Schism in al-Shabaab Leadership in Somalia Follows Failed Ramadan Offensive

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Andrew McGregor

October 21, 2010

Though denials have been issued, the failure of al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive, intended to rout Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) from Mogadishu, appears to have led to a major rift between the group’s Amir, Shaykh Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr”, and his deputy, Shaykh Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur.”

Mukhtar Robow

Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur”

Though the rivalry between Abu Mansur and Godane goes back some time, it only burst into the open after Abu Mansur’s 1,200 to 2,000 fighters from the southern Bay and Bakool regions began to take heavy losses in the Ramadan offensive. Nearly all of Abu Mansur’s fighters are members of the Digil and Mirifle, known jointly as the Rahanweyn. There are reports of hundreds of deaths and desertions in the Bay-Bakool force, which was apparently pushed into the frontlines of the fighting by northern commanders. Abu Mansur downplayed complaints from his men that they were treated badly by other Shabaab commanders and failed to receive medical treatment when wounded until one of his commanders, Shaykh Ayub, went missing. Eventually Abu Mansur learned from Godane that the Shaykh had been badly wounded and was killed by members of al-Shabaab’s Amniyaat special forces unit (loyal to Godane) to ensure he would die a martyr. This proved the last straw for Abu Mansur, who ordered the withdrawal of his men from the battlefield in Mogadishu (Jowhar, October 8; Wadanka.com, September 28; Suna Times, October 9).

There are questions within al-Shabaab regarding financial improprieties and the appointment of members of Godane’s northern Isaaq clan to vital positions within the movement. A three-day mediation between the two leaders in a hotel in the southern Somali town of Marka failed completely, leading to Abu Mansur’s withdrawal of fighters under his command from Mogadishu (Waagacusub.com, October 1). Godane was supported in the dispute by Shaykh Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani”, another Shabaab commander from the Isaaq clan, who was quoted as saying, “Mukhtar Robow is a transgressor. He is a tribalist. He is nothing. Let him leave” (Jowhar.com, October 8; Wadanka.com, September 28).

According to one report, Abu Mansur made five demands of the Shabaab leadership:

• The resignation of Abdi Godane as the movement’s leader.

• An agreement to allow aid agencies to operate freely in Somalia.

• The disbanding of the Amniyaat Special Forces.

• The launch of an investigation into the death of senior al-Shabaab commanders in the frontlines.

• The dismissal of any al-Shabaab commanders found to be responsible for these deaths (Jowhar.com, October 8).

After TFG and AMISOM forces began making gains in the fighting, Abu Mansur’s forces returned to Mogadishu from the towns of Baidoa and Hudur in the Bay and Bakool regions (New Vision [Kampala], October 5; Dhacdo.com, October 12).  Apparently having made his point that the fighters from these regions were essential to al-Shabaab’s military success, Abu Mansur’s troops were able to help stabilize the frontlines in Mogadishu.

Abu Mansur is reported to have met in Mogadishu with Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of rival Islamist militia Hizb al-Islam, with the two discussing closer ties and a possible alliance against Godane (Markacadey.net, October 10). Abu Mansur was al-Shabaab’s chief negotiator in unification talks with Hizb al-Islam earlier this year that collapsed at the last moment when Godane insisted that Shaykh Aweys’ movement be absorbed into al-Shabaab and operate under that name only. There is speculation that Abu Mansur’s negotiations with Hizb al-Islam were designed to bring the Hawiye clan (which dominates Hizb al-Islam) into his camp, thus creating a powerful coalition against the outsider Abdi Godane, whose Isaaq clan is largely based in breakaway Somaliland and plays a small part in the fighting in south Somalia.

Abu Mansur took to the minbar (pulpit) of a mosque in Mogadishu’s Bakara market on October 8 to deny the reports of the rift (Garowe Online, October 9; Shabelle Media Network, October 9). As if to refute the view of some observers that Abu Mansur is nothing more than a “nationalist in Islamist garb,” the Shabaab deputy leader used the presence of the media to send his greetings to Osama bin Laden, assuring him that al-Shabaab were the students of al-Qaeda. “We are sending a message to our group leader – al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden – that we are still continuing fighting until we join our fellow brothers who were killed by American troops in other countries,” said Abu Mansur (IRIN, October 14; Shabelle Media Network, October 8; Garowe Online, October 9). He then followed his Mogadishu statement with another denial at the Dabaqeynka mosque in Baidoa, where he urged residents of the Bay and Bakool regions to join in the fighting. He described reports of the rift as a fabrication designed to sow suspicion in the ranks of the mujahideen (Somaaljecel.com, October 13).

Abu Mansur’s very public style is at odds with Abdi Godane’s furtiveness. The latter rarely makes public appearances or statements and was widely ridiculed in Somalia after photos appeared on the internet of the Shabaab leader donning women’s clothing as a disguise. One of the major issues between the two men has been Godane’s insistence on banning humanitarian aid agencies from working in Somalia, a ban actively opposed by Abu Mansur and the main reason the latter was relieved of his position as al-Shabaab spokesman last year. Lately the al-Shabaab leadership has even warned Somalis against accepting medical help or pharmaceutical drugs from AMISOM forces, virtually the only source of medical aid for many Somalis caught in war-torn Mogadishu.

It appears the military stalemates in Mogadishu and in Central Somalia against the Sufi Ahlu Sunna wa’l-Jama’a militia have begun to take their toll on the Shabaab leadership, allowing clan rivalries to emerge that were successfully submerged in the movement so long as it continued to gain ground. Godane’s secretive style of leadership and absence from the frontlines does not play well with the Somali fighters under his command, which may leave him perilously short of armed support should Abu Mansur make a play for the leadership.

This article first appeared in the October 21, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Tribal Dispute Makes Oil-Rich Abyei Region Potential Flashpoint for Renewed Sudanese Conflict

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Andrew McGregor

October 4, 2010

The future of the Sudan may lay in Abyei, a relatively small district on the border between Sudan’s North and South. Its status as part of either North or South Sudan will be determined in a plebiscite on January 9, held simultaneously with a referendum in the South that is expected to lead to the secession of the Southern provinces. Though the Abyei region is rich in high-quality crude oil, a conflict with the potential to ignite a new round of civil war may actually be fought over grazing rights.

Ngok DinkaNgok Dinka Leaders

Sitting atop the Muglad Basin, Abyei is one of Sudan’s most productive regions for high-quality oil production.  It is also home to the agricultural Ngok Dinka tribe, closely related to other Dinka clans in the South Sudan. However, for up to eight months a year it is also home to the nomadic Missiriya Arabs, part of the Baqqara (cattle-herding) Arab group that dwells in southern Darfur and southern Kordofan and takes its herds south for precious water and grazing during Sudan’s dry season (Asharq al-Awsat, August 6, 2009).

Abyei’s troubled status began in 1905 when the Anglo-Egyptian administration of Sudan transferred the “area of the nine Ngok Dinka chieftains” from the southern Bahr al-Ghazal province to the northern province of Kordofan. Relations between the Ngok Dinka and the Missiriya were amicable until the outbreak of the 1956-1972 North-South civil war, when the Ngok Dinka sided largely with the southern Anyanya separatist movement. When the war resumed in 1983, the Ngok Dinka again sided with the Southern opposition, this time in the form of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M).

Beginning in 1965, the Missiriya and other Baqqara Arabs were armed by Khartoum, forming mounted units known as the Murahileen. These militias raided the southern civilian population in SPLA-controlled territory, carrying out atrocities and kidnappings with a free hand. Though relations between the southern agriculturalists and the nomadic Arabs had always been uneasy, this strategy opened an irrevocable gulf between the two communities in the Abyei region.

Clashes occurred in the region in 2007 and 2008, when the town of Abyei was effectively razed to the ground by government-allied forces. The borders of Abyei were redrawn by an international arbitration tribunal in 2009 to neither side’s satisfaction, though the most productive oil fields were separated from a diminished Abyei and attached to the northern Kordofan province (RFI, July 22, 2009). The final status of the region is to be determined in a January 2011 referendum to be held simultaneously with the referendum on Southern independence, but a referendum commission has yet to be organized and there are still disputes regarding who is eligible to vote (Sudan Tribune, September 30; PANA Online [Dakar], September 24). With a vote for southern separation looking like a near certainty, the Missiriya fear that they will lose access to their traditional grazing lands. In this sense they are at odds with the National Congress Party of President Omar al-Bashir, which is willing to lose tribal grazing lands in favor of retaining oil fields.

As the plebiscite approaches and the question of whether the Missiriya will be allowed to vote on Abyei’s future remains unresolved, the rhetoric of Missiriya leaders has grown more incendiary. According to Missiriya chief Mukhtar Babo Nimr, “We will use force to achieve our rights and we will use weapons against anyone who tries to stop us from voting in the referendum… If they don’t meet our demands then we will set everything alight. If that leads to war then so be it” (Reuters, September 29). The Missiriya have prevented the demarcation of the new tribunal-ordered borders and the summer was marked by demonstrations organized by both the Njok Dinka and the Missiriya, as well as a number of attacks on villages by gunmen. Arop Madut Arop, a parliamentarian from Abyei, noted the southern peoples of Abyei “may take up arms. Their people in the SPLA/M may defect and go and join them and suddenly the northern army will also come in [and] within a few days, Sudan is back to war” (IRIN, July 8).

This article first appeared in the October 4, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Jihad in the Rasht Valley: Tajikistan’s Security Dilemma

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Andrew McGregor

October 4, 2010

Efforts by Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon to solve his problem with Islamist militants through lengthy sentences for detained opposition members encountered a serious reversal on August 22 when 25 militants made a dramatic escape from a State National Security Committee (SNSC) remand center Tajikistan’s capital city of Dushanbe, killing four guards in the process.

Tajikistan has experienced little internal success since obtaining its independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991. A devastating civil war followed from 1992 to 1997, which provoked the loss of most of Tajikistan’s ethnic Russian and European population, which formed much of the country’s professional and administrative classes. A peace and reconciliation agreement in 1997 promised a new era, but in recent years the regime has expelled most of the former armed Islamist opposition from their posts in the reconciliation government, adding to a wave of unrest fueled by corruption, economic failure and the revival of Islam after decades of Soviet repression.

The Jailbreak

The SNSC remand center in Dushanbe has its own security staff and is located inside a larger remand center operated by the Ministry of Justice. Though the escapees appear to have been in control of the SNSC facility for four hours, they nevertheless took Justice Ministry guards by surprise as they burst out of the SNSC building dressed in regulation camouflage uniforms. One car was commandeered by the fugitives, but it is unclear how the rest escaped through the city without hindrance (Avesta [Dushanbe], August 25).

Rasht Valley 2 Escape Planner Ibrohim Nasriddinov

According to one report, the escapees were able to arm themselves with 20 pistols, seven AK-47 assault rifles, one machine-gun and four grenades (Nigoh [Dushanbe], September 1). Most of the fugitives had been charged with plotting a coup against the state and had been handed stiff sentences of 15 to 30 years imprisonment by Tajikistan’s Supreme Court on August 20.  Unidentified gunmen who were believed to be part of the group of escaped prisoners fought a four-hour gun-battle with Defense Ministry outposts in the Romit Canyon (about 45 km from Dushanbe) on September 3 (Asia-Plus Online [Dushanbe], September 3; Itar-Tass, September 3).

Authorities believe the escape was organized by Ibrohim Nasriddinov, who was serving 23 years for murder and the planning of a terrorist act. Nasriddinov was caught on September 7 (Interfax, September 7). He is frequently identified as a former inmate of Guantanamo Bay although his name does not appear on the official list of prisoners (RFE/RL, August 7, 2007; Itar-Tass, September 7). There were reports that Nasriddinov was treated as a “privileged” prisoner, being allowed to move around the facility freely at night (Asia-Plus Online, September 2). Close relations between prisoners and guards coupled with understaffing (three guards for 90 prisoners) were cited as reasons for the success of the escape (Imruznews [Dushanbe], September 1).

The fugitives included 15 citizens of Tajikistan, five citizens of Russia, four citizens of Afghanistan and two citizens of Uzbekistan (Interfax, September 7; Khovar [Dushanbe], September 24). The two Uzbeks, Furkat Khalmetov and Khamidullo Yuldashov, were convicted of illegal border crossing and participating in an attempt to overthrow the government of Tajikistan, respectively (Itar-Tass, September 24).
A Dagestani escapee, Gusein Sulaymanov, was killed after wounding three policemen in a September 8 raid on a house used by militants (Interfax, September 29). Another escapee, Rahmiddin Azizov, a former Rasht Valley security officer, was killed in an operation in the Fayzobod district (Asia Plus Online, September 27; Interfax, September 29). Rahmiddin was serving a life sentence and was charged with belonging to a militant group led by his brother, Negmat (RIA Novosti, September 26).

Most of the fugitives were seized in last year’s Operation Kuknor (“Poppy”) and are alleged to have been former loyalists of Lieutenant General Mirzo Ziyoev, the military commander of the Tajik Islamists in the civil war who was given a high military rank and his own paramilitary in the reconciliation that followed the war (Itar-Tass, September 2). He was dismissed in 2006 and accused of having joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an assertion that was quickly denied by late IMU leader Tahir Yuldash (RFE/RL Uzbek Service, July 16, 2009; Ferghana.ru, July 16, 2009). Ziyoev was captured by security forces on July 11, 2009 and died later that day in crossfire between security forces and a group of militants (Millat [Dushanbe], July 23; al-Jazeera, July 16, 2009; IWPR, July 23, 2009).

Though some escapees were thought to be headed to the Afghanistan border, most were believed to be on their way to the eastern Tavildara district, where they were apprehended in a military sweep last year.

The Dagestan Connection

One of four Dagestanis involved in the escape, Magomet Ahkmadov was named as one of the three men who led the breakout by killing four guards and wounding two others (Interfax, August 24). The other leaders included Mirzomen Abiyev, Kazbek Dzhabailov, and Gusein Sulaymonov, who was later killed in a gunfight with police (Interfax, September 29).

Another Dagestani, Ahmad Sultanov, was sentenced to nine years in prison only days after the prison break for “circulating extremist ideas” and making calls for jihad. Sultanov is an alleged member of Dagestan’s Shari’a Jamaat, one of the most active armed Islamist groups in the North Caucasus (Itar-Tass, August 27).

The Ambush in the Kamarob Gorge

Using grenades and automatic weapons, an unidentified militant group ambushed a military convoy in the Kamarob gorge of eastern Tajikistan, about 260 km from Dushanbe, on September 19. The attack killed at least 28 soldiers and left many more wounded, leaving the government to suspect experienced guerrilla leaders like Mirzokhuja Ahmadov (a.k.a. “Belgi”), Abdullo Rakhimov and Alovudin Davlatov (a.k.a. Ali Bedak) of responsibility for the assault. Later reports put the death toll at 40 of the total 75 man detachment (RIA Novosti, September 20). The Tajik Defense Ministry insisted fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya were part of the ambush force (Itar-Tass, September 26).

Tajik security officials identified Abdullo Rakhimov (better known as “Mullo Abdullo”) as the main suspect, and a later video message from an IMU spokesman claimed responsibility on behalf of the movement, which has had little presence outside the northwest frontier region of Pakistan since 2001. Issued by Abdufattokh Ahmadi, the message said the attack was a response to several issues, including the closure of “thousands” of mosques, unreasonable detention of Muslims, a prohibition on headscarves, and government cooperation with the United States and NATO against Afghanistan’s Muslims (Radio Liberty Tajik Service, September 23; Ferghana.ru, September, 24).

Calls for the resignation of the Tajik defense minister followed criticism that the army consisted of poorly-trained and poorly-supplied workers and farmers, many of whom are young and without military experience (Farazh [Dushanbe], September 22; Chark-i Gardun [Dushanbe], September 22). Last June the United States announced it would build a $10 million Counterterrorism Training Center at Qarotogh in Tajikistan’s Shahrinav District, pending an agreement with the Tajikistan government. Both Washington and Dushanbe have made it clear that the center will train only Tajik soldiers and will not house American military personnel. U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, told reporters on September 1 that the United States had no intention of establishing a military presence in Tajikistan (Interfax, September 7).

Tajik Military Operations Following the Kamorab Gorge Ambush

Two days after the ambush in the Kamorab Gorge, government troops began searching houses in the Rasht Valley belonging to former members of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), the leading opposition front in the civil war. Security forces encountered resistance at the home of Mirzokhuja Ahmadov, where five of Ahmadov’s followers were killed in a gunfight. Security forces reported seizing assault rifles, grenade launchers, mines and three completed bombs containing nearly 20 kg of explosives (RIA Novosti, September 23). Ahmadov himself was not found at the scene and his whereabouts remain unknown. The former Islamist warlord was formerly head of the government’s organized crime unit in the Rasht Valley following post-civil war reintegration efforts. An attempt to arrest him in 1998 resulted in the shooting death of Oleg Zakharchenko, chief of Tajikistan’s OMON police unit, by one of Ahmadov’s men. Government officials have accused Ahmadov of sheltering Mullo Abdullo in his home since the latter’s return from Afghanistan (RFE/RL, September 28). The government attack reportedly prompted another former opposition commander, Shoh Iskandarov, to join the militants in the mountains (RFE/RL, September 22).

Rasht Valley 3Rasht Valley

The raid on Ahmadov’s residence came only a week after Defense Minister Sherali Khayrulloev, Interior Minister Abdurahim Qahhorov and SCNS Deputy Leader Mansurjon Umarov met with Ahmadov and Iskandarov to assure them military operations in the Rasht Valley were intended only to apprehend Mullo Abdullo (RFE/RL, September 15). There were also rumors that the ministers had asked for the ex-warlords’ cooperation in hunting down Mullo Abdullo. The ambush in the Kamarob Gorge appears to have led to a turnabout in government policy. According to an Interior Ministry spokesman, two more members of Ahmadov’s group were detained without resistance on September 29, but many other suspected members of Ahmadov’s group might be released due to lack of evidence (RFE/RL, September 29).

The pursuit of the spectral Mullo Abdullo, who largely disappeared from view after reports he was captured by government forces in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province in 2002, and who may or may not have returned to the Rasht Valley last year, consumes much of the efforts of Tajikistan’s security forces and provides a convenient bogeyman for government use. Mullo Abdullo has not been seen in Tajikistan since September 2000, when a government offensive destroyed most of his group. Mullo Abdullo’s wife claims she does not know the whereabouts of her husband and does not believe he was responsible for the ambushed convoy (Asia-Plus Online, September 27).

Continuing military operations are being led by the chief of the Tajik General Staff, Ramil Nadyrov, and are reported to involve Tajik Special Forces and helicopter gunships (Itar-Tass, September 30; AFP, September 20). Rumors of Russian intervention in the form of troops or helicopters from the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division base in Tajikistan began circulating after several alleged sightings in early September, but both Tajik and Russian sources denied the involvement of Russian personnel in the counterterrorist operations (Avesta, September 8; Itar-Tass, September 30). The 201st Division is permanently based in Tajikistan where it has been responsible for guarding the border with Afghanistan against militant incursions since 2001. While some Tajiks suspected Russian involvement in the hunt for the fugitives, others accused Russian or other “foreign forces” of engineering the escape (Farazh [Dushanbe], September 1; Millat [Dushanbe], September 1).

The mass escape, both alarming and humiliating, resulted in quick changes to the nation’s security leadership. Colonel-General Khairidin Abdurakhimov was relieved of his duties as head of the State National Security Committee (SNSC) “at his own request” and was replaced by Saimumin Yatimov, a former diplomat who became involved in state security matters in 2000 (Asia Plus Online, September 2; Interfax, September 7). All other top officials of the SNSC were dismissed, as well (Itar-Tass, September 2).

The Khudzhand Suicide Bombing

A rare Tajik suicide car-bombing on September 3 targeted a regional police unit in the northern town of Khudzhand (350 km north of Dushanbe), killing at least two policemen and injuring nearly two dozen others (Interfax, September 3; September 7; Asia-Plus Online, September 3; Avesta, September 3; Daydzhest Press [Dushanbe], September 9). Authorities blamed the IMU, but responsibility for the attack was later claimed by a previously unknown group calling itself Jamaat Ansarullah. The claim suggested the assailants were local in origin; “The operation was carried out in response to the killing and humiliation of our brothers and ordinary Muslims behind the walls of that God-damned place” (Kavkaz-Tsentr, September 8). A representative of Tajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was hesitant in accepting the claim, saying “enemies of Islam” invent organizations with Arab names to tie Muslims to acts of violence. “As far as we know, there is no such organization even among banned religious organizations in our country. I even doubt that it exists in the world,” stated the IRP representative (Asia-Plus Online, September 11).

A September 5 explosion at a Dushanbe disco that wounded seven people was at first believed to be an attack by radical Islamists, but investigations revealed the blast was the result of “gross misconduct by visitors using pyrotechnics” (Interfax, September 7).

Taliban on the Border

On September 10, a Tajik border patrol encountered what they described as a large group of Islamist fighters, including Afghan Taliban, trying to cross the border from Afghanistan. A firefight lasting nearly 24 hours ensued, with the border police eventually driving off the Taliban incursion. Authorities claimed one officer and 20 Taliban were killed. Though only seven Taliban bodies were recovered, officials said the rest were observed being put into the river by their former comrades to be carried away. The battle took place roughly 210 km south of Dushanbe on the banks of the River Pyandzh and on a number of islands in the river occupied by Taliban fighters (Reuters, September 11; AFP, September 13).

Response from the Legal Islamist Opposition

In an effort to curb extremism, President Emomali Rahmon has asked parents to arrange for the return of their children studying at Islamic institutions abroad, claiming they were being trained as “extremists and terrorists” (Asia-Plus Online, August 30). The request proved highly controversial and brought pointed criticism from the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party (the only legal Islamic party in Tajikistan) (Asia-Plus Online, August 26).

The IRP responded to the new violence by issuing a call for national unity and a halt in the process of destabilization (Ozodagon [Dushanbe], September 22). Party leader Muhiddin Kabiri said his appeals to the government to open discussions with the militant opposition had fallen on deaf ears and led to the current violence (Najot [Dushanbe], September 23). Kabiri maintains that moderates form the majority in Tajikistan, but both the secular government and the armed Islamist opposition are now dominated by extremists. The government has jailed more than 100 members of banned Islamic groups in the last year alone. Kabiri’s views on the violence were sought by assistant to the U.S. secretary of state on South and Central Asia Robert Blake during a recent two-day visit to Dushanbe (Vecherniy Dushanbe, September 7).

Conclusion

It is difficult to get a clear picture of the security picture in Tajikistan. Foreign press reports are quick to work al-Qaeda into their headlines, with reports suggesting all of Tajikistan’s militants are somehow operatives of that organization. Tajik authorities prefer to blame their troubles on a revival of the IMU in Tajikistan or alternatively to blame Islamist opponents of the government who have already been subject to a campaign of marginalization for some years. The possible emergence of new groups such as the Jamaat Ansarullah and the pursuit of shadowy figures such as Mullo Abdullo tend to confuse the picture even more. Along the frontier with Afghanistan there is the risk of fugitive militants escaping across the border to join the Taliban while other groups of Taliban are apparently trying to make their way into Tajikistan. Presenting its troubles in the framework of the “war on terrorism” allows the Dushanbe government to avoid discussions of official nepotism, corruption and inefficiency as factors causing unrest in the country.

The small number of militants active in Tajikistan does not pose an existential threat to the nation, as some have suggested. They have little influence outside the Rasht Valley and do not enjoy the levels of popular support the armed opposition had in the 1990s. However, economic stagnation and the continuing marginalization of all types of political opposition threaten to create the conditions in which militant groups could flourish, especially those offering an Islamic solution to Tajikistan’s problems in harmony with the nation’s ongoing grass-roots Islamic revival.

This article first appeared in the October 4, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

PKK Commander Suggests Kurdish Alignment with Israel against Turkey

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Andrew McGregor

October 4, 2010

KarayilanMurat Karayilan

PKK Commander Murat Karayilan compared the situation of Turkey’s Kurds to the Jewish Holocaust in a public appeal to Israel to ally itself with the radical Kurdish nationalist movement against the Turkish state. The appeal was made in a recent interview with an Israeli journalist that was later broadcast on Israel’s Channel 2 Television (Haaretz, September 22):

More than any other people in the world, I would have expected Israel to understand and identify with us. After all, you, who have experienced the Holocaust, massacres, expulsions and persecution, now see our people, the Kurdish people, experiencing that same fate. Everyone in this area – Syrians, Turks and Iranians – wants and is trying to destroy us, and you, of all people, are the ones providing them with the weapons to destroy us.

Karayilan was interviewed at a secret hideout in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, close to the border with Iran. With PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan confined to a Turkish prison, Karayilan has emerged as the effective leader of the Kurdish cross-border insurgency. Ocalan was seized in Nairobi in 1999, allegedly by a team of Israeli Mossad agents who turned the PKK leader over to Turkish security services (Daily Nation [Nairobi], February 27). Since then, however, there has been a general belief in Turkey that Israel has provided arms and training to PKK and Peshmerga fighters in northern Iraq. An Israeli commando team involved in training Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in northern Iraq was forced to withdraw in 2005 after their presence was made public, but recent reports indicate Israeli military trainers have returned to the region (Yedioth Ahronoth, December 1, 2005; Ynet, December 1, 2005; Arutz Sheva, February 5; Today’s Zaman, June 9).

Despite this belief, one of the PKK commander’s main concerns was the supply of Israeli-made Heron class unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the Turkish military. The UAVs have been highly effective in locating PKK positions in difficult terrain for targeting by Turkish forces (see Terrorism Focus Briefs, April 1, 2008). Karayilan remarked of the change in relations:

Once we were friends. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel went out of its way to assist the Kurds. We admired you. But since the 1980s, from the moment you tightened your relationship, and your military cooperation, with Turkey, you have been considered here to be among those who systematically assist in our oppression and eradication… It is clear and natural to us that there should be relations between Israel and Turkey. Why not? But why should these relations come at our expense, at the expense of our lives? I wonder if Israelis are at all aware of the use that is made of the weapons and training they provide to Turkey.

Israel has not made an official statement on Karayilan’s interview, but an Israeli diplomat requesting anonymity told a Turkish daily, “The Israeli position is known and clear. We see the PKK as a terrorist organization and we support the Turkish fight against terror” (Today’s Zaman, September 22).

Despite what seemed to be a vicious public disagreement between Israel and Turkey following the May 31 Israeli commando raid on a Turkish ship carrying aid to Gaza, diplomatic and military officials worked behind the scenes to ensure economic and military ties remained relatively undamaged by the feud (Hurriyet, September 22; see Terrorism Monitor Briefs,  June 12). Karayilan, however, attempted to exploit the rift:

More than any other Turkish head of state, this prime minister, [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, openly shows how he is tightening relations with Hezbollah and Syria. He hugs [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad and praises Hamas. Are you sure this is your friend?

An important ministerial summit between Turkey and Syria is scheduled for October 2-3, with terrorism expected to be one of the principal topics of discussion. Turkey is intent on improving economic relations with Syria and has already received Syrian support on the PKK issue (Hurriyet, September 28). However, the May 31 incident brought an abrupt end to Turkish efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel. Turkish interior minister Besir Atalay is also expected to meet soon with his counterparts in Syria and Iran to discuss the PKK threat.

Only a few days before Karayilan’s interview was broadcast, three PKK members were reported arrested in the port city of Jounieh by Lebanon’s Military Intelligence on charges of spying for Israel (Journal of the Turkish Weekly, September 23). Lebanon has arrested over 70 people on suspicion of spying for Israel since April 2009 (AFP, September 24).

This article first appeared in the October 4, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Puntland’s Shaykh Muhammad Atam: Clan Militia Leader or al-Qaeda Terrorist?

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Andrew McGregor

September 29, 2010

No roads penetrate the mountains of the Galgala district of Puntland’s Bari Region. Though it lies almost directly south of the steamy and bustling port of Bosaso, Puntland’s commercial capital, the moderate climate and cave-riddled hills of the relatively inaccessible Galgala region form a natural base for guerrilla operations. Control of the area has become a source of conflict in recent years after mineral exploration efforts uncovered a rich trove of various minerals in high demand on international markets.

Puntland MapEfforts by the regional administration of Puntland (a semi-autonomous region of Somalia) to introduce resource exploitation into the area has resulted in a local resistance movement that may have morphed into an Islamist jihadi movement under the command of local Islamist Shaykh Muhammad Sa’id “Atam.” Puntland declared regional autonomy in 1998 to create a stable administration separate from the political chaos and violence engulfing Mogadishu and southern Somalia. The administration is dominated by the Majarteen clan.

Shaykh Atam’s Background

Shaykh Atam, a member of Puntland’s minority Warsangeli clan (a branch of the Darod), is alleged to have been part of the al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) forces under Shaykh Muhammad Haji Yusuf that fought the Ethiopian military incursion in southern Somalia’s Gedo region in 1996 (Frontier FM [Nairobi], August 13). As well as being a respected Islamic scholar, Shaykh Atam has been described as educated, disciplined and charismatic. His native Galgala region was once part of the Warsangeli Sultanate that ruled the area from the 13th to 19th centuries.

A known arms-dealer believed to have ties with the arms trade in Yemen, Shaykh Atam equipped a local armed group that resisted efforts by Australian firm Range Resources to carry out resource exploration in the Galgala region in 2006. The ad hoc militia succeeded in driving the exploration company and its security services guard from the area. Shaykh Atam has maintained his militia since and is reported to wield influence in the area through funds provided by arms sales, his advocacy of Shari’a and his ability to play on clan differences with Puntland’s majority Majarteen clan to alienate locals from the regional administration, which normally has only the slightest presence in the area (Reuters, July 28). Shaykh Atam’s militia is sometimes referred to locally as the “Natural Resource Troops” or “The Defenders of Sanaag Resources” (Galgala News Agency, July 31; August 17).

A report issued by the UN Monitoring Group in Somalia in 2008 claimed that information had been received indicating that Shaykh Atam was “aligned with al-Shabaab and may take instructions from Shabaab leader Fu’ad Muhammad Khalaf “Shangole.” The reports also suggested that his forces received supplies of weapons from Yemen and Eritrea. [1]

Clashes Begin

On July 26 Shaykh Atam’s forces attacked Puntland security checkpoints in the Karin district of the Bari region, killing one soldier. Security forces responded with a mass attack on insurgent bases in the mountains (Radio Gaalkacyo, July 26). The next day, Shaykh Atam told a news conference that he intended to continue fighting until his movement took control of the Puntland commercial center of Bosaso and implemented Shari’a there (Radio Shabelle, July 27). He also said the attack was a response to the regional administration’s blockade of supplies to the region (Radio Garowe, July 29).

Shaykh Atam’s militia clashed with security forces again on August 8 (Miisaanka.com, August 9). Al-Shabaab media relayed a report from the militants that claimed the capture of ten named members of the security services (Radio Andalus, August 8). Heavy fighting continued on August 9 near the Galgala town of Karin, with a reported 18 insurgents killed and some 20 wounded security personnel and insurgents arriving at a Bosaso hospital for treatment (Radio Horseed, August 9; Dayniile Online, August 10). General Abdisamad Ali Shire, commander of the Puntland security operations in the region, vowed to crush the insurgents, but military moves to secure important roads in Bosaso led to rumors that Shaykh Atam’s forces had already entered the city (Shacabkha.net, August 9; Somali Memo, August 9). While General Ali Shire issued threats, Puntland Security Minister Yusuf Ahmad Khayre was offering an amnesty to the insurgents if they would withdraw from the fighting even as other government officials said the fighting was spreading to other villages (Dayniile Online, August 10; Horseed Radio, August 9). Shaykh Atam told a sympathetic media source; “We are not here to provoke anyone; however, if the forces in western Bari Region attempt to provoke us with an attack, we will teach them a lesson” (Dayniile Online, August 10).  By August 11, senior Puntland commanders were claiming to have seized the last of Shaykh Atam’s bases, though one of his lieutenants, Abdikarim Ahmad Beynah, insisted that the militants were in fact besieging the security forces (AFP, August 11). Shaykh Atam also accused the security forces of burning farms and torturing residents (Dayniile Online, August 10).

While traditional elders in the Bari region tried to mediate between the regional administration and Shaykh Atam’s group at first, the heavy-handed response of the security services (including the burning of farms and forcing women to remove the jilbab, an Islamic covering that reveals only the face and hands) led some elders to call for an uprising against the regional administration by mid-August (Shabelle Media Network, August 16).

Fighting flared up again on August 20 when Shaykh Atam’s fighters launched an attack on security forces inside Galgala village (Mareeg.com, August 20). Additional forces and weapons belonging to the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS) and the Puntland Paramilitary were rushed to the Galgala region on August 22 while a committee of elders attempted to restart peace negotiations (Voice of Mudug, August 22; Galgala News Agency, August 26). Apparent differences with the government over the conduct of the fighting in the Galgala mountains led to the resignation of Puntland military chief Colonel Sa’id Abdi Farah “Tutaweyne” (Radio Gaalkacyo, August 22; Raxanreeb, August 22). After a brief lull, ten officers and civilians were killed in a new outbreak of fighting in the Bari region on September 12 (Mareeg.com, September 13).

Tactics

A report on a pro-Islamist website pointed out that the Puntland forces from Garowe and Bosaso lacked the necessary “skill, patience and special training” to fight effectively in the mountains of the Bari region, elements possessed by Shaykh Atam’s local forces, well trained in guerrilla warfare (Somali Memo, August 13). It was an assessment shared by Shaykh Atam in a mid-August interview; “I am operating from my backyard [laughing] and thanks to God none of our militiamen was hurt. These people [i.e. the security forces] are moving like animals, firing blank shots while we are firm on the ground because we know the terrain. We do not just fire unless we are sure of what we are firing at… The people who are fighting are members of the local community who took up arms against injustice of displacement, burning down houses, killing the young and the elderly as well as poisoning wells and other sources of water” (Frontier FM [Nairobi], August 13).

Puntland 1Puntland Government Troops on Operations in Galgala

After losing his main bases to Puntland security forces, Shaykh Atam announced a change in tactics on August 14. Rather than trying to defend static positions, the insurgents would now rely on “hit and run methods” (Radio Gaalkacyo, August 14). An example of the new tactic had already been displayed two days earlier, when a hit and run attack on a Puntland security forces base in Bari region was repulsed with the loss of two government soldiers and at least four insurgents (AFP, August 13). Shaykh Atam’s militia typically deploys small arms, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. It has also used improvised explosive devises (EIDs) to harass security forces and interfere with their supply lines (Shabelle Media Network, August 17; Raxanreeb.com, August 25; Somaliland Press, August 20).

A Battle for Resources?

The current conflict in Galgala has its roots in a 2006 effort by the regional administration to begin resource exploration in the area without local consultation and outside of any existing constitutional framework for such activities. Armed resistance led by Shaykh Atam to attempts by Puntland security forces to force their way into the area led to numerous deaths and the withdrawal of the Range Resources exploration team.

The region was the subject of intense exploration efforts in the early 1990s by Conoco and Phillips Petroleum, but the dissolution of effective government in Somalia after the overthrow of President Si’ad Barre in 1991 led to these firms abandoning their concessions.

Australia’s Range Resources signed a controversial exploration deal with the Puntland administration of Mohamud Muse Hersi “Adde” in 2005. A dispute with then-TFG President and Puntland native Abdullahi Yusuf over the legality of other Puntland resource deals led to the resignation of TFG Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Gedi in October 2007.Yusuf had at first said Puntland had no authority to negotiate such deals outside the framework of the TFG, but a reversal in his stance led to the dispute with Gedi. The resource deals played a large part in the brief creation of the self-proclaimed Warsangeli-dominated Maakhir State (based roughly on the borders of the old Warsangeli Sultanate) between 2007 and 2009.

After being repulsed by the Galgala militia, Range Resources brought in Canadian-owned Africa Oil Corporation (formerly Canmex) as a joint-venture partner in developing Puntland’s oil and mineral wealth in 2007. The election of Abdirahman Muhammad Farole, an Australian citizen, as Puntland’s president in January 2009 marked the beginning of Range Resource’s renewed efforts to conduct oil and mineral exploration operations in Puntland.

Galgala and other parts of the Bari region are above the Majiyahan Ta-Sn Deposit, a zone rich in minerals such as Albite, Quartz, Microcline, Tantalite, Tapiolite, Cassiterite, Spodumene and Muscovite. Some of these minerals are used to produce highly pure concentrations of lithium carbonate, a key component of batteries.

In May 2008 there were reports that the foreign exploration firms had assembled their own 250-man militia, armed with 50 of Somalia’s ubiquitous “technicals,” armored pick-up trucks equipped with a heavy machine gun or anti-aircraft weapons on the flatbed (Garowe Online, May 21, 2008).

The Regional Response

Though the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu has expressed alarm over the outbreak of violence in Galgala, it has no forces available to assist in the repression of Shaykh Atam’s movement. TFG Minerals and Water Resources Minister Abdi Hasan Awale Qeybdid suggested instead that the government-aligned Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a Sufi militia send forces to the region (Markacadey.net, August 9). TFG Member of Parliament Asha Ahmad Abdalla claimed that President Farole was conducting atrocities in his effort to secure Galgala’s mineral resources, for which he had already accepted payment from Western companies. She also accused the TFG of sending arms to the Puntland security forces to assist in this campaign (Dayniile Online, August 16).

Somaliland’s Interior Minister, Dr. Muhammad Abdi Gabose, declared that Somaliland (a self-declared but unrecognized state neighboring Puntland) had not devised a strategy to deal with the Galgala militants, whom he described as “a threat to Somaliland whether they are defeated by Puntland or not… If they are defeated, their remnants can commit acts of terrorism inside Somaliland” (Garowe Online, September 8). The Minister’s remarks indicated that Hargeisa regards the militants as an outgrowth of the Islamist insurgency in southern Somalia rather than a home-grown resistance to efforts by the Puntland administration to exploit the resources of the Galgala region. Even though Somaliland is engaged in a low-level border conflict with Puntland over the city of Los Anod and the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, Abdi Gabose also appealed for greater security cooperation with Puntland (Garowe Online, August 13; Somalimirror, August 14). Somaliland claims Galgala is part of its eastern Sanaag province, a claim locals have used to assert that the Puntland administration is attempting to operate in areas outside its jurisdiction (Somaliland Press, February 15; August 20).

Addis Ababa regards Shaykh Atam’s forces as a wing of al-Shabaab; according to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “The ongoing fighting between Puntland forces and al-Shabaab is an indication that the threat posed by this group is not just limited to southern Somalia regions but to other parts of the country that are peaceful.” The ministry urged Puntland and Somaliland to cooperate in forming “a powerful force” to fight al-Shabaab (Dayniile Online, August 18).

Despite claims that the administration has Galgala under control, President Farole has also appealed for international assistance in putting down the revolt; “This war terrorists have launched on Puntland today will not be limited to this region. If the international community does not assist us, the war will spread all over the region. Indeed it has already reached Kampala” (AFP, July 26). Shaykh Atam has mocked President Farole’s requests; “He pleaded that the international community and women take up arms… We are self-sufficient and God is our shepherd because we have been attacked without provocation” (Dayniile Online, August 10). He suggested Ethiopia had denied a request by Farole for the intervention of the hated Ethiopian military; “Farole went looking for additional forces from the Ethiopian colonizers but they rejected his requests for fear that they might be afflicted with painful lessons similar to the ones in southern Somalia where they were engaged in jihad. We are now undertaking a jihad similar to that one and we will defend ourselves from anyone that attacks us” (Dayniile Online, August 16).

The Puntland Intelligence Service

The Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS), led by Colonel Ali Muhammad Yusuf “Binge,” is the strongest armed group in Puntland and has taken the lead in the fighting in Galgala. The security force is largely drawn from the Osman Mahmoud subclan of the Majerteen and was established in 2001. It has been a frequent target of suicide-bombings and assassinations directed by al-Shabaab, which intends to extend its influence into Puntland. The PIS owes much of its prominence in Puntland’s power structure to aid and assistance provided by the United States and Western intelligence agencies. In addition it is alleged to receive 50% of the state budget. It has been frequently accused of inciting clan warfare between Majarteen and Warsangeli in the Bosaso region and acting in a provocative fashion towards leaders of the Islamic community (Puntlandpost, March 25, 2009).  In April 2009 the newly elected Abdirahman Muhammad Farole ordered the PIS to shut down its Bosaso office after numerous public complaints, but the PIS obtained an extension (Garowe Online, April 29, 2009). The clashes in Galgala will help cement the PIS presence in the region. The PIS is unpopular in Bosaso, where residents commonly refer to it as “Ashahaada la dirir,” i.e. “Those who fight against the unity of God” (Hiraan Online, August 18).

Farole has struggled since his election to establish his dominance over the powerful PIS. Matters came to a head in March when the President ordered the sacking of the PIS leader since 2004, Osman Abdullahi “Diyane.” [2] There were suggestions that Farole suspected Diyane of using his contacts with Western intelligence agencies to provide damaging information regarding Farole’s links to Puntland-based piracy to the United Nations. To emphasize his reforms of the organization, Farole also decreed that the PIS would be henceforth named the Puntland Intelligence Agency/Puntland Security Force (PIA/PSF) (Somaliland Press, March 14).  However, this rather unwieldy moniker has failed to catch on and the organization is still commonly referred to as the PIS.

The PIS has also cooperated with Ethiopian security services by arresting and handing over leading members of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnic-Somali separatist movement that has traditionally used Puntland as a cross-border refuge (Garowe Online, April 25, 2008; May 4, 2008).

The Information War

The director of Bosaso’s Radio Horseed, Abdifatah Jama Mire, was sentenced to six years in jail and a fine of $500 in August as a penalty for “interviewing and broadcasting views of people who are fighting the government” after conducting an interview with Shaykh Atam. Prosecutors had only asked for a three-year jail term (National Union of Somali Journalists, Nusoj.org, August 14). Abdifatah, who was not allowed legal representation, pointed out that an interactive interview with Shaykh Atam broadcast on the Paltalk network had already covered much of the same ground and had even been quoted by Puntland authorities to support their position that Atam was connected to al-Shabaab (Shabelle Media Network, September 4; Garowe Online, August 14).

On August 15, Puntland Information Minister Abdihakim Ahmad Guled banned local media from interviewing leaders of the insurgency or even commenting on official news reports of the fighting (Radio Gaalkacyo, August 16). VOA reporter Nuh Muse Birjeb was also banned from the region after interviewing Shaykh Atam. [3]

Al-Shabaab media outlets have taken up the cause of Shaykh Atam’s movement and its fight against “the apostate militia group that works for the Christian government of Ethiopia [i.e. the Puntland security forces]” (Radio Andalus, August 8).

Shaykh Atam – an Associate of al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda?

Soon after the fighting in Galgala began, al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage “Ali Dheere” announced that Shaykh Atam’s militia had no connection to al-Shabaab and consisted solely of local people; “It should not be [the case] that every time a group of Muslims fight against current regimes that they should be said to be part of al-Shabaab” (VOA Somali Service, July 29). Shaykh Atam also denied any involvement of al-Shabaab at the time.

A UN Secretary-General’s report earlier this month described the Galgala militants as “a clan militia… believed to have close connections to al-Shabaab.” The Puntland press presented this as validation of the government’s claims the insurgency in Bari region was being orchestrated by al-Shabaab (Garowe Online, September 15). [4]

Puntland administration security advisor Ahmad Husayn announced on August 13 that the administration had evidence that foreign fighters had joined Shaykh Atam’s group, but did not provide any proof (Radio Gaalkacyo, August 13). Shaykh Atam has denied the presence of any foreign fighters in his group at almost every opportunity. One recent report claimed hundreds of Islamist fighters from southern Somalia had arrived in Bosaso to join the fight against the Puntland government, though this could not be verified (Dayniile Online, September 17).

Shaykh Atam has also received verbal support from Somalia’s Hizb al-Islam militia. The chairman of Hizb al-Islam in the Banaadir region (which includes Mogadishu), Ma’allin Hashi Farah, issued a statement on August 12 calling on “the mujahideen, wherever they are, to support their brother Shaykh Atam, who is battling Puntland. I encourage fighters loyal to Hizb al-Islam to travel there” (Kismaayo News Online, August 12; Dayniile Online, August 12).

Shaykh Atam claims that the people of his region have never had any relations with the Puntland administration, which he regards as an “apostate party.” It was their decision to “invade” Galgala that led to the fighting – he and his militia have no responsibility for the conflict. Shaykh Atam’s explanation of the fighting has little of the incendiary Islamist rhetoric that pervades al-Shabaab’s provocative insistence on the conquest of areas of Somalia outside their control in the interest of forming an Islamic Caliphate. According to Shaykh Atam; “Our interest is to defend ourselves. Any Muslim person would love to live in freedom and with his religion – and also to defend yourself against any enemy that invades you… We are not intending to invade anyone; however, we have been invaded and we also defended ourselves and we will continue fighting” (BBC Somali.com, August 10). Puntland’s General Abdullahi Ahmad Ja’amah “Ilka Jiir” denied claims the administration was fighting clan militias in Galgala; “We are fighting terrorists and the people must understand that the government is there to defend them from any attack (Garowe Online, August 21).

While Shaykh Atam denies the Puntland administration’s so-far unsubstantiated claims of the presence of al-Qaeda members and foreign fighters in his militia, he has made his own claims of an American and Ethiopian presence in the Puntland security forces attacking the area. In particular he says three American officials arrived in the wake of the Puntland security forces to take pictures of the battle-sites, including damaged mosques, madrassas and an Islamic library burned down by Puntland forces (BBC Somali.com, August 10; Dayniile Online, August 10).

Shaykh Atam has been vague about his relationship to al-Shabaab, making any possible relationship to the movement more a matter of interpretation than assertion. Typical is his response to a BBC Somali service reporter’s question regarding his ties to al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda:

There is nothing like that. Al-Shabaab has already said that we have no relations except the Islamic brotherhood ties between us… We are Muslims and if being a Muslim [means] you are a member of al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda – so be it. We are Muslims, who are opposed to those against the religion… Our ideology is based on Islam. We never carried guns to fight – but we were invaded and forced to fight” (BBC Somali.com, August 10).

The Shaykh was a bit more explicit in a Paltalk teleconference but still stopped short of clearly identifying his group as a wing of al-Shabaab; “We are al-Shabaab and al-Shabaab are us; we are joined in the same struggle to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia” (Horseed Media, July 27).

Conclusion

Shaykh Atam’s revolt may be viewed as an example of a clan-based conflict over resources quickly evolving into an Islamist insurgency under the political/religious conditions developed during the “war on terrorism.” Though the conflict may have local origins, as an Islamist seeking the rule of Shari’a in the Galgala region, Shaykh Atam may find natural ideological if not material allies in al-Shabaab. There is little evidence yet to suggest that the Galgala rebellion is a new front in al-Shabaab’s struggle to bring the northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland under its control, but folding the conflict into the larger “war on terrorism” allows the Puntland administration to use extraordinary measures to consolidate its control of the region without fear of international approbation.

Shaykh Atam’s belief that the regional administration of Puntland is apostate and in need of elimination places him firmly in the takfiri camp of the Salafi-Jihadist movement that includes al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. The shift from local militia to Islamist movement leaves little room for reconciliation with the Puntland administration. According to Shaykh Atam; “We can only engage in talk with Muslims who believe in the one God and in Prophet Muhammad as his messenger, but anti-Islamic people are apostates. The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) said that whoever changes his religion should be fought” (Frontier FM, August 13).

Notes

  1. Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia submitted in accordance with resolution 1811 (2008), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement
  2. Presidential Decree No. 27, March 12, 2010, http://www.puntland-gov.net/viewnews.asp?nwtype=News&nid=News201331312101644706
  3. VOA Somali, August 10, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/somali/news/somali/Attam-oo-ka-hadlay-qabsashada-Galgala-100346509.html
  4. For the Secretary-General’s report, see http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-89AUFT?OpenDocument

 

This article first appeared in the September 29, 2010 issue of Militant Leadership Monitor

Egyptian Islamic Group Ideologist Dr. Najih Ibrahim Says Time Is Not Right for Islamists to Seize Power

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Andrew McGregor

September 23, 2010

Dr. Najih Ibrahim, the principal theorist of Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (GI – Islamic Group), has outlined a new future for the GI, Egypt’s most notorious terrorist group in the 1990s and the domestic movement of many Egyptian extremists who went on to form the core leadership of al-Qaeda.

Najih IbrahimDr. Najih Ibrahim

A founding member of the movement, Najih Ibrahim, was released from prison in 2006 in a mass release of 1200 GI members from Egyptian jails. His release followed a 2003 decision by the movement to renounce political violence and the initiation of the “Revisions project”, led by imprisoned GI leader Sayed Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl), once a close associate of al-Qaeda’s Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Revisions project has now spread to other parts of the Arab world, as imprisoned Islamists re-examine their advocacy of political violence and terrorism. Najih Ibrahim discussed the implications of the recent death of Egyptian state security officer, Major General Ahmad Ra’fat al-Tayyib, the sponsor of the Revisions project. The GI ideologue insists that this event will have little impact on the Revisions, as General al-Tayyib’s individual approach to the project has now become state policy. The Revisions initiative is now “a deep-rooted ideology.”

Najih Ibrahim pointed to the recent release of the eldest son of former GI leader, Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman (imprisoned in the United States since 1996), as proof of the success of ongoing reconciliation efforts. Shaykh Omar’s son, Muhammad, spent seven years in prison after his arrest in Afghanistan as part of the exiled group of GI hardliners that dominated al-Qaeda’s leadership (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], September 5). Muhammad is married to the daughter of the late Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, another Egyptian Islamist who acted as al-Qaeda’s commander in Afghanistan until his death by U.S. missile strike earlier this year (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 2).

Referring to the aborted Koran burning in Florida and American perceptions of Islam in general, Najih Ibrahim maintains that Americans should learn about Islam “from its sources, and not from the Zionist media or from the behavior of al-Qaeda… The fact is that Bin Laden is not Islam; Islam is greater than Bin Laden, greater than all the Islamist movements, and greater than the behavior of all Muslims.”

Instead of the direct pursuit of power, Najih Ibrahim advocates a policy of “participation, not replacement”:

The Islamist movement started with the concept of replacement, namely that the Islamists replace the regime. No, let us abandon this concept, and support the concept of participation and cooperation in what is good. Let us leave for the state the sovereignty issues, and we handle Islamic call, education, and the development of society, its progress, educating its ethics and preserving its identity… Whoever the ruler might be, we will not clash with him. We will cooperate with him in what is good. What we can change in a kind way, and by good word, we will change, and what we cannot will be beyond our ability.

Najih Ibrahim says the GI believes Islamists should abandon the idea of seizing power, as the goal is unrealistic. “If they achieve power, they will be forced to relinquish it by the regional and international powers,” Ibrahim said. He warns Islamists that they will be put under siege and subjected to negative portrayals in the media and economic blockades that will make payment of government salaries or alleviation of poverty impossible. Najih Ibrahim even considers participation in the People’s Assembly elections undesirable, saying the funds used for election campaigns could be better used to support the 4,000 orphaned children of deceased GI members and the 12 GI members still under sentence of death in Egyptian prisons. He holds little hope for change at the executive level, saying presidential elections will be “only a formality” that will lead to the re-election of President Hosni Mubarak or his son, Jamal Mubarak. “It will not be anyone other than one of these two,” Ibrahim believes. Najih Ibrahim warns of the danger posed to the Islamist movement by secularists who are eager to push the Islamists into confrontation with the ruling power. After doing so, the secularists then turn “into the followers and entourage of the ruler; they climb over our skulls and wounds, they take control of media, culture and everything and leave us to go to prisons and detention camps as usual.”

This article first appeared in the September 23, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Hizb-I-Islami Leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Claims Civil War that Followed Russian Withdrawal Will Not Be Repeated

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Andrew McGregor

September 23, 2010

Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Afghanistan’s Hizb-i-Islami and a former prime minister of the country, recently outlined his views on the future of the Afghan conflict, the jihad in Pakistan, the role of al-Qaeda, the legitimacy of suicide attacks and other issues (Geo News TV, September 15). [1]

Hekmatyar PakistanGulbuddin Hekmatyar on an Official Visit to Pakistan

The fate of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood at the hands of al-Qaeda assassins posing as Algerian journalists in 2001 is never far from the minds of Afghan political leaders, so to protect Hekmatyar’s security the interview with Pakistan’s Geo News TV was carried out by sending Hekmatyar a videotape containing questions and receiving a videotape carrying replies in return.

Hekmatyar sees most parties to the current conflict in Afghanistan coming out weaker as a result of the war. Iran and Pakistan have become embroiled in their own difficulties, while even al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban are not in a position to aid the Afghan mujahideen as they did in the past. Afghanistan’s own Northern Alliance has “disintegrated,” while other proxy groups used by Russia and the United States have become “diluted”. “The United States and its allies will have to face a similar fate after the evacuation from Afghanistan as the Soviet Union did. They will neither be able to do what they did after the 9/11 incident, nor what they did after Soviet Union’s withdrawal [when] they created the Northern Alliance in collaboration with Russia, which blocked the establishment of an Islamic government by the mujahideen.” Iran, however, is accused by Hekmatyar of cooperating with the United States while pretending to be its opponent. As a result, “Iran never had the level of influence in Afghanistan’s internal affairs as it has now.”

Surprisingly, Hekmatyar appealed to the Taliban of Pakistan to abandon their fight against the government of Asif Ali Zardari and devote their energies to driving out the foreign troops based in Afghanistan. Should the current situation change in Pakistan, the direction of its mujahideen could be refocused. “If the occupying forces attack Pakistan or any other Muslim country, it will become obligatory on all Muslims to support the Pakistani mujahideen. No doubt, the supporters of infidels [i.e. the Islamabad government] are also violating the teachings of Islam, but we need to differentiate between the bigger and smaller enemies and adopt different approaches in dealing with them.” Hekmatyar claims Afghan president Hamid Karzai does not have the authority to negotiate a withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces from Afghanistan. Instead, he offers a plan prepared by his party entitled Milli Meesaq (the National Charter), which he claims is supported by a majority of Afghan politicians.

The veteran Islamist warlord claims there is little chance of al-Qaeda re-establishing itself in Afghanistan, though he says their presence has been exaggerated to justify the aggression of the Western nations. “There are no al-Qaeda centers or warriors in Afghanistan anymore. The Western countries themselves have accepted that the number of al-Qaeda warriors in Afghanistan is less than 100. Is it possible that 150,000 troops equipped with modern weapons have been fighting for nine years to kill 100 warriors?”

Nevertheless, Hekmatyar advocates tactics closely associated with al-Qaeda, including attacking religious scholars who oppose suicide attacks as “pro-government opportunists.” Other than those who carry out strikes against mosques, those who give their lives in suicide attacks will be “well rewarded by God.” When asked if responsibility for 9/11 lay with al-Qaeda, the Jews or the Americans, Hekmatyar said he believed al-Qaeda was responsible, “because the Jews cannot prepare such committed people who can sacrifice their lives in suicide attacks.”

This article first appeared in the September 23, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Nigerian Security Commanders Dismissed after Boko Haram Militants Blast Their Way Out of Prison

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Andrew McGregor

September 16, 2010

Threats made in July by the new chief of northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram sect were fulfilled in recent days with a mass prison breakout of incarcerated sect members and what appears to be a series of killings of security personnel by motorcycle-riding gunmen. Imam Abubakr Shekau warned of a new jihad by Boko Haram members seeking revenge for the ruthless repression of their movement in July 2009 by security services angered by Boko Haram attacks on their posts and personnel (Ansar al-Mujahideen, July 11).

Bauchi PrisonBauchi Prison

The September 7 escape of over 700 prisoners in Bauchi Prison was apparently inspired by a Boko Haram pledge that their members would not spend the Eid al-Fitr holiday in prison. Eyewitness accounts told of a daring assault by a handful of militants that went on for two hours without relief from security forces. According to these accounts, the militants had cut or shaved their habitual long beards to better infiltrate prayer gatherings close to the prison. AK-47 assault rifles were concealed under their babanrigas, a loose flowing top worn over trousers. On a signal the militants began their attack on the prison gates while trying to assure terrified residents they were on “a mission” and were not there to attack civilians.

Some who were not close to the prison initially thought the gunfire was firecrackers set off to celebrate the Eid.  One witness said, “There was nothing to make anyone suspicious of them. They wore normal dress and did not sport their trademark long beards. But by the time they sprang into action, it was clear that they were well trained. The guns looked very sophisticated and they handled them with expertise like combatants” (Vanguard [Lagos], September 11). Four individuals, including a policeman, a soldier and two civilians, were killed in the attack (Nigerian Tribune, September 12). As many as 759 prisoners escaped during the assault, of whom 123 were Boko Haram members awaiting trial on charges stemming from the July 2009 violence.

The Boko Haram unit that carried out the assault had clearly planned to take advantage of the relaxed atmosphere during the Eid festivities, striking just as the guards were preparing to break their fast. According to Bauchi Governor Isa Yuguda, “All of us were caught unaware by the attackers because they came at the time nobody was expecting, considering that we are in the holy month of Ramadan, when all true Muslims are expected to be fasting and not engage in anything that could lead to the shedding of blood.”

Following the prison break, alarm spread throughout the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Kano, where 25 Boko Haram suspects are being held at the Kano Central Prison. The Kano Sallah (Eid al-Fitr) celebrations were marked by a show of force by security personnel and a military convoy including a tank accompanying Kano Governor Ibrahim Shekarau to the Kano Central Mosque (Next, September 12). The governor of Bauchi State pledged a door to door search would be conducted to find all Boko Haram suspects (Next [Lagos], September 13). Security at the Gombe State Prison was also intensified in expectation of further attacks (Vanguard, September 10).

President Goodluck Jonathan used the mass escape as an opportunity to make sweeping changes in Nigeria’s military and police leadership, sacking Chief of Army Staff Major General Abdulrahman Dambazzau (who was in New York on official duties at the time), Inspector General of Police Ogbonna Onovo, Chief of Defense Staff Air Marshal Paul Dike, Naval Chief Vice Admiral Ishaya Ibrahim and the Director General of the State Security Service Afakriya Gadzama.

Minister of Defense Prince Adetokunbo Kayode insisted the changes were not dismissals, pointing out the two year terms of the security commanders had expired in August and the president was merely exercising his prerogative to appoint new leaders (Vanguard, September 10; Nigerian Compass, September 10). The president made clear what he wanted from the security services, saying, “My expectations are that our armed forces and security agencies should be proactive. We must employ intelligence to nip crises in the bud even before it can occur” (Vanguard, September 12).

Jonathan broke the traditional stranglehold of northern Muslim tribes on the military command by appointing Major General Onyeabo Azubike Ihejirika of the Eastern Ibo tribe as the new Chief of Army Staff. Ihejirika is the first Ibo to lead the military since the Ibo-supported Biafran secession war of the 1960s. The appointment was made with wide commendation from southern Nigerian governors and politicians (Vanguard, September 10).

The prison breakout was preceded by a series of killings of policemen in northern Nigeria by motorcycle-riding gunmen. The attacks that killed six policemen in two months were initially blamed on armed robbers (Next, August 26; Nigerian Tribune, August 27).

The use of AK-47 assault rifles by the militants raised concerns over the flow of arms into the northern region. The President-General of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria accused security services of overseeing illegal arms imports through the ports. He stated, “Last week, members of Boko Haram, armed with AK47 rifles, attacked the Bauchi prison and its environs. How did they get the arms? You go to Niger Delta, come to Lagos and other parts of the country, illegal arms are everywhere and in the wrong hands” (Vanguard, September 12). Meanwhile in the north, security officials recently seized 52 AK-47 rifles, 1,700 rounds of ammunition and $32,000 in cash being smuggled from Chad to the flashpoint city of Jos, where thousands of people have been killed in sectarian violence in recent years (AfrikNews, August 18).

This article first appeared in the September 16 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Clashes with Yemeni Military at Lawdar

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Andrew McGregor

September 16, 2010

Heavy fighting between alleged al-Qaeda forces and government troops near the town of Lawdar in Yemen’s Abyan governorate broke out on the weekend of August 21-22 following a deadly ambush by AQAP fighters, claiming a reported eight to 11 soldiers and at least 14 militants (Reuters, August 22; Sep26.net, August 21; AFP August 22). Yemeni military forces were dispatched to the district to re-establish the government’s writ. Al-Qaeda militants and members of the secessionist Southern Mobility movement were given 24 hours to leave Lawdar or the houses they were staying in would be bombarded. Following a mass flight of civilians and the expiration of the ultimatum, more fighting broke out on August 22, as militants resisted their expulsion. Defense Minister General Muhammad Nasir Ahmad Ali was reported to be leading the security operations in Lawdar District personally (AFP, August 22).

Lawdar (BBC)

Tribal mediation apparently failed in the conflict around Lawdar, with fatal consequences for one of those involved. A leader of the al-Fadl tribe, Shaykh Hussein Saleh Majdal, was assassinated along with his two bodyguards in an attack on the evening of September 4. The shaykh was described as leading the mediation between security forces and al-Qaeda militants (ArabNews.com, September 5; Yemen Observer, September 7).

Government sources have repeatedly referred to armed elements of the secessionist Southern Mobility movement as fighting alongside al-Qaeda in the struggle for Lawdar District.  They described a plan by Southern Mobility leaders to assemble their followers in a march intended to break the security cordon around Lawdar (al-Watan, September 11). Security authorities also announced the detention of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mansub, an alleged “terrorist subversive element” who was arrested at a roadblock while in possession of documents alleged to detail the cooperation between AQAP and Southern Mobility (al-Siyasah [Kuwait], September 7). Southern Mobility, however, acknowledges it has activists in the region but says they are involved in “peaceful struggle” (Aden Press Online, September 12).

Although Deputy Interior Minister Saleh al-Zuari declared Lawdar District fully purged of “terrorist elements” on August 24, continuing operations revealed that the militant presence was far from vanquished. A day after al-Zuari’s statement, gunmen riding motorcycles targeted a military patrol in a public marketplace in the Zinjibar District of Abyan, killing four soldiers (Yemen Observer, August 28).  On August 27, Yemeni troops took the worst of it in a clash with the militants near Lawdar, leaving 11 dead. Two militants were killed, including (according to security officials) the al-Qaeda second-in-command in Lawdar, Adel Saleh Hardaba (Yemen Observer, August 28).On the same day a 25 year-old al-Qaeda suspect was arrested in northern Abyan while on his way to Lawdar. He was found in possession of an explosives belt and told investigators he had been assigned by al-Qaeda commander Ali Alwi al-Saqqaf to carry out a suicide bombing in Lawdar (Yemen Observer, September 1).

Fighting erupted again on August 31 in which another 12 militants were reported killed. The alleged leader of al-Qaeda forces in the district, Salah Ali Abdullah Al-Damani, was arrested on September 5, though sources vary as to whether he was captured in a night-time raid or seized at a checkpoint (26Sep.net, September 5).

By September 7, AQAP fighters were reported to have largely, but not entirely, pulled out of Lawdar and were heading to nearby Ma’rib and Shabwah governorates, both current hotbeds of anti-government militancy. The director-general of Lawdar District, Ahmad Ahmad Ali al-Qafish, told journalists that the fighters included Saudi, Pakistani, Egyptian, Syrian and Somali elements, though this could not be confirmed (al-Siyasah [Kuwait], September 7). Defense Ministry sources reported three foreigners were discovered amongst the militants slain in the fighting of August 20-21 (26Sep.net, August 21).

This article first appeared in the September 16 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Yemen Arms Dealer Faris Manna Claims Government Arming Houthist Rebels

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Andrew McGregor

September 9, 2010

Yemen is not only one of the world’s most heavily armed nations on a per capita basis, but also serves as a regional hub for arms shipments, a lucrative trade that has the approval of Yemen’s government. One of Yemen’s most prominent arms dealers, Faris Manna, had a falling out with his former sponsor, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, after being imprisoned earlier this year on charges of providing arms to the Houthist rebels of northern Yemen. Manna recently gave an interview to an Arabic language daily in which he claimed Saleh’s government was responsible for arming the Houthist rebellion, a claim supported by his brother, the former governor of Sada’a governorate (elaph.com, August 17).

Faris MannaFaris Manna

The 40-year-old Manna, a former organizer for the ruling General People’s Congress, describes himself not as an arms retailer but as a facilitator, arranging deals between Arab and African consumers and foreign suppliers, principally in Russia and Eastern Europe, where he maintains offices. “I conclude arms deals, like other international companies that facilitate deals between states and arms manufacturers… We bring the parties closer together, and help them reach agreements. This is our role, nothing else,” explained Manna. Despite the accusations against him, Manna denies selling arms in local Yemeni markets. “I have never done that. This is what tendentious people say. They spread such rumors. We work in the framework of the Yemeni constitution and law, as well as within the international law,” he stated.

According to the Yemeni arms merchant, who acted as an intermediary in negotiations between the government and the Houthist rebels, it is the state that made room in local markets for the arms trade, which it supplies through stocks discretely removed from military garrisons; “I want to say that there was collusion in certain army garrisons to hand over weapons to the Houthists. It has become clear that their ammunition came from the Army, and all their rifles and weapons came from the Army. There are photographs and documents that prove this. All the proof is available. The matter has become clear and unambiguous.” Manna has useful connections to the Houthists – his brother Hassan Manna was formerly governor of Sada’a governorate, the home of the Houthist rebellion. Faris says his brother resigned as a result of his unjust detention; “How could he go on working when his brother was wrongly and unjustly arrested? He refused to carry on working, but out of respect for the brother president of the republic, may God protect him, and in appreciation of the relations between us and him, we did not publish our resignation.” Several weeks after his brother’s arrest last January, Hassan Manna threatened to reveal the “true source” of the Houthist arms, suggesting that the Ministry of the Interior was heavily involved in shipping arms to the northern rebels, though this accusation was strongly denied by Brigadier General Muhammad Abdullah al-Qawsi, following which Hassan Manna warned the press against publishing any further comments on the issue delivered under his name (Yemen Tribune, February 21).

Manna claims the charges against him were the work of the National Security Agency (NSA), which sought to create a divide between himself and the president, his long-time patron. In June, a supporter of Faris Manna fired on a security convoy carrying him to court from Sana’a rooftops (Yemen Observer, May 11). Manna denied allegations that his family was behind the attack (Yemen Gazette, July 3).

This article first appeared in the September 9, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor