Internal Disputes Plague al-Shabaab Leadership After Mogadishu Withdrawal

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Andrew McGregor

August 19, 2011

Al-Shabaab’s sudden withdrawal from Mogadishu on August 6 in the face of a concentrated offensive by Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) appears to have been followed by a major internal dispute over the movement’s leadership, possibly resulting in the appointment of a new leader.

AMISOM Armor in Mogadishu

Al-Shabaab has tried to cover up the problems and issues that led to the withdrawal by maintaining it was a “tactical” move (Hiraan Online, August 12; AllPuntland, August 10). One al-Shabaab leader, Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys (former leader of Hizb al-Islam, now absorbed into al-Shabaab) admitted in an interview that the movement was forced to turn to a new strategy because it could no longer match the military strength of AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces in Mogadishu’s intense urban warfare  (Somali Channel TV [London], August 12).

However, there are signs that al-Shabaab’s withdrawal was not as planned as the movement would like to let on; AMISOM troops and Somali police discovered a store of 137 155 mm artillery shells left behind in a deserted house in a part of Mogadishu’s Bakara Market recently occupied by al-Shabaab. As the movement does not possess 155 mm artillery, it is likely the shells were being cannibalized for explosives needed in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (Horseed Media, August 13; AFP, August 13).

Al-Shabaab has claimed a certain number of fighters were left behind, explaining the resistance that AMISOM forces continue to encounter (especially in the north of the city) as they continue their cautious occupation of the neighborhoods newly vacated by al-Shabaab. The TFG has attempted to capitalize on al-Shabaab’s difficulties by offering an amnesty to those fighters still active in Mogadishu who are prepared to renounce violence (AFP, August 10). In some places, the retreating Islamists have been replaced by local clan militias under the command of powerful businessmen who have no desire to come under TFG rule. Many other of these fighters are reported to be veterans of Hizb al-Islam still under the direct command of Hassan Dahir Aweys (Jowhar.com [Mogadishu], August 9).

According to the Ugandan commander of AMISOM, Major General Fred Mugisha, the African Union peacekeepers “now have to cover a much larger area of the city and we risk being overstretched” (AFP, August 10).  Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has recently pledged to send another 2,000 soldiers from the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) to Mogadishu to consolidate AMISOM’s gains after repeated pleas for military support from other African Union nations to AMISOM’s Ugandan and Burundian contingents failed to win any positive response (Daily Monitor [Kampala], August 13).

Though his TFG fighters played only a small part in driving al-Shabaab out of the national capital, Somali president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad is now talking tough regarding his determination to defeat his former Islamist allies: “Al-Shabaab is a threat to Somalia as well as to the stability of the wider region and the world. We will not stop pursuing them. Our determination is to clear them from the territory of Somalia” (PANA Online [Dakar], August 11). However, many Somalis fear the expulsion of al-Shabaab will mean a return of the warlords who devastated Mogadishu for nearly two decades. Their fears were not allayed by the president’s appointment of former warlord (and serial opportunist) General Yusuf Muhammad Si’ad “Indha Adde” (Dayniile Online, August 9).

Faced with the consequences of its inability or unwillingness to deal with the growing famine in central and southern Somalia, al-Shabaab has resorted to ever more desperate efforts to prevent the total depopulation of its “Emirate.” Among their more fantastic theories is Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage’s explanation of the flight of many Somalis from Shabaab-controlled regions to refugee camps in Kenya or Ethiopia to receive the international aid that al-Shabaab forbids in most of its territory. According to the Shabaab spokesman, the non-Muslim enemy has devised a new strategy to “transport [Somalis] abroad, especially to Christian countries like Ethiopia and Kenya, so that their faith can be destroyed and [so] that they could be staff and soldiers for the Christians” (AFP, July 30).

It is very likely that the Islamist movement’s ineffectual response to the massive drought and famine (“pray for rain”) has irreparably damaged the movement’s credibility as a political movement in Somalia. However, al-Shabaab has displayed a remarkable resiliency for an often divided movement that seems to excel at disappointing old friends and making new enemies. Given its temporarily diminished capacity for direct military confrontation, it can be expected that the movement will pursue other highly familiar tactics, such as kidnappings, bombings and assassinations.

Some Somali sources report that Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr’s” controversial leadership of al-Shabaab has come to an end with his replacement by Shaykh Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani,” a former al-Shabaab chief in Kismayo, deputy to Godane and veteran of fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan. His activities since his return to Somalia, including the murder of several foreigners in 2003-2004, have earned him a 25-year prison sentence issued in absentia in his native Somaliland. Like Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Haji is a member of the Isaaq clan of northern Somalia. Abdi Godane inserted many Isaaq into senior leadership positions in al-Shabaab even though most of the movement’s fighters hail from southern Somali clans. Somali sources say the appointment was supported by senior al-Shabaab members Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur,” Shaykh Fu’ad Shongole and Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys (Somali Broadcasting Corporation Online [Puntland], August 9).   

Shaykh Mukhtar Robow, who commands the largest contingent in al-Shabaab, has sought Godane’s replacement for nearly a year now, following the failed “Ramadan Offensive” that was repelled with heavy losses to Mukhtar Robow’s southern Somali Rahanweyn fighters, who were pushed into the frontlines and then denied medical treatment for their wounds by order of Abdi Godane (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 21, 2010). Nonethelss, al-Shabaab’s spokesman, Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage “Ali Dheere,” has asserted that reports of a leadership struggle within the movement were nothing but “enemy propaganda” (BBC Somali Service, August 13).

This article was originally published in the August 19, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Has al-Qaeda Opened a New Chapter in the Sinai Peninsula?

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Andrew McGregor

August 17, 2011

The one area of Egypt that appeared ready to explode into violence during last January’s revolution was the Sinai. Unlike the unarmed, peaceful demonstrators that filled the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, the Bedouin tribesmen of the Sinai were well armed and already engaged in a low-level conflict with Egyptian authorities over a number of issues, including Bedouin smuggling activities, a traditional occupation that has lately become politicized through Bedouin interaction with radical Islamists in Gaza, the end-user of the weapons the desert dwellers are shipping to Sinai’s eastern border. Possibly the only reason a large-scale conflict did not break out in Sinai at the time was the flight or desertion of nearly all the police and security forces based in Sinai after a number of attacks on police stations. Now, however, after a growing number of acts of militancy and the release of an alarming video allegedly depicting the formation of an al-Qaeda-sympathetic movement in Sinai known as al-Shabaab al-Islam (The Youth of Islam), Egypt’s security forces are back, this time accompanied by a significant military presence. [1] The release of the video and a subsequent statement followed an attack on an al-Arish police station in northeast Sinai and the fifth attack this year on a pipeline supplying natural gas to Israel

Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula

An August 2 pamphlet distributed in al-Arish entitled “A Statement from al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula” displayed a mix of local and regional concerns, demanding an Islamic Emirate in the Sinai, an end to the exploitation of Sinai’s wealth by non-residents, the full implementation of Shari’a, an end to discrimination against the Bedouin, the revocation of Egypt’s treaties with Israel and Egyptian military intervention on behalf of the Palestinians in Gaza. It also questioned the military government’s efforts to halt drug-smuggling in the region (Youm7.com [Cairo], August 2; Bikya Masr [Cairo], August 2). Though the video was carried on jihadi websites before being taken down by its host, the declaration of a new branch of al-Qaeda in this highly sensitive and strategic region has yet to be supported by a statement from any of al-Qaeda’s known media outlets.

Still from the video released by al-Shabaab al-Islam.

Despite the influx of Egyptian security forces into the Sinai, the military-run interim government is reluctant to acknowledge the emergence of an al-Qaeda chapter in the Sinai. One state-controlled Egyptian daily described the group’s declaration as “a fabrication” (al-Jumhuriyah [Cairo], August 4).

The latest disturbances began on July 29 when tribesmen in Land Cruisers or on motorcycles attacked a police station in al-Arish, killing three civilians and two security officers as well as wounding 19 others (MENA Online, July 30). The attack occurred the same day as an estimated one million Islamists gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to demand an Islamic state in Egypt. Tribal sources indicated that most of the attackers came from a single village that had become a stronghold of Salafi-Jihadis who “raise the black flags of al-Qaeda” (al-Ahram [Cairo], August 1). A later statement by police said that 15 suspects had been arrested in connection with the attack, ten of them Palestinians (al-Ahram, July 31).

On July 30, an Egyptian National Gas Company (Gasco) pipeline carrying natural gas to Israel was attacked for the third time in a month, and the fifth time this year. The attackers punched a hole through the pipeline with rocket-propelled grenades. The pipeline was still out of operation following an earlier attack on July 12 (Jerusalem Post, July 31). Israeli sources indicate that a second attack on the pipeline in the early hours of July 30 was beaten off by private security forces working for Israel’s East Mediterranean Gas Company (Globes Online [Rishon LeZion], July 31).

Beside the militants’ distaste for Israel, the pipeline also symbolizes the corruption of the Hosni Mubarak regime, which is believed to have offered a contract at below-market prices to Israel in return for kickbacks. The loss in revenue to the Egyptian state is estimated at roughly $700 million. One tribal leader insisted that locals viewed such attacks by militants as little more than a nuisance: “The most they do is torch the pipeline that transfers gas to Israel and we couldn’t care less about whether Israel has gas or not” (Daily News Egypt, August 12). The steady series of attacks on the $500 million al-Arish to Ashkelon pipeline have placed the future of the project in jeopardy and Israel is already looking for alternative supplies.

Further unrest spread to the main border crossing with Gaza at Rafah, a key smuggling site, where Egyptian police turned back hundreds of people (Ma’an News Agency [Bethlehem], July 31).

The Bedouin Struggle with the State

As the meeting point of Asia and Africa, the Sinai has always been important to Egypt’s security. Though the Sinai has been, with brief interruptions, a part of Egypt in one form or another since the time of the First Egyptian Dynasty (c. 3100 – 2890 B.C.E.), it has also been regarded as something apart from the Egypt of the Nile and Delta, a remote wasteland useful for mineral exploitation and strategic reasons but otherwise best left (outside of Egyptian security outposts) to the unruly Semitic and Bedouin tribes that have called the Sinai home since ancient times. The effect of these policies is that the Sinai Bedouin form only a tiny minority of Egypt’s total population, but retain an absolute majority in the Sinai.

In recent decades, however, Cairo has attempted to impose the deeply infiltrated security regime that existed in the rest of the country up until last January’s revolution. Many Bedouin involved in traditional smuggling activities found themselves in Egyptian prisons serving long sentences in often brutal conditions. The attempt to impose a security regime on the freedom-minded Bedouin led to a greater alienation of the tribesmen from the state, and the Egyptian uprising presented an opportunity to quickly roll back decades of attempts to impose state control on life in the Sinai. Most importantly, it opened the door for those influenced by the Salafist movements of neighboring Gaza to begin operations.

There are roughly 15 Bedouin tribes in the Sinai. In the politically sensitive northeast region (including al-Arish and the border area) the most important are the Sawarka and Rumaylat. There are also significant Palestinian populations in al-Arish and the border towns of Rafah and Zuwaid

Local Bedouin took the opportunity of storming the Sinai’s prisons, freeing an unknown number of Bedouin smugglers and Palestinian militants. In nearly all cases they were unopposed by prison staff. One of the escapees was Ali Abu Faris, who was convicted for involvement in the Sharm al-Shaykh bombings that killed 88 people in 2005. Others freed included Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners convicted more recently of planning terrorist operations in Egypt (see Terrorism Monitor, June 12, 2009). Since emptying the prisons the tribesmen have warned the police to stay out of the main smuggling centers on penalty of death and the region has been effectively operating without any type of government. Police stationed in the north Sinai have tended to be drawn from Egypt’s Nile and Delta population rather than local sources, giving the impression of an occupation force to some of the Sinai’s more-independent minded Bedouin.

One unintended consequence of sealing the border between Gaza and Egypt has been growing cooperation between Bedouin and Gazan smugglers. While goods and arms have passed into Gaza, Salafi-Jihadi ideology has crossed into Sinai in return. A new and volatile combination of Bedouin dissatisfaction, Palestinian radicalism and Salafist-Jihadi ideology erupted in 2004 with the emergence of the Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (Monotheism and Struggle) – a mixed Bedouin-Palestinian group that opposed the presence of Egyptian security forces and sought to end tourism in the region, especially visits to historical or archaeological sites, which the group regarded as idolatry. The new group carried out a series of bombings in 2004-2005 that targeted tourist resorts in Sinai (well used by Israelis) and international peacekeepers belonging to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) (see Terrorism Monitor, May 2, 2006). The government security operations that followed cast a very wide net, killing dozens of suspects and sweeping thousands of Bedouin into detention, creating an ever more hostile relationship between the Bedouin and Egyptian administrators and security forces.

Cairo’s Military Response

Cairo addressed the emerging threat on August 12 by sending over 2000 troops from the Egyptian Second Division backed by police and border guards to al-Arish, along with a number of armored vehicles stripped of their main armaments to meet security obligations under Egypt’s treaty with Israel. Authorities were emphatic that the deployment was for defensive purposes only and that none of the troops would be “chasing anyone in Sinai’s mountains” (al-Masry al-Youm, August 12). The deployment marks the largest Egyptian military presence in the Sinai since the signing of the 1979 Camp David Accords.

The military response is hampered by Camp David Accord restrictions on the deployment of Egyptian military forces in parts of the Sinai, especially in the sensitive “Zone C” near the Israeli border, where only international peacekeepers and Egyptian civilian police were allowed to carry arms before a 2005 agreement with Israel permitted the deployment of 750 soldiers to secure the border. Al-Arish is located in Zone B, where Egypt is permitted to maintain four border security battalions, but Rafah and Zuwaid are within Zone C.

Despite attempts to downplay the extent of the deployment in Sinai, the inclusion of two brigades of Special Forces (1,000 men) would indicate significant operations are planned. Security sources claim the deployment is called “Operation Eagle” and is designed to restore security in the Sinai in three phases:

  • Supported by armored vehicles and warplanes, the troops will restore security in northern Sinai and crack down on organized crime and smuggling rings in al-Arish.
  • Security forces will then deploy in the border towns of Rafah and Zuwaid, where they anticipate strong resistance. Salafists have already destroyed the shrine of Shaykh Zuwaid in the town that bears his name, an action typical of Salafist ideology.
  • The last phase of the operation will be a coordinated ground-air offensive in the mountains of central Sinai, particularly the Mount Halal area, which is believed to be a haven for militants (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], August 13; Egyptian Gazette, August 13).

So far, the deployment has not impressed many tribesmen. Of the disarmed armored vehicles, tribal leader Shaykh Hassan Khalaf remarked: “They look stupid and are completely useless in facing Islamist groups who carry machine guns and heavy artillery. Israel has tied the army’s hands.” North Sinai governor al-Sa’id Abd al-Wahab Mabruk has denied the existence of “Operation Eagle,” insisting that the newly arrived security forces will be limited to protecting individuals and buildings (Daily News Egypt, August 12).

The return of the Egyptian military to sensitive areas of the Sinai has been encouraged in some quarters of Egypt as a necessary step to allay fears of Israeli military action designed to protect Israel’s security in the border region (al-Ahram [Cairo], August 12). Typical of the suspicion regarding Israeli intentions is a report in a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily that said Egyptian security sources claimed to have intelligence regarding contacts between the militants and Israel’s Mossad in relation to obtaining material support for further terrorist operations that would give Israel an excuse to stop the opening of the Rafah border crossing with Gaza (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 12).

The Salafist Denial

Reports are circulating that claim Sinai’s Salafist community intends to replace traditional Bedouin councils with courts run by Salafist shaykhs, their writ enforced by 6,000 armed men. According to a leading local Salafist, Shaykh Sulayman Abu Ayyub, the Salafists “will work to serve justice between people, even if we have to use force through youth members” (al-Misri al-Youm [Cairo], August 10). Local Salafist leader Shaykh As’ad al-Beek has denied the reports, however, maintaining that the Salafists do not conduct any armed activities (Daily News Egypt, August 12).

The leader of the Salafist movement in al-Arish, As’as Bey al-Arish, denied that the Salafis had entered into any confrontations with police in Sinai, claiming that such rumors originate with Israel’s Mossad, which “propagates such rumors to foster instability in Sinai” (Youm7.com [Cairo], August 12; Bikya Masr [Cairo], August 12). Other Salafist leaders have denied that the movement had any part in the attack on the al-Arish police station (MENA Online, August 2).

Conclusion

The near collapse of Egypt’s internal security forces has opened to Egypt to a resurgence of Islamist violence that would have been inconceivable a year ago. There are now concerns within Egypt that the nation’s sizeable but divided Islamist community intends to usurp the secular revolution to impose an Islamic state in Egypt.

Aside from suspicions of Israeli involvement in instigating the unrest, some Egyptian commentators see the hand of HAMAS behind the disturbances in the Sinai (al-Akhbar [Cairo], August 10). However, there seems to be a general reluctance to discuss the specific grievances of the Sinai Bedouin or their place in Egyptian society. Thousands of years of Egyptian occupation have failed to integrate the native peoples of the Sinai Peninsula into Egypt, whether socially, politically or even economically. The persisting sense of alienation provides fertile ground for the growth of militancy, conditions easily exploited by Salafist-Jihadi groups that see themselves fighting two enemies in the region – the apostate regime in Cairo and the Zionist regime in Israel. While the enhanced security force now in the Sinai may be able to restore some semblance of security in the urban areas of the northeast, it will almost certainly be insufficient to tackle the militants should they decamp to the wild, cave-ridden mountain region of central Sinai.

Note

1. The video was posted to YouTube (www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYuKeeIVFzM ) on July 27, but has since been removed “as a violation of YouTube’s policy on depiction of harmful activities.”

This article was first published as a Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary on August 17, 2011

The Battle for Zinjibar: The Tribes of Yemen’s Abyan Governorate Join the Fight against Islamic Militancy

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Andrew McGregor

August 12, 2011

As if Yemen did not already face enough political, social and economic challenges in the midst of a multi-sided civil war, there are significant and not unreasonable fears in the Yemeni opposition that President Ali Abdullah Saleh has manufactured a new conflict between the state and al-Qaeda in Abyan governorate designed to ensure Western support for his continued rule. Many Yemeni political and military leaders insist the bitter and ongoing battle for the coastal city of Zinjibar (capital of Abyan governorate) is merely the culmination of a decade long policy of manipulating the al-Qaeda threat.

Yemen’s military is badly divided at the moment; some units and commanders have crossed over to the opposition, some units are engaged with Huthist rebels in northern Yemen, some (such as the Republican Guard) are devoted to crushing protestors, and still others, such as the leadership of the embattled 25th Brigade in Zinjibar, say they are neither pro- nor anti-regime, but will fight to the death to prevent an al-Qaeda takeover.

Saleh’s regime has attempted to capitalize on the seizure of Zinjibar as a warning of what can result from the instability sweeping Yemen as a result of anti-regime protests, describing the militants as “members of al-Qaeda [who] benefit from any instability to establish their Islamic state (Yemen Times, June 2).

The Islamist Takeover of Zinjibar: Betrayal at the Top?

According to official reports, Zinjibar was taken by about 300 Islamist militants (which the government identified as al-Qaeda) in late May after two days of fighting with government forces (AFP, May 29). Residents of Zinjibar reached by Western media provided a different version of events, describing a city abandoned to militants who went on a looting spree (BBC, May 29). Only the 25th Brigade refused to evacuate the city and was soon surrounded by militant forces. It seems that the original 300 militants received substantial reinforcements before tribal forces recently began cutting the roads into Zinjibar.

Not long after the occupation reports began to appear in the jihadist forums of the proclamation of an “Islamic Emirate of Abyan,” as declared by AQAP (Ansar1.info, March 28; al-Bawaba, March 31). The forces in Zinjibar, however, are gathered under the banner of the newly formed Ansar al-Shari’a (al-Watan [Sana’a], August 4). The exact identity of the Islamist forces in Zinjibar remains uncertain. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has not issued any statements regarding the fighting there, though government statements routinely refer to the forces occupying the city as “al-Qaeda.”

Yemen’s foreign minister, Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi, strongly denied suggestions that the government was using al-Qaeda in Zinjibar to further its own interests and collect Western funding intended for anti-terrorism activities: “It cannot be said that the state that spares no effort in fighting [al-Qaeda], is the one that planted it there” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 29).

Perhaps reflecting the level of suspicion that surrounds the Saleh regime, some commentators in Yemen’s press have rejected the notion that al-Qaeda has anything to do with the events in Abyan (al-Masdar [Sana’a], July 26). Ali Nasir Muhammad, a leading figure in the separatist Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) views the seizure of Zinjibar by Islamist militants as part of an effort to create international concern over the future of south Yemen, tarnishing in the process “the image of the southern peaceful struggle” (Ma’rib Press, July 27). Meanwhile, the Abyan Forum for Reconciliation, Tolerance and Solidarity denounced the “suspicious alliance” between the army and al-Qaeda, which it suggested was impeding “any victory over terrorism” (Aden Press Online, July 31).

The 25th Mechanized Brigade Besieged

General Muhammad al-Sawmali, commander of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, based on the east side of Zinjibar, has been steadfast in his refusal to abandon Zinjibar in the fashion of the other security services and military units based there. The General caustically remarked: “God bless our colleagues in the Public Security, Police, and Central Security who pulled out of the governorate and left behind all their military equipment and munitions as a gift for al-Qaeda elements… I do not want to go too far and accuse my colleagues of complicity with al-Qaeda against us and I do not cast doubt about them… but we can say that it is cowardice and fear that filled them after the governor, his deputies, and directors of departments left Zinjibar” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

 

Islamist Militants in Zinjibar

The 25th Brigade is considered close to Major General Ali Muhsin Saleh al-Ahmar, a powerful commander in the Yemen Army who has thrown his lot in with the opposition. In May, Ali Muhsin joined eight other generals in issuing “Statement Number One,” in which the generals accused the President of “surrendering Abyan [Governorate] to an armed terrorist group” (iloubnan.info – May 29, 2011; AFP, May 29; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 17). An intensified effort by militants to drive the Brigade from Zinjibar began on May 30.

Despite serious shortages of food and water in his garrison, the general maintains that his brigade’s “national, religious and moral duty to our God, homeland and governorate” do not permit his force to evacuate from Zinjibar (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

The Tribes Join the Battle

AQAP was once clearly subordinate to the tribes in the Yemeni power structure, but the occupation of Zinjibar by AQAP-allied militants and the flight of tens of thousands of refugees brought about a realization that the militants were now willing to operate independently of the approval or interests of the tribes. Only days before the tribal intervention in Zinjibar, Yemen’s embassy in Washington claimed that AQAP had only been able to expand its operations in Abyan through the efforts of tribal elders who had offered the militants shelter and protection while refusing to cooperate with government security units (Yemen Post, July 10).

The tribal intervention began when tribal leaders such as Shaykh Abdullah Bal’idi of Abyan’s Bal’id tribe called on members of all the local tribes, especially the locally powerful al-Fadl tribe, to unite against the Islamist militants (Akhbar al-Yawm [Sana’a], July 6). The shaykh’s appeal came from concern for local security, as he pointed out many of the militants were actually natives of Ma’rib and Shabwah governorates. Shaykh Abdullah also accused the authorities of having an interest in prolonging the fighting in Abyan (al-Watan [Sana’a], August 4). Some of the Islamists were reported to have arrived from abroad via Aden Airport as tourists before joining the ranks of the Ansar al-Shari’a (al-Hayat, August 1). General al-Sawmali maintains that many of the Islamist reinforcements in Zinjibar have arrived from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. He described his opponents as “scattered groups from various areas or even from various countries whose concern is to kill. They use religion as a tool while some of them are ignorant to a large extent concerning religion. Some of them are extremists and others are tribal elements that have no objective. They do not have a clear objective or a clear leadership. Many of them are children who have enthusiasm to fight, and some of them have been bought by money” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

By mid-July, tribesmen in the Abyan towns of Mudiyah, Mehfed and Ja’ar began pushing the militants out of their towns after seeing the devastation wrought in Zinjibar and witnessing the murder of tribesmen affiliated with the security forces (AFP, July 17).

On July 17, the Yemen Army launched an offensive involving troops from the 119th Brigade (based in Lahj governorate), armor and rocket launchers designed to relieve the 25th Brigade, supported by rocket attacks from naval ships offshore (Reuters, July 17). The offensive, which approached Zinjibar from the west, was joined by roughly 450 tribesmen.

One tribal leader, Shaykh Ahmad al-Rahwi, suggested that the tribesmen were uniquely qualified through local knowledge and traditional fighting techniques to engage and defeat the militants in the same type of guerrilla warfare the militants use (Yemen Online, July 15). In this matter the shaykh has the agreement of the 25th Brigade’s General al-Sawmali: “We want these tribes to assume their role in the war against al-Qaeda because the people of the area are aware of the circumstances of their area better than the regular forces. They can also distinguish between the armed men and they know from where they have come and to which tribes they belong” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

Yemen’s Defense Ministry claimed two prominent al-Qaeda operatives, Ayid al-Shabwani and Awad Muhammad Saleh al-Shabwani, were killed in fighting on July 20, though both had been reported killed in the past (26 September.net, July 20; Reuters, July 21). At the same time, reports emerged from Zinjibar of a rift between two factions of militants, the Ansar al-Shari’a and a second faction of local Abyan fighters (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 20). Two days later, tribesmen prevented a convoy of militants from reinforcing their colleagues in Zinjibar, killing one militant and arresting ten others on the main highway leading to the city (Reuters, July 22).

Elsewhere in Abyan, tribesmen claimed to have forced al-Qaeda fighters under commander Salim al-Shayabi from the town of Lawdar on July 25, seizing a large quantity of arms and mines in the process (AFP, July 25). The town was taken after the tribesmen gave militants two days to leave (al-Hayat, July 27).  Members of the local al-Awazil tribe had held a lengthy meeting on July 18 during which it was decided to drive armed militants out of the Lawdar district, especially foreign elements (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 20). Lawdar was the scene of heavy fighting between AQAP and government forces in August 2010 (Reuters, August 22, 2010; Sep26.net, August 21, 2010; AFP August 22, 2010; see also Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 15, 2010).

Ten militants killed in a July 25 attack on the 25th Brigade (al-Masdar [Sana’a], July 25). The next day, a militant leader known as Sa’id Qarnoushh was one of five to ten militants killed in an on the  Brigade (Dawn [Karachi], July 26; Reuters Africa, July 26).Reports later emerged from Zinjibar of the July 27 death of wanted Saudi jihadist Abdullah al-Juwayr (a.k.a. Ibrahim al-Najdi), one of 17 militants killed in a fierce battle with Yemeni forces. Al-Juwayr was reputedly the Amir of AQAP forces in Yemen’s Hadramawt governorate and was a veteran of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was believed to be planning terrorist strikes in the capital of Sana’a (al-Hayat, July 27).

A major setback occurred on July 28 when air strikes by the Yemen Air Force killed 15 to 25 armed tribesmen supporting the military offensive, causing a temporary withdrawal of tribal forces from the battle. The airstrike also killed Lieutenant Colonel Haidara Ali of the Yemeni army. The tribesmen remained on the sidelines for two days before returning with a warning from their field leader, Muhammad al-Ja’adani: “We caution the government’s forces to be careful of another strike on our fighters. Repeating that mistake will lessen the tribes’ desire to help clear out the militants” (Reuters, August 3). Al-Ja’adani had earlier claimed that the tribesmen had given their positions to government forces before the airstrike, adding: “The regime and the al-Qaeda organization are two different sides of the same coin, and it is hard to distinguish between them” (News Yemen Online [Sana’a], July 30). On August 2, al-Ja’adani announced the tribes of the region would soon hold a council to take a determined line against the regime’s “conspiracy” against Abyan (Akhbar al-Yawm [Sana’a], August 2).

By July 20, the 119th Brigade was involved in overnight battles in the Khamila and Dio districts of western Zinjibar. Brigadier General Ahmad Awad Hassan al-Marmi, the commander of military forces in Abyan, was killed in intense fighting in Zinjibar over July 29-30, less than a week into his new appointment. A number of other officers and tribal leaders were also killed in the battle (al-Hayat, August 1). After yet another “friendly fire” incident that wounded some 20 tribal fighters, the SMM claimed that the Yemen Air Force, U.S. forces and Yemen’s Republican Guard were deliberately targeting the tribes of Abyan using coordinates provided by the jihadis (Akhbar al-Yawm, July 31). Both before and after the incident, leaders of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform accused the regime of trying to dissolve the military-tribal alliance in Abyan to allow the militants to occupy Zinjibar (Akhbar al-Yawm, July 26; al-Sahwah [Sana’a]. July 31).

On August 1 the fighting shifted to the nearby village of  al-Khamila, where 18 militants were killed by air strikes and artillery (al-Masdar [Sana’a], August 1). A day later the 119th Brigade killed three militants during a battle in Khamila (Xinhua, August 2). The Zinjibar garrison began receiving artillery support from the 39th Brigade based in neighboring Dawfas, though the 39th has had to repel its own attacks from militants (Akhbar al-Yawm, August 2; al-Mu’tamar [Sana’a], August 3). Militants continue to operate in the Hassan Valley just outside of Zinjibar, with Yemeni intelligence units complaining of difficulty in tracing their movements as the militants have stopped using cellphones to communicate (Xinhua, July 29).

Drone War in Yemen

The United States has been heavily involved in air operations in Abyan, striking terrorist targets with cruise missiles, fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For now, drone operations in Yemen are conducted by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but CIA-directed drone operations are expected to begin soon, operating from a purpose-built base within Yemen or somewhere else in the Persian Gulf expected to be completed by September. U.S. drones currently operate out of the American military base in Djibouti. The U.S. administration appears to be stepping up its drone attacks in Yemen following their success in eliminating much of the militant leadership in northwest Pakistan by this method.

A June 3 American airstrike on Zinjibar killed two important AQAP members, Ammar Abadah Nasir al-Wa’eli, a veteran of Afghanistan, and Ali Abdullah Naji al-Harithi, a veteran of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq currently serving as a commander in the al-Qaeda affiliated Aden Abyan Islamic Army (Inspire 6, Summer 2011; for al-Qaeda’s Aden Abyan Islamic Army, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, November 11, 2010).

July 14 – Another U.S. airstrike on July 14 targeted a police station in the Wahdi district of Abyan, killing at least six militants, possibly including their commander, Hadi Muhammad Ali (al-Jazeera, July 14). One who escaped, however, was Fahd Muhammad al-Qusa, an al-Qaeda operative and veteran of Afghanistan who was released from prison in 2007 after serving part of his sentence for involvement in the attack on the USS Cole. Since then the Yemen government has refused to extradite him to the United States and he survived a drone attack in 2009. Most of the militants in Wahdi were believed to have moved there after being expelled by tribesmen from the Mudiyah district of Abyan.

U.S. drones killed five militants, including a field commander, on July 27 in western Zinjibar (Xinhua, July 27). American drones made a further strike on militants on August 1 near the Wahda stadium, at a site between Zinjibar and Ja’ar, and in the village of al-Khamila, roughly six miles outside Zinjibar, though there were conflicting reports claiming at least one of the three strikes was actually carried out by the Yemen Air Force (Reuters, August 1; Yemen Post, August 1). At least 15 militants were believed to have been killed in the raids, including AQAP commander Nasser al-Shadadi.

The Threat to Aden

Many of the 90,000 refugees from Zinjibar and elsewhere in Abyan have fled to the port city of Aden, which has also been subject to AQAP violence recently, including a bomb that killed a British shipping agent and a suicide attack by a Saudi militant that killed nine soldiers headed to Zinjibar on July 24 (Yemen Post, July 20).  These blows were preceded by a number of other attacks, including the car bomb killings of Colonel Mutea al-Siyani (June 29) and Colonel Khalid al-Hubaishi (June 23). Both men belonged to the 31st Armored Brigade. Another car bomb targeted armored vehicles on June 13. The attack was carried out by a suspected al-Qaeda operative who had been briefly jailed but was release five months previously without explanation (Yemen Times, July 4; July 25). On June 20, Major General Mahdi Maqwala, the military commander of the Southern military area, narrowly escaped assassination by a car bomb planted in front of his house. Major General Ahmad Mansur al-Sawma’i, who has defected to the opposition, accused General Maqulah of planning the other attacks against the officers, whom he alleges were not on good terms with Maqulah, as part of a conspiracy to “drown Aden in a sea of blood” (Ma’rib Press, July 26).

Aden is only 35 km from Zinjibar; the latter could easily act as a base for operations against Aden if the militants are not expelled. According to General al-Sawmali, only the 25th Brigade forms a barrier to the Islamist takeover of Aden: “If we pull out or surrender, they will enter Aden the following day and from it they will go to the other governorates” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 27).

So far, it has only been the resistance of the 25th Brigade in Zinjibar that has saved Aden from a similar occupation by Islamist militants. There are reports from within Aden that security forces have backed away from controlling the streets, encouraging armed individuals to wander around the city at night and hang banners promoting the Caliphate without opposition (Yemen Times, July 25). Yemen’s Minister of Defense, Major General Muhammad Nasser Ahmad, admitted in early July that armed Islamists from Abyan had already entered Aden before a military cordon was built around the port (Yemen Times, July 4). As a strategic port city, Aden is normally well defended, but in the current environment it is difficult to gauge the loyalty of the troops based there or to know what orders they are acting under.

Conclusion: A Fragile Alliance

One month into the combined army-tribal offensive only slight progress can be reported. The militants are still far from being dislodged from Zinjibar, though some progress has been made on halting reinforcements from reaching them.

In the volatile political climate that prevails in Yemen at the moment, each faction in the multi-sided fighting has interpreted the events in Abyan in light of their own concerns and suspicions. Lack of a common perception of the forces and their intentions in the conflict will inevitably dissolve opportunities for negotiation and lead to prolonged hostilities.

The tribesmen of Abyan have no love for the regime, which they barely differentiate from the Islamist militants in terms of their malicious intent towards the people of Abyan governorate. While the struggle of the 25th Brigade in Zinjibar may have aroused some admiration from the tribesmen, it is nonetheless a fact that the tribal elements are only one “friendly-fire” incident from abandoning their new alliance with a badly divided military, leaving the way open for an Islamist assault on Aden.

Though the militants in Abyan are not fighting under the AQAP banner, the large number of known AQAP operatives engaged in the struggle for Zinjibar confirms the militants are at the very least closely affiliated with al-Qaeda.

This article was originally published in the August 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Murder of South Sudanese Rebel Leader Puts Juba’s Amnesty Programme at Risk

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Andrew McGregor

August 12, 2011

The mysterious death of South Sudanese rebel commander Colonel Gatluak Gai (a.k.a. Galwak Gai) may jeopardize future attempts to rein in some seven other renegade commanders who refuse to join the new post-independence government of South Sudan.

Gatluak Gai

Gatluak was a Nuer from Unity State’s Koch county. A colonel in the region’s prison service, Gatluak was little known until his failure to receive an expected appointment as Kock county commissioner led him into politics as a supporter of Angelina Teny (wife of South Sudan vice-president Riek Machar and a failed candidate for Unity State governor) and eventually into rebellion (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 17, 2010).

Unity (Wahda) State contains some of the largest oil reserves in Sudan. Its economic potential and position along the North-South border has resulted in its devastation by marauding troops, militias and tribal fighters since 1997, resulting in a massive displacement of the population

Colonel Gatluak took up arms against the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA – the armed wing of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement – SPLM) in May, 2010 with an announcement that he had seized 27 machine guns and intended to join the rebel movement of Lieutenant General George Athor Deng (Al-Ra’y al-Amm [Khartoum], May 29). The SPLA replied by accusing Gatluak of working in the interests of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, May 29). Only a week later, however, Gatluak was defeated in a clash with the SPLA in Unity State’s Mayom County. Gatluak was reported to have fled into thick brush (Sudan Tribune, June 8, 2010). The SPLA was confident Gatluak’s rebellion was broken and an offer of amnesty was given in September 2010 as part of a larger amnesty program sponsored by South Sudan president Salva Kiir. Gatluak remained in the field rather than accept the amnesty.

Negotiations with Gatluak resumed in July after South Sudan’s declaration of independence. An agreement was reached under which Gatluak’s forces would be integrated into the ranks of the SPLA while Gatluak himself would receive the rank of Lieutenant General. While the rank of Lieutenant General (and its associated salary and perks) appears to have become the default compensation for rebel commanders joining or rejoining the SPLA, it was a remarkable jump in rank for a prison service colonel who was virtually unknown to the rest of South Sudan’s inflated general staff.

Gatluak agreed to the terms of the July 20 amnesty, which included an end to hostilities and cattle-rustling, the provision of a list of all members of his rebel formation, the integration of his men into the SPLA, and an agreement to be moved anywhere in South Sudan as a senior officer in the SPLA (Sudan Tribune, July 20).

According to Ruei, Gatluak’s group was seeking a new supply of arms from Khartoum, though the latter had made this supply conditional on Gatluak’s group joining the larger Nuer rebel movement led by Peter Gadet, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), operating out of Unity State’s Mayom county (Sudan Tribune, July 27). [1] Colonel Gatluak had previously denied having any ties to Gatdet, who is Gatluak’s son-in-law.

While it is confirmed that Gatluak and three of his followers were killed on July 25, accounts of his death begin to diverge after that. Gatluak’s deputy, Marko Chuol Ruei, admitted responsibility for his commander’s death a week later on local radio, saying Gatluak and several other rebel officers had decided to renege on the agreement with the SPLA and ally themselves with the North Sudan, adding:”Gatluak Gai should blame himself for his death” (Bentiu Radio, July 24; Sudan Tribune, July 25). The former deputy said he had taken command and was ready to honor the agreement with the SPLA/M.

However, Gatluak’s brother, John Nguanyeat Gai, disputed Ruei’s version of events, saying Gatluak had no intention of dishonoring the agreement but was instead murdered by SPLA elements angered by his sudden promotion to Lieutenant General. Nuer Colonel Bol Gatkuoth, a spokesman for Peter Gatdet’s rebel group, said Gatluak “was killed by the SPLA… He signed a peace agreement and was ambushed by the same forces he signed the agreement with… It was a way of luring him in so that they could catch him” (AFP, July 23). Gatluak’s wife claimed their camp was already surrounded by SPLA troops by 5 AM and that Gatluak was killed while trying to escape with his family, rather than in a confrontation with his deputy (Sudan Tribune, July 25).

Nine of Gatluak’s sons served in his almost exclusively Nuer militia, which SPLA officials confirm will still be integrated with SPLA forces (AFP, July 23).

The SPLM’s deal with Gatluak appears to have been hastily fashioned as Juba was eager to present a unified face to the world when South Sudan celebrated its independence in July. Though the deal reached with Colonel Gatluak was seriously flawed – his promotion to Lieutenant General suggested that rebellion was a sure route to an exaggerated rank for disaffected soldiers and government officials – his death poses similar problems, in that it dissuades other notoriously suspicious rebel commanders from reaching an agreement with officials in Juba. Regardless of its real motives, however, Gatluak’s murder might serve to disabuse some potential rebels from the belief a quick insurrection is the key to rapid promotion.

Note

1. Footage of the SSLA can be seen at : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_zoe1kaoIo and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iIjKGDpVNPY&feature=related.

This article was originally published in the August 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Qaddafi Ally Robert Mugabe Calls NATO “Terrorists,” Threatens to Expropriate Western Firms in Zimbabwe

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, August 12, 2011

Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s policy of using Libya’s oil wealth to build stronger ties with sub-Saharan African nations through financial aid, investment and arms supplies has resulted in a distinct lack of support in many of these nations for NATO’s military intervention in the Libyan rebellion. Among the most vociferous of Qaddafi’s supporters has been the long-time ruler of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe has been frequently mentioned as a possible place of exile for the Libyan leader and there were rumors earlier this year that Zimbabwean troops had been sent to Libya, rumors that gained strength within Zimbabwe after the nation’s defense minister declined to issue a straightforward denial (Zimbabwean, February 25, 2011). One Zimbabwe daily later claimed to have confirmation from state intelligence sources that 500 soldiers and a number of state security agents intended to reinforce Qaddafi’s female bodyguard had been deployed in Libya (Zimbabwe Mail, March 17).

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe

President Mugabe, who has been consistent in his support for the Libyan leader, took the opportunity of using a 90 minute speech in Harare to castigate NATO for its actions in Libya, particularly those directed personally at Qaddafi and his family, describing the NATO members as “terrorists.” The speech was delivered as part of celebrations honoring the Chimurenga War, the local name for the national liberation struggle that brought Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party to power in 1980.

Mugabe warned Zimbabweans to be vigilant of foreign attempts at regime change in Zimbabwe as he defended his friend and ally, Mu’ammar Qaddafi:

Look what they are doing in Libya. The brazen way they seek to kill Qaddafi… they are deliberately throwing bombs at his family residences. [NATO] has lost its legitimacy, it has become terrorist and beware this they can do on any other African country than Libya. We must always be in a state of preparedness. They seek to kill Qaddafi. They have in fact deliberately killed some of his children. Now when they do that deliberately, it is exactly what the Taliban and al-Qaeda do – what is the difference in terms of what they [NATO] are doing? That’s why I say NATO is now a terrorist organization as well.  If it defies international law it has no rules and goes out blatantly wanting to kill – that’s brazen murder, assassination, who then can respect it as a law-abiding organization? (Zimbabwe Guardian, August 8).

Mugabe also warned he will soon take action against foreign firms operating in Zimbabwe that originate in countries supporting sanctions against his regime, naming mineral giant Rio Tinto in particular: “If they are to continue mining, then the sanctions must go.” The president added that Western investment could easily be replaced by investment from friendlier countries, such as Russia, China, India and Cuba (Zimbabwe Guardian, August 8).  China is making strong inroads in Zimbabwe; after loaning the nation $700 million earlier this year it was rewarded with substantial diamond and platinum concessions. Chinese corporations also appear to have received an exemption from a government program that requires mining companies to turn over 51% of their shares to black Zimbabweans by September 31 (ZimOnline, August 9).

This article was originally published in the August 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Afghan Taliban Statement Seeks Legitimacy for Islamic Emirate

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Andrew McGregor

August 4, 2011

Statements from Afghanistan’s Taliban movement have begun taking on a more diplomatic tone as the movement grows ever more confident of an eventual victory over foreign forces that are beginning to question the value of extending their deployments. A July 28 statement entitled “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Rethinking Afghanistan” took the opportunity to jab at American fiscal sensitivities by reminding the United States that the cost of its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had precipitated a “head-long descent into financial meltdown” (alemarah.net, July 28).

America’s reputation as a world leader in human rights has similarly suffered through the “gross human rights violations by American interrogators in the Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and Bagram jails,” as well as drone attacks and night raids “in which thousands of innocent men and women have lost their lives.”

Despite the great financial cost and the blows to America’s international reputation, the Taliban insists the American intervention in Afghanistan has succeeded only in destabilizing the region and imposing a corrupt government of former warlords who ship foreign aid funds through Kabul airport to “clandestine bank accounts.”

To bring an end to the conflict (and to further the unspoken aim of legitimizing the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Emirate), the Taliban statement suggests the following:

  • The war in Afghanistan must be separated from the “war on terrorism,” with the Afghan mujahideen no longer being referred to as “terrorists.”
  • Afghans must be given their independence according to the UN Charter.
  • Based on its performance over the last decade, the Islamic Emirate should recognized as a political and military power.
  • Afghans should be given the right of self-determination to form an Islamic government.
  • U.S. and other foreign troops should coordinate a “face-saving” withdrawal with Taliban forces.
  • Afghanistan’s neighbors must build “an environment of cooperation and trust” with the Islamic Emirate.

In return for these steps, the Islamic Emirate pledges “as a proven military and political force” to commit to the stability of the region following the withdrawal of foreign forces.

This article was originally published in the August 4, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Hunt for the “Fifth Column” Could be the Beginning of the End for Libya’s Rebels

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Andrew McGregor

August 4, 2011

The brutal and as yet unexplained murder of General Abd al-Fatah Yunis and two of his aides on July 28 has left Libya’s Benghazi-based rebels eyeing their comrades with suspicion as rumors circulate of deception and betrayal in the rebel ranks. The hunt is on to uncover regime loyalists operating within the rebel movement at the same time tribal rivalries threaten to shatter the rebel cause. The search for “Fifth Columnists” could have disastrous results for the unity and effectiveness of the rebel forces, whose leadership is dominated by individuals closely and recently tied to the Qaddafi regime.

Libyan Loyalist Fighters

At the time of the murders, General Yunis was mysteriously separated from his usual security detail and was accompanied only by two officers in his command. After being shot and possibly tortured, the bodies of General Yunis and his two aides were burned and dumped on the outskirts of Benghazi. Without reliable information on the killing from the Transitional National Council (TNC), rumors regarding the cause of the general’s death continue to spread in Benghazi. Some suggest General Yunis was acting as a double agent to sabotage rebel efforts, others claim he was actually murdered by “Fifth Column” Qaddafi loyalists or by rebels (possibly Islamists) seeking revenge for activities carried out while he was Qaddafi’s Interior Minister. Several days before the killing, Yunis claimed to have documents providing “conclusive evidence” Algeria was providing arms to Qaddafi’s forces (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 25), adding another element of intrigue to the case.

Demonstrations by the late general’s Obeidi tribe followed the murder, many demanding justice, others calling for retribution against the TNC, which they blame for the killings. The Council has promised an investigation, but the slow pace and lack of information on its progress has only served to further infuriate many Obeidi tribesmen, who for now are being held in check by tribal elders.

Yunis was replaced by the former commander of the Tobruk garrison of the Libyan Army, Major General Sulayman Mahmud al-Obeidi, a member of the same tribe as Yunis. Under the command structure introduced on July 13, all armed rebel factions are to come under the command of the civilian defense minister, Dr. Jalal Muhammad Mansur al-Digheily, though some members of the rebel coalition are now demanding al-Digheily’s resignation.

Dr. Jalal Muhammad Mansur al-Digheily

On July 31, rebel troops in western Benghazi attacked the factory headquarters of a rebel militia known variously as the Yusuf Shakir Brigade or al-Nida’a. The five-hour battle left four rebels and 11 members of the Shakir Brigade dead. A rebel spokesman claimed that the roughly 40 member militia was a front for Qaddafi loyalists and included Moroccans, Algerians, Egyptians and Africans.  As well as allegedly playing a role in the murder of General Yunis, a rebel spokesman claimed the group was planning car bombings and assassinations after mounting a prison break that freed a number of high-profile prisoners at the same time as the Yunis murder (al-Jazeera, July 31; Tripoli Post, July 31; Financial Times, July 31). The fighting was said to have begun after the militia refused an order to disarm and disband (AFP, July 30). The rebels also occupied the headquarters of the Obeida ibn al-Jarah militia (named for a companion of the Prophet) on July 28, claiming the militia’s leader had confessed to killing General Yunis (Financial Times, July 31).

Rebel spokesman Mustafa al-Sagazly announced that 63 people had been arrested in security sweeps of Benghazi led by the February 17 Brigade, a rebel militia led by Isma’il al-Salabi that is emerging as the dominant power in the rebel army. Al-Salabi said his Brigade was still looking for “high-ranking prisoners of war” who escaped from two detention centers and are believed to be on the loose in Benghazi (AFP, August 1).

According to Ali Sulayman Aujali, the rebel representative in Washington, the rebel leadership has been aware for some time that there are Qaddafi loyalists active in Benghazi: “There are a few people whom the council knew have relations with the regime, but the people of Libya thought they were with the revolution” (Washington Times, August 1).

Mustafa al-Sagazly, the TNC deputy interior minister, claimed that Qaddafi loyalists in Benghazi were receiving orders from Tripoli through encoded messages broadcast on al-Jamahiriya state television (Financial Times, July 31).  It is uncertain whether these allegations had anything to do with the controversial June 30 NATO bombing of Libyan state television in Tripoli, an operation that killed three television technicians and wounded scores of civilians.

Meanwhile the loyalist forces, which are usually described as “demoralized” in Western media accounts based on rebel sources, consistently mount spirited counter-attacks to retake lost ground even though they lack any effective defense against punishing NATO airstrikes, actions not usually seen in dispirited or demoralized forces. Though the rebel line maintains that most of Qaddafi’s men are only waiting for an opportunity to defect, nearly five months have passed without any significant increase in defections from the rank-and-file, many of whom have had ample opportunity to cross the lines by now. Those eastern-based troops who defected early in the struggle continue to contribute little to the rebel effort, which is still dominated by poorly-trained amateurs who view orders as suggestions and follow only those commanders they like. Rivalries and distrust have made creating a single military leadership difficult enough – extending a centralized command and control system throughout the rebel ranks will be extremely difficult.

The violent dissension within the rebel movement has emboldened the Qaddafi regime, which has withdrawn an offer of a ceasefire if NATO stops its bombing campaign. The government is also now offering an amnesty for rebels returning to the fold, sweetened by offers of promotions and various other rewards (Reuters, August 3). The regime has also taken the opportunity of sowing further discord in the rebel ranks by announcing it is in contact with leading figures in the TNC, including former Qaddafi loyalists Mahmud Jibril and Ali Essawi, as well as Islamist leader Ali al-Salabi (AFP, July 30). In an August 3 interview with the New York Times, Sa’if al-Islam Qaddafi (son of the Libyan leader) said the government had formed an alliance with Ali al-Salabi against the rebels. Al-Salabi acknowledged having discussions with regime representatives, but denied forming a pact with them (AFP, August 4).

Psychologically at least, Qaddafi has the upper hand on the rebels, whose military leadership, cobbled together from ex-Qaddafi loyalists, CIA assets and radical Islamists, is in danger of being consumed by distrust, paranoia and internal disputes. If further rebel purges follow, the rebel movement stands at risk of complete collapse.

This article was originally published in the August 4, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Afghan Taliban Condemn CIA for “Diabolic” Hacking of Their Official Website

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Andrew McGregor

July 28, 2011

Various reports claiming the death of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar have emerged in the last year, all of them apparently false. The latest report of his death was the most unusual, as it appeared to originate with authentic Taliban spokesmen, the apparent victims of a concerted attempt to hack into their electronic communications devices in order to deliberately spread disinformation at a critical point in the struggle for Afghanistan. The Commission of Cultural Affairs of the Islamic Emirate [of Afghanistan, i.e. the Taliban] responded by issuing a “Statement of the Cultural Affairs Commission of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Recent Shameful Attempt by the Enemy” a day after the July 20 hacking effort (alemara1.com; July 21; ansar1.info, July 21).

Zabihullah Mujahid

In the early hours of July 20, text messages began to circulate from the mobile phones of veteran Taliban spokesmen Zabihullah Mujahid and Qari Yusuf Ahmadi saying: “Leadership council of IEA [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] announces that Amir al-Mumineen [Commander of the Faithful, i.e. Mullah Omar] has passed away. May mighty God bless him.” More detailed e-mails were also sent from the movement’s official website that claimed the Taliban leader had died of a heart attack. The notice was accompanied by a long obituary and the announcement that the Mullah had been succeeded by Gul Agha, a close aide (AFP, July 20).

A spokesman for Afghanistan’s National Directorate for Security (NDS) said his agency had received no reports of the death of the Taliban leader, who has remained in hiding since being forced from the Taliban capital of Kandahar in 2001. The NDS may have been hesitant to support the latest claims, having been embarrassed in May when it spread reports that Mullah Omar had gone missing from his Quetta hideout.  A more elaborate version of this story suggested that Mullah Omar had been killed by his Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) escort on May 21 while being transported from Quetta to a new hideout in North Waziristan in an operation directed by former ISI director General Hamid Gul (Tolo News [Kabul], May 23; Reuters, May 23). Both the Taliban and General Gul dismissed the report, the latter describing it as “rubbish.”

The Taliban statement on Mullah Omar’s latest “virtual death” blamed the hacking effort on the CIA, claiming the agency had hacked the Islamic Emirate’s official website alemara1.com by posting a fake announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in Pashto, English and Arabic. The announcement was also sent using the email addresses of spokesmen Zabibullah and Qari Yusuf. Text messages were sent from the spokesmen’s mobile phones through the Roshan and Afghan Wireless mobile communications companies. The work was done at night while the mobile phones of Taliban officials are usually powered off.

Qari Yusuf Ahmadi

The statement admitted that “the enemy” had already created many problems for the Taliban website, including the posting of false information. Nonetheless, “the colleagues working at the website of the Islamic Emirate have foiled all efforts of the enemy. When the enemy hackers managed to take control of the website, our technical managers… promptly retrieved from [the enemy hackers] control of the website.” The Taliban described the hacking as a “diabolic act,” though it noted: “We would like to say that in the world of technology, such pernicious attempts and fraudulent activities are not unusual things… But this incident was unusual in that the attempt had been made by a known party and still more at the level of a government. So it was a shameful and unusual action.” The movement urged the mobile phone companies, the Yahoo and Google web browsers and journalists whose reputation was harmed by circulating the false report to “raise their voice of protest.”

Last January, the Washington Post ran an article claiming Mullah Omar had suffered a heart attack on January 7 and had been treated for several days in a Karachi hospital. The report was based on information provided by The Eclipse Group, a “private intelligence” firm operated by former CIA agent Duane R. Clarridge (Washington Post, January 18). Clarridge was indicted in the Iran-Contra scandal but was later pardoned. In 2010, rumors that Mullah Omar had been arrested in Karachi by the ISI were spread by American thriller writer Brad Thor and “confirmed” by Colonel Oliver North, who was also indicted in the Iran-Contra affair.

This article was originally published in the July 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia: An Interview with the Islah Movement’s Abdurahman M. Abdullahi Baadiyow

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Andrew McGregor

July 28, 2011

The Jamestown Foundation recently posed a series of questions in an online interview with Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow), an Islamic scholar and prominent leader of the Islah (Reform) movement in Somalia.  The interview was designed to shed light on the views of Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood (under the banner of the Islah movement and the incipient Justice and Unity Party) on a number of the political, religious and social issues facing Somalia today. Among the topics discussed are the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, the future of the embattled Transitional Federal Government, the influence of al-Qaeda on Somalia’s al-Shabaab movement, the introduction of Salafism to Somalia, the effect of American intervention in Somalia, the possibility of a popular uprising in the style of the “Arab Spring” and the roots of Islamic resistance in Somalia in the Dervish movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdulla h Hassan. [1]

 

Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

[Jamestown Foundation] Somalia’s Islah Movement is often described as Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood. How close is Islah to the ideology of Hassan al-Banna and the Egyptian Ikhwan? Does Islah maintain contacts with the international Muslim Brotherhood?

[Abdurahman M. Abdullahi]  Islah describes itself as an Islamic movement representing the Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia. It takes inspiration and understanding of Islam from the ideological guidelines laid down by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Its vision is based on looking Islam as a comprehensive way of life and a religion that, besides calling for worshipping one God (Allah), calls for adopting Islamic principles and values in the social, political and economic spheres.  The Islah Movement is part of the international network of Muslim Brotherhood organizations. These organizations are independent entities that are united in their peaceful and gradual approach in reforming their societies and promoting the concept of the universality of Islam and its peaceful coexistence with other worldly regions.  The international network of the Muslim Brotherhood plays a consultative role and is a forum to exchange ideas and share experiences among its members.

Can you describe the platform and goals of your new political formation, the Justice and Unity Party?

For the Somali state to recover, a pan-clan national civic movement is required that surpasses clan based organizations, a movement that invigorates the concepts of citizenship and democratic governance on the one side and accommodates Islam and the clan system in a new social contract on the other. Only through a national movement with multiple persuasions and organizations united in the strategic goal of restoring the Somali state and tolerance to each other, will capable and qualified leadership emerge and the state recover.

The Justice and Unity party is a new initiative of the Islah Movement which aims to mobilize Somali society through a national political party. The founders of the party will not be limited to the members of Islah, but will include many prominent personalities, both men and women. This party is in the process of formation and will be announced publicly when all the required steps are completed. It adopts the general guidelines and principles of Islamic moderation, consultation (shura), and democracy. Its main principles include safeguarding the dignity of all citizens, protecting universal human rights and realizing justice and unity in the war-torn Somalia. It also advocates and promotes peace and cooperation in particular amongst the peoples of the Horn of Africa. Moreover, it strives to transform Somali society from clan based partisan politics to a modern society where political affiliation and ideology plays a role in political competitions. Membership of the party will be open equally for all Somalis who are willing to join and adhere to its principles and policies. More details of this party and its leadership will be published after its public announcement.

The Islah Movement welcomed the decision of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) cabinet to implement Shari’a as Somalia’s new official legal code in 2009. Two years on, how would you assess the success of this change? Why do you think al-Shabaab, which demands Shari’a in Somalia, continues to reject the TFG’s effort to impose Shari’a?

Even though the Islah Movement welcomed this decision, it was well aware that the TFG cannot implement Shari’a because it is very corrupt and weak.  Moreover, it is our understanding that implementing Shari’a should not be equated with the application of some elements of hudud (criminal punishments) for offenses such as theft, fornication and the consumption of harmful drugs. Application of Shari’a is very wide concept and instead of focusing on the doable parts of Shari’a such as mercifulness, cooperation, caring for the weak, respecting other religions and good governance based on consultation (shura) or democracy, extremist elements focus on the punishment aspects of Shari’a. Welcoming the TFG’s decision was meant to support the right direction in accordance with Islah ideology.  On the other hand, even though al-Shabaab calls for the application of Shari’a, their understanding of Islam is a distorted, extremist approach departing from Islamic moderation and the gradual, transformational approach. They want to apply Islam violently without any legitimacy.  The only Shari’a they can accept is their way of Shari’a under their absolute leadership.

Al-Qaeda is often claimed to play an important part in the al-Shabaab insurgency. How would you assess al-Qaeda’s influence on the Islamist movement in Somalia?

First, let me address the wrong usage of the terminology “Islamist movemen”t to describe al-Shabaab. Islamist movements are not monolithic and include various organizations promoting, teaching, advocating for the application of Islamic principles and adhering to its values in the society and the state. Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab – its offshoot in Somalia – do not represent the Islamic movement and in doing so distorts the image of all Islamic movements. They could be described simply as armed Islamic movements. Historically, direct al-Qaeda involvement in Somalia started in 1991 when its members infiltrated the al-Itihad al-Islamiya movement in the early years of the civil war. Osama bin Laden during his stay in Sudan [1992-96] was interested in creating an al-Qaeda affiliated organization in Somalia and pushed al-Itihad, which was a neo-Salafist movement, towards armed conflict. However, when the leaders of al-Itihad abandoned armed struggle, a splinter group under the name of al-Shabaab appeared on the scene after al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on U.S. targets.  Al-Shabaab today is a formidable force and controls large swathes of southern Somalia though their ideological influence is dwindling.

Al-Shabaab’s destruction of Sufi shrines and tombs has led to the formation of a Sufi-based armed movement. How would you assess the role of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a in Somalia?

Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a is a new name which means “Sufi brotherhoods in Somalia” even though the name originally covered all Sunni branches of Islam and only excluded the Shi’a and  a number of other sects. Armed Sufis are not a new phenomenon in Somalia; a similar situation occurred during the first two decades of the 20th century when the Dervish movement under the leadership of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan led the armed Salihiyah Brotherhood against Britain and Ethiopia. Moreover, this movement also fought the Qadiriyah and Dandarawiyah brotherhoods that refused to accept the leadership of Sayid Mohamed. The new armed role of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a is a reaction to Shabaab’s destruction of the revered shrines. It will have serious consequence on the traditional peaceful approach of the Sufi brotherhoods even as they encounter spreading Wahhabism in Somalia.

The mandate of the Transitional Federal Government is about to expire. Do you view the attempt to renew this mandate as legitimate?

The original mandate of the TFG expires in August 2011, however, it was extended for an extra year in order to be able to complete transitional tasks such as adopting a new constitution, forming a new, smaller parliament, electing a president and forming a new government. Constitutionally, the extension is considered illegitimate; nevertheless, there is no alternative way for national institutions to be renewed. The unpopular agreement arrived at in Kampala under the leadership of the Ugandan president [the June 9 Kampala Accord] was finally approved by the parliament and a new government was formed under the leadership of a Somali-American professor [new Prime Minister Dr.Abdiweli Mohamed Ali]. Let us hope that things will change for the better during the next year.

Do you believe the TFG has the potential or ability to restore a functioning government to Somalia?

It is very difficult to predict the future performance of the TFG, which is under great pressure. There is no doubt that the capacity of the TFG in terms of leadership, human resources, finances and security institutions is very poor. However, it seems that a new educated elite is entering the political game, which gives us some hope. I am hopeful and see the light at the end of the tunnel. I see improvement day after day, better administration, and dedication of the new leaders.

What direction do you think is appropriate to replace the TFG?

There were many failed efforts at institution building in Somalia during the last 20 years in which Somalis had imposed upon them some sort of state building model that had failed. Indeed, there is a need for new and serious thinking on how to build a new Somalia. It requires new national vision, new approaches and new leadership.  The new vision should focus on peacefulness, justice and unity of the society. This approach should be Somali-driven, legitimate and supported by the external stakeholders. New political institutions will eventually produce new leadership beyond the civil war mentality.

Somali president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad is one of the most controversial figures in Somalia. What differences (if any) do you see between the Shaykh Sharif who was leader of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Shaykh Sharif who is the President of Somalia?

The difference is between his two locations of power. In the first place, he was leading armed opposition forces that fought against a warlord alliance believed to be funded by the CIA counter-terrorism task force in the Horn of Africa. The ICU included diverse groups which were united to topple President Abdullahi Yusif’s weak government and to fight the Ethiopians.  Currently, Shaykh Sharif is in the mantle of the President of Somalia under the protection of AMISOM forces. He is in a very difficult position in fighting his former colleagues. For sure, Sharif has gained more experience now than he had during his tenure as the leader of the Islamic Courts Union.

Do you see American military and financial support of the TFG as a positive or negative contribution to the Somali political process? How does your movement view U.S. drone attacks on al-Qaeda suspects within Somalia?

There is no doubt that U.S. counter–terrorism policy in the Horn of Africa has played a bigger role in fuelling extremism and strengthening al-Shabaab. On the other hand, I also think that without direct and indirect American support to the TFG, al-Shabaab could have taken over the rest of Mogadishu and Somalia. It requires a prudent and calibrated approach to cooperate without instigating further violence. With respect to drone attacks, we see them as negative in achieving the goal of eliminating terrorism.  New and more dedicated individuals will emerge to avenge their mentors and leaders.  The method of drone attack is not welcomed by my organization.

Of all the countries in Africa, Somalia would seem to have the greatest promise for unity. It shares a common language, a common ethnicity and a common religion, yet Somalia remains almost impossibly divided after two decades of political and social instability. Is this an internal phenomenon, or have external factors contributed to this development?

It is true that Somalia’s peoples share the same language, adhere to the Islamic faith, and despite its numerous clans, belong mainly to one ethnic group.  These factors were thought to serve as vital ingredients in nation building in the developing world. However, the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s and the increasing intra-clan conflicts in many parts of the country poses a challenge to re-instituting state and nation-building. The collapse of the Somali state is the product of complex factors: original, operational and proximate causes that include external as well internal factors. In the final analysis however, responsibility of the collapse of the Somali state and the difficulty of its restoration lies primarily on the shoulders of the leadership of Somalia.  All nations have challenges, but their leaderships come up with solutions and save their nations. In that context, Somalia is not different and eventually leaders will emerge and end this protracted conflict.

Salafism appears to be a growing trend in Somalia, often displacing traditional Sufism. Do you see Salafism as compatible with the national and historical Somali character?  

No. Salafism, which is known in Somalia as Wahabism, is a new intruder in Somalia that is not tolerant to traditional Islamic practices. It is confrontational and fights against al-Shari’a theology, the Shafi’iyah school of jurisprudence and Sufism, which are the three components of traditional Islam in Somalia. All violent confrontations in the name of Islam are driven by some elements who claim to belong to the Salafia ideology. Al-Itihad and its offshoot al-Shabaab share the ideology of Salafism.

Al-Shabaab’s Shaykh Jama Abdusalam recently urged Somalis to “carry out Egyptian and Tunisian-style uprisings in Somalia.” Is there a possibility for this in Somalia? The response of the Brotherhood to the popular uprising in Egypt has seemed confused and contradictory at times. In the event of such an uprising in Somalia, what role would you foresee for your movement?

Frankly, I do not think there is the possibility of a popular uprising at this particular historical moment in Somalia. With respect to the role of Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian uprising, allow me to disagree that it was confused and contradictory. I have had the honor of visiting Egypt after the uprising and participated in the opening of the Muslim Brotherhood main office in Cairo. I have met and discussed the role of Muslim Brotherhood in the uprising with many of their leaders. They have affirmed that even though they did not initiate the uprising, they were nevertheless the most organized group to participate in it and maintain it.  Somalia had passed through a similar uprising in the late 1990s and the Libyan and Yemani scenarios are very close to what Somalia experienced 20 years ago. The Islah Movement is working to lead civic transformation in Somalia and strives to bring together a divided nation and to restore dignity and unity. This process is not through uprisings, but through planned programs that allow the participation of the majority of Somalia’s citizens.

Note

  1. For the Dervish Movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, see Andrew McGregor: “Expelling the Infidel: An Historical Look at Somali Resistance to Ethiopia,” Terrorism Monitor, February 21, 2007, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=1281

This article first appeared in the July 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Top Darfur Rebel Commander Captured in South Kordofan

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Andrew McGregor

July 28, 2011

After several weeks of conflicting reports from Khartoum regarding the presence or absence of fighters from Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Sudanese state of South Kordofan, a military spokesman has announced the capture of a leading JEM commander, Brigadier General al-Tom Hamid Toto, in a battle between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and a combined force of JEM rebels and Nuba rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (for the war in South Kordofan, see Terrorism Monitor, July 1).

JEM Fighters: A Highly Mobile Force

SAF spokesman Colonel al-Sawarmi Khalid Sa’ad said the JEM commander would soon face trial in Khartoum. The official Sudan News Agency (SUNA) quoted the JEM Brigadier confirming his arrest, which he said happed after his vehicle was destroyed by shelling, during which he sustained a head injury. Toto added that his force had received logistical support from the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) during the JEM incursion into South Kordofan (SUNA, July 21).

A combined SPLA/JEM press release later confirmed the capture of three fighters, including two commanders, Brigadier Toto and Commander A. Zaki. The joint force reported overrunning the SAF garrison in al-Tais (25 km south of the state capital of Kadugli) in a battle that lasted from July 10 to July 17, killing 150 SAF troops and seizing large quantities of light and heavy machine guns, artillery, RPGs and anti-aircraft missiles. The statement also warned the prisoners must be treated as prisoners of war, a status Khartoum has routinely denied to JEM fighters [1] After earlier denials, the battle and the capture of Brigadier Toto led to an SAF admission that it was indeed fighting JEM units in South Kordofan, but said the rebel alliance would make little difference to the region’s balance of power (Sudan Tribune, July 18). The commander of the SAF’s 5th Brigade, Fadl al-Mula Muhammad Ahmad, claimed that government forces had “inflicted enormous losses of life and property” on the joint JEM/SPLA forces at al-Tais (Sudan Tribune, July 22).

Though Khartoum seemed reluctant to admit JEM was again operating in Kordofan, the chief of Sudan’s Joint General Staff, Lieutenant General Ismat Abdul Rahman Zain al-Abdin, claimed that the SAF had anticipated the revolt of the Nuba SPLA in June by learning of a plan to ally the Nuba fighters with a rebel faction from Darfur prior to announcing the confederation of South Kordofan with the new state in South Sudan (Sudanese Media Center, June 27).

JEM has lately been threatening to mount a new attack on the national capital of Khartoum. Elements of a massive 2008 long-distance desert raid reached the suburbs of Omdurman (Khartoum’s sister city on the west bank of the Nile), but fizzled out there under counter-attacks by local security forces before entering Khartoum proper (see Terrorism Monitor, May 15, 2008).

JEM has also made several raids from Darfur into Kordofan since 2006:

  • JEM forces joined other Darfur rebels in a raid on Hamrat al-Shaykh in Northern Kordofan in July 2006 (al-Sahafa [Khartoum], July 4, 2006).
  • On August 29, 2007, four columns of JEM fighters seized a Sudanese military base at Wad Banda (West Kordofan) for several hours, killing at least 41 SAF troops and taking large quantities of weapons and ammunition (SUNA, August 31, 2007, Sudan Tribune, August 31, 2007; see also Terrorism Focus, September 11, 2007).
  • In October, 2007 JEM seized Chinese-operated facilities at the Defra oil field in South Kordofan as a warning to China to cease its support for Khartoum (Reuters, October 25, 2007; October 29, 2007).
  • A JEM force attempted to take Chinese oil facilities at al-Rahaw (South Kordofan) in November 2007. JEM claimed to have taken al-Rahaw, but the SAF claimed they were driven off.
  • JEM officials said the local Arab Missiriya had joined them in a December, 2007 raid on the Heglig oil field in South Kordofan, the most important oil field in Sudan (Reuters, December 11, 2007).

Though Khartoum professes to be unworried, it is almost certain that there is major concern in the capital over a possible alignment between JEM and the Nuba SPLA or the GoSS, which now has one of the largest armies in Africa. Khartoum has hinted at such a development for years and was likely alarmed by the appearance of a high-level JEM delegation in Juba during the July 9 South Sudan independence celebrations. The JEM leaders held talks with SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – the political wing of the SPLA) leaders and conveyed a written message from JEM leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim (Sudan Tribune, July 10).

JEM and the other major rebel movements in Darfur have abstained from the Doha peace talks, which Khartoum says will be the last opportunity for negotiations. The head of the government delegation at Doha, Dr. Amin Hassan Omar, claimed on July 22 that JEM leader Dr. Ibrahim Khalil had been arrested by Libyan intelligence (Radio Omdurman, July 22). Though this has not been confirmed, Khalil had been staying in Libya after being expelled from Chad when N’Djamena and Khartoum agreed to stop hosting each other’s rebel movements in January 2010 (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, January 21, 2010).  Last February, the movement appealed to the United Nations to rescue the JEM leader from Libya, saying his life was in danger as a result of Khartoum’s allegations that JEM fighters were acting as mercenaries in Qaddafi’s military (Reuters, February 28). [2]

Note

1. “Joint JEM/SPLA Forces defeat SAF in South Kordofan: A Military Statement,” http://www.sudanjem.com/2011/07/52292/

2. See Andrew McGregor: “Update on African Mercenaries: Have Darfur Rebels Joined Qaddafi’s Mercenary Defenders?” Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary, February 24, 2011,  https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=1082

This article was originally published in the July 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.