The South African National Defense Force: A Military in Freefall

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Andrew McGregor

January 25, 2013

Despite an eagerness to use the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) as an means of projecting the nation’s influence abroad, there is evidence that South Africa’s government has so neglected or mismanaged its military assets that it may soon be unable to defend itself, much less engage in international adventures.

South African TroopsSouth African Troops in the Central African Republic

Laat year, Roelf Meyer, the chairman of South Africa’s defense review committee, identified a number of strategic goals for the SANDF, including:

  • Maintaining the security of South Africa’s borders
  • Promoting peace and security in Africa
  • Assisting civil authorities in policing or anti-poaching efforts
  • Establishing South Africa as a responsible leading member of the African Union
  • Responding to new regional threats such as piracy (Business Day [Johannesburg], April 13, 2012).

However, with a reduced force size and inadequate resources, the SANDF will soon have difficulty meeting most of these goals. The SANDF is already estimated to be three battalions short of what it requires to meet current commitments (Johannesburg Star, January 9).  Defense spending is now 1.2 % of GDP, shy of the IMF’s recommended 2%, and there are no plans to increase it.

Considering the current restraints on SANDF, the president’s decision to deploy a reinforced paratroop company of some 400 men to the Central African Republic (CAR) earlier this month took many by surprise, not least because of the president’s failure to inform parliament of the deployment and the costs involved as he is required to do by the South African constitution (Johannesburg Star, January 8; for the intervention in the CAR, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, January 10). The South African force was chartered into the CAR due to a lack of operable transport aircraft.

Prior to the CAR deployment, SANDF already had nearly 2,000 personnel active on peacekeeping and training missions in Darfur, the CAR and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Some 1,200 South African troops were amongst the 1,500 man UN peacekeeping force (the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo – MONUSCO)  that was heavily criticized in November for allowing a few hundred rebels to take the Congolese city of Goma with little fighting (See Terrorism Monitor, November 30, 2012). With a total strength of over 19,000 and a budget of over $1.4 billion annually, MONUSCO is the largest and most expensive peacekeeping force in the world (Daily Monitor [Kampala], December 29, 2012).

Life in the South African military is not seen as desirable by many potential recruits. Pay can be erratic, HIV rates are as high as 25% (making these troops unavailable for external deployment) and an estimated 35% of South Africa’s military barracks have been classed as unfit for human occupation since 2007 (Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], April 21, 2012).  Without money to operate sophisticated equipment, skilled staff continue to flee at the end of their enlistment and there is little opportunity for new recruits to train in skills useful in the civilian world. Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defense has described abuse of women in the SANDF as “common,” adding that many female recruits have been impregnated by their instructors (BUAnews, November 26, 2011). Racial abuse of black subordinates by white senior officers also remains a problem 19 years into the integration process (Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], August 21, 2011). South African troops are unionized and have at times clashed with police during pay disputes.

With the 2012 defense budget of $3.8 billion still far below the 2% of GDP required to maintain the armed forces, the South African defense department began looking at ways of generating income, including contracting out soldiers to municipalities to do various labor and infrastructure repair projects. The department also created the Defense Estate Management agency to lease or sell-off defense department lands. Much of the land owned by the SANDF came by way of British government endowments of military facilities made on the condition that they could only be used for defense purposes (Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], April 21, 2012).

There has also been a temptation to use the military as a well-armed police force to suppress labor unrest and gang activity. Considerable controversy was generated last year when President Jacob Zuma deployed 1000 SANDF troops to aid police in disarming striking Lonmin miners following a massacre by police (Johannesburg Times, September 21, 2012; SAPA, September 16).  Western Cape premier Helen Zille issued a request for troops to fight “emergency levels” of gang violence in Cape Town in July (AFP, July 10, 2012).  By late November, there were calls for the army to be sent to rural areas of the Western Cape to prevent violence by striking farmworkers (SAPA, November 28, 2012).

Sending the SANDF into the streets of South Africa damaged President Zuma’s credibility as the South African Development Community (SADC) facilitator in neighboring Zimbabwe, where he has urged that Zimbabwean troops be confined to barracks. According to the state-run Daily Mail, if South African presidential spokesman Mac Maharaj “thinks he will be able to still come here and continue mindlessly preaching about keeping the army in the barracks as part of President Zuma’s mediation, then he does not take himself seriously” (New Zimbabwe, September 24, 2012).

Politicization of the military is still a problem in South Africa. There has been speculation that the current chief of the SANDF, Angolan-trained Lieutenant General Solly Zacharia Shoke, received his appointment as a result of his history as a commander in Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC’s military wing (SAPA, May 11, 2011). Umkhonto we Sizwe forces were integrated into the newly formed SANDF between 1994 and 2004. An investigative commission recently declared that the SANDF was too politicized, a situation typified by former Defense Minister Lindiwe Sisulu’s preference for wearing SANDF uniforms at public occasions (SAPA, April 28, 2011).

A sometimes unaccountable procurement process remains a problem for the South African military; last year the political opposition revealed over $7.75 billion had passed through a defense department slush fund that had failed to reveal to parliament how the money had been spent (Johannesburg Times, April 18, 2012). The army has been overlooked in recent acquisition programs and is close to finding itself equipped with obsolete equipment in terms of armored personnel carriers, logistics vehicles and main battle tanks (Financial Mail [Johannesburg], October 21, 2012).

During the years of sanctions, South Africa developed a competitive and innovative defense industry. Since then a somewhat diminished defense industry has survived domestic cutbacks by turning to the export trade. Now, however, once innovative designs are becoming dated while research and development funding is drying up, threatening a once profitable industry that was a reliable employer of skilled labor (Financial Mail [Johannesburg], October 21, 2012).

South Africa’s once-effective air force has new aircraft but cannot afford the fuel and maintenance needed to keep them in the air. Despite this, one element of the air force that did see extensive time in the air was Squadron 21, charged with flying South African VIPs and government ministers. Former defense minister Lindiwe Sisilu booked 203 flights over three years in chartered luxury Gulfstream jets at an estimated cost of $4.5 million. Some 63 of the flights were empty, as they were intended solely to pick the minister up somewhere and take her to another destination in what one opposition critic described as “a staggering waste of money” (Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], November 9, 2012).

In 2012, President Zuma decided the Boeing Business Jet purchased by his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, for $66 million in 2001, was no longer good enough for presidential travel. Controversy erupted when it was learned the defense department had been instructed to purchase two Boeing 767s for Zuma’s exclusive use, two Boeing 737s for the exclusive use of his deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe and two smaller business jets for former presidents and government ministers. Following the predictable uproar, the SANDF leased two executive jets from a Nigerian charter company at a cost of $88 million over five years (Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], April 8, 2012; Johannesburg Star, October 19).

While government ministers travel in luxury, the South African Air Force (SAAF) still transports troops in 70-year-old Dakota aircraft. One of these, a Dakota C47TP (an upgraded DC-3 with turbine engines) crashed last December, claiming 11 lives when it was unable to fly above inclement weather. The crash came shortly after the military decided it could no longer afford a maintenance contract for its military aircraft (SAPA, December 6, 2012; Sunday Times [Johannesburg], December 10, 2012). World War II-era Dakotas also continue to be used for surveillance of South Africa’s 3,900 kilometer coastline in the absence of modern surveillance aircraft (Sunday Times [Johannesburg], April 18, 2012). Meanwhile, 26 new Swedish-built Gripen fighter-jets, purchased at a cost of R10 billion, average only two hours in the air each week; not enough to keep the machines in operable condition and far from the 10 hours of flight-time each week considered necessary to keep pilots well-trained (Sunday Times [Johannesburg], December 10, 2012).

Former SAAF chief Lieutenant General Carlo Gagiano retired in 2012 after trying to resign in late 2011 during his hospitalization for stress as he continued to try unsuccessfully to find enough money for the fuel and maintenance to keep the SAAF in the air. His successor, Lieutenant General Fabian Zimpande Msimang (the first black chief of the SAAF) will have trouble keeping all but executive travel jets in the air if current funding problems continue.

The once formidable South African navy now spends little time at sea. Replacement parts and maintenance budgets barely exist, leaving only one of the navy’s four new frigates operational and only one its four new submarines able to put out to sea (Sunday Times [Johannesburg], December 10, 2012). South African Navy ships and SAAF aircraft carry out anti-piracy operations in the Mozambique Channel, though this mission is also threatened by underfunding.

Despite economic troubles and a collapsing military, South Africa still desires to be a major player in Africa, which encourages it to commit to missions that stretch the military’s capacity to breaking point.  Unless current trends are reversed, the steady transformation of the SANDF into an assembly of riot police and border guards will be completed in just a few years. Geography and reputation have left South Africa with few external enemies, but it is also extremely wealthy in various resources. South Africa was only cobbled together from various constituent parts a little more than a century ago, and it would not be surprising if a general collapse of South Africa’s security infrastructure invited the emergence of secessionist movements drawing on both domestic and external inspiration. South Africa’s eventual inability to project force beyond its borders will also have important implications for regional security in sub-Saharan Africa.

This article first appeared in the January 25, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Egypt’s Muslim Brothers Watch as Divisions Rend Their Salafist Challengers

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Andrew McGregor

January 25, 2013.

As the February 25 parliamentary elections grow near, the political wings of Egypt’s Salafist movement continue to fragment, raising questions about the movement’s ability to replicate its relative success in last year’s elections, in which the movement took nearly a quarter of the available seats despite being political neophytes.

Abd al-GhafourEmad Abd al-Ghafour (al-Jazeera)

Egypt’s Salafist movement was shaken on December 26, 2012, when Nur Party leader Emad Abd al-Ghafour and two former Nur Party spokesmen, Yousri Hammad and Muhammad Nur, joined roughly 150 other party members in a mass resignation followed by the creation of the new Watan (Homeland) Party (Daily News Egypt, December 29, 2012). The Nur Party was the lead element in a largely Salafist coalition that placed second in parliamentary elections last year before that parliament was dissolved as unconstitutional by a June decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt.

Abd al-Ghafour became engaged in a power struggle with Nur Party vice-chairman Shaykh Nasser al-Borhami, a founder of al-Da’wa al-Salafiya (the Salafist Calling), an Islamist group formed in 1970s Alexandria as a rival to the Muslim Brotherhood that later created the Nur Party as its political expression. Al-Ghafour led a wing of the party that called for internal reform of the powerful role played in political decisions by the clerics of al-Da’wa al-Salafiya. Not surprisingly, al-Ghafour and al-Watan have lost the support of the Salafist Calling, which will inevitably hurt their appeal to the party’s core constituency. Referring to the dispute, Ahmad Badie, a prominent Nur Party defector and new Watan Party spokesman, said: “The role of clerics should be restricted to handing down edicts and opinions on matters that pertain to the Shari’a… but they should not be involved in elections or day-to-day politics” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 21).

Watan Party vice-president Dr. Yusri Hamad explained in an interview with a pan-Arab daily that the new party’s ultimate reference is Islamic Shari’a, “the general model for all Salafist parties.” Al-Watan, however, will not be “exclusionist,” but will welcome the participation of Copts and women in its ranks: “We have spoken about women’s rights and dignity and the importance of women playing a role. At the same time, we are also extending our hand in national partnership to the Copts because Egypt was not built by any one faction or entity; therefore everybody is invited to participate in the country’s construction and development.”   This openness will not, however, extend to guaranteeing women roles as candidates for the party. In the Egyptian context, Hamad says Salafism “means that we believe that state-building and reform must be based on two things; modernity, in addition to the traditions and values that are present and which distinguish Egypt from other countries” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 7).

Borhami and the Nur Party are adamant that mandatory representation for women and Christians in the new Egyptian parliament is a violation of Shari’a and the constitution; “Allocating quotas for women and Copts simply because of their gender or religion is blatant discrimination” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 21). The Nur Party was forced to include female candidates in the previous parliamentary election to avoid being banned from participation.

Given the measured words of the Watan leaders and their temperate demeanor, it is somewhat surprising that they have aligned themselves closely with Shaykh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, an outspoken and unpredictable preacher who spoke at the Watan founding despite planning to announce his own Salafist party days later.

Abu Ismail keeps his place in Egyptian headlines through an apparently endless series of provocative statements. Most recently he blamed Egypt’s post-revolution economic collapse on “rumors about the economy” spread by the political opposition (al-Shorouk [Cairo], January 4). He has also condemned the national protests scheduled for January 25, describing their advocates as “criminals” who want “to burn the country” (Daily News Egypt, January 4).

Abu Ismail has repeatedly called for the dismissal of Interior Minister Major General Ahmad Gamal al-Din after police tried to enter his political headquarters following an outbreak of political violence. A series of violent attacks on the offices of the Wafd Party and its newspaper as well as the offices of the Popular Current, a political coalition led by Neo-Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi (Karama Party), were blamed by police on members of Abu Ismail’s party.  Abu Ismail denied any knowledge of the attacks but was undone by his own followers, who celebrated their role in the attacks on their Facebook accounts (Daily News Egypt, December 16, 2012).

Abu Ismail has said he will not run for president or for the House of Representatives (the new name for Egypt’s parliament), adding that he had only run for president in the last election from fear that the regime would mount a counter-revolution (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 22). Before his disqualification from the contest on the grounds his mother had dual U.S.-Egyptian citizenship (a violation of electoral rules), Abu Ismail shocked many Salafists with his advocacy of rebellion against “unjust” rulers. Despite the suspicions raised by his support for this very un-Salafist belief, Abu Ismail seems to have appealed to many young Islamists who subsequently entered his camp (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], January 21).

Besides their alliance with Abu Ismail’s Umma al-Misriya Party, al-Watan is seeking to build a coalition named Watan al-Hor (Free Homeland) with other Salafist parties, including the Asala (Fundamentals) Party of Shaykh Muhammad Abd al-Maqsud, Hizb al-Fadila (Virtue Party), Hizb al-Islah (Reform Party) and the Islamist New Labor Party. Negotiations continue regarding the participation of two other parties, Hizb al-Wasat (Center Party), a moderate breakaway faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizb al-Bena’a wa’l-Tanmia (Building and Development Party), the political wing of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya.

Though an accelerating process of political divisions is usually regarded as a troubling sign for most political movements or ideologies, the deputy chief of the Nur Party, Mustafa Khalifa, has put a more attractive spin on the political fragmentation, suggesting it will provide voters with “more alternatives from across the political spectrum” (al-Ahram Weekly, January 23). In a less rosy light, it appears that, unlike the more powerful and enduring Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafist movement in Egypt has fallen victim to the growth of personality-driven politics. There is little to differentiate between the aims and ideology of the growing number of Salafist political parties; in most cases these differences could probably be accommodated within a single party. As the new Salafist formations draw their strength from existing parties, a space is opened for the emergence of confrontational leaders such as Abu Ismail who have the potential of polarizing the nascent electorate. The Muslim Brotherhood can also be expected to exploit the Salafist divisions in February’s parliamentary election by presenting themselves as a movement where the promotion of Islam in daily life is more important than the success or failure of individuals.

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, January 25, 2013.

A Response to the Crusaders? Defining the True Purpose of the Attack on In Amenas

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Jamestown Special Report, January 18, 2013

Andrew McGregor

As the Algerian government continues to control a haphazard and inconsistent flow of information from In Aménas, the site of this week’s dramatic hostage-taking by Islamist militants, there continues to be confusion over the number of hostages killed in an assault by Algerian security forces and even the fate of the militants themselves.

In Amenas 1The remote In Aménas gas field is close to the Libyan border, some 1600 kilometers from the capital of Algiers, and is operated as a joint venture between BP, Norwegian Statoil and the Algerian government-owned Sonatrach. However, with most of the facility now in the hands of the Algerian military after a bloody intervention, the main questions that must be addressed at this point involve the origin and purpose of the attackers. The answers to these questions may differ significantly from those provided by the militants themselves over the last two days.

“Those Who Sign in Blood”

At the core of the attack is veteran Algerian jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), a prominent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) commander whose differences with the movement’s leadership resulted in Belmokhtar splitting with AQIM in October to set up his own fighting group, “the Brigade of Those Who Sign in Blood.” In early December, Belmokhtar led a column of fighting vehicles and loyalists to the Malian border post of al-Khalil, close to the frontier with Algeria (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, January 10).  Al-Khalil is just north of the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains of Kidal and is a vital border post along a main Saharan highway that brings all types of commerce, licit and illicit, south through the Algerian desert town of Adrar. Algeria announced that its borders had been sealed and secured on January 14, two days before the raid on In Aménas (AFP, January 14).

Belmokhtar’s new militant formation issued a statement of responsibility for the raid on In Aménas on January 16, declaring the attack “a response to the blatant intervention of the Crusader French forces in Mali” and the Algerian “conspiracy with the French to strike the Muslims in Mali” (ansar1.info, January 16). Though the claim of responsibility suggested that the attack was made in response to Algeria’s January 14 decision to allow over-flights by French military aircraft, such an assault would in fact require weeks of planning and organization, even more so if the attack was actually mounted from Mali, as the attackers claim. A spokesman for AQIM’s Katibat Mulathamin confirmed that “the commando” had been prepared for this operation for nearly two months “because we knew in advance that the [Algerian] regime would be a good ally of France in the war against Azawad [i.e. northern Mali] (Agence Nouakchott d’Information, January 17).

Most interesting was a nearly simultaneous claim of responsibility from AQIM’s Katibat al-Mulathamin (“Brigade of the Wearers of the Veil,” a reference to the male Tuareg custom of wearing a veil – Arabic “litham”). This brigade was formerly Belmokhtar’s command before his split with the rest of the AQIM leadership in October. If this was not simply a case of AQIM trying to jump onboard an ongoing operation, it would seem to indicate that Belmokhtar’s split with the rest of the organization was not as severe as thought or has been subject to some degree of reconciliation in recent weeks.

in amenas 2One of the kidnappers told a French news agency by phone that his group were “members of al-Qaeda” under the command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar and had come “from northern Mali” (AFP, January 16). However, this claim merits some deeper examination. The distance from Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s new base in the Malian border town of al-Khalil to In Aménas is no less than 725 miles as the crow flies. For those not blessed with wings, the actual drive would be significantly longer, using both Algerian highways and desert tracks that would take the attackers around the north side of Algeria’s Hoggar mountains. While it is true that Algeria’s border with Mali is long and difficult to defend, it is difficult to envision the passage of a large convoy of militants through the busy section between al-Khalil and the Algerian border post at Bordj Mokhtar without detection. A sizable convoy would be required to carry out the attack, carrying its own food, water and fuel as well as fighters, weapons and munitions. If the attackers were indeed able to travel in a heavily-armed convoy from one end of Algeria to the other without the least interference or detection from Algerian security forces, this would indicate either Algerian government cooperation or a complete breakdown in Algeria’s security infrastructure, both unpalatable alternatives. A third option, however, is that such claims are intentional misdirection designed to conceal the real point of origin of the attackers – Libya.

Algerian Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia hinted at the unlikelihood that the attackers had come direct from Mali or any other country, saying that the terrorists had come “not from Mali, nor from Libya, nor from any other neighboring country” (Algérie Presse Service, January 16). By the next day, however, Kablia had changed his mind, now claiming that the attackers were from Libya, without elaborating (Echorouk [Algiers], January 17).

A terrorist attack of this type was somewhat unexpected, at least based on previous experience. Even at the height of clashes between Algeria’s Islamist militants and government forces in the 1990s, the Islamists never attempted to penetrate a heavy security cordon placed around Algeria’s vital oil and gas infrastructure in the southern desert region. Fighting from well-concealed bases in the heavily-wooded Kabylie Mountains of northern Algeria was always preferable to mounting operations in difficult desert terrain where no cover was available from air surveillance or attack. In this sense, it seems that proximity to Libya may have been the deciding factor in the selection of In Aménas as a target. Libya is still struggling to consolidate control of its desert interior and the distance from the Libyan border to In Aménas could be easily covered at night, allowing the attackers to emerge undetected with the rising of the sun. The nearby Algerian military camp entrusted with protecting the gas installation did not go into action until the terrorists has already seized the facility.

The Purpose of the Attack

Belmokhtar’s new group is one of a host of new Islamist formations to suddenly emerge in northern Mali. According to a spokesman from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), these new groups are intended to “fight the neighboring countries, especially Algeria” (Le Temps d’Algerie, January 16).

The raiders were reported to have demanded the release of 100 Islamists from Algerian prisons in exchange for the hostages, which seems to have been the real purpose of the hostage-taking (AFP, January 16). Unusual for a Belmokhtar kidnapping, there was no mention of a cash ransom, though it is possible that not all the details regarding demands have become available. The assailants claimed to be equipped with mortars and anti-aircraft missiles, saying “We hold the Algerian government and the French government and the countries of the hostages fully responsible if our demands are not met. It is up to them to stop the brutal aggression against our people in Mali” (Ansar1.info, January 16).

According to Algerian government sources, the raid began at 5 AM when three vehicles carrying heavily armed terrorists attacked a bus carrying foreign workers to the local airstrip, overpowering its security escort and killing at least one foreign worker (Algérie Presse Service, January 16; L’Expression [Algiers], January 16). Algeria’s Interior Minister, Dahou Ould Kablia, was clear from the first; there would be no negotiations with the terrorists.

Algerian helicopters opened fire on the terrorists when they tried to flee the gas plant in vehicles using hostages as protection. Among those killed in the first Algerian attack was Abu al-Bara, an Algerian associate of Belmokhtar and the apparent leader of the raid (al-Akhbar, January 17). Others killed in the Algerian assault include veteran jihadist Lamine Boucheneb (a.k.a. Amir Tahir), leader of the Fils du Sahara pour la justice islamique and Mauritanian Abdallahi Ould Humeida. According to a source within the “Signatories in Blood,” the raiders were a diverse group that included jihadis from Canada, Algeria, Mali, Egypt, Niger and Mauritania (Agence Nouakchott d’Information, January 17).

The hostage-taking was somewhat unusual in that both kidnappers and abductees remained in touch with the outside world by telephone. One of the hostages told France 24 TV that the prisoners had been force to wear explosive belts by the raiders, who promised to blow up the gas plant if attacked by Algerian forces (France 24, January 16). Another hostage reported that the attackers had mined the entire plant and were will armed with rocket-propelled grenades (Le Figaro [Paris], January 16).  As the Algerian military made its final assault on the complex, a spokesman for the hostage-takers was on the phone with a Mauritanian news agency, threatening to kill the hostages against a background of loud explosions before the line went dead (Agence Nouakchott d’Information, January 17).

After the Algerian military had retaken control of the gas facility, an AQIM spokesman promised more operations would be mounted against the Algerian regime, warning Algerians to “keep away from the locations of foreign companies, as we will strike where nobody would expect” (Agence Nouakchott d’Information, January 17).

Conclusion

The raid suggests that Belmokhtar continues to work closely with AQIM elements despite the differences that led the veteran jihadist to assemble his own formation in early December. However, there is a strong possibility that Belmokhtar’s raid on In Aménas will have the inevitable result of dragging a so-far reluctant Algeria into the conflict in northern Mali. Mauritania, another hold-out despite a history of intervening in northern Mali against al-Qaeda elements, has now reversed its position and agreed to deploy combat troops in northern Mali (Jeune Afrique, January 16). Chad has also decided to send a so-far indeterminate number of its highly capable desert fighters to Mali, thus furnishing, together with Algeria and Mauritania, the missing elements of an African intervention force that was far too reliant on West African troops with little knowledge of Saharan-style desert warfare. If Algiers does commit to the military destruction of the Islamist forces in northern Mali, Belmokhtar’s ill-timed raid on In Aménas may be remembered as the beginning of the end for the Mali-based Islamists.

Though unsuccessful in the short-term, the raid will have long-term impact on the Algerian energy industry as expat workers are recalled or leave on their own accord and Algerian military resources are diverted to protecting isolated desert installations. There is a strong possibility of further strikes in Algeria to relieve pressure on embattled AQIM units in northern Algeria, where recent and effective counterterrorist operations have put the movement on its heels. Most important, however, is the realization that it is Libya, rather than northern Mali, that has become a base for terrorist operations in the Sahara/Sahel region.

Did France Move Too Soon in Mali?

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Andrew McGregor

Jamestown Foundation Commentary, January 16, 2013

When an Islamist offensive took the Malian town of Konna late last week, France decided to respond with a military intervention it declared was necessary to prevent Islamist forces from taking over the rest of the country.

Mali map 2The Islamist offensive was led not by al-Qaeda, but by Ansar al-Din, a largely Tuareg Islamist movement that has been aggressively consolidating its control of northern Mali in recent weeks at the expense of its erstwhile (and largely foreign) allies in al-Qaeda and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). The unexpected move south was almost certainly designed to further this consolidation by demonstrating the movement’s military skills while offering a common cause to gather in the disunited Islamists under Ansar al-Din’s banner. Putting pressure on Bamako to take negotiations seriously instead of waiting for an international intervention was certainly another objective.

Given that French unilateral intervention in Libya dragged its NATO allies into a war that has destabilized the entire Saharan/Sahel region and created new and unforeseen opportunities for radical Islamist groups, the reluctance of France’s allies to leap into this new intervention should not be surprising. Though France has received commitments of logistical and humanitarian support from leading EU nations, Canada and the United States, it would probably take a major military reversal to bring troops from these nations into the conflict. In a military sense there seems little doubt that France has the means to defeat the Islamists in open warfare. French vulnerability lies in its massive economic interests in the Sahara/Sahel region and the exposure of tens of thousands of French citizens to retaliation in the form of kidnappings or murders. MUJWA has already vowed to strike at French interests and citizens “everywhere; in Bamako, in Africa and in Europe.”

If it intends to retake northern Mali on behalf of Bamako, France will have great difficulty performing the task without deploying ground forces. Mali’s military has always performed abysmally in northern Mali and there is no reason to think that it will do any better now against an enemy that is better organized and armed than ever before. Simply pushing it ahead with promises of French air support will likely be insufficient to reverse Islamist gains in the region. Mali’s most effective troops, its loyalist Tuareg and Arab militias, have been sidelined due to racial suspicions in Bamako. The addition of a small composite force drawn from a variety of Francophone nations belonging to ECOWAS is likely to have little impact on the ground in the absence of any type of planning, preparation or experience in mounting joint operations.

While the Tuareg of Ansar al-Din actually reside in northern Mali and may decide to mount a campaign to defend territory they regard as theirs, other militants belonging to al-Qaeda and related groups may decide to bolt rather than be placed in the unusual position of trying to defend fixed positions. Algeria and other neighboring nations have been preparing to seal their long and undefended borders, but are still far from completing these efforts. Al-Qaeda, which relies on mobility for its survival, may thus be able to escape a French-led offensive that has begun too soon for border security measures to be implemented.

There are numerous promises from French allies to provide training to Malian regulars, but with the campaign already underway it would seem to be a bit late for such measures. There is also a danger that Bamako could unleash pro-government Black African tribal militias in the wake of an advance by the Malian army. With a record of atrocities against the Arab, Tuareg and Mauritanian peoples of northern Mali, these militias could easily initiate a round of racially-inspired violence that could last for years or even decades. Ansar al-Din have done their own part to sour racial relations in Mali by massacring over 100 mostly southern soldiers taken prisoner when the northern garrison at Aguel Hoc was captured by the Islamists in January, 2012.

The question is whether the French intervention was an overreaction. Though the Ansar al-Din offensive was certainly designed in part to test the resolve of Malian military forces based in the “front-line” cities of Mopti and Sévaré, there was actually little chance for several thousand Tuareg fighters and their allies to take Bamako and the rest of southern Mali, a region where they would be heavily outnumbered by a hostile population that could count on a massive international military response to help expel the Islamists. Ansar al-Din’s political agenda is restricted to lightly-populated northern Mali; the movement has never expressed a desire to conquer the rest of Mali, nor would its planners be likely to delude themselves that such an effort would be possible without armed allies in the south, and these simply do not exist. The Ansar al-Din offensive has proven to be a strategic mistake, though in itself this would seem to confirm that the movement did not expect a military response from France to what amounted to little more than a probing of Malian government defenses.

Who is Joining the Battle in Mali?

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Andrew McGregor

Aberfoyle International Security Special Report, January 15, 2013

When Tuareg-led Islamist groups advanced into the “no-man’s land” between Islamist-held northern Mali and government-controlled southern Mali, it precipitated a new war in the Sahel/Sahara region that probably neither side expected at this time.

french in maliThe largely Tuareg Ansar al-Din movement (led by veteran rebel Iyad ag Ghali, a.k.a. Abu al-Fadl) dropped out of peace talks on January 3 and announced it was prepared to resume hostilities after determining Bamako’s negotiators were only playing for time before an international military intervention could be mounted. In pressing south, Ansar al-Din was likely pursuing the following limited objectives rather than making a move on the Malian capital of Bamako:

  • Consolidate military command and control over divided Islamist fighting forces, including Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) forces recently defected to Ansar al-Din
  • Establish Ansar al-Din as the principal military and political force in northern Mali
  • Test the resolve of Malian military forces and their militia allies in Mopti and Sévaré
  • Pressure the Bamako government to take negotiations seriously before scheduled peace talks resumed later this month.

Unfortunately, the nations with the greatest experience in fighting al-Qaeda militants in the Sahara, Algeria and Mauritania, are not represented in the pro-government forces being assembled in Mali as part of the French-led Operation Serval, though they are taking important steps to seal their borders to prevent the escape of Islamist fighters. Algiers has also approved the over-flight of French military aircraft. On the other hand, nationals of both Algerian and Mauritania are well represented in the Islamist forces occupying northern Mali. Another nation that could make a major contribution to the anti-Islamist coalition is Chad, whose fighters redefined desert warfare in their campaigns against Libya’s military in the 1980s. Chad had expressed interest in joining an international intervention force, but cooled to the idea after Chadian president Idriss Déby Itno decided the force was too badly organized to commit Chadian troops, though he may yet accede to French requests for troops.

ECOWAS Chairman and Côte d’Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara ordered an immediate deployment of the 3,300-man UN-authorized AFISMA on January 11 (PANA Online [Dakar], January 14). However, with the ECOWAS intervention now moved up from its scheduled date of September, 2013, these troops will now arrive with little coordination, planning or training for their mission.

As of January 15, the following international deployments or pledges have been made:

France – 750 French troops are now present in Mali, with an additional 1,750 on their way. Of the existing deployment, 400 soldiers belong to the French Marine Infantry (the Marine Infantry are not amphibious troops in the American and British sense, but are rather the old French colonial infantry designed for overseas service. French marine infantry units have seen significant service in Afghanistan). Most of these troops arrived from the French base in Chad, possibly accompanied by some of the 200 French Foreign Legionnaires stationed there.

French aircraft in Mali include two older Mirage F1 CR fighter jets on loan from the French Operation Epervier, based in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena. These aircraft may have seen service against Libyan forces in the Chadian desert wars of the 1980s. A squadron of Dassault Rafale multirole combat aircraft began bombing operations in Mali on January 13 after flying in from their base in France.

There are also an undetermined number of Gazelle helicopter gunships belonging to the 4e Régiment d’Hélicoptères des Forces Spéciales (4e RHFS), a Special Forces unit based in the Pyrenees town of Pau. Ansar al-Din claims to have destroyed two French attack helicopters already, though French spokesmen have admitted to only one. Unlike previous campaigns against various African rebel groups, Ansar al-Din is well-equipped with modern anti-aircraft weapons looted from Libyan armories.

The existing French deployment includes some sixty armored vehicles and light tanks suitable for desert warfare, many of which have arrived from the French base in Senegal.

France has urged the estimated 6,000 French citizens resident in Mali to evacuate the country.

United States – U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has asserted that “there is no consideration of putting any American boots on the ground at this time” (New York Times, January 15). However, the U.S. is expected to provide a variety of military aid, including intelligence, communications support, non-lethal surveillance drones, surveillance aircraft and in-flight refueling services.

United Kingdom – The UK is providing only “limited logistical support,” consisting of two transport planes. The first RAF C-17 left on January 13. Transport aircraft are vital in moving African forces into Mali as they have no air transport capabilities of their own. British troops may participate in training Malian troops.

Canada – Canada sent a single C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft on February 15 on a one-week deployment to ferry French troops and equipment to Bamako. This deployment may be renewed.

Belgium – Belgium has committed two C130 Hercules transports and one to two rescue helicopters with a total of 80 personnel. The deployment will be reviewed at the end of February.

Germany – Early reports from French sources that German troops had joined the first deployment of French forces now appear to have been false. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has declared that “the deployment of German combat troops is not up for debate” (AFP, January 13). Germany might still participate in an EU training mission for Malian troops. Logistical and medical support are other possibilities.

Spain – Spain is considering sending a military transport plane with 30 personnel to ferry French and African troops, but may wait until an EU meeting on January 17 to make a final decision.

Denmark – Denmark is expected to contribute one C-130 transport on a three-month deployment.

Niger – Neighboring Niger has pledged 500 troops, though it is not yet clear whether this force will include former Tuareg rebels who have been incorporated into the Nigerien military. Niamey has also taken steps to seal its common border with Mali.

Burkina Faso – Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta) has committed 500 troops, some of whom may be American-trained.  Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré has played an important role in hosting peace talks between Bamako and the two Tuareg insurgent groups, the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar al-Din.

Nigeria – Nigeria, which has the largest military in West Africa, was once expected to provide the bulk of the troops in the projected 3,300 man ECOWAS intervention force (AFISMA), though it has yet to send combat troops to Mali. The Nigerian AFISMA commander, Major General Shehu Abdulkadir, has already arrived in Bamako. A Nigerian Air Force technical support team is in place, though their mission is limited to assessing “infrastructure, to provide back-end support and to help maintain the Malian air force” (AFP, January 12). The Nigerian military has pledged a force of 900 troops (up from an original pledge of 600), with the first company expected to arrive in Mali on January 16.

Togo – Togo has pledged 500 troops from the Forces armées togolaises (FAT).

Benin – Benin has pledged 300 troops to operate alongside the Togolese forces.

Senegal – Senegal has pledged 500 troops. The Senegalese military has extensive peacekeeping experience and many of its troops are American-trained.

Ghana – Ghana is sending 120 troops from the Engineering Corps of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF).

Guinea – Guinea has pledged one company of troops (approximately 150 men).

MNLA – The Malian Tuareg separatists of the MNLA have offered to assist France in driving “terrorist forces” out of northern Mali, in language the movement usually uses to refer to AQIM and MUJWA, but not their fellow Tuareg of Ansar al-Din. Though the MNLA was driven into the background by the Islamist coalition after a series of successes against the Malian military in early 2012, it has since engaged in a number of battles with AQIM and MUJWA, which it regards as foreign interlopers and drug-traffickers.

European Union – The EU is expected to provide training and financing through the European union Training Force-Mali (EUTM-Mali), though this will take the form of bilateral agreements rather than coming under the EU umbrella.

African Troops Pour into Central African Republic to Halt Rebel Advance

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Andrew McGregor

January 11, 2013

African troops from several nations have begun to arrive in the Central African Republic (CAR) in an effort to save the embattled regime of President François Bozizé Yangouvonda. The latest threat to the Bozizé regime began on December 10, 2012, when a coalition of three rebel movements known as “Seleka” began an offensive in the north of the country, covering 500 km over rough terrain in only 19 days before halting close to the capital of Bangui.

The rebels met only minimal resistance from government troops (the Forces armées centrafricaines – FACA) and troops belonging to the Mission de consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine (MICOPAX), an international force of over 500 troops from Chad, Gabon, Cameroon and the Congo. Bozizé has dismissed his own son, Jean-Francis, from his post as Defense Minister over the failure of the army to offer any resistance to the rebel advance (PANA Online [Dakar], January 4). For now the rebel advance has halted outside Damara, roughly 100 miles from the capital of Bangui as both parties head to talks in the Gabon capital of Libreville.

The CAR has abundant reserves of uranium, diamonds and timber, but continued insecurity and corruption have left the landlocked nation one of the poorest and most underdeveloped on earth. The military often goes unpaid for months at a time and has occasionally relied on emergency shipments of cash from France to prevent new rounds of mutinies. As a result, the poorly trained and ill-led force has come to resemble yet another bandit group that rarely conducts operations of any size outside the capital. The Presidential Guard is largely composed of Chadian mercenaries.

The rebel coalition is composed of three groups that came to terms with the government in the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement; the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR), the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) and the Front démocratique du people centrafricain (FDPC). These groups accuse Bozizé of failing to meet the terms of the agreement over the last five years and now demand his ouster. Seleka is under the nominal command of Michel Djotodia, a founding member of the UFDR and is represented in Paris by Eric Massi, the son of Charles Massi, a former government minister and CPJP leader who was killed in mysterious circumstances after his arrest in 2009. Seleka’s military chief is Aubain Issa Issiaka. Though the coalition is united in their hatred of Bozizé, they appear to be unable to agree on little else (Jeune Afrique, January 2). Despite the unwillingness of the international contingent to confront the rebel advance so far, Gabonese MICOPAX commander General Jean-Felix Akaga has warned Seleka that “We will not give up Damara, this must be clear. If the rebels attack Damara, this will mean that they have decided to take on the ten countries of Central Africa” (Jeune Afrique, January 2).

The CAR’s Territorial Administration Minister, Josué Binoua, claims that the rebel groups are in fact composed of rebels from Darfur and the remnants of Mahamat Nouri’s Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique (ANCD), a relatively inactive Chadian rebel group since it lost the backing of Khartoum in 2010 (for the collapse of the Chadian rebellion, see Terrorism Monitor, October 28, 2010). The ANCD has denied any involvement in the rebellion (AFP, January 4). According to Binoua, the leaders of the rebellion studied in Saudi Arabia and Qatar and intend to impose Wahhabist beliefs on the CAR (Jeune Afrique, January 7). Though many of the rebels are indeed Muslims from the northern CAR, these claims seem designed to rally international support behind the Bozize regime by raising the specter of a takeover by Salafi-Jihadists similar to that in northern Mali.

Several nations have responded to an appeal for more troops from Chadian president Idriss Déby Itno, chairman of the Communauté économique des Etats d’Afrique centrale (CEEAC), the multinational body sponsoring MICOPAX. Congo-Brazzaville has committed 120 troops, as has Gabon and Cameroon. These forces are expected to join the 400 Chadians deployed at Damara, the last outpost before Bangui (PANA Online [Dakar], January 1; RFI, January 2; January 4; AFP, December 31, 2012). The reinforcements will operate under the command of MICOPAX. However, Gabonese Defense Minister Ruffin Pacome Odzonga has made it clear that “the mandate of the Gabonese troops is provide a buffer and not to fight the rebels” (RFI, January 2). CEEAC is composed of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tomé and Principe.

South Africa is also sending 400 members of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to the CAR on a limited deployment ranging from January 2 to March 31. Whether these troops would participate in operations against the rebels remains uncertain, as their mandate mentions only assisting FACA with “capacity building” and assisting in the “planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration processes” (SANews [Tshwane], January 7).

A detachment of several hundred French troops in Bangui as part of Operation Boali (intended to support the CAR military and international forces of the CEEAC) have been detailed to protect French nationals and diplomatic premises in the CAR capital. [1] CEEAC forces are expected to replace local vigilante groups in the capital known as Kokora. Armed with machetes and bows and arrows, these groups have detained or abused Muslims in the capital whom they accuse of being a fifth column for the rebels (AFP, January 2; January 5).

Note

1. France Diplomatie, December 27, 2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/central-african-republic-188/france-and-the-central-african/political-relations-6283/article/central-african-republic-q-a For Operation Boali, see http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/operation-boali-rca/dossier/les-forces-francaises-en-republique-centrafricaine.

This article first appeared in the January 11, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor

Islamist Groups Reconfigure in Northern Mali as Intervention Looms

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Andrew McGregor

January 11, 2013

Just as the days of cooperation between the three Islamist groups that seized control of northern Mali last year seemed to be over, the three groups appear to have mounted a joint push southwards towards Malian Army lines near Mopti and Sévaré. The move may be intended to present a united front before peace talks resume in Ouagadougou on January 19, though the exact composition of the force remains uncertain. The advance may also offer an opportunity to test the resolve of the Malian Army and its allied militias, which have been talking tough but showing little sign of mounting an offensive against the Islamists any time soon.

TimbuktuIslamist Fighters in Timbuktu

In the last few weeks, a combination of internal racial and religious tensions between the Islamist groups has been exacerbated by a perceived need to reconfigure alliances in the region to prepare for an inevitable external military intervention. The largely Tuareg Ansar al-Din movement commanded by Iyad ag Ghali (a.k.a. Abu al-Fadl) also appears to be making efforts to consolidate a leading role amongst the militant groups. Important changes are afoot in the command structure of the other Islamist groups in northern Mali which have, until now, been dominated by Mauritanian and Algerian Arab commanders.

In an interview with an Algerian newspaper, Shaykh Awisa, a leading member of Ansar al-Din’s military command, referred to the movement’s shift away from an alliance with the largely Black African Islamists of MUJWA (Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa) in favor of closer ties to its former partner, the Tuareg nationalist MNLA: “Our relations with the MNLA are very good. We have a common enemy [i.e. MUJWA]. There are no problems between our movement, Ansar al Din, and the MNLA” (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 27, 2012). The MNLA fought a fierce battle with MUJWA on November 16, 2012.

MUJWA has identified a replacement for Hisham Bilal, believed to have been the first sub-Saharan individual to command an al-Qaeda-associated jihadist combat unit. Bilal and a number of his men returned to his native Niger and surrendered to authorities there on November 8, 2012, complaining that the Arab commanders of MUJWA viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white” (AFP, November 9, 2012). Bilal’s successor is a Beninese national using the nom de guerre “Abdullah.” The new commander is reported to speak Yoruba, a major language in Nigeria as well as Benin, and may have been responsible for contacts between MUJWA and northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram movement (Radio France Internationale, December 31, 2012).  According to one report, MNLA leader Bilal ag Acherif was in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in mid-December, trying to convince authorities there that his movement could, with Nigerian arms and logistical support, provide a bulwark against the expansion of Boko Haram (Jeune Afrique, December 16, 2012).

MUJWA speaks of itself as an alliance between native Arab, Tuareg and Black African tribes and various muhajirin (“Immigrants,” i.e. foreign jihadists) from North and West Africa. According to MUJWA, their “war” against the MNLA was sparked not only by the Tuareg nationalists’ refusal to adopt Shari’a as the law of the land, but also by their racial attitudes, suggesting that in the MNLA, “the Black has no rights, while the White has rights” (in Malian usage, “white” is applied to Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians). [1] To further its official position on race relations, MUJWA cites a familiar hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) recorded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855 C.E.): “An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over a black, nor does a black have any superiority over a white except by piety” (Musnad Ahmad 22391).

On January 2, MUJWA’s Salah al-Din Brigade announced it had decided to leave MUJWA and join Iyad ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din movement. The decision by Brigade leader Sultan Ould Badi (a.k.a. Abu Ali) to swear allegiance to Ag Ghali apparently came after lengthy efforts by Ansar al-Din leaders to unify the Islamists. Most of the fighters in the Salah al-Din Brigade are reported to hail from Gao and Kidal (Sahara Media, January 2).

A leading member of the MNLA and its provisional Azawad government denied rumors of dissent within his movement while warning at the same time that any member of Ansar al-Din who allies himself with MUJWA will be treated as a MUJWA fighter (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 10, 2012). At the moment there are no hostilities between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din, both primarily Tuareg rebel movements who have been engaged in joint peace talks being held in Ougadougou and Algiers despite their conflicting goals. However, on January 3, Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali announced that his movement would no longer abide by its offer to end hostilities with the Bamako government due to the latter’s failure to bring anything of substance to negotiations in Ougadougou and its decision to recruit mercenaries from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire to fight in northern Mali (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January 3; AFP, January 3).

Within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Mauritanian, Muhammad al-Amin Ould al-Hassan Ould al-Hadrami (a.k.a. Abdallah al-Shinqiti), is reported to have been appointed the new amir of the Furqan Battalion to replace Yahya Abu al-Hammam, who took over as amir of AQIM’s Sahara command (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 18, 2012). Al-Shinqiti finished a degree from Nouackcohott’s Higher Institute for Islamic Studies and Research in 2006 while serving a 14-month prison term before joining AQIM (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], December 31, 2012). AQIM’s penchant for cigarette and drug smuggling has created friction with Ansar al-Din, which has vowed to eliminate the trade in areas under its control (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 29).

In order to broaden its base, Ansar al-Din now appears to be abandoning its strict adherence to the non-native Salafism that brought the movement into conflict with many residents of northern Mali. In negotiations being held in Burkina Faso, Ansar al-Din has backed away from its insistence that Shari’a be applied throughout Mali rather than just northern Mali (Azawad). Movement leaders such as Iyad ag Ghali and Algabass ag Intalla have been meeting with local religious leaders and tribal chiefs to assure them Ansar al-Din does not intend to interfere with the traditional form of Islam practiced in the region (Jeune Afrique, December 21). By doing so, the movement hopes to marginalize the foreign Salafists commanding AQIM. If Ansar al-Din is to have any success in the ongoing negotiations with Bamako it must be able to demonstrate some degree of popular support and thus cannot afford to continue alienating local Muslims. Such moves also help bring Ansar al-Din closer to the MNLA, which rejects the introduction of Islamist extremism into the region.

Meanwhile, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), who split from AQIM after a dispute with the movement’s leadership in November, is reported to have relocated with a detachment of loyalists and MUJWA fighters equipped with dozens of vehicles armed with heavy machine-guns to al-Khalil, an important transit point for smugglers and legitimate traders alike near the Algerian border (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 26, 2012; for Belmokhtar’s split, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, November 15; November 30). The occupation of al-Khalil gives Belmokhtar an opportunity to control fuel smuggling in the region as well as shipments of food and other goods to northern Mali. [2]

While northern Mali was once neatly divided between the three armed Islamist groups in the region, Ansar al-Din has now moved its forces out of Kidal into Timbuktu and Gao regions, once the preserves of AQIM and MUJWa, respectively. AQIM appears to have responded to this move by creating a new brigade to operate in Kidal, the Katibat Yusuf bin Tachfine, led by a Kidal Tuareg named Abu Abd al-Hamid al-Kidali (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 3, 2012). In the current environment of mistrust in northern Mali, a joint operation may be the only way of preventing an outbreak of clashes between the sometimes cooperative, sometimes antagonistic Islamist movements operating in the region.

Note

1. Statement from the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, Gao, November 23, 2012

2. For al-Khalil, see Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 2012.

This article first appeared in the January 11, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor.

Islamist Groups Mount Joint Offensive in Mali

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Andrew McGregor

January 10, 2013

Just as the days of cooperation between the three Islamist groups that seized control of northern Mali last year seemed to be over, the three groups appear to have mounted a joint push southwards towards Malian Army lines near Mopti and Sévaré. The move may be intended to present a united front before peace talks resume in Ouagadougou on January 19, though the exact composition of the force remains uncertain. The advance may also offer an opportunity to test the resolve of the Malian Army and its allied militias, which have been talking tough but showing little sign of mounting an offensive against the Islamists any time soon.

Ansar al-DinAnsar al-Din Fighters (al-Jazeera)

In the last few weeks, a combination of internal racial and religious tensions between the Islamist groups has been exacerbated by a perceived need to reconfigure alliances in the region to prepare for an inevitable external military intervention. Also, the largely Tuareg Ansar al-Din movement commanded by Iyad ag Ghali (a.k.a. Abu al-Fadl) appears to be making efforts to consolidate a leading role amongst the militant groups. Important changes are afoot in the command structure of the other Islamist groups in northern Mali which have, until now, been dominated by Mauritanian and Algerian Arab commanders.

In an interview with an Algerian newspaper, Shaykh Awisa, a leading member of Ansar al-Din’s military command, referred to the movement’s shift away from an alliance with the largely Black African Islamists of MUJWA (Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa) in favor of closer ties to its former partner, the Tuareg nationalist MNLA: “Our relations with the MNLA are very good. We have a common enemy [i.e. MUJWA]. There are no problems between our movement, Ansar al Din, and the MNLA” (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 27, 2012). The MNLA fought a fierce battle with MUJWA on November 16, 2012.

MUJWA has identified a replacement for Hisham Bilal, believed to have been the first sub-Saharan individual to command an al-Qaeda-associated jihadist combat unit. Bilal and a number of his men returned to his native Niger and surrendered to authorities there on November 8, 2012, complaining that the Arab commanders of MUJWA viewed Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” and believed “a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white” (AFP, November 9, 2012). Bilal’s successor is a Beninese national using the nom de guerre “Abdullah.” The new commander is reported to speak Yoruba, a major language in Nigeria as well as Benin, and may have been responsible for contacts between MUJWA and northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram movement (Radio France Internationale, December 31, 2012). According to one report, MNLA leader Bilal ag Acherif was in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in mid-December, trying to convince authorities there that his movement could, with Nigerian arms and logistical support, provide a bulwark against the expansion of Boko Haram (Jeune Afrique, December 16, 2012).

MUJWA speaks of itself as an alliance between native Arab, Tuareg and Black African tribes and various muhajirin (“Immigrants,” i.e. foreign jihadists) from North and West Africa. According to MUJWA, their “war” against the MNLA was sparked not only by the Tuareg nationalists’ refusal to adopt Shari’a as the law of the land, but also by their racial attitudes, suggesting that in the MNLA, “the Black has no rights, while the White has rights” (in Malian usage, “white” is applied to Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians). [1] To further its official position on race relations, MUJWA cites a familiar hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) recorded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855 C.E.): “An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over a black, nor does a black have any superiority over a white except by piety” (Musnad Ahmad 22391).

On January 2, MUJWA’s Salah al-Din Brigade announced it had decided to leave MUJWA and join Iyad ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din movement. The decision by Brigade leader Sultan Ould Badi (a.k.a. Abu Ali) to swear allegiance to Ag Ghali apparently came after lengthy efforts by Ansar al-Din leaders to unify the Islamists. Most of the fighters in the Salah al-Din Brigade are reported to hail from Gao and Kidal (Sahara Media, January 2).

A leading member of the MNLA and its provisional Azawad government denied rumors of dissent within his movement while warning at the same time that any member of Ansar al-Din who allies himself with MUJWA will be treated as a MUJWA fighter (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 10, 2012). At the moment there are no hostilities between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din, both primarily Tuareg rebel movements who have been engaged in joint peace talks being held in Ougadougou and Algiers despite their conflicting goals. However, on January 3, Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali announced that his movement would no longer abide by its offer to end hostilities with the Bamako government due to the latter’s failure to bring anything of substance to negotiations in Ougadougou and its decision to recruit mercenaries from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire to fight in northern Mali (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January 3; AFP, January 3).

Yahya Abu al-HammamYahya Abu al-Hammam

Within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Mauritanian, Muhammad al-Amin Ould al-Hassan Ould al-Hadrami (a.k.a. Abdallah al-Shinqiti), is reported to have been appointed the new amir of the Furqan Battalion to replace Yahya Abu al-Hammam, who took over as amir of AQIM’s Sahara command. Al-Shinqiti finished a degree from Nouackcohott’s Higher Institute for Islamic Studies and Research in 2006 while serving a 14-month prison term before joining AQIM (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], December 31, 2012). AQIM’s penchant for cigarette and drug smuggling has created friction with Ansar al-Din, which has vowed to eliminate the trade in areas under its control (Le Temps d’Algérie, November 29).

In order to broaden its base, Ansar al-Din now appears to be abandoning its strict adherence to the non-native Salafism that brought the movement into conflict with many residents of northern Mali. In negotiations being held in Burkina Faso, Ansar al-Din has backed away from its insistence that Shari’a be applied throughout Mali rather than just northern Mali (Azawad). Movement leaders such as Iyad ag Ghali and Algabass ag Intalla have been meeting with local religious leaders and tribal chiefs to assure them Ansar al-Din does not intend to interfere with the traditional form of Islam practiced in the region (Jeune Afrique, December 21). By doing so, the movement hopes to marginalize the foreign Salafists commanding AQIM. If Ansar al-Din is to have any success in the ongoing negotiations with Bamako it must be able to demonstrate some degree of popular support and thus cannot afford to continue alienating local Muslims. Such moves also help bring Ansar al-Din closer to the MNLA, which rejects the introduction of Islamist extremism into the region.

Meanwhile, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), who split from AQIM after a dispute with the movement’s leadership in November, is reported to have relocated with a detachment of loyalists and MUJWA fighters equipped with dozens of vehicles armed with heavy machine-guns to In Khalil, an important transit point for smugglers and legitimate traders alike near the Algerian border (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 26, 2012). The occupation of In Khalil gives Belmokhtar an opportunity to control fuel smuggling in the region as well as shipments of food and other goods to northern Mali. [2]

While northern Mali was once neatly divided between the three armed Islamist groups in the region, Ansar al-Din has now moved its forces out of Kidal into Timbuktu and Gao regions, once the preserves of AQIM and MUJWa, respectively. AQIM appears to have responded to this move by creating a new brigade to operate in Kidal, the Katibat Yusuf bin Tachfine, led by a Kidal Tuareg named Abu Abd al-Hamid al-Kidali (Le Temps d’Algérie, December 3, 2012). In the current environment of mistrust in northern Mali, a joint operation may be the only way of preventing an outbreak of clashes between the sometimes cooperative, sometimes antagonistic Islamist movements operating in the region.

Notes 

  1. Statement from the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, Gao, November 23, 2012.
  2. For In Khalil, see Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 2012.

This article first appeared in the January 10, 2013 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Sudanese Regime Begins to Unravel After Coup Reports and Rumors of Military Ties to Iran

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Andrew McGregor

January 7, 2013

The Sudanese capital of Khartoum is currently the center of a web of intrigue involving an alleged coup attempt, bitter divisions in the Islamist movement, a mysterious airstrike on the capital by Israeli warplanes and what appears to be a possible shift in foreign policy that would involve greater military and diplomatic cooperation with the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis.”

Most worrisome for the ruling Islamist/military alliance led by President Omar al-Bashir is the alleged coup attempt, which reflects growing divisions within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Rather than being the work of outsiders to the power structure, the attempted coup appears to have been the work of a combination of members of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Islamist officers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and possibly a number of Islamist politicians and businessmen. With an ailing Bashir possibly ready to step down later this year after 24 years of rule, there is a growing tendency for political contenders to act peremptorily to secure their accession to power in a nation roiled by multiple rebellions and the economically devastating separation of South Sudan in 2011.

“Corruption and Deviance from the Islamic path”

National Congress Party officials disclosed that 13 individuals had been arrested in a November 21 NISS round-up on charges of planning the overthrow of the government, including some of the most powerful men in the country. Most of the detainees may be characterized as hardline Islamist military and intelligence officers who are said to oppose the “corruption and deviance from the Islamic path” of the current regime. The alleged plotters are charged with targeting “the stability of the state and some leaders of the state” (AFP, November 29). The suspects face repercussions ranging from a presidential pardon to death sentences, though the latter would certainly be seen as provocative by many within the Islamist power structure (al-Mashhad al-An [Khartoum], December 6, 2012).

Nafi Ali NafiNafi Ali Nafi

Among the suspects are:

  • Former Presidential advisor and former NISS director Lieutenant General Salah Abdallah Abu Digin (a.k.a. Salah Gosh). Well known throughout Sudan, Salah Gosh was national intelligence director until he was sacked in 2009 following the failure of the Sudanese intelligence forces to discover and deter an attack by Darfur rebels on the national capital. He then served as a presidential advisor for security affairs for three years until losing that position in a 2011 power struggle with NCP vice-chairman Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi. Privately, Gosh’s family is reported to have claimed Nafi Ali Nafi is behind the charges against the former NISS director (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012). Following his surprise dismissal, Gosh went into business by opening a number of trading companies but was still reputed to be influential in regime circles. Gosh was taken to hospital with heart problems shortly after his arrest, where he underwent successful heart bypass surgery (AFP, November 29, 2012; al-Watan [Khartoum], December 2, 2012; Akhbar al-Yawm [Khartoum], December 6, 2012). Despite U.S. sanctions, Sudanese intelligence worked closely with its U.S. counterparts during Salah Gosh’s time as intelligence chief, with Gosh regarded as Sudan’s point man for contacts with the CIA. It was reported that Sudanese intelligence took a closer look into Gosh’s activities after noting he had gradually moved 25 members of his family to the United States earlier this year (al-Akhbar [Khartoum], November 24, 2012). Since his arrest, Gosh has had his immunity from prosecution revoked and his assets frozen by the Central Bank of Sudan.

Salah GoshFormer NISS director Lieutenant General Salah Abdallah Abu Digin (a.k.a. Salah Gosh)

  • Brigadier General Muhammad Ibrahim Abd al-Jalil (a.k.a. Wad Ibrahim), a veteran of 12 years of fighting in the South Sudan and once considered the Amir of the “Mujahideen” movement in Sudan, dedicated to transforming the Sudanese civil war into a “jihad” against Christians and animists in the South. Known for his modest lifestyle and so far untainted by charges of corruption, Wad Ibrahim is reputed to be a popular figure in the Sudanese officer corps. He was in charge of the president’s security for seven years.
  • NISS Major General Adel al-Tayib, a cousin of Wad Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune, November 22; al-Intibaha [Khartoum], November 29, 2012).
  • Former commander of the Sudanese-Chadian Border Force Colonel Fath al-Rahim Abdallah Sulayman, who is alleged to be the go-between for Wad Ibrahim and Salah Gosh.
  • Khalid Muhammad Mustafa, a former mujahideen commander operating in the Blue Nile region. Khalid is believed to be close to Wad Ibrahim.
  • Businessman Mustafa Nur al-Dayim, who is alleged to have ties to Dr. Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], November 29, 2012; December 6, 2012).
  • Lieutenant Colonel Amin al-Zaki, a well-known Islamist and deputy director of the NISS in White Nile Province.
  • Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Mumtaz of the Signal Corps, based in White Nile province and thought to be an associate of Wad Ibrahim (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], November 29, 2012).
  • Colonel Muhammad al-Zaki of the Armored Corps.
  • Colonel Hassan Abd al-Rahim of the Armored Corps. Abd al-Rahim is alleged to have provided contacts between the plotters and the Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], December 6, 2012).
  • Dr. Ghazi Salah al-Din – Head of the NCP bloc in parliament and formerly a close advisor to the president, entrusted with important files such as the Darfur issue. Ghazi Salah al-Din is a leader of the reform movement within the NCP that has mobilized behind the issues of corruption and economic deterioration (al-Akhbar [Khartoum], November 24, 2012).
  • Major General Musa al-Amin (al-Ahram al-Yawm [Khartoum], December 4, 2012).
  • General Abd al-Mula Musa Muhammad Musa – The retired general and commissioner of the White Nile State was arrested on December 3 after his name emerged during interrogation of the other suspects (al-Ahram al-Yawm [Khartoum], December 4, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012).

Two prominent politicians have been implicated in the plot, though solid evidence has not been presented and both men remain free for the moment. Both men have a history of antagonism to the regime and could be considered to fall into the “usual suspects” category whenever Khartoum is faced with political disturbances:

  • Dr. Hassan al-Turabi: The leader of the Islamist Popular Congress Party and former leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF). Though Turabi was not specifically named in connection to the coup, presidential advisor Nafi Ali Nafi’s reference to the plotters receiving assistance from “Islamists who have personal ambitions” was widely thought to be a reference to al-Turabi (Sudan Tribune, December 2, 2012). Dr. Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi was the first Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, but underwent a split with the faction led by President Omar al-Bashir in 1998, leading to the formation of al-Turabi’s Islamist opposition party, the Popular Congress Party (PCP).
  • Sadiq al-Mahdi, a former two-time Prime Minister of Sudan (1966-1967, 1986-1989) was overthrown by the military/Islamist alliance of Colonel Omar al-Bashir and Dr. Hassan al-Turabi in 1989. Sadiq is the great-grandson of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, the 19th century Sufi leader who overthrew Egyptian rule of the Sudan in 1885. Sadiq is the Imam of the Ansar Sufi movement and leader of its political wing, the Umma Party (a.k.a National Umma Party – NUP).

After meeting with the Sudanese press during a visit to Cairo, al-Mahdi was initially quoted as saying Salah Gosh had met with him over dinner to ask the Umma Party leader to head the post-coup regime, though al-Mahdi later claimed he had been quoted out of context (al-Sudani [Khartoum], December 4, 2012; al-Qarar [Khartoum], December 5, 2012; Sudan Vision, December 31, 2012). Presidential Assistant Nafi Ali Nafi asked: “Is it logical that Sadiq al-Mahdi [would] disclose what went on between him and Gosh in the past without meaning it?” (Sudan Tribune, December 15, 2012).

Al-Mahdi has also been described as having extensive contacts with the rebel Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition by media sources unfriendly to the NUP. Presidential advisor Nafi Ali Nafi has said he is “confident that the Umma party knew the zero hour [of the coup attempt]” (Sudan Tribune, September 22, 2012). NUP leaders and members of al-Mahdi’s Ansar religious movement have warned against attempts to implicate al-Mahdi in the alleged coup (Sudan Tribune. December 3, 2012; Akhbar Alyoum [Khartoum], December 4, 2012). A recent sermon by the leader of the Ansar council decried the presence of foreign UN and AU troops in the country, the absence of democracy and the alleged usurpation of the nation’s resources by the ruling circle (al-Sudani [Khartoum], December 22, 2012).

While the regime has attempted to implicate the opposition, the episode instead suggests the military/Islamist coalition that has ruled Sudan since 1989 is experiencing another split as the coalition’s strongman, Bashir, begins to show signs of physical weakness that could imperil his grip on the regime. Bashir has also suffered political blows in recent years by being indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and failing to triumph in the battle against Southern secession.

Jockeying for Political Supremacy

Within the so-called “loyalist” faction of the NCP there are several possible successors to President-Field Marshal Bashir, who is expected to resign later this year or by 2015 at the latest:

  • Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi – NCP vice-chairman, former major-general and current presidential advisor. Nafi is one of the most powerful men in Khartoum and is regarded as being extremely close to the president. As a former Iranian-trained chief of military intelligence, Nafi was entrusted with overseeing controversial security operations in Darfur and South Kordofan that have been described by observers as crimes against humanity. Nafi emerged as the victor in a power struggle with Salah Gosh when the latter was dismissed as NISS director. Nafi is seen by some as al-Bashir’s bulwark against the ambitions of First Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. Nafi and al-Bashir are both members of the riverine Ja’aliyin tribe.
  • First Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha – A leading member of Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) and a former Turabi loyalist who abandoned his mentor when the latter fell out with Bashir. Taha was rewarded with the vice-presidency and often acts as the public face of the government while building a powerful constituency as the deputy chairman of the NCP. Taha is a lawyer and judge by profession and a member of the Shaiqiya, one of the three riverine Arab tribes (Shaiqiya, Ja’aliyin and Danagla) that have monopolized power in Sudan since independence.  Taha is deeply implicated in unleashing the Janjaweed forces of Musa Hilal in Darfur. A two-time Amir of the Sudan Islamic Movement (SIM), Taha is an NCP insider regarded as a frontrunner and will likely have the backing of the SIM’s new leadership in any run at the presidency.
  • Speaker of the National Assembly Ahmad Ibrahim al-Tahir – A leading hardline member of the NCP who has described the late Osama bin Laden as “a holy warrior” and describes the separation of South Sudan as an “international conspiracy” (al-Ra’y al-Aam [Khartoum], June 26, 2011; Sudan Tribune, May 3, 2011).
  • Lieutenant General Bakri Hassan Salih – Minister of Presidential Affairs and former Minister of Defense, General Bakri is deeply implicated in the abuses committed by pro-government militias and government security forces in Darfur. He has been close to al-Bashir ever since he played a crucial role in the 1989 coup that brought al-Bashir to power.

Divisions in the Sudanese Islamic Movement

The growing differences between factions of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) began to erupt in January with the release of a memo calling for urgent reforms and an end to institutionalized corruption. The memo was signed by a thousand party members and associates (Sudan Tribune, January 11, 2012).

Splits in Sudan’s Islamist movement between those favoring the political status quo and those seeking political reform emerged at the 8th General Conference of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) in November. With the resignation of Sudanese vice-president Ali Osman Muhammad Taha as SIM chairman, a struggle emerged for control of the movement. The conference quickly deteriorated into a confrontation between Bashir regime loyalists and those seeking substantial reforms within the failing Sudanese administration. Among those groups in the SIM calling for reform was al-Saihun (“the Travelers”), an NCP-associated faction based upon a core of veteran military officers and paramilitary jihadists embittered by the loss of South Sudan after a long and bloody civil war. Some NCP loyalists maintain that al-Saihun is a front for members of the PCP (Alwan [Khartoum], November 29, 2012). Al- Saihun and PCP leader Hassan al-Turabi backed NCP parliamentary leader Ghazi Salah al-Din in an unsuccessful bid for the leadership of the SIM. However, NCP loyalists assumed control of the movement with the election of economist al-Zubayr Ahmad al-Hassan as the new secretary-general of the SIM after Ghazi withdrew from the contest. Ghazi was accused a short time later of being one of the alleged coup plotters. Under al-Zubayr’s leadership, many Islamists contend the SIM has now been reduced from an advisory body to the NCP to a movement whose views will be dictated by the regime. SIM reformers were ultimately unable to push through their demands that the movement be separated from the NCP.

After the conference, al-Saihun issued a statement calling for the dismissal of Minister of Defense Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussein. The reformers cited the minister’s disputes with senior army officers (some ending in dismissals), failure to respond to alleged Israeli attacks on Sudan and an inability to provide Sudanese troops and paramilitaries with the means to end rebellions in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile Province. The statement followed an earlier appeal in January, 2012 by 700 officers of the Sudan Armed Forces calling for an end to corruption in the arms procurement process, citing as an example the purchase of over 100 defective Ukrainian tanks in 2010 (Sudan Tribune, January 20, 2012). The officers also called for a greater degree of separation between the NCP and the Army command structure.

Motivations for Overthrowing the Bashir Regime

Speculation is rife in Khartoum over the motivation of the alleged putschists, with some suggesting the move was meant to preempt other attempts to seize power (a common justification for coup attempts in the Sudan). Speculation on the future of the regime has been fuelled by rumors that the president may be terminally ill. Al-Bashir has had two tumor-related surgeries on his throat in Qatar and Saudi Arabia since August, 2012 despite international sanctions against his travel connected to an ICC indictment for war crimes (BBC, November 30, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012).

There is also the possibility that the alleged plotters represented an Islamist faction within the military that felt that Khartoum’s ongoing military campaigns against various rebel movements were suffering from government corruption and the policies of Defense Minister Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussein. Besides the seemingly intractable conflict in Darfur, fighting has again flared up along the border of the South Sudanese state of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (Sudan Tribune, December 10, 2012). Khartoum maintains that Juba continues to command and control troops of the SPLA-Northern Command now fighting the NCP regime in Sudan’s Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan provinces.

A Khartoum daily considered close to the Bashir regime provided details of the videotaped confessions presented by NISS director Muhammad Atta and Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi to a select group (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], December 6, 2012). According to the report, Wad Ibrahim and other coup plotters confessed to organizing the coup in cooperation with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur-based rebel movement that came close to seizing the capital and deposing Bashir in 2008 and has remained a regime bogeyman ever since. [1]  JEM’s participation was made conditional on the deportation to Europe for trial of the “List of 51,” a UN-generated sealed list of 51 Sudanese citizens suspected of war crimes in Darfur that was handed to the ICC in 2005. By mutual consent the coup would take place while Bashir was out of the country for medical treatment in recognition of the popularity of the president in some quarters and the difficulty of ultimately deporting Bashir to face his own ICC indictment. The detainees described Wad Ibrahim rather than Salah Gosh as the intended leader of a 15-member post-coup command council. Salah Gosh’s confession was not shown, raising questions as to whether the former intelligence director has in fact made a confession.

The videotaped confessions apparently included that of a “sorcerer” said to have been engaged by one of the generals involved in the plot to cast an immobilizing spell over certain regime figures. Pressed as to why he did not report the incident, the “sorcerer” claimed a dream revealed the coup would be unsuccessful, so he felt no further action was necessary.

Muhammad AttaNISS Director Lieutenant General Muhammad Atta al-Mawla

Dealing with the “Traitors”

Having rounded up the coup suspects, the regime is now divided as to how to deal with them, a new dispute that is proving as divisive as any of the others facing the regime. The Director of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), Lieutenant General Muhammad Atta al-Mawla, described the plotters as “traitors” who had even drafted a proclamation announcing themselves as “counter-revolutionaries” who intended to supersede the “Salvation Revolution” of 1989. Al-Atta has pledged that the suspects will face justice without leniency (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012; Sudan Vision, December 7, 2012). Vice-President Taha says that the suspects will be prosecuted without special treatment: “We have no double standards… the way with us is working within the ranks, not treachery and treason and destabilizing the ranks” (Sudan Tribune, December 2, 2012). Presidential advisor Nafi Ali Nafi has been especially vocal in his demands that the suspects face trial, saying some of them had already been detained on similar charges in the past. This time, according to Nafi, there is ample evidence to mount a full prosecution (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012). A group of Khartoum lawyers led by government critic Nabil Adib has pledged to form a committee to defend the suspects while some NCP members have warned that action against the alleged plotters would be “costly” (Sudan Tribune, November 24, 2012; November 26, 2012).

On the other hand, prosecuting the still influential suspects could tear the ruling NCP apart at a time it can ill afford disunity in the ranks. According to the Sudan Tribune, an al-Saihun Facebook page claimed NCP parliamentarians organized a candid meeting between al-Bashir and the leading detainees on December 19 that ended with “hugging and tears,” though this could not be verified (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2012). Bashir has been placed in a difficult position as prosecutions would likely generate new attempts to depose him. It might well be to the ailing president’s benefit to offer a grand gesture of forgiveness, with the quiet promise that further such dissent in the NCP will not be endured with magnanimity.  However, with the prospect that Bashir might be president for only a short time longer, other ranking figures in the regime such as Taha and Nafi may see a purge as a means of reshaping the NCP going into the post-Bashir era.

Meanwhile, the streets of Khartoum have been the scene of massive and occasionally violent student demonstrations in recent weeks. The protesters, who call for the overthrow of the regime, initially flooded into the streets following the apparent murder of four students from Darfur by NCP members on December 7 (Sudan Tribune, December 10, 2012; Al-Sahafah [Khartoum], December 9, 2012).

The net continues to be cast wider and wider in the aftermath of the initial interrogations with the arrests of dozens of Saihun members as well as two “Islamist” media members, one a cameraman for al-Jazeera, the other an employee of the al-Fida Media Center, which used to produce videos promoting the jihad in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012).

The fallout from the alleged coup attempt has even reached various research centers, cultural centers and NGO’s active in Khartoum that are now alleged to be engaged in actions “prejudicial to national security” financed by foreign sources. Prominent among these are institutions receiving funds from the American National Endowment for Democracy, whose financing originates with the U.S. State Department The pro-government newspaper Akhir Lahzah reported in its Sunday’s edition that the authorities would launch a broad campaign against a number of “research centers, and those labeled cultural centers” (Akhir Lahzah [Khartoum], December 22, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 29, 2012; Reuters, December 31, 2012).   Dr. Nafi recently criticized American NGOs for their alleged contacts with rebel forces in Sudan, claiming that three American Jewish organizations had held meetings with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) to identify ways in which they could help the rebels overthrow the Khartoum government (Citizen [Khartoum], December 23, 2012).

A statement from al-Mahdi’s religious followers, al-Ansar, saw a more nefarious intent behind the security crackdown: “We doubt there was a coup attempt to begin with, and we believe it was an attempt to liquidate rivals and a move aimed at pre-empting dissent from the disgruntled youth of the Islamist movement” (Sudan Tribune, December 4, 2012). The post-coup crackdown seems to have had little success in restraining the growing number of calls for political reform and changes to the leadership. Al-Turabi’s PCP called for the president to step down, citing the government’s claim that Sadiq al-Mahdi and the National Umma Party were behind the coup attempt as “the last card” of a desperate regime (The Citizen [Khartoum], December 4, 2012).

The regime has also been embarrassed by the late December release on jihadi websites of video footage of the June 2010 escape by tunnel from Sudan’s most secure prison of four Islamist militants sentenced to death for the 2008 murder of a U.S. Agency for International Development official and his Sudanese driver (GIMF/al-Hijratain Media, Ansar1.info, December 28, 2012). [2] Apparently inspired by the similar escape of al-Qaeda militants from a Yemeni prison in February 2006, the chained convicts were apparently able to dig a 38 meter tunnel to freedom without interference from prison staff. [3]

Economic pressures in the wake of South Sudan’s separation are fueling growing discontent with the Khartoum government. Oil revenues have declined steeply, inflation is at over 40%, food supplies are soaring in price, professionals are fleeing the country and currency reserves are drying up. Khartoum continues to devote much of its spending to the repression of various uprisings in parts of the country.

Iranian Ships in Port Sudan

In the early hours of October 24, 2012, the Yarmuk small-arms factory in a southern suburb of Khartoum was attacked by Israeli fighter jets in what appeared to be a relatively risk-free practice run for an Israeli airstrike on Iranian targets. Israel has justified previous attacks on Eastern Sudan by claiming Iran ships arms through Sudan to Gaza, though even a basic knowledge of the distances involved, the exposed, waterless terrain and the fact that such overland shipments would require bypassing tight Egyptian border controls before crossing through several restricted military zones on the Egyptian Red Sea coast suggest that such claims have no basis in reality. [4] There are now claims from Israel that the Yarmuk arms factory was controlled by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and was engaged in producing arms for Hamas that were then shipped by the improbable overland route through Egypt to Gaza. Though new Egyptian president has adopted a more supportive stance towards Gaza than his predecessor, the overland arms route is alleged to have existed through several years of the Mubarak regime, which had no interest in arming the Gaza militants.

In the aftermath of the Yarmuk attack, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry said production at the factory had no connection to Iran, describing Israel as “an outlaw state… trying its best to pass fabricated information through different sources that have a link with Israel” (AFP, November 27, 2012; al-Arabiya/AFP, October 30, 2012). Opposition parties pointed out that the ease with which the Israelis were able to strike the capital confirmed Sudan’s military capacity was dedicated to the suppression of opposition movements rather than the defense of the nation (Sudan Tribune, October 30, 2012).

In light of the Israeli accusations, a visit to Port Sudan on October 28 by Iran’s “22nd Fleet” generated further speculation over the nature of relations between Tehran and Khartoum. Consisting of the supply ship Kharg (with three antiquated Sea King helicopters) and the Admiral Naghdi corvette (launched in 1964), the 22nd Fleet docked in Port Sudan after carrying out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Mandab Strait. After three days in port the Iranian ships left on October 31 (Suna Online [Khartoum], October 31, 2012; Mehr News Agency [Tehran], December 9). Though uneventful, the visit was heavily criticized in the Saudi Arabian media as a threat to regional security and a danger to Sudan’s relations with Gulf countries. The Iranian ambassador to Khartoum rejected assertions from Tel Aviv that the mission of the Iranian ships was to offload containers of weapons intended for Hamas, pointing out that the ships were open to the public on all three days of their visit to Port Sudan (al-Watan [Khartoum], November 1, 2012).

Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karti, who has opposed greater cooperation with Iran on the grounds it would come at the expense of good relations with Arab Gulf countries, later revealed that his recommendation to reject a visit by Iranian ships in February, 2012 was accepted and acted on by the government, but the attack on the Yarmuk defense factory appeared to have produced a dramatic reversal in this policy (Sudan Tribune, November 27, 2012).

A second Iranian visit to Port Sudan came from the 23rd Fleet on December 8, though Sudanese officials maintained the visit was pre-planned and routine. The detachment included the supply ship Bushehr and the guided missile frigate Jamaran, the domestically-built pride of the Iranian Navy (though described inaccurately by Iran as a destroyer). Sudanese naval commander Abdallah Matari took the occasion to urge expanded Iranian-Sudanese military cooperation (Fars News Agency [Tehran], December 8, 2012).

The Sudanese Foreign Ministry insisted the visit was pre-planned and not intended as a reaction to the Israeli airstrike on Khartoum, though some Sudanese questioned the wisdom of allowing a second Iranian naval visit so shortly after the controversy generated by the first visit (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012; al-Ayam [Khartoum], December 10, 2012). Foreign Minister Ali Ahmad Karti confirmed divisions within the regime over Khartoum’s apparently growing relations with Iran when he revealed he had not been informed of the arrival of the two Iranian warships, saying he would have opposed the visit if he had been aware of it (al-Sudani [Khartoum], November 4, 2012; Sudan Tribune, November 4; The Citizen [Khartoum], November 5, 2012).

Since 2008, the Iranian Navy has been expanding its presence in the region through anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, deployments to the Indian Ocean and the dispatch of two ships through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean in February 2011. Taking his inspiration from remarks made by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear-Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, has described the role of a “Strategic Navy” in securing Iranian waters, protecting Iranian shipping in international waters and projecting influence abroad (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, November 29, 2012). Sayyari has emphasized Iran’s growing regional importance, noting that the Islamic Republic was now “a decision-maker in South Asia” that has reached a point where “no world power can ignore its influence in the region” (Fars News Agency [Tehran], December 12, 2012). Admiral Sayyari has elsewhere responded to alarmist news reports of the Iranian Navy’s activities by insisting that access to international waters belongs to all the people of the globe (IRNA, December 3, 2012). According to a major pan-Arab daily, Tehran offered Khartoum an alliance designed to “protect the Red Sea,” but Foreign Minister Ali Karti denied any knowledge of such a proposal (al-Hayat, November 2, 2012; Sudan Tribune, December 13, 2012). Karti is alleged to have opposed the alliance at a heated meeting of the NCP’s foreign relations committee.

Nevertheless, in defending the two visits by Iranian warships as “routine,” Karti claimed that American warships had made a similar stop in Port Sudan in November (Sudan Tribune, December 5, 2012). However, the Foreign Minister’s claim was challenged by U.S. Navy spokesmen, who insisted they “didn’t have any record” of American ships visiting the Sudan in November (Sudan Tribune, December 6, 2012).

A spokesman for the Darfur-based rebel Justice and Equality Movement (always eager to embarrass the regime) claimed that Khartoum and Sudan had discussed a deal to build an Iranian naval base, a base that some Israeli journalists fancifully maintain already exists in Sudan, allegedly employing hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards offloading arms shipments for Hamas from Iranian cargo ships with to Iranian-run warehouses (Hurriyat [Khartoum], December 11, 2012; al-Rakoba [Khartoum], December 9, 2012, December 11, 2012; Yedi’ot Aharonot [Tel Aviv], October 25, 2012). The alleged Revolutionary Guards’ base in Port Sudan presumably cooperates with other phantom Iranian naval bases claimed to be in Eritrea. [5] Following the allegations, Sudanese foreign ministry undersecretary Rahmatallah Uthman asserted that Khartoum has a policy of not allowing foreign military bases on its soil, adding that Iran was “no exception” (The Citizen [Khartoum], December 10, 2012).

Israeli businessman are engaged in establishing an economic base in newly independent South Sudan, another point of contention with Khartoum, which has no desire to see Israeli influence grow in a neighboring nation, particularly one still as closely tied to (north) Sudan as South Sudan. Israel has a long but covert relationship with South Sudan, having begun providing military training to South Sudanese insurgents shortly after the nation gained independence in 1956.

Conclusion

If the alleged coup is grounded in fact, it would not be the first attempt to overthrow al-Bashir in the 24 year history of his regime and possibly not the last. It is the first, however, to be mounted by figures so close to the president and until now considered to be among the pillars of the regime.  Democracy has never quite taken hold in Sudanese society, which remains afflicted with a tendency for certain individuals to decide it is they alone who have the answer to Sudan’s complex problems. The nation is in dire need of financial assistance but recent efforts to obtain financial aid from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been unsuccessful. Iran is also suffering financially from economic sanctions against it, but a demonstration by Khartoum that it is considering closer ties to the Islamic state (such as hosting Iranian warships) may be one way of putting pressure on the Sunni states of the Gulf to reconsider their position. Khartoum is also in need of military assistance, having blown its chance to make significant upgrades to its military by indulging in a corrupt procurement process. China once seemed a promising partner in this regard, but the separation of the South Sudan now means that Beijing must maintain cordial ties with both north and south Sudan to ensure the continued flow of oil from Chinese owned wells in the south to the export terminal in the north. The Iranian dalliance is a dangerous gambit, however, as it poses both internal and external risks that may be greater than the possible benefits from a closer alliance with the Islamic state.

After 24 years of Islamist/military rule in Khartoum, the secular and non-Islamist opposition has been effectively marginalized, but emerging divisions within the Islamist camp will make it more difficult for the regime to resist the armed groups that threaten to tear the remaining state apart. A divided security structure also presents opportunities for Salafist-Jihadist cells (such as the one dismantled in Dinder National Park in December) to exploit the situation to their advantage. For the moment, the likelihood of a democratic succession in the Sudan appears increasingly remote

Andrew McGregor is the Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues in the Islamic world.

Notes

1. For the raid on Omdurman, see Andrew McGregor, “Darfur’s JEM Rebels Bring the War to Khartoum,” Terrorism Monitor, May 15, 2008) http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374172 and Andrew McGregor, “Traitors or POWs? Khartoum Sentences JEM Rebels to Death,” Terrorism Focus, August 6, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5105&tx_ttnews[backPid]=246&no_cache=1

2. For the trial of the assassins, see Andrew McGregor, “Alleged Assassins of U.S. Diplomat Claim Khartoum Regime Incites People to Jihad,” Terrorism Focus, February 6, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34508

3. For the “Great Escape” in Yemen, see Andrew McGregor, “Al-Qaeda’s Great Escape in Yemen,” Terrorism Focus 3(5), February 7, 2006, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369888 and Andrew McGregor, “Yemen Convicts PSO Members Involved in February’s Great Escape,” Terrorism Focus 3(29), July 25, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=847

4. See Andrew McGregor, “Strange Days on the Red Sea Coast: A New Theater for the Iran-Israel Conflict?” Terrorism Monitor 7(8), April 3, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34807&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1

5. For Eritrean reaction to such claims, see “Eritrea: Phantom Israeli and Iranian Military Bases,” Eritrean Centre for Strategic Studies, December 27, 2012, http://www.capitaleritrea.com/eritrea-phantom-israeli-and-iranian-military-bases/

Sufi Militia Joins Somali Government Forces while Ras Kamboni Militia Distances Itself

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Andrew McGregor

December 14, 2012

Somalia’s new national government continues to make slow but steady progress in bringing the southern and central parts of the embattled nation under unified rule. An important step was taken on December 1 when the Sufi Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a militia officially joined federal government forces.

Ahlu sunnah wal JamaaFighters of the Ahlu wa’l-Sunna

The Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a (ASJ) militia, approximately 1,000 to 2,000 strong, has its basis in a Sufi umbrella group formed in 1991 to defend traditional Somali Sufi Islam. The movement took to arms in 2008 when the Salafist al-Shabaab movement began to demolish Sufi shrines and the tombs of Sufi masters in the interests of banning the “un-Islamic” practice of “worshipping the dead” (see Terrorism Monitor, April 2, 2010) Two years later the ASJ aligned itself with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TNG), though differences between the movement and then-TFG president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad prevented al-Shabaab from obtaining the level of representation in government it felt was its due. The movement found more willing patrons in the Ethiopian military, which has provided it with arms, money and training as well as working alongside it in military operations against al-Shabaab in central Somalia.

Under the new Somali government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud joint operations with Somali government troops have increased. In order to further cooperation with the government, the ASJ will now open an office in the capital, Mogadishu (Raxanreeb, December 1, 2012). ASJ members now hope to receive the same benefits as members of the national army though the exact method of integration has yet to be announced.

Shaykh Mahmud Hasan Farah was re-elected as the chairman of the movement’s executive committee in November (Bar-Kulan Radio [Nairobi], November 21, 2012). Shaykh Mahmud insists that the movement rejects all forms of “clan-ism and tribalism,” but must play some role in the new state: “We are telling the new government that Ahlu Sunnah has no culture of opposing governments and we welcome it, but a government, in which we don’t have someone to represent us cannot purport to represent us. We must have a representative in the government” (Radio Kulmiye [Mogadishu], November 18, 2012). The chairman’s words were echoed by senior ASJ official Shaykh Ali Shaykh Ibrahim: “We ask the government, as Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a, to give special consideration to its relationship with Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a because Ahlu Sunnah has not taken up arms to fight the government but to defend Islam, after our clerics were killed, our saints tombs desecrated, and our mosques destroyed” (Radio Kulmiye, November 16, 2012).

However, it appears that the ASJ is no less fractious than the rest of Somalia, with a number of the militia’s leaders in central Somalia resisting the appointment of Shaykh Mahmud as chairman and the new leadership council in Mogadishu on the grounds that they had not been consulted while their own leadership candidates were not considered (Dayniile Online, November 19, 2012).

The movement recently vowed to launch new operations in central Somalia to “remove al-Shabaab remnants from the country” (Gaalkacyo Radio, November 17, 2012; November 24, 2012). Somali intelligence officials believe al-Shabaab has been receiving arms shipments from Libya and Yemen as it organizes a return to guerrilla warfare in rural areas after having been expelled from most of the urban areas it only recently controlled (Raxanreeb.com, November 5, 2012). Though al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared jihad in Somalia obligatory on “every Muslim who is capable,” there is growing evidence that many of the foreign fighters in Somalia have left for more promising battlefields in Yemen (AFP, November 6, 2012).

Somalia’s Internal Affairs and National Security Minister Abdikarin Husayn Guled has said that the new government is also trying to integrate the southern Ras Kamboni militia into government forces, but at the moment the rift between Ras Kamboni and Mogadishu is growing rather than narrowing (Shabelle Media Network, November 29, 2012).

Ras Kamboni organized demonstrations in Kismayo against the new federal government in November that claimed the president was preventing the economic development of the Juba by preventing the export of the charcoal stockpile and called for Mogadishu to leave the creation of a new administration in the Juba region to the eight-nation Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) (Dhacdo.com, November 9, 2012).

At the center of the dispute was the disposition of some four million bags of charcoal that was stockpiled in Kismayo before al-Shabaab had an opportunity to export it. The charcoal was worth an estimated $25 million to $40 million in Middle Eastern markets (Africa Review [Nairobi], November 4, 2012).  Much of the Somali charcoal trade is dominated by businessmen with close ties to al-Shabaab and the trade was a major source of financing for the Islamist militants before they lost Kismayo in September (see Terrorism Monitor, November 18, 2010). The rapid and ongoing deforestation of southern Somalia by the charcoal industry has been described as an “ecocide” and threatens the long-term viability of the entire region.

Charcoal exports have long been illegal in Somalia and a further international ban on the Somali trade was imposed by the UN Security Council in February, these measures and an order to temporarily close the port of Kismayo from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud have all failed at preventing Ras Kamboni and local businessmen from exporting much of the stockpile under the supervision of Kenyan troops belonging to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  Nairobi and IGAD both support the continuation of the charcoal trade, the most lucrative industry in southern Somalia.

Ras Kamboni fighters shot up much of Kismayo on November 21 in the alleged “pursuit” of an unknown attacker who hurled a grenade at the home of Ahmed Madobe (Bulshoweyn.com, November 21, 2012). Only days later a powerful bomb went off outside a district administration office where Ras Kamboni officials were having a meeting (Mareeg Online, November 25). The Ras Kamboni militia was recently identified by Somali MP Abdullahi Hussein Ali as the source of the ongoing robberies and general insecurity that is plaguing Kismayo (Mareeg Online, November 13, 2012). The militia did little to enhance its reputation in Kismayo when it rounded up over 400 residents in an operation designed to catch a few militants by dragging a large net. The operation was defended by Ras Kamboni spokesman Abdinasir Seeraar: “I think there are some [detainees] who have connections with al-Shabaab and some innocents, but how can we know unless we make some arrests and conduct investigations;  that’s when we can know who is the Shabaab member and who is not” (BBC Somali Service, November 2, 2012).

Ras Kamboni had previously ruled Kismayo jointly with al-Shabaab after the city was taken by the Islamists in 2006. The movement joined the now defunct Hizb al-Islam movement in 2009, but the following year it underwent a split, with one faction formally joining al-Shabaab (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, February 4, 2010). While still an Islamist movement, Ras Kamboni now fights Shabaab extremists under Kenyan patronage. Nairobi views Ras Kamboni as a pliant local partner in its efforts to establish a Nairobi-supported buffer administration named “Jubaland” in southern Somalia under the nominal rule of Mogadishu.  The plan has the backing of ethnic-Somali politicians in Kenya who have cross-border clan connections. ASJ has inserted itself into the debate, insisting any effort to form a new administration in the Juba region without consulting them would ultimately fail (Radio Risala, November 19, 2012).

There are also persistent rumors that influential Islamist and former Hizb al-Islam leader Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys is seeking to abandon al-Shabaab and join the government forces but is being held under close watch by al-Shabaab to prevent his escape (Dhacdo.com, November 23, 2012). Shaykh Aweys merged his movement with al-Shabaab in December 2010.

This article originally appeared in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor