Controversial Syrian Preacher Abu al-Qaqa Gunned Down in Aleppo

Posted on October 16, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

October 16, 2007

As Dr. Mahmud al-Aghasi (a Kurdish-Syrian preacher better known as Abu al-Qaqa) left an Aleppo mosque after Friday prayers on September 28, an assassin stepped out of a car and opened fire with an automatic weapon. The controversial preacher received mortal wounds to the head and body, while three others were wounded.

Abu al-Qaqa

Little information on the case has emerged from the normally secretive and tightly controlled Syrian state. Most of what is known comes from al-Qaqa’s own followers in Ghuraba al-Sham (Strangers of Greater Syria), some of whom chased the killer for two to three kilometers before apprehending him. Al-Qaqa’s deputy, Samir Muhammad Ghazal Abu Khashabah, claims to have received information that the assassin was a member of a takfiri group (Salafi Muslims who declare other Muslims infidels) and had been released just recently after having been taken into U.S. custody in Iraq three years ago. Abu Khashabah also suggested that the gunman and his driver were recruited for the job by foreign (i.e. American) interests in Iraq (al-Jazeera, September 28; al-Watan, September 30; al-Hayat, October 1).

Sources in the Syrian security apparatus report that the suspect was a Syrian in his 20s and well known in Aleppo. Personal reasons were discounted as a cause for the murder by the sources, who noted that the accused was “a collaborator with the Americans” (al-Watan, September 30). Thousands of al-Qaqa’s followers attended the funeral of the 34 year-old ethnic Kurd near Aleppo on September 29. A Syrian flag on his coffin and the attendance of numerous members of the Baathist Party suggested that the deceased had closer ties to the Syrian regime than to the radical Islamist community.

Abu al-Qaqa is suspected of having played a major role in facilitating the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq through Syria. There were also apparently conflicting accusations of ties to al-Qaeda and/or Syrian intelligence. Although elements of the U.S. popular press enthused over the death of a “leading al-Qaeda member,” al-Qaqa was highly critical of Osama bin Laden’s methods and organization, describing the latter as a creation of the CIA. According to his deputy, Abu Khashabah, the preacher had been threatened by al-Qaeda and various takfiri groups due to al-Qaqa’s development of a “moderate trend that did not segregate between Sunnis and Shiites” (al-Hayat, October 1). Many of the fighters al-Qaqa is alleged to have funneled into Iraq were Saudis (Gulf News, October 2). In the wake of his death, al-Qaqa’s movement remains adamant that the preacher only provided guidance for young jihadis eager to fight in Palestine or Iraq.

Abu al-Qaqa was frequently criticized by Syrian opposition parties, some of which suggested he was an agent of the Baathist regime. At times, there seemed to be little effort to disguise al-Qaqa’s links to Syrian intelligence. The preacher moved freely around Syria with bodyguards whom many believed were supplied by one of Syria’s four main intelligence agencies. Al-Qaqa gave regular sermons at Aleppo’s al-Tawabbin mosque, something normally done only with the permission of Syria’s Al-Awqaf Ministry (al-Watan, September 30). At one point, al-Qaqa even suggested unifying the religious and security establishments in Syria (al-Rai al-Aam, June 14, 2006). Various mujahideen internet forums warned against dealing with the preacher, accusing al-Qaqa of working for Syrian intelligence or U.S. authorities. Although these types of accusations are common in the covert world, appearance can sometimes be as good as reality. Syria is now trying to act as a sponsor to the armed Sunni opposition in Iraq (including former Baathists), but suspicions in Iraq surrounding al-Qaqa’s loyalties might have necessitated his removal to advance the new policy.

Abu al-Qaqa’s death might also be related to accusations that he supplied Syrian-trained fighters to Fatah al-Islam militants inside Lebanon’s Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. Al-Qaqa’s role in the 106-day battle that ended on September 2 is difficult to confirm but is widely believed in Lebanon, where he has been referred to as the “Godfather of Fatah al-Islam” (Naharnet-AFP, September 29). A captured Fatah al-Islam militant claims that Syrian intelligence aided the organization in infiltrating Lebanon (al-Akhbar, October 3; Daily Star, October 4). These fighters were allegedly on their way to Iraq when Syrian intelligence diverted them elsewhere after deciding to close the pipeline for foreign jihadis in Iraq

Another theory suggests al-Qaqa abandoned his allegiance to Syrian intelligence in favor of employment by the Americans, a move that appears almost suicidal in view of the close monitoring given to the preacher by Syria’s efficient security services. Abu al-Qaqa made revolutionary changes in his message and lifestyle about a year ago that created new suspicions about his activities. Up to that point, members of the preacher’s movement bore the beards and traditional clothing typical of Arab Islamists. Suddenly, al-Qaqa issued a fatwa encouraging his followers to adopt Western clothes. Having sheared most of his once enormous beard, al-Qaqa donned a suit and gold watch and began to drive expensive cars and conduct business from pricey Damascus hotels. The source of al-Qaqa’s sudden wealth remains uncertain.

It is not inconceivable that the United States could have been involved in the preacher’s death, especially if it is believed that al-Qaqa continued to be an important link in the supply of foreign fighters to the insurgency in Iraq. Extraterritorial assassination has become a weapon in the security operations of countries like Russia and Israel and its usefulness has been much discussed in U.S. security circles in recent years. There is, however, no official confirmation of the allegations that the suspect was recently in U.S. detention. Considering al-Qaqa’s erratic behavior, inconsistent political views and his almost certain involvement in the murkier depths of covert intrigue, it is quite likely al-Qaqa’s death will become one of the many unexplained deaths associated with the war on terrorism.

This article first appeared in the October 16, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Tactical and Strategic Factors in Turkey’s Offensive against the PKK

Posted on October 5, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

October 5 2007

A Turkish military offensive in the ethnic-Kurdish provinces of southeastern Turkey began in mid-September. Turkey’s autumn campaigns against the militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) usually do not begin until October, but the current campaign is designed to reinforce Turkey’s position in negotiations with Iraq over the elimination of PKK bases in northern Iraq. The offensive also delivers a message to Turkey’s U.S. ally, which has been reluctant to move against PKK bases in Iraq. According to Turkish Land Forces Commander General Ilker Basbug, “the U.S. should understand and see that it is not time for words, but for action” (Today’s Zaman, September 25). Turkey’s armed forces, the Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri (TSK), have until the end of October (when winter weather sets in on the mountainous border region) to destroy or capture the 1,500-1,900 PKK militants believed to be in Turkey.

Turkish Gendarmerie

Large-scale TSK operations are underway in Sirnak, Siirt and Hakkari provinces, where “interim security zones” were established in early June. Up to 40,000 men are deployed, mostly from the Turkish paramilitary Gendarmerie, working under Gendarmerie regional commands. Turkish troops are also conducting “search-and-destroy” operations with the support of helicopter-gunships in the southeastern provinces of Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Bingol and Tunceli. The Gendarmerie is destroying hidden supply depots that would otherwise sustain the roughly 1,000 PKK fighters that might remain in Turkey during the winter rather than take refuge in the PKK bases in northern Iraq.

Cross-border shelling into northern Iraq’s Erbil and Dahuk regions may be intended to cut off PKK escape routes. Thousands of Iraqi Kurds are reported to have been displaced by the shelling (Today’s Zaman, September 27). Iran’s Republican Guard has also been shelling Kurdish targets in Iraq’s Sulaimaniya province for several weeks now. If the PKK fighters can be eliminated or driven from Turkey’s eastern provinces before the winter starts, they may not pose much of a threat by spring if Turkey’s simultaneous diplomatic offensive is successful.

The PKK has responded to the offensive with landmines, car bombs, suicide bombings and attacks against security posts using small arms and rocket launchers. According to General Basbug, typical PKK operational units are 7-8 members in size, smaller than the groups of 20-30 militants common in the mid-1990s. Kurdish websites describe 13 straight days of fighting in Sirnak, Hakkari and Siirt provinces in September (ROJ TV, September 26). Nearly 30 PKK militants have been killed since the operation began, while the PKK claims almost the same number of TSK killed.

The Turkish Gendarmerie operates under the control of the army, while its law enforcement role is under the minister of the interior. The Gendarmerie is responsible for border patrols and internal security (especially in rural areas not served by other police forces). Special operations units of the Gendarmerie have been deployed to Diyarkabyr and other Kurdish centers, with more units in training. Together with selected TSK units and agents of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT), the Gendarmerie will try to negate the PKK’s territorial advantage by flooding the region with federal security forces, flushing PKK operatives from their hideouts to force them into open confrontation with superior Turkish forces (Today’s Zaman, June 14). Unfortunately, the Gendarmerie’s offensive coincides with the release of a new book by a retired Gendarmerie colonel who describes faking fire-fights to intimidate local Kurds, and the deployment of bearded units of fake PKK members in Hakkari province during the 1990s (Bya News Centre, September 26). The revelations would seem to confirm allegations of “false-flag” operations by Turkish security forces in the region during that period.

Turkey is phasing out the use of conscripts in counter-terrorism operations in favor of a professional force of volunteers. The move is in part a reaction to a popular perception in Turkey that TSK casualties are largely the result of insufficient training for conscripts. Under the new plan, six commando brigades will be drawn from highly trained professional soldiers to operate in southeast Turkey and along the Iraqi border. The TSK’s two existing Special Forces mountain commando brigades (Bolu and Kayseri) are an important element in most counter-terrorist operations in southeastern Turkey. Human rights organizations have accused the mountain commandos of numerous human rights abuses during the large-scale operations of the mid-1990s.

The TSK is also attempting to reform the controversial “Village Guards,” a local militia force accused of many human rights abuses, including the deployment of “death squads” to terrorize civilian Kurds in the 1990s (New Anatolian, September 22). The Village Guards and their intelligence agency, JITEM, have been called up to assist the Gendarmerie in the current campaign with their knowledge of local conditions. Often acting as guides for the TSK, they are sometimes exposed to retributive attacks as a result. Last week, 12 people, including seven Village Guards and their relatives, were killed in Sirnak province when PKK fighters ambushed their minibus (Reuters, September 29). A few days earlier, the same Village Guards had been involved in tracking down and killing Nazan Bayram (aka Nuda Karker), a female militant and senior PKK commander.

On the political front, the interior ministers of Turkey and Iraq concluded a new security arrangement in Ankara on September 28. Following up on last August’s Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and Iraq, the security agreement is intended to deal with the problem of cross-border movement by Kurdish militants. Provisions for cross-border “hot pursuits” of PKK suspects were dropped from the final agreement after strong opposition from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) threatened to stalemate negotiations. Such provisions would have deprived the PKK of sanctuaries close to the Iraqi-Turkish border, a prerequisite for effective Turkish anti-guerrilla operations.

Before the ministerial meeting, northern Iraq’s KRG issued a statement declaring the PKK and its Iranian-Kurd offshoot Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) illegal organizations. The KRG “doesn’t consider these two organizations to be a part of political life in Kurdistan” (Peyamner News Agency, September 24). The KRG opposed the security agreement, however, forcing a change to the terms and the exclusion of the “hot pursuit” clause. Nevertheless, the agreement forms the basis for future cooperation while defining Iraq’s responsibility for suppressing terrorism. The deal also contains provisions for the arrest and extradition to Turkey of PKK members. To assist Iraqi authorities, Turkey has provided the names of 150 PKK members wanted for terrorist offenses from the 3,600-4,000 PKK militants Ankara claims are based in northern Iraq (Hurriyet, September 25).

In conclusion, Baghdad and Washington continue to urge Ankara to deal directly with the autonomous KRG, something the Turkish government refuses to do. The KRG statement declaring the PKK and PJAK illegal is clearly intended to invite bilateral discussions with Turkey on security issues. In the meantime, the ongoing offensive satisfies calls from the Turkish public and the armed forces for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to take action against terrorist threats. The arrival of winter, which usually enforces a pause in PKK operations, may give the Ankara, Baghdad and Washington governments time to arrive at a diplomatic solution to the PKK problem.

This article first appeared in the October 5, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Fueling the Dragon: China’s Uranium Industry in Niger

Posted on October 3, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

October 3, 2007

A latecomer to the exploitation of foreign energy resources, China has resorted to developing economic relationships with high-risk yet energy-rich nations like Niger in order to maintain its extraordinary pace of development. According to the International Energy Agency, with China’s demand for energy resources steadily increasing, it faces the possibility of having to import 80 percent of its energy needs by 2030 [1]. Demand for oil products in China is expected to grow by at least 5.6 percent each year for the next five years (Xinhua, October 25, 2005).

For several years now, China has looked to Africa for its energy future, and the continent already supplies 25 percent of China’s oil needs. Niger, an impoverished former French colony, has been targeted by China for energy resource development due to its potential reserves of petroleum and its vast confirmed reserves of uranium. Uranium production in Niger (until recently dominated by France) represents 8-10 percent of the world’s supply (3,400 tons in 2006) and accounts for nearly 70 percent of the country’s exports. Given China’s recent emphasis on developing additional nuclear power plants, such a supply of uranium has proven to be incredibly attractive for China’s state-owned energy companies.

The Diplomatic Front

China and Niger first established diplomatic relations in 1974. After a four-year hiatus due to Niger’s short-lived diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, China resumed official relations with Niger in 1996. Since then, Nigerien and Chinese leaders have been frequent visitors to each other’s capitals. The groundwork for the resumption of relations between the two nations was laid during meetings between Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 2001. During the same visit, Tandja became the first foreign head of state to visit the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region of northwest China, a largely Muslim province that has had experience in anti-desertification and irrigation techniques (People’s Daily, June 6, 2001).

China’s main exports to Niger include textiles, communications equipment and rice. Niger, like most other African countries, supplies China with raw materials but has had great difficulty in establishing a Chinese market for its own manufactured goods. China’s booming export industry tends to suppress the manufacturing sector in many African countries, hindering local development. Sino-Nigerien economic relations are governed by a bilateral trade agreement and a joint economic and trade commission. China also provides scholarships for Nigerien students to Chinese universities and medical assistance in the form of a 36-member medical team. In addition, Chinese goodwill has also been expressed through prestige development efforts like the Zinder water supply project, completed in May 2006.

A Strategic Energy Supply

Niger presents the most promising source of uranium to fuel China’s program to dramatically increase its use of nuclear power. China’s current reliance on coal-powered energy plants is quickly choking its cities in layers of toxic smog. To remedy this, China plans to build one nuclear plant a year until 2020, mostly in the rapidly expanding industrial centers along the Chinese coast. The project will increase China’s nuclear generating capacity from its current nine gigawatts (GW) to 40 GW (Reuters, September 20). China’s attempt to develop cleaner energy sources, however, could come at a cost to Niger’s environment, a cost Niger seems willing to bear given its desperate need for capital.

Chinese firms active in Niger’s energy sector include the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation (Sino-Uranium), the China National Uranium Corporation (CNUC) and the Société des Mines d’Agelik, a Chinese prospecting company owned by the China Nuclear Engineering and Construction (Group) Corporation. The CNUC is developing two sites in the Agadez region of Niger, Teguidda and the smaller Madaouela. Production was scheduled to begin in 2010, though this is now threatened by rebel activity. The CNPC is currently exploring for oil in the Agadez region’s Bilma and Tenere concessions.

Domestic Instability

Rebel activity in Niger’s resource-rich north has threatened the short-term development of its resource industry and has made it much more difficult for Chinese firms to operate in the region. A Tuareg-led rebel group, Le Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ), is demanding an end to economic marginalization, environmental degradation and ethnic discrimination. Under pressure from the elusive rebels, the northern region of the country has reverted to military rule. While President Tandja has attempted to stifle all news coming out of the north, Niger’s rebel movement has been effective in capitalizing upon modern communications technology as a medium for public relations [2].

Already, the rebels have already begun harassing Chinese companies, and the July kidnapping of a Sino-Uranium executive by the MNJ was intended as a warning to foreign mineral firms that their disregard for the environment and their present arrangements with the Niger government are unacceptable (Xinhua, July 7). (The executive was later released unharmed.) Rebels also attacked an armed supply convoy heading to a CNPC exploration camp in July, killing four soldiers. Following these incidents, the Chinese pulled out of their field operations to return under military escort to Agadez.

The MNJ accuses China of supplying arms to Nigerien military operations in the north in exchange for mineral concessions. They also accuse the government of using mineral revenues to purchase military arms and equipment, including two Russian-made helicopter gunships. Niger’s government denies the charges, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry maintains that it takes a “cautious and responsible approach” to arms exports, strictly observing “domestic laws and international obligations” [3]. Yet, rumors abound in West Africa of a Chinese military presence in the region; in January, the Nigeria’s Defense Minister was forced to issue a public denial after reports of Chinese troops operating in the Niger Delta under contract from the Lagos government were published in a local newspaper (The Guardian [Nigeria], January 24).

French-Chinese Competition

Until recently, the French uranium company Areva had a virtual monopoly on uranium production since the material was first discovered in Niger in 1957. In early September, several Nigerien civil-society groups organized marches to demand Areva’s departure from Niger for allegedly supporting the northern rebels, though no concrete proof was offered to support the charges. The leader of one of the groups involved in the protest suggested that Areva was hiring mercenaries to plant landmines (VOA, September 8). Concurrently, officials of the Niger government have accused Areva of plotting to frighten off their Chinese rivals in the uranium-rich Agadez region by financing MNJ attacks. Even the French government was pulled into the dispute, eventually offering resolution services as well as a team to demine northern Niger. After both the rebels and the French uranium miners denied the accusations of collaboration, Areva increased its payments to the Niger government and committed itself to improving environmental safety measures. It should be noted that Areva has hardly been immune to MNJ activities; on April 30, rebels attacked Areva’s Imouraren exploration camp, killing one and wounding four (AFP, April 20). Areva was subsequently forced to halt operations in the area for a month.

Areva is also making efforts to enter China’s nuclear development sector, but there are reports that China has recently cancelled plans for two Areva reactors to be built in Guangdong Province in favor of using domestic technology (though there is still the possibility that the Areva reactors might be relocated) (Reuters, September 20). France relies heavily on the Areva operations in Niger for uranium to supply its own reactors and nuclear weapons program. Without alternative sources of supply, France will use all of its influence to maintain its leading position in Niger’s resource sector. Reflecting energy competition abroad, India has also suddenly emerged as a major competitor for undeveloped energy supplies in the West African region, though in Niger, China may have acted quickly to sideline India’s offers to the Niger government (Times of India, September 23).

Conclusion

The recent international revival of interest in nuclear power has created an opportunity for Niger to break out of the neo-colonial legacy of French rule by broadening its trade and cooperation with countries like China. As Niger’s Prime Minister Seyni Oumarou recently said of this shift in patrons, “Nothing is going to be as it was in Niger…Today the whole world is seeking to profit from the partnership with the Chinese and we should not isolate ourselves from that” (Reuters, August 1). Yet China’s sense of urgency in locking up energy supplies makes it vulnerable to major disruptions from opposition groups, such as Niger’s MNJ. Efforts to secure energy resources irrespective of market supply and demand threatens to destabilize global energy markets while perpetuating corrupt and undemocratic regimes that are able to offer protection to Chinese operations, thus leading China into a neo-colonial style relationship it has long tried to avoid in Africa.

Notes

Osumi, Yo, “World Energy Outlook, and Energy Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” presentation at IEA Conference, “The Korean Peninsula and Energy Security in Northeast Asia: Toward a Northeast Asian Energy Forum,” November 27-28, 2006, available online at: www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2006/yo_neasia.pdf.
The MNJ posts information about itself at: m-n-j.blogspot.com.
The statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry is available online at: www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t339261.htm.

This article first appeared in the October 3, 2007 issue of the China Brief

Leadership Disputes Plague al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Posted on September 25, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 25, 2007

A battle is underway for control of the leadership of Algeria’s last major armed Islamist group. A country exhausted by violence has used a combination of amnesties and military action to reduce the once powerful Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) to a few hundred fighters. Under the leadership of Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wadoud (also known as Abd al-Malik Droudkel), the commander since 2004, the GSPC has been reorganized into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Droukdel’s decision to align the group with Osama bin Laden and adopt al-Qaeda-style tactics has led to a further loss of personnel. There are now reports that the GSPC leader has been deposed by a three-day meeting of group leaders in the Lakhdaria region east of Algiers. GSPC amirs loyal to Droukdel have already been replaced, but the congress was unable to decide on a new leader (Liberté, September 18).

Abd al-Malik Droukdel

Several factors were involved in Droukdel’s dismissal, including the controversial transformation of the GSPC into a regional branch of al-Qaeda without consultation with the rest of the movement (as required), the inequitable distribution of funds from extortion and kidnapping rackets, the adoption of suicide bombings and the recruitment of teenagers to carry out such attacks.

Surprisingly, former GSPC leader Hassan Hattab is reported to have taken part in the congress that ousted Droukdel. Hattab has been part of the Islamist insurgency since it began in 1992. A former paratrooper, Hattab joined the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) at its inception, becoming the group’s amir in the Kabylie mountains two years later. Hattab formed the GSPC in 1998 in reaction to the brutal violence and civilian massacres that characterized GIA operations. Hattab conceived the movement as a guerrilla force that, unlike the GIA, would avoid inflicting civilian casualties in favor of targeting government and military personnel. Hattab was forced out of the GSPC leadership in 2001 and has been inactive since 2004, other than a recent public debate (via the internet and press interviews) with Droukdel over insurgent methods. Despite numerous reports of his death and a death sentence delivered in absentia earlier this year, the ex-GSPC leader remains a fugitive in the Algerian mountains. Hattab insists he is still the legitimate leader of the GSPC/AQIM and denies reports from his rivals that he resigned from the organization.

In March 2006, Hattab urged AQIM members to take advantage of the government amnesty offer, but did not do so himself. A month later, Hattab denounced the AQIM suicide attacks in Algiers in an open letter to President ‘Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika, repeating his call for AQIM to abandon the armed struggle. Hattab also suggested the Islamist movement had begun to “drift” from its original goals (Magharebia, April 17, May 10).

Further criticism of AQIM’s jihad came last week from Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian Muslim Brother who has made himself an influential figure in political Islam through his embrace of modern communications technology, including internet and television broadcasts from his base in Qatar. Known for views that frequently conflict with those of Salafis, al-Qaradawi rebuked AQIM for its extremism while receiving medical treatment in an Algerian military hospital: “You should follow in the footsteps of the Islamic group in Egypt which has announced that they are shunning violence…Regret your actions and join the Islamic mainstream” (The Peninsula [Doha], September 20).

On the same day, a call for greater violence in Algeria came from al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In a statement, al-Zawahiri urged the people of Algeria and other North African states to carry out an ethnic cleansing of French and Spanish residents as part of the effort to restore “al-Andalus” (Muslim rule in the Iberian peninsula) (Reuters, September 20).

AQIM faces financial problems, has lost many of its leaders and is opposed by most of the population, including many Algerian Islamists. Operations are now largely restricted to six eastern provinces and two provinces in the south after the GSPC sustained heavy losses in government offensives. Most of the remaining units are infiltrated by Algerian intelligence operatives who seek to inflame divisions within the movement. Hattab has also complained of GIA extremists infiltrating the GSPC, creating deviation from its goals and methods. Since 1999, 8,000 militants have taken advantage of the amnesty, with only 300 still in the field (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 16). Many of those who have accepted the presidential pardon are dissatisfied with the government’s unfulfilled promises of work and housing, but a mass return to arms still seems unlikely.

Droukdel, however, has rejected appeals from former comrades and religious leaders to abandon his struggle: “We will not surrender to apostates and bad scholars” (Ech-Chorouk, August 29). The change of leadership could signal an end to the close ties with al-Qaeda and a refocus on the national insurgency. In terms of tactical doctrine, Hattab and Droukdel have been at odds for years, each claiming support from the Quran and Sunna for their methods. Hassan Hattab has already admitted being in contact with Algerian government officials regarding the possibility of his own surrender and suspension of the outstanding death sentence against him. It is possible that dismantling the Algerian wing of al-Qaeda might be the price of a presidential pardon for Hassan Hattab.

This article first appeared in the September 25, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Wad Banda Raid Shows Khartoum Losing Control of Darfur Conflict

Posted on September 11, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 11, 2007

A daring rebel raid 200 kilometers into the Sudanese province of Kordofan suggests that the Darfur conflict may actually be spreading, despite the initiation of Darfur peace negotiations in Tanzania last month. At 4 PM on August 29, four columns of fighters from Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) converged on a Sudanese military base at Wad Banda, Kordofan province. The rebels occupied Wad Banda for several hours, leaving before sundown with captured weapons and all the police vehicles. At first, the military denied there was a base at Wad Banda, but later acknowledged that a small group of “renegades” had been driven off by police. Two days later, the government reported 41 deaths as a result of the raid (SUNA, August 31). Both JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and the Khartoum government reported the participation of a faction from the largest rebel movement in Darfur, the Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity (SLA-Unity), but the claim was immediately refuted by SLA military commander Sulayman Marjan (Sudan Tribune, August 31).

JEM Fighters

The raid followed a similar operation in early August in which JEM and a coalition of rebels targeted the garrison responsible for guarding Darfur’s sole rail link to Khartoum. During a brief occupation of the town of Adila, JEM seized numerous vehicles and heavy weapons, many of which were probably used in the Wad Banda raid. Both attacks were led by Abd al-Aziz Ushar al-Nur Ashr, a Darfur field commander who has returned from east Sudan, where JEM carried out military operations against Khartoum in alliance with the Beja Congress. It was not the first such attack on Kordofan; last year, JEM combined with other rebels to raid Hamrat al-Shaykh in northern Kordofan (al-Sahafa, July 4, 2006).

The Sudanese government responded by treating the attack on Wad Banda as part of an external threat to Sudan’s stability. The minister of the interior, Professor al-Zubayr Bashir Taha, told the remaining police at Wad Banda that “plots by the colonial powers” would be defeated. The governor of North Kordofan added that unity was needed to thwart “international conspiracies” against Sudan (Sudansafary.net, September 2). The next day, a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum denied any U.S. links to the rebels, deploring the loss of “innocent life” (Sudansafary.net, September 3). According to the rebels, Wad Banda served as a supply depot for government and militia attacks on civilians in south Darfur. JEM complains that Sudanese MiG-29s and antiquated Antonov bombers continue bombing civilian targets in Darfur in violation of a UN Security Council resolution (particularly following the raid on Adila).

JEM is usually regarded as a Zaghawa-dominated movement, based on the semi-nomadic African tribe that straddles the Chad/northern Darfur border. JEM leaders are probably the most experienced and sophisticated of all the many rebel movements in Darfur, giving the movement a weight unjustified by its numbers. Many Zaghawa became skilled and innovative desert fighters during the Chadian civil war and the campaign against Libyan garrisons in northern Chad. The conflict in Darfur is, in part, a reflection of the growing assertiveness of the Zaghawa, who already dominate the government in Chad. In Sudan, the Zaghawa now present a commercial challenge to Arab dominance of the economy. Zaghawa factionalism, however, has prevented the development of a unified Zaghawa movement. In recent months, JEM has made efforts to broaden its ethnic base, including sacking the group’s military commander, who was accused of favoring the Zaghawa.

Even after signing peace agreements with rebel movements in the south and the east, Khartoum is faced with a deteriorating situation in the west. In an unsettling development, some Darfur Arabs (including janjaweed defectors) have begun to take up arms against the government, forming new rebel fronts or joining existing groups of African Muslim rebels. Combined with JEM’s new military offensive, Khartoum risks losing its grip on Darfur before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping mission in January.

This article first appeared in the September 11, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Turkey at the Intersection of Islam and Kemalism

Posted on August 15, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 15, 2007

Tuesday’s announcement of the re-nomination of Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul for the post of president of Turkey puts the nation’s fiercely secularist military only one step away from reporting to an Islamist politician. Yet the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) must still see its nominee through several rounds of voting in parliament (VOA, August 14). To allay opposition fears, the foreign minister, a well-known Islamist, has vowed to uphold and strengthen the secular principles of Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk,” military founder of the modern and Westernized Republic of Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk”

Defining themselves as the “absolute defenders of secularism,” Turkey’s general staff has expressed its displeasure with the direction of the government by means of a military coup four times since 1960. July’s re-election of the AKP Islamists with a parliamentary majority despite vocal opposition from the military no doubt sent a signal to the Turkish generals that a coup d’état is not the political option it once was. It is a situation that cannot sit easily with the self-appointed guardians of Kemalism, the almost sacred combination of secularism, modernism, and nationalism that saved the Turkish nation after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Kemalism is under strain in today’s Turkey, but its legacy cannot be easily abandoned.

Until now, the Turkish presidency has been viewed as the embodiment of secularist Kemalism. Under the current constitution, the president must approve all decisions of the Higher Military Council. Since these decisions include regular purges of “Islamist officers” (the latest was in July), the general staff fears that an Islamist president will interfere with this process. The problem may be short-lived, however, with reports that a new constitution will transfer most of the president’s powers to the prime minister and his cabinet, making the post largely ceremonial (Turkish Daily News, August 1). The move may be viewed as a major concession to the military’s nearly implacable opposition to an Islamist president.

Work is already underway to create a new constitution to replace the 1982 version, drafted under the supervision of the general staff after the military coup of 1980. The present document is something of a paean to Mustafa Kemal, starting with a description of Ataturk as “the immortal leader and unrivalled hero.” National principles are identified as the “six arrows” of Kemalism: nationalism, secularism, statism, republicanism, populism, and revolutionism. These principles were incorporated into the constitution in 1937 and have appeared in every version since. For many Turks, Kemalism is tied so tightly to the structure of Turkish society that the Kemalist Thought Association (ADD) recently declared “Opposing Kemalism is to oppose science… it is to go up against the scientific structuring of social rules” (Turkish Daily News, August 2).

AKP MP Zafer Uskul

Law professor and constitutional expert Zafer Uskul, a newly elected member of the AKP, has incited a fierce debate over the future of Kemalism by suggesting that Turkey needs a “colorless constitution… one that does not impose any ideology on the country” (Sabah, July 27). Even for many of his AKP colleagues, Uskul’s call to drop all references to “Ataturk nationalism” and “Kemalist principles” from the constitution went too far.

Turkey’s former chief prosecutor, Sabih Kanadoglu, claimed Uskul’s comments were “just a repetition of the European Union spokespersons’ expectations from Turkey” (Turkish Daily News, August 4). The Islamist politicians by no means reject the Ataturk legacy. Kemalism does not oppose the practice of Islam, but makes it a private matter with no standing in the state. The Islamists have begun mining the early history of the republic for proof that rigid secularism was not the intention of the nation’s founders. They are fond of citing Mustafa Kemal’s cooperation with Islamic leaders in the chaotic years following the Ottoman collapse, while overlooking Ataturk’s often scathing views on Islam following his consolidation of power in 1927. The Islamic Virtue Party actually campaigned in 1999 under an Ataturk slogan: “The Republic is Virtue.”

Turkey is in the middle of a social transformation in which the economic success of the Anatolian heartland is beginning to challenge the “old economy” of the dominant military-corporate class of the coastal cities. The AKP is more than a one-note religious-based party; it is also the party of economic liberalization, supported by a new class of Anatolian businessmen with traditional social values. AKP reforms intended to secure membership in the European Union have gradually reduced the military’s role as “guardian of the nation,” and the party’s triumph at the polls despite strong military opposition seems to be an endorsement of this process. For now the military is still interpreting the meaning of the AKP victory in regard to their own political role, but sooner or later the military must reevaluate its role in the republic. The nation has matured politically since Mustafa Kemal’s time, and the democratic process leaves little room for “guardians of the state.”

Nonetheless, the AKP must move slowly to achieve its aims. With so many self-appointed guardians of the Kemalist legacy, there is always the real danger of ultra-nationalist violence. It is worth noting that while ten officers were dismissed from the military in July for religious activities, a further ten were dismissed for their involvement with right-wing extremists (New Anatolian, August 11). The constitutional debate is still in its early stages and is certain to get much more heated before Islam and Kemalism are able to accommodate each other.

This article was first published in the August 15, 2007 issue of the Eurasia Daily Monitor

PKK Arms Scandal Fuels Turkish Suspicions

Posted on August 14, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 14, 2007

U.S. policy in Kurdish northern Iraq seems to be in flux, reflecting differences within the U.S. administration and the growing bitterness in U.S.-Turkish relations since Turkey prohibited the movement of U.S. troops through its territory during the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Claims last spring by deserters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that U.S. trucks were delivering arms to PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq have resulted in a series of denials and investigations by Washington (Milliyet, July 2).

Since then, Turkey claims to have seized quantities of U.S.-supplied arms from the Kurdish militants of the PKK. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul noted that some of the weapons seized from the PKK (including U.S.-made M-16 rifles) came from U.S. shipments to the Iraqi army, but added that if direct arms shipments were discovered, “our relations [with the United States] would really break apart” (Kanal A TV, July 15). In response, a U.S. spokesman declared, “such reports would have no basis in fact” (New Anatolian, July 17).

To deal with this crisis in relations, William J. Haynes, general counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, led a seven-member team of U.S. officials in closed talks with representatives of the Turkish General Staff (including the deputy chief-of-staff, General Ergin Saygun), the Foreign Ministry, the Security Directorate and the National Intelligence Organization (Today’s Zaman, July 27). The meeting discussed an ongoing investigation by the U.S. Department of Defense into reports that U.S. arms were being sold by U.S. troops in Iraq. The session was no doubt prompted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s complaints that U.S. explanations were unconvincing as to why “a serious amount” of weapons confiscated from the PKK were U.S.-made (NTV, July 16). Shortly after the meeting, an FBI delegation headed by FBI International Operations Chief Thomas Fuentes arrived in Ankara to further discuss the problem with Turkish officials.

The Department of Defense delegation suggested that the U.S.-origin arms seized from PKK fighters were diverted from U.S. supplies to government troops by elements in the Iraqi security apparatus, but the FBI’s involvement suggests a criminal case involving unauthorized arms transfers by U.S. personnel. According to Foreign Minister Gul, the results of an internal investigation indicate that corrupt U.S. troops were involved in selling arms to the PKK (NTV, July 19). The other (and most dangerous) possibility is that covert U.S. arms supplies to the anti-Iranian Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) were shared with Kurdish comrades in the PKK. PJAK leader Rahman Haj-Ahmadi was in Washington recently seeking financial and military aid for his movement, despite PJAK and the PKK being designated terrorist organizations (Today’s Zaman, August 6). PJAK is effectively an offshoot of the PKK and shares many of the same facilities and resources in the Qandil Mountains (Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006). Iran claims that PJAK is already receiving arms and other assistance from the United States.

According to the Report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in 2006, of 370,000 light weapons shipped by the United States to Iraq since 2003, only three percent had their serial numbers recorded by the U.S. Defense Department before distribution, making it very difficult to trace captured weaponry. Much of the equipment supplied by the United States is not of American type, such as AK-47 assault rifles and Austrian-made Glock pistols. The U.S. government cannot account for the ultimate destination of 190,000 weapons issued in Iraq during the 2004-2005 train-and-equip program, according to a report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO notes that record-keeping has improved, but arms are still being delivered without proper documentation (GAO-07-711, July 31). Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani has protested the practice of American commanders arming various Iraqi factions without consulting the Baghdad government. At the same time, the Iraqi government is complaining of Washington’s slow response to Baghdad’s offer to buy $1.5 billion worth of American arms, including helicopters and M-16 rifles. China has stepped in as an alternate supply, and Iran has also offered to supply the Iraqi government with weapons and training (Agence France-Presse, July 26).

In late July, the U.S. Department of Defense provided a secret briefing to select members of Congress on a new plan to have U.S. Special Forces members assist Turkish forces in eliminating the PKK leadership in northern Iraq. The most likely targets would have been PKK leaders Murat Karayilan and Cemil Bayik, two men named in a similar scenario discussed at Washington’s Hudson Institute last June in the presence of Jalal al-Talabani’s son and two Turkish generals (ROI TV, June 23; Anatolia News Agency, June 19).

Meanwhile, problems continue to loom on the horizon for U.S.-Turkish relations. The U.S. House of Representatives is expected to pass a bill next month recognizing Ottoman massacres of Armenians in World War I as “genocide.” It is an unusual move by legislators who otherwise spend little time analyzing historical questions, and one that will be regarded as a slap on the face by many in the Turkish government and military. If the recently signed Turkey-Iran natural gas deal goes forward, Turkey may become subject to U.S. sanctions, creating a major NATO rift with a range of implications, few of them favorable to the United States. Reports are also surfacing in the Turkish media that the United States has started to look for alternatives to its Turkish military bases in the Balkans, Azerbaijan and even northern Iraq. If true, this suggests that planning is already underway for the eventuality of a break in Turkish-American relations (Turkish Daily News, July 26). The downward slide in relations is reflected by a July poll by the U.S.-based Pew organization showing that only nine percent of Turks had a “positive view” of the United States. More alarmingly, 75% of Turks were concerned that their NATO ally could pose a military threat to Turkey (Sunday Telegraph, July 29). In winning the “hearts and minds” of Iraq’s Kurdish minority, the United States appears to be losing those of a vital ally.

This article first appeared in the August 14 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

China’s Oil Offensive Strikes: Horn of Africa and Beyond

Posted on August 10, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 10, 2007

In its efforts to expel an Islamist government and capture a handful of inactive al-Qaeda suspects in Somalia, the United States has risked its political reputation in the region through a series of unpopular measures. These include backing an unsuccessful attempt by warlords to take over the country, several ineffective air raids, and finally, the financing of an unpopular Ethiopian military intervention. As African Union peacekeepers struggle to restore stability in the capital of Mogadishu, China has stepped in to sign the first oil exploration deal negotiated by Somalia’s new government. The agreement is the first of its kind since the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 began a long period of political chaos in the strategically important nation.

Chinese Oil Rig in South Sudan (Tong Jiang/Imaginechina)

China’s four major oil corporations have unlimited government support, allowing them to edge out the smaller Western oil companies that traditionally take on high-risk exploration projects like Somalia. Latecomers to the global oil game, the Chinese companies and their exploration offshoots have focused on oil-bearing regions neglected by major Western operators because of political turmoil, insecurity, sanctions or embargoes. China once hoped to supply the bulk of its energy needs from deposits in its western province of Xinjiang, but disappointing reserve estimates and an exploding economy have given urgency to China’s drive to secure its energy future. Twenty-five percent of China’s crude oil imports now come from African sources.

The Somalia deal is part of a decades-long Chinese campaign to engage Africa through investment, development aid, “soft loans,” arms sales and technology transfers. The European Union recently warned China that it would not participate in any debt-relief projects involving China’s generous “soft-loans” in Africa (Reuters, July 30).

Global demand for oil is expected to rise over 50 percent in the next two decades even as prices rise and reserves decline. To meet this demand, China and other Asian countries offer massive infrastructure developments in exchange for oil rights. President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders are regular visitors to African capitals and Chinese direct investment in Africa totaled $50 billion last year.

Oil in Somalia?

Last month a deal was reached between Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China International Oil and Gas (CIOG) to begin oil exploration in the Mudug region of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland (northeast Somalia) (Financial Times, July 17). Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which has yet to secure its rule, is to receive 51 percent of the potential revenues under the deal.

Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf (a native of Puntland) appears to have negotiated the deal in concert with Puntland officials but without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, Ali Muhammad Gedi, who is still working on legislation governing the oil industry and production-sharing agreements. Gedi insists that “in order to protect the wealth of the country and the interests of the Somali people, we cannot operate without a regulatory body, without rules and regulations” (Financial Times, July 17). The agreement with China may become an important test of the authority of the transitional government. China has effectively pre-empted the return of Western oil interests to Somalia, though it is unclear how the Chinese project may be affected by the passage of a new national oil bill. Somali negotiators assured the Chinese firms that new legislation would have no impact on exploration work due to begin in September (Shabelle Media Network, July 17).

Though Somalia has no proven reserves of oil, Range Resources, a small Australian oil company already active in Puntland, suggests that the area might yield 5 to 10 billion barrels (Shabelle Media Network, July 14). Somalia is also estimated to have 200 billion cubic feet of untapped natural gas reserves. Western petroleum corporations, however, conducted extensive exploration of potential oil-bearing sites in Somalia in the 1980s and found nothing worth developing.

Public unrest is already on the rise in Puntland as the local government grows increasingly authoritarian and the national treasury has mysteriously dried up. Discontent has accelerated as leaders of the one-party regime continue to sign resource development deals with Western and Arab companies without any form of public consultation. The new deal with China has the potential to ignite political unrest in one of the few areas of Somalia to have avoided the worst of the nation’s brutal political nightmare.

China’s Strategy in Africa

Last November, Beijing hosted an important summit meeting between Chinese leaders and representatives of 48 African countries. The African delegates gave unanimous support to a declaration endorsing a one-China policy and “China’s peaceful reunification” [1]. China in turn announced a $5 billion African development fund (administered by China’s Eximbank), with a promise of $15 billion more in aid and debt forgiveness to come. In exchange for secure energy supplies, China is also offering barrier-free access to Chinese markets, something Africans have been unable to obtain from the United States or the EU.

While China has had success in securing energy supplies in Africa, its oil offensive is by no means flawless. Chinese corporations working abroad provide little employment for local people and are remarkably tolerant of corruption and human rights abuses. Chinese overseas operations are also notorious for their disregard of environmental considerations. The latter is perhaps unsurprising, considering the environmental devastation afflicting China’s own industrial centers. Yet, the combination of all these factors tends to create unrest in nations where Chinese operations are seen as benefiting members of the ruling elite and few others. What is also notable is that of the five African countries where China is involved in major resource operations, only one, Angola, is not dealing with a major insurgency.

Sudan

China continues to expand its operations in the Sudan, its most successful foreign energy project to date. Oil from southern Sudan currently supplies 10 percent of China’s imported energy needs. Chinese and Malaysian companies operating as a joint venture (with a minority Sudanese share) stepped up to take over the exploitation of Sudan’s vast oil reserves after international pressure forced out the Canadian Talisman Corporation. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) recently announced the acquisition of a 40 percent share in a major exploration site off the Sudanese Red Sea coast. A 1997 embargo prevents U.S. companies from operating in the Sudan.

The Sudanese/Swiss ABCO Corporation claims that preliminary drilling in Darfur revealed “abundant” reserves of oil. These reserves have yet to be confirmed, but it appears that the rights may have already passed into Chinese hands (AlertNet, June 15, 2005; Guardian, June 10, 2005).

Ethiopia

China and Malaysia, partners in the Sudan, are trying to replicate their Sudanese success in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. As a demonstration of goodwill—and to increase the incentives for cooperation—China and Ethiopia signed a debt relief agreement in May worth $18.5 million (Xinhua, May 30). In addition, a new convention center for the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa is being built with substantial Chinese assistance.

Following its usual practice, China imported its own labor to work in the Ogaden projects in preference to hiring local workers. Asian exploration companies tend to arrive in the region with large military escorts after negotiating contracts with the Tigrean-based government in Addis Ababa. The ethnic-Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden region have little input, making the operations a target of the rebel Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). A commando unit of the ONLF attacked a well-guarded Chinese oil exploration facility in northern Ogaden on April 24, killing 65 Ethiopian troops and nine Chinese workers. A further seven Chinese workers were abducted “for their own safety” and released a week later (ONLF communiqué, April 24)

Niger

In Niger the CNPC (already active in two other concessions) appears to be in the lead for the sole rights to the promising Agadem concession, to be awarded sometime this month. With financial support from the Chinese government, CNPC is offering to build a refinery and a pipeline in exchange for the rights, a commitment even Western oil giants like Exxon have shied away from. A Tuareg-based rebel movement in the resource rich north has declared Chinese oil and uranium operations “unwelcome” while accusing China of supplying the Niger army with weapons to pacify the region. Rebels attacked an armed supply convoy heading to a CNPC exploration camp in July, killing four soldiers (Reuters, July 31).

Nigeria

Last year, the CNOOC moved into territory previously dominated by major Western oil companies in the Niger Delta, paying $2.7 billion for a 45 percent share in an offshore oilfield expected to go into production in 2008 (Reuters, April 26, 2006). China is building $4 billion worth of oil facilities and other infrastructure in return for access to other promising Nigerian oil-fields, including the untapped inland Chad basin (BBC, April 26, 2006).

With a growing insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta threatening Nigeria’s oil industry, China has stepped in to supply weapons, patrol boats and other military equipment. Beijing does not share Washington’s reluctance to supply such hardware to a Nigerian military accused of corruption and human rights violations (Financial Times, February 27). The insurgents claim that Chinese, Dutch and U.S. resource companies fail to hire local labor and are devastating the local economy and environment through unchecked pollution. The world’s eighth largest oil exporter, Nigeria is also a major market for Chinese exports.

Angola

Beijing has been wooing oil-rich Angola through promises of aid and development. Its promise of $2 billion in soft loans brought a guarantee of uninterrupted oil supplies to China and offshore exploration rights for CNPC while enabling Angola to avoid Western pressure to restructure a corrupt and inefficient economy.

Competition with the United States

As China intensifies its economic engagement with Africa, the United States has been steadily increasing its military presence in Africa, supplying arms, training troops and opening new bases for U.S. personnel. Efforts such as the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative have brought U.S. forces into many countries for the first time as part of the global effort against al-Qaeda. The creation last February of AFRICOM, a new U.S. regional combatant command for Africa, reflects Washington’s new interest in the area. Despite the anti-terrorism rhetoric, it appears that the main function of AFRICOM will be to secure U.S. energy supplies in a region that is expected to provide a growing share of the United States’ future energy needs.

Ironically, U.S. arms and military training provided under the guise of “counter-terrorism assistance” may ultimately provide Chinese oil interests with the security they need to carry out operations in high-risk areas. An Ethiopian army financed and equipped by the United States for use against “Al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia” is now being used to protect Chinese oil exploration efforts in the Ogaden region through military operations against ONLF rebels and punitive attacks on ethnic-Somali civilians.

Conclusion

So far, a visible disinterest in tying resource development contracts to social or economic reforms has aided China in securing its energy future in Africa. To be fair, this pattern of tolerance for corruption in regimes with desirable natural resources was set long ago by Western corporations and governments. China still employs the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in its relations with Africa, but many Africans are beginning to see China as an exploitive major power supporting corrupt regimes in the same manner as the former Western imperial powers. While China is taking some small steps to correct this impression, problems will persist unless Africans see immediate benefits from the Chinese presence, particularly in the field of employment. China’s success in presenting itself to the Third World as “the largest developing country” will eventually have limited currency if its business operations become indistinguishable from Western corporations. In the meantime, China’s rivalry with the West for control of Africa’s oil is certain to intensify.

Notes

See the full text of the Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, available online at: english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/16/content_6586.htm.

Hybrid Force: The UN’s Peacekeeping Gamble in Darfur

Posted on August 7, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 7, 2007

A close examination of the terms of the Darfur peacekeeping mission approved by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 offers little confidence that the mission will be any more successful than the current African Union deployment. The resolution approves a force of 26,000 men, including the 7,000 AU peacekeepers already in Darfur (Middle East Online, August 6). On Khartoum’s insistence, the bulk of the force must be African in origin. The proposed “hybrid” UN/AU force appears to be little more than a much larger, more complicated version of the ineffective AU operation already in Darfur. Three of the most effective Western militaries (the U.S., the U.K. and Canada) have already stated they will have no role in the force.

AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan: To be replaced by UNAMID (Rob Crilly)

The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a “Chapter 7” peacekeeping force. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter allows for “necessary action,” including force, to protect the mission as well as humanitarian organizations and civilians. In the watered-down version of Chapter 7 negotiated with Khartoum, the Sudanese government must first approve such use of force. UNAMID will be led by Nigerian Gen. Martin Agwai, an experienced peacekeeper and chief of the Defense Staff of the Nigerian Armed Services since June 2006. Agwai has warned that it is unlikely that enough African troops can be raised to fill out the new peacekeeping force. UNAMID is not expected to fully deploy until December 31, probably an optimistic deadline given the composition of the force and the nature of the territory. Financing will be a problem with a mission expected to cost $2 billion in its first year. Despite international pledges of support, existing AU peacekeeping forces in Darfur and Somalia are notoriously under-financed, with very few funds actually reaching the troops in the field. In a road-less environment with no infrastructure, the mission will require an effective system of transport and air support. If trouble erupts, surface routes will become highly dangerous and outposts difficult to relieve or evacuate.

Instead of mandating disarmament, Resolution 1769 only calls for UNAMID to “monitor” illegal arms movements in Darfur. All parties are urged to commit to a cease-fire and the creation of “initiatives” to return the displaced, provide compensation and put new security measures in place. There are no provisions for the arrests of war crimes suspects. During Security Council negotiations on the resolution, China and the three African members of the UNSC (South Africa, Ghana and the Republic of the Congo) succeeded in dropping a key provision calling for “further measures” (i.e., sanctions) to be taken against Sudan if it failed to cooperate with the UN mission.

There is no question of the 2.5 million displaced persons returning home in the near future. The well-armed Arab tribes that have settled on seized lands must first be removed. This is not as simple as returning them to their traditional lands, however, for in many cases their old pastures have become lifeless deserts. Land redistribution or compensation cannot be achieved without the participation of Khartoum and certainly does not fall within UNAMID’s mandate. The traditional land rights system of Darfur was designed to accommodate both nomads and farmers. Some form of renegotiation of this system with the involvement of local scholars and tribal elders would seem to form the best basis for a lasting peace in Darfur. None of this will be possible, however, without a process of disarmament and the demobilization of militias and rebel groups.

Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir and Vice President ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha are consummate political survivors in a country where politics is frequently played for keeps. They will not be looking for an open clash with the UN force, but will do everything else possible to make their stay uncomfortable. The Sudanese leadership will not be easily cowed or forced to relinquish sovereignty in any degree. Its consent to a Chapter 7 UN force comes only after a considerable diplomatic effort by China, perhaps the only world power with an honest claim to influence in Khartoum today. It would be unwise to expect China’s present level of support for the Darfur mission to continue very long after the close of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

The conflict is growing increasingly complicated. Arabs are fighting Arabs over depopulated regions, and former rebels who signed the 2006 Abuja agreement are now fighting their former allies on behalf of the government (al-Sudani, August 2). Just identifying the combatants will be a test for the UN/AU mission; few of the larger tribes share any single political viewpoint and it is often impossible to visually distinguish a Darfuri “Arab” from an “African.” All units will depend heavily on a small pool of translators; the local dialect of Arabic spoken as a lingua franca is poorly understood outside of Darfur. Banditry (including attacks on humanitarian convoys) will continue even through a cease-fire. Any such attack could easily provide an excuse by one party or the other to resume hostilities. With at least 16 rebel factions in the field, the development of a unified leadership is essential to the success of negotiations (Sudan Tribune, August 3).

The experience of the AU force in Somalia, where only 1,500 Ugandan troops showed up while four other countries failed to deploy the balance of the 8,000-man force, does not inspire hope that anything like 20,000 African soldiers can be in Darfur by the end of the year. It is almost inevitable that the projected “hybrid” force will have to be reshaped to include Western contingents just to maintain a presence in Darfur. Real success in restoring peace to Darfur under UNAMID’s current mandate is highly unlikely.

This article first appeared in the August 7, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Niger’s Uranium Industry Threatened by Rebels

Posted on July 31, 2007 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

July 31, 2007

As the focus of U.S. justifications for its invasion of Iraq and the subsequent “yellowcake” political scandal, both the African country of Niger and its considerable uranium reserves have become well known since 2002. While claims that Niger was supplying uranium to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program have been refuted, there are new concerns that a growing rebellion in Niger’s north might destabilize the country and its uranium industry, now the third largest in the world.

Fighters of the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ)

The Tuareg-led rebel group, Le Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ), also includes a number of disaffected members of the Tubu, Arab, Peul, Hausa and other nomadic or semi-nomadic groups dwelling in northern Niger. Despite unsubstantiated claims that the Tuareg present a critical North African link to a supposed expansion of al-Qaeda operations to the Sahel region, the MNJ rebellion has no apparent Islamist component. The grievances of the MNJ are nearly identical with the causes of past Tuareg revolts—government corruption, underdevelopment, inequitable distribution of wealth, economic marginalization and ethnic discrimination.

The government of President Mamadou Tandja has responded by restricting press freedom, refusing to negotiate with the rebels and dispatching 4,000 troops to the north (Le Republicain [Niamey], July 1). The final move is not without its own dangers, as there are reports of mass desertions from the military to the rebels (Afriquenligne, July 21). Militarization of the northern region has already brought the vital Saharan tourist trade to a crashing halt, with European charter flights into Agadez canceled until December. The government has also reduced fuel supplies to the north, making it difficult for food to find its way to the market. Although the official reason is to prevent fuel theft by the rebels, the government is no doubt hoping that pressure on the food supply will diminish MNJ popularity in the north.

Uranium production in Niger represents 8-10% of the world’s supply (3,400 tons in 2006) and accounts for nearly 70% of the country’s exports. The French discovered uranium in Niger’s Tim Mersoï Basin in 1957, using the metal for its nuclear weapons program. Since then, French uranium concern Areva has developed two major uranium mines at Arlit and Akouta, both in the Agadez region, home of the old pre-colonial Tuareg sultanate. The mines operate as joint ventures with ONAREM (Niger’s state mining concern) and a number of minority interests. Although Niger’s uranium is expensive to produce, it is plentiful—with reserves expected to hold out for several more decades. All Niger uranium is pre-sold to COGEMA (France), ENUSA (Spain) and OURD (Japan). Massive diversions of the metal, such as those claimed by the U.S. administration in 2002, are virtually impossible. The rebellion threatens government plans to double the output of its uranium industry in the next four years to meet a growing demand for nuclear fuels. The cost of uranium has soared from $7 per pound in 2000 to over $130 per pound in 2007. Chinese, Canadian and Indian firms are leading the resulting exploration rush in the Agadez region.

Little of Niger’s wealth in natural resources, which includes other precious metals and petroleum, has reached the people of Niger—recently ranked last in quality of life by a UN development index. Impoverished tent cities, burdened with unemployed Niger citizens seeking work, have developed around foreign mining operations. According to the MNJ, as few as 15% of the jobs are available to locals; they, instead, survive on the crumbs of the foreign-managed facilities. Uranium dust has contaminated pastures and the scarce water sources in northern Niger, and a coal-fired fuel plant provides energy for the mines with few environmental restrictions.

Development of the Ingall region of Agadez, a vital grazing ground for Niger’s pastoralists, is specifically opposed by the MNJ—who expressed their displeasure with China’s efforts in the area by kidnapping an executive of the China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation on July 6 (Xinhua, July 7). Although the worker was later released, all the company’s personnel were withdrawn under military escort to Agadez. According to a MNJ spokesman in Paris, the Chinese are not welcome “because they don’t work with locals, they don’t employ locals, and they respect the environment even less” (Reuters, June 27). The halt in Chinese operations is unlikely to last; China needs fuel for a planned series of nuclear reactors that have been designed to reduce the growing economy’s dependence on coal-fired energy plants. The MNJ claims that the government used fees from exploration permits to buy two Russian Mi-24 helicopter gunships, and it accuses China of providing arms to the Niger military. MNJ leader Aghali ag Alambo states that “We’re not against any firm, be it from China or elsewhere. But we are against companies which supply the national army while that army is directing its force against civilians who are demanding their rights” (Reuters, July 7).

Libya has been accused of supporting the insurrection, likely because of its close ties to Tuareg militants dating back to the Libyan-sponsored Islamic Legion of the 1970s. French uranium miners Areva have also been charged within Niger of supporting the rebel movement, reflecting a common belief in some elements of the ruling class that French sympathies tend to lie with the desert Tuareg rather than the African tribes of the south. Areva denies the charges, pointing to its own financial losses due to rebel activity, including an April 20 attack on an Areva camp that shut down production for a month (Agence France-Presse, April 20). In an effort to quell opposition to the uranium industry, Areva has announced plans to spend over $1 billion on health and environmental concerns in northern Niger (Africast, May 3).

While Areva is moving toward alleviating the impact of its operations, it is yet to be seen whether its concerns will be shared by other foreign operations in northern Niger. Past experience shows that Niger security forces do not have the ability to quash opposition in the area. Unless measures are taken to accommodate the needs of indigenous tribal groups, the risk of heightened radicalization will be unavoidable.

This article first appeared in the July 31, 2007 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus