Vichy versus Asia: The Franco-Siamese War of 1941

Posted on November 16, 2002 by McGregor

Dr. Andrew McGregor
November 16, 2002

In 1940 the Vichy government of French Indo-China was isolated and threatened by the imperialist Japanese, the neighbouring Thais and by native rebel movements. The French had about 50,000 colonial and metropolitan troops stationed in the colony. They outnumbered the small French civilian population of 40,000 colonists in a territory of 25 million Indo-Chinese. The French collapse in the spring of 1940 resulted in the German occupation of 60% of France, but Marshall Pétain’s Vichy government retained control of the remainder, as well as France’s colonial empire. Indo-China was, however, cut off from re-supply from Vichy France. A British blockade proved effective, meaning that troops could not be rotated for the duration of the war, nor could parts be obtained for military equipment. Fuel supplies could also not be replenished so long as the petroleum-short Japanese Empire controlled the Asian theatre.
Legionnaires of the 5e Régiment étranger d’infanterie (5e REI) during the Vichy campaign against Thailand

Vichy diplomats attempted to persuade Germany to allow them to ship arms and equipment to Indo-China, appealing to the Germans on racial grounds, pointing out the possibility of the ‘white race’ losing ground in Asia. The Germans would promise only to speak to the Japanese. At the same time Vichy was fending off offers from the Chinese to occupy Indo-China to ‘protect’ it from the Japanese. Aware of China’s own irredentist claims in the area, the French doubted they would ever get their colony back if the Chinese were allowed in.

The Japanese deliver a shock

As France fell, the Japanese began to make demands of the Governor-General of Indo-China, General Catroux. When the General acceded to demands that rail traffic to China be stopped he was promptly replaced. Vichy named the loyal commander of the FNEO (Forces Navales d’Extreme-Orient), Vice-Admiral Jean Decoux, as Governor General. By September Decoux was facing far greater demands from the Japanese, including the right to station and transport troops through Indo-China, the use of selected airfields, and the evacuation of a hard-pressed Japanese division fighting in China through the port of Haiphong. An appeal to the Americans for help was poorly received.

Aware of his predecessor’s fate, Decoux hesitated, signing the agreement just before the Japanese ultimatum ran out. The Japanese division was tired of waiting, however, and proceeded to cross the border on September 22, 1940, attacking the Tonkinese cities of Dong Dang and Lang Son with tanks and infantry. The Japanese navy made landings along the coast, Haiphong was bombed, and the Japanese Air Force flew repeatedly over Hanoi. The Japanese offensive came as a shock to some senior French officers, who still believed in natural European superiority and often talked about taking tough action against the Japanese. Dong Dang fell immediately, and Lang Son fell two days later, with many of the locally raised colonial units breaking and running before their first experience of artillery and disciplined infantry attacks carried out by veteran soldiers. French intelligence had reported that the Japanese were demoralized, but it was the French who collapsed under pressure. Local villagers revealed French positions to the Japanese, French artillery fired on French positions, ammunition ran out quickly, and over a thousand Indo-Chinese troops deserted.

A statement issued by the Japanese emperor on October 5 called the Lang Son attack unfortunate but not important. The French prisoners were released, but 200 German legionnaires who had been separated from the other French prisoners were not released until the 13th of October. The pursuing Chinese army made numerous forays across the frontier, and the French administration remained fearful of a full-scale Chinese invasion until the end of the war. The French had lost 800 men in two days of battle with the Japanese.

Nationalist rebellions

The fall of Lang Son had almost immediate consequences for French rule. Discontented locals had witnessed how easily an Asian army defeated the whites. Vietnamese nationalist Tran Trung Lap was able to raise some 3,000 men in the Lang Son region, many of them deserters from the Indo-Chinese units defeated by the Japanese. Their arms were provided from French stocks captured by the Japanese. The returning French demonstrated they could still deal with a poorly trained rabble, and quickly drove the revolutionaries into the mountains, where planes and artillery hammered them. Tran Trung Lap was ambushed, and though he escaped the massacre of his men by machine-gun, he was shortly after captured and executed at Lang Son in December.

In the south of Vietnam, then known as Cochin China, an even more dangerous rebellion broke out in late November. Thai troops had begun to deploy along the Cambodian border and most of the garrisons in Cochin China had been sent to the frontier. Fighting broke out in the My Tho region and French police found themselves overwhelmed. The rebellion spread to Saigon and a number of southern provinces. A battalion of the Foreign Legion and a battalion of Tonkinese colonial troops on their way to Cambodia were diverted to the south and, with the help of artillery, air and naval detachments, quickly repressed the rebellion with utmost ruthlessness. The French had made their point, and could now send their forces west to deal with the Thais.

War with Thailand

The French now had to deal with a growth of militarism and Thai nationalism in neighbouring Thailand (the name was changed from Siam in 1938). Just as Germany sought to regain the territories lost in the Treaty of Versailles, Thailand was eager to retake the ethnic Thai lands along the Mekong River it was forced to cede to the French colony of Laos in 1904. In 1907 the French had also forced Siam to cede the largely Khmer provinces of Siemreap, Sisophon and Battambang to French Cambodia. The pro-Japanese government of Marshal Pibul Songgram sensed an exploitable weakness in the now isolated French colony, and began a military campaign to retake these territories after the French rejected demands for their return in October 1940.

The Thais had signed a non-aggression pact with the French in June 1940, but failed to ratify it after the collapse of metropolitan France. By October Marshal Songgram had mobilized 50,000 troops (in five divisions) and obtained 100 modern fighters, bombers and seaplanes from Japan. The Thai air-force was now three times the size of that available to the French, with the new aircraft added to the 100 American planes obtained between 1936 and 1938 (mostly Vough Corsairs and Curtiss Hawks). The Thai navy had also been equipped with modern ships and outclassed the French colonial fleet on paper at least. Border skirmishes began in November and the Thais crossed the Mekong in December. Hard-pressed elsewhere, the French could only commit fourteen battalions to the defence of Battambang Province.

On January 5, 1941, the Thais launched a full attack with artillery and aerial bombardment of French positions. The Thai offensive covered four fronts:

1) North Laos, where the Thais took the disputed territories with little opposition
2) South Laos, where the Thais crossed the Mekong by the 19th of January
3) The Dangreks Sector, where confused fighting went back and forth
4) Colonial Route 1 (RC 1) in Battambang province, where the heaviest fighting occurred.

The initial advance on the RC 1 was repulsed by the Cambodian Tirailleurs (riflemen). The main Thai column ran into a French counter-attack on January 16, colliding with the French at Yang Dam Koum in Battambang. The Thai force was equipped with Vickers 6-ton tanks while the French lacked any armour. The French counter-offensive had three parts:

1) A counter-attack on the RC 1 in the region of Yang Dam Koum
2) An assault by the Brigade d’Annam-Laos on the islands of the Mekong River
3) Operations by the naval ‘Groupement occasionnel’ against the Thai fleet in the Gulf of Siam

The main thrust of the offensive was by Col. Jacomy’s forces along the RC 1. The attack at Yang Dam Koum was a debacle from the start. The assault forces consisted of one battalion of Colonial Infantry (European) and two battalions of ‘Mixed Infantry’ (European and Indo-Chinese). The forest made artillery operations difficult, French aircraft never showed, leaving the skies to the Thai air-force, and radio communications were poor. The French transmitted orders using Morse code, perhaps explaining why the Thais often anticipated their movements. A complete rout was prevented when the Thais ran into a battalion of the Fifth regiment of Legion infantry at Phum Préau. The legionnaires were hit hard by a Thai armoured assault, but brought up two 25mm and one 75mm gun for use against the tanks. The motorized detachment of the 11th Regiment of Colonial Infantry reinforced the line, and three Thai tanks were destroyed, the rest deciding to retire. The diversionary assault on the Mekong was successful, but the largest battle of the war was to be fought in the Gulf of Siam.

Naval War in the Gulf of Siam

The French navy was all important in Indo-China, as with any overseas colony. The modest force had a virtually non-existent role in the great Asian war of 1941-45, being unable to resist either Japanese advances or Allied blockades, but they were nevertheless to have one great, unexpected battle before meeting an ignominious end. The fleet in Indo-China was divided into two parts with separate levels of responsibility. The FNEO was assigned responsibility for the overall defence of French colonies in Indo-China and the Pacific, while the Marine Indochine with its river gunboats was responsible for interior security in Indo-China.

With the land war going badly for the French, it was decided to send the small French fleet to the Gulf of Siam to engage a Thai naval force supporting the flank of the Thai advance. The Thai ships had been spotted lying at anchorage in the Koh Chang islands by a French navy flying boat. The French task-force (or Groupement occasionel) consisted of the light cruiser Lamotte-Piquet, the two colonial sloops Dumont d’Urville and Amiral Charner, and the WW1 vintage gunboats Tahure and Marne.

HTMS Dhonburi at the Battle of Koh Chang

During the night of January 16 the French ships closed in on the islands, dividing themselves into three groups to cover the exits from the island group. On the morning of the 17th the French roared in under cover of the mist to engage the Thais. The Thai ships included three Italian-built torpedo boats and the dual-pride of the Thai fleet, the two new Japanese-made armoured coastal defence ships with 6” guns, Donburi and Ahidéa. The French were surprised to find both coastal defence ships there, as they expected only the Ahidéa, but the Donburi had arrived the day before in a standard rotation. The French lost the advantage of surprise when an overeager Loire 130 seaplane tried to bomb the Thai ships. The Thais received the French with the opening salvoes of the battle at 6:14 AM. The Lamotte-Piquet quickly inflicted fatal damage on the Ahidéa with gunfire and torpedoes, forcing it to run aground. By 7 AM French guns had sunk all three torpedo boats.

The Donburi was spotted attempting to escape through the 200m high islands and the French cruiser set off in pursuit. The Donburi was set afire but continued to engage the cruiser and the sloops, which now began to pour fire into the Donburi. Badly damaged and listing to starboard, the Donburi eventually disappeared behind an island and the French broke off. Later in the day the Donburi was taken in tow by a Thai transport but capsized soon after. Throughout the engagement the French sailors were impressed by the courage of the Thai sailors under fire.

The French ships were unable to exploit their victory, however, due to the arrival of Thai Corsairs targeting the Lamotte-Piquet. Fierce anti-aircraft fire drove off the attacks and by 9:40 AM the French turned for home. In a brief but decisive engagement the Thai fleet had been destroyed at negligible cost to the French. It appeared at the time to be a sudden and dramatic reversal of French fortunes.

Aftermath

The Japanese had seen enough and accompanied an offer to mediate the conflict with the arrival of a powerful naval force off the mouth of the Mekong River to encourage negotiations. A tentative armistice was imposed on January 28, but Thai provocations on the frontier continued until a formal armistice was signed aboard the Japanese battleship Natori off Saigon. The extent of Thai-Japanese collaboration was revealed when a Japanese-imposed treaty between Vichy and Thailand was signed on May 9, 1941. The disputed territories of Laos, part of the Cambodian province of Siem Réap and the whole of Battambang were awarded to Thailand. The conflict had cost the French over 300 men and a further loss of prestige amongst its colonial subjects. European troops and material losses could not be replaced due to the blockade. The French garrison remained highly demoralized until the Japanese coup in 1945 destroyed the Vichy colonial army in Indo-China.

In the end the Thais fared little better. The Khmers largely evacuated the lost Cambodian territories, preferring French rule, and Thailand itself was soon occupied by its more powerful ally, the Japanese. American Flying Fortresses bombed Bangkok in 1942. The Thais declared war against the allies in 1944, but there was some confusion over whether the declaration was actually delivered to the US government, and after the war the Thai government certified the declaration of war as null and void. The uncomfortable affair was mutually forgotten. The disputed territories in Laos and Cambodia were returned to the new Gaullist government at the end of the war.

The French light cruiser Lamotte-Piquet was laid up shortly after the battle of Koh Chang due to the shortage of fuel. In 1945 the ship was bombed by American planes before being scuttled during the brutal Japanese coup of March 1945. The remaining naval force continued to escort convoys up and down the Vietnamese coast as best they could from 1941 to 1945. In their sudden seizure of Indo-China, the Japanese sank a number of French ships with shore fire, while the remainder were scuttled by their crews, who were then imprisoned. The French colonial armed forces in Indo-China had ceased to exist by the time the British and Chinese armies arrived after the Japanese surrender. It was the British and Chinese, rather than the men of Vichy, who would turn the colony over to Gaullist France at the end of World War II.

This article was first published on November 16, 2002 by Military History Online http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/francosiamese/default.aspx#

FNEO – Forces Navales d’Extrême-Orient

Lamotte-Piquet	Light cruiser (Flagship)	1926	9350 tons 8 6.1” guns	Sunk by aircraft, Dec.1, 1945
Dumont d’Urville	Colonial sloop	1933	2,600 tons	Scrapped in 1958
Amiral Charner	Colonial sloop	1933	2,600 tons	Scuttled, March 10, 1945
Tahure	First-class sloop	1919	850 tons	Sunk by U.S. submarine, April 30, 1944
Marne	First-class sloop	1916	601 tons	Scuttled in the River Canthro, March 10, 1945

Siamese Naval Forces

Dhonburi (Domburi)	Coastal defense cutter	c. 1938	2,265 tons 4 8’ guns	Capsized under tow, Jan.14, 1941
Ahidéa (Sri Ayuthia)	Coastal defense cutter	c. 1938	2,265 tons 4 8” guns	Ran aground, Jan.14, 1941 Raised by the Japanese Sunk by shore-fire, 1951
Chonduri	Torpedo boat		470 tons	Sunk, Jan.14, 1941
Trat (Trad)	Torpedo boat		470 tons	Sunk, Jan.14, 1941
Songhkli (Songkhla)	Torpedo boat		470 tons	Sunk, Jan.14, 1941

This chart was first published on November 16, 2002 by Military History Online http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/francosiamese/navalforces.aspx

The Struggle for Saudi Arabia

Posted on October 1, 2002 by McGregor

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

Strategic Datalink no. 108

Andrew McGregor

October 2002

In Saudi Arabia there are fears that Iraq may not be the only Gulf state in which the United States is planning “regime change.” US-Saudi relations have reached a crisis point in the wake of repeated charges of al-Qaeda support at the highest levels of the Saudi regime. There is a growing feeling in some quarters of the Bush Administration that the Saudi royal family are no longer reliable allies, and that Saudi oil supplies are at risk from a growing movement of Islamist radicals. For the Saudi regime, however, every expression of political support for the United States comes at a considerable cost to their slowly fading legitimacy. With the royal family, the Americans, and the radical Islamists each striving to consolidate themselves, the once-stable US-Saudi pact is quickly turning into a three-way struggle for the kingdom’s future.

Mounting Pressure in US-Saudi Relations

News was leaked this August of a recent RAND Corporation briefing on Saudi Arabia to the Defense Policy Board in Washington. The briefing suggested that the US insist the Saudis stop funding Islamist militants, prosecute anyone linked to terrorism and end anti-Israel land anti-US propaganda. Failure to comply should be met by “targeting” Saudi financial assets and oil fields. [1] While the Bush Administration was quick to reassure the kingdom’s effective ruler, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah, the kingdom is now awash in rumours of a coming UN seizure of Saudi oil assets. The leak may well have been designed to place pressure on the Saudi regime to change their opposition to the use of US bases within the kingdom for an attack on Iraq. On September 15, 2002 the Saudi foreign minister stated that the bases may be used in a UN-sanctioned action against Iraq, a major policy change and concession to the Americans.

The once well-entrenched Saudi royal family is now openly opposed by radical Islamist shaykh-s and, to a lesser extent, the government-controlled ulama (religious scholars). The government’s pro-Western stance is not shared by all its citizens. Saudi citizens have been involved in Islamist jihad activities in Bosnia, Chechnya, Daghestan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and hundreds have answered al-Qaeda’s call for fighters and terrorists. The continuing presence of permanent US bases in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War inflames Saudi public opinion. [2] King Fahd only gained the approval of the ulama for their establishment by assurances that they would be closed immediately after the war. Part of the regime’s contract with its citizenry is defence. By ceding this responsibility to the Americans, the regime risks irrelevance. During the Gulf War, Osama bin Laden offered an army of Arab veterans of Afghanistan for the defence of Saudi Arabia. To his everlasting anger, the royal family rejected the offer in favour of an American presence.

The Islamist Opposition

The radical Islamists are not totally at odds with establishment ulama, which often gives subtle approval to radical aims. The ulama, radical or moderate, are all dedicated to distancing Saudi Arabia from the US. Violent responses to the US presence in the kingdom began in 1995 with the bombing of the US mission to the Saudi National Guard. This marked the beginning of the involvement of Saudi veterans of the Afghanistan war in the anti-US struggle. Their actions displayed the influence of Palestinian jihad theorist and practitioner Dr. ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, who provided leadership and assistance to the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan until his mysterious assassination in 1989. In their confessions the plotters also admitted to being influenced by Saudi opposition leader Muhammad al-Mas’ari and an imprisoned Jordanian Islamist, Abu Muhammad (aka ‘Issam Tahir al-Maqdisi). Before being beheaded, the suspects described the illegitimacy of the Saudi regime and its tame establishment clergy. In their opinion, the royal family and the government-approved ulama had failed to adhere to Islamic Shari’a law, and had further allied themselves to the “Crusader” cause of the Western powers.

Muhammad al-Mas’ari (The Times)

The Saudi regime has in fact dealt harshly with many Islamic extremists, especially when they are judged to pose a threat to the survival of the royal family. In 1979, Islamists led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and Muhammad al-Qahtani seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca in an attempt to overthrow the royal family, terminate the “alliance with the Christians,” and to abolish the establishment ulama. [3] After protracted fighting, all the Islamists who survived were executed. A 1994 crackdown focused on a radical grouping known as the Awakening Shaykhs and the Islamist Opposition Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) was disrupted by mass arrests, leading to the self-exile to London of its leader, Muhammad al-Mas’ari. The Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) has largely replaced the CDLR in the kingdom since 1997. Nevertheless, relations between the Islamists and the Saudi regime are a far cry from the gun battles in Egypt between radicals and government forces. In one sense, the Saudi crackdown actually worsened the situation for the royal family. The dissidents in exile turned to the Internet and of the telecommunications sources, suddenly finding themselves with the means of getting their message into every Saudi home. Expensive efforts by the Saudi government to block the MIRA website have proven futile. [4]

At times, government reaction to criticism from the radical shaykh-s seems hesitant; the reaction of the Minister of Justice to charges of widespread government corruption was to suggest that radical Islamists were promoting fitna (public disorder), “and that is worse than corrupt rule.” [5] British authorities have determined that a November 2000 wave of car bombings directed against Westerners in Riyadh was the work of radical supporters of Bin Laden, but was blamed on Canadian Bill Sampson and other Western Expatriates in an effort to divert attention from the growing Islamist opposition. [6] At the highest levels there is a reluctance to acknowledge Saudi Arabia as a breeding ground for anti-American terrorism; according to Prince Turki al-Faysal, former Saudi intelligence chief, the fact that Bin Laden “chose 15 Saudis for his murderous [9/11] gang… can only be explained as an attempt to disrupt the close relationship between our two countries.” [7]

Beyond Wahhabism

Saudi Arabia is frequently identified as the source of the international Wahhabist movement, an austere Islamic reform movement rooted in Saudi Arabia’s harsh desert interior. Since the 18^th century alliance between the Sa’ud family and puritanical Islamist revivalist Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the Saudi royal family has relied on the support and approval of the Wahhabi clergy for their legitimacy as rulers. Growing opposition to the regime within the establishment Wahhabist ulama has led to attempts to marginalize opposition shaykh-s through the steady restructuring of the government bodies regulating Islam. The radical ulama want to decentralize establishment Islam, ending the process of state control that began with the reforms of King Faysal (1964-75). The new Islamist leaders do not rely on the example of al-Wahhab for legitimacy; the reliance of the royal family upon this figure for their own legitimacy has in some sense devalued this association. [8] Ideologically placed beyond the influence of the government and establishment Wahhabism, the independent Islamist ulama represent a serious threat to the regime.

‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn al-Sa’ud

Islamist Shaykh al-Shuaibi, described by an al-Qaeda spokesman as “one of the great imams [religious leaders] of Saudi Arabia,” has already issued a ruling declaring America to be “an enemy of Islam and Muslims.” Al-Shuaibi also endorsed the radical idea that jihad must be fought against heretical Islamic regimes, implying the Saudi royal family. [9] Osama bin Laden’s appeals to the Saudi armed forces to conduct a guerrilla campaign against American targets inside Saudi Arabia have fallen on deaf ears so far. His own abandonment of a disco lifestyle for the foxholes of Jihad has provided an inspirational model to many Saudis, but his cynicism and assumption of unearned religious authority have dissuaded disaffected Saudis from rallying to his cause. The fact that Bin Laden hails from a Yemeni family rather than a Saudi clan makes indifference to his cause convenient to some Saudis. Even the radical shaykhs are critical of Bin Laden’s strategy, pointing out that he has brought destruction upon Muslim lands. [10] Bin Laden has suggested that the Saudi regime be abolished, with the division of the entire Arabian Peninsula into two new states, “Greater Hijaz” and “Greater Yemen.” [11] Inspirations of this sort are unlikely to garner any support from the lesser emirates of the Persian Gulf. From Kuwait to Qatar, these tiny but wealthy states are largely governed by complacent royal families using a healthy patronage system. They are now discovering that they are not immune to the spread of radical Islamism.

A Kingdom of Arms

Saudi Arabia, despite its immense oil wealth, now runs a deficit, and is having trouble paying for US arms shipments. The re-export of Saudi oil revenues to America in the form of arms orders is a sore point for the Islamists. Many Saudis blame the US for encouraging the regime to waste money on unnecessary weapons. According to a leading Islamist shaykh, Dr. Safar al-Hawali:

Since World War II, America has not been a democratic republic; it has become a military empire after the Roman model. It is even more abhorrent because its administration is ruled by the pressure groups that are the most dangerous to the human race – the companies that create destruction and sell arms. {12]

The Islamists question why $300 billion in arms purchases over the last 25 years have left the kingdom so helpless it requires permanent bases of a foreign power to ensure its security. Defence spending currently consumes 18% of the Saudi budget, compared to 4.5% in the US. The truth is that with its small population and territory the size of Western Europe it has never been possible for Saudi Arabia to defend itself against any of the regional powers. Even the royal family has acknowledged they are entirely reliant upon the US for defence. For the Islamists, Saudi defence spending has the appearance of kickbacks in return for US support of the ruling family.

Crown Prince ‘Abdullah has not hesitated to express his displeasure with America’s unconditional support for Israel, and was thoroughly disappointed with US reaction to his peace initiative in early 2002. When ‘Abdullah gave a speech to Saudi troops departing for action against the Iraqis in 1991 he expressed his sadness that he was not instead witnessing Saudi soldiers and their Arab Iraqi brethren preparing to leave for the liberation of Palestine. Though there is no reason to doubt the Crown Prince’s sincerity in his desire to see a just settlement for the Palestinians, he has been able to use this platform to secure his pan-Islamic credentials in the face of growing pressure from the domestic ulama. In the meantime, the Crown Prince continues to warn Washington that its policies are forcing an irrevocable split between Saudis and Americans.

Khobar Towers (AFP)

The Quiet Struggle Between Saudi Arabia and the United States

There are a number of open irritations in US-Saudi relations. One is the stagnant investigation into the 1996 bombing of American quarters in the al-Khobar towers in which 19 Americans were killed. Almost certainly the work of Saudi Shi’is working with intelligence agents of the Shi’ite regime in Iran, the later reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran hindered the investigation. Saudi Shi’a compose 25 to 30% of the population of the Eastern Province [13] and are strongly repressed by the Sunni (majority) government of Saudi Arabia. [14] Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin ‘Abdul-‘Aziz denies even the existence of the Shi’ite “Saudi Hizbullah” organization that the US blames for the attack. [15] In the end, the Saudis suggested Iranian participation in the Khobar blast may have been limited to “rogue elements,” in exchange for an Iranian agreement to cease support for radical Saudi Shi’a and the prospect of warmer relations with the new Iranian President, Mohammed Khatami. The failure to bring the case to resolution fuels allegations from both Sunni radicals and Shi’ite opposition figures that Sunni veterans of the Afghan war carried out of character for the usually peaceful Shi’ite community. [16]

Despite American demands, Saudi Arabia has considered the Khobar Towers investigation complete since 1998 and refuses to send the imprisoned suspects to the US for trial. The Bush administration has likewise refused to extradite the large number of Saudi prisoners in Guantanamo Bay for interrogation and trial in Saudi Arabia. “Axis of Evil” member Iran returned 12 Saudi members of al-Qaeda to the kingdom in August, with the understanding that intelligence gleaned from their interrogations would be passed on to the US.

Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, with Shi’a zone highlighted (Stratfor)

Saudi Arabia now finds itself under legal and financial attack in the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Saudi-based Islamic charities, banks and corporations are under close scrutiny by federal investigators, and many are named (together with three Saudi princes) in a $3 trillion class-action lawsuit filed in August 2002 by families of victims of the attacks. Some reports indicate that court documents show the Saudi regime paid $300 million in protection money to al-Qaeda in the late 1990s to prevent further terrorist attacks within the kingdom. At the same time, a senior official of the Saudi central bank was confirming that $200 billion in private Saudi investments had been pulled out of the United States in the spring and summer of 2002. [17]

Protectorates in the East?

The US is currently involved in an expensive effort to fill the nation’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to its 700-million-barrel capacity. Filling the SPR is a preparation for a possible interruption in Saudi oil supplies in the event of disruption due to Iraqi retaliation for American attacks, or seizure of the anachronistic Saudi government by radical Islamists. With bases already in the area, how long can it be before the US declares Saudi Arabia’s oil-producing Eastern Province “a strategic necessity,” and proclaims a protectorate over the region?

In the event of a seizure of the Eastern Province the royal family might continue as rulers of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and a smaller kingdom. The Saudi Islamists take the rumours of American plans to partition Saudi Arabia seriously. Shaykh al-Awaji suggests that American military superiority will be met with suicidal resistance. Said he:

If America has intercontinental missiles and bombs, then our bombs are the Jihad fighters, whom American has called ‘suicide attackers’ and we call ‘martyrs.’ We will develop them because we see them as a strategic weapon.

There is some speculation that the Shi’a of the Eastern Province may welcome a regime change, particularly if the new government is secular and democratic. Although the Eastern Province is the source of the kingdom’s incredible wealth, revenues have been slow to filter down to the province’s Shi’a community. Infrastructure is poor and the region’s first modern hospital was not built until 1987. The Saudi regime expects loyalty from the Shi’a minority in return for shielding the community from the most extreme of the Sunni ulama, who press for the forcible conversion, deportation or execution of the Shi’ite kuffar (heretics). The Shi’a once formed one-third of the oil industry’s work-force, but have been dismissed under pressure from the Wahhabists. Many Shi’a would welcome the opportunity to get back into the petroleum industry and to find relief from Wahhabist animosity.

Old Enemies, Uncertain Future

An alternative to the division of the kingdom is to replace the Sa’ud family with members of the Hashemite clan. The Hashemites, former rulers of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, emerged from the First World War as rulers of the Hijaz (western Saudi Arabia) and the newly formed kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan. The Hijazi Hashemites were deposed by ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn al-Sa’ud in 1925, their realistic British patrons “allowing events to take their natural course.” [19] The Iraqi Hashemites were overthrown in 1958, but the Jordanian branch of the family still governs, though it also faces the kind of criticism from Jordanian Islamists that Saudi Arabia’s royal family endures. At least three major Islamist plots against the government have been foiled by Jordanian security services in the last decade. Though the Hashemite option has its proponents, replacing one monarchy with another would represent a return to imperialist diplomacy of a century ago, and would ultimately do nothing to contribute to the stability of the region. Many of the 7,000 princes of the Sa’ud family have important positions in the Saudi security forces, access to the kingdom’s vast arms stores, and a willingness to defend their authority and privileges against their old Hashemite rivals. A Hashemite regime is unlikely to gain the approval of either establishment or radical ulama in Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

In the 1980s, the Americans nodded approvingly as the call went out for Muslims to volunteer for jihad against foreign intervention in Afghanistan, and gave full encouragement to rich Saudis to donate money to the cause. Having helped to establish both the cause and the network that sustains it, the Americans must now address the anger created by their Saudi bases and their ongoing support for Israel’s obstinacy. Washington’s solution to the Saudi problem may be to bring Iraqi oil assets under American protection while lessening America reliance on Saudi resources. American interests are already exploring expansion into the largely untapped petroleum fields of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin. The “liberation” of Iraqi oilfields will have a punishing effect on the Saudi economy, driving more unemployed young Saudis toward radicalism while inhibiting the government’s ability to fund international Islamist causes. It will also have the effect of disrupting the patronage system that keeps the al-Sa’ud in power.

Although the Bush administration is still supporting the Saudi regime publicly, Saudis and Americans are looking at each other in a new light, and neither cares for what it sees.

Endnotes

The RAND Corporation speaker, former Lyndon Larouche associate Laurent Murawiec, delivered a rather bizarre and poorly-received lecture on “Islamic Terrorism” at the University of Toronto last spring. The address consisted almost entirely of a discussion of ancient Chinese taxonomy, occasionally spiced with irrelevant quotations from 19^th century German scholars. In the wake of the uproar caused by the later briefing to the Defense Policy Board, Mr. Murawiec’s resignation was received by the RAND Corporation in September 2002.
Last June, the Saudis announced the arrest of an al-Qaeda cell planning attacks on American military installations within Saudi Arabia. A Sudanese veteran of the Afghanistan war led the cell of 11 Saudis and one Iraqi.
Joseph Kechichian, “Islamic revivalism and change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-‘Utaybi’s ‘Letters to the Saudi people’,” The Muslim World 80, 1990, pp. 1-16.
For the information war in SA, see Brian Whitaker, “Losing the Saudi Cyberwar,” Guardian, February 26, 2001; “Islamic Psy-Ops,” from “The IW Threat from Sub-State Groups: an Interdisciplinary Approach,” by Dr. Andrew Rathmell, Dr. Richard Overill, Lorenzo Valeri, Dr. John Gearson: Paper presented at the Third International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Norfolk VA, June 17-20, 1997.
‘Abdullah bin Muhammad Al al-Shaykh, quoted in Milton Viorst, “The Storm in the Citadel,” Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 1996.
Francine Dubé: “Family asks son in Saudi jail to cooperate,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 2, 2002.
Prince Turki al-Faisal (Director, Saudi General Intelligence Department, 1977-2001), “The US and Saudi Arabia: A partnership that works,” Washington Post, September 18, 2001.
Madavi al-Rasheed, “La couronne et le turban: l’état saoudien à recherché d’une nouvelle légitimité,” In: Bassma Kodmani-Darwish and May Chartouni-Dubarry (eds.), Les états Arabes face à la contestation Islamique, Paris, 1997, p.74.
“Saudi Arabia faces pro-Taliban religious movement at home,” IslamOnline.net, Dubai, October 17, 2001, http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2002-10/18/article11.shtml , 19/2/01.
Shaykh Mohsin al-Awaji and Dr. Muhammad al-Khasif, quoted in “Saudi opposition Sheikhs on America, Bin Laden, and Jihad” (Transcript of a broadcast by al-Jazira TV, July 10, 2002), Middle East Media Research Institute Special Dispatch Series no. 400, July 18, 2002.
Joshua Teitelbaum, “Holier than thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic opposition, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Papers no. 52, Washington, 2000, p. 77.
“Saudi opposition Sheikhs on America, Bin Laden, and Jihad,” op cit, fn.10.
Formerly known as the region of al-Hasa. The name was changed to the mundane “Eastern Province” to sever the historic connections between al-Hasa and the Shi’a community.
The influential Wahhabist clergy regards Shi’ism as shirk (polytheism), and hence a heresy in Islam. The Saudi Shi’ite community is one of a number of Shi’ite groups found in the Gulf. The relatively powerless Shi’a majority in Iraq is the best known. Kuwait’s Shi’a minority has prospered, but the Shi’a majority in Bahrain has been involved in frequent and often violent protests against the Emirate’s Sunni regime.
Much of the information alleging the existence of a “Saudi Hizbullah” was provided by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) at the deportation proceedings of Hani ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Sayigh, a Shi’a suspect in the attack.
Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims, New York, 1999, pp. 179-201.
Roula Khalaf, “Saudi downplays US investment selloff,” Financial Post (Toronto), August 23, 2002.
Shaykh Mohsin al-Awaji, quoted in: “Saudi opposition Sheikhs on America, Bin Laden, and Jihad,” op cit, fn. 10.
‘Abd al-‘Aziz relied upon al-Ikhwan (“the Brotherhood”) for the military power needed for the al-Sa’ud to form the Saudi Kingdom. The Ikhwan were strict Wahhabists from the interior province of Najd, the home of the al-Sa’ud. They were disbanded by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in 1927 as a threat to the stability of his new dual kingdom of Najd and Hijaz, later united in 1932 as the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There are constant complaints from the other provinces of Saudi Arabia of “Nadji chauvinism” amongst the rulers of the kingdom, and some even complain that the name “Saudi” Arabia implies personal ownership of the Kingdom by the al-Sa’ud family.

Bush as Bonaparte: ‘Regime change’ in the Middle East, Then and Now

Posted on October 1, 2002 by McGregor

Dr. Andrew McGregor, Aberfoyle International Security

Shout Monthly, Toronto

October 2002

President George W. Bush

As the Bush administration promotes regime change in Iraq, it finds elements of its armies in action against Muslim foes in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Georgia. Preparations are ongoing for assaults on Yemen and, ultimately, Iraq. In the midst of all this military activity the US administration must convince the rest of the Islamic world that ‘regime change’ in Muslim countries is not an attack on Islam itself. George W Bush might look at the experience of an earlier ‘Republican’, Napoleon Bonaparte, who two hundred years ago also found himself trying to overthrow local Islamic rulers while trying to assure Muslims of his respect for Islam.

In 1798, while still a general in the army of Revolutionary France, Bonaparte was entrusted with a bold mission designed to seize Egypt and reopen the ancient trade route to the East through the Suez. Egypt was still a land of mystery to the Europeans, ruled nominally by the Ottoman Turks, but in practice by a military caste known as the Mamluks. The latter were brought as slaves to Egypt from the Caucasus and Central Asia and trained in the military arts. The Mamluks amused themselves with constant and bloody struggles for supremacy as well as looting the merchants and citizenry at will. In arrogance they were unsurpassed, and few of them ever bothered to learn the language of their subjects, Arabic. The Mamluks, however, never forgot to present themselves as benefactors and patrons of Islam, often giving rich endowments to Koranic schools and Islamic foundations.

After Bonaparte had driven the Mamluks from northern Egypt he sought to impress the Islamic establishment by attending their prayers and Koranic discussions. One time, Bonaparte’s aides discovered the general awaiting the Islamic council in Turkish garb. Horrified, (“He cut such a poor figure in his turban and caftan”) they persuaded Napoleon to change before the arrival of the dignitaries. Eventually Bonaparte became known as a talib, or student of Islam. (The Afghan “Taliban” were so-named for the participation of students from Pakistan’s madrassa-s, or Islamic schools, as fighters in the early stage of the Taliban conquest of Afghanistan).

Just as President Bush quickly retracted his early use of the word “crusade” to describe his anti-terrorist action, Napoleon also strove to separate himself from the traditional model of Christian/Islamic enmity; “We have nothing to do with those infidels of barbarian times who came to fight against your faith; we recognize its sublimity, we adhere to it, and the moment has come when all regenerate French will also become true believers.” Bonaparte proclaimed the Republic’s imprisonment of the Pope and his own destruction of the Knights of Malta to the skeptical Islamic leaders as proof of his army’s detachment from Christianity. Napoleon further claimed that his successes were the result of the will of Allah and the protection of the Prophet Muhammad. The general admitted privately, however, that his Islamic policy was designed to “lull fanaticism to sleep before we uproot it.”

At one point, Bonaparte met with a panel of Cairo’s learned shaykh-s and agreed that he and his army would convert to Islam in exchange for a fatwa (religious ruling) ordering the submission of Egyptian Muslims to French rule. The astonished shaykh-s reminded Napoleon of the usual provisions regarding circumcision (not practiced in France at the time) and the prohibition of wine. Unwilling to approach his troops with these conditions, Napoleon attempted to negotiate with the scholars. While the shaykh-s proved flexible on the question of circumcision, they were adamant on the prohibition of wine, the life’s-blood of the French army. In time it was agreed that wine drinking could be overlooked if the soldiers donated one-fifth of their wages to charity. Napoleon eventually lost his enthusiasm for this idea, but many of his men (including a leading general) converted privately to Islam in order to take Egyptian wives.

The Bush administration has conceded that anti-terrorist action in the Middle East and Central Asia will not succeed without the cooperation of Muslim states, and has worked hard to create an inclusive ‘alliance’. Bonaparte also realized that the French occupation of Egypt could not survive without the acquiescence of Egypt’s Muslim neighbours. A diplomatic correspondence started, with Napoleon proposing alliances with sultans from India to Morocco. Napoleon even suggested that the mysterious Sultan of Darfur in the African interior provide him with thousands of black slaves to replace his ever-shrinking number of French soldiers.

In his correspondence, Napoleon stressed that within his territory the mosques were open, religious traditions were respected, pilgrimage was protected, and Islamic festivals celebrated with more grandeur than ever. In practice mosques were destroyed to create fields of fire for French artillery near the Citadel, taverns were opened everywhere in Cairo, and the pious citizens forced to watch their unveiled daughters consorting with French soldiers. The scandalized Egyptian chronicler, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Djabarti, recorded that “the French prided themselves on their slavery to women.”

Nevertheless, it was a real-estate tax that sparked a vicious urban revolt in Cairo. The rebellion was brutally repressed through many days of horror in Cairo’s narrow streets and courtyards. In victory Bonaparte appeared magnanimous, but from that point on the volleys of firing squads could be heard behind the Citadel walls each night, their victims dumped quietly into the Nile before daybreak. So many were killed that eventually the French found it necessary to change the method of execution to decapitation in order to make less noise and save precious ammunition.

Djezzar Ahmad Pasha

Napoleon’s occupation army was intended to be supported by the French fleet, but Nelson’s destruction of this force left Bonaparte in need of regional alliances for his isolated regime. Failed overtures to the Ottoman ruler of Syria, the ‘Butcher’, Djezzar Pasha (the Saddam Hussein of his day) led to a disastrous French campaign in Palestine where the army was ravaged by plague and heavy battle losses. The Sharif of Mecca, whose economy was dependent upon coffee exports to Egypt, maintained a pleasant correspondence with Bonaparte while allowing thousands of fierce tribesmen to cross the Red Sea to fall upon the French troops. The eager tribesmen had heard that the French wore armour of gold and silver.

Napoleon abandoned his army to return to France in mid-1799. The army held on until their capitulation to the Turks and English in 1801. In exile at St. Helena, Bonaparte romanticized his Egyptian exploits; “If I had stayed in the Orient, I probably would have founded an empire like Alexander’s by going on pilgrimage to Mecca.”

George Bush is unlikely to contemplate the conversion of himself or his army in order to win over Muslim opinion in the “War on Terrorism.” If the conflict expands beyond Afghanistan to Iraq and Yemen, however, American troops will run into the same problems of distrust and resentment from Muslims that made the French conquest of Egypt impossible. In Afghanistan the limited American presence has not been enough to prevent power returning to the warlords, Afghanistan’s modern “Mamluks.” Afghanistan’s new US-approved president is as powerless as Napoleon’s native appointees in Cairo.

Protestations of friendship and respect will continue to dominate US relations with most of the Muslim world, but there is always the danger of a modern-day Sharif of Mecca turning his eyes when his people begin to join the fray. Bonaparte wrote at the time, wrongly, that “by gaining the support of the great shaykh-s of Cairo, one gains the public opinion of all Egypt.” Throughout the French occupation the Egyptians expressed a preference for misrule by the Muslim Mamluks to the scientific administration of their self-proclaimed benefactors, the infidel French. It was a lesson the French found hard to understand, but one that the Americans must recognize if they are to have success in forming effective governments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Unilateral imposition of unpopular puppet regimes will not contribute to the security of the Middle East and Central Asia. The real challenge for Washington is the introduction of forms of government that will engage the interest and participation of the citizens of the Muslim world. When under pressure in Egypt, Bonaparte’s republicanism quickly turned to imperialism. Unlike Bonaparte, however, Mr. Bush cannot simply walk away from the Mid-East if the going gets tough. To succeed, “regime-change” must be about governance issues as much as the consolidation of petroleum interests.

Algeria: The Arab-Berber Conflict Today

Posted on August 1, 2002 by McGregor

Dr. Andrew McGregor, CIIA

Shout Monthly, Toronto, August 2002

New developments in the ancient Berber-Arab conflict in Algeria have seen disaffected Arabs making common cause with the Berber minority against the Algerian government. While the Berbers have enjoyed important victories, their struggle with the Algerian government continues. Meanwhile, the Berbers – like most of the Islamic world, non-Arabs who do not necessarily share the goals of Arab Islamists – face violent opposition from the Islamic insurgents. Dr. Andrew McGregor explores recent events.

Wild street celebrations in the towns of the Kabyle mountains of Algeria welcomed the pardon and release of dozens of Berber activists from Algerian prisons on August 5. President ‘Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s concession to Berber demands for a presidential amnesty gave the appearance that the struggle between the ethnic Berber minority and the Algerian government and security forces has taken a turn in favour of the Berbers. This struggle is often depicted as part of the old rivalry between Arabs and native Berbers in northern Africa, but last summer the Berber opposition became dangerous to the government when Berber protests began to pull disaffected Algerian Arabs in behind them. Berber militants have demonstrated an ability to embarrass le Pouvoir, the cabal of business leaders and generals that run Algeria behind a democratic façade. The mobilized Berber opposition is especially disturbing at a time when the government is seeking to privatize Algeria’s corruption-ridden oil industry while promoting supposed democratic reforms.

Protesters in Algiers Wave a Berber Flag (Asharq al-Awsat)

As the indigenous people of North Africa, once occupying a swath of territory stretching from the Canary Islands to the Nile Valley, the Berbers endured Carthaginian and Roman rule before Muslim Arabs began to spread west in the late seventh century, eventually overpowering the native culture. The struggle between Arabs and Berbers for North Africa became part of several great Arabic-language poetic epics still told in north African coffee-shops today. Since then, the Berbers have declined in numbers and territory, though large numbers may still be found in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco (40% of the total population) as well as the mountains of Algerian Kabylia, where their 7 million people make up roughly 25% of the national population. Other groups are found in Tunisia (35% of the population), Libya, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Egypt.

Today, in the midst of a Berber cultural revival, many Kabyle Berber leaders represent the Arabs as the latest in a series of colonizers (There are smaller groups of Algerian Berbers in the Aures mountains and the Ouarseni Massif, but the Kabylians are the most politically active). It is a mistake to regard Berbers as an excluded minority, however. Berbers can be found in the highest levels of Algerian military, political, business and intellectual circles.

The Berbers have always been difficult subjects when ruled by other peoples. Roman Christianity and Arab Islam alike were faced with a Berber affinity for heretical movements. After the Arab conquest the Berbers learned to use Islamic identities and institutions to reassert control over their communities, eventually building three great empires in North Africa and Spain between the 11^th and 15^th centuries; the Almoravids, the Almohads and the Maranids. Berbers bristled at Arab airs of superiority due to their intimate connection to Islam’s homeland. In response several hadith-s (traditions) were fabricated which described the conversion of the Berbers by the Prophet Muhammad himself well before the Arab conquest. The Moroccan Bargawatiyya movement translated the Koran into Berber in the 10^th century, but Sunni Muslim reformists destroyed their kingdom and burnt the offensive Berber Koran.

Horace Vernet Painting of the First French Mass in Kabylia, 1837

The French, who finished their conquest of Kabylia in 1857, attempted to divide the Berbers from their Arab neighbours. The use of Berber customary law (qanun) rather than Islamic shari’a law was approved for Kabylia. The French also attempted to ‘re-convert’ the Kabyle Berbers to Christianity in an attempt to gain colonial allies in Algeria. While the French produced endless studies ‘proving’ a Christian legacy in Kabylia, there is little evidence that Christianity ever spread beyond a small number of culturally assimilated coastal Berbers in the later days of the Roman Empire. Though Berber conversion to Islam was widespread, their interpretation of Islamic law has always been tempered by the maintenance of pre-Islamic custom. Women are particularly important in the preservation of ancient customs and have been in the forefront of recent demonstrations.

French attempts to split Arabs from Berbers were ultimately a failure. During the struggle for Algerian independence, the Berbers stood solidly behind the revolutionary FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), providing much of the movement’s internal leadership. The post-independence government, mostly composed of returned Arab political exiles, soon found itself fighting armed Kabyle groups after Ben Bella declared Algeria an Arab state in 1962. Kabylian Berbers had a high literacy rate in French, with Arabic often a third language at best. Post-independence Arabization policies marginalized many Berbers accustomed to privileged access to government positions in the previously French-speaking government. The confusion over language and the wretched state of Algerian schools has led some Kabyle Berbers to describe their people, with bitter humour, as “trilingual illiterates.”

Mouloud Mammeri, 1917-1989 (Le Matin d’Algerie)

The Berber language, which now flourishes as much in Paris as in the Kabyles, is at the heart of Berber/Arab tensions. The latest round of confrontation began in 1980 when Professor Mouloud Mammeri attempted to give a lecture on ancient Berber poetry. The Algerian government showed its insecurity by canceling the lecture, leading to widespread demonstrations. Then-president Chadli Benjedid responded by declaring: “We are Arabs whether we like it or not. We belong to the Arab-Islamic civilization and there is no other identity for the Algerian citizen.” Since independence, both Berber language and culture had been dying a natural and almost unnoticed death, but a combination of forced Arabization and repression sparked a Berber renewal. According to the late Berber poet, Kateb Yacine, “They want to depict us as a minority within an Arab people, when in fact it is the Arabs who are a minute minority within us, but they dominate us through religion…”. This has become a common refrain among Berber militants, who like to remind Algeria’s Arabs that most of them are part of an Arabized Berber majority.

A major victory for the Berbers was achieved in March, when the President reversed the long-held Arabization policy to make the modern Berber language, Tamazight, a national language, declaring that ‘When we speak about Tamazight, we mean the identity of the entire Algerian people.’ A modified Latin script is now used to write Tamazight. The ancient Libyans, Berber contemporaries of the Ancient Egyptians, had used a phonetic script to transcribe their language. Preserved in slightly modified form in the Tifinagh characters used by the Saharan Tuareg, this script is now being promoted as an authentic means of recording Tamazight. It is but one example of today’s Berbers reaching to the past for forms of expression and identity. The ongoing publication in France of the Encyclopédie Bérbére is another vital development in creating a Berber cultural base. A new Berber-language translation of the Koran is also in publication.

At the forefront of Berber resistance is the Mouvement Cultural Bérbére (MCB), a group that found itself in the 1990s fighting not only government Arabization, but also attacks from radical Islamists who find fault with Berber (and most Algerian Arab) forms of Islamic worship. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) called for the total Arabization and Islamization of the Kabylians, and introduced the pattern of brutal murders and rural massacres that have characterized the rest of the Algerian civil war. Berber-language singers were special targets of FIS assassination squads, sometimes having their throats cut after being killed in order to make the point. As if to rub salt into an open wound, the Algerian government passed a law enforcing the use of Arabic only days after the assassination of the highly popular Berber singer Lounes Matoub in 1998. In Algeria, as in Morocco, government authorities refused to register Berber names for newborns, and legal proceedings are conducted entirely in Arabic.

(al-Jazeera)

Faced with government intolerance, the Kabyle Berbers must also cope with Islamists who regard them as secularists or even heretics. While the FIS has come to terms with the government, the violence has been sustained by the activities of the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC). Both groups have prominent places on the US State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, and are linked to al-Qa’idah. Recently the government (with American backing) has finally scored major victories against both groups, raising hopes of a so-far elusive military solution to the Islamist insurrection. The government’s credibility, however, is threatened by renewed accusations of involvement in civilian massacres ultimately blamed on the Islamists. So long as the Algerian general staff remain the power behind the civilian government there is unlikely to be any investigation or resolution of these claims. In the meantime, the political violence continues, claiming 150 lives last month alone.

The Algerian Berbers are represented by two political parties, the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), and the smaller Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD). The RCD joined Bouteflika’s government, but has suffered in reputation as a result. Berber political activity has lately been moving away from the largely discredited political parties to the local community councils (jama’a), the traditional method of self-governance in the Kabyles. Many feel that the amnesty for Berber activists was part of an effort to avoid a Berber boycott of local elections in October. A militant-led campaign for ‘zero-balloting’ in Kabyle resulted in only a 2% turnout in parliamentary elections earlier this year. The official turnout nation-wide was set at 47%, a figure many Algerians claim is far too high. Though the opposition parties that were expected to do so well in the elections barely registered in the final tally, the results were characterized by the US State Department as ‘progress in Algeria for greater democracy’.

President Bouteflika has had little success in dealing with a morbid economy, housing shortages, severe inequities in the distribution of Algeria’s oil wealth, continuing Islamist violence and an unemployment rate of over 30% (higher in Kabylia). For Bouteflika, last summer’s Berber-generated unrest provided a convenient scapegoat for his own failures; according to the president, the unrest came just as Algeria “was about to regain its real place on the national stage, rebuild and launch an economic revival programme.” Bouteflika has also relied on the well-worn suggestion of ‘external sources’ behind the unrest. More than 60% of Algeria’s population is now under 30 years of age, and prospects are increasingly bleak. Last summer young Arab demonstrators shouted “Nous sommes tous des Kabyles!” in what the government must have found a bizarre challenge to official policy.

Unlike their Tuareg cousins to the south, who have engaged in separatist revolts in Mali and Niger, the Berbers of Kabyle are not engaged in a separatist movement. No one seriously believes that the mountains can sustain an independent country. The Berbers are engaged in a cultural and linguistic struggle based on a strong tradition of independence within a greater state. The World Amazigh Congress has concluded that:

The Algerian state cannot continue suppressing the country’s age-old language and culture. It must be the state of everyone and not only that of the citizens of the Muslim faith or Arabic speakers. It must become the state of all Algerians without discrimination on the basis of language or faith. For this reason, it must inject in the country’s constitution political, linguistic and religious pluralism.

Similar demands were made in a “Berber Manifesto” released by Moroccan Berber activists two years ago.

Algeria’s continuing instability delays the resumption of much needed foreign investment as the Algerian government lurches from crisis to crisis. For now, international reaction is mixed; Libya has expressed grave concerns about the prospect of destabilization in the Maghrab as a result of Berber/Arab conflict, France has been loudly rebuked by the Algerian government for interference after complaining of gendarmarie tactics, and Morocco, with its large Berber minority, continues to watch developments carefully. Berber demands for the removal of the heavy-handed Algerian gendarmarie from the Kabyles and more equitable distribution of energy-sector revenues continue to be sore-points. Aware of their millennia-old presence in North Africa, the Algerian Berbers appear ready to resist assimilation and to preserve an independent African and Muslim identity despite the opposition of national leaders and Islamists alike.

The Saddam You Know and the Devil You Don’t

Posted on May 8, 2002 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

Ottawa Citizen Commentary

May 8, 2002

A banker with a spotty record, a handful of nervous generals in exile and a couple of war criminals – meet the leaders of the Iraqi opposition, one of whom will soon take the prize as the American-sponsored alternative to Saddam Hussein. U.S. strategy in Iraq favours the replacement of Saddam Hussein by another Sunni Muslim strongman through a coup d’état, but the efficiency of Iraq’s security services continually puts Saddam several steps ahead of the CIA. Unable to mount a coup, the United States has squandered millions on ineffectual and corrupt Iraqi exile “leaders” who are no closer to a popular insurgency now than they were 10 years ago.

The leading contender is a wealthy Iraqi Shiite mathematician, Ahmad Chalabi, who is said to have escaped Jordan in the trunk of a car after his mathematical skills failed to prevent his Petra Bank being closed down for “irregularities.” Mr. Chalabi convinced several U.S. congressmen to propose him as leader of an Iraqi opposition coalition in 1991. He wanted to unite the disparate opposition groups under one umbrella – the Iraqi National Congress (INC) – with himself as leader and paymaster, of course. Through the early 1990s, the opposition parties met at CIA-funded affairs that the participants believed were paid for through Mr. Chalabi’s allegedly embezzled millions.

The problem with Mr. Chalabi is that he is virtually unknown inside Iraq and his credibility is hopelessly compromised by years of association with the CIA. Even within the Iraqi National Congress, Mr. Chalabi is widely disliked. The joke in Washington is that Mr. Chalabi has more influence on the banks of the Potomac than on the banks of the Tigris. The September 11 attacks postponed yet another Washington investigation into Mr. Chalabi’s questionable accounting practices as Iraqi National Congress leader.

Under the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, the U.S. government is allowed to fund seven different opposition groups ranging from Iranian-backed Shiite Islamists to constitutional monarchists. Each has its own agenda, and there is little chance of long-term co-operation under the Iraqi National Congress umbrella.

The idea of using the Iraqi National Congress as a type of Northern Alliance ground army [as in Afghanistan] supported by American air power comes on the heels of years of neglect of the military capabilities of the INC. Small in numbers, inexperienced in combat, poorly armed and in all likelihood riddled by Iraqi intelligence agents, it would take an amazing transformation to turn the INC into a reliable fighting force.

There is no question that many Iraqi officers are ready to turn against Saddam, but they will not do so based on an air campaign. Saddam’s regime has survived 10 years of sporadic bombing, only to emerge with Saddam more powerful than ever. A previous INC attempt to seize power in 1995 ended in disaster when the U.S. withdrew its support in favour of an internal military coup.

Two Kurdish factions provide most of the INC troops. Now co-operating with each other after years of civil war, they have no incentive to renew the fight against Baghdad. The Kurdish north is enjoying unprecedented autonomy, a revived economy thanks to the United Nations oil-for-food program, and protection from the U.S. Air Force. The Kurdish minority knows it will never be able to seize power in Baghdad as the Tajiks have done in Kabul. Many Kurds have felt betrayed by the CIA in the past and are wary of new involvement, knowing that Turkey, a vital U.S. NATO ally, would oppose full independence.

Lately, some elements within the U.S. administration transferred their support from the INC to another contender, Ayad Alawi and his Iraqi International Accord (mostly defectors from the Iraqi military), though Mr. Alawi is also unknown to a generation of Iraqis. Others favour Nizar Khazraji, one of Saddam’s generals until his defection several years ago. The ex-general is now under house arrest in Denmark, accused of being responsible for war crimes and participating in the 1988 gas attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja. Many of Mr. Khazraji’s fellow exiles suspect the general is a double agent for Iraqi intelligence.

Though broad generalizations about Iraqi democracy are made for public consumption, the concept is given short shrift in closed-door discussions in Washington. The United States still fears that a politically liberated Shiite majority in Iraq might choose to join their religious brethren in Iran, creating a type of Shia super-state inimical to American interests. The deep enmities between Iraq’s Arab Shiites and the Iranians that developed during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s are overlooked in this vision of the future, but, like the Mafia says, why take a chance?

Put simply, in the event of a U.S. attack on Iraq, the work of seizing the oil fields and sites of possible deployment of weapons of mass destruction would be far too important to be left to the Iraqi National Congress. These tasks will need to be done quickly without any room for error.

There is a growing feeling in Washington that the use of proxy forces to fight its battles in the region was a mistake. Since the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on covert attempts to depose Saddam Hussein, with nothing to show for it but some INC assurances that victory is only a few more million away.

When Saddam enjoyed American support in the 1980s, it was because of his success in holding Iraq together and containing revolutionary Iran by concentrating power within the ruling Sunni minority. His successor will be expected to carry out the same missions. It is only Saddam who has worn out his welcome, not Iraq’s secular dictatorship. Faced with crippling fragmentation or a brutally enforced unity, it is little wonder that Iraqis fear the future more than Saddam.

AIS UPDATE – December 2016

What happened to the main candidates to lead post-Saddam Iraq?

Ahmad Chalabi

After channeling massive amounts of false “intelligence” regarding Iraqi WMDs to the Bush administration and the New York Times, Chalabi fell out with the Americans after he was accused of fraud and theft. In June 2004 he was accused of supplying U.S. state secrets to Iran. Counterfeiting charges and an alleged assassination attempt followed. Following ten years in Iraqi politics, Chalabi died in 2015.

Ayad Alawi

Shiite politician Ayad Alawi supplied questionable “evidence” of Iraqi WMDs to the UK that played a major role in obtaining public support for the in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Allawi was made interim Prime Minister of Iraq in 2004-05 and served as Vice-President of Iraq in 2014-2015.

Nizar al-Khazraji

The former general wanted for war crimes created a political scandal by escaping house arrest in Denmark in 2003. He is believed to have fled to the United Arab Emirates. Nothing was heard from him until 2014, when a memoir of his military service during the Iran-Iraq War was published in Qatar.

Unmasking the ‘Axis of Evil’: Iraq, Iran and North Korea are no angels. But they are no al-Qaeda sympathizers, either.

Posted on February 19, 2002 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

Ottawa Citizen Commentary

February 19, 2002

In his state of the union address, American president George W. Bush repackaged the “rogue nations” of the Clinton era as the more threatening “axis of evil,” a new target in the war on terrorism. Prime Minister Chretien said last week that “the question of the production of unacceptable armaments in Iraq is a problem that is under the authority of the United Nations, and it is completely different than the problem of terrorism,” a statement that could easily be applied to Iran and North Korea. Does the axis play a role in international terrorism, or is the American administration taking care of some unfinished business while it is mobilized for war? For an answer, let’s look at the involvement in terrorism of each of these states.

Iraq

The prime minister [of Canada] and Russian president Vladimir Putin last week both said there was insufficient evidence to connect Iraq to Islamist terrorism. The secular Iraqi leadership prefers to support secular splinter groups of the PLO rather than Islamist groups. Osama bin Laden detests Saddam Hussein so much that he offered during the Persian Gulf War to raise an army of Arab veterans of Afghanistan to fight Iraq on behalf of Saudi Arabia.

Most allegations of Iraqi collusion with Islamist groups come from defectors to the United States who are seeking citizenship and money in return for information that invariable comes without substantiating evidence. Iraq continues to harbour Mujahedeen Khalq, an Iranian terrorist group opposed to the current Iranian regime and responsible for a number of assassinations. Baghdad continues to host the ailing and inactive Abu Nidal, but, like Osama bin Laden, Saddam’s support for Palestine is mostly rhetorical.

Iraq does have an active chemical and biological weapons program (developed with U.S. and British assistance), but it is highly unlikely to provide such weapons to terrorist groups for fear of retribution. Saddam has nothing in common with Islamist groups, and his commitment to the Palestinians does not include endangering his own position.

Iran

Shiite Iran was a bitter enemy of the Shiite-hating Sunni Taliban, supplying arms to the Northern Alliance and nearly going to war with the Taliban in 1998. Al-Qaeda’s anti-Shiite extremists are unlikely recipients of Iranian aid. Iran condemned the September 11 attacks and, in recent days, Iran claims to have arrested 150 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters and family members who fled to Iran after escaping Afghanistan via U.S. ally Pakistan, a long-time supporter of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Iran remains a patron of the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah organization, which made a successful strategic transition from classic terrorism to guerrilla operations against Israeli military targets in its battle to drive Israel from Lebanon. Hezbollah is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S., a definition not completely accepted elsewhere. Iran also supports the Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups of militants within Palestine, regarding the liberation of Palestine as a religious obligation. The shipment of arms intercepted by Israel was probably less an attempt to aid terrorist attacks than to give the Palestinians the means to adopt the proven methods of the Hezbollah.

Iran has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, but considers itself a victim of terrorism by Mujahedeen Khalq attacks and likes to remind the U.S. that its unconditional support for Israel undermines the war against terrorism.

Iranian intelligence forces have been implicated in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, but there have been no major incidents of direct Iranian terrorism since the election of moderate president Mohammad Khatami in 1997. Democratization and westernization are ongoing processes in Iran, but moderates seeking engagement with the West are being pushed into the camp of the conservative clergy by the “axis of evil” speech.

North Korea

North Korea’s terrorist acts have traditionally been organized by state security groups and have been almost exclusively directed at South Korea. Despite this, it is reconciliation-seeking South Korea that has protested most strongly at the inclusion of North Korea in the axis.

North Korea’s major acts of terrorism occurred in 1983 and 1987, during the presidency of the late Kim II-Sung. With American urging, North Korea has since signed five anti-terrorism conventions and is in the process of ratifying two more. But its refusal to surrender members of the now moribund Japanese Red Army (responsible for a 1970 hijacking) to Japan has placed North Korea on the U.S. list of terrorist states.

Nevertheless, there are no pressing “terrorism” concerns that involve North Korea (though a Tamil Tiger video shot last year is alleged by some to show North Korean equipment in use by the Tamils). There is no evidence that North Korea has ever been involved with Islamist terrorist groups.

Each of the axis countries has a historical association with terrorism (a large club), but may be regarded as uncooperative or hostile to the aims of al-Qaeda. The axis appears to be a revision of the list of rogue states, conceived as possible sources of nuclear-armed missile attacks on the continental United States. The $60 billion scheme intended to defend the U.S. from this possibility, the unproven National Missile Defense (NMD), should not have survived September 11 when it was demonstrated that expensive and provocative ballistic missile programs were unnecessary to inflict major damage on the U.S. Currently, none of these nations is close to being able to target the U.S. with missiles. Unable to protect the U.S., the missile defence shield is an expensive gift to the defence industry.

Even if a strike on the U.S. were successful, none of the axis states has arrived at a solution to a variant of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) that we might term AD, Assured Destruction.

But while the Americans fret about the “axis of evil,” two of the world’s largest states remain poised inches away from nuclear annihilation in Kashmir. The al-Qaeda leadership remains at large, Afghanistan remains a ruinous breeding ground for violence, Saudi Arabia and Egypt remain unaddressed hotbeds of Islamist extremism and the Israel/Palestinian conflict is escalating. In the meantime, the “victory” over the primitive Taliban is taken as proof that Pax Americana can be imposed on all the U.S.’s enemies at once.

An attempt to replace any of the axis regimes would require a serious commitment of U.S. ground forces, especially with coalition support falling by the way. In the meantime, Americans are left asking; Whatever happened to that Bin Laden fellow?

Darfur in the Age of Stone Architecture – Index

Posted on December 30, 2001 by McGregor

McGregor, Andrew: Darfur in the Age of Stone Architecture c. AD 1000 – 1750: Problems in Historical Reconstruction, BAR International Series 1006, Cambridge Monographs in African Archaeology 53, 2001

Please note the names from the King-lists have not been included in the index.

Footnotes are indexed for content but not citations.

Aba Kuri: 96(fn.44)

Abalessa: 14, 14(fn.29)

‘Abbasids: 24, 25, 26(fn.39), 28(fn.65), 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 43, 48, 50, 50(fn.64), 51, 52, 55, 56, 128

‘Abd al-Gadir: 38,

‘Abd al-Karim, Sultan: 44, 45, 56, 77-78, 88

‘Abd al-Karim ibn Yame: 28(fn.65), 43

‘Abd al-Majid, Sultan: 44

‘Abd al-Qadir: 68

‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid, Sultan: 96, 96(fn.39)

‘Abdallahi ibn Muhammad al-Khalifa: 62(fn.38)

‘Abdallab Arabs: 50(fn.64), 126

‘Abdullah Gema’a (Jama’a): 126-127

‘Abdullah Wad Hasoba al-Moghrabi: 62(fn.36)

‘Abdullahi Bahur, King: 28

‘Abdullahi Kamteinye, Sultan: 30

Abéché: 45, 77

Abo: 96(fn.44)

Abraham: 36(fn.44)

Abtar: 128(fn.68)

Abu Asal: 88, 95

Abu Delayk: 117

Abu Deleig: 125(fn.37)

Abu al-Fida: 22(fn.4), 23, 52

Abu Garan: 118-119

Abu Hadid: 129, 130

Abu Hamed: 37(fn.46), 124

Abu Hamid al-Gharnati: 38

Abu Haraz: 124(fn.32)

Abu Kundi: 89

Abu’l-Malik: 55

Abu Negila: 116(fn.4)

Abu’l-Qasim: 89, 89(fn.28), 96

Abu Qona’an: 16, 74, 117, 122(fn.6), 123, 128-130, 128(fn.68), 132, 140

Abu Sufyan (Sofyan): 122-124, 127, 127(fn.51), 130, 131, 134

Abu Suruj: 21

Abu Telfan: 23(fn.18), 45, 77

Abu Urug: 125

Abu Zabad: 28

Abu Zayd: 49-52, 52-53, 85

Abu’l-Sakaring Dynasty: 50

Abunjedah: 54

Al-Abwab: 37, 37(fn.46), 129, 129(fn.78)

Abydos: 25

Abyssinia, Abyssinians: 26(fn.38), 38, 111(fn.12), 129, 129(fn.79)

Acien, Kwanyireth Bol: 75

Adams, William Y.: 68, 123, 132(fn.5), 134

Al-Adayk: 49

Addison, F.: 122

Adelberger, J.: 64(fn.57)

Adimo (Dimo): 75

Adindan: 68(fn.97)

Ador, King: 37, 129

‘Agab, King: 85

Agadez: 137

Agadez Chronicle: 130

Agathermerus: 16

Agumbulum: 130

Ahaggar: 13(fn.26)

Ahl al-Awaid: 86

Ahmad Adam: 36

Ahmad al-‘Abbasid: 50

Ahmad Arbaf, Faki: 35

Ahmad Bakr, Sultan: 88-89, 93(fn.10), 95, 96, 96(fn.44)

Ahmad al-Daj: 25, 26, 27, 27(fn.45), 28, 29, 30

Ahmad al-Dia: 29

Ahmad Hamid: 61, 62(fn.37)

Ahmad al-Kabgawi: 27

Ahmad Kanjar: 45

Ahmad al-Ma’qur: 10, 18, 44, 46(fn.31), 49-56, 50(fn.60), 84-85, 87, 112(fn.26), 139

Ahmad al-Turkan: 28

Aidhab: 65

Ainyumba Daifani: 116

Aïr: 113, 130, 137

Akec La, Queen: 75

Akurwa: 75(fn.2)

Alans: 36(fn.44)

Albanians: 74

Albinism: 129, 129(fn.86)

Alexander the Great: 29, 36-39, 36(fns.44-45), 37(fns.51-52),

Alexandria: 126(fn.44)

Algeria: 13-14, 20,

‘Ali, A. Muhammad: 9

‘Ali Ahmad: 119(fn.36)

‘Ali Dinar (Sultan): 4, 11, 11(fn.s 10, 11), 12, 34(fn.26), 34(fn.29), 35, 43(fn.3), 45(fn.23), 54, 57(fn.5), 62(fn.38), 69, 78(fn.14), 96, 96(fn.38), 96(fn.40), 116, 116(fn.1)

‘Ali Dunama: 72

‘Ali Ghaji Zeinama: 72

‘Ali ibn Ahmad, Sultan: 72

‘Ali Korkorat, Sultan: 59, 59(fn.15)

‘Ali Musa: 45

Almásy, László Ede: 127(fn.57)

Almohads: 52

Almoravids: 110(fn.1)

Alwa (Aloa): 37(fn.46), 62(fn.36), 122, 123, 126(fn.44), 127, 131

Ama Soultane: 77

‘Amara Dunqas: 126

Ambus Masalit: 78(fn.14)

Amdang: 86

Aminu, Muhammadu: 16

Ammon: 37, 37(fns.53-54), 38

Ammon (place-name): 128

Amsa, Queen: 72

Amun-Re: 37

Anakim: 128

‘Anaj (Anag, Anak): 48(fn.53), 117, 122, 122(fn.6), 123-131, 123(fn.12), 124(fn.32), 125(fns.37,38), 127(fns.57,58), 128(fns.60,68), 130(fn.92), 140

Andal: 29

Andalus: 48

Anderson, AR: 37(fn.50)

Anedj: 129

‘Angarib, Sultan: 26, 27

Anglo-Egyptian Condominium: 12, 13, 27, 27(fn.52), 62(fn.42), 79, 124

Ani, King: 129, 129(fn.77)

Annok: 36(fn.41)

Anthony: 13(fn.26)

Arab, Arabs: 17, 18, 24(fn.25), 26, 28(fn.65), 31(fn.5), 36(fn.44), 43(fn.6), 44, 44(fn.8), 45, 45(fn.23), 48, 49, 50(fn.60), 53(fn.90), 55, 56, 57(fn.2), 62, 63(fn.47), 72(fn.128), 87, 88(fn.18), 89, 111, 111(fns.11,12), 116, 117, 119, 125(fn.33), 125(fn.37), 126, 128(fn.68), 129, 130, 139

Arabia: 2, 26(fn.38), 27, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 38, 50, 117, 135, 136

Arabic: 11(fn.11), 13, 44(fn.13), 63, 64(fn.54), 71(fn.119), 73(fn.142), 75(fn.7), 77(fn.9), 96(fn.41), 97, 104, 109, 110(fn.1), 111(fn.11), 117(fn.15), 140

Arari: 96(fn.41)

Arin Dulo: 31

Arkell, AJ: 1, 7-9, 12, 16, 20, 21, 23(fn.16), 25, 26, 27, 29(fn.69), 31, 31(fn.6), 33, 33(fn.18), 34, 34(fn.25), 34(fn.30), 36, 36(fn.39), 38, 38(fn.57), 44(fn.13), 45, 45(fn.21), 46, 46(fn.31, 32), 46(fn.35), 47, 48, 50, 53(fn.90), 54, 56, 57, 57(fn.1), 59(fn.9), 60, 60(fn.24), 61, 62, 62(fn.37), 63, 63(fn.49), 64, 64(fn.53), 65, 65(fn.67), 66-69, 68(fn.97), 69(fns.101,102), 70-71, 70(fn.111), 71(fn.118), 72, 72(fn.129), 74, 75, 75(fn.7), 78(fn.14), 91(fns.2,3,7), 93, 93(fn.8), 94, 94(fns.21,22,27), 95, 96(fns.39,41), 97, 97(fn.46), 112, 112(fn.21), 113, 115, 116, 116(fn.4), 117, 118, 122(fn.6), 123, 123(fn.13), 127, 128, 130(fn.96), 132, 134

Arianism: 137

Arlas: 128(fn.68)

Armenia, Armenians: 52(fn.79)

Armi Kowamin: 64(fn.53)

Ary: 129

Asben: 130

Ashdod: 128

Ashmolean: 65

Assyrian: 8, 28(fn.65)

Aswan: 110, 116, 137

Asyut: 5, 125

Atbara: 88, 116, 131

Aule: 63

Aurès: 20

Aurungide Dynasty: 116

Awlad Mahmud: 130

Awlad Rashid: 72(fn.128)

Awlad Sulayman: 44, 63(fn.47)

Axum: 113

Ayesha: 55

‘Ayn Farah: 33, 36(fn.39), 54(fn.99), 56, 57(fn.5), 61, 64-74, 64(fn.60), 65(fn.67), 66(fn.75), 67(fn.86), 69(fn.100), 69(fn.102), 91(fn.3), 112, 122, 127, 131, 132, 134, 137, 139

‘Ayn Galakka: 55, 66(fn,75), 73-74, 73(fns.146,148), 128(fn.68)

‘Ayn Siro: 60(fn.23)

‘Ayn Sirra: 72(fn.129)

Ayyubid: 23

Axum, Axumites: 8

Azagarfa: 96(fn.41)

Al-Aziz, Caliph: 52(fn.79)

Babaliya: 48,

Babylon: 22

Bachwezi: 18

Bacquié, Captain: 134

Badanga Fur: 71

Badar: 136

Badi, Sultan: 87

Badr al-Gamali al-Guyushi: 52(fn.79)

Bagari: 116

Baghdad: 50, 52

Bagirmi: 5, 7, 27(fn.55), 43, 62, 63, 75(fn.3), 88, 95, 111, 111(fn.11), 119, 135

Bagnold, RA: 116

Bahar: 91

Baheir Tageru: 125

Bahnasa: 43(fn.6)

Bahr, Wazir: 89

Bahr al-Arab: 27(fn.55), 75

Bahr al-Ghazal (Chad): 67(fn.86), 73, 74, 132-135, 132(fn.1)

Bahr al-Ghazal (South Sudan): 23, 25, 27(fn.45), 27(fn.55), 29, 31(fn.5), 33(fn.12), 75, 128(fn.68), 132(fn.1)

Bahr al-Jamal: 56

Baiyuda Wells: 124

Balal: 111(fn.11)

Balfour Paul, HG: 1, 8(fn.19), 17, 20, 26-27, 28, 31, 35, 36(fn.41), 38(fn.60), 44, 60, 60(fn.24), 61, 61(fn.29), 62, 65, 66, 66(fns.75,77), 68(fn.92), 69, 70, 72, 95

Banda: 7, 27(fn.55)

Bani Abbas: 48

Bani Habibi: 16

Bani Mukhtar: 16

Bantu: 27(fn.55)

Banu Hillal: 44, 46(fn.31), 48, 48(fn.53), 49, 51, 51(fn.71), 52, 52(fns.79, 80), 52(fn.86), 53, 57(fn.2), 85, 117, 120(fn.46), 129

Banu Sulaym: 52, 52(fn.79)

Banu Ummaya: 64(fn.53)

Bao: 49

Baqqara: 24, 27(fn.55), 44, 50(fn.60)

Barah (Bazah): 129

Barakandi: 31(fn.6)

Barani Berbers: 128(fn.68)

Barboteu, Lieutenant: 48

Barca: 64

Bargala: 57(fn.1)

Bariat: 55

Barkindo, BM: 46, 46(fn.30), 47, 111(fn.12), 136, 136(fn.32), 137, 137(fn.41)

Barqat Umm Balbat: 124

Barquq, Sultan: 111(fn.12)

Barr: 128(fn.68)

Barr ibn Qays ‘Aylan: 38

Barra, Battle of: 54

Barrjo: 31(fn.4), 128(fn.68)

Barth, Heinrich: 5, 43, 43(fn.6), 46, 46(fn.27), 57(fn.2), 111

Basa: 129(fn.78)

Basi: 28(fn.60)

Basigna: 119(fn.37)

Batálesa: 43, 43(fn.6)

Batnan, King: 85

Bayko: 23, 23(fns.17, 19), 25, 25(fn.29), 27(fn.45), 29, 88

Bayko King-List: 42

Bayt al-Mayram: 61, 69, 69(fn.102)

Bazina à degrès: 20, 20(fn. 22), 118(fn.27)

Beaton, AC: 16, 87, 87(fn.9)

Bedariya: 128

Bedde: 63

Befal: 129

Beja: 22, 132

Beliin: 137

Bell, Herman: 130(fn.92)

Bender, Lionel M.: 6, 23, 119(fn.34), 128(fn.60)

Bénesé: 43, 43(fn.6)

Benghazi: 77(fn.1)

Beni – see Bani

Benoit Pierre: 13, 13(fn.26)

Berber, Berbers: 7, 13, 14, 14(fn.29), 16, 17, 17(fn.15), 20, 21, 25, 26, 33, 36(fn.44), 38, 45(fn.25), 46, 46(fn.27, 30, 31), 48, 48(fn.53), 49, 52, 53, 53(fn.90), 57(fn.2), 61(fn.31), 62, 64(fn.53), 70, 72(fn.129), 77, 80(fn.2), 111(fns.11,12), 119, 122, 122(fn.6), 123, 125, 125(fn.33), 128, 128(fn.68), 129, 130, 130(fn.93), 137, 139

Beri: 23

Beringia, Battle of: 45(fn.23), 62(fn.42)

Berre, Henri: 24, 25

Berti: 33, 64, 116, 118-119, 119(fn.34), 120(fn.44)

Bayuda Desert: 125

Bible: 37(fn.52), 128

Bidayat: 27, 48, 48(fns.53, 54), 49, 49(fn.55), 72(fn.128), 117, 128(fn.68), 137

Bidayriya Arabs: 88(fn.18)

Bilaq: 33, 33(fn.22)

Bilia Bidayat: 137

Bilia Bidayat, Sections: 48

Bilma: 46

Biltine: 45

Binga: 7, 27(fn.55)

Bir Bai Depression: 77

Bir Natrun: 22(fn.1)

Birged (Birked): 51, 51(fn.71), 64, 64(fn.54), 88, 120, 120(fn.46)

Birged Sections: 120(fn.46)

Biriara Bidayat, Sections: 49

Birni: 56, 72(fn.134)

Bivar, AH: 11, 67(fn.86), 73(fn.144), 74

Blemmyes: 127(fn.58)

Blue Nile, Blue Nile Province: 7, 62(fn.36), 117

Bochianga: 132, 132(fn.7)

Bora Dulu: 9

Bordeaux, General: 73(fn.146)

Borgu: 135, 136

Borku: 44, 66(fn.75), 73, 74, 77(fn.1), 128, 132(fn.4), 137

Borno (Bornu): 5, 7, 11, 16, 16(fns. 4,7), 26(fn.39), 28, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 36(fn.44), 44, 46, 46(fn.27), 47, 47(fn.43), 48, 50, 50(fn.64), 51, 54, 57(fn.2), 63, 69(fn.101), 70, 70(fns.111,116), 71, 72-73, 72(fns.129,135), 74, 75, 75(fn.3), 77(fn.1), 80(fn.1), 88, 91, 110, 111, 111(fns.11.12), 112, 118, 119, 123, 127, 131, 137, 139

Bosnians: 74

Botolo Muhammad: 119(fn.36)

Brahim (Sultan): 44

Brands: 25, 46(fn.37), 70, 70(fn.107), 72(fn.129)

Braziers: 134

Brett, Michael: 52

Bricks, Brick Construction: 65(fn.67), 66, 66(fn.75), 67(fn.86), 70(fn.109), 72-73, 73(fns.142,143,144,148), 74, 95, 96, 114, 122, 124, 126, 127, 132

Britain, British: 11(fn.10), 13, 45(fn.23), 62(fn.42), 65(fn.67)

British Columbia: 15

Brown, Robert: 111

Browne, WG: 5, 46(fn.37), 114, 130

Bruce, James: 38(fn.58), 89(fn.28)

Brun-Rollet: 52

Buba: 15

Budge, EA Wallis: 127(fn.58)

Bugiha: 137(fn.37)

Bugur, King: 29, 31

Bukar Aji: 136(fn.32)

Bulala: 44, 48, 56, 67(fn.86), 70, 73, 73(fn.143), 110, 111, 111(fn.11), 112, 112(fn.21), 137

Bulgi: 57(fn.1)

Burgu Keli: 57(fn.1)

Burnus: 128(fn.68)

Burundi: 115

Busa: 135

Bussa: 136

Butana: 130

Butr Berbers: 128(fn.68)

Byzacena: 137

Byzantium, Byzantines: 43(fn.6), 135, 135(fn.21), 137

C-Group: 45(fn.21), 132(fn.7), 134

Cailliaud, Frèdèric: 38, 46(fn.37)

Cain: 128

Cairo: 11(fn.9), 52, 52(fn.79), 63, 64, 78(fn.15), 111, 111(fn.12)

Cameroon: 5, 115, 136(fn.32)

Campbell, E.: 60

Canaanites: 128, 128(fn.68), 132

Canary Islands: 37, 130, 37, 130(fn.93)

Cannibalism: 78(fn.14)

Capot-Rey, MR: 132(fn.5)

Carbou, H: 27(fn.54), 44(fn.8), 46(fn.32), 53, 80(fn.1), 111-112

Carrique, Captain: 73-74, 128(fn.68)

Carthage, Carthaginians: 14, 115, 137

Caucasus: 35, 36(fn.44)

Celts: 36(fn.44)

Central African Republic: 27(fn.55)

Chad: 7, 17, 22, 23, 27(fns.54,55), 31(fn.5), 44, 44(fn.13), 45, 48(fn.51), 66(fn.75), 67(fn.86), 72, 111(fn.9), 112, 113, 114, 132-137, 132(fn.7), 140

Changalif: 45

Chapelle, Jean: 44, 48

Chittick, HN: 125-127

Chokhorgyal Monastery: 35

Chosroe II (Chosroes, Khosraw, Kisra): 26(fn.38), 135, 135(fn.25)

Chouchet Tomb: 14, 14(fn.27), 20, 20(fn.21), 77, 118, 118(fn.27), 119, 119(fns.40,41,42)

Christianity, Christians: 8, 11, 23, 33, 36(fn.44), 38, 44(fn.13), 46, 46(fn.31), 46(fn.35), 46(fn.37), 47, 46(fn.37), 62(fn.36), 64(fn.54), 65(fn.67), 66, 67, 67(fn.86), 68-69, 69(fn.102), 70, 72(fn.129), 74, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117, 120, 120(fn.48), 122-123, 124(fn.29), 125-127, 126(fn.44), 130, 131, 132-137, 132(fns.4,6), 137(fn.41), 139-140

Chronicle of John: 137

Circassians: 74

Clapperton, H: 110(fn.3)

Clarke, Somers: 68

Cleopatra: 13(fn.26)

Cline, Walter: 48(fn.47)

Cohanim: 15

Cohen, Ronald: 11

Congo: 27(fn.55), 33(fn.12)

Copts (Egyptian): 111, 112, 123, 126(fn.44), 132, 135

Crawford, WF: 27, 38(fn.58), 123, 123(fn.13)

Crete: 38(fn.58)

Cromlech: 31(fn.10)

Crowfoot, JW: 130

Cunnison, I: 24

Cuoq, Joseph M.: 77(fn.9)

Currie, James: 46(fn.37)

Cyrenaïca: 37, 64, 77, 117

Cyrus the Great: 37(fn.52)

Dagio: 63

Dahia: 29

Daima: 114

Daju: 5, 6, 6(fn.6), 8, 12, 16, 18, 22-42, 22(fn.44), 23(fns.15, 16, 18, 19), 24(fn.21), 27(fn.45), 27(fn.52), 27(fn.54), 28(fn.58), 29, 29(fn.66-67, 71-72), 30, 30(fn.75,77), 31-42, 31(fn.6), 33, 33(fn.18), 34, 34(fn.25), 34(fn.29), 35, 36, 36(fn.45), 43, 44, 45, 51, 53(fn.98), 64, 64(fns.54,60), 72(fn.128), 75(fn.3), 87(fn.9), 91, 110, 112, 118, 118(fn.19), 128, 131, 139-140

Daju Hills: 27, 34, 113(fn.1)

Daju King-Lists: 40-42

Daju Sections: 24

Dak, son of Nyikango: 75

Dakin al-Funjawi: 88(fn.18)

Dakka: 116

Dala Afno (Dali Afnu, Afuno): 44, 70, 75, 91

Dala Gumami, Mai: 72

Dalatawa: 44

Dali: 31, 51, 54, 62-63, 71, 71(fn.118), 75, 75(fn.7), 76, 84, 87, 91, 93, 93(fn.10), 97(fn.45), 112(fn.26), 139

Dalloni, M: 119(fn.42), 130

Damergu: 47, 47(fn.46)

Danagla: 117

D’Anania, Giovanni Lorenzo: 63-64, 71

Danat, King: 29

Daoud al-Mireim, Sultan: 45

Dar Abo Dima: 51, 128

Dar Abo Uma: 51

Dar Birked: 89

Dar Dali (Daali): 62(fn.42), 75(fn.7)

Dar Dima: 75(fn.7)

Dar Erenga: 36(fn.41)

Dar Fertit (Fartit): 29, 112(fn.24)

Dar Fia: 87, 95

Dar Fur (see Darfur)

Dar Furnung: 43, 54, 64, 64(fn.60), 70, 72, 72(fn.129), 75, 86, 139

Dar al-Gharb: 75(fn.7)

Dar Hamid: 119

Dar Hawawir: 125

Dar Humr: 50, 50(fn.61)

Dar Kerne: 95

Dar Kobbé: 27(fn.45), 28(fn.65), 34(fn.25)

Dar Masalit: 30, 36(fn.41), 78(fn.14), 86

Dar Qimr (Gimr): 34(fn.25), 36(fn.41), 44, 45, 95

Dar al-Riah: 75(fn.7)

Dar Runga: 62(fn.42)

Dar Sila: 6(fn.6), 12, 23, 23(fn.18), 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29(fn.72), 30, 34(fn.25), 36(fn.41), 45, 56

Dar Simiat: 33

Dar Sinyar: 44

Dar Tama: 27, 27(fn.45), 29(fn.72), 45, 79

Dar Tokonyawi: 75(fn.7)

Dar Tuar: 50, 34(fn.25), 50

Dar Uma: 75(fn.7)

Dar Wona: 29, 31, 93, 93(fn.10)

Dar Zaghawa: 33(fn.18), 50, 64(fn.53), 112, 112(fn.24)

Dar Ziyad: 44

Daranga Fur: 78(fn.14)

Darb al-Arba’in: 4, 5, 50, 60, 110, 112, 112(fn.25), 122(fn.6)

Dardai: 47, 47(fn.46), 48, 48(fn.51)

Darfur, Administrative Divisions: 75(fn.7)

Darfur, Geography of: 2-4

Darfur, Trade Routes: 4, 73, 77(fn.1)

Darsala: 47, 47(fn.46)

Date Palm Cultivation: 36, 48, 80(fn.2),

Daud Kubara ibn Sulayman: 129

Da’ud al-Mirayn: 77

Dawa: 57

Dawurd al-Miriri al-Modaddan, Sultan: 55

Daza Tubu: 16, 16(5), 34(fn.29), 45, 47, 137

Dazaga (Dazagada): 44(fn.13), 45

De Breuvery, J: 30, 50

De Cadalvène, E: 30, 50

De Lauture, PHS D’Escrayac: 87

De Medeiros, F.: 17

De Neufville, RL: 65, 65(fn.61), 66(fns.74,75), 67(fn.87), 68, 69(fn.100)

Debba: 31, 31(fn.4)

Debeira East: 67

Debeira West: 65, 65(fn.67)

Delil Bahar: 51, 63

Demagherim: 46(fn.27), 54

Dengkur: 34(fn.26)

Denham, D.: 72, 110(fn.3)

Derdekishia: 47-48

Dereiba Lakes: 34-36

Derihurti: 47

Dhu’l-Adh’ar: 39

Dhu al-Manar: 38

Dhu Nowas: 136

Dhu al-Qarnayn (see Alexander the Great)

Diab, Sultan: 45

Diffinarti: 68

Diffusionism: 8

Dilling: 75

Al-Dimashqi: 123

Al-Dinawari: 37

Dingwall, RG: 63, 65

Dinka: 128

Dionysus: 37(fn.50), 38

Dirku: 16

Dirma: 57

Divine Kingship: 35, 113, 139

Diyab: 49

Djelil al-Hilali: 84(fn.3), 85

Djourab: 132

Dolmens: 118(fn.27)

Donatism: 137

Dongola: 23, 43, 52(fn.86), 67(fn.86), 85, 117, 122(fn.6), 123, 129, 134

Dowda: 57, 57(fns.1-2), 60

Drums (see Nahas)

Dukkume, Malik: 87

Dulo Kuri: 57, 91-93

Dumont, Henri J.: 60(fn.18), 118-120

Dumua: 64(fn.60)

Durma: 57(fn.5)

Duros: 47

Edmonds, JM: 123, 125

Edwards, WN: 116(fn.1)

Egypt, Egyptians: 5, 7, 8, 11, 25, 33(fn.22), 38, 43, 52, 52(fn.79), 53, 54, 60, 63, 63(fn.47), 64, 71, 74, 88, 97, 110, 111(fn.12), 112, 112(fn.25), 113, 122(fn.6), 123, 123(fn.16), 125, 127, 128, 128(fn.67), 129, 131, 132, 134, 135

Eilai: 125

England, English: 54

Ennedi: 8, 27, 36(fn.39), 44, 44(fn.15), 46, 48(fn.54), 55, 77, 128, 128(fn.68), 137

Eparch: 38(fn.59)

Equatoria: 33(fn.12)

Erenga: 36(fn.41), 79

Errè: 45

Et-Terge Masalit: 78(fn.14)

Ethiopia: 37, 128(fn.68)

Eunuchs: 20, 57(fn.2), 62, 62(fn.42), 76

Evans-Pritchard, EE: 7, 75(fn.2)

Fara: 54

Faragab: 129

Farafra Oasis: 52(fn.80)

Faras: 38, 67, 69

Fashir: 75(fn.3), 89

Al-Fashir: 5, 9, 11, 11(fn.9), 34(fn.26), 45, 45(fn.23), 50, 62(fn.38), 63(fn.47), 69, 75(fn.3), 78(fn.14), 120(fn.46), 135

Fatimids: 52, 52(fn.79)

Fazughli: 27, 38, 128

Fazzan (Fezzan): 5, 20(fn.22), 45(fn.23), 48, 48(fn.51), 119(fn.41)

Felkin, RW: 34, 86, 87(fn.9), 114

Fella (Fellanga): 64(fn.60), 70

Fenikang: 75(fn.2)

Fentress, Elizabeth: 52

Ferti: 20

Fertit: 27, 27(fn.55), 30

Fez: 62(fn.36)

Fezzan (Fazzan): 63(fn.47), 73, 74, 119

Fiki Khalil: 54

Fiki Muhammad Tahir: 62(fn.38)

Fileil, Sultan: 30

Filga: 59, 94, 95

Fir: 27(fn.55)

Fira: 64(fn.53)

Firat: 27(fn.55)

Fisher, AGB: 111(fn.11), 112, 112(fn.26)

Fora: 51

Forang Aba: 71

Foranga Fur: 71

Forei: 95

Foucauld, Pére: 13

France, French: 13, 30, 30(fn.78), 34(fn.29), 48(fn.51), 63(fn.47), 65(fn.67), 73(fn.146)

Franciscans: 137

Frobenius, Leo: 135

Fuchs, P.: 72(fn.128)

Fugbu (Fugobo): 80(fn.3)

Fulani: 36(fn.44), 72, 119

Funj: 24(fns.21, 25), 25, 31(fn.4), 38, 38(fn.57), 51, 87, 88(fn.18), 89, 95, 112, 126, 128(fn.60), 129, 131

Funj Chronicle: 51, 126, 126(fn.44), 127, 131

Fur: 6-7, 11, 16, 17, 18, 27(fn.55), 28, 29(fn.71), 30, 31, 33, 34, 34(fn.25), 36, 45, 45(fn.18), 51, 53, 55, 57, 57(fn.2), 62, 64, 64(fns.53,54), 71, 71(fns.120,123), 75, 78(fn.14), 79, 86-109, 86(fn.7), 91(fn.5), 123, 139

Fur King-Lists: 97-109

Fur Language: 86, 86(fn.2), 94(fn.22)

Furnung Hills: 60, 60(fn.23), 119(fn.38)

Furogé (Feroge): 27, 27(fn.55), 29(fn.73), 30

Ga’afir Gurmun (Germun), King: 85

Gabir: 64

Gabri: 20

Gaéda: 44, 44(fn.15)

Gamburu: 69(fn.101), 72-73

Gami Kheir, Malik: 116(fn.1), 118

Gao: 110(fn.1)

Gaoga: 33, 110-112, 110(fn.1), 112(fns.21,24,26)

Garamentes: 115, 130

Garoumélé: 73, 73(fn.143)

Garu: 72(fn.135)

Gedaref: 50

Garstang, John: 62

Gath: 128

Gaya: 136(fn.32)

Gaza: 128

Gelti al-Naga: 130(fn.94)

Genealogy: 5, 11(fn.11), 12-15, 24, 47(fn.46), 53(fn.91), 84, 96(fn.41), 97, 111(fn.12), 128(fn.68)

Geneina: 86

Genies (Jinn): 62(fn.38)

German: 64(fn.57)

Gezira: 129(fn.78)

Ghabashat, Battle of: 89

Ghana: 22, 135

Gharbanin: 25(fn.29)

Ghazali: 67, 134

Ghudiyat Arabs: 87

Ghulam Allah ibn ‘Ayd: 28(fn.65)

Ghumsa: 46

Ghuzz: 74

Giants: 31(fn.4), 53-54, 73, 74, 123, 128, 128(fn.68)

Giggeri, Sultan: 88, 95

Gilgamesh: 37, 37(fn.50)

Gili: 78

Gillan, Angus: 7, 35, 35(fn.34)

Gillif Hills: 125

Gillo: 75

Ginsi: 87

Gitar, King: 28

Gitxsan: 15

Glass: 65-66, 65(fn.67)

Gnol: 23(fn.15)

Gobir: 135

Gog and Magog: 36, 36(fn.44)

Gogorma: 95

Gold: 71

Gordon-Alexander, LD: 96(fn.40)

Goths: 36(fn.44)

Greece, Greek: 7, 28(fn.65), 37, 38, 65(fn.67), 126(fn.44), 132, 135(fn.25), 137

Gros, René: 29, 44(fn.17)

Guanche: 130(fn.93)

Gula: 27(fn.55)

Gule: 128(fn.60)

Gunda: 47(fn.46)

Gura’an (Kura’an): 25, 34(fn.29), 56, 132, 137, 137(fn.37)

Gurli (Gerli): 95

Gurri: 95

Gurzil: 37(fn.53)

Haaland, R.: 114

Hababa, Habuba’at: 62(fn.38), 97

Habasha: 22, 23, 33(fn.22)

Hache à gorge axe: 125

Haddad: 113

Hafir: 120, 125, 125(fn.37), 130

Hajang Keingwo: 97, 97(fn.46)

Hajar Kudjuna: 25

Hajar Kujunung: 30,

Hajar Te’us: 28(fn.65)

Hajj ‘Ali: 50

Hajj Brahim Delil: 63

Ham, Hamites: 6-7, 8, 22, 25, 26, 38, 46, 125(fn.33), 128

Hamad ‘Abbas Himyar: 29(fn.73)

Hamaj (Hamej): 128, 128(fn.60)

Hamid bin Abdullah: 96(fn.41)

Hamid Ahmad: 28(fn.64)

Hammad bin Tamr: 119

Harim: 57(fn.2), 62(fn.42)

Harkhuf: 45(fn.21), 116

Harkilla: 135

Harut: 78

Hassaballah, General: 126

Al-Hassar, Sultan: 44

Hausa: 44, 70, 73(fn.143)

Hauya Hoe: 59, 113, 119

Hawara Berbers: 125, 125(fn.33)

Hawawir: 125, 125(fn.33),

Haycock, BG: 113

Haydaran, Battle of: 52

Haykal: 68

Hebrew, Hebrews: 36(fn.44), 128

Hebron: 65, 128

Helbou: 27(fn.31)

Helmolt, Dr.: 77(fn.9)

Henderson, KDD: 29

Henige, DP: 14, 84

Heracles: 37(fn.50)

Heraclius: 135

Herodotus: 11

Al-Hidjr: 28(fn.65)

Hijaz: 27(fn.53), 27(fn.54), 28(fn.65), 49, 78, 136

Hill, LG: 25

Hill Nubian: 120

Himyarites: 18, 26, 26(fns.38, 39), 29(fn.73), 38, 39, 38(fn.61), 49, 111(fn.12), 125(fn.33), 135, 136

Hobbs, Capt. HFC: 35, 35(fn.34)

Hobson, RL: 70

Hoes (see also Hauya hoes): 122, 122(fn.6)

Hoggar Mountains: 13, 20(fn.22),

Holt, PM: 48(fn.53), 51, 51(fn.74), 98

Holy Stones (see Stone Worship)

Houghton, AA: 65, 65(fn.61), 66(fns.74,75), 67(fn.87), 68, 69(fn.100)

Howara: 119

Hrbek, I: 63(fn.47), 71(fn.1244), 112

Huard, P.: 113, 132(fn.7), 134

Huddleston, Major HJ: 35

Hudud al-Alam: 132-134

Human Sacrifice: 78

Hummay, Sultan: 111(fn.12)

Hungarians: 74

Huns: 36(fn.44)

Hurreiz, Sayyid Hamed: 54

Husayn (Hussein) Abu Koda: 78(fn.14)

Husayn Morfaien, Sultan: 30

Ibadites: 137

Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahr: 129

Ibn Abi Zar of Fez: 125(fn.33)

Ibn al-‘Arabi: 23

Ibn Assafarani: 130,

Ibn Batuta: 64(fn.53)

Ibn Hazm: 38

Ibn Kathir: 37

Ibn Khaldun: 23, 38, 52, 52(fn.78)

Ibn Qutayba: 6

Ibn Sa’id: 22, 23, 37, 136

Ibn Selim al-Aswani: 37(fn.46), 62(fn.36), 126(fn.44), 127, 129(fn.78)

Ibn Shaddad: 52

Ibn al-Wardi: 33(fn.22)

Ibrahim (Pretender to the Fur Throne): 78(fn.14)

Ibrahim, Sultan (Fur): 5, 62(fn.38), 96, 116

Ibrahim, Sultan (Tunjur):

Ibrahim al-Dalil (see Dali)

Ibrahim Musa Muhammad: 7, 9, 9(fn.9), 68(fn.88), 70(fn.111)

Ibrahim bin ‘Uthman, Sultan: 110

Idris Aloma, Mai: 70, 70(fn.111), 71, 72-73, 75(fn.3), 123

Idris Ja’l: 87

Idris Katargarmabe (Katarkanabi), Sultan: 112

Al-Idrisi, Muhammad: 17, 22, 33, 45(fn.25), 111, 112(fn.20), 137

Ifriqsun bin Tubba Dhu al-Manar: 38

Ihaggaren Tuareg: 13

Illo: 136

Imam Ahmad: 47

Imatong Hills: 33(fn.12)

India, Indian: 63, 63(fn.47)

Iriba Plateau: 77,

Irima: 64(fn.53)

Iron, Iron-working: 33, 59(fn.13), 62, 70, 93, 113-115, 114(fns.12,16), 119-120, 120(fn.43), 122, 123, 123(fn.16), 140

Irtet: 116

Irtt: 116,

Isabatan: 13

‘Isawi bin Janqal: 89

Islam, Islamization: 11, 12, 18, 28(fn.65), 34, 36(fn.44), 44, 48, 50, 53(fn.90), 55, 62(fn.38), 69, 70-71, 71(fn.124), 72(fn.128), 73, 86-87, 86(fn.7), 89, 95, 97, 110, 111(fn.12), 112, 117, 117(fn.14), 118, 127, 135-136, 139

Isma’il Ayyub Pasha: 75(fn.7), 103-104

Israel: 128

Italy, Italians: 34(fn.29), 54, 63(fn.47),65(fn.67), 110(fn.1)

Iya Basi: 78(fn.14)

Ja’aliin Arabs: 25, 26(fn.39), 28(fn.65), 45, 119

Jackson, HC: 124, 124(fn.32), 125(fn.37)

Jacobites: 137

Jallaba Hawawir: 125(fn.33)

Jalut: 13(fn.25

Janakhira: 27(fn.55)

Janqal (Jongol), Sultan: 88, 88(fn.18)

Japheth: 36(fn.44)

Jarma: 56

Jawami’a: 96-97, 96(fn.41), 129

Jayli: 51

Jebel ‘Abd al-Hadi – see Jebel Haraza

Jebel Adadi: 95, 95(fn.31)

Jebel Afara: 96(fn.38)

Jebel Aress: 48

Jebel Au: 18

Jebel al-Azib: 129

Jebel Bayt al-Nahas: 129

Jebel Belbeldi: 130(fn.94)

Jebel Burgu: 28(fn.65)

Jebel Doba: 31

Jebel Eisa: 60, 118

Jebel Ferti: 59

Jebel Foga: 21, 91, 91(fn.3), 93, 95

Jebel Forei: 93

Jebel Gelli: 50(fn.63)

Jebel Gidera: 36(fn.41)

Jebel Gurgi: 54

Jebel Haraza: 33, 123, 123(fn.12), 129, 129, 129(fn.77), 130-131, 130(fns.87,94), 131

Jebel Hileila: 33,

Jebel al-Hosh: 125

Jebel Hurayz (Harayz, Hereiz): 43, 48-9

Jebel Irau: 126

Jebel Jung: 64(fn.53)

Jebel Kaboija: 117

Jebel Kadama: 45

Jebel Kadjanan: 30

Jebel Kadjano: 25

Jebel Kajanan: 30

Jebel Karshul: 130

Jebel Katul: 129

Jebel Keima: 16, 31(fn.6), 93

Jebel Kerbi: 60

Jebel Kilwa: 28, 30, 31, 33

Jebel Kurkeila: 130

Jebel Kwon: 135

Jebel Liguri: 23

Jebel Mailo: 53

Jebel Maman: 127(fn.58)

Jebel Marra: 1, 7, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25, 27(fn.55), 28, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.66), 31, 33, 34, 36, 36(fn.41), 38, 45, 51, 53, 54, 57(fn.5), 62(fn.42), 66, 78(fn.14), 86, 87-90, 91, 93-95, 94(fn.21), 112, 119(fn.38), 128, 131, 139

Jebel Masa: 59, 72(fn.129)

Jebel Meidob – See Meidob Hills

Jebel Mogran: 117

Jebel Mojalla: 95

Jebel Moya: 130

Jebel Mun: 79

Jebel Mutarrak (Mutarrig): 59-60

Jebel Nami: 54, 94, 95, 97,

Jebel Omori: 113(fn.1)

Jebel Otash: 36

Jebel al-Raqta: 125

Jebel Shalasi: 130

Jebel Si: 16, 20, 53, 54(fn.100), 57, 57(fn.5), 75, 75(fn.3), 86

Jebel Siab: 118

Jebel Silga: 33

Jebel Suruj: 88(fn.18)

Jebel Tageru: 125, 128-129

Jebel Taqali: 50, 50(fn.64)

Jebel Teiga: 60, 122(fn.6)

Jebel Tika: 95

Jebel Tréya (J. Thurraya): 77-78

Jebel Udru: 117

Jebel Um Kardos: 30, 53(fn.98)

Jebel Umm Qubu: 125

Jebel Wara: 33

Jebel Zankor – See Zankor

Jebel Zureiq: 21

Jebelein: 31(fn.4)

Jebelawi (Jebala, Jebelowi) Fur: 86, 87, 89

Jerash: 65, 65(fn.67)

Jernudd, B: 86

Jesus Christ (Nabi Isa): 136

Jews, Judaism: 15, 26(fn.38), 115, 136, 137

Jil Shikomeni: 111

Jinn-s: 79, 117

Joshua: 128

Juba II: 110(fn.3)

Juhayna Arabs: 129

Jukun: 26, 27, 135

Jungraithmayr, H.: 25, 29(fn.67)

Jupiter Ammon: 37(fn.54)

Jur: 23(fn.15)

Jura: 124

Kababish Arabs: 130(fn.96)

Kabbashi: 28

Kabkabiya: 28(fn.65), 88, 90

Kabushiya: 37(fn.46), 129(fn.78)

Kachifor, Sultan: 30

Kadama: 43, 55, 77, 77(fn.6)

Kaderu: 129(fn.78)

Kadmul: 47(fn.45), 48

Kadugli: 23, 23(fn.15), 75

Kagiddi – see Shelkota

Kai: 47

Kaiga: 112

Kaitinga: 25, 29(fn.71)

Kaga: 117

Kaja: 116(fn.4), 117

Kaja Seruj: 122, 123, 127

Kajawi: 123

Kalak Tanjak: 78

Kalamsiya: 38, 38(fn.60)

Kalck, Pierre: 112, 112(fn.26)

Kalga: 34

Kalge: 87(fn.9)

Kalokitting: 66(fn.76)

Kamadugu: 72

Kamal Yunis: 68(fn.88), 69(fn.101)

Kamala Keira: 97

Kamdirto: 119(fn.37)

Kamni: 96(fn.44)

Kamteinyi, Sultan: 28, 33

Kanem: 7, 12, 16, 22, 23, 26, 26(fn.39), 33, 44, 44(fn.8), 44(fn.13), 45, 46, 46(fn.27), 47, 47(fn.46), 48, 53, 56, 62, 63, 63(fn.47), 67(fn.86), 70, 72, 72(fn.130), 73(fn.143), 74, 80, 80(fn.1), 81, 84, 85, 111, 111(fns.11,12), 112, 118, 118(fn.24), 120, 122(fn.6), 128, 135, 136

Kanembu: 44, 44(fn.8), 46, 74, 80(fn.3), 111, 111(fns.11,12), 112, 119-120

Kano: 63, 77(fn.1)

Kanuri: 11, 16, 22(fn.4), 23, 28(fn.65), 44, 44(fn.13), 45, 46, 47, 47(fn.43), 54, 61(fn.33), 72(fn.135), 73(fn.142), 111, 111(fns.11,12), 112, 119, 128, 136

Kapteijns, Lidwien: 27

Kara: 27(fn.55)

Karakit Fur: 7, 86, 86(fn.4)

Karanga: 45, 77

Karanog: 124(fn.25)

Karkour-Nourène Massif: 44

Kas (Kusayr), King: 85

Kashemereh: 77

Kashémerém: 43

Kashmara: 25, 77

Kassala: 50, 52, 127(fn.58), 129(fn.78)

Kassifurogé, King: 30, 53(fn.98)

Katsina: 137

Kauara (Kawra) Pass: 20-21, 57

Kawar: 16, 22, 33, 45, 45(fn.25), 45(fn.25), 46, 46(fn.26), 47, 47(fn.46), 54, 120, 136

Kawka: 22

Kayra Fur: 10, 11, 11(fn.11), 12, 17, 18, 24, 29(fn.66), 31, 34(fn.25), 38, 43, 43(fn.3), 49, 50, 51, 55(fn.111), 59, 59(fn.15), 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 75, 75(fn.3), 84-85, 86-109, 88(fn.21), 91(fn.2), 97(fn.45), 112, 120(fn.46), 131, 139-140

Kebeleh: 18-20, 18(fn.17)

Kedir, King: 27. 28

Kedrou: 129, 129(fn.78)

Kel Innek: 130

Kel Rela: 14, 14(fn.29)

Kella: 14

Kenen (Khanem), King: 85

Kenzi-Dongola: 120

Kerakirit: 75(fn.3)

Kerne: 78

Kerker: 60, 60(fn.18), 65, 118, 119-120, 122(fn.6)

Kerkur: 118(fn.27)

Kernak Wells: 125

Al-Kerri: 75, 75(fn.3), 126

Kersah: 129, 129(fn.78)

Khalaf, Sultan: 29, 29(fn.71), 30

Khamis Mubaju: 31(fn.9)

Kharadjites: 137

Khartoum: 8,

Khazars: 36(fn.44)

Kheir Ullah: 43

Khor Gadein: 123, 130

Khor al-Sidr: 125

Khouz: 73, 74, 128(fn.68)

Khujali bin ‘Abd al-Rahman, Faki: 88

Khuzam Arabs: 72(fn.128)

Khuzaym (Khoués), King: 85

Kilwa: 10

Kinin (see also Tuareg): 34(fn.29), 128

Kira: 47

Kirati (Kurata) Tunjur: 44, 47

Kirsch, JHI: 77

Kisra: 135, 135(fn.25)

Kitab Dali – see Law, Pre-Islamic

Knoblecher, Ignaz: 51(fn.74)

Kobbé: 4, 5

Kobbé Zaghawa: 88

Kobe: 94

Koc Col: 75

Kodoï: 45

Koenig, Dr A-M.: 29(fn.66), 30(fn.78), 88(fn.18), 100

Kolge: 88, 94(fn.21)

Koman: 128(fn.60)

Konda (Kidney feast): 97

Konnoso: 8

Konyunga Fur: 34(fn.25)

Kor, King: 29, 29(fn.66), 51

Kora (Korakwa): 7, 75(fn.3), 86(fn.4)

Kora Mountains: 54

Koran: 36(fn.44), 37, 50, 73, 89, 97

Kordofan: 23, 24, 24(fn.25), 25, 27, 27(fn.55), 28, 28(fn.58), 28(fn.65), 30(fn.78), 34, 49, 50, 50(fn.60), 50(fn.64), 52, 53, 64(fn.54), 66(fn.75), 70, 75, 82, 85, 87-90, 87(fn.9), 96(fn.41), 101, 110, 114(fn.12), 116(fn.4), 117, 117(fn.10), 118(fn.19), 119-120, 120(fns.46,48), 122, 123, 123(fn.12), 124-125, 125(fn.33), 127-131, 129(fn.86), 130(fn.96), 132, 135

Korkurma (Korgorma): 94(fn.21)

Koro Toro: 113, 132, 132(fns.5,7), 134-135, 134(fn.14), 140

Koro Toro Radiocarbon Dates: 138

Koseru (Kaseru), Sultan: 33

Kotoko: 63, 111(fn.11)

Kotor-Furi: 47(fn.46)

Kourdé: 77

Kreish: 8

Kropácek, L: 53, 72, 123

Kufic: 46(fn.37)

Kufra (Koufra): 4, 22, 26(fn.39), 31(fn.5), 77

Kujunung: 28

Kuka: 33, 59, 111-12, 111(fn.11)

Kuli (Kulli): 86, 88

Kulu: 64

Kulubnarti: 38

Kundanga: 78(fn.14)

Kunjara Fur: 45(fn.18), 62, 75(fn.7), 85, 86, 89-90, 97, 139

Kurds: 74

Kuroma, King: 51

Kurra: 59(fn.9)

Kurru: 47, 68, 123, 123(fns.15,16), 127

Kuru (Kurru), King: 28(fn.64), 31, 43, 84, 87, 93, 93(fn.10), 139

Kusbur (Kosber), King: 16, 28, 29, 31

Kush (Cush): 22, 23, 47, 113, 116(fn.4), 119, 123(fn.16), 127

Kush al-Wagilah (Kushah, Kus): 123

Kusi: 59

Kuttum: 9, 29(fn.71), 43, 54(fn.100), 119(fn.38)

Kutul: 117

Kwawang, Kunijwok: 75

Lagowa: 24

Lake Chad: 5, 26, 28(fn.65), 31(fn.5), 72(fn.129), 74, 111(fn.9), 114, 130, 132

Lake Esan: 35

Lake Fitri: 33, 45, 55(fn.111), 56, 110, 111, 111(fn.9), 111(fn.11), 112

Lampen, GD: 117

Lamtuna: 137

Lange, D: 73(fn.142), 110

Lango: 33(fn.12)

Largeau, Colonel: 6(fn.6), 73(fn.146)

Larymore, Constance: 136

Last, Murray: 22

Law, Islamic: 71, 71(fn.118,123)

Law, Pre-Islamic: 71, 71(fns.118,121)

Le Rouvreur, Albert: 36(fn.41)

Lebeuf, JP: 74, 77

Lemba: 15

Leo Africanus: 33, 110-112, 112(fns.20,21,25), 113, 137

Leucaethiopes: 16

Lewicki, T.: 22

Al-Libei, Sultan: 44

Libya, Libyans: 17, 34(fn.29), 37, 37(fn.53), 97

Libyan Desert: 117

Liguri: 23, 24

Litham: 43(fn.3), 45, 45(fn.25), 64(fn.53), 96(fn.44)

Locust Wizards: 34(fn.25)

Lol: 23(fn.15)

Lotuko: 33(fn.12)

Low, Victor: 12, 24,

Luniya Mountains: 136-137

Luwai ibn Ghalib: 26(fn.39)

Luxor: 38

Lwel: 75

Ma’at: 38

Maba: 44, 45, 74, 77(fn.9)

Mabo: 118(fn.28)

Macedonians: 37(fn.51)

Machina: 72

MacIntosh, EH: 27(fn.54), 30, 31,

MacMichael, Harold A.: 5, 12, 16, 22, 24, 27, 29(fn.71), 38(fn.57), 43, 43(fn.6), 49, 49(fns.55, 58), 52(fn.86), 53, 57(fn.5), 60, 62(fn.38), 64(fns.53,54,60), 65, 65(fn.61), 66, 66(fn.75), 67, 68, 70, 72(fn.129), 78(fn.14), 79, 85, 86, 96(fn.40), 116, 117, 120(fn.46), 128, 129(fns.77,86), 130, 130(fn.87)

Mace-heads: 130(fn.87)

Madala: 55

Madeyq: 68(fn.97)

Madi: 33(fn.12)

Magharba: 62, 62(fn.36), 63(fn.47), 70(fn.111)

Maghreb, (Maghrab, Maghrib): 20, 26(fn.38), 38, 39, 52, 62, 62(fn.36), 125(fn.33)

Magumi (Magomi: 16, 111, 111(fns.11,12)

Magyars: 36(fn.44)

Mahamid Arabs: 45, 89

Mahas: 117

Mahdiyya: 11(fn.10), 28, 36(fn.39), 87, 96, 116,

Mahmud al-Samarkandi: 24(fn.25)

Mahram: 16(fn.7)

Mai, King: 28

Mak Husayn: 38

Maiduguri: 74

Mailo Fugo Jurto: 30(fn.74),

Majala: 94

Majians: 128(fn.68)

Makada: 48

Makuria: 123, 140

Malakal: 31(fn.4)

Maledinga: 134

Malha City: 118, 119-120

Malha Crater: 116, 116(fn.1), 118, 118(fn.20), 119-120

Mali: 5, 115, 135

Malik al-Dubban: 97

Malik Kissinga Dora: 97

Malikite Mandab: 71, 71(fn.118)

Al-Mallagi: 125

Malumba: 136(fn.32)

Malwal: 23(fn.15)

Mamluks: 5, 62(fn.36), 129

Manawashi, Battle of: 62(fn.38), 96

Al-Mandar: 95

Mandara: 23, 46, 54, 63, 135-136, 136(fn.32)

Mandara Chronicle: 136, 137

Manjil: 38, 38(fn.57)

Al-Mansur Qala’un, Sultan: 52

Mao: 44, 45, 67(fn.86), 114, 118, 118(fn.24), 119-120, 119(fns.36,42), 120

Maqdum: 36, 36(fn.41)

Al-Maqrizi (Makrizi): 23, 126(fn.44)

Maranda: 22

Marawiyyun: 22

Ma’rib: 26(fn.38), 52(fn.78)

Masalit: 25, 43(fn.3), 64, 78(fn.14), 87

Masmaj: 55

Al-Mas’udi: 39

Matrilineal Succession: 46, 55, 56, 116, 118, 130, 130(fn.93)

Mauny, R: 112(fn.26), 134

Maydon, Major: 117

Mayram: 61(fn.33)

Mayri: 51

Mayringa Fur: 51

McCall, DF: 135, 135(fn.25)

Mecca: 28, 55, 62(fn.42), 71(fn.124), 72, 87, 136

Medes: 37(fn.52)

Meidob Hills, Meidobis: 18, 33(fn.18), 60, 60(fn.18), 116-121, 116(fn.4), 119(fn.38), 120(fns.46,48), 121, 122(fn.6), 128

Meidobi Burial Customs: 117(fn.11)

Meidobi King-Lists: 121

Meidobi Religion: 117-118, 117(fn.14)

Meidobi Sections: 116

Melik – see Malik

Memmi: 63

Merbo: 9

Merga: 46

Meroë, Meroitic: 8, 25, 26, 31, 31(fn.4), 46, 48, 54, 62, 112(fn.21), 113-115, 113(fn.1), 119, 122, 122(fn.6), 123, 124, 124(fn.29), 125, 127, 127(fns.51,56), 130, 132, 134-135, 140

Merri: 35, 36, 36(fn.45)

Michelmore, APG: 72(fn.129)

Missirya (Messiriya) Arabs: 50(fn.61), 72(fn.128)

Mihrab: 61, 66, 68-69

Mima (Mimi): 8, 25, 45, 55, 64, 64(fns.53,54)

Minbar: 68

Minos: 38(fn.58)

Mira: 50

Miri: 33

Misr Muhammad: 49(fn.59)

Mitnet al-Jawwala: 125

Moab: 128

Mockler-Ferryman, Major: 136

Modat, Captain: 112

El-Moghraby, Asim I.: 60(fn.18), 118-120,

Molu: 86, 87(fn.9)

Morocco: 14(fn.29)

Mohammed, Ibrahim Musa: 17, 69, 69(fn.101), 91(fn.5), 96(fn.40), 113, 120(fn.44)

Mondo: 44(fn.8), 80(fn.1), 81, 84, 85

Mongo-Sila: 23, 24

Mongols: 36(fn.44), 50

Morga: 63

Moro: 31(fn.5), 33(fn.12)

Moses: 37, 37(fn.51)

Muglad: 29

Al-Muhallabi: 22, 22(fn.4)

Muhamid Arabs: 55

Muhammad (Daju King): 29

Muhammad (Prophet): 28(fn.65), 71(fn.124), 110, 136

Muhammad ‘Ali: 30(fn.78), 62(fn.36), 73

Muhammad Bakhit, Sultan: 30

Muhammad Bello, Sultan: 36(fn.44)

Muhammad Bulad, Sultan: 27

Muhammad Bulat, Sultan: 88

Muhammad Dawra, Sultan: 88-89, 88(fn.23), 95-96

Muhammad Fadl, Sultan: 96

Muhammad Gunkul, Sultan (see Janqal)

Muhammad al-Hasin, Sultan: 49

Muhammad Husayn, Sultan: 95-96

Muhammad Ibrahim: 52(fn.77),

Muhammad Idris bin Katarkamabe, Mai: 70

Muhammad al-Ja’ali: 50(fn.64)

Muhammad Sayah: 118

Muhammad al-Shayb, Sultan: 44

Muhammad al-Shinqiti: 78(fn.15)

Muhammad bin Tamr: 119

Muhammad Tayrab, Sultan: 55(fn.111), 64(fn.54), 75(fn.3), 89-90, 95, 96, 97, 120(fn.46)

Muhammad Wad Tom, Shaykh: 129(fn.75)

Muhammad Yanbar: 119, 119(fn.36)

Al-Mu’izz ibn Badis: 52

Mujuf: 55

Mukarra (Mukurru): 37(fn.46), 46, 46(fn.31), 46(fn.35), 47, 47(fn.46), 52, 56, 127, 134

Mundara: 130

Munio: 46, 54

Al-Mur, Sultan: 55(fn.111)

Murdock, George Peter: 13

Murgi: 64(fn.54)

Murra: 95

Murtafal: 31(fn.6)

Murtal: 97

Musa, Sultan: 88, 94, 94(fn.21), 96, 96(fn.39)

Musa ‘Anqarib: 88-89

Musa Tanjar: 45, 45(fn.18)

Musa Um Ruddus, Shartai: 54(fn.100)

Musaba’at: 30(fn.78), 33, 49, 84-85, 84(fn.3), 85, 87-89, 97, 101, 103, 123, 131

Mustafa, Sultan: 24

Musulat: 63

Mutansir: 52, 52(fn.79)

Muwalih: 125

Muweileh: 125

Nachtigal, Gustav: 5, 13, 28, 28(fn.65), 31, 34, 44, 44(fn.8), 44(fn.13), 47, 47(fn.43), 49, 50, 53, 53(fn.91), 54, 55(fn.111), 57(fn.2), 57(fn.5), 71, 71(fn.121), 73, 75(fn.3), 75(fn.7), 77, 78(fns.14-15), 80(fn.1), 87(fn.9), 88, 91, 96, 102, 111, 118, 120(fn.46), 131

Nafer, King: 29

Nahas: 62, 62(fn.38), 87, 118

Na-Madu, King: 118-119

Nanku: 64(fn.53)

Napata: 26, 113, 127

Nari: 33

Nas Far’aon: 27, 27(fn.54)

Nassara (Nazarene): 73, 132, 140

Negib Effendi Yunis, Yuzbashi: 118(fn.19)

Nejran: 136

Newbold, D: 16, 61(fn.31), 117, 122, 122(fn.2), 123, 123(fn.13), 124, 124(fn.29), 125, 127(fn.57), 129, 129(fns.74,86), 130(fns.92,94)

N’Gazargamu: 72-73

Ngok Dinka: 23

Nguru: 73

Niamaton: 79

Nieke, Margaret R.: 11

Niger: 115

Niger (River): 110(fns.1,3), 136

Nigeria: 7, 13, 27, 44, 113, 114, 132, 136(fn.32)

Nikki: 136

Nilo-Saharan Language Group: 86

Nisba: 54

Njamena: 23

Nkole: 14

Noah: 28(fn.65), 128

Nobatia: 38

Nobiin: 120

Nok Culture: 114

Northern Rhodesia: 13

Noyo: 94

Nuba: 22, 23, 27(fn.55), 33, 33(fn.22), 50, 117, 118(fn.19), 122, 128-130, 136

Nuba Hills: 27, 120, 128

Nubia, Nubians: 11, 38, 43, 43(fn.6), 44(fn.13), 46, 46(fn.31), 46(fn.37), 47, 50, 52, 52(fn.86), 56, 64(fn.54), 65, 66, 67(fn.86), 68-69, 69(fn.102), 74, 97, 110, 112, 112(fn.21), 116-117, 118, 120(fn.48), 122-123, 123(fn.16), 124(fn.29), 126(fn.44), 129, 130-131, 132, 132(fns.6,7), 134-135, 137(fn.37), 139-140

Nubian Language: 116(fn.4), 120, 130(fn.92), 131

Nuer: 34(fn.26)

Nuh: 22

Nukheila: 22(fn.1), 127(fn.57)

Numan Fedda: 97(fn.45)

Nupe: 135

Nur Angara: 62(fn.38)

Nuri: 123(fn.16)

Nuwabiya: 123

Al-Nuwayri: 52

Nyala: 23, 24, 27, 27(fn.52), 28, 62, 62(fn.38), 75, 86

Nyèri: 45

Nyidor, Reth: 75

Nyikango: 75, 75(fn.5)

Nyolge (Nyalgulgule): 23, 23(fns.15, 19), 24, 29

Al-Obeid: 75, 88(fn.18)

O’Fahey, RS: 46(fn.31), 50, 56, 61(fn.33), 64(fn.57), 112, 112(fn.25)

Ogot, Bethwell A: 134-135

Ogra: 64

Olderogge, DA: 6

Omar Kissifurogé – see ‘Umar Kissifurogé

Omdurman: 62(fn.38), 116, 117

Oral Tradition: 10-15, 31(fn.6), 51(fn.69), 74, 75-76, 113, 129, 135, 139-140

Órre Baya: 57, 57(fn.2), 60, 95

Órre De: 57(fn.2), 60

Osiris: 8(fn.15)

Ostrich Eggs (decorative): 34, 34(fn.26), 36

Ottomans: 5, 24(fn.25), 74

Ounianga: 77

Ouogayi: 73(fn.148)

Oxyrinchus: 43(fn.6)

Paçir: 75, 75(fn.3)

Pahlavi: 135(fn.25)

Palestine: 65, 68, 128, 128(fn.68)

Palmer, HR: 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 33, 46(fn.32), 48, 53(fn.90), 55, 72, 80(fn.1), 112, 112(fn.20), 128, 129, 135, 136, 137

Papadopoullos, T.: 135

Papyrus: 116(fn.1)

Parthians: 26(fn.38), 36(fn.44)

Patwac: 75

Pelpelle: 89

Penn, AED: 122-123, 122(fn.7), 126-127

Perari Kalga: 34

Perron, Dr.: 5

Persia, Persians: 26(fn.38), 37, 37(fn.52), 132, 134-135, 135(fns.21,25)

Petherick, J.: 52

Petracek, Karel: 119(fn.34)

Philae: 8, 33

Phoenicians: 115

Pilgrim Bottles: 124, 124(fn.29), 125, 127, 129, 129(fn.75)

“Platform of Audience”: 60, 61, 62, 65, 119

Pleiades: 78(fn.13),

Pliny the Elder: 16, 110(fn.3)

Pomponious Mela: 16

Pontiphar: 49(fn.58)

Potagos, Panyotis: 23

Pottery: 70, 122(fn.7), 123, 124, 124(fn.32), 132, 132(fn.5), 134, 134(fn.13), 140

Pre-Islamic Religion: 34, 86-87, 87(fn.9), 96(fn.38), 97, 117-119, 117(fn.14), 123, 136, 137

Prisons: 66, 66(fn.76), 93

Prophecy: 35

Ptolemy, Ptolemies, Ptolemaic Period: 16, 38, 43(fn.6), 127

Qalaun, Sultan: 129

Al-Qalqashandi: 111(fn.12)

Qaqu: 22

Qarri (Querri, Gerri): 122, 125-127, 126(fn.44), 127(fn.46), 131

Qayrawan: 52, 125(fn.33)

Qays ‘Aylan: 38

Qelti al-Adusa: 129, 129(fn.73)

Qibla: 95

Qihayf, Battle of: 89

Qimr: 36(fn.43), 88

Qubba-s: 36(fn.41), 69, 95, 96

Quran – see Koran

Quraysh: 26(fn.39), 50, 50(fn.64), 102, 111(fn.12)

Radcliffe-Brown, AR: 7-8

Al-Rahad: 50

Rahaman: 26(fn.38)

Red Sea: 38, 63(fn.47)

Redjem: 118(fn.27)

Reisner, George A: 123

Reth: 75, 75(fn.2)

Reygasse, Maurice: 13-14, 20(fn.21), 118(fn.27)

Richards, Audrey I: 13

Rifa’a: 51

Rikabiya Ashraf: 130

Rizayqat Arabs: 89

Rizik (Rézik), King: 85

Ro-Kuri Region: 53, 95

Robinson, AE: 28, 29(fn.66), 38(fn.58)

Rodd, Francis R.: 130

Rome, Romans: 14, 26(fn.38), 37, 37(fn.52), 74, 114, 135, 137

Ronya: 59

Rosen, Georg: 77(fn.9)

Royal Platform: 59

Royna: 59(fn.12)

Rugman, Lady: 66-67

Rwanda: 115

Ryan, Bimbashi: 124(fn.32)

Sa’ad, Sultan: 44

Sabaloka Gorge: 126

Sabula: 57

Sabun: 75(fn.7), 91

Saccae: 63

Sadaqah: 97

Safia: 130

Sagava: 63

Saifawa Mai-s: 71

Salah, Sultan: 29

Salf (Zalf), King: 30

Salih (prophet): 28, 28(fn.65)

Salih ibn ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abbas: 28(fn.65),

Salt Collection, Salt Trade: 116, 118, 120

Salt, Sir Henry: 86(fn.2)

Salua: 94

Al-Samarkandi: 50

Samarra: 65(fn.67)

Sambei: 27, 34(fn.25)

Sambella (Sambellanga): 64(fn.60)

Sania Kiri: 57

Samna: 33

San’a: 15

Sanam: 123(fn.16)

Sandstone Rings: 129–130, 130(fn.87)

Sanhaj Berbers (Sanhaja): 48, 125(fn.33), 128, 128(fn.68)

Sania: 123

Santandrea, P. Stefano: 29(fn.73)

Sanussis: 34(fn.29), 73, 73(fn.146), 74, 128(fn.68)

Sao: 31(fn.5), 63, 72, 111(fn.11)

Sarsfield-Hall, EG: 87, 117(fn.14)

Sassanids, Sassanians: 26(fn.38), 135

Sau: 55

Sa’ud: 28(fn.65)

Savonnier: 80(fn.2)

Sawwar bin Wa’il bin Himyar: 125(fn.33)

Sayf ibn Dhu Yazan: 26(fn.38), 111(fn.12)

Sayfawa: 16(fn.7), 111, 111(fns.11,12)

Schmidt, Peter R: 14

Scythians: 36(fn.44)

Sebakh, King: 129

Selatia: 62(fn.38)

Seleukos I Nikator: 37(fn.51)

Seligman, CG: 6, 7, 75(fn.2), 130(fn.87)

Selima Oasis: 46, 46(fn.37), 134

Seliquer, Captain: 132

Sendi Suttera, Iya Basi: 89

Serbung Masalit: 87

Serengiti: 60(fn.18), 118, 119

Sergitti: 79

Serra East: 68(fn.97)

Serra West: 67

Shabaka, King: 129(fn.79)

Shadow Sultan (see Kamni)

Shaffai Boggarmi, Dardai: 48(fn.51)

Shaheinab: 8

Shari’a – See Law, Islamic

Shartai: 34(fn.25)

Shatt: 23, 23(fn.15), 24, 29

Shau al-Dorsid, Sultan: 16, 27, 30, 30(fn.74), 44(fn.15), 48, 50, 51, 53-54, 56, 57-64, 57(fn.5), 59(fn.15), 61(fn.32), 62(fns.36-37), 70(fn.111), 72, 75, 75(fn.3), 84-85, 87, 96(fn.41)

Shaw, WBK: 123-124, 124(fn.25), 127(fn.57)

Shelkota Meidob: 116, 116(fn.4), 121

Shendi: 27, 27(fn.53), 28(fn.65), 30(fn.78), 125(fn.37)

Sherkayla: 50

Shilluk: 8(fn.15), 34(fn.26), 75, 75(fn.2), 123

Shimir: 55

Shinnie, Peter: 11, 13, 67, 67(fn.86), 73(fn.144), 74, 113, 113(fn.1), 127, 127(fn.56), 132, 135

Shirim: 88

Shoba: 90

Showaia: 96(fn.38)

Showunga Tunjur: 59

Shu (Egyptian God): 54

Shuqayr, Naum; 89

Shuwa Arabs: 44

Si Dallanga: 54

Siesa: 71

Sigato: 119

Sikar: 91

Simiat Hills: 33

Sinnar (Sennar): 5, 27, 27(fn.55), 28(fn.65), 30(fn.78), 38(fn.58), 43, 87, 88(fn.18), 89(fn.28), 126, 126(fn.44), 129

Sira al-Hilaliya: 49

Sitting Burial: 31(fn.5), 119(fn.42)

Sira al-Hilaliyya: 49

Sirma: 59

Slatin Pasha, Rudolf: 1, 29, 51, 78(fn.14)

Slaves, Slavery: 27(fn.55), 34, 71, 87-89, 96, 120(fn.46), 140

Snakes in Religious Rites: 78-79

Soba: 62(fn.36), 65(fn.67), 66, 122, 123, 124, 124(fn.29), 126-127, 126(fn.44), 127(fns.47,56), 131

Sobat River: 31(fn.4), 75

Solomon: 39

Songhay: 135

Songs: 80

Sopo River: 23

South Africa: 15

South Sudan: 35

Spain, Spanish: 54, 110, 137

Spaulding, Jay: 50, 64(fn.57), 112, 112(fn.25)

Stevenson, RC: 23

Stewart, Andrew: 38

Stone Circles: 118(fn.27), 124, 129

Stone Worship: 61(fn.30), 72, 72(fn.129), 86, 87(fn.9), 117-119, 139

Suakin: 127(fn.58)

Subhanin: 25, 25(fn.29)

Sudan Notes and Records: 7, 8

Sudan Political Service: 7, 8

Sufyan, King: 85

Sufyan al-Thawri: 37

Sulayman (founder of Bilia Bidayat): 48

Sulayman al-Abyad: 89

Sulayman Solong (Sliman, Solongdungo), Sultan: 43, 55(fn.111), 59, 59(fn.15), 70, 70(fn.111), 78(fn.14), 87-88, 89, 93, 93(fn.10), 94-96, 96(fn.41), 118, 120(fn.46), 131, 139

Sun Worship: 77(fn.9)

Sunghor (Sungor): 36(fn.41)

Suni Valley: 94

Supreme Court of Canada: 14-15, 15(fn.33)

Syria. Syrian: 50, 68

Taberber: 28(fn.64)

Taboos: 96(fn.38)

Tabun, Shartai: 31

Tagabo Hills: 116-119, 119(fn.36), 119(fn.38)

Tahir, Basi: 28

Tahrak, King: 129

Taiserbo: 31(fn.5)

Taitok: 14, 14(fn.29)

Tageru Hills: 128

Taharqa, King: 129(fn.79)

Tajia (Tagia): 38(fns.57-58)

Tajuwa: 22-23, 33, 112(fn.20)

Takaki (Tekaki): 66(fn.76), 71(fn.120)

Tari: 134

Al-Taka: 129, 129(fn.78),

Takamat: 13-14

Tama: 27(fn.31), 36(fn.41), 45(fn.21)

Tamachek: 45(fn.25)

Tamurkwa (Tamurka) Fur: 86, 86(fn.4), 87

Tanit: 14

Tanjak: 55

Tanjikei: 36(fn.41)

Tanzania: 10, 115,

Tar Lis (Tarlis): 112

Tari: 132

Taruga: 114

Tartari: 135

Tatars: 36(fn.44)

Al-Tayeb, Shaykh: 29(fn.66), 99

Tchertcher Mountains: 128(fn.68)

Tebeldi Trees: 3-4, p.3 (fn.5)

Teda: 16, 16(fn.5), 22, 22(fn.4), 34(fn.29), 45, 47, 47(fn.45), 48, 48(fn.47), 119, 128

Tedagada: 45

Tedjeri (Tejeri): 119(fn.41)

Teiga Plateau: 117

Tamaragha Doka, Shaykh: 129(fn.81)

Temeh: 45(fn.21)

Ten Tribes of Israel: 36(fn.44)

Termit: 113

Terninga, Sultan: 27

Teqaqi: 71

Tesseti Dynasty: 116

Thamud: 28(fn.65)

Thelwall, Robin: 117, 120

Thurro: 75

Thutmosis III: 46, 46(fn.35), 134

Thutmosis IV: 8

Tibesti (Tu): 5, 8, 16, 20, 31(fn.5), 45, 45(fn.23), 46(fn.32), 47, 47(fn.46), 48, 48(fn.51), 54, 64(fn.58), 113, 119, 128(fn.68), 130, 136-137

Tibet: 35

Tidikelt: 14(fn.29)

Tidn-Dal Language: 116

Tié: 67(fn.86), 73, 73(fn.144), 74

Tifinagh: 14, 70, 70(fn.108)

Tilho, Commandant: 77, 132, 132(fn.4)

Timsah: 28(fn.64)

Tin Hinan: 13-14 13(fn.25), 14(fn.29)

Tine: 88, 94(fn.21)

Tirga umm sot: 33, 33(fn.18),

Tit: 20(fn.21)

Tiv: 13

Togoland: 5

Togonye, Togoinye: 34, 34(fn.25)

Tong Kilo: 94, 97(fn.46)

Tong Kuri: 93

Tongoingi (Togoingi): 34(fn.25)

Tora: 16-21, 31, 33, 44, 53, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 90, 91, 91(fn.5), 94, 95, 95(fn.31), 97, 119, 123, 126, 127, 128, 128(fn.68), 131

Toronga Kuroma: 16, 17-18

Torti Meidob: 116

Toschka: 134

Tounjour Wells: 132, 132(fn.6)

Tow: 54

Transmogrification: 86,

Treinen-Claustre, F: 134

Tréya (see Jebel Tréya)

Trigger, Bruce: 8, 120

Tripoli: 4, 60, 63(fn.47), 70(fn.111), 77, 77(fn.1), 117, 137

Tuareg (see also Kinin): 13-14, 34(fn.29), 36(fn.44), 43(fn.3), 45, 46(fn.32), 64(fn.53), 128, 130, 130(fns.93,96)

Tubba Kings: 38, 111(fn.12)

Tubiana, J.: 43, 63

Tubu (Tibu, Tibbu): 16, 27(fn.54), 34(fn.29), 44, 44(fn.8), 45, 46, 46(fn.27, 30, 31), 47(fn.46), 48(fn.51), 49, 56, 64(fn.53), 75(fn.3), 117, 130, 137, 139, 140

Tubu Genealogy: 47(fn.46)

Tukl: 20, 61(fn.31), 65-66, 69

Tumaghera: 45-48, 45(fn.25), 46(fn.26), 46(fn.31, 32), 47-48, 47(fn.43), 47(fn.46), 48(fn.51), 54, 113, 140

Tumaghera of Tibesti, Sections: 47, 47(fn.46)

Tumam Arabs: 8

Tumsah (see Tunsam)

Tuna: 59

Tunis: 20, 36(fn.41), 44, 49, 50, 52, 63, 77(fn.1), 80

Tunis (Kanem): 80(fn.1)

Tunisia: 20(fn.22), 52, 73, 74

Al-Tunisi, Muhammad ‘Umar: 5, 27(fn.55), 28(fn.65), 37(fn.54), 43, 57(fn.2), 64(fn.53), 72(fn.134), 77(fn.9), 120(fn.46)

Tunjur: 5, 10, 12, 16, 18, 25, 26, 28, 28(fn.64), 28(fn.65), 29(fn.71), 30, 30(fn.74), 31, 33, 34(fn.25), 36(fn.41), 43-85, 43(fn.6), 44(fns.8, 15), 45(fn.18), 45(fn.19), 46(fn.31), 47(fn.46), 48(fn.47), 48(fn.53), 48(fn.54), 51(fn.71), 52(fn.86), 53(fn.90), 55(fn.111), 57(fns.2,5), 59(fn.15), 62(fn.37), 62(fn.42), 63(fn.47), 72(fn.128), 75(fn.3), 77(fn.6), 80(fns.1,2), 84(fn.3), 87, 88, 88(fn.21), 91, 95, 97, 111, 111(fn.11), 112, 113, 118, 119, 120(fn.46), 131, 132, 132(fn.6), 134, 139

Tunjur, Sultan: 30, 43

Tunjur-Fur: 43, 64(fn.60), 70

Tunjur of Kanem, Sections: 44(fn.13)

Tunjur King-Lists: 81-85

Tunjur Language: 44(fn.8), 63, 64(fn.54)

Tunjur Sections (Darfur): 43

Tunjur Wara: 59

Tunsam (Tumsah), Sultan: 28(fn.64), 31, 49, 70, 84, 87, 89, 93, 93(fns.8,10), 139

Tura: 47

Turco-Egyptians: 12, 62(fn.36)

Turi: 54, 57(fn.1)

Turks (see also Ottomans, Turco-Egyptians): 36(fn.44), 63, 70(fn.111), 74

Turkish Language: 74, 77(fn.9)

Turra: 16, 18, 27, 53, 57, 59, 69, 70, 91(fns.2,3), 93(fn.8), 95-97, 96(fn.43), 97(fn.45), 97(fns.46,47), 99

Turra Hills: 91

Turti: 35

Turrti Dynasty: 118, 121

Turuj: 8, 27(fn.55), 33

Turza: 120(fn.46)

Al-Tuwaysha: 119

Ubangi River: 110(fn.3)

Udal, John O.: 75, 75(fn.3)

Uddu: 86

Ufa, King: 29

Uganda: 14, 18

Um Bura: 64(fn.53)

Um Bus Masalit: 78(fn.14)

Um Daraj (Durraj): 129-130

Um Kurdoos: 28

Umangawi: 78(fn.14)

‘Umar, Daju King: 28

‘Umar, Tunjur Sultan: 77

‘Umar ‘Ali: 45

‘Umar Kissifurogé: 28, 29-30, 33

‘Umar Lel, Sultan: 27, 89, 95

‘Umar ibn Muhammad Dawra – see Muhammad Dawra

Umm Kiddada: 119

Umm Harraz: 94

Umm Harot: 125

Umm Shaluba: 73(fn.148), 77

Ummayads: 48, 49, 51

Umunga Fur: 33

Upper Nile Province: 34(fn.26)

Uri: 27, 28(fn.64), 44, 56, 57, 57(fns.2,5), 59, 60-64, 60(fn.23), 60(fn.24), 61(fn.30), 62(fn.37), 63(fns.46,47), 64(fn.58), 65(fn.65), 68-69, 70, 70(fn.111), 72, 73, 74, 93, 112, 112(fn.21), 119, 119(fn.38), 122(fn.6), 139

Urimellis: 64

Urti Meidob: 116, 121

Venda: 15

Vansleb, JM: 64, 112(fn.25)

Vantini, G: 134

Vatican: 137

Veil – see Litham

Venice, Venetian: 63, 63(fns.47,49)

Vienna Manuscript: 51(fn.74)

Vogel, Dr. Edward: 78

Wadai: 5, 8, 21, 25, 26, 27, 27(fns.54,55), 28, 28(fn.65), 28(fn.65), 33(fn.18), 34, 36(fn.41), 43, 44, 45, 45(fn.21), 46, 48, 48(fn.53), 48(fn.54), 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57(fn.2), 59, 62, 64(fns.53,54), 71, 72(fns.128,129), 74, 75(fns.3,7), 77-79, 77(fns.1,6), 83, 86, 88-89, 95, 110, 111, 111(fn.11), 112(fn.24), 120(fn.46), 128, 132, 134, 135, 140

Wadai, Aboriginal groups: 25

Wadi Abu Dom: 134

Wadi Abu Hashim: 125

Wadi Abu Sibaa: 124

Wadi al-Anaj: 127(fn.57)

Wadi Barei: 94(fn.21), 95

Wadi Golonut: 118

Wadi Halfa: 8, 68(fn.97)

Wadi Hawar (Howar): 4, 9, 47, 125

Wadi Howa: 77

Wadi Jeldama: 95

Wadi Jugtera: 64(fn.53)

Wadi Magrur: 117

Wadi al-Melik (Milk): 4, 117, 122(fn.6), 123, 125, 127

Wadi al-Mukaddam (Muqaddam): 117, 125

Wadi al-Sabt: 38

Wadi Tunsam: 93

Wadi Umm Shaluba: 44

Wadi Uri: 64(fn.58)

Wahb bin Munabbih: 6, 37, 37(fn.52)

Al-Wahwah: 37(fn.46)

Walool: 126

Walz, Terrence: 54

Wamato: 119(fn.37)

Wandala: 136(fn.32)

Wansborough, John: 11

Wara: 33(fn.18), 43, 45, 55, 59, 74, 77-79, 77(fn.6)

Wastani: 36(fn.41)

Wathku: 23

Wau: 23(fn.15)

Wawat: 8

Western Field Force: 1-2

White Nile: 31(fn.4), 50

Wickens, GE: 18-20

Wirdato Meidob: 116, 118

“Wise Stranger” (see also Ahmad al-Ma’qur): 10, 28(fn.65), 29(fn.73), 46, 48, 49-52, 50(fn.64), 56, 87, 119

X-Group: 124(fn.29)

Yahia: 27(fn.31)

Yame: 28(fn.65), 43

Yao: 111(fn.11)

Ya’qub ‘Arus, Sultan: 88

Ya’qub Bok Doro, Sultan: 30

Al-Ya’qubi: 22, 128

Yaqut bin ‘Abd Allah al-Hamawi: 22(fn.4)

Yasir: 39

Yemen: 25, 26, 26(fn.38), 29(fn.73), 37, 38, 49, 111(fn.12), 125(fn.33), 136

Yér: 27(fn.55)

Y’nk: 128

Yusuf, Prince: 89

Yusuf As’ar Yath’ar (Dhu Nuwas): 26(fn.38), 136

Zaghawa: 22, 22(fn.4), 23, 23(fn.8), 25, 27, 29(fn.71), 36(fn.41), 49(fn.55), 50(fn.67), 63-64, 64(fn.53), 72(fn.128), 77, 88, 89, 112(fn.20), 114(fn.16), 119, 136

Zaghay: 23

Zakaria: 69

Zalaf, King: 28, 29

Zalingei: 86

Zanata Berbers: 49,

Al-Zanati, Khalifa: 49

Zanj: 22, 23, 23(fn.8)

Zankor: 66(fn.75), 122-123, 122(fns.2,6), 123(fn.13), 127, 127(fns.53,56), 130, 131, 134

Zarroug, Mohi al-Din Abdalla: 127

Zayd: 36(fn.41), 51

Zayadiya Arabs: 36(fn.41), 51

Zayn al-‘Abidin de Tunis: 77(fn.9)

Zeltner, Jean-Claude: 44

Zenata: 128(fn.68)

Zeugatania: 137

Zeus Ammon: 37-38

Zhylarz, Ernest: 46(fn.35), 120(fn.48)

Ziegert, H: 9

Zingani: 137(fn.37)

Al-Zubayr Pasha: 11(fn.10), 12, 62(fn.38), 87, 96

Zurla: 63

A Nuer Pyramid: Upper Nile Province, South Sudan

Posted on March 30, 2001 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March, 2001

Over the last century, a great deal has been discovered about the pyramids of the Egyptian Old Kingdom. We know something of the technique used to build them, we are fairly confident of their purpose and we have certain bureaucratic records shedding light on some aspects of the organization of the work-force involved. What often seems to elude us is the motivation of the workers who endured back-breaking labour and, no doubt, many untimely deaths. What also seems strange is the rapidity with which the Egyptians moved from building rather modest monuments to the immense works of the Third and Fourth Dynasties. These developments seem to be inextricably tied to the processes of social unification and state formation. In the Nuer pyramid of Ngundeng we have an interesting parallel from recent times of a decentralized society with no prior experience of cooperative labour or monument building suddenly uniting to build an impressive and well-made structure. This little known work from the southern reaches of the Nile can shed some light on the processes involved in the transformation of Egyptian society some 4,500 years earlier.

The Nuer are one of the largest groups of Nilotic peoples in the South Sudan. As with other Nilotes, their origins and history are as yet poorly understood. A traditional political system is difficult to identify within Nuer society, which anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard once described as “organized anarchy.” The leopard-skin chief is a figure of priestly rather than political authority, and Nuer tended to organize under central leadership only when faced with an unusual outside threat. Even then, the unification of different Nuer groups under a single individual was extremely rare. Evans-Pritchard, whose work on the Nuer was long a staple of college anthropology courses, tended to overemphasize the egalitarianism of Nuer society, ignoring the emergence of a so-called “aristocratic” class of Nuers.

The Nuer prophet Ngundeng was born sometime between 1850 and 1860, and was a member of a leopard-skin clan of the Lou Nuer. Members of such a clan were often referred to as kuaar muon, or earth-priests, as they were felt to have a mystical relationship with the soil. Since the prosperity of all Nuer was closely tied to the earth, such figures occupied an unusual position as potential mediators between various factions of the Nuer, who were habitually involved with blood-feuds and other mutual antagonisms. Ngundeng is usually thought to have been of Dinka descent, the Dinka being the largest of the Nilotic tribes of the South Sudan. Ngundeng spoke Dinka fluently, and was familiar with Dinka manners and customs. As other young Nuer men learned to hunt and fish, Ngundeng spent his days fasting, mumbling incantations and speaking in tongues, earning as well a reputation for being able to self-levitate and to transform himself into a goat. It is said that, as a youth, he deprived anyone who displeased him of the power of speech (save his mother, who was immune), and as a result many of his village neighbors moved to more remote parts. In his early days as a prophet, Ngundeng was said to live for weeks in the bush by himself, surviving on animal and human excrement. He later developed a taste for re-cooked ashes. Evans-Pritchard considered him a genuine psychotic, but nevertheless, Ngundeng’s growing reputation brought him an unusual amount of wealth and wives. It should be noted that the eating of unclean food was also characteristic of the Judaic prophets, and is related to an inversion of normal modes of behavior that helps set the prophet apart from the ordinary individual.

When his first son was born, Ngundeng announced that the particular spirit that the particular spirit that possessed him was called Dengkur, “Deng” being a Dinka word for God, and “kur” being a Nuer term for angry.

At a time just prior to the construction of the pyramid the Gaajok Nuer women were enduring a period of general infertility. In return for curing these women of their barrenness, usually by spitting on them (a traditional means of bestowing blessings in many parts of the Sudan), Ngundeng accepted payment in the form of ivory tusks, beads and cattle. At the same time, smallpox was striking the Nuer, and their cattle were afflicted with rinderpest. Ngundeng came up with the idea of burying the plagues beneath a huge mound that would contain them. Such an idea was revolutionary for the Nuer, who were entirely unaccustomed to extensive or sustained cooperative labour.

The work, which began about 1870, was carried out in three stages: first was the construction of huts for the workers, and while these were being built Ngundeng required payment for his services in grass, timber or labour. This phase lasted one winter season. The second phase lasted two years, and consisted of the accumulation of grain and corn, usually brought to the village by any visitor of passer-by who did not wish to incur the wrath of Ngundeng. When the granaries were full, Ngundeng went into seclusion, fasting for seven days, followed by passing into a trance for three days. At this time word went out for the Nuer to congregate at Ngundeng’s village. The Nuer, forgetting all their customary blood feuds, gathered from points all over the South Sudan until, so it is said, the plain was black with people. After exhorting the crowd for an entire night under a full moon, Ngundeng carried the first load of earth to the site of the mound. For four years, thousands of Nuer worked under his supervision constructing the Bie Dengkur, the mound of Dengkur.

The construction of large mounds built of ash, cattle dung, cotton soil and clay was not without precedent in the South Sudan, though it had not been known among the Nuer previous to Ngundeng’s time. These works are variously said to have been made as monuments to the prophets who ordered their construction, or as burial mounds for the prophets, who were buried, sometimes alive, either beside or beneath them. The model for their shape appears to be the only non-domestic structure traditionally built in the South Sudan, the cattle hut. Two very prominent Dinka mounds can be mentioned in this regard; being those of Ayong Dit and Pwom Ayeuil. The first is built north of Malakal, and remains, like the other, an important shrine. This mound, known as Yiek Ayong, is said to have been built over the body of Ayong Dit, who was bricked up by his own orders in his cattle hut with his wife and eight favorite bulls. A ceremony was held every eight years, during which the mound was repaired and eight bulls sacrificed.

The second mound, known as Pwom Ayeuil (the mound of Ayeuil), is situated on the island formed by the Bahr al-Zeraf and the Bahr al-Jabal. The mound is the work of the Luac Dinka, who are known to have been driven from this area in 1820, and must therefore predate this event, making it at least 180 years old. Beside this monument, which is now much weathered and reduced in height by years of heavy rain, is the grave of Ayeuil Longar, the reputed ancestor of no less than five sections of the Dinka. Traditional tales tell of the many deaths of workers on the mound and the incorporation of their corpses into the structure. Other tales tell of human bodies being used as props in the scaffolding, the individuals being buried alive in the construction of the mound. The Dinka word for these mounds, yik, is also used in describing the mound of Dengkur, suggesting a direct relationship between the Ngundeng project and the earlier Dinka mounds.
The mound of Dengkur was some 300 feet in circumference and 50 to 60 feet high, surrounded by a row of elephant tusks. In form it was a perfect cone; the term “pyramid” is the one applied to it by British colonial administrators. Other tusks were buried within the centre of the mound, along with the horns of a white bull, the entrails of a goat, and various bones. The use of elephant tusks was more than decorative; in Nuer cosmology, elephants possess a spiritual power linked to the destiny of men and were in some ways regarded as cousins to the Nuer. At the peak of the mound was a spear decorated with an ostrich egg and ostrich feathers.

In the years following the completion of the Bie Dengkur, Arab slavers twice attacked the area and carried off all the people and ivory they could, but the mound was kept in good repair and served as a rallying point for Nuer warriors. At some point during this difficult period, Ngundeng had an elaborate brass pipe made for him by an Anuak craftsman. The manufacture of this object was kept secret until one morning the astonished Nuer observed the pipe sitting by itself at the peak of the mound with smoke issuing from its bowl. The pipe quickly assumed its own magic, being said to render its possessor invulnerable, as well as serving as a death-dealing weapon, reputedly felling both men and cattle at a mere wave. Ngundeng let it be known that the pipe would play a major role in ridding Nuer country of the hated “Turks,” as Ottoman, Egyptian and British forces were all known. Ngundeng died in 1906, before the final struggle between the “Turks” and the Nuer.

Ngundeng had become the father of twin sons, Gwek and Lil, in 1883, but it was initially felt that the spirit of Dengkur had passed to his eldest son, Reth. It was Gwek, however, who appeared to have been possessed by Dengkur, speaking in tongues, standing on his head atop the mound, and allegedly transforming himself into a goat. Goats were normally associated with women and cattle with men; the transformation into a goat is again a type of behavioral inversion associated with sexual ambiguity. The matter of Gwek’s status was sealed when Gwek was spotted smoking the brass pipe on top of the mound, for the pipe had not been seen since Ngundeng’s death, presumably having accompanied him to the spirit world. The name “Gwek” means “frog,” and was said to have been given to him as a result of Ngundeng feeding Gwek’s mother frogs as a method of increasing her fertility. Those who knew the adult Gwek felt the name was especially suited to this short, squat, large-headed individual who was known for drooling at the mouth. Quite likely Gwek was an epileptic, experiencing seizures almost daily, during which he would shake, foam at the mouth and scream at the top of his lungs, quite often while standing atop the mound. The Nuer did not haphazardly appoint madmen or epileptics (gwan noka) to positions of authority. Symptoms of epilepsy could only be regarded as signs of prophethood when they were accompanied by a perceived success in curing barrenness, healing, rain-making, divining the future, stopping epidemics and leading raids. The sociologist Max Weber classed such people as “charismatic berserks.”

No one ever saw Gwek climbing or descending the mound; one British officer making a visit to the village thought that Gwek would go up in the night and descend the next night, but he was unable to observe him doing either, despite his best efforts. Climbing the mound was no easy feat, as another British officer later found out. The sides were exceptionally smooth with no handholds. After reaching the top with the assistance of a native trooper, the officer described his descent as “an involuntary and painful slide.”
Although the Anglo-Egyptian army had taken control of the Sudan in 1898, it was not until 1916 that patrols were sent into Nuer country in the Upper Nile province. The Nuer prophets were noted by the administration as having been responsible for leading raids against neighboring tribes, a practice that continued into the 1940s. By 1918, Gwek was leading large raids against the Dinka and even massacred a company of the 9th Sudanese Regiment. Gwek normally went into battle carrying his pipe and a magical fishing spear (normally a ritual object associated with the Dinka) and leading a white bull – an animal that was especially associated with rain-making ceremonies and accompanied Nuer prophets on raids against the Dinka. A government patrol in 1918 met Gwek’s advance on them with a burst of machine-gun fire. The bull was killed with its head pointing towards the Nuer, a signal for immediate retreat.

HC Jackson, then Deputy Governor of Upper Nile province, visited the mound in 1921 with a small escort of native police. Gwek refused to see him, and the small group was soon surrounded by a large number of angry warriors. With little chance of being able to fight their way out, Jackson defused the situation by breaking out his canvas field bath and having an impromptu bath, much to the amusement of the warriors.

Relations between Gwek and the government deteriorated, however, as courts and a native police force were established, greatly reducing both Gwek’s authority and his income. The situation grew worse as the government proposed building a road through Nuer country, connecting it with the territory of their traditional rivals, the Dinka. Over 20 years earlier, Ngundeng had made a prophecy that the Turks would defeat the Nuer in battle many times before making “a great white path” to the Nuer border. At that point a plant would sprout atop the mound of Dengkur. When it reached the height of a man, the Nuer would rise up and drive the Turks out forever. Soon hundreds of bulls were being sacrificed at the base of the mound and warriors began to arrive from all over Nuer land, including forces under the leadership of two other prophets, Char Koryom and Pok Karajok. In 1927, District Commissioner Captain V.H. Fergusson was allegedly murdered along with a Greek merchant and a number or Dinka bearers by a group of Nuer, an action that resulted in an order to arrest Gwek. The perceived threat from the Nuer prophets was even raised in the British House of Commons, and Gwek and Pok Karajok were immortalized in a few lines from the satirical Punch magazine:

I fear that Messsrs. Pok and Gwek
Will shortly get it in the neck
And that an overwhelming shock
Is due to Messrs. Gwek and Pok

Then let us mourn the bitter wreck
In store for Messrs. Pok and Gwek
When we administer the knock
To Mr. Gwek and Mr. Pok.

The eventual advance of a large force of government troops succeeded in dispersing the Nuer. When the patrol reached the mound, which by this time was recognized by the government as a symbol of Nuer resistance, a group of engineers spent a week digging a tunnel into the base of the mound, in which they place a charge of high explosives. The Nuer warriors were assembled for a display of government power and told to watch the mound closely, for it would vanish on a signal from the British leader of the patrol. The attempt to destroy the mound was a failure, however. As Percy Coriat, the Nuer-speaking officer involved described it, “a puff of white smoke and a few lumps of earth tumbling down the side was all they saw.” The mound was attacked by the Royal Air Force in 1927, but bombs failed to destroy it. Gwek remained at large and raids and other disturbances continued. In January 1929, another government column was dispatched to the pyramid.

Percy Coriat climbing the “pyramid,” 1928

Arriving at 5:30 in the morning, they found large numbers of spear-carrying warriors dancing at the base of the mound. Magic water was given to the warriors, who were told that it would render them immune to bullets and taxes, while reeds were given out in the understanding that they would be magically transformed into guns once the battle began.
The column formed a square and began firing over the heads of the warriors in an effort to provoke a charge. The shots had their desired effect and soon the Nuer were rapidly advancing, singing and driving Gwek’s white bull before them. When they had reached 120 yards from the square the government troops opened a withering fire that broke the charge. Gwek’s body and pipe were found beside the slain white bull. The prophet had got closer to the square than anyone else. Though the action wasn’t quite the “Battle of the Pyramids” fought between Napoleon and the Mamluks, it nevertheless had as great an impact on the Nuer of the South Sudan, ending for the most part all resistance to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government.

After the battle, the British hung Gwek’s body in a tree so that all the Nuer could see that he was truly dead. Gwek’s pipe wound up in the hands of District Commissioner Alban, who liked to shock the local Nuer by having a smoke from it. Eventually it was destroyed in a fire, but the pieces were recovered and presented to the Khartoum Museum.
The ruined mound stood for many years, with the Nuer prevented by the government from effecting any repairs. As late as 1940, a plague of locusts prompted Gwek’s twin brother, Lil, to request that the mound be “closed up” in order to enclose and bury the plague. Permission was refused. The Bie Dengkur after its Partial Demolition by Government Forces.

In conclusion, we can see some similarities and differences between the Bie Dengkur and the Old Kingdom pyramids:

1/ The Egyptian pyramids were built at the instigation of a divine (or semi-divine) king, while the Nuer mound was built under the direction of a prophet who acted as a spokesman for God.

2/ In time, the pyramids of the Old Kingdom came to symbolize the over-concentration of power and wealth in one individual’s hands leading to resentment and the looting of these structures as early as the First Intermediate Period. The mound of Dengkur, however, came to serve as both a symbol of Nuer resistance to outside aggression and as a means of controlling some of the more inimical elements of nature.

3/ The Egyptian works served as funerary monuments for the benefit of one individual, while the mound of Dengkur was rather more functional, serving to bury plague and disease for the benefit of the entire community.

4/ Both works assisted, intentionally or not, in the unification of fractious but otherwise homogenous peoples and in the mass organization of labour. In this sense, the pyramids of Egypt were vitally important in the formation of a powerful state; the inspiration of Ngundeng might likewise have enabled the Nuer to assume a politically dominant position in the South Sudan had a more advanced culture not interfered at a vital point in their development of a proto-state.

Bibliography

Alban, A.H.: “Gwek’s pipe and pyramid,” Sudan Notes and Records 23(1), pp. 200-201.

Biedelman, T.O.: “Nuer priests and prophets: charisma, power and authority among the Nuer,” in: T.O. Biedelman (ed.), The Translation of Culture, London, pp. 375-415.

Burton, J.W.: “A note on Nuer prophets,” Sudan Notes and Records 54, pp.95-107.

Coriat, Percival: “Gwek the witch-doctor and the pyramid of Dengkur,” Sudan Notes and Records 22(2), 1939, pp.221-37.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E.: “Customs and beliefs relating to twins among the Nilotic Nuer,” Uganda Journal, 1936, pp.230-38.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E.: The Nuer, Oxford, 1940

Greuel, P.J.: “The Leopard-skin chief: An examination of political power among the Nuer,” American Anthropologist 73, 1971, pp.115-20.

Howell, P.P.: “Pyramids in the Upper Nile Region,” Man 48, 1948, pp.52-53.

Jackson, H.C.: Sudan Days and Ways, MacMillan and Co., London, 1954.

Johnson, Douglas H.: “Foretelling Peace and War: Modern Interpretations of Ngundeng’s Prophecies in the Southern Sudan,” in: M.W. Daly (ed.): Modernization in the Sudan: Essays in Honor of Richard Hill, Lilian Barber Press, New York, 1985

Johnson, Douglas H.: Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Clarendon Press, 1997

Kelly, Raymond C.: The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1985

Kingdon, F.D.: “The Western Nuer Patrol,” Sudan Notes and Records 32, 1945, pp. 77-84.

Stigand, G.H.: “Warrior classes of the Nuers,” Sudan Notes and Records 1, 1918, pp.116-18.

Thomas, L.: “The Nuer Patrol, 1927-28,” in D. Lavin (ed.), The Condominium Remembered: Proceedings of the Durham Sudan Historical Records Conference 1982, Vol. 1, Durham, 1991, pp. 108-110.

A transcript of this lecture was first published in Proceedings of the Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations Graduate Students’ Annual Symposia 1998-2000, Benben Publications for the University of Toronto, 2001, pp. 201-210.

The Circassian Qubba-s of Abbas Avenue, Khartoum: Governors and Soldiers in 19th Century Sudan

Posted on March 16, 2001 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor
Canadian Institute of International Affairs

Nordic Journal of African Studies 10(1), Helsinki, 2001

Abstract:
Departing from two qubba-s, beehive-like tombs from the 19th century in the centre of Khartoum, the author portrays the complicated sequence of power politics in Egypt and in the Sudan, which ‘explains’ the existence of those two burial monuments in an area where most such monuments were destroyed after the Mahdi’s conquest in 1885. These qubba-s are grave monuments of two nineteenth century Circassian governors-general of the Sudan in the service of Viceroy Muhammad ‘Ali and his descendants. In the qubba-s can be seen the passing of an extraordinary age of Circassian prominence in the Nile Valley. Several events contributed to the end of the Circassian importance in international affairs in general and in Egypt in particular, including (a) the elimination of Mamluk recruitment; (b) the conquest of a divided Circassia by Russia; (c) the exile of many Circassians to Turkey, Jordan, and other points in the Middle East; (d) the growth of Arab nationalism in Egypt and other parts of the Ottoman Empire; and (e) the momentous changes in the power structure of the Ottoman government that culminated in the revolution of the Young Turks.

INTRODUCTION

Passed every day by thousands of people in the downtown core of Khartoum are a pair of qubba-s, or large, beehive-shaped tombs. Surrounded today by modern office towers, their quiet and dusty façades barely invite a second glance, and they are probably taken by most passers-by to be tombs of a pair of local shaykh-s, as the qubba-style monument is almost universally associated with Islamic saints in the Sudan. In reality, however, these structures are not religious in nature, but are rather reminders of the great variety of people who arrived in the Sudan in the nineteenth century, some to rule, some to exploit, some to develop and some to colonize. Drawn from Europe, the Maghrab, the Caucasus, the Middle East and even Central Asia, most of these individuals came voluntarily to participate in the opening of this vast country, while others arrived on orders or even in chains as prisoners in forced exile. Notable among these were the many Circassian military men in Egyptian service, often rising from slavery to assume vitally important positions in the Sudanese administration.

The qubba-s on ‘Abbas Avenue are almost unique examples of ‘secular’ monuments of this type in the Sudan as they mark the burials of two nineteenth century Circassian governors-general of the Sudan in the service of Muhammad ‘Ali and his descendants. Many examples of qubba-s devoted to Sudanese holy men are surrounded by subsidiary burials as followers and even later generations hope to partake in the baraka of the shaykh through burial close to his monument. Mimicking this pattern of burials, the secular qubba-s of ‘Abbas Avenue are likewise accompanied by a number of subsidiary graves, including those of a pair of notable native Sudanese officers of the Egyptian army who pursued service as far afield as Greece, the Crimea and Mexico.

After the abandonment of Khartoum following the Mahdi’s conquest in 1885 and the subsequent demolition of all major buildings for materials for the new ‘Islamic’ capital of Omdurman across the White Nile, the Circassian qubba-s became virtually the only intact remnants of the pre-Mahdist Sudanese capital. It would seem logical to assume that these tombs evaded destruction by the religiously inspired Mahdists through their resemblance to the tombs of Islamic holy men, but the reasons for their survival may be much more complex.

1. THE CIRCASSIANS

The Circassians (also known as Cherkess and Adyghe) who occupied the western half of the north Caucasus are among the most ancient of the region’s innumerable ethnic and linguistic groups. By the tenth to thirteenth centuries AD the Circassians began to consolidate themselves on the Black Sea coast, trading with Byzantium and the Mediterranean merchant cities. Among the products dealt were highly prized Circassian slaves, the women esteemed for their beauty and the young men for their military prowess (Allen, 1970). Nominally Christian with many pagan traditions, the Circassians turned to Islam (introduced by Crimean Tatars) in the 17th and early 18th centuries as a reaction to the Russian threat from the north. The Circassians were politically tied to the Ottoman Empire, but disunity amongst the various tribes allowed Russia to militarily penetrate their homeland. In the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople (Edirme), the Ottoman Empire gave up all claims on the fertile Circassian homeland, but in the 1830s a sense of national identity was formed with British and Ottoman encouragement. Foreign intervention on behalf of the Circassians seemed possible during the early stages of the Crimean War, but eventually the Allies (Britain, France and Turkey) decided to make a landing on the Crimean peninsula rather than the Black Sea coast, despite Turkish support for military intervention in the Caucasus. Major Russian operations resumed in 1862, and after 35 years of nearly constant warfare, Circassian resistance collapsed in 1864, with four to five hundred thousand Circassians being driven from their lands into ships destined for Turkey. Heirs to a proud warrior tradition, some Circassian chiefs were said to have ridden their horse into the Black Sea, drowning themselves in full warrior’s regalia. By 1866 as many as one million Circassians had been driven from their homes, many perishing of disease, exposure and starvation in the process. [2] A last effort to retake Circassia came in 1877, when large numbers of Circassians joined in the Ottoman invasion of the Black Sea coast; though initially successful, the attempt was eventually abandoned (Allen and Muratoff 1953). A large Circassian diaspora emerged from this catastrophe, in which the Circassians were dispersed to communities in Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Palestine, though the displaced Circassians continued to have great success in the armed forces and royal guards of their adopted countries. The Circassian homeland was eventually broken into three autonomous republics, Adygea, Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, in each of which the Circassians now form a small minority (Habjoka 1972).

To explain the burial of two Circassian military men in religious-style tombs in Khartoum we must first briefly look back to Egypt in 1260 AD, when the powerful class of military slaves known as Mamluks seized power from their masters and created their own unique dynasty. The Mamluks were not Egyptians themselves, but were instead purchased as boys from dealers in the Caucasus mountains, Turkestan, and even Mongolia. They were succeeded in power not by their own children, but by new slaves imported from far beyond Egypt. In 1382, the Circassian faction of Mamluks from the North Caucasus gained dominance and spent the next 135 years battling each other while terrorizing and pillaging their hapless Egyptian subjects. The Ottoman invasion of 1517 did not end Mamluk authority as expected, but in many cases only supplied the Mamluks with a new series of Ottoman governors to bully and torment.

The end of this system of misgovernment arrived in the person of Muhammad ‘Ali at the head of 10,000 Albanian troops in a combined Ottoman-British invasion of French-occupied Egypt. Seizing power in 1803, Muhammad ‘Ali followed a policy of massacres against the Mamluks while also cutting off the supply of new slaves from Circassia and Georgia.

By 1811, Muhammad ‘Ali had succeeded in destroying the Mamluks as an institution, but the resilient Circassians continued to wield considerable control and influence in Egyptian affairs for the next 70 years, although they were now under the vigilant eye of the Viceroy and his successors. Culturally aligned to the Ottoman Turks through their shared use of Turkish rather than Arabic, the Circassians formed part of a Turko-Circassian elite in Egypt that enjoyed a monopoly on force and the major state offices despite their small numbers. Probably only 1% of the population at the beginning of the 19th century, the supply of fresh Circassian slaves began to diminish under the Viceroy’s rule, and the children of Turko-Circassians began to be raised as Arabic-speaking Egyptians.

Growing numbers of native Egyptian administrators and the concurrent growth of Arabic as the language of government meant that by the 1870s the term ‘Turko-Circassian’ had lost much of its ethnic meaning, instead indicating more of a socio-economic class. The use of Ottoman Turkish in government had long kept Egyptians from public office, but long after the use of Arabic and French had become common in many ministries, the Egyptian Army retained Turkish as the language of command, allowing the Turko-Circassians some leverage in keeping a lingering grip on their previous monopoly on force. [3] The development of a nascent Egyptian nationalism behind Ahmad ‘Urabi was in large part a response to the entrenchment of the wealthy, land-holding Turko-Circassian elite, but many Circassians realized that their grip on Egypt was highly tenuous, and the Circassian nobles and officers split into Ottoman and ‘Urabist factions. With the ‘Urabist nationalists in power, a number of Circassian staff officers attempted a coup in 1882 designed to preserve the old order. The rising was thwarted and the officers were sentenced to exile in the Sudan (later commuted to exile in Turkey by Khedive Tawfiq, a virtual non-punishment) (Cole 1993: 237-238).

Some few hundred Mamluks escaped Muhammad ‘Ali’s wrath by fleeing to the Sudan, and in an effort to eliminate these and to acquire at the same time large numbers of black slaves to swell the ranks of his army, Muhammad ‘Ali sent his son Isma’il to the Sudan at the head of a large invasion force in 1820. Isma’il was also entrusted with the task of exploiting the supposed gold fields of Sinnar. The army was a motley collection of Turkish troops, Bedouin, Bosnians, Magharba volunteers and Bashi-Bazouks, [4] loosely disciplined irregulars (mostly Albanians, Circassians, Kurds and Slavs). The army also included a battery of field artillery, which was to prove decisive in several engagements ahead.

2. THE TURKO-EGYPTIAN CONQUEST OF THE SUDAN

The advance of Isma’il’s force was unopposed until they reached the land of the Sha’iqiya, along the Nile in the region between Korti and the fourth cataract. Proud and warlike, the Sha’iqiya courageously but futilely charged the Egyptian guns in two battles in December 1820. Heavy Sha’iqiya losses on the battlefield were followed by the brutal mutilation of many of the civilian population by Turkish troops. Despite this, the surviving Sha’iqi warriors were recruited into Turkish service and remained among the most effective instruments of force available to the regime until its demise 65 years later.
Reaching Sinnar on the Blue Nile in June 1821, a detachment under the Viceroy’s capable son Ibrahim Pasha received the submission of King Badi IV, ruler of the now decrepit Funj empire. The conquest of Fur-ruled Kordofan was entrusted to Muhammad ‘Ali’s son-in-law, the Daftardar Muhammad Bey Khusraw. [5] Again Turkish guns laid waste to the chain-mailed cavalry of the Fur governor and his Arab allies at the battle of Bara. Only the outbreak of an anti-Ottoman rebellion on the Greek island of Morea prevented a further invasion of Darfur itself.

Turkish troops throughout the new territories were immediately put to the task of enslaving tens of thousands of the Viceroy’s new subjects (as well as their neighbors) and shipping them to Cairo. Isma’il was constantly spurred on by his father, who was desperate to fill the ranks of the nizam al-jadid, his new army of black slaves and Egyptian fellahin (agricultural peasants). Muhammad ‘Ali stated these recruits were ‘worth even more than jewels’ (Douin 1944: 277-285).

Massive new tax levies were instituted to compensate for the failure of the Turks to discover the long rumoured gold sources of Sinnar and Kordofan. While the early years of the occupation might be termed ‘rule by razzia,’ there were exceptional administrators such as ‘Abdin Bey al-Arna’ut (‘the Albanian’), who made many improvements as governor of Dongola (1821-26). The stability of Dongola was unusual, however, as rebellion flickered throughout the new Egyptian territories.

On an inspection tour of Shendi in 1822, Isma’il made insulting and unreasonable demands for slaves and cash from the Ja’aliyin mek (king), Nimr Muhammad. Mek Nimr responded by uniting with his cousin Mek Musa’ad to brutally kill Isma’il and his entourage. With Muhammad ‘Ali’s new heir Ibrahim needed in Egypt to deal with rebellious fellahin, the suppression of the Arab revolt that followed Isma’il’s death was left to the Daftardar, Muhammad Bey Khusraw, who accomplished the task through massacres and relentless cruelty towards the rebels and the innocent alike. Before being relieved in 1824, the atrocities carried out by the Daftardar in Sudan coloured Sudanese attitudes towards the ‘Turks’ for the remainder of their administration. Muhammad Bey Khusraw was eventually judged a liability by his father-in-law, the Viceroy, and was poisoned on the Viceroy’s orders in 1833.

The administration of the Turko-Egyptian regime changed little with the arrival of a new governor for Sinnar and Berber at the head of a regiment of the nizam al-jadid. ‘Uthman Jarkas al-Birinji was a middle-aged Circassian Mamluk of the Viceroy’s household who attempted to revive the Mamluk style once in Sudan by recruiting fourteen other Mamluks as a personal bodyguard. These efforts brought admonishment from the Viceroy, and ‘Uthman’s brutal attempts to collect the excessive taxes drove the all-important cultivators of the fertile Gezira region into the desert to perish of starvation and disease.

After ‘Uthman’s sudden death in 1823 he was replaced by a Kurd, the Mamluk Mahu Bey Urfali. Mahu accomplished much in his single year as governor, pacifying the country, suspending tax collection for three years, decentralizing the administration and restoring discipline to the marauding troops. Nevertheless, the Viceroy desired another hand at the helm, and installed ‘Ali Kurshid Agha as the Sudan’s first hikimdar (governor-general) in 1826.

Ali Kurshid was given wide powers, but discovered his new domain was already in ruins after only five years of Turko-Egyptian rule. The hikimdar’s rule, which lasted until 1838, was characterized by a number of important developments, including the establishment of Khartoum as the new capital of the Sudan, the introduction of a number of new crops, the growing cultivation of cotton, and the revival of the Gezira region. ‘Ali Kurshid also worked hard at organizing the slave trade and mounted numerous raids on the Shilluk, the Dinkas and the Hadendowa, many of which met fierce resistance (Hill 1959; Udal 1998; Douin 1944).Qubba of Ahmad Pasha Abu Adhan (McGregor)

3. THE QUBBA OF AHMAD PASHA ABU ADHAN

Muhammad ‘Ali’s conquest of the Sudan gave ambitious Circassians a new field in which to resume their ruling ways at some distance from the ever-suspicious Viceroy while still being officially engaged in his service. The qubba-s in downtown Khartoum memorialize two such men.

The first of these is Ahmad Pasha Abu Adhan, Governor-General of the Sudan from 1839 to 1843. Brought to Egypt as a Circassian slave, Ahmad Pasha was a career soldier who fought under Muhammad ‘Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, in Arabia, Syria and Greece. After serving as Egypt’s Minister of War, Ahmad Pasha’s first task as Governor-General was an eight-month campaign undertaken in 1840 to subjugate the Hadendowa tribe of the Beja in the east part of the Sudan. Taking Kassala following heavy fighting, Ahmad Pasha then embarked on a large raid into the Blue Nile area in search of slaves for Muhammad ‘Ali’s army. According to one source, his force of nearly 5,000 men and artillery was soundly routed by a desperate charge of spear-carrying tribesmen at Kormuk (Paton 1863: 227-231). In 1843 Muhammad ‘Ali ordered the preparation of a large force to invade Darfur, an independent sultanate west of the Sudan, but the operation was called off at the last minute because Muhammad ‘Ali began to suspect Ahmad Pasha of treasonous activities.
While governor, Ahmad Pasha made a number of innovations in the administration of the Sudan, including the development of the manufacturing sector of the country, the imposition of a levy of slaves upon each taxable person, and a crackdown on government corruption, especially among the Coptic financial clerks who used the mysteries of accounting to fleece their Turkish masters. The Governor-General was especially popular with the black troops of the Egyptian army, which eventually caused Muhammad ‘Ali to regard him as a threat to his own rule. The Viceroy could well recall that it was his own popularity with the Albanian troops serving in Egypt that enabled him to seize control, though Muhammad ‘Ali would later take pains to eliminate his unruly supporters by sending them off to fight in expeditionary forces accompanied by letters to their commanders advising them that these men were to considered ‘expendable.’

When rumours began to circulate that the Governor-General was negotiating with the Ottoman sultan to separate the Sudan from Egypt, Ahmad Pasha was ordered back to Cairo. The Governor-General apparently decided instead to take a fatal dose of poison in Khartoum, though rumours held that the poison had been administered by Muhammad ‘Ali’s messenger. The Governor-General’s family was detained in Khartoum for a year afterwards in an attempt to suppress speculation, and the whole incident was regarded as something of a scandal in Istanbul. [6]

Qubba of Musa Pasha Hamdi (McGregor)

4. THE QUBBA OF MUSA PASHA HAMDI

The Western qubba on ‘Abbas Avenue is that of Musa Pasha Hamdi, Governor-General of the Sudan from 1862 to 1865. Musa Hamdi was a Circassian soldier of long experience in the Sudan. His career began when he was sold as a slave in the Cairo market to a Turk. Enrolled in the army, Musa Hamdi was captured in a campaign against the Syrians, but succeeded in escaping. Musa Hamdi progressed quickly through the ranks due to a combination of cunning and ruthlessness, and despite being dismissed at one point for his inhumane treatment of prisoners (an accomplishment at a time when taxes were collected through beatings and conscripts were transported in chains), Musa Hamdi was soon appointed to a succession of important posts. When made Governor-General, Musa Hamdi brought with him a reputation for cruelty demonstrated in campaigns against the Beja in the eastern Sudan. Although several of his predecessors had taken steps against the Sudan’s immense trade in slaves, Musa Hamdi allowed the slave trade to resume unhindered. Taxation was also raised to unsustainable levels and it was not long before the Sudan’s administration became a net drain on the Cairo treasury. In the south the Governor-General came into conflict with several of the often-large private slave armies created by Nubian and Arab traders and slavers from the north Sudan. A successful raid on Abyssinia resulted in Musa Hamdi’s promotion to the third grade of pasha (Rumeli beylerbeyi), but a later expedition against the Nuba of Southern Kordofan ended in defeat for the Governor-General. Musa Hamdi solved the problem of a large and under-utilized army in the Sudan by loaning regular troops to slave-raiders in the South. The Governor-General’s short rule ended with his death from smallpox in Khartoum in 1865. His successor defamed him as ‘a drunkard, a gambler, and a thief,’ though it was the practice for new governors to denigrate their predecessors so as to make their own regimes shine in comparison. Samuel Baker, who knew the Governor-General, described Musa Hamdi as ‘a rather exaggerated specimen of Turkish authorities in general, combining the worst of oriental failings with the brutality of a wild animal’ (Baker 1877: 8). HA MacMichael, a later Governor-General of the Sudan, remarked of Musa Hamdi that ‘murder and torture were no more to him than pastimes’ (MacMichael 1922: 429).

5. THE TOMB OF MUHAMMAD BEY ALMAS

As mentioned above, Islamic qubba-s are typically surrounded by the graves of followers and descendants of the shaykh within, a pattern followed by the monuments of ‘Abbas Avenue, which are accompanied by a handful of lesser burials. Among these is that of Muhammad Bey Almas (or al-Maz). A Dinka from the south Sudan, Muhammad Almas entered the Turkish-Egyptian army as a common soldier in 1834 and eventually rose to the rank of commissioned officer.

Far from the Sudan, the manipulations of the French emperor Napoleon III in Mexico were to have an unforeseen effect on the lives of Almas and many of his fellow Sudanese comrades-in-arms. Napoleon III committed a large number of French troops in 1862 to support the ambitious attempt to place a Hapsburg royal on the throne of Mexico, but Yellow Fever and malaria proved devastating to the French troops. The French Emperor was increasingly involved financially with Egypt, and his request for the loan of black troops used to such conditions for use in the most fever-ridden areas was met with approval. By January 1863 Muhammad Almas was on his way to Mexico as second-in-command of 447 Sudanese soldiers, assuming command of the regiment shortly after the death of its commanding officer, Binbashi Jubarat Allah.

The Sudanese proved very effective fighters and became highly popular with their French allies. [7] Almas was personally decorated by the Hapsburg Arch-Duke Maximillian with the order of Our Lady of Guadeloupe, a singularly unusual distinction for a Muslim officer. A much-reduced Sudanese force embarked for the return to Egypt in 1867, stopping along the way for a review by Napoleon III in Paris. Almas was decorated with the cross of Officer of the Legion of Honour by the French emperor,and was further promoted upon his return to Egypt. The Mexican veterans proved a remarkably durable lot, serving as the most reliable troops under successive governors of the Sudan. Gordon gave the highest commands to Mexican veterans in his defence of Khartoum, and several served long enough to participate in Kitchener’s 1899 conquest of the Mahdist forces at Omdurman. [8]

6. THE TOMB OF ADHAM PASHA AL-‘ARIFI

A second military burial at the site is that of Adham Pasha al-‘Arifi (commonly called al-Taqalawi). Born in the Nuba hills of Southern Kordofan, al-‘Arifi, probably a Nuba in origin, was one of the first black Sudanese to be taken to Egypt for a military education. After his training, al-‘Arifi fought in Muhammad ‘Ali’s campaigns in Syria before serving as second in command of a regiment of Sudanese troops (the 9th) sent to the Crimea in 1853 as part of the Ottoman expeditionary force. After fighting the Russians, al-‘Arifi returned to the Sudan in 1862, where he embarked on a tax-collecting campaign in the Fazughli mountains of the Blue Nile region. In 1865 Cairo issued orders for a battalion to be formed from black troops stationed in Kassala for the relief of the Sudanese battalion already in Mexico. The Kassala garrison mutinied, and al-‘Arifi was placed in command of one of three columns sent to suppress the mutineers. Al-‘Arifi persuaded the garrison to surrender, but they were then executed to a man, despite Al-‘Arifi’s protests. His own role in the affair nevertheless brought al-‘Arifi promotion and eventually the post of acting Governor-General in 1872 while serving as commanding officer of all troops in the Sudan (Hill 1967: 27).

Several other tombs are found on the site, including that of the wife of Mari Bey. Mari Bey (also known as Békir Agha, and Békir Bey) was a Corsican adventurer who claimed to have served under Napoleon as a colonel, though others insisted he was only a drummer; hence his nickname, ‘Le Colonel Tapin’. Appointed an instructor in Muhammad ‘Ali’s army, Mari Bey campaigned against the Wahhabites in Arabia and against the Greeks in Morea. By 1834 he was on the staff of Ahmad Pasha in Arabia. While serving as a prefect of police in Cairo in 1853 he fell into disfavour with ‘Abbas I and was temporarily exiled to Khartoum, where his wife died and was buried beside the qubba of his old commander, Ahmad Pasha.

The last tomb on the site belongs to Ibrahim Bey Marzouk, an Egyptian writer who appears to have been of some influence in Khartoum, having once served on a commission of inquiry regarding government corruption.

7. THE QUBBA-S

The Sudanese Qubba in its most basic beehive form – Northern Dongola Reach, Nubia (Sudan Archaeological Research Society – Northern Dongola Reach Survey)

Qubba-s are found mainly along the Blue Nile and the Nile north of Khartoum, though isolated examples are found through most of Muslim Sudan. The qubba is always a holy place, and the fenced area around it is also haram, a sanctuary where a traveler’s goods can be left safely and without interference. The qubba-s are sites of local pilgrimage on holy days, or on occasions when it is necessary to make a special request from the saint. A solemn oath may also be sworn at a qubba belonging to a family ancestor.

More complex examples from Wad Madani on the Blue Nile (Photo – David Love)

The qubba of Ahmad Pasha, the earlier of the two on ‘Abbas Avenue, represents the beginning of the last phase of development of Sudanese qubba-s, using a cube foundation with a beehive cupola, the two being mediated by a polygon in the middle. In the ‘Abbas Avenue examples and in another qubba at Mekali (that of Al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah al-Halengi) each of the foundation corners supports a phallic-shaped column. This type of ornament evolved into a more elaborate small dome supported by four open arches, as in the Mahdi’s tomb and others in Omdurman (as-Sadig 1966; Humudi 1977: 107-116).

How did these small burial structures on ‘Abbas Avenue come to be the last remnants of pre-Mahdist Khartoum? Their outward appearance as religious sanctuaries does not appear sufficient reason when the historical record is examined. The tombs were those of major figures in the hated Turko-Egyptian regime, and while the vast majority of the Mahdists were illiterate tribesmen from the west Sudan, the identity of the occupants of these qubba-s would have been no mystery to Islamic scholars such as the Mahdi or to the many former members of the Turko-Egyptian regime who had fallen in with the Mahdists, and who would know the true nature of the tombs’ occupants or at least be able to read the inscriptions found there. Islamic associations were not alone enough to prevent the destruction of a structure by the Mahdists: the Great Mosque of Khartoum was dismantled for building materials shortly after the Mahdist victory, and it is further known that the Mahdists destroyed the qubba of al-Hasan al-Mirghani (1810-69) in Kassala because of his son’s opposition to the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa. In these circumstances it is all the more puzzling as to why these two ‘secular’ qubba-s, representative of the cruelty and extortion of the Turko-Egyptian regime, should have survived the abandonment and destruction of the rest of the city.

The Qubba Tomb of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, Omdurman

It is suggested that, given the structural similarity between the ‘Abbas Avenue qubba-s and the much grander tomb of the Mahdi in Omdurman, that the Circassian qubba-s served as architectural models for the tomb of the Mahdi, who died very shortly after the fall of Khartoum. As the rest of Khartoum was dismantled, these qubba-s were spared the fate of the rest of the city through their association (however tenuous) with the Mahdi. These tombs, representative of the old order, could owe their preservation to the sanctity of the man who forever destroyed that old order in the Sudan.

What, then, was the legacy of these Circassian governors and their fellow Ottomans during Egypt’s 19th century rule in the Sudan? Before his fateful return to Khartoum, General Gordon insisted in an interview in 1884 (in the Pall Mall Gazette) that ‘all that was needed in order to restore law and order in the Sudan was to promise the Sudanese that in future no Turks or Circassians should be allowed to exploit them and ruin their country’. Lord Cromer, who devised the Condominium government of Britain and Egypt that ruled the Sudan after 1899, described the Turko-Circassian administration of the Sudan as ‘the worst form of misgovernment’. George Schuster, a prominent member of Sudan’s government in the 1920’s, described the regime as ‘one of the blackest stories of misadministration in human history – a record of corruption by Government officials, of slave trading, of local wars and complete civil disorder.’ [9]

Egyptian views of the Turko-Circassian legacy in Sudan vary; some have focused on
Egypt’s ‘civilizing mission’, some have disclaimed Egyptian involvement in what was in reality an Ottoman Turkish administration, and still others have blamed the ills of the administration on the Europeans introduced to the Sudan government by Khedive Isma’il in the 1870’s. Sudanese scholars have used Egyptian correspondence of the period to reject any notion of Egypt carrying out a ‘civilizing mission’ above and beyond the exploitation of Sudanese resources and peoples, and further emphatically dispose of the idea that the Sudanese umma required Egyptian guidance in religious affairs (Warburg 1992).

While the Turko-Circassians did open the Sudan to world markets and created a centralized administration, the devastation wrought by a brutal and wasteful slave trade, the consequent depopulation of viable economic areas, and the use of forced labour on over-ambitious and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to exploit the country’s natural resources meant that the Sudan’s financial books were doomed to drown in red ink even before corrupt administrators of each level of government took their take of the official revenues.

8. CONCLUSION

The small collection of qubba-s and graves on ‘Abbas Avenue are an important monument to the vast changes that came to the Middle East and North Africa in the 19th century. In the qubba-s we may see the passing of an extraordinary age of Circassian prominence in the Nile Valley. Among the events that conspired to bring an end to Circassian importance in international affairs in general and their prominence in Egypt in particular were;

a) the elimination of Mamluk recruitment
b) the conquest of a divided Circassia by Russia
c) the exile of many Circassians to Turkey, Jordan, and other points in the Middle East
d) the growth of Arab nationalism in Egypt and other parts of the Ottoman Empire
e) the momentous changes in the power structure of the Ottoman government that culminated in the revolution of the Young Turks. [10]

On the other hand, we may see in the careers of the two Sudanese officers the entry of the black tribes of the south Sudan onto the modern international scene. Born into a world where most people rarely ventured far from their village, these Nuba, Dinkas, Shilluks and others represented their little known peoples with distinction in such far-flung places as Syria, Russia, France and Mexico.

Though they, like the Circassians, began their Egyptian service as slaves, they were pioneers in the transition of power in the Sudan from the varied ‘Turk’ races of the Ottoman empire to the Sudanese nationalists who would eventually guide the Sudan to independence.

Notes

[AIS Update – December 2016] – The author made several visits to the site in the 1980s and 1990s, which was, at the time, close to a road sign that read “Abbas Avenue.” It was later learned that the avenue had been renamed al-Baladiya Avenue at some point after independence, though apparently the old road signs had not been removed. The qubba-s can be found on al-Baladiya (formerly Abbas) between al-Qasr Avenue and Babiker Badri Street. The author regrets the mistake.
The precise figures have been the subject of some dispute; see Henze (1992: 103-104).
For the role of the Circassian elite in a changing 19th century Egyptian society, see Abu-Lughod (1967: 325-344).
Turkish: basibozuk, literally ‘crack-brained.’ Lively accounts of service in such units can be found, for example, in Money (1857) and Vizetelly (1897).
The Daftardar was the Egyptian government Intendant of Finance.
Hill 1967: 41-42. For details of the controversy, see Santi and Hill (1980: 87-89) and Hill (1956: 83-87).
The Sudanese and French were only part of a polyglot force that included Austrians, Belgians, Mexicans, Legionnaires and Martinicans.
A full history of the Mexican campaign is given in Hill and Hogg (1995). A colourful first-hand account can be found in Jifun (1896). See also Ravert and Dellard (1894: 43-53, 104-23, 176-85, 230-45, 272-85).
Gordon is quoted in Daniel (1966: 426). For British views of the Turko-Egyptian regime, see Schuster (1979) and MacMichael (1934: Ch. 3).
The post-Communist efforts to unite the Circassian diaspora are described in Smith (1998 : 92-95).

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as-Sadig, S. O. 1966. The Domed Tombs of Eastern Sudan: Their functional, cultural and psychological values. Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Khartoum.

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Russian advance towards the Muslim world, Marie Bennigsen Broxup (ed.). London.

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Revue d’Égypte I.

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Norwich.

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Uzbekistan: Emerging Regional Power or Unstable Core of Central Asia?

Posted on October 1, 2000 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor, Ph.D., CIIA

Strategic Datalink no. 92, October 2000

Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies

Poorly known today, Uzbekistan could once have justifiably claimed to be the center of the world in an earlier age. A place of Islamic learning and pilgrimage, the region spawned generations of great conquerors from its dominant position on the great Silk Road that connected the economies of Asia, Europe and the Middle East. The decline of this great trade-route was followed by Russian conquest and annexation between 1868 and 1876, and Uzbekistan entered a long sleep under Russian and Soviet rule, until the Soviet collapse in 1991 thrust independence upon the completely unprepared Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Uzbekistan, like its post-Soviet neighbors in Central Asia, remains an experiment in state-building. Despite a rich and ancient heritage, these nations (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) have no tradition as independent self-governing entities, and remain torn between Soviet-style authoritarianism, emergent capitalism, ethnic nationalism, Slavic separatism and resurgent Islam. [1] The modern borders are the result of Communist gerrymandering designed to divide ethnic groups and create weaknesses within each of the republics. New pressures arising from Russian post-colonial politics and the growth of militant Islamist groups are threatening the security and stability of several Central Asian nations already on the verge of economic and environmental collapse. At the centre of this incipient turmoil is the nation of Uzbekistan, an aggressive would-be regional power with a population of 25 million and an army of some 50,000. [2] Uzbekistan’s direction will play a major role in determining the success or failure of the Central-Asian state-building experiment.

The mounting crisis in Central Asia has prompted a flurry of diplomatic activity and the formation of new and often unlikely security alliances. The Sunni Islamist threat has prompted cooperation between Russia, the US, Israel, China and Turkey, with increasing input from India and Shi’ite Iran. With a $8 billion Western investment in petroleum projects, the US has taken a sudden interest in the region, sending Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a number of FBI and CIA officials with $9 million to fight terrorism. China has turned against its former Taliban allies in Afghanistan, in part for allowing Uyghur Muslim separatists from Western China to train in Islamist bases within Afghanistan. [3] This year’s meeting of the “Shanghai Five” (China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan) had a sense of immediacy as the member nations focused on threats to regional stability from religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking. President Karimov of Uzbekistan unexpectedly cancelled a meeting with NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson in order to attend the summit as an observer. Karimov, who formerly affected aloofness towards the Shanghai Five and other regional security groups, has expressed a sudden willingness to join.

Russia Returns

Land-locked Uzbekistan has large natural gas and uranium resources that cannot be exploited without regional stability, and in the mounting crisis requires partners to establish security. Russian-Uzbek relations have steadily improved since the accession of President Putin. Though highly suspicious (like China) of Western economic and military activity in the area, Russian is nevertheless appealing to the West and Israel to join Russia in a campaign against what it views as an international Islamic conspiracy. More specifically in Central Asia, Russia has warned of Islamist plans to create an “Islamic State of Ferghana.” Part of the Russian strategy appears to involve undermining regional organizations sponsored or favored by the United States.

Despite early high expectations in Ankara regarding the opening of Central Asia to Turkish influence and commerce, the post-communist regimes of the region have been reluctant to embrace Pan-Turkism, preferring instead to attempt to carve out new national identities which will prove less threatening to the continued existence of the ruling elites. In recent years, Russian policy towards Central Asia was difficult to define, but lately a philosophy of “Eurasianism” (encompassing common goals between Russia and its Asian neighbors to the exclusion of American interests) has gained favor across the Russian political spectrum. [4] Since the 1999 Tashkent bombings, however, Karimov has steadily moved towards a rapprochement with the Russians after dalliances with NATO and the United States, neither of which have regional forces able to extricate Karimov from a security crisis.

A growing hub for the region’s extensive underground economy, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan serves as a warehouse and conduit for smuggling networks specializing in consumer commodities, weapons and drugs. The profits fund radical Islamic movements of every stripe, many of them operating bases inside Afghanistan. In a break from traditionally impoverished peasants’ revolts of the past, the network of radical Islamists is now largely self-financed. International volunteers from the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, Turkey and the Arab states may be found in Afghanistan’s mujahidin training camps, and have served in the Taliban’s offensive against the Northern Alliance. Russian threatened to bomb Afghanistan earlier this year in retaliation for Afghanistan’s ongoing support for the Chechen rebels and other Islamist formations. Uzbekistan continues to be an active partner with Iran in supplying the opposition Northern Alliance, [5] which includes a force of ethnic Uzbeks under warlord Rashid Dostum. [6]

From Khans to Apparatchiks

After the conquest of Turkestan, Uzbekistan was formed under Tsarist rule from the khanates of Bokhara, Khiva and Quqon. In the Soviet period there was a focus on cotton production in Uzbekistan, a move that was to have drastic environmental repercussions, felt today in the desiccation of the Aral Sea, a crippling drought, and the spread of wind-blown pollutants from chemical fertilizers. Across the border in Kyrgyzstan there are dozens of nuclear waste dumps left by the Russians. Improperly contained, these dumps threaten the entire water supply of the Ferghana Valley with radioactive contamination. The Russians now refuse to provide any of the missing records that could help to stave off this impending disaster.

President Islam Karimov

Political life in Uzbekistan suffered greatly during the Soviet period. Native communist leaders were subject to purges were subject to purges, and decision-making eventually fell into the hands of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. As a result, there were few Uzbeks with government experience who could step into the administrative void left by the Soviet collapse in 1991, other than a number of highly cautious Uzbek apparatchiks. One such was Communist Party first-secretary Islam Karimov, who continued to rule Uzbekistan through the transition to independence. Karimov appears to have intended to set up Uzbekistan as a regional power independent of Russian influence, closing the Russian bases inside Uzbekistan and dropping out of the Collective Security Pact (the military alliance of the CIS). Internally, Karimov moved quickly to outlaw all potential secular and Islamic opposition. The surviving form of tame official Islam has little appeal to many Uzbeks.

Since the initial conquest, Uzbekistan has harbored a thread of resistance to Russian/Soviet rule. The Pan-Turkish Jadidi and Basmachi movements both failed to establish an independent Turkestan. With their elimination, the Soviets designed the boundaries of the new republic of Uzbekistan in 1925 with an eye to making the republic the dominant core of Central Asia. Included within its boundaries was 90% of the Ferghana valley and the cities of Tashkent, Samarkand and Bokhara. Uzbekistan’s neighbors fear irredentist claims on their territories based on the khanate boundaries. [7] In reaction they complicate matters by withdrawing political representation from the substantial Uzbek minorities within their borders, especially in Kyrgyzstan.

A Central Asian Caliphate?

After nearly a decade of independence, the aging ex-communist rulers of Uzbekistan have yet to develop a taste for political pluralism, as corruption and the short-sighted repression of even moderate expressions of opposition to the regime inspires the growth of Islamic militantism. [8] Leading the radical Islamist movement are the so-called Wahhabis, Salafist members of an austere Sunni Muslim movement inspired by the revivalist teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1691-1765). [9] The movement was introduced into Central Asia from India in the early 19^th century, and became strongly politicized in opposition to Soviet policies of official atheism. Islam remained the domain of the same “official” schools of Islam, along with tolerant Sufi schools of thought (especially the Nakshbandi order centered in Bokhara) until the late 1980’s, when Wahhabist missionaries began to enter Central Asia. Islamist activity in Uzbekistan is strongest in the Ferghana Valley, Namangan and Andijan, and has recently spread to the Uzbeks of the Osh and Jalalabad oblasts of Kyrgyzstan. [10] It is this group which today supplies the most militant opponents of the Karimov regime, but the term “Wahhabi” is typically applied by governments throughout Central Asia to anyone who opposes the post-Soviet ruling class, including bandits and other common criminals, thus obscuring the true strength and activities of the movement. [11] Wahhabism is also strongly opposed to Sufi practices, and is frequently the source of much strife in communities where it has been introduced.

The Ferghana Valley

The Wahhabist philosophy is mixed in Central Asia to a large degree with Deobandism, a pan-Islamic revival movement developed in India as a reaction to 19^th century British imperialism. Deobandism became politically radicalized in modern Pakistan and, in a crude form, came to be the basis of the Taliban system in Afghanistan (along with the traditional Pashtun code, the Pashtun wali). Saudi funding of the Deobandi madrassa-s (religious schools) tended to bring their teachings closer to Wahhabism.

IMU Leader Tahir Yuldash (Ferghana News)

The current leader of the Wahhabist Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is Tahir Yuldash (also known as Tahirjon Yuldashev). [12] As a 24-year-old school dropout, Yuldash found himself the leader of the Namangan Islamic movement in 1991, leading the calls for recognition of Islam as the state religion and the reinstitution of Shari’a law. A short-lived Muslim government in Namangan was repressed by Karimov, but funds soon began to flow in from the Saudi Arabian movement Ahl-e Sunnah for the construction of madrassa-s and other activities. Yuldash escaped from Uzbekistan after the Tashkent bombings of February 1999, and is said to have established his IMU camp in Afghanistan with help from a donation by Osama bin Laden.

IMU Military Leader Juma Namangani

In the last two years, the IMU have mounted two campaigns under their military commander, Juma Namangani (also known as Jamabai Khajiev). In the first, in 1999, the militants crossed into Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan, kidnapping four Japanese geologists (amongst others) for ransom. [13] Namangani’s guerrilla force grew out of the Muslim exile group forced from Uzbekistan in 1992. Having fought for the Islamic opposition in the Tajik civil war of 1992-97, the Uzbeks were left out of the Tajik peace accords, and determined to re-establish themselves in the Ferghana Valley. This year, Namangani’s guerrillas tried to force their way through Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan, coming within 100 km of the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. Fierce fighting occurred in several places, in which the rebels demonstrated better training and equipment (anti-aircraft weapons, night-vision equipment, etc.) than did the national security forces, which failed to coordinate their activities. A second wave of kidnappings (mostly mountain-climbing Westerners) took place, though most of the hostages escaped or were released. Uzbekistan’s willingness to bomb IMU targets in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with or without permission has antagonized relations with its neighbors. Karimov, who opposed the Tajikistan peace agreement that gave the Islamist opposition 30% of government posts, has also been accused of sponsoring a short-lived rebellion in northern Tajikistan in late 1998. Uzbek officials have accused the Tajiks of aiding the IMU in their entry into Uzbekistan.

An important addition to the Uzbek Islamist movement is the growing Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). Although it has its roots in Saudi Arabian reformist Islam, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir broke with the Wahhabis at an early stage in order to pursue a type of Islam more in tune with the modern world. The stated aim of the party is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. The movement’s secret leadership is protected by a cell structure, and Uzbek authorities have unsuccessfully resorted to mass arrests and torture to expose the party leaders. The growing influence of the shadowy Hizb-ut-Tahrir promises to be an even greater threat to the security of the Uzbek state than the IMU, who can at least be engaged and destroyed in open warfare.

Though Karimov has been vociferous in his public denunciations of a “Wahhabist” hand behind the Tashkent bombings, it is possible that their true source was among certain government officials angered by a new policy governing resource distribution. Regardless, the bombings were used as the pretext for a vicious attack on real and potential opponents of the Karimov regime (Islamic and secular), with thousands of arbitrary arrests and widespread reports of torture. [14] This latest wave of repression is an even more severe version of the disastrous Uzbek crackdown on religion in the early 1990s, which created a pool of thousands of desperate religious exiles available for recruitment by Islamist organizers. Well-trained since in the Afghan and Tajik civil wars, these exiles now pose a small but formidable threat to some of the rather weak militaries of the region. The Uzbek firing-squads nevertheless compound the problem and radicalize moderate Muslims.

Conclusion

In neighboring Tajikistan, the rapprochement between ex-Communists and Islamists has been ineffective in cooping with drought, infrastructure collapse, disease and impending starvation. As Uzbekistan slides into its own economic and environmental collapse it threatens to pull the entire region with it. The military threat of the Islamists is, for the moment, exceedingly small, but the precariousness of the political situation in Central Asia is exposed by the ability of small demonstrations to create mayhem through the political systems of the entire region (the armed IMU group that started the 1999 crisis initially consisted of only 21 men). The presence of an external Islamic threat is being exploited by Karimov, Putin and others to legitimize their centralization of authority and to squash more moderate internal dissent (such as the Islamic Renaissance Party, which expressed an interest in parliamentary democracy). Karimov has repeatedly spurned opportunities to incorporate even moderate forms of Islam into a more democratic political structure. Islamic militancy may also be cynically used by the Uzbek leadership to divert attention from the impending economic collapse of Uzbekistan.

The shallow understanding of Islam displayed by the Uzbek and other regional leaders is a guarantee that the Islamic revival will continue to be mishandled and inadvertently politicized. Meaningful resource extraction from Central Asia also appears unlikely in the present climate, and a dispute over water-sharing has the potential to grow into a multi-state conflict. Anti-terrorism measures and funding, as offered by the United States, cannot alone restore stability to a region that has yet to come to terms with its Islamic identity and remains in dire need of infrastructure, investment and environmental repair. The increasing militarization of the region and its arbitrary borders is also in contravention of Central Asia’s need for economic and environmental cooperation. Unifying elements exist; with the exception of Tajikistan, the majority population of each state enjoys a common Turkic cultural and linguistic heritage. Sunni Islam, which more than any other factor should be a unifying force in Central Asia, is instead proving to be the major source of divisiveness as it is manipulated by authoritarian governments and political-minded religious reformers alike.

Endnotes

The Turkmenistan government of President Saparmurat Niyazov has attempted, with some success, to stay clear of regional security entanglements. Turkmenistan is ethnically homogenous and, though an undemocratic authoritarian, Niyazov has supported the rebirth of Islamic life and incorporated Islamic leaders into the governance structure.
Uzbekistan’s ethnic groups consist of Uzbeks (80%), Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5%), Kazakhs (3%), Karakalpaks (2.5%), Tatars (1.5%), others (2.5%).
For the Uyghur rebellion, see Andrew McGregor, “Mummies and Mullahs: Islamic separatism in China’s new frontier,” Behind the Headlines 56(4), Summer 1999, CIIA, pp. 4-12.
See Bruce R Kuniholm, “The Geopolitics of the Caspian Basin,” Middle East Journal 54(4), Fall 2000, pp. 563-64.
The Northern Alliance consists of the formerly ruling Jamiat-i-Islami of President Rabbani and Defence Minister Massoud, the Jombesh-e-Milli Islami (National Islamic Movement) of General Dostum and two Shi’a factions, the ethnic Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat Islami (Islamic Unity Party) and the Harakat-i-Islami (Islamic Movement).
Dostum’s army, like all the other factions in Afghanistan, supports itself through the drug trade. Dostum was accused in September by Tahir Yuldash of fighting alongside the Uzbek government forces against the IMU.
Uzbekistan’s aggressive attitude towards border delimitation has prompted calls within Kazakhstan for the creation of a military bloc of Central Asian states to oppose Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan has also expressed frustration with Uzbekistan’s habit of shutting off gas supplies to express its displeasure with its neighbors.
The current parliament meets only two or three times a year and is little more than a cheering gallery for President Karimov. A recent proposal to introduce a bicameral legislature gives the appearance of greater democracy, but may actually serve to strengthen Karimov’s position.
The movement rejects the name “Wahhabi” as idolatrous, preferring instead the term Muwahiddun, or Unitarians. The resolutely monotheist movement follows the Hanbalite interpretation of Shari’a law, strictest of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.
Uzbeks form about 13% of the population of Tajikistan. Most are concentrated near the Uzbekistan border.
The Wahhabist movement has also gained many adherents in the Northern Caucasus in the last decade, and has been a prime motivator behind conflicts in Daghestan and Chechnya, where it has not only come into conflict with Russian policies, but also with the more traditional and tolerant Sufi modes of worship practiced in the region. In Chechnya, for example, both President Maskhadov and his enemy, the Russian-appointed puppet-governor Khadyrov, have both felt compelled to issue edicts against Wahhabism.
The IMU was officially designated as a terrorist organization by the US State Department on May 1, 2000.
Japan has been criticized for paying a reported $6 million in ransom for the geologists, which inevitably fuelled the kidnappings that followed the next summer. There are also reports of a dispute between Yuldash and Namangani over the division of the ransom.
Six men were executed in January 2000 for their alleged part in the bombings following a controversial trial with allegations of forced confessions. The men first implicated both Tahir Yuldash and Muhammad Salih, leader of the banned opposition party Erk.