Category Archives: Sudan

Surrendered Commander Says Lord’s Resistance Army Sponsored by Khartoum

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, November 25, 2009

Senior Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander Lieutenant Colonel Charles Arop has given an interview to a Kampala daily after having been sent to the Ugandan capital following his surrender to Ugandan troops operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (New Vision [Kampala], November 23). Arop is best known for directing a massacre of 143 Congolese civilians in the village of Faradje on Christmas Day, 2008 (see Terrorism Monitor, November 13). He is now engaged in helping Ugandan forces convince other LRA fighters to surrender. During the interview, he showed reporters wounds from nine bullets, three of which are still inside his body.

LRA 1Former LRA field commander Charles Arop

Following rumors circulating in October that the LRA had crossed into south Darfur, Arop said it was the intention of LRA leader Joseph Kony to move along the Central African Republic border to Chad and then into Darfur to meet officers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), long reputed to be the LRA’s sponsors. Kony “told me he was going to meet Fadil, the SAF officer who coordinates LRA activities. He wants the Arabs to give him logistical support and a safe haven” (see Terrorism Monitor, October 23). Arop says Kony urged all LRA units to make their way to Darfur and report to the first “Arab” military post they came across.

Despite a disastrous start to last year’s Operation Lightning Thunder, a joint operation of the militaries of Uganda, the DRC and Southern Sudan, continuous pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) has eliminated many LRA fighters and compelled others to turn themselves in after suffering from exhaustion and hunger. Arop estimates only half of the force of 500 LRA fighters that existed last December are still in the field. “Kony is desperate. Things are really hard. We were constantly on the move. Sometimes we would not rest for a week. The UPDF was pursuing us everywhere.”

Arop suggests it was only a delay by the UPDF in following the LRA into the Central African Republic (CAR) that allowed the LRA a chance to regroup and abduct more people for use as fighters, laborers or sex slaves. Like most LRA fighters, Arop was himself an abductee, taken from his home in Gulu at age 16. Though the LRA began as a Christian fundamentalist/Acholi nationalist movement, there are few Acholis still left in the LRA ranks, with most fighters representing a hodgepodge of individuals abducted from various tribes in Uganda, South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR.

LRA 2Lord’s Resistance Army Fighters

Arop describes LRA leader Joseph Kony as a man obsessed with his own survival. Since Operation Lightning Thunder began, Kony has stopped communicating by phone, sending messages only by couriers on foot or by sending his aides up to 20 kilometers away before they are allowed to use their phones. Arop confirmed earlier reports that Kony never takes part in battles. “Whenever attacked, he runs away and leaves his fighters to fight back. I have never seen him fight.”

The LRA commander elaborated on last year’s horrific Christmas Day massacre at Faradje, describing the attack as retaliation ordered by Kony for the participation of Congolese troops in Operation Lightning Thunder. Arop claims his own role was carried out under duress. “Kony gave 30 of his bodyguards to join my group. There was no way I could not execute the mission. They had a phone and were constantly reporting to him. If I had refused, I would have been killed… It was painful, but you have to do it. I want to ask the relatives of those we killed to forgive me. Whatever we did, we did it under orders.”

According to Arop, the LRA received most of its weapons and military supplies from the SAF. Large caches of arms were concealed in the river banks and hills of South Sudan. “There are still a lot of arms caches the UPDF has not yet unearthed.” Other weapons and supplies were recently seized from UN troops in the DRC and game rangers in Garamba National Park, where the LRA took refuge after the start of Operation Lightning Thunder.

This article first appeared in the November 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

 

Is Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army Operating in Darfur?

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Andrew McGregor

October 23, 2009

Various reports are claiming that the guerrillas of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have moved in bulk into South Darfur, where they will allegedly seek supplies and arms from the Sudanese government. The movement into Darfur was reported to have been compelled by helicopter attacks on the LRA by Ugandan Special Forces units operating out of Yambio, Sudan as part of a tripartite (DRC, Uganda, South Sudan) military offensive against the brutal fighters led by the notorious Joseph Kony.

Arrow BoysArrow Boys of Western Equatoria

Most prominent of these was a front page cover story in Britain’s Independent daily asserting Kony and a significant part of his forces had crossed into southern Darfur (Independent, October 17). The main source in the story was a statement by Major-General Kuol Deim Kuol of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of South Sudan that was carried in the Sudanese press two weeks earlier (Sudan Tribune, September 28). General Kuol claimed the bulk of the LRA forces had crossed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) into southern Darfur, where they had clashed with the local population. The General maintained SPLA reconnaissance groups had tracked the LRA across the border, where he suggested they would seek a safe base for their wives and families while seeking arms and ammunition from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

However, the Independent reported Kuol saying hunters had encountered LRA fighters near the town of Tumbara. There is no such place in southern Darfur, though there is a Tambura in the southern part of Western Equatoria (South Sudan), close to the LRA’s operations in the CAR, but far from the border with southern Darfur. The Independent added that the LRA had moved into the “Raga district in southern Darfur.” Raga is in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, also part of South Sudan rather than Darfur. The director of communications from the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) declared the mission had spent days going over reports of an LRA presence, but had failed to find any “hard evidence” to confirm them (Independent, October 17).

The original Sudan Tribune story said that “Kuol suggested that Kony is seeking protection from the Sudanese army and may be used to fight the Darfur rebels” (September 28). Basing its report on the Sudan Tribune story, the Kampala Observer claimed several days later that Kuol had stated that the LRA were fighting as mercenaries alongside the Janjaweed militia in Darfur (October 4).

Elsewhere, there were reports of LRA fighters killing two women in raids near Yambio in Western Equatoria at the same time the main group was reported to be crossing into Darfur (Sudan Tribune, October 16; New Vision [Kampala], October 16). The fighters were driven off by members of the lightly armed Arrow Boys, a local self-defense group that combats LRA incursions with weapons such as spears and bows and arrows. Yambio is roughly 650 kilometers from the border with South Darfur as the crow flies – much farther in rough and road-less bush country. If these reports are correct, they would suggest either the main body of the LRA has abandoned elements of its forces in the move north, or is still operating in the area where the DRC, CAR and Sudan borders intersect. Other LRA units were simultaneously reported to be carrying out new attacks in the northern DRC (BBC, October 14).

The presence in Darfur of the LRA, which is generally believed to have once been armed and funded by Khartoum in retaliation for Kampala’s support of the SPLA, would be a major embarrassment to President Omar al-Bashir, who is currently facing Darfur-related war crimes charges from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Salah Gosh, a senior presidential advisor who has been tied to war crimes in Darfur in his former capacity as director of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Services, accused the SPLA of issuing “fabrications,” adding, “The SPLA knows very well where Kony is” (Sudan Tribune, September 28).

The reports of an LRA entry into Darfur came as Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni invited Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to an AU summit on refugees held this week in Kampala (New Vision, October 14). Despite Uganda being a signatory to the ICC statute—and thus obligated to enforce the ICC warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest—Museveni said such an act would not be “according to the culture of the Great Lakes region in Africa… We do not believe in surprise attacks.” An ICC representative insisted Uganda had a responsibility to carry out the arrest (Daily Monitor, October 16). The issue was resolved when Sudan decided to send two junior ministers to the summit instead (New Vision, October 19). Sudan has also expressed its willingness to share its expertise in the oil sector with Uganda as the latter begins development of a one-billion barrel oil reserve discovered on the Albertine rift in Uganda (Dow Jones Newswire, October 1; Sudan Tribune, October 2).

This article first appeared in the October 23, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Strange Days on the Red Sea Coast: A New Theater for the Israel-Iran Conflict?

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Andrew McGregor

April 3, 2009

Over the last few months, the strategically important African Red Sea coast has suddenly become the focal point of rumors involving troop-carrying submarines, ballistic missile installations, desert-dwelling arms smugglers, mysterious airstrikes and unlikely alliances. None of the parties alleged to be involved (including Iran, Israel, Eritrea, Egypt, Sudan, France, Djibouti, Gaza and the United States) have been forthcoming with many details, leaving observers to ponder a tangled web of reality and fantasy. What does appear certain, however, is that the regional power struggle between Israel and Iran has the potential to spread to Africa, unleashing a new wave of political violence in an area already consumed with its own deadly conflicts.

Red SeaIsraeli Air Force F-16I Sufa (Storm)

Airstrike in the Desert

Though an airstrike on a column of 23 vehicles was carried out on January 27 near Mt. Alcanon, in the desert northwest of Port Sudan, news of the attack first emerged in a little-noticed interview carried on March 23 in the Arabic-language Al-Mustaqillah newspaper (see https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=1854). In the interview, Sudanese Transportation Minister Dr. Mabruk Mubarak Salim, the former leader of the Free Lions resistance movement in eastern Sudan, said that aircraft he believed to be French and American had attacked a column of vehicles in Sudan eastern desert after receiving intelligence indicating a group of arms smugglers was transporting arms to Gaza. Dr. Salim’s Free Lions Movement was based on the Rasha’ida Arabs of east Sudan, a nomadic group believed to control smuggling activities along the eastern Egypt-Sudan border.

On March 26, Dr. Salim told al-Jazeera there had been at least two airstrikes, carried out by U.S. warplanes launched from American warships operating in the Red Sea. There was no further mention of the French, who maintain an airbase in nearby Djibouti. After the news broke in the media, Sudanese foreign ministry spokesman Ali al-Sadig issued some clarifications:

The first thought was that it was the Americans that did it. We contacted the Americans and they categorically denied they were involved… We are still trying to verify it. Most probably it involved Israel… We didn’t know about the first attack until after the second one. They were in an area close to the border with Egypt, a remote area, desert, with no towns, no people (Al-Jazeera, March 27).

With the Americans out of the way, suspicion fell on Israel as the source of the attack.

Sudanese authorities later claimed the convoy was carrying not arms, but a large number of migrants from a number of African countries, particularly Eritrea (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 27; Sudan Tribune, March 28). According to Foreign Minister Ali al-Sadig; “it is clear that [the attackers] were acting on bad information that the vehicles were carrying arms” (Haaretz, March 27). Dr. Salim claimed the death toll was 800 people, contradicting his earlier claim that the convoy consisted of small trucks carrying arms and that most of those killed were Sudanese, Ethiopians and Eritreans (al-Jazeera, March 26). There was also some confusion about the number of attacks, with initial claims of a further strike on February 11 and a third undated strike on an Iranian freighter in the Red Sea. The latter rumor may have had its source in Dr. Salim’s suggestion that several Rasha’ida fishing boats had been attacked by U.S. and French warplanes. Otherwise, no evidence has been provided to substantiate these claims.

A Hamas leader, Salah al-Bardawil, denied his movement had any knowledge of such arms shipments, pointing to the lack of a common border between Gaza and Sudan as proof “these are false claims” (Al-Jazeera, March 27).

A Smuggling Route to Sinai?

The alleged smuggling route, beginning at Port Sudan, would take the smugglers through 150 miles of rough and notoriously waterless terrain to the Egyptian border and the disputed territory of Hala’ib, currently under Egyptian occupation. From there the route would pass roughly 600 miles through Egypt’s Eastern Desert, a rocky and frequently mountainous wasteland. Criss-crossing the terrain to find a suitable way through could add considerably to the total distance. North of the Egyptian border the Sudanese smugglers would be crossing hundreds of miles of unfamiliar and roadless territory. The alternatives would involve offloading the arms near the border to an Egyptian convoy or making a change of drivers. Anonymous “defense sources” cited by the Times claimed local Egyptian smugglers were engaged to take over the convoy at the Egyptian border “for a fat fee” (The Times, March 29).

Use of the well-patrolled coastal road would obviously be impossible without official Egyptian approval. The other option for the smugglers would be to cut west to the Nile road which passes through hundreds of settled areas and a large number of security checkpoints. The convoy would need to continually avoid security patrols along the border and numerous restricted military zones along the coast. Either Egyptian guides or covert assistance from Egyptian security services would be needed for a 23 vehicle convoy to reach Sinai from the Egyptian border without interference. Once in the Sinai there is little alternative to taking the coastal route to Gaza, passing through one of Egypt’s most militarily sensitive areas, to reach the smuggling tunnels near the border with Gaza.

Water, gasoline, spare parts and other supplies would take up considerable space in the trucks. Provisions would have to be made for securing and transporting the loads of disabled trucks that proved irreparable, particularly if their loads included parts for the Fajr-3 rockets the convoy was alleged to be carrying, without which the other loads might prove unusable. Freeing the trucks from sand (a problem worsened by carrying a heavy load of arms) and making repairs could add days to the trip. The alleged inclusion of Iranian members of the Revolutionary Guard in the convoy would be highly risky – if stopped by Egyptian security forces, every member of the arms convoy would be detained and interrogated (Israeli sources claimed several Iranians were killed in the raid). It would not take long to separate the Iranians from the Arabs, with all the consequences that would follow from the exposure of an Iranian intelligence operation on Egyptian soil.

Of course most of these problems would disappear if Egypt was giving its approval to the arms shipments. But if this was the case, why not send the arms through Syria and by ship to a port near the Gaza border? Ships are the normal vehicle for arms deliveries as massive quantities of arms are usually required to change the military balance in any situation.

Israel’s Haaretz newspaper reported that the arms were “apparently transferred from Iran through the Persian Gulf to Yemen, from there to Sudan and then to Egypt through Sinai and the tunnels under the Egypt Gaza border” and included “various types of missiles, rockets, guns and high-quality explosives” (Haaretz, March 29). The Yemen stage is unexplained; Iranian ships can easily reach Port Sudan without a needless overland transfer of their cargos in Yemen before being reloaded onto ships going to Port Sudan. Looking at this route (the simplest of several proposed by Israeli sources), one can only assume Hamas was in no rush to obtain its weapons.

Reserves Major General Giyora Eiland, a former head of Israel’s National Security Council, alleged the involvement of a number of parties in the Sinai to Gaza arms trade, including “Bedouin and Egyptian army officers who are benefiting from the smuggling.” He then turned to the possibility of arms being shipped through Sudan to Gaza; “Almost all of the weapons are smuggled into Gaza through the Sinai, and some probably by sea. Little comes along this long [Sudan to Gaza] route” (Voice of Israel Network, March 27).

Video footage of the burned-out convoy was supplied to al-Jazeera by Sudanese intelligence sources. The footage shows only small pick-up trucks, largely unsuitable for transporting heavy arms payloads. If Fajr-3 missiles broken down into parts were included in the shipment, there would be little room for other arms (each Fajr-3 missile weighs at least 550 kilograms). Sudanese authorities described finding a quantity of ammunition, several C-4 and AK-47 rifles and a number of mobile phones used for communications by the smugglers. There was no mention of missile parts (El-Shorouk [Cairo], March 24). No evidence has been produced by any party to confirm the origin of the arms allegedly carried by the smugglers’ convoy.

Assessing Responsibility

Citing anonymous “defense sources,” the Times claimed the convoys had been tracked by Mossad, enabling an aerial force of satellite-controlled UAVs to kill “at least 50 smugglers and their Iranian escorts” (The Times [London], March 29). American officials also reported that at least one operative from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards had gone to Sudan to organize the weapons convoy (Haaretz/Reuters, March 27). According to the Times’ sources, the convoy attacks were carried out by Hermes 450 and Eitan model UAVs in what would have been an aviation first – a long distance attack against a moving target carried out solely by a squadron of remote control drones.

U.S.-based Time Magazine entered the fray on March 30 with a report based on information provided by “two highly-placed Israeli security sources.” According to these sources, the United States was informed of the operation in advance but was otherwise uninvolved. Dozens of aircraft were involved in the 1,750 mile mission, refuelling in midair over the Red Sea. Once the target was reached, F15I fighters provided air cover against other aircraft while F16I fighters carried out two runs on the convoy. Drones with high-resolution cameras were used to assess damage to the vehicles.

The American-made F16I “Sufa” aircraft were first obtained by the IAF in 2004. They carry Israeli-made conformal fuel tanks to increase the range of the aircraft and use synthetic aperture radar that enables the aircraft to track ground targets day or night. The older F15I “Ra’am” is an older but versatile model, modified to Israeli specifications.

The entire operation, according to the Israeli sources used by Time, was planned in less than a week to act on Mossad information that Iran was planning to deliver 120 tons of arms and explosives to Gaza, “including anti-tank rockets and Fajr rockets with a 25 mile range” in a 23 truck convoy (though this shipment seems impossibly large for 23 pick-up trucks with a maximum payload capacity of one ton or less – on paved roads). The Israeli sources added that this was the first time the smuggling route through Sudan had been used.

Israeli officials claimed anonymously that the convoy was carrying Fajr-3 rockets capable of reaching Tel Aviv (Sunday Times, March 29; Jerusalem Post, March 29). The Fajr-3 MLRS is basically an updated Katyusha rocket that loses accuracy as it approaches the limit of its 45km range and carries only a small warhead of conventional explosives. It has been suggested that the missiles carried by the convoy “could have changed the game in the conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants,” thus making the attack an imperative for Israel (BBC, March 26). Yet far from being “a game-changer,” the Fajr-3 was already used against Israel by Hezbollah in 2006. It has also been claimed that the Fajr-3 rockets could be used against Israel’s nuclear installation at Dimona, but Israeli officials reported at the start of the year that Hamas already possessed dozens of Fajr-3 rockets (Sunday Times, January 2). Some media accounts have confused the Fajr-3 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which would seem to be the weapon in question, with the much larger Fajr-3 medium-range ballistic missile.

Reports of the complete destruction of the entire convoy and all its personnel raise further questions. Desert convoys tend to be long, strung out affairs, not least because it is nearly impossible to drive in the dust of the vehicle ahead. Could an airstrike really kill every single person involved in a strung out convoy without a ground force going in to mop up? UAVs with heat sensors and night vision equipment might have remained in the area to eliminate all survivors, but this seems unnecessary if the arms had already been destroyed. The political risk of leaving Israeli aircraft in the area after the conclusion of a successful attack would not equal the benefit of killing a few drivers and mechanics.

What role did Khartoum play in these events? A pan-Arab daily reported that the United States warned the Sudanese government before the Israeli airstrike that a “third party” was monitoring the arms-smuggling route to Gaza and that such shipments needed to stop immediately (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 30). Despite state-level disagreements, U.S. and Sudanese intelligence agencies continue to enjoy a close relationship.

With Sudan under international pressure as a result of the Darfur conflict, Khartoum has sought to renew its relations with Iran. Less than two weeks before the airstrike, Sudanese Defense Minister Abdalrahim Hussein concluded a visit to Tehran to discuss arms sales and training for Sudanese security forces. An Iranian source reported missiles, UAVs, RPGs and other equipment were sought by Sudan (Sudan Tribune, January 20).

An Iranian Base on the Red Sea?

As tensions rise in the region, wild allegations have emerged surrounding the creation of a major Iranian military and naval base in the Eritrean town of Assab on the Red Sea coast. Assab is a small port city of 100,000 people. A small Soviet-built oil refinery at Assab was shut down in 1997. Last November an Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean Democratic Party, published a report on their website claiming Iran had agreed to revamp the small refinery, adding (without any substantiation) that Iran and Eritrea’s President Isayas Afewerki were planning to control the strategic Bab al-Mandab Straits at the southern entrance to the Red Sea (selfi-democracy.com, November 25, 2008).

Red Sea 2Main Street in Assab: New Iranian Military Base?

A short time later, another Eritrean opposition website elaborated on the original report of a refinery renovation, adding lurid details of Iranian ships and submarines deploying troops and long-range ballistic missiles at a new Iranian military base at Assab. Security was allegedly provided by Iranian UAVs that patrolled the area (EritreaDaily.net, December 10, 2008).

The Israeli MEMRI website then reported that “Eritrea has granted Iran total control of the Red Sea port of Assab,” adding that Iranian submarines had “deployed troops, weapons and long-range missiles… under the pretext of defending the local oil refinery” (MEMRI, December 1, 2008).

The story was further elaborated on by Ethiopian sources (Ethiopia and Eritrea are intense rivals and political enemies). According to one Ethiopian report, Iranian frigates were using Assab as a naval base (Gedab News, January 28). An Ethiopian-based journalist contributed an article to Sudan Tribune in which he again claimed Iranian submarines were delivering troops and long-range missiles to Assab, basing his account on the original report on selfi-democracy.com, which made no such claims (Sudan Tribune, March 30). Israel’s Haaretz noted that Addis Ababa is “a key Mossad base for operations against extremist Islamic groups” in the region, adding that some of the weapons destroyed in the convoy had “reportedly passed through Ethiopia and Eritrea first” (Haaretz, March 27).

Only days ago, a mainstream Tel Aviv newspaper reported that Iran has already finished building a naval base at Assab and had “transferred to this base – by means of ships and submarines – troops, military equipment and long range-ballistic missiles… that can strike Israel.” The newspaper claimed its information was based on reports from Eritrean opposition members, diplomats and aid organizations, without giving any specifics (Ma’ariv [Tel Aviv], March 29). On March 19, Israel’s ambassador to Ethiopia accused Eritrea of trying to sabotage the peace process in the region by serving as a safe haven for terrorist groups (Walta Information Center [Addis Abbab], March 19). In only four months, a minor refinery renovation was transformed into a strategic threat to the entire Middle East.

Conclusion

Questions remain as to how the moving convoy was found by its attackers. Did Mossad have inside intelligence? Did the Israelis use satellite imagery from U.S. surveillance satellites as part of the agreement they signed in January on the prevention of arms smuggling to Gaza, or did they use their own Ofeq-series surveillance satellites? Was an Israeli UAV already in place when the convoy left Port Sudan? A retired Israeli Air Force general, Yitzhak Ben-Israel, recognized the difficulty involved in finding and striking the convoy by noting; “The main innovation in the attack on Sudan… was the ability to hit a moving target at such a distance. The fact that Israel has the technical ability to do such a thing proves even more what we are capable of in Iran” (Haaretz, March 27).

The two-month silence on the attacks from other parties is also notable – it is unlikely U.S. and French radar facilities in Djibouti would have missed squadrons of Israeli jets and UAVs attacking a target in nearby East Sudan. If the Israelis took the shortest route through the Gulf of Aqaba and down the Red Sea they would likely be detected by Egyptian and Saudi radar on their way out and on their way back. According to former IAF commander Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, the attack would require precise intelligence and a two and a half hour flight along the Red Sea coast, keeping low to evade Egyptian and Saudi radar. The aircraft would also require aerial refuelling (Haaretz, March 27).

Even if the aircraft evaded radar, their low flight paths would have exposed them to visual observation in the narrow shipping lanes of the Red Sea.  Israeli aircraft would almost certainly have been tracked by the Combined Task Force-150, an allied fleet patrolling the Red Sea. All other routes would have taken the aircraft through unfriendly airspace. By March 27, an Egyptian official admitted that Egypt had indeed known of the airstrike at the time, but added the Israelis had not crossed into Egyptian airspace (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 27).

If Tehran was involved in this remarkably complicated smuggling operation, it will now be taking its entire local intelligence infrastructure apart to find the source of the leak. Egypt is reported to have deployed additional security personnel along the border with Sudan, effectively closing the alleged smuggling route (Haaretz, March 29). As Sudan revives its defense relationship with Iran it is very likely rumors and allegations will continue to proliferate regarding an Iranian presence on the Red Sea.

 

This article first appeared in the April 3, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Eastern Sudan’s Free Lions Movement Claims U.S.-French Airstrikes on Sudanese-Egyptian Border

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Andrew McGregor

March 26, 2009

The Free Lions Movement of Eastern Sudan is reporting airstrikes on arms smugglers along the Egyptian-Sudanese border by French and American warplanes (Al-Mustaqillah, March 23). According to Dr. Mabruk Mubarak Salim, head of the Free Lions Movement and former Secretary-General of the rebel Eastern Front (a coalition of the Beja Congress, the Free Lions and Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement), the aircraft were acting on intelligence indicating arms smugglers in the area were shipping arms to Gaza. Both the smugglers and several fishing boats are alleged to have been hit in the airstrikes. To date, there has been no confirmation of the report from the remote and sparsely populated region. French and American aircraft operate from a nearby airbase in the former French colony of Djibouti.

Free Lions 1Rashaida Arab Wedding Ceremony (Fatima Abbadi)

The Free Lions Movement is based on the Arab Rashaida tribe, a nomadic group that moved into the region from the Arabian Peninsula in search of open pastures in the late 19th century. Though traditionally aloof from Sudanese politics, in recent years the Rashaida joined the indigenous Beja tribes of eastern Sudan in rebellion against the central government in Khartoum. The movement operated from bases in Eritrea, which has also become home to members of the Rashaida. An Eritrean-mediated agreement ended the rebellion in 2006. The Rashaida have a reputation for smuggling activities in the remote areas of the Red Sea coast.

A recent report co-written by Yoram Cohen, the former deputy head of Israel’s Shin Bet intelligence agency, and American Matthew Levitt, described an unlikely movement of Iranian arms to Gaza, allegedly supplied by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: “The arms travel overland to Egypt through a variety of routes that cross Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and South Africa and eventually meet in Sudan, where they are moved to Egypt’s Sinai desert. After the material enters the Sinai, it is transferred into Gaza via tunnels underneath the Philadelphi Corridor” (Jerusalem Post, March 3). The report was issued only days before the alleged airstrikes.
Free Lions 2The Egyptian-Sudanese border occasionally makes the news when a long-standing dispute over control of the Hala’ib region flares up. To prevent the region’s Arab tribes from being divided by an artificial border, the 1899 Sudan Condominium agreement allowed for Sudanese administration of Hala’ib, a largely barren and roughly triangular area of 25,000 square kilometers lying north of the border. Sovereignty would remain with Egypt. Since both Egypt and the British-Egyptian Sudan Condominium were both under the effective control of London, the decision provoked little controversy. This would change in 1956, when British-Egyptian rule in Sudan came to an end and a newly independent Sudan began treating Hala’ib as its own territory. Oil was discovered in the region in non-commercial quantities in 1978. Sudan continued to encourage exploration of the region until Egypt occupied the area in 1992 (Middle East Quarterly, March 1994). Among the Eastern Front’s demands was the restoration of Hala’ib to Sudanese control.  Control of the region tends to become a flashpoint during periods of strained relations between the two nations, but there seems to be a mutual recognition that Hala’ib is not worth fighting over.

This article first appeared in the March 26, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Sudanese Jihadis Declare Intention to Carry Out 250 Suicide Bombings in United States, France and UK

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Andrew McGregor

March 19, 2009

A coalition of militant Salafi-Jihadi groups in Sudan has threatened to carry out 250 “martyrdom operations” in the United States, France and the UK in response to the issue of a warrant by the International Criminal Court for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges of war-crimes (Akhir Lazha [Khartoum], March 10). The strikes would target “world imperialists and CIA agents” in the three countries in what was described as “another September 11 attack” (Sudan Tribune, March 11). The statement was also carried by a number of jihadist websites. The coalition, calling itself the Coalition of Jihad and Martyrdom Movements, also called for the assassination of ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and Khalil Ibrahim, the Zaghawa leader of Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Salah GoshSudanese Intelligence Chief Salah Abdallah Gosh (Sudan Tribune)

Khalil Ibrahim’s movement staged a spectacular but unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Bashir regime last May by sending a convoy of JEM fighters by truck all the way from the Chad border to the suburbs of Omdurman. The statement described Ibrahim and the Paris-based Abd-al-Wahid Muhammad al-Nur (the Fur leader of a faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army/Movement – SLA/M) as “Zionist agents,” an accusation commonly made by the Khartoum regime as a consequence of the leading role played by Jewish organizations in Darfur activism. The coalition announced the formation of joint brigades under a unified command to carry out jihad and rid Darfur of colonialist “filth.” The coalition also declared its intention to coordinate with other global jihadist movements.

The new threats follow a February 21 warning from Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Abdallah Gosh (who has worked closely with the CIA on counterterrorism issues despite being labeled as one of the architects of the Darfur crisis) of the consequences of an ICC warrant for al-Bashir: “We were once fanatical Islamists, but we have become moderates and now believe in coexistence and peace. However, we will never break apart and have no choice but to revert to our fanaticism in order to manage our battle with the ICC” (Al-Sahafah [Khartoum], February 21).

Musa HilalMusa Hilal (Michael Kamber/NYT)

The statement was issued on March 9 by a group of mostly unknown Salafi-Jihadi militant groups, all apparently based in Sudan. Most notable of these was the Liwa’a Isud Darfur (Darfur Lions Brigade), which, according to the statement, is led by Shaykh Musa Hilal, the most prominent and powerful of the Janjaweed leaders in Darfur.

Musa Hilal’s involvement in the terrorist threat is interesting, as he remains an official of the Sudanese government, serving as Adviser to the Ministry of the Federal Government since January 2008. The statement was carried in Sudan by Akhir Lazha, an Arabic-language daily thought to have close connections to Sudanese intelligence and the ruling National Congress Party led by Omar al-Bashir. In late February, Musa Hilal promised to mobilize 30,000 of Darfur’s “finest mujhahideen” to ensure anyone who supported the ICC would “pay the price” (Al-Intibaha [Khartoum], February 27). JEM has accused Musa Hilal’s men of responsibility for the March 11 kidnapping of three Darfur-based members of relief organization Médecins Sans Frontières (AFP, March 13).

The other groups signing the statement are extremely obscure. They include; Jama’at al-Shahid Abu Qusaysah, Jama’at Ansar Allah al-Jihadiya al-Salafiya, Jama’at al-Bahisin al-Shihada and Jama’at Liwa’a al-Shahid Ali Abd al-Fatah.

Four soldiers belonging to United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were wounded by gunfire from an unknown source in Western Darfur the same day the statement was issued (AFP, March 10). Neither Sudan nor the United States has ratified the treaty establishing the powers of the ICC.

 

This article first appeared in the March 19, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Pro-Government Warlord Launches Attack in South Sudan’s Oil-Rich Malakal Region

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Andrew McGregor

March 13, 2009

Fierce fighting broke out last week in the oil-rich region in and around Malakal, the capital of Sudan’s Upper Nile State, after a government-sponsored militia leader made an unexpected return to the city, where he is wanted by local authorities for his role in a violent episode in 2006 that left 150 people dead.

TanginyaMajor General Gabriel Tanginya

Major General Gabriel Tanginya (a.k.a. Gabriel Gatwech Chan) led a pro-government militia in the 1983-2005 North-South Civil War. Following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Tanginya and his forces were integrated into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), with the militia leader being rewarded with the inflated rank of Major General. Bloody clashes with the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in 2006 led to the withdrawal of Tanginya and his militia to Khartoum, where they have remained since. His surprise return to Malakal on February 23 was seen by some southern politicians as a provocation designed to reignite the civil war (AFP, February 27; Sudan Tribune, February 26). The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) claims Tanginya was met in Malakal by members of the SAF’s military intelligence. Peacekeepers belonging to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) asked Tanginya to leave shortly after his return to Malakal, but the militia leader refused.

Fighting erupted after the SPLA tried to arrest Tanginya on an outstanding warrant issued by the GoSS. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) units belonging to the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) formed from SPLA and government forces after the 2005 peace treaty joined in the defense of Tanginya against their former JIU comrades. Troops of the SPLA’s 7th Division under the command of Major General Majier Amel pounded the SAF units and Tanginya’s militia with artillery and tank-fire, driving these forces towards the Malakal airport (New Sudan Vision, February 25). Fighting also spread to the Faluj oil field north of Malakal, where the GoSS reported clashes between Khartoum’s “petroleum police” and villagers in a number of places inside the oil-producing zones.

The fighting came to an end with the dispatch from Khartoum of a delegation led by Government of South Sudan (GoSS) Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, a controversial figure who led his own Nuer-based pro-government militia against the SPLA during the Civil War. Machar ordered Tanginya to return to Khartoum and UN officials urged the JIU to “demonstrate tolerance and uphold their professional obligations” (Sudan Tribune, February 27). The death toll in Malakal included 26 civilians, 15 soldiers of the SPLA, and 16 soldiers of the SAF. 84 soldiers and civilians were wounded (Sudan Tribune, February 27).

Malakal was the scene of tribal violence earlier this year when a dispute between the Chollo Shilluk and the Ngok Dinka over who should enter a local stadium first for a celebration of the fourth anniversary of the CPA turned violent. Nine people were killed and 90 injured by the fighting and police gunfire. Shortly thereafter as many as 12 people in the nearby village of Nagdiar were killed in an attack and two other villages burned to the ground (Miraya FM [Juba], January 25). Malakal lies in land traditionally claimed by the Chollo Shilluk. The Ngok Dinka arrived in the area in 1818, leading to disputes over land ownership (Khartoum Monitor, January 16). The Dinka are the most powerful tribe in the SPLA. The arrival of General Tanginya in Malakal may have been an attempt to exploit this dispute to create further divisions between the Shilluk and the Dinka in the lead-up to the 2011 referendum on Southern independence.

The fighting also demonstrated the fragility of the JIU, which broke into North-South factions as soon as the fighting began. Though it has always been difficult to find anyone with much confidence in the joint infantry units, there was still some hope they might provide a template for a combined national army if the South votes for unity with the north in the upcoming referendum.

In 2006 SPLA forces in Malakal clashed with Tanginya’s second-in-command, Mabor Dhol, after the latter refused orders to leave Malakal. 150 people were killed in the consequent fighting and a warrant was issued for Tanginya’s arrest. GoSS Minister of Information Gabriel Changson Chang said, “We must stress that any attempt to evacuate or protect Tanginya and his accomplices will constitute a crime of harboring and aiding criminals” (Sudan Tribune, February 26). In response, Riek Machar described the arrest procedure as “a complicated matter:”  “There is nobody that would arrest a Major General in the Sudan Armed Forces, except the command of the SAF, which I don’t belong to” (Sudan Tribune, March 1).

This article first appeared in the March 19, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part Two

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Andrew McGregor

February 12, 2009

In March 2005, an earlier 2004 UN arms embargo on non-government forces in the Darfur conflict was expanded by the UN Security Council to include the Sudan government. Russia approved the passage of UN Resolution 1591, which bans the transfer of weapons to Darfur without the Security Council’s permission. What is poorly understood is that Khartoum is still allowed to purchase all the arms it wants if the arms are designated for use outside of Darfur. Though deployment of new military equipment to Darfur must be approved by a UN committee on Sudan sanctions, Khartoum’s disregard for this provision has left a giant hole in the arms embargo.

T-54Sudanese Troops on a Russian-made T-54 Tank

Commenting on reports that Russia had transferred 33 military aircraft to Sudan since 2004, David Miliband the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs noted the limitations of the UN embargo; “The UK continues to request that the UN extend its arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan, but not all Security Council members agree” (UK House of Commons, Hansard, November 6, 2008).

One of the issues Russia’s new envoy must be dealing with is Khartoum’s concerns over Russia’s role in providing arms to South Sudan’s Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) – arms that will almost certainly be used against government forces if fighting resumes between the South and the military-Islamist government in Khartoum. The Juba-based Government of South Sudan is building one of the largest armies in Africa with its share of Sudan’s oil revenues and may soon be in the market for its own jet fighters. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan forbids either side from making major arms purchases without permission from a Joint Defense Board, though this provision is widely ignored by both sides (Anyuak Media, January 10).

The recently released Ukrainian cargo-ship, MV Faina, seized by Somali pirates in September, held 33 Russian-designed T-72 battle tanks and a substantial cargo of grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns, small arms and ammunition believed to be on their way to landlocked South Sudan via Mombasa. The ship was released on February 5 after the payment of a reported ransom of $3.2 million, a fraction of the $35 million originally demanded (RIA Novosti, February 5). The American destroyer Mason and ocean tug Catawba provided the ship with fuel, water and humanitarian assistance as it proceeded to Mombasa, a transit point for arms shipments to South Sudan (Navy News, February 6). Unlike earlier arms shipments to South Sudan through Kenya that attracted little attention, the destination of the tanks and other arms will be closely watched by a host of interested parties. Both Ukrainian intelligence and Kenya’s Defense Ministry insist the arms are destined for the Kenyan army, even though it does not use any Russian-designed equipment and has no training on Russian-designed equipment (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 29, 2008). The ship’s manifest, released by the pirates, indicated the end recipient of the cargo was “GOSS,” the usual acronym for the Government of South Sudan.

Russian arms appeal to many countries with limited budgets, harsh conditions or a poorly-educated military. According to Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, the continued production of outdated Soviet military equipment to developing countries has become a lucrative business:

The so-called production of arms using Soviet designs and equipment, a Soviet-trained workforce and Soviet-made weapons repainted to look like new is typical in the defense industry today. This keeps production costs low and profits high, while the veil of secrecy surrounding the arms trade allows firms to avoid taxes almost entirely… There is hardly a local war or conflict in the world where Russian arms are not extensively employed because they are reliable, relatively cheap and often specifically designed in the Soviet era for use by poorly trained and educated conscript soldiers (Moscow Times, July 27, 2004).

Konstantin Makienko of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies has offered an explanation for why Sudan and other African nations prefer to stick with Russian arms:

The presence of conflicts naturally leads to a demand for armaments, with the priority on the fastest possible delivery of low-cost weapons, especially those that are simple to use and maintain and which have been either used by the army in question or which could be supplied along with personnel from abroad to maintain the equipment. These factors encourage repeat purchases from the same suppliers (Moscow Defense Brief 4 (14), 2008).

Though China is frequently criticized for its arms shipments to Sudan, Russia has more quietly become Khartoum’s major arms supplier, an activity in which it has been joined by former Soviet states such as Belarus and Ukraine. A SIPRI report based on its Arms Transfers Database stated that Russia had accounted for 87 percent of Sudan’s major conventional weapons purchases in the period 2003-2007, while China was responsible for only eight percent (www.sipri.org/content/<wbr></wbr>armstrad/2008/04/01).

In a sense, it is a return for the Russians -the Soviet Union dominated the Sudanese market for military equipment after the left-leaning Revolutionary Command Council led by General Ja’afar Muhammad Nimeiri took power in May 1969 and began a massive expansion of the Sudanese military. The Soviets supplied armor, artillery, MiG-21 fighters, Antonov cargo planes and various military helicopters as well as Soviet technicians and trainers. By 1971, however, Nimeiri was purging communists from the government and banning communist-affiliated trade unions and professional associations. The Sudanese Communist Party responded with a violent three-day coup attempt in July, 1971 that ultimately failed when troops loyal to Nimeiri rallied for a counter-attack. Suspicions of Soviet involvement brought a swift deterioration in Soviet-Sudanese relations. When the Soviets backed the 1977 Marxist military coup in Sudan’s rival, Ethiopia, the remaining Soviet military advisors in Sudan were expelled and Khartoum turned to a new supplier, the United States.

In 2006, the Russian press reported that Sudan was seeking not only new Russian arms, but also a $1 billion long-term loan to help pay for them. The request did not receive a warm response in Moscow, where memories are still fresh of the write-offs of billions in debt incurred by African nations purchasing arms on credit in the 1970s and 1980s (Kommersant, October 20, 2006).

The Sudanese army operates over 200 Russian-model T54 and T55 battle tanks, obtained from Russia, Belarus and Poland (the latter through a secondary sale by Yemen, which acts as a kind of arms bazaar for the region). The tanks are obsolete in the European context, but are still useful for providing fire support to infantry operations in Sudan. Khartoum, however, has switched to Chinese-made battle tanks and apparently intends to look to China for most future purchases of armor. Sudan has also purchased as many as 60 Soviet-designed BTR-80A armored personnel carriers from Russia in recent years.

In July 2008, International Criminal Courts (ICC) prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo charged Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with various counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and murder. The ICC is still reviewing the charges, which will likely go forward unless there is intervention at the UN Security Council level, most likely from China or Russia.

With ongoing sanctions, international disapproval and possible war crimes charges pending against the Sudanese president, Moscow is well aware the Khartoum regime is looking for allies, especially ones with a presence on the UN Security Council. Russia has not yet announced its position on trying al-Bashir in the ICC, but has hinted it may be willing to support a deferral of the charges (Sudan Tribune, January 31). Supported by new-found wealth from its own immense oil industry, Russia’s new engagement with Sudan is an expression of Russia’s new confidence and apparent eagerness to pursue an aggressive and exclusive foreign policy. Sudan, of course, is not the only African nation to purchase large quantities of Russian arms, but it is a vast, strategically important, resource-rich nation with minimal American presence or influence. As such, it represents an important gateway for Russia to rebuild its once-formidable stature and presence in Africa.

This article was first published in the February 12, 2009 issue of the Eurasia Daily Monitor

Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One

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Andrew McGregor

February 11, 2009

Flush with petrodollars and beset by regional insurgencies and a possible resumption of the North-South civil war, Khartoum has become an important consumer of foreign arms despite a widely ignored international embargo. The Sudanese military is embarking on a massive modernization campaign and appears to have found a willing partner in Russia, which seeks to extend its influence in Africa and find new customers for Russia’s active arms industry as sales to China drop off dramatically. China has also become Russia’s main competition in arms sales to Africa and is frequently able to supply Chinese-built Russian-designs for significantly less than Russia’s arms industry.

MargilovMikhail Margilov and President Omar al-Bashir

Aside from arms shipments, Russian trade and investment in Sudan is minimal – part of the ongoing legacy of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s often heavy-handed approach to Africa. A failed coup attempt by the Sudanese Communist Party in 1971 that led to the execution of most of the party’s leadership and the Soviet occupation of Muslim Afghanistan in the 1980s left a climate of strained relations between the two countries. Relations have improved recently as Moscow joined China in opposing the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur.

One sign of the importance Moscow now places on its relations with Sudan was the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s appointment last December of a special envoy to Khartoum, Mikhail Margilov, head of the Russian Federation Council’s foreign affairs committee. Margilov has stated Russia must re-establish its presence in Sudan and Africa by being an active participant in conflict resolution (RIA Novosti, December 8, 2008). The new envoy has already made visits to Darfur and the southern capital of Juba (Sudan Tribune, January 31). Following a meeting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Margilov announced Moscow’s intention to sponsor an international conference on Darfur later this year “to review the positive developments in Darfur.” Margilov did not elaborate on the nature of these “positive developments,” but added that Russia is now “actively engaged on Sudan issues and wants to play an active role in the UN Security Council (UNSC), Africa and in world affairs” (SUNA, January 30).

Last November, Sudan’s Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Muhammad Hussein, confirmed the sale of 12 Russian MiG-29 fighter jets to Sudan (RIA Novosti, November 14; AFP, November 14). Foreign Minister Hussein rejected American criticism of the sale, “It is not for the U.S. to determine what our priorities should be. We know what our country needs” (Sudan Tribune, November 16, 2008).

The Sudanese Defense Minister was in Moscow at the time, where he also invited Russian oil companies to invest in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2008).  So far, Russia’s only interaction with Sudan’s growing energy sector came in 2002, when the Russian-Belarusian oil company Slavneft signed a $126 million production-sharing agreement with Sudan for oil exploration, but the project later fell through (Pravda, January 18, 2002).  Since then, Sudan’s oil industry has been dominated by oil firms from China, Malaysia and India, but Russia is interested in exporting its oil operations expertise (Russia is the world’s second-largest oil producer).

Russia has successfully cornered the Sudanese market for modern warplanes. In 2001, Russia signed a $120 million deal with Sudan to supply ten MiG-28SE fighters and two MiG-29UB (a dual-seat trainer), which were delivered by 2003-2004 (Kommersant, August 16, 2006).

Sudan took delivery of 12 Russian MiG-29s in July 2004. The delivery was made five months early to avoid potential problems with a UN arms embargo, which was still under debate at the time. The sale was immediately criticized by the United States, which, despite extensive cooperation between the CIA and Sudanese intelligence, officially considers Sudan a sponsor of international terrorism. Asked about reports of the delivery of Russian warplanes to Sudan, a U.S. State Department spokesman replied:

The United States opposes all arms transfers to Sudan, which is a state sponsor of terrorism. Any transfer of lethal military equipment to state sponsors of terrorism is sanctionable under U.S. laws. In addition to U.S. law regarding lethal military equipment transfers to state sponsors of terrorism, the current crisis in Darfur, particularly the continuing violence, is cause for strong opposition to any transfers to Sudan (U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, July 22, 2004).

It is thought the fighters came from a stock of 200 MiG-29s kept at the MiG assembly plant at Lukhovtsy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia was trying to sell these surplus fighters to Algeria and Yemen as well (Moscow Times, July 27, 2004).

Fourteen MiG-29 Fulcrums were supplied to Sudan in 2006, along with Russian trainers, who are rumored to have also flown combat missions against the Darfur rebels. A former Russian air-force pilot was killed when his MiG-29 was shot down on May 10, 2008 during an attack on Omdurman by rebels belonging to Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Echo Moskvy, May 28, 2008; Interfax, May 29, 2008; Sudan Tribune, May 29, 2008).

A Khartoum newspaper, Alwan, was closed by authorities after reporting the loss of the Russian aircraft and pilot. Alwan‘s editor was charged with disclosing “sensitive military information harmful to the country’s security and its accomplishments” (Sudanese Media Center, May 14, 2008; Sudan Tribune, May 16, 2008). There have been reports of Sudanese fighter pilots who (like most of the military) hail from Darfur refusing to carry out missions against the Darfur rebels, creating an urgent need for experienced pilots in the Sudanese air-force (Sudan Tribune, May 30, 2008).

In July 2008, 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum jet fighters were reported to have been shipped either from or through Belarus in cargo planes to a military airbase north of Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, July 21, 2008; RIA Novosti, July 21, 2008). Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport denied supplying the MiG-29s “either directly or indirectly” (Moscow Times, July 23, 2008). A spokesman for the Belarus Ministry of Defense described the reports as a “hoax,” adding; “I do not see a point in commenting on stupidity (Pravda, July 21, 2008).

Most of Sudan’s MiGs are based at Wadi Sayidna military airport, just north of Khartoum. JEM rebels reported attacking the airbase on their way to Omdurman last May, seizing a large quantity of modern arms (Sudan Tribune, May 11, 2008).

The Sudanese Air Force is eager to phase out its half-dozen decrepit Soviet-era Antonov AN-24 and AN-26 transport aircraft, which it has used as modified bombers in South Sudan and Darfur by rolling “barrel bombs” out the cargo door. Many other Soviet-supplied aircraft are at least 40 years old and no longer fit to operate in Sudan’s difficult conditions. A number of Russian-made MiG-23BN fighter-bombers obtained as Libyan surplus have been phased out of service (Kommersant, August 16, 2006).  Russia has the advantage of supplying aircraft that are modern but familiar to Sudanese pilots. Khartoum’s main interest is in ground-attack aircraft, the only use Sudanese warplanes have ever received.

Russia has also supplied Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to replace Sudan’s ancient Soviet-era Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters. Several of these have been spotted in use in Darfur despite being delivered after the UN arms embargo on Darfur. Sudanese military helicopter pilots are trained under contract at the helicopter training center in the Russian town of Torzhok (Tver Oblast).

Russian and Ukrainian crews also operate most of the commercial aircraft in use in Sudan today. In 2005, Antonov opened a large technical maintenance center in Khartoum for the Antonov aircraft already in operation in Sudan and expected new purchases of AN-74s, designed for operation in hot climates (National Radio Company of Ukraine, November 18, 2005).

 

This article was first published in the February 11, 2009 issue of the Eurasia Daily Monitor

Alleged Assassins of U.S. Diplomat Claim Khartoum Regime Incites People to Jihad

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Andrew McGregor

February 6, 2009

The ongoing trial in Khartoum North of the alleged assassins of a U.S. diplomat is revealing some of the lethal undercurrents in the continuing struggle between different Islamist factions in the capital.

GranvilleJohn Granville

John Granville, an officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and his driver, Abdul Rahman Abbas Rahama, were killed in a rare attack on Western nationals in Khartoum. Returning home from a New Year’s party, Granville and his driver were cut off by another vehicle around 4AM. A gunman opened fire, killing both before fleeing the scene.

At first, Sudanese officials insinuated the killer came from the capital’s Western community by stating Granville had been gambling and was seen arguing with another individual before leaving the party. Officials also claimed that a number of cars with diplomatic plates were seen following Granville’s vehicle (Dar al-Hayat, January 1, 2008). The Sudanese Foreign Ministry later suggested Granville became involved in a “street argument” as Sudanese were in the street celebrating the New Year (Sudan Tribune, January 4; AFP, January 4, 2008). An FBI team was sent to Sudan in the days after the murders to assist in the investigation (Reuters, January 5, 2008).

The timing of the attack on Granville raised suspicions of government sanction, if not participation, as it came only one day after U.S. President George Bush signed the “Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act,” a bill drafted in response to Khartoum’s alleged genocide in Darfur. Most American businesses were already prohibited from working in Sudan following a 1997 executive order signed by then-President Bill Clinton, but the 2007 bill was seen as the beginning of an expanded sanctions regime against Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, December 31, 2007). At the same time, the close cooperation between the Sudanese intelligence services and the CIA since 9/11 has angered many Sudanese Islamists. According to the chairman of Sudan’s Foreign Affairs Committee, certain extremists “believe we have buckled in to the U.S. and are selling them out” (Los Angeles Times, April 13, 2008).

A claim of responsibility from a previously unknown group calling itself Ansar al-Tawhid (Supporters of Monotheism) was issued in the following days (AFP, January 4, 2008). The statement claimed the murders were in response to efforts to humiliate Muslim men, dishonor Muslim women, and raise the cross of Christianity over the Sudan.

Another previously unknown group, al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles, also issued a statement claiming to have killed Granville and Rahama as part of its jihad against the United States and its “Crusader and infidel allies” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 12, 2008). The veracity of both claims was disputed by Sudanese authorities and the men on trial are not accused of belonging to either group.

Two of the suspects were arrested by security forces after a gunfight in a suburb of Omdurman in February, 2008 (SUNA, February 11, 2008; Reuters, February 11, 2008). Authorities claimed the men were part of the group behind a foiled August 2007 plot to bomb Western embassies in Khartoum. Sudanese security forces reported a plot designed to attack the British, French, and American embassies, but the plotters were arrested after causing an accidental explosion while manufacturing bombs in a house (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 12, 2008).

A preliminary hearing was held under tight security last August and was attended by U.S. embassy personnel, FBI agents, and members of the U.S Bureau of Diplomatic Security (AFP, August 17, 2008). Supporters of the accused gathered outside, raising clenched fists and flashing “V for victory” signs (Reuters, August 17, 2008). When the hearing resumed on August 31, the shackled defendants entered the court chanting “God is great” before pausing to spit in the faces of two Western female journalists (Reuters, August 31, 2008).

The prosecution’s statement alleged that the five men, being misled by Satan into believing their activities were religiously sanctioned, had organized a cell in the northern city of Atbara, where they trained and armed themselves with rifles and handguns. After moving to Omdurman they began scouting possible sites of New Year’s parties that might be attended by Westerners with the intention of attacking them. They were disappointed to find their chosen venues either empty or heavily guarded on New Year’s Eve, so they began driving around, hoping to find a victim on their way home from a party until eventually encountering Granville (Reuters, August 31).

Last September chief investigator Police General Abdul Rahim Ahmad Abdullah told the court that the men had scouted American housing in Khartoum as well as plotting to kill a British diplomat in response to British schoolteacher Gilian Gibbons allowing her Khartoum students to name a teddy bear “Muhammad.” The five were also alleged to have planned to join the jihad in Somalia, but decided to initiate their own activities in Sudan (AP, September 11, 2008).

In the current session of the trial, three of the five defendants, Muhammad Makkawi Ibrahim Muhammad (a 23-year-old civil engineering student); Abdul Basit al-Hajj Hassan (a 20-year-old trader); and Muhammad Osman Yusuf Muhammad (a 29-year-old ex-Sudan Armed Forces officer still on active service at the time of the killings) claimed that their confessions were made under torture and now refute the charges. “Killing American unbelievers is an honor, but I was not involved in this case,” declared Muhammad Makkawi (Al-Arabiya, January 21; Reuters, January 21).

The other two accused are Murad Abdul Rahman (a 35-year-old driver) and Abdul Raouf Abu Zaid Muhammad, a 23-year-old merchant but more importantly the son of the leader of Sudan’s Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya, a Salafist religious group whose mosques have been the target of bloody assaults by rival Islamists.

Ansar al-Sunna is well known for its adversarial relationship with the governing Islamists of the National Congress Party (and its predecessor, the National Islamic Front). Though Ansar al-Sunna tends towards Saudi-style Salafism and advocates the implementation of Shari’a, it opposes the political exploitation of Islam or the violent imposition of Islamic law. For this, it has drawn the ire of Takfir wa’l-Hijra (Renunciation and Exile), a radical Islamist group that conducted attacks on Ansar al-Sunna mosques in Omdurman and Wad Medani in 1994, 1997, and 2000. In the February 1994 incident, five armed men attacked the group’s Omdurman mosque, killing 19 and injuring 26 (Sudan News and Views, May 19, 1994). The government seized the Ansar al-Sunna mosques after the attack and arrested the group’s leader, Shaykh Abu Zaid Muhammad Hamza. The 1996 attack on the group’s Omdurman mosque left 12 dead. In December 2000, 23 members of Ansar al-Sunna were killed and over 40 were wounded in an assault by a lone gunman (Abbas Baqir Abbas) armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle on the same mosque during evening prayers. The gunman was shot dead during the attack and 60 members of Takfir wa’l-Hijra were arrested afterwards. The Libyan/Tunisian founder of Takfir wa’l-Hijra was executed by the Khartoum regime in 1995.

Facing death by hanging if found guilty, the defendants in the Granville case have attacked the Khartoum government, accusing it of encouraging jihadi violence” “They incite people to jihad against the kufar [unbelievers] but when believers are accused of putting the words into action, they get beaten… The regime’s leaders should be in court because they pushed people towards jihad” (AFP, January 21).

 

This article first appeared in the February 6, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Kordofan Oil Operations at Risk as Killings Continue

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Andrew McGregor

November 5, 2008

Right on the heels of the death of five Chinese oil workers in Sudan’s South Kordofan province came news of the murder of three Sudanese oil workers and the abduction of two Yemeni workers in neighboring Unity State. The latest ambush is blamed on individuals from Sudan’s Baqqara (cattle-owning) Arabs, who are also held responsible for the abduction and killing of the Chinese workers (Sudan Times, October 30).

Kordofan oil 1Murdered Chinese Oil Workers are Returned to China

Nine employees of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) were abducted on October 18 while doing contract work for the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). Three were killed on October 27 in an incident described by Chinese authorities as a botched rescue attempt by the Sudanese Armed Forces and by Khartoum as an accident caused when the kidnappers became nervous after a military helicopter began monitoring their movements. Two more workers were found dead in the following days (AFP, October 31). Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi is reported to have told his Sudanese counterpart, “It is one of the most serious killing cases of oversea Chinese workers in recent years and we are very shocked by it” (Sudan Times, October 29). Four remaining workers were hospitalized after being rescued.

Identification of Arab Misseriya tribesmen as the responsible parties seems to have been confirmed by the arrival of a delegation of Misseriya leaders to negotiate the workers’ release and a claim of responsibility from Abu Humaid Ahmad Dannay, a Misseriya who also claims to be the leader of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Kordofan (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 24). Though JEM has repeatedly stated its determination to drive out China’s oil operations, it has denied any participation in the latest abductions through recognized spokesmen. Dannay refuted Khartoum’s description of the abductions as terrorism, stating, “The government is terrorizing us and we will respond in a similar manner.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry has also denounced the kidnappings as “terrorism” while calling for “severe punishment” of those responsible (China Daily, October 29; Xinhua, October 28). Sudanese security forces report they have the names of 25 individuals involved in the abductions, while local reports say the kidnappers are suffering from shortages of food and drinking water (Miriya FM, October 32; November 1).

The government continued to claim that Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was responsible for the abductions until November 1, when Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor identified the suspects as former members of the government’s Popular Defense Forces (PDF) militia who were not integrated into the regular army after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Sudan Tribune, November 1). The PDF in South Kordofan have suffered from a recent decline in funding and numerous defections to the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA).

Kordofan oil 2Misseriya Leaders

Misseriya grievances against Sudan’s growing oil industry include the destruction of pasture land and a preference for employing imported Asian workers instead of hiring locally. Having fought for years on the frontline of the north-south civil war, the Misseriya now feel abandoned by Khartoum. The Misseriya feel that the oil fields of the north-south border region were secured through their efforts, only to now see oil revenues used for the reconstruction of Khartoum while the poverty of South Kordofan remains unchanged. The leadership of the Misseriya is in a state of flux after government efforts to replace traditional leaders who supported Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma party with inexperienced individuals willing to support the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), which is dominated by Arab Islamists from north Sudan. Misseriya gunmen also abducted four Indian oil workers and their Sudanese driver last May.

Continuing attacks on oil workers threaten the development of the petroleum industry in Sudan just as a decline in oil prices and demand is creating a sharp drop in current revenues. The continuing militarization of the oil-producing regions is unlikely to inspire further investment, though China has stated its close economic involvement with Sudan will stay unchanged despite this latest in a series of attacks on Chinese facilities (AP, October 21).

This article first appeared in the November 5, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus