese sources say 13 individuals were killed and 24 arrested after an eight-hour gun battle in Dinder while others suspects managed to flee into the bush (Sudan Tribune, December 1, 2012; December 3, 2012). Dinder is a massive national park in Sinnar Province (eastern Sudan), roughly 400 km southeast of Khartoum.

Authorities were first alerted to the presence of the militants in October when the latter attacked wildlife police at the Galgu post in Dinder and seized their weapons. The attack was initially believed to have been the work of poachers, but authorities later determined it was the work of Islamist militants running a training camp in Dinder for would-be jihadists bound for Somalia or Mali (Sudan Tribune, December 1, 2012).

Sudanese authorities said the suspects belonged to a “Salafist-Jihadist group” and would face charges of murder, incitement and the formation of a criminal network. The detainees were described as university students between the ages of 19 to 25 who were supplied from Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, December 3, 2012). Despite being an imported ideology in the Sudanese context, Salafism has made significant inroads in Sudan’s universities and has steadily gathered more adherents in the larger community, particularly in the capital. Authorities in Sinnar Province said the takfiri group had no known links to al-Qaeda (Akhir Lahza [Khartoum], December 4, 2012).  Ahmad Abbas, the governor of Sinnar, said the leader of the group was a chemistry professor, though he declined to name him (Blue Nile TV, December 3, 2012). There was speculation that two young men who tried to attack a prominent Sufi shaykh in Khartoum on December 9 were tied to the Dinder Park extremists (al-Sudani [Khartoum], December 10, 2012).

The raid came only days after Khartoum again requested that Sudan be removed from a U.S. list of states sponsoring terrorism, though Washington has been largely unsympathetic to such efforts so far. When South Sudan separated, Khartoum lost most of the oil wealth that once allowed it to ride out U.S. financial sanctions, leaving the regime in Khartoum desperate to find some means of rescuing its faltering economy in the face of growing public dissatisfaction. Though counter-terrorist raids might help restore relations with the United States, Khartoum’s increased military cooperation with Iran works against such restoration.

This article originally appeared in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor

Egypt’s Internal Islamist Threat: Who are the Suspects in the Madinat Nasr Cell?

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Andrew McGregor

November 30, 2012

Amidst new political turmoil in Egypt, the investigation continues into the extent of the radical Islamist network disrupted by an October 24 police raid on the militants’ armory in the Cairo suburb of Madinat Nasr. [1] A number of those arrested during the Madinat Nasr raid or as a result of subsequent investigations into the cell are experienced jihadists, many with connections to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which formally merged with al-Qaeda in 2001. Others possess military experience and may have been prepared to turn their knowledge of arms and tactics against the post-revolutionary Egyptian state, though some of the detainees claim the Madinat Nasr cell was directed primarily at running Libyan arms to Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria.

Madinat al-NasrFire that followed a bomb explosion during the raid on a Madinat Nasr building.

Here, then, is a short look at the profiles of some of the major figures arrested or being sought in connection with the raid on the Madinat Nasr cell:

Shaykh Adil Awad Shahtu: A former leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Shahtu was arrested on charges of establishing and financing the Madinat Nasr cell (Dar al-Hayat, October 31, 2012). Shahtu, a leading member of EIJ, was imprisoned in Egypt in 1991 following his return from three years in Afghanistan and was not released until March, 2011 after the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Shahtu was one of the leaders of the September 11 protest at the U.S. embassy in Cairo. The Interior Ministry reported that Shahtu was arrested while trying to slip into Libya with a large quantity of cash in different currencies (al-Hayat, November 1, 2012).

Shahtu is a vocal opponent of the democracy that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt: “I oppose democracy because it is not the faith of the Muslims, but the faith of the Jews and Christians. Simply put, democracy means the rule of the people itself over itself… According to Islam, it is forbidden for people to rule and to legislate laws, as Allah alone is ruler.” In the shaykh’s elitist interpretation of Islamic rule, “commoners, such as workers and fellahin [Egypt’s traditional peasant class]” would be barred from participating in the Shura (consultative council) that advises the ruler. Shahtu has warned that “if the [Coptic] Christians make problems for the Muslims, I will exterminate you,” as well as insisting on a shutdown of the tourism industry and a ban on all the arts (Roz Al-Yousef (Egypt), August 13, 2011).

Since his arrest, Shahtu has maintained the Madinat Nasr cell was seeking only to support the revolution in Syria: “We disagree with the Muslim Brotherhood, but we do not consider its members as infidels. We were not targeting any Egyptian or Egyptian installations” (al-Hayat, November 4).

Wa’il Abd-al-Rahman – Identified as the “prime suspect” in the Madinat Nasr cell and described as a takfiri (a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy) and former member of the EIJ, al-Rahman was reported to have been arrested two months earlier and sentenced to jail on charges of seeking to overthrow the regime “and of judging the ruler [al-Mursi] as an infidel.” Police claim to have found gunpowder and other materials for manufacturing explosives in his house (al-Hayat, October 27, 2012; al-Tahrir [Cairo], October 31, 2012).

Muhammad Jamal al-Kashif (a.k.a. Abu-Ahmad) – A former EIJ leader released after the revolution, al-Kashif’s present location is unknown. Egyptian security services report that al-Kashif has been an active al-Qaeda operative in Yemen and Libya and had been given orders by Dr. al-Zawahiri to lead terrorist operations in Egypt and Libya (al-Dustur [Cairo], October 28, 2012; al-Hayat, October 27, 2012).

Karim Isam Ahmad Azzazi – Forty-years-old, Karim Isam reportedly blew himself up during the raid (al-Hayat, October 31, 2012). According to the autopsy report, the beardless suspect died of burns and showed no trace of bullets (al-Tahrir [Cairo], October 31, 2012). It is Karim Isam who allegedly rented the ground floor of a 15-storey property in Madinat Nasr and undertook a number of renovations, including the installation of an iron door and the creation of a private parking area from which visitors to the site could enter the building unobserved (al-Wafd [Cairo], October 28, 2012).

Karim Ahmad al-Badawi (a.k.a. Abu Hazim) – A 53-year-old Egyptian from Cairo Governorate who is reported to have died during the raid, possibly as a result of being shot by police while fleeing (al-Akhbar, October 26, 2012). The exact circumstances of his fate remain unclear, largely due to considerable confusion in the local media between Karim Ahmad al-Badawi and Karim Isam Ahmad Azzazi (see above).

Rami Ahmad Muhammad al-Mallah – A former radar specialist and captain in the Egyptian Army before resigning a short time ago following his decision to express his Islamist allegiance by growing a beard. An alleged leader of the Madinat Nasr cell, al-Mallah was arrested in downtown Cairo a day after the Madinat Nasr raid while trying to obtain a tourist visa to Turkey as part of a scheme to sneak into Syria (al-Hayat, October 28, 2012; November 3, 2012).

Muhamad Sa’id Merghani – The Tunisian suspect is believed to be an expert in the use of explosives and is thought to have taken part in the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi (al-Jumhariyah [Cairo], October 29, 2012; al-Shuruq al-Jadid [Cairo], October 31, 2012). During his interrogation, Muhammad Sa’id admitted to being a member of the Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood and claimed that he was trying to make his way to Syria to join the insurgency (al-Hayat, November 4, 2012).  Egypt’s security services have asked for Tunisian assistance in investigating this aspect of the case.

Tarik Abu al-Azm – A former Egyptian Army officer who has faced criminal charges before, al-Azm claims he was only friends with the cell leader and has no interest in politics.

Nasr Hani Hasan Rashid – Picked up two weeks after the raid, Nasr Hani is alleged to have returned from Libya at the beginning of November to carry out terrorist operations after receiving military training from al-Qaeda elements in Libya (al-Shuruq al-Jadid [Cairo], November 7, 2012).

Other suspected cell members either detained in the raid or on the run include Tarik Yahya Hulayl, Muhammad Salman Sulayman, Nabil Abd al-Moneim and Amr al-Rifa’i Surur.

Information available on the suspects so far suggests the growth of an Islamist network connecting militants from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria. As Egypt enters a new political and constitutional crisis following the assumption of extraordinary powers by President Muhammad al-Mursi there will be new opportunities for Egypt’s Salafi-Jihadi community to press its agenda through a return to the armed conflict that raged between Islamists and Egyptian authorities in the 1990s.

Note

1. See Andrew McGregor, “The Face of Egypt’s Next Revolution: The Madinat Nasr Cell,” Jamestown Foundation Hot Issue, November 20, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40137&cHash=bc3b95312dc7c4911c1727f4b929e2fd

This article was originally published in the Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor

International Community Cools to Intervention as Islamists Defeat Tuareg in Northern Mali

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Andrew McGregor

November 30, 2012

With ECOWAS and the African Union now in agreement over the formation of a force of 3,300 African peacekeepers drawn from both ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS nations, many nations whose support would be required for the success of such an option have recently cooled to this plan, while others, such as Algeria, continue to maintain a reserved position. An apparent victory by one of the Islamist factions occupying northern Mali over a well-armed Tuareg rebel militia that has offered to join counter-terrorist operations has not inspired confidence in the ultimate success of the under-size AU force. [1]

MNLA 3MNLA on the Move (Andy Morgan)

Though January 2013 had long been suggested as the starting date of an international military intervention, UN Special Envoy for the Sahel Region, former Italian premier Romano Prodi, said during a visit to Rabat that it would be September, 2013 before an intervention could begin (AFP, November 20, 2012). With the intervention receding into the distant future, many refugees from the fighting in northern Mali are returning to their homes, unhappy with Islamist rule but unwilling to wait nearly a year or more for assistance in driving the Islamists out of the region.

Nigeria’s decision to pledge only 600 troops to the projected force of 3300 would seem to imperil a project that was designed to be built around a larger Nigerian core (Daily Trust, [Lagos], November 22, 2012). Chad, a non-ECOWAS country, has apparently agreed to join the intervention force, but the composition of the rest of the force has yet to be revealed (L’Indépendant [Bamako], November 12, 2012). The EU has dampened earlier expectations that European troops might supplement African forces in the mission. According to EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove: “The European Council held on 18 and 19 October came out in favor of a military mission to train the Malian Army. There is no question of European intervention as such. It is up to Mali to win the north back” (Le Monde, November 12, 2012).

Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci reminded concerned parties that: “Algeria is not convinced that an exclusively military solution would bring peace and unity to Mali. Our wish is to convince our partners that the military path must be oriented toward the fight against terrorism. It must be accompanied by a political process in the form of a dialogue between the Malian protagonists” (Jeune Afrique, November 14, 2012). In neighboring Mauritania, national assembly president Messaoud Ould Boulkheir warned of the fallout from an intervention: “[Mali] is like a volcano about to erupt… If this volcano awakens, it will dump incandescent ashes over its neighbors” (AFP, November 12, 2012). A November 14 communiqué from the Tunisian president’s office warned against an “uncalculated military intervention in Mali” that could turn the Maghreb into a “hotbed of tension” and threaten the security of the Maghreb states (Tunisian Press Agency, November 15, 2012).

Libya delivered its opinion on a military intervention in Mali via Mahfouth Rahim, director in charge of African affairs at the Libyan Foreign Ministry: “We Libyans believe that we should not focus on military solutions at the moment to avert escalation which might lead us to what happened in Afghanistan… The military solution would exacerbate the crisis as the Tuareg rebels and other Islamist groups would be forced to seek refuge in other countries such as Libya” (PANA Online [Dakar], November 14, 2012).

Former Malian prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (1994-2000, parliamentary speaker, 2002-2007) is among those who have urged caution, noting that the Malian army needs time to rebuild to counter tactics likely to be used by the Islamist militants: “The population will be used as a human shield. Hence the need for extreme care in planning and skill in implementing an intervention. Military logistics and intelligence will be crucial with a view to knowing exactly whom we are dealing with, before saying: “Let’s go in, let’s go in!” (Le Monde, November 4, 2012).

In the north, meanwhile, the defeat of the secular Tuareg rebel Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) by Islamist forces demonstrated the latter’s military strength and the readiness of the Islamist groups to cooperate in the field. During what has been described as a MNLA attempt to retake Gao, fighting broke out with forces belonging to the Islamist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) near Asango on November 16. Asongo is 120 miles west of Menaka, where the MNLA was attempting to create a base for counterterrorist operations (Jeune Afrique, November 18, 2012; AFP, November 20, 2012). Locals suggested that many of those resisting the MUJWA attack in Asongo were not MNLA members, including local Tuareg political leader, Alwabegat ag Slakatou and six of his men who were reported among the dead (AFP, November 20, 2012).

AQIM was reported to have sent some 300 reinforcements to Gao from Timbuktu, roughly 185 miles to the west (AFP, November 17; Jeune Afrique, November 18, 2012). The reinforcements were said to belong to AQIM’s Katibat al-Mulathamin (Veiled Brigade) and the Katibat Osama bin Laden, led by Abu Walid Sahrawi.

Though MNLA spokesmen described only light casualties in the clash and described the action as “an initial success,” reports from the area and Malian security sources described dozens killed in “a real bloodbath” (Tout sur l’Algérie, November 17; AFP, November 20, 2012). Both sides presented casualty figures that were likely inflated, with the MNLA claiming 65 AQIM and MUJWA fighters killed, while MUJWA announced the death of over 100 members of the MNLA (AFP, November 20, 2012). The MNLA’s chief-of-staff, Machkanani ag Balla, suffered a serious wound while leading his men in the fight. MUJWA spokesman Walid Abu Sahrawi said the movement was dedicated to destroying the MNLA: “In Azawad, we are going to pursue the MNLA wherever they may still be found. We control the situation” (Jeune Afrique, November 18, 2012). Northern Mali’s three northern provinces are now conveniently divided between the three Islamist movements – Gao in MUJWA, Timbuktu in AQIM and Ansar al-Din in Kidal. The MNLA was expelled from Gao in June and now operates in rural areas only.

According to MNLA spokesman Hama ag Sid Ahmed, MUJWA forces setting up new bases on the outskirts of Gao have been joined by AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar (who appears to be at odds lately with the rest of the AQIM leadership – see Terrorism Monitor Brief, November 15, 2012) and various Pakistanis, Egyptians and Moroccans (Tout sur l’Algérie, November 16, 2012).

A spokesman for the Islamist Tuareg group Ansar al-Din claimed that movement leader Iyad ag Ghali had tried to prevent the fighting between MUJWA and the MNLA and remained on the sidelines when the conflict began. In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré is now holding joint talks with Ansar al-Din and the MNLA, rather than meet the two rebel Tuareg groups separately, as had been the case so far (AFP, November 16, 2012). According to an Ansar al-Din spokesman, if talks go the right way, “one can foresee ways and means in which one can get rid of terrorism, drug-trafficking and foreign groups” (AFP, November 14, 2012; PANA Online [Dakar], November 18, 2012).

Note

1. The intervention force briefly took the name “Mission de la CEDEAO [Communauté Economique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest] au Mali” (MICENA – ECOWAS Mission in Mali).before expanding its base by adopting the new name “Mission Internationale de Soutien au Mali” (MISMA – International Support Mission to Mali).

This article was originally published in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor

Tunisian President Warns of Growing Strength of Salafist Jihadi Movement

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Andrew McGregor

November 30, 2012

Like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Tunisia’s Islamist-dominated government is facing often violent demands for the immediate imposition of an Islamic state from radical Salafist groups, leading Tunisia’s secularist president to warn of the threat posed by Salafi-Jihadists to that nation’s democratic evolution.

Moncef MarzoukiPresident Moncef Marzouki (Business News)

Moncef Marzouki became the interim president of Tunisia after his election by the new Constituent Assembly in December, 2011. Marzouki was a long time dissident during the regime of Zine al-Abdin bin Ali, suffering imprisonment and an extended exile in France. Marzouki’s Congress for the Republic political party was one of two secularist parties that joined the larger Islamist Ennadha Party to form a new post-revolutionary coalition government. While Ennadha member Hamadi Jebali assumed the greatest power as Prime Minister, the president remains in charge of defense issues and foreign policy, though he must consult with the prime minister on both portfolios (Reuters, December 13, 2011).

According to the Tunisian president, those Arab Islamists who accepted the democratic process following the Arab Spring revolutions are finding themselves increasingly at odds with more extreme Islamist factions that regard acceptance of democracy as treason, as well as with the broader population that has looked to moderate Islamists for rapid reforms and improvements in their living conditions:

“Now the Islamists are finding out that they have fallen into the trap of democracy because they have heavy responsibilities in the economy and regarding living conditions. The people now want solutions to the problems of water, food, security etc. The people will judge them [the Islamists] on the basis of performance. I can say with full frankness now that if Ennahda went to the elections today it would perhaps be surprised by a violent reaction from the people because they did not do what was expected of them” (al-Hayat, November 4, 2012).

Marzouki has previously suggested that the center of jihad was shifting from the Afghanistan-Paskistan region to the Arab Maghreb (North Africa west of Egypt) after finding a foothold in northern Mali. Fear of becoming embroiled in the international “war on terrorism” has produced a policy of dialogue with religious extremists, “but these policies have not produced a result until now and, on the contrary, we have seen what happened” (al-Hayat, October 4, 2012).

Since the revolution, Tunisia’s new Islamist government has been challenged by mass protests and a series of attacks by radical Salafists, including the September 14 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis led by veteran jihadist Abu Iyad al-Tunisi. Four of the attackers were killed by security forces. In late October, Salafist militants attacked two National Guard posts in the Tunis suburb of Manouba after a Salafist was charged with assaulting the head of the local public security brigade. Shortly afterwards Khalid Karaoui, imam of the Ennour Mosque in Manouba, died of wounds incurred in the attack (al-Jazeera, October 31, 2012; AFP, November 1, 2012). There have even been direct clashes in the streets between Salafists and supporters of Ennadha with sometimes fatal results (AFP, November 5, 2012). Ennadha is also facing pressure from its youth wing, which is demanding quicker reforms and the prosecution of former regime members accused of corruption and torture.

Many of the leaders of these strikes are veterans of the Salafi-Jihadist Groupe Combattant Tunisien (GCT), founded in 2000 by Abu Iyad al-Tunisi (a.k.a. Sayfallah bin Hussein) and Tarik bin Habib Maaroufi, who returned to Tunisia last spring after serving time in Belgium on terrorism-related charges (Tunisia Live, April 1; for Abu Iyad, see Militant Leadership Monitor, May 1, 2012). Maaroufi is best known for his role in planning the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Mahsoud in Afghanistan in 2001.

Fifty-eight of those arrested in the clashes at the U.S. embassy went on a hunger strike in prison in protest of the conditions under which they are held and to bring attention to what the hunger-strikers describe as government persecution of the Salafist movement. Two prisoners have already died, including Muhammad Bakhti, a colleague of Abu Iyad and a senior Tunisian Salafi-Jihadist who was sentenced to 12 years in jail after clashes between the army and Salafists near Tunis in 2007. Bakhti was released in the amnesty that followed the revolution (AFP, November 17, 2012).

The bloody demonstration at the U.S. embassy was led by Abu Iyad al-Tunisi (a.k.a. Sayfallah bin Hussein). A one-time follower of radical Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada, Abu Iyad was a founder of the GCT and is the current leader of the Salafi-Jihadist group, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AST) (Business News [Tunis], September 17, 2012). Abu Iyad left Tunisia in 1991 under pressure from the Ben Ali regime. He attempted to obtain political asylum but his anti-British sermons did little to endear him to his hosts, who eventually sent him packing. Abu Iyad then joined the battle against American forces in Afghanistan before his arrest in Turkey in 2003 and subsequent extradition to Tunisia, where he was sentenced under the anti-terrorism act to 58 years in prison, where he remained until his release under the post-revolution amnesty in 2011 (Business News [Tunis], November 17, 2012). Abu Iyad has since stated his belief that it is the U.S. embassy that rules the country “and pulls the strings of the party in power” (Business News [Tunis], September 17, 2012).

Police efforts to detain Abu Iyad after the incident appear to have been half-hearted, missing him at home, at a funeral he attended the next day, and most revealingly during an appearance at a Tunis mosque that had been widely announced on social networking sites earlier that day (Business News [Tunis], September 17, 2012).

Ennadha has been criticized by the opposition for not taking a firmer line with Tunisia’s Salafists, but party leader Rached Ghannouchi is wary of alienating the community, possibly pushing it towards even greater violence: “We need to avoid the rhetoric of the enemy within. We have the experience of Ben Ali, who detained tens of thousands of Ennahda members and demonized the party. Then the regime fell, and now Ennahda is in power. If we want to demonize the Salafists, they are the ones that will be in power in 10-15 years’ time. This is why we talk to them as citizens, not as enemies” (Le Monde, October 18, 2012).

In remarks that mirror the difficulties Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is having with the Egyptian Salafist community, Gannouchi has elsewhere warned that the Salafis’ demonstrations and violence result in the depiction of Tunisia as a “center for terrorism and extremism” and a “Salafi State, even though they are a minority within a minority. I do not think they follow Ennadha. Actually they might become the biggest enemies of Ennadha” (al-Hayat, October 4, 2012).

In the post-revolutionary period, not only has the disparate coalition of secularists, leftists and Islamists that deposed the Ben Ali regime returned to its component (and rival) parts, but almost each political party represented in the new parliament, including Ennadha, has suffered splits and defections, hampering Tunisia’s political transition and weakening its response to internal threats (al-Jazeera, October 23, 2012). In a response to these growing tensions, a state of emergency has been imposed on a month-by-month basis since July, but on October 31, President Marzouki imposed a three-month extension of the state of emergency, reflecting a deteriorating security situation (Tunis Afrique Presse, October 31, 2012).

This article first appeared in the November 30, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

The Return of War to Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Can the Revolutionary Army of the Congo be Contained?

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Andrew McGregor

November 30, 2012

The seizure last week by mutinous Congolese soldiers of the city of Goma in the midst of the mineral rich Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has brought the deaths of hundreds of people and displaced hundreds of thousands of others. The ineffective response of the DRC military and the UN troops intended to support it has nourished fears that the mutineers might continue their march through the Congo, plunging the war-wracked state into yet another round of uncontrollable violence.

Great Lakes AfricaNow calling itself the Revolutionary Army of the Congo (RAC), the group of mutineers formerly known as M23 had pledged to march on the DRC capital of Kinshasha if DRC president Joseph Kabila failed to agree to discuss their demands, which include calls for national talks to be hosted by President Kabila, the release of political prisoners (including leading opposition politician Etienne Tshisekedi), the dissolution of the national electoral commission (believed by the ARC to have arranged Kabila’s re-election in 2011) and the investigation of military corruption (New Vision [Kampala], November 27, 2012).

The RAC/M23 movement has its origins in the largely Tutsi Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), an ethnic-defense militia based in the DRC province of Nord-Kivu. [1] The movement was believed to have been sponsored by Rwanda as a proxy force for use against the Kivu-based Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu militia determined to finish the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus that ravaged Rwanda in 1994. The FDLR appears to have stepped up cross-border operations into Rwanda in recent days and has renewed clashes with RAC/M23 (AP, November 27, 2012). The ICC issued a warrant in July for the arrest of FDLR commander Sylvestre Mudacumura, a Rwandan Hutu facing nine counts of war crimes.

General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda, a Rwandan Tutsi wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes committed while both a rebel and an officer in the DRC national army, took control of the CNDP in 2009. [2] The peace agreement that followed in that same year resulted in the integration of most of the CNDP into the DRC army, known as the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).  Colonel Ntaganda led a mutiny of up to 600 soldiers in Nord-Kivu in March after orders came for the ex-CNDP troops to be redeployed from Kivu, where ex-members of the CNDP had made a comfortable living by exploiting and taxing the numerous mining operations in the area. The Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) was named for the March 23, 2009 peace agreement that movement leaders claim Kinshasha failed to honor (East African [Nairobi], July 16, 2012).

Colonel Ntaganda, who has always denied being the M23 commander despite abundant evidence to the contrary, has kept a low profile since April, allowing the movement’s leadership to pass into the hands of its official commander, Colonel Sultani Makenga. Makenga (now a RAC brigadier) is a former CNDP commander who is believed to have played a major role in massacres carried out in the region in 2007 and 2008. Colonel Makenga denies Ntaganda is being harbored by the RAC (East African [Nairobi], October 22, 2012). At the time of his desertion from FARDC in May, Colonel Makenga was the second-in-command of DRC operations against the Hutu FDLR. Makenga was designated for asset seizure by the U.S. Treasury Department on November 13 in relation to his alleged use of child soldiers and being a recipient of arms and material related to military activities in the DRC.

Under a deal forged by Uganda, a RAC spokesman announced on November 29 that the movement would hand over the town of Sake to UN forces on November 30, to be followed by a withdrawal from Goma to a point 12 miles north of the city, though 100 RAC fighters would be allowed to remain at the Goma airport (AFP, November 29, 2012). In return, Kinshasha has agreed to negotiate with the rebels and hear their grievances, once they have retreated to 20 kilometers (12 miles) north of the city.

The Assault on Goma

A three-month truce was shattered on November 15 as RAC and Congolese forces clashed at daybreak, both sides claiming later to have acted in self-defense. Tanks belonging to the UN’s Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) rolled into defensive positions outside Goma, ready to support the defense of the city of one million people close to the Rwandan border. On November 18, UN attack helicopters, provided by the Ukraine and operated by Ukrainian pilots ran ten strike missions against the rebels outside Goma (AFP, November 18, 2012). The night before the assault on Goma, Rwandan General Joseph Nzabamwita reported that the DRC army had bombarded the Rwandan border region with T-55 tank shells, mortars and anti-aircraft missiles. A FARDC spokesman said an investigation was under way but countered that Rwanda had also fired mortars across the border (AFP, November 19, 2012).

RACongoPatrol of the Revolutionary Army of the Congo near Goma

RAC forces continued to advance and took the city in the morning of November 20 after a few hours of light resistance from FARDC and UN forces based in Goma. With the RAC on the outskirts of Goma, DRC forces engaged in some tough talk, with the local Republican Guard commander promising to “die with the population” rather than leave them to the hands of the rebels (Agence Congolaise de Presse, November 19, 2012). Residents of Goma reported that the Republican Guard (which reports to the president directly rather than to FARDC command) did offer some resistance to the insurgents while FARDC troops busied themselves with looting before abandoning the city (AFP, November 19, 2012). A FARDC spokesman claimed later that DRC armor came under fire from Rwandan artillery every time they tried to shell RAC positions, but a Rwandan spokesman replied: “Every time [FARDC] gets beaten on the ground, they use the RDF [Rwandan Defense Force] as an excuse” (AFP, November 17, 2012). Many of the Congolese troops shed their uniforms before fleeing into the bush. The precipitate departure of Congolese forces from Goma appears to have provided the ARC with an arms windfall of as much as 1,000 tons of arms and ammunition, including heavy artillery (AP, November 27, 2012).

After the attack, the DRC government reported that the rebels had been reinforced by 4,000 Rwandan troops and had been provided with night-vision goggles that gave them an advantage in the fighting (Agence Congolaise de Presse, November 19, 2012; November 20, 2012). The DRC had earlier claimed to have found bodies wearing Rwandan Army uniforms after clashes with the RAC on November 15, but a Rwandan army spokesman retorted: “This an old propaganda gimmick; it’s easy to try to draw Rwanda into this mess” (AFP, November 15, 2012; November 18, 2012, Jeune Afrique, November 17, 2012).

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius expressed his disappointment with the performance of the UN’s 1,500 man peacekeeping force in Goma: “MONUSCO’s mandate should be revised. MONUSCO was not in a situation where it could prevent what happened when faced with a few hundred men” (AFP, November 20, 2012). The UN has stated its Goma contingent, part of a force of 6,700 UN troops in Nord-Kivu, would remain in Goma, though their role in the current situation remains undefined.

UN peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous defended the MONUSCO contingent in Goma, pointing out that their mandate called for support of FARDC troops, but given the fact that government forces fled from Goma shortly after fighting began this was “hardly achievable… and clearly it is not the role – not the mandate of MONUSCO – to directly hit the armed groups…” (Xinhua, November 21, 2012).

MONUSCO’s ineffective defense of Goma sparked large demonstrations in several cities, including Kisangani, where UN vehicles were set on fire and stones thrown at UN offices. Protesters also targeted the government and the ARC for their roles in the continuing violence (Agence Congolaise de Presse, November 21, 2012; November 22, 2012).

After a “strategic withdrawal” from the Goma area, FARDC troops are now based around the town of Minova, 36 miles from Goma. On November 22, FARDC launched an offensive to retake the town of Sake, west of Goma. The Goma Airport remains under the control of UN forces.

Regional Involvement in the Crisis – Rwanda

A UN report on foreign military involvement in the Kivu region was leaked earlier this month, creating a diplomatic crisis in the Great Lakes region. Much of the report appeared to confirm the DRC’s claims that neighboring Rwanda and Uganda were providing arms, intelligence and logistical support to RAC/M23. The DRC is now demanding that Rwanda and Uganda be targeted by U.S. and UN sanctions for its support of RAC (AFP, November 18, 2012). Some of the fallout was internal, however; General Gabriel Amisi Kumba, the chief of DRC land forces, was dismissed by President Kabila on November 22 after having been accused in the report of trafficking arms to various militant groups, including suspected RAC allies in the local Maï-Maï and anti-Hutu Raia Mutomboki groups (JournaldeKin.com [Kinshasha], November 23, 2012; AFP, November 22, 2012).

Based partly on MONUSCO radio intercepts, Rwanda was identified in the report as playing a major role in creating and backing RAC/M23, with Minister of Defense General James Kabarebe accused of directing the movement’s activities with the assistance of Army chief-of-staff Lieutenant General Charles Kayonga and Lieutenant General Jacques Nziza. Rwandan troops fought in the Congo during the rebellion against President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1996-1998 and again from 1998 to 2003. Rwandan troops returned to the DRC with permission in 2009 to pursue the Hutu FDLR militia.

Rwanda’s activities in the border region have led to the cancelling of an important training agreement with the Belgian military; according to Belgian foreign minister Didier Reynders: “We will not train soldiers who could contribute to the destabilization [of the Congo]” (Radio Télévision Belge Francophone, November 11, 2012). The DRC, seeing an opportunity, dispatched Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo to Brussels to urge greater military assistance and training from the Belgians.

Regional Involvement in the Crisis – Uganda

Uganda, which President Kabila describes as “the bad boy” of the region, was also identified as a major backer of RAC/M23, much to the outrage of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni (Sunday Monitor [Kampala], October 29, 2012). Ugandan police chief Lieutenant General Kale Kayihura and the President’s brother, General Salim Saleh, were singled out in the UN report for providing  military assistance and troops to RAC/M23 (Daily Monitor [Kampala], November 5, 2012).

Uganda has intervened in the DRC before, particularly in 1996-1998, when Ugandan troops backed Laurent Kabila’s efforts to depose President Mobutu Sese Seko and again in 1998-2003 during a vast civil war that dragged in many other African countries. Ugandan generals, some related to President Museveni, made enormous profits by pillaging the eastern Congo’s mineral industry.

Ugandan premier Amama Mbabazi described the leaked report as the work of “UN amateurs” and asked:

Why should we continue involving Uganda where the only reward we get is malignment? Why should the children of Ugandans die and we get malignment as a reward? Why should we invite retaliation by [Somalia’s] al-Shabaab by standing with the people of Somalia, only to get malignment by the UN system? (Daily Monitor [Kampala], November 2, 2012).

After the release of the UN report, Uganda announced it was considering three options before taking action:

  • Withdrawing from regional peacekeeping operations in Somalia (where they form the core of the African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM)  and the Central African Republic
  • Continuing with these operations despite the UN report
  • Demanding a withdrawal of the allegations contained in the UN report before allowing Ugandan peacekeeping operations to continue (Daily Monitor [Uganda], November 26, 2012).

After Uganda made its threat to abandon UN-backed peacekeeping operations in Somalia, UN officials quickly began to back away from the report, saying that the views expressed therein “did not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations” (Africa Review [Nairobi], November 5, 2012).

During an interview with a local newspaper, Ugandan defense minister Dr. Crispus Kiyonga admitted that Ugandan authorities had conducted secret meetings with RAC/M23 to urge them to stop fighting and suggested that these meetings might have been misinterpreted as support for the group (Daily Monitor [Kampala], November 12, 2012).

Pursuit of the largely moribund Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group is often cited by the government as the reason for its cross-border military operations in the eastern DRC. Museveni claims that a recent series of assassinations of prominent Muslim clerics in Uganda is the work of ADF operatives based in the DRC (Observer [Kampala], September 17; for the ADF, see Terrorism Monitor, December 20, 2007). In an interview with Ugandan journalists, Kabila said joint DRC-Ugandan operations against elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) based in the Congo had been successful and that further joint operations against Ugandan rebels of the ADF based in the Kivu region would have followed if they hadn’t been pre-empted by the new outbreak of violence in the region (Sunday Monitor [Kampala], October 29, 2012).

As leader of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), President Museveni is officially leading regional efforts to quell the fighting in Kivu and appears to have some influence over RAC/M23. [3] Despite the claims that Uganda is arming and facilitating the RAC/M23 rebellion, Uganda says it still has the “moral authority” to continue as a mediator in the conflict (IRIN [Nairobi], November 23, 2012). The ICGLR has proposed forming a “neutral” international force of 4,000 troops under AU and UN supervision to eliminate armed groups in the eastern DRC, but it will be difficult to find solid commitments of trained and capable troops for this force. The neutral force is intended to include 4,000 troops from Angola, Tanzania, Kenya and the DRC, although only Tanzania has committed a small force of 500 men in the three months that have passed since the creation of the force was announced, and funding remains unconfirmed. It was intended to deploy the force by December, but this now appears unlikely (Daily Monitor [Kampala], November 1, 2012). DRC Prime Minister Ponyo has stated his preference for a “reinvigorated” MONUSCO as a “credible and realistic alternative” to the proposed “neutral international force” (Agence Congolaise de Presse, October 26, 2012).  President Museveni, who favors the new force, has said that what is required is a “new hybrid of troops who are ideologically committed and loyal” (Observer [Kampala], September 17, 2012).

Conclusion

The struggle for the wealth of Kivu Province continues without regard for the residents of the region, who are buffeted one way or another by offensives and counteroffensives. For now, however, it appears that RAC has stepped back from its announced intention of taking the war to Kinshasha, which was always more of a threat than a potential reality due to the great distances, difficult terrain and hostile groups that would be encountered on any march to the national capital. If the RAC actually withdraws from Goma in the coming days (which is by no means guaranteed), it has still emerged from the latest round of fighting with greater wealth, more arms and a degree of respect for their military capabilities when matched with FARDC. The question is whether RAC can translate their new situation into an agreement by a largely unwilling DRC government to consider or even discuss their demands. For the moment, FARDC, even with the support of UN forces, is almost certainly incapable of driving RAC from its lucrative bases in the mining regions of Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu. The region’s notorious volatility and reputation as a haven for every type of bandit and would-be revolutionary does not hold much promise that a truce with one group will prevent other groups from continuing to rampage across the eastern Congo. In the end, Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC all value their proxy militias too much to be expected to take decisive steps to bring peace to a region bearing impressive mineral wealth for those willing to bend international protocols to exploit it.

Notes

1. For background on the M23, see Andrew McGregor, “M23: A New Player in the Proxy Wars of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Terrorism Monitor, July 26, 2012.

2. For Ntaganda, see Andrew McGregor, “War Crimes, Gold Mines and Mutiny in the North-East Congo: A Profile of General Bosco Ntaganda,” Militant Leadership Monitor, August 31, 2012,

3. The ICGLR consists of 11 member-states: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

This article was originally published in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor