Category Archives: Darfur

Have Darfur Rebels Joined Qaddafi’s Mercenary Defenders?

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Andrew McGregor

February 24, 2011

A handful of unconfirmed reports from Libya have cited the presence of Darfur rebels in the ranks of the African mercenaries defending the regime of President Mu’ammar Qaddafi (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], February 21, 2011; Reuters, February 22, 2011). A spokesman for the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a press gathering that authorities were investigating the claims (Sudan Tribune, February 22, 2011). Darfur has strong historical ties to Libya, its northern neighbor, and Qaddafi has played a large role in hosting peace talks and encouraging the unification of Darfur’s many rebel groups. Perhaps mindful of his own future, Qaddafi has also been one of the main defenders of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir from possible arrest and prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in Darfur, using his influence in the African Union to pressure other African leaders on the issue, many of whom are also mindful of the precedent that could be set by al-Bashir’s prosecution.

Jem RebelsJEM Rebels

Officials of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the strongest of Darfur’s rebel movements, reacted with anger to the allegations, saying JEM has no fighters in Libya, has no interest in interfering with Libyan affairs and will hold Khartoum responsible for any harm that comes to the thousands of Sudanese citizens working in Libya (Sudan Tribune, February 22, 2011). When a Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman later announced that his ministry now had proof (as of yet undisclosed) that Darfur rebels were engaged in the fighting in Libya, JEM official al-Tahir al-Feki responded: “These allegations are very offensive and show no sensitivity towards the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who reside in Libya who will be put in jeopardy as being seen as mercenaries or taking sides. To say that there are JEM fighters in Libya fighting for Gaddafi, this is just provoking the Libyans to go after all the Sudanese” (Reuters, February 23, 2011). There are an estimated half million Sudanese living in Libya and Sudanese officials say they are working on an evacuation plan should that prove necessary (SUNA [Khartoum], February 21, 2011).

JEM’s leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, has been harbored in Libya since May 2010, when he was refused re-entry to Chad, JEM’s former base (Sudan Tribune, May 19, 2010). The relocation was the result of a peace agreement between Chad and Sudan that ended a long-running proxy war across the Chad-Sudan border (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 28, 2010). Khartoum was extremely displeased with the Libyan decision to offer the JEM leader refuge and it would not be surprising to see Sudanese officials taking the opportunity to try and discredit JEM by linking its fighters to the mercenaries firing on civilians in Libya.

There is something of a precedent here; JEM rebels were active in the defense of their Chadian host when Chadian rebels operating out of Darfur attacked the Chadian capital of N’Djamena in February 2008. There were different circumstances at work, however; JEM stood to lose their Chadian bases if a Sudanese-backed faction took power in Sudan. There were also tribal ties between the Chadian leadership and the leadership of JEM, both of which are dominated by members of the cross-border Zaghawa tribe. In this context, however, it should also be mentioned that the Chadian rebels were Zaghawa as well (see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 30, 2010). A number of Zaghawa are believed to have served in Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion in the 1990s.

As the protesters grow in strength, suspected mercenaries are being dealt summary justice in the streets, often through hanging. Growing numbers of suspected mercenaries are also being detained by revolutionary committees, including alleged gunmen from Chad, Niger and Sudan (Reuters, February 24). Libya has a substantial black African work force and student population that are likely to come under suspicion in the chaotic events engulfing that nation. As mercenaries in Libya come to realize they are both expendable and unlikely to be paid, they will likely use violent and unpredictable means to extricate themselves from the situation.

The reported use of mercenaries in a desperate attempt by Qaddafi’s regime to retain power in Libya is threatening to blow up into a pan-African scandal. It is difficult to believe that gunmen with military experience were hired and flown out of various African nations without the knowledge of security services in those countries, suggesting some African governments have cooperated with the plan or at the very least looked the other way. The issue has been raised in the parliaments of Kenya and Zimbabwe, with the defense minister of the latter nation skirting the question by saying he had “no mandate in my duty as Minister of Defense to investigate activities happening in another African country” (News Day [Harare], February 23, 2011; Daily Nation [Nairobi], February 23, 2011).

This article first appeared in the February 24, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

With Elections Over, Khartoum Goes on the Offensive in Darfur

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Andrew McGregor

May 20, 2010

The leader of Darfur’s most effective rebel movement, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was recently in Cairo seeking greater Egyptian participation in negotiations between JEM and Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Dr. Khalil Ibrahim accuses the Qatar government of showing favoritism to Khartoum in its role as mediator in the on again, off again Doha negotiations.

Khalil IbrahimJEM Leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim

While Khalil Ibrahim was in Cairo, the Sudan government sought to embarrass his hosts by making a public request for Interpol to arrest the Egyptian government’s guest. Sudanese Justice Minister Abdul Bassit Sabdarat announced he had asked Interpol to “arrest” Ibrahim “wherever he is located,” although the Justice Minister must have been aware that Interpol facilitates international law enforcement cooperation but does not make arrests (Sudanese Media Center, May 10). The statement was designed solely to express Khartoum’s displeasure with Khalil’s presence in Cairo; Khartoum had previously requested Interpol’s assistance in detaining the JEM leader in 2006 and 2008 (Sudan Tribune, June 11, 2008). Khalil Ibrahim is also already on Interpol’s list of fugitives wanted on charges of terrorism laid by the Sudan government. [1] The JEM leader mocked the arrest request in an interview with a pan-Arab daily, asking why Sudanese police don’t arrest him while he is in Sudan (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 13).

In a Cairo interview, the JEM leader suggested that the latest rapprochement between Chad and Sudan would have little effect on his movement, which has used bases in Chad in the past but is now largely based in Darfur. He also recalled the May 2008 JEM raid on Omdurman, describing the operation as one “worthy of being taught in the military academies… We moved the war from Darfur to the heart of Khartoum and we asserted our power on the ground” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 13).

Khalil described the recent elections as rigged, pointing to the results in Darfur as proof. “What is comic is that all those that won in Darfur are members of the [ruling] National Congress. We know that these were not elected by the Darfur masses; the fraud was shameless.” Nevertheless, he urged the leaders of South Sudan to postpone the upcoming referendum on independence in hope of a last minute deal to ensure the unity of Sudan. The JEM leader claimed his movement did not seek political power in Sudan, but was only “looking for a formula to solve Sudan’s problems in general” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 13).

After the Egyptian Army invaded the region in 1916, Egypt co-ruled Darfur with Great Britain until Sudanese independence in 1956. In the interests of securing stability on its southern borders, Egypt has become more involved in seeking a solution to the Darfur crisis, including the return of Egyptian troops to Darfur as part of the UNAMID peacekeeping force. Two Egyptian peacekeepers were killed and three wounded earlier this month when a small Egyptian military convoy was ambushed in South Darfur by unidentified attackers (MENA Online, May 7; PANA Online, May 8; al-Jumhuriyah [Cairo], May 11). The men were buried at a mass funeral in Lower Egypt’s al-Dakhalia governate (MENA Online, May 5).

In the wake of the Egyptian deaths, Rwanda’s Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamyumba, the UNAMID land forces commander, promised a more vigorous response to attacks on peacekeepers. “Self defense is an inherent right that should be exercised without a doubt” (New Times [Kigali], May 13).

Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, is reported to have become angry over Khalil Ibrahim’s reception in Cairo during a meeting in Khartoum with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Ghayt and Intelligence Director Omar Sulayman. The president sent two of his closest aides to Cairo on May 15 to resolve what is being described as a “silent crisis” over the JEM leader’s visit to Egypt (al-Hayat, May 14).

With the ceasefire between JEM and Khartoum in a near state of collapse, Khartoum went on the offensive on May 15, seizing the longtime JEM stronghold at Jabal Moun near the Chad border after several days of shelling. A Sudan Armed Forces spokesman claimed 108 JEM fighters had been killed and another 61 taken prisoner, though JEM claims to have carried out a successful withdrawal. There was also heavy fighting between JEM and the SAF reported near the South Darfur capital of Nyala, with both sides claiming victory (Sudan Tribune, May 16; AFP, May 15; Reuters, May 15).

1. See Interpol’s wanted list: www.interpol.int/public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/2006/45/2006_37945.asp

This article first appeared in the May 20, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Chadian Opposition Clashes with Government Troops

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Andrew McGregor

May 6, 2010

Reports have emerged of a pair of battles on April 24 and April 28 between Chadian government forces and those of the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (FPRN), one of a number of rebel movements seeking to overthrow the government of President Idriss Déby. The fighting apparently took place close to the village of For Djahaname, near the border with Sudan’s Darfur province. Fighting took place in December 2009 in the same region, which is home to the cross-border Salamat Arab tribe (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 1).

Chad Opp 1Chadian Government Forces Take the Offensive

Government spokesmen claimed the army had killed 105 insurgents and captured another 80 in the two clashes. FPRN forces led by Adam Yacoub Kougou claimed to have defeated the government’s troops on April 24, capturing a large quantity of weapons, but after the second battle it said only that large numbers of troops had been lost on both sides and that it was awaiting expected air raids by Chadian warplanes (AFP, April 24). The FPRN leadership later claimed the regime had been “caught lying red-handed,” and that 64 wounded soldiers had been taken to French military facilities in Chad for medical treatment (AFP, May 1).

Unlike most of the Chadian opposition groups, which are based across the border in Darfur, the FPRN is based inside Chad. The usual pattern for such attacks is for N’Djamena to claim that those responsible were working for the Sudanese government, followed by retaliatory attacks by Chad’s own proxies in Darfur. When the initial attack occurs in Sudan, the entire process is reversed. This time, however, N’Djamena did not blame Khartoum, keeping instead to the reconciliatory path the two nations have been following since January. Rather than recriminations, N’Djamena actually congratulated Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on his “brilliant” victory in the recent Sudanese elections (Reuters, April 29). President Déby also did Khartoum a favor by denouncing the Southern Sudanese separatist movement, saying independence would harm both Sudan and the region at large. The Chad-Sudan border was reopened in mid-April for the first time in seven years (AFP, April 14).

Chad Opp 2FPRN Leader Adam Yacoub Kougou 

The N’Djamena regime began negotiations with several opposition groups in April as part of the larger reconciliation program, but the FPRN was not involved in these talks (AFP, April 26). The movement consists mainly of rebels who left the umbrella UFR group because they opposed negotiations with the Déby regime. Another rebel movement, the Mouvement pour la democratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT), signed a ceasefire with the government on April 24 (PANA Online, April 24). MDJT fighters are scheduled to be integrated into Chad’s military and security forces. Déby is said to be exhausted with never-ending negotiations with Chad’s rebel movements, and has told the remaining rebels that he has “no money, no positions, or anything else to give” (L’Observateur [N’Djamena], April 14).

Unfortunately for Déby, the clashes came just as his government was attempting to persuade Europe and the United Nations that peacekeepers are no longer needed in eastern Chad, the site of the battles. N’Djamena has insisted on the departure of the U.N.’s Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT), a 5,000-man peacekeeping mission deployed in the Central African Republic and the eastern regions of Chad, the frontline of the conflict between Déby’s regime and the insurgents. Without cooperation from N’Djamena, MINURCAT’s Irish and Finnish contingents have decided to withdraw, while the mission as a whole will be drastically scaled back as heavy weapons and equipment are withdrawn from Chad. After May 16, the mission will consist of only 1,900 men, far short of the figure necessary to be effective. Déby has called the mission “a failure,” suggesting the peacekeepers were unwilling to leave the safety of their fortified bases (AFP, April 23).

Across the border in Darfur, it appears that the peace accord between Khartoum and the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is beginning to unravel. JEM, which appears to have lost some degree of its former support from N’Djamena, has reported various low level clashes with government forces in recent days. JEM forces in West Darfur claim Sudanese MiGs and Antonov aircraft are flying reconnaissance flights over JEM deployments in West Darfur in preparation for a major government offensive using heavy weapons and local auxiliaries (Sudan Tribune, April 22).

This article first appeared in the May 6, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Dr. Khalil Ibrahim – Darfur Rebel Challenges Sudan’s Power Structure

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Andrew McGregor

January 30, 2010

Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad Achar Foudeil Taha is the chairman of Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (Harakat al-Adl wa’l-Muswaa – JEM), the most powerful and determined of the many armed movements in Darfur challenging the authority of the military/Islamist regime in Khartoum. A former Darfur Minister of Education and member of Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF), Khalil enjoys asylum status in France but is often found in the field in Darfur, unlike many of his rivals in Darfur’s other rebel movements. Given the effectiveness of his fighters and the national aspirations of his movement, Khalil Ibrahim is unquestionably the most important of the rebel leaders active in the Sudan.

Khalil Ibrahim 2JEM Leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim

Khalil specialized in community medicine in the Netherlands while studying at the University of Maastricht and worked as a doctor in Saudi Arabia and Sudan (al-Hayat, December 15, 2009). As a physician leading a military/political movement, Khalil has been ably assisted on the battlefield by a cohort of experienced desert fighters, mostly veteran Zaghawa commanders with experience fighting Libyans in northern Chad.

JEM has its origins in meetings in al-Fashir in the 1990s of a cell of non-Arab members of the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, a veteran Islamist and the architect of Sudan’s Islamic legal system as Attorney General in the government of dictator General Ja’afar al-Numeiri (1969-85). Al-Turabi was determined to bring non-Arab Islamists into the government, but many of those he recruited, like Khalil Ibrahim, were infuriated by the impenetrability of the existing power structure, based on the Ja’aliyin, Shaiqiya and Danaqla riverine Arab tribes (representing less than 5% of the population) that have ruled Sudan since 1956.

The intellectual foundation of the movement is found in a May 2000 manifesto entitled The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan. Based on extensive statistics, charts and graphs, the work argued that power and wealth in the Sudan had been monopolized by the riverine Arabs since independence. Khalil announced the existence of the JEM shortly afterwards in August 2001. The movement then announced its physical presence in a successful raid on the military airport at al-Fashir in April 2003, carried out jointly with forces of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M).

After five years of steady fighting, Khalil’s movement made international headlines with a daring 600 km, 400 vehicle raid on the national capital of Khartoum-Omdurman in May 2008, suddenly transforming the movement from a regional resistance group to a serious threat to the continued existence of the Sudanese regime.. When most of his column was stopped by government resistance in Kordofan, about 75 km west of the capital, a smaller group of JEM vehicles headed straight for the unprepared capital. The attack crested in the suburbs of Omdurman as the remaining JEM vehicles careened through deserted streets until their eventual destruction by ad-hoc units of police and secret service members. Reports at the time that Khalil was in hiding in Omdurman after his truck had been disabled by gunfire led to a government reward of $250,000 for information leading to his capture, but the JEM leader soon resurfaced in Darfur. Khalil regards the attack as a notable success for his movement:

On that day we confirmed to the Sudanese people and the world that our movement has military and political capabilities and has the strong willpower to change the regime in Khartoum. We gained the respect of our people and the world… With our attack on Omdurman, we undermined the regime, which was deceiving the international community that it possessed military power – army, popular defense militias, security services, and the Janjaweed. We confirmed to them that this regime was just a paper tiger” (Asharq al-Awsat, May 13, 2009).

The JEM leader is a member of the Zaghawa Kobe, one of the three main branches of the Zaghawa tribe, which straddles the border between Chad and northern Darfur. The Zaghawa are an indigenous semi-nomadic tribe that maintained their own petty sultanates less than a century ago. Despite small numbers, the Zaghawa now dominate both the government and the opposition in Chad, as well as dominating JEM and several other Darfur resistance groups. JEM’s detractors point to what they allege is the continued domination of the movement’s leadership by the Zaghawa despite its aspirations to be an inclusive organization, but Khalil points to the many Arab and African leaders who have left rival movements for membership in JEM; “The remaining movements should either join us or join the government. There is no third choice in Darfur” (Asharq al-Awsat, May 13, 2009).

Khalil disputes assessments coming from United Nations and United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) officials that the conflict in Darfur is dying down, charging instead that such statements are the result of large cash payments made to the officials by al-Bashir’s regime (Asharq al-Awsat, September 26, 2009).

Khalil points to the growing number of political and tribal leaders who have abandoned the regime in favor of JEM as proof of the movement’s appeal beyond Darfur; “The Justice and Equality Movement is a general revolution. It is a revolution for all those who are marginalized and for all the Sudanese people who are demanding freedom, equality, and change. It is not only a revolution for Darfur” (al-Hayat, December 15, 2009). The JEM commander claims the movement also has support in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan (once a stronghold of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army – SPLA) and the mountainous region along the Red Sea (another area of discontent with the Khartoum regime). A number of high-ranking Kordofan members of al-Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party defected to JEM in December.

JEM does not recognize the ever-expanding number of “resistance movements” in Darfur, many of which do not carry out military operations against the regime. Khalil suggests many of these groups are creations of Khartoum’s intelligence service. There is some acknowledgement of Abd al-Wahid Muhammad Nur’s largely Fur Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), but Khalil suggests they have become largely irrelevant by keeping to fortified positions in the Fur heartland of Jabal Marra rather than attacking government positions (al-Hayat, December 15). JEM has carried out a number of military operations in cooperation with the Sudan Liberation Army – Unity (SLA-Unity), one of many SLA/M breakaway groups.

Khalil sees no opportunity for political change in the forthcoming general elections, saying they will be “a complete crisis and a catastrophe”; “[The elections] are a foregone conclusion in favor of the National Congress [Party]. They are a scenario [to extend] Omar al-Bashir’s presidency.”  If al-Bashir returns to power, Khalil sees the separation of the South as inevitable, but suggests unity could be preserved if all the Sudanese political parties agreed for Sudan to be ruled by a southern president (al-Hayat, December 15).

Within Darfur, Khalil’s archrival is fellow Zaghawa Minni Arko Minnawi, who took his faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) over to the government’s side after the Abuja Accord of 2006. JEM benefited from Minnawi’s decision when many of his fighters began to abandon his movement in favor of continued resistance with JEM; “We are supported by many tribes while Minnawi is surrounded by individuals that are defending his position for which he sold the cause of Darfur. He has become a mercenary while we are fighting for the interests of all of Sudan” (Asharq al-Awsat, September 26, 2009). For his part, Minnawi maintains that JEM “wants to be in control and take charge of other movements. This can never be accepted by a revolutionary movement… The behavior of the Justice and Equality Movement shows that that if they gain power they will annihilate people. The proposals by the Justice and Equality Movement have become Nazi and Fascist-like” (Asharq al-Awsat, September 24, 2009).

In the past, Khalil has accused the Khartoum regime of “an arrogant and patronizing attitude and superficial thinking” and threatened a “second Omdurman,” but with JEM and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) having reached something of a stalemate in Darfur, there are reports that Khalil has entered into direct talks with the Sudanese president’s adviser on Darfur, Dr. Ghazi Salah al-Din, in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena (Asharq al-Awsat, September 26, 2009; May 13, 2009; January 19, 2010). However, there is a deep level of distrust between the two parties and such talks have produced little in the past. While Khalil Ibrahim insists JEM’s preferred strategy is a negotiated settlement with Khartoum that will establish a new and equitable sharing of power and revenues, there is no question he will use JEM’s military strength to press home any advantage that may appear in the political instability that may precede the general elections and the 2011 referendum on Southern independence.

This article first appeared in the January 30, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor

Armed Opposition Groups Redeploy in Wake of Chad-Sudan Border Security Pact

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Andrew McGregor

January 21, 2010

Recent talks in N’djamena seem to confirm both Sudan and Chad have realized that their use of proxies in a long-standing dispute is a dangerous game that threatens the existence of both regimes.

TimaneRFC Leader Timani Erdime (Tchadoscope)

An agreement was reached during talks on January 8-9 that committed both parties to cease the hosting or supporting of armed opposition groups, basically reviving the March 2008 Dakar Agreement between Chad and Sudan (see text at Sudan Tribune, March 18, 2008).  A statement issued by the Chadian Foreign Ministry said N’djamena was prepared to allow all participating bodies, including the Khartoum government, to “verify on the ground the absence of any anti-Sudan presence in Chadian territories” (AFP, January 11). Chad and Sudan have also agreed to stop using their respective media to launch attacks on each other (SUNA, December 29, 2009). The Sudanese Foreign Ministry was adamant that the negotiations were strictly “tactical” and had nothing to do with the ongoing Darfur peace negotiations in Doha.

Sources at the Chadian Foreign Ministry told the French press that a government delegation had been sent to eastern Chad to tell Dr. Khalil Ibrahim that he and his Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces would have to leave the country (AFP, January 11). JEM is the most effective opposition group in Darfur and the only one with national aspirations. Its largely Zaghawa leadership has maintained close ties to the Zaghawa president of Chad, Idriss Déby. While the Zaghawa of northern Chad and northern Darfur represent only 2 to 4% of the total population in both countries, they have developed a political and economic importance far greater than their numbers would indicate. A JEM spokesman stressed that the movement was not concerned by the rapprochement, insisting that JEM forces were “in Darfur, not in Chad” (Sudan Tribune, January 12). Nevertheless, JEM and other rebel groups in Darfur draw recruits from the over 250,000 Darfur refugees living in camps in eastern Chad.

On January 14, JEM reported that government planes were bombing the rebel stronghold at Jabal Mun in West Darfur, forcing hundreds of civilians to flee across the border to Chad (Sudan Tribune, January 14; AFP, January 13). JEM has also complained that Chadian rebels newly based in the Sayah district of North Darfur are “committing crimes against our people there” (Sudan Tribune, January 11).

Residents of al-Sayah have complained to aid groups that the Chadians were raping, beating and looting locals, mostly members of the non-Arab Berti tribe, as well as helping themselves to scarce quantities of water, livestock, food and firewood without compensation (Reuters, January 11). The United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reported the arrival of the Chadian fighters at al-Sayah on December 3, 2009. The appearance of an estimated 5,000 fighters in some 700 vehicles has put a severe strain on available resources. A Berti appeal to the regional governor to withdraw the rebels was met with a firm refusal, with the governor reportedly saying the rebels were there as part of an agreement to withdraw Chadian opposition groups from the border (al-Sahafa [Khartoum], December 19). JEM deputy chairman Muhammad Adam Bakhit claims the redeployment is designed to make the forces available for the defense of al-Fashir if it is threatened by the Darfur rebels (Sudan Tribune, January 20).

The Chadian forces belong to the Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR), an umbrella group of rebels based in Darfur. The principal component of the UFR is the Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement (RFC), whose Zaghawa leader, Timane Erdimi, is also leader of the UFR. Though Timane and his twin brother Tom are nephews of Chadian president Déby and former cabinet ministers in his government, they are now among his strongest opponents. Timane was sentenced to death in absentia in August, 2008. Most RFC fighters are Zaghawa defectors from the Garde Républicaine.

N’djamena and Khartoum have agreed to deploy a joint border patrol designed to prevent cross-border infiltration of armed groups. Enforcement of the terms of the new agreement may prove more difficult for the Chadian opposition groups than JEM. While JEM forces have bases within Darfur, the Chadian groups are based solely in Darfur and only emerge onto Chadian territory to carry out raids. JEM is largely armed from stocks captured from the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the Chadian groups rely on Khartoum for their arms. Expelling these groups from Sudan could result in the permanent loss of a potential asset that could be used against N’Djamena should relations falter once more in the pattern typical of Chadian-Sudanese relations. Khartoum will likely prefer to keep such forces away from the border for the time being and deploy them against Darfur rebel groups to earn their keep.

This article first appeared in the January 21, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Is Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army Operating in Darfur?

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Andrew McGregor

October 23, 2009

Various reports are claiming that the guerrillas of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have moved in bulk into South Darfur, where they will allegedly seek supplies and arms from the Sudanese government. The movement into Darfur was reported to have been compelled by helicopter attacks on the LRA by Ugandan Special Forces units operating out of Yambio, Sudan as part of a tripartite (DRC, Uganda, South Sudan) military offensive against the brutal fighters led by the notorious Joseph Kony.

Arrow BoysArrow Boys of Western Equatoria

Most prominent of these was a front page cover story in Britain’s Independent daily asserting Kony and a significant part of his forces had crossed into southern Darfur (Independent, October 17). The main source in the story was a statement by Major-General Kuol Deim Kuol of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of South Sudan that was carried in the Sudanese press two weeks earlier (Sudan Tribune, September 28). General Kuol claimed the bulk of the LRA forces had crossed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) into southern Darfur, where they had clashed with the local population. The General maintained SPLA reconnaissance groups had tracked the LRA across the border, where he suggested they would seek a safe base for their wives and families while seeking arms and ammunition from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

However, the Independent reported Kuol saying hunters had encountered LRA fighters near the town of Tumbara. There is no such place in southern Darfur, though there is a Tambura in the southern part of Western Equatoria (South Sudan), close to the LRA’s operations in the CAR, but far from the border with southern Darfur. The Independent added that the LRA had moved into the “Raga district in southern Darfur.” Raga is in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, also part of South Sudan rather than Darfur. The director of communications from the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) declared the mission had spent days going over reports of an LRA presence, but had failed to find any “hard evidence” to confirm them (Independent, October 17).

The original Sudan Tribune story said that “Kuol suggested that Kony is seeking protection from the Sudanese army and may be used to fight the Darfur rebels” (September 28). Basing its report on the Sudan Tribune story, the Kampala Observer claimed several days later that Kuol had stated that the LRA were fighting as mercenaries alongside the Janjaweed militia in Darfur (October 4).

Elsewhere, there were reports of LRA fighters killing two women in raids near Yambio in Western Equatoria at the same time the main group was reported to be crossing into Darfur (Sudan Tribune, October 16; New Vision [Kampala], October 16). The fighters were driven off by members of the lightly armed Arrow Boys, a local self-defense group that combats LRA incursions with weapons such as spears and bows and arrows. Yambio is roughly 650 kilometers from the border with South Darfur as the crow flies – much farther in rough and road-less bush country. If these reports are correct, they would suggest either the main body of the LRA has abandoned elements of its forces in the move north, or is still operating in the area where the DRC, CAR and Sudan borders intersect. Other LRA units were simultaneously reported to be carrying out new attacks in the northern DRC (BBC, October 14).

The presence in Darfur of the LRA, which is generally believed to have once been armed and funded by Khartoum in retaliation for Kampala’s support of the SPLA, would be a major embarrassment to President Omar al-Bashir, who is currently facing Darfur-related war crimes charges from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Salah Gosh, a senior presidential advisor who has been tied to war crimes in Darfur in his former capacity as director of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Services, accused the SPLA of issuing “fabrications,” adding, “The SPLA knows very well where Kony is” (Sudan Tribune, September 28).

The reports of an LRA entry into Darfur came as Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni invited Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to an AU summit on refugees held this week in Kampala (New Vision, October 14). Despite Uganda being a signatory to the ICC statute—and thus obligated to enforce the ICC warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest—Museveni said such an act would not be “according to the culture of the Great Lakes region in Africa… We do not believe in surprise attacks.” An ICC representative insisted Uganda had a responsibility to carry out the arrest (Daily Monitor, October 16). The issue was resolved when Sudan decided to send two junior ministers to the summit instead (New Vision, October 19). Sudan has also expressed its willingness to share its expertise in the oil sector with Uganda as the latter begins development of a one-billion barrel oil reserve discovered on the Albertine rift in Uganda (Dow Jones Newswire, October 1; Sudan Tribune, October 2).

This article first appeared in the October 23, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Sudanese Jihadis Declare Intention to Carry Out 250 Suicide Bombings in United States, France and UK

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Andrew McGregor

March 19, 2009

A coalition of militant Salafi-Jihadi groups in Sudan has threatened to carry out 250 “martyrdom operations” in the United States, France and the UK in response to the issue of a warrant by the International Criminal Court for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges of war-crimes (Akhir Lazha [Khartoum], March 10). The strikes would target “world imperialists and CIA agents” in the three countries in what was described as “another September 11 attack” (Sudan Tribune, March 11). The statement was also carried by a number of jihadist websites. The coalition, calling itself the Coalition of Jihad and Martyrdom Movements, also called for the assassination of ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and Khalil Ibrahim, the Zaghawa leader of Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Salah GoshSudanese Intelligence Chief Salah Abdallah Gosh (Sudan Tribune)

Khalil Ibrahim’s movement staged a spectacular but unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Bashir regime last May by sending a convoy of JEM fighters by truck all the way from the Chad border to the suburbs of Omdurman. The statement described Ibrahim and the Paris-based Abd-al-Wahid Muhammad al-Nur (the Fur leader of a faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army/Movement – SLA/M) as “Zionist agents,” an accusation commonly made by the Khartoum regime as a consequence of the leading role played by Jewish organizations in Darfur activism. The coalition announced the formation of joint brigades under a unified command to carry out jihad and rid Darfur of colonialist “filth.” The coalition also declared its intention to coordinate with other global jihadist movements.

The new threats follow a February 21 warning from Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Abdallah Gosh (who has worked closely with the CIA on counterterrorism issues despite being labeled as one of the architects of the Darfur crisis) of the consequences of an ICC warrant for al-Bashir: “We were once fanatical Islamists, but we have become moderates and now believe in coexistence and peace. However, we will never break apart and have no choice but to revert to our fanaticism in order to manage our battle with the ICC” (Al-Sahafah [Khartoum], February 21).

Musa HilalMusa Hilal (Michael Kamber/NYT)

The statement was issued on March 9 by a group of mostly unknown Salafi-Jihadi militant groups, all apparently based in Sudan. Most notable of these was the Liwa’a Isud Darfur (Darfur Lions Brigade), which, according to the statement, is led by Shaykh Musa Hilal, the most prominent and powerful of the Janjaweed leaders in Darfur.

Musa Hilal’s involvement in the terrorist threat is interesting, as he remains an official of the Sudanese government, serving as Adviser to the Ministry of the Federal Government since January 2008. The statement was carried in Sudan by Akhir Lazha, an Arabic-language daily thought to have close connections to Sudanese intelligence and the ruling National Congress Party led by Omar al-Bashir. In late February, Musa Hilal promised to mobilize 30,000 of Darfur’s “finest mujhahideen” to ensure anyone who supported the ICC would “pay the price” (Al-Intibaha [Khartoum], February 27). JEM has accused Musa Hilal’s men of responsibility for the March 11 kidnapping of three Darfur-based members of relief organization Médecins Sans Frontières (AFP, March 13).

The other groups signing the statement are extremely obscure. They include; Jama’at al-Shahid Abu Qusaysah, Jama’at Ansar Allah al-Jihadiya al-Salafiya, Jama’at al-Bahisin al-Shihada and Jama’at Liwa’a al-Shahid Ali Abd al-Fatah.

Four soldiers belonging to United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were wounded by gunfire from an unknown source in Western Darfur the same day the statement was issued (AFP, March 10). Neither Sudan nor the United States has ratified the treaty establishing the powers of the ICC.

 

This article first appeared in the March 19, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part Two

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Andrew McGregor

February 12, 2009

In March 2005, an earlier 2004 UN arms embargo on non-government forces in the Darfur conflict was expanded by the UN Security Council to include the Sudan government. Russia approved the passage of UN Resolution 1591, which bans the transfer of weapons to Darfur without the Security Council’s permission. What is poorly understood is that Khartoum is still allowed to purchase all the arms it wants if the arms are designated for use outside of Darfur. Though deployment of new military equipment to Darfur must be approved by a UN committee on Sudan sanctions, Khartoum’s disregard for this provision has left a giant hole in the arms embargo.

T-54Sudanese Troops on a Russian-made T-54 Tank

Commenting on reports that Russia had transferred 33 military aircraft to Sudan since 2004, David Miliband the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs noted the limitations of the UN embargo; “The UK continues to request that the UN extend its arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan, but not all Security Council members agree” (UK House of Commons, Hansard, November 6, 2008).

One of the issues Russia’s new envoy must be dealing with is Khartoum’s concerns over Russia’s role in providing arms to South Sudan’s Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) – arms that will almost certainly be used against government forces if fighting resumes between the South and the military-Islamist government in Khartoum. The Juba-based Government of South Sudan is building one of the largest armies in Africa with its share of Sudan’s oil revenues and may soon be in the market for its own jet fighters. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan forbids either side from making major arms purchases without permission from a Joint Defense Board, though this provision is widely ignored by both sides (Anyuak Media, January 10).

The recently released Ukrainian cargo-ship, MV Faina, seized by Somali pirates in September, held 33 Russian-designed T-72 battle tanks and a substantial cargo of grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns, small arms and ammunition believed to be on their way to landlocked South Sudan via Mombasa. The ship was released on February 5 after the payment of a reported ransom of $3.2 million, a fraction of the $35 million originally demanded (RIA Novosti, February 5). The American destroyer Mason and ocean tug Catawba provided the ship with fuel, water and humanitarian assistance as it proceeded to Mombasa, a transit point for arms shipments to South Sudan (Navy News, February 6). Unlike earlier arms shipments to South Sudan through Kenya that attracted little attention, the destination of the tanks and other arms will be closely watched by a host of interested parties. Both Ukrainian intelligence and Kenya’s Defense Ministry insist the arms are destined for the Kenyan army, even though it does not use any Russian-designed equipment and has no training on Russian-designed equipment (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 29, 2008). The ship’s manifest, released by the pirates, indicated the end recipient of the cargo was “GOSS,” the usual acronym for the Government of South Sudan.

Russian arms appeal to many countries with limited budgets, harsh conditions or a poorly-educated military. According to Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, the continued production of outdated Soviet military equipment to developing countries has become a lucrative business:

The so-called production of arms using Soviet designs and equipment, a Soviet-trained workforce and Soviet-made weapons repainted to look like new is typical in the defense industry today. This keeps production costs low and profits high, while the veil of secrecy surrounding the arms trade allows firms to avoid taxes almost entirely… There is hardly a local war or conflict in the world where Russian arms are not extensively employed because they are reliable, relatively cheap and often specifically designed in the Soviet era for use by poorly trained and educated conscript soldiers (Moscow Times, July 27, 2004).

Konstantin Makienko of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies has offered an explanation for why Sudan and other African nations prefer to stick with Russian arms:

The presence of conflicts naturally leads to a demand for armaments, with the priority on the fastest possible delivery of low-cost weapons, especially those that are simple to use and maintain and which have been either used by the army in question or which could be supplied along with personnel from abroad to maintain the equipment. These factors encourage repeat purchases from the same suppliers (Moscow Defense Brief 4 (14), 2008).

Though China is frequently criticized for its arms shipments to Sudan, Russia has more quietly become Khartoum’s major arms supplier, an activity in which it has been joined by former Soviet states such as Belarus and Ukraine. A SIPRI report based on its Arms Transfers Database stated that Russia had accounted for 87 percent of Sudan’s major conventional weapons purchases in the period 2003-2007, while China was responsible for only eight percent (www.sipri.org/content/<wbr></wbr>armstrad/2008/04/01).

In a sense, it is a return for the Russians -the Soviet Union dominated the Sudanese market for military equipment after the left-leaning Revolutionary Command Council led by General Ja’afar Muhammad Nimeiri took power in May 1969 and began a massive expansion of the Sudanese military. The Soviets supplied armor, artillery, MiG-21 fighters, Antonov cargo planes and various military helicopters as well as Soviet technicians and trainers. By 1971, however, Nimeiri was purging communists from the government and banning communist-affiliated trade unions and professional associations. The Sudanese Communist Party responded with a violent three-day coup attempt in July, 1971 that ultimately failed when troops loyal to Nimeiri rallied for a counter-attack. Suspicions of Soviet involvement brought a swift deterioration in Soviet-Sudanese relations. When the Soviets backed the 1977 Marxist military coup in Sudan’s rival, Ethiopia, the remaining Soviet military advisors in Sudan were expelled and Khartoum turned to a new supplier, the United States.

In 2006, the Russian press reported that Sudan was seeking not only new Russian arms, but also a $1 billion long-term loan to help pay for them. The request did not receive a warm response in Moscow, where memories are still fresh of the write-offs of billions in debt incurred by African nations purchasing arms on credit in the 1970s and 1980s (Kommersant, October 20, 2006).

The Sudanese army operates over 200 Russian-model T54 and T55 battle tanks, obtained from Russia, Belarus and Poland (the latter through a secondary sale by Yemen, which acts as a kind of arms bazaar for the region). The tanks are obsolete in the European context, but are still useful for providing fire support to infantry operations in Sudan. Khartoum, however, has switched to Chinese-made battle tanks and apparently intends to look to China for most future purchases of armor. Sudan has also purchased as many as 60 Soviet-designed BTR-80A armored personnel carriers from Russia in recent years.

In July 2008, International Criminal Courts (ICC) prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo charged Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with various counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and murder. The ICC is still reviewing the charges, which will likely go forward unless there is intervention at the UN Security Council level, most likely from China or Russia.

With ongoing sanctions, international disapproval and possible war crimes charges pending against the Sudanese president, Moscow is well aware the Khartoum regime is looking for allies, especially ones with a presence on the UN Security Council. Russia has not yet announced its position on trying al-Bashir in the ICC, but has hinted it may be willing to support a deferral of the charges (Sudan Tribune, January 31). Supported by new-found wealth from its own immense oil industry, Russia’s new engagement with Sudan is an expression of Russia’s new confidence and apparent eagerness to pursue an aggressive and exclusive foreign policy. Sudan, of course, is not the only African nation to purchase large quantities of Russian arms, but it is a vast, strategically important, resource-rich nation with minimal American presence or influence. As such, it represents an important gateway for Russia to rebuild its once-formidable stature and presence in Africa.

This article was first published in the February 12, 2009 issue of the Eurasia Daily Monitor

Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One

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Andrew McGregor

February 11, 2009

Flush with petrodollars and beset by regional insurgencies and a possible resumption of the North-South civil war, Khartoum has become an important consumer of foreign arms despite a widely ignored international embargo. The Sudanese military is embarking on a massive modernization campaign and appears to have found a willing partner in Russia, which seeks to extend its influence in Africa and find new customers for Russia’s active arms industry as sales to China drop off dramatically. China has also become Russia’s main competition in arms sales to Africa and is frequently able to supply Chinese-built Russian-designs for significantly less than Russia’s arms industry.

MargilovMikhail Margilov and President Omar al-Bashir

Aside from arms shipments, Russian trade and investment in Sudan is minimal – part of the ongoing legacy of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s often heavy-handed approach to Africa. A failed coup attempt by the Sudanese Communist Party in 1971 that led to the execution of most of the party’s leadership and the Soviet occupation of Muslim Afghanistan in the 1980s left a climate of strained relations between the two countries. Relations have improved recently as Moscow joined China in opposing the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur.

One sign of the importance Moscow now places on its relations with Sudan was the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s appointment last December of a special envoy to Khartoum, Mikhail Margilov, head of the Russian Federation Council’s foreign affairs committee. Margilov has stated Russia must re-establish its presence in Sudan and Africa by being an active participant in conflict resolution (RIA Novosti, December 8, 2008). The new envoy has already made visits to Darfur and the southern capital of Juba (Sudan Tribune, January 31). Following a meeting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Margilov announced Moscow’s intention to sponsor an international conference on Darfur later this year “to review the positive developments in Darfur.” Margilov did not elaborate on the nature of these “positive developments,” but added that Russia is now “actively engaged on Sudan issues and wants to play an active role in the UN Security Council (UNSC), Africa and in world affairs” (SUNA, January 30).

Last November, Sudan’s Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Muhammad Hussein, confirmed the sale of 12 Russian MiG-29 fighter jets to Sudan (RIA Novosti, November 14; AFP, November 14). Foreign Minister Hussein rejected American criticism of the sale, “It is not for the U.S. to determine what our priorities should be. We know what our country needs” (Sudan Tribune, November 16, 2008).

The Sudanese Defense Minister was in Moscow at the time, where he also invited Russian oil companies to invest in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, December 22, 2008).  So far, Russia’s only interaction with Sudan’s growing energy sector came in 2002, when the Russian-Belarusian oil company Slavneft signed a $126 million production-sharing agreement with Sudan for oil exploration, but the project later fell through (Pravda, January 18, 2002).  Since then, Sudan’s oil industry has been dominated by oil firms from China, Malaysia and India, but Russia is interested in exporting its oil operations expertise (Russia is the world’s second-largest oil producer).

Russia has successfully cornered the Sudanese market for modern warplanes. In 2001, Russia signed a $120 million deal with Sudan to supply ten MiG-28SE fighters and two MiG-29UB (a dual-seat trainer), which were delivered by 2003-2004 (Kommersant, August 16, 2006).

Sudan took delivery of 12 Russian MiG-29s in July 2004. The delivery was made five months early to avoid potential problems with a UN arms embargo, which was still under debate at the time. The sale was immediately criticized by the United States, which, despite extensive cooperation between the CIA and Sudanese intelligence, officially considers Sudan a sponsor of international terrorism. Asked about reports of the delivery of Russian warplanes to Sudan, a U.S. State Department spokesman replied:

The United States opposes all arms transfers to Sudan, which is a state sponsor of terrorism. Any transfer of lethal military equipment to state sponsors of terrorism is sanctionable under U.S. laws. In addition to U.S. law regarding lethal military equipment transfers to state sponsors of terrorism, the current crisis in Darfur, particularly the continuing violence, is cause for strong opposition to any transfers to Sudan (U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, July 22, 2004).

It is thought the fighters came from a stock of 200 MiG-29s kept at the MiG assembly plant at Lukhovtsy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia was trying to sell these surplus fighters to Algeria and Yemen as well (Moscow Times, July 27, 2004).

Fourteen MiG-29 Fulcrums were supplied to Sudan in 2006, along with Russian trainers, who are rumored to have also flown combat missions against the Darfur rebels. A former Russian air-force pilot was killed when his MiG-29 was shot down on May 10, 2008 during an attack on Omdurman by rebels belonging to Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Echo Moskvy, May 28, 2008; Interfax, May 29, 2008; Sudan Tribune, May 29, 2008).

A Khartoum newspaper, Alwan, was closed by authorities after reporting the loss of the Russian aircraft and pilot. Alwan‘s editor was charged with disclosing “sensitive military information harmful to the country’s security and its accomplishments” (Sudanese Media Center, May 14, 2008; Sudan Tribune, May 16, 2008). There have been reports of Sudanese fighter pilots who (like most of the military) hail from Darfur refusing to carry out missions against the Darfur rebels, creating an urgent need for experienced pilots in the Sudanese air-force (Sudan Tribune, May 30, 2008).

In July 2008, 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum jet fighters were reported to have been shipped either from or through Belarus in cargo planes to a military airbase north of Khartoum (Sudan Tribune, July 21, 2008; RIA Novosti, July 21, 2008). Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport denied supplying the MiG-29s “either directly or indirectly” (Moscow Times, July 23, 2008). A spokesman for the Belarus Ministry of Defense described the reports as a “hoax,” adding; “I do not see a point in commenting on stupidity (Pravda, July 21, 2008).

Most of Sudan’s MiGs are based at Wadi Sayidna military airport, just north of Khartoum. JEM rebels reported attacking the airbase on their way to Omdurman last May, seizing a large quantity of modern arms (Sudan Tribune, May 11, 2008).

The Sudanese Air Force is eager to phase out its half-dozen decrepit Soviet-era Antonov AN-24 and AN-26 transport aircraft, which it has used as modified bombers in South Sudan and Darfur by rolling “barrel bombs” out the cargo door. Many other Soviet-supplied aircraft are at least 40 years old and no longer fit to operate in Sudan’s difficult conditions. A number of Russian-made MiG-23BN fighter-bombers obtained as Libyan surplus have been phased out of service (Kommersant, August 16, 2006).  Russia has the advantage of supplying aircraft that are modern but familiar to Sudanese pilots. Khartoum’s main interest is in ground-attack aircraft, the only use Sudanese warplanes have ever received.

Russia has also supplied Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to replace Sudan’s ancient Soviet-era Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters. Several of these have been spotted in use in Darfur despite being delivered after the UN arms embargo on Darfur. Sudanese military helicopter pilots are trained under contract at the helicopter training center in the Russian town of Torzhok (Tver Oblast).

Russian and Ukrainian crews also operate most of the commercial aircraft in use in Sudan today. In 2005, Antonov opened a large technical maintenance center in Khartoum for the Antonov aircraft already in operation in Sudan and expected new purchases of AN-74s, designed for operation in hot climates (National Radio Company of Ukraine, November 18, 2005).

 

This article was first published in the February 11, 2009 issue of the Eurasia Daily Monitor

Kordofan Oil Operations at Risk as Killings Continue

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Andrew McGregor

November 5, 2008

Right on the heels of the death of five Chinese oil workers in Sudan’s South Kordofan province came news of the murder of three Sudanese oil workers and the abduction of two Yemeni workers in neighboring Unity State. The latest ambush is blamed on individuals from Sudan’s Baqqara (cattle-owning) Arabs, who are also held responsible for the abduction and killing of the Chinese workers (Sudan Times, October 30).

Kordofan oil 1Murdered Chinese Oil Workers are Returned to China

Nine employees of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) were abducted on October 18 while doing contract work for the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). Three were killed on October 27 in an incident described by Chinese authorities as a botched rescue attempt by the Sudanese Armed Forces and by Khartoum as an accident caused when the kidnappers became nervous after a military helicopter began monitoring their movements. Two more workers were found dead in the following days (AFP, October 31). Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi is reported to have told his Sudanese counterpart, “It is one of the most serious killing cases of oversea Chinese workers in recent years and we are very shocked by it” (Sudan Times, October 29). Four remaining workers were hospitalized after being rescued.

Identification of Arab Misseriya tribesmen as the responsible parties seems to have been confirmed by the arrival of a delegation of Misseriya leaders to negotiate the workers’ release and a claim of responsibility from Abu Humaid Ahmad Dannay, a Misseriya who also claims to be the leader of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Kordofan (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 24). Though JEM has repeatedly stated its determination to drive out China’s oil operations, it has denied any participation in the latest abductions through recognized spokesmen. Dannay refuted Khartoum’s description of the abductions as terrorism, stating, “The government is terrorizing us and we will respond in a similar manner.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry has also denounced the kidnappings as “terrorism” while calling for “severe punishment” of those responsible (China Daily, October 29; Xinhua, October 28). Sudanese security forces report they have the names of 25 individuals involved in the abductions, while local reports say the kidnappers are suffering from shortages of food and drinking water (Miriya FM, October 32; November 1).

The government continued to claim that Darfur’s rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was responsible for the abductions until November 1, when Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor identified the suspects as former members of the government’s Popular Defense Forces (PDF) militia who were not integrated into the regular army after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Sudan Tribune, November 1). The PDF in South Kordofan have suffered from a recent decline in funding and numerous defections to the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA).

Kordofan oil 2Misseriya Leaders

Misseriya grievances against Sudan’s growing oil industry include the destruction of pasture land and a preference for employing imported Asian workers instead of hiring locally. Having fought for years on the frontline of the north-south civil war, the Misseriya now feel abandoned by Khartoum. The Misseriya feel that the oil fields of the north-south border region were secured through their efforts, only to now see oil revenues used for the reconstruction of Khartoum while the poverty of South Kordofan remains unchanged. The leadership of the Misseriya is in a state of flux after government efforts to replace traditional leaders who supported Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma party with inexperienced individuals willing to support the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), which is dominated by Arab Islamists from north Sudan. Misseriya gunmen also abducted four Indian oil workers and their Sudanese driver last May.

Continuing attacks on oil workers threaten the development of the petroleum industry in Sudan just as a decline in oil prices and demand is creating a sharp drop in current revenues. The continuing militarization of the oil-producing regions is unlikely to inspire further investment, though China has stated its close economic involvement with Sudan will stay unchanged despite this latest in a series of attacks on Chinese facilities (AP, October 21).

This article first appeared in the November 5, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus