Karzai Claims Mystery Helicopters Ferrying Taliban to North Afghanistan

Andrew McGregor

November 6, 2009

HelicoptersWhile the Western press has been occupied recently with accounts of fraudulent elections in Afghanistan and the alleged role of President Hamid Karzai’s brother as a paid CIA agent, a stranger but perhaps more instructive story was playing out in Afghanistan that reveals the rather shallow penetration NATO and Coalition efforts have made in building trust and confidence in that country, as well as giving some indication of what can be expected from a Karzai administration that does not sense full support from its former backers in the West as it begins a second term. In addition the controversy demonstrates the very different perceptions of the counterterrorism struggle in the West and in Afghanistan.

For several weeks now, Afghanistan has been consumed by stories of mysterious “foreign helicopters” ferrying Taliban fighters to a new front in northern Afghanistan. These helicopters are alleged by no less than President Karzai to belong to “foreign powers” such as the United States and its allies. The helicopters are said to land in remote regions, but their activity has supposedly been noted by nomads who travel through the deserts of Baghlan and Kunduz province (Hasht-e Sobh, October 13).

Without mentioning guilty parties or offering evidence, President Karzai suggested the reports of helicopters delivering terrorists to north Afghanistan were true, saying, “We have received reliable reports from our intelligence service. We have received reliable reports from our people, and today I received a report that these efforts [to transfer Taliban fighters] are also being made mysteriously in the northwest. The issue of helicopters has also been proved. We do not make any more comments now and investigations are under way to see to whom and to which foreign country these helicopters belong” (Tolo TV, October 11). According to Karzai, the “unknown” helicopters had been taking Taliban fighters to Baghlan, Kunduz and Samangan provinces in northern Afghanistan. The president’s remarks were quickly followed by a call from the Lower House speaker, Muhammad Yunis Qanuni, for a government debate on the issue. “When the president of Afghanistan, as the first man of the country, is raising a fact and a problem, then it shows that the problem is important and serious.” According to Takhar MP Habiba Danesh, the helicopter airlifts were already underway before the elections (Tolo TV [Kabul], October 13; Ferghana.ru, October 12; Hasht-e Sobh [Kabul], October 13).

Kunduz governor Muhammad Omar claimed the fighters being brought to his province at night were members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group that recently lost its longtime leader Tahir Yuldash and is now hard pressed by the Pakistani government in South Waziristan, their home since 2001. The governor pointed to the detention of 15 militants by U.S. Special Forces south of Kunduz, whom he described as supporters of the late Tahir Yuldash (Afghan Islamic Press, October 11; Eurasia.net, October 13). At the same time, the governor noted the security situation in his province was improving (Tolo TV, October 11). The governor of Baghlan province, Muhammad Akbar Barakzai, also claims to have received intelligence that unidentified military helicopters are making midnight landings in remote areas of his province (Tolo TV, October 21).

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s former rival for the presidency, accuses the Afghan government of being behind the transfer of Taliban fighters to the northern provinces. “They have sent to the north of the country the most evil people, the most notorious and criminal people who are involved in killing the people of Afghanistan and crime against the people of Afghanistan… I have the names of these people; they sent them to the north by helicopters so that they carry out their mission. Is this a government?” (Tolo TV, October 11).

Iran’s state television network, Press TV, sought to exploit the controversy by adding a large number of details to the helicopter story in an October 17 report, all according to unnamed “diplomats”:

• The British Army was responsible for relocating Taliban fighters with Chinook helicopters to the northern provinces from Helmand province in south Afghanistan (though this might come as a surprise to critics of the UK’s Ministry of Defence, who have suggested the military has not provided enough transport helicopters to meet British needs – BBC, August 30).

• The death of Afghan interpreter Sultan Munadi in a  September British Special Forces raid that freed a New York Times reporter from Taliban captivity has already been a controversial issue in Afghanistan, with repeated calls for an inquiry into the circumstances of his death. Press TV claimed Munadi was killed during the raid by a British sniper because he had documents and photographs verifying the British role in the alleged airlift.

• American forces were supplying the Taliban militants in north Afghanistan with weapons seized during the 2001 invasion. Most date back to the era of Soviet occupation.

• Afghan Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar, a British educated Pashtun, was working under the direction of the UK. The Interior Ministry has funneled arms to the newly relocated Taliban through Pashtun police officers. The distribution of arms to Taliban fighters by the Afghan police was also reported by Kabul daily Arman-e Melli on October 13.

Not all Afghan officials believe in the nocturnal activities of the “mystery helicopters.” Amrullah Saleh, the chief of the National Directorate of Security (NDS – the Tajik-dominated national security agency), dismissed the helicopter reports, as did many other members of Afghanistan’s security services. Amrullah maintains that the reports are designed solely with the intention of reducing trust in Western forces engaged in Afghanistan (Hasht-e Sobh, October 13). Even a member of Karzai’s campaign team, MP Nur Akbari, noted diplomatically that the president’s assertions were “unexpected,” saying that security officials had not provided any such information in the past (Hasht-e Sobh, October 13). President Karzai’s endorsement of the “mystery helicopter” theory compelled U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry to issue a clear denial of “the rumors about the reinforcement of the Afghan government’s armed opposition in the north by the U.S.A. These rumors are baseless” (Tolo TV, October 14).

Nevertheless, one Afghan daily reported widespread belief in the “mystery helicopter” phenomenon. “The people strongly believe that these helicopters belong to the British and U.S. forces. They also believe that these helicopters have transferred some armed residents of the neighboring provinces to northern provinces and the killing of several armed men from these areas in the north seem to confirm this issue” (Arman-e Melli [Kabul], October 13).

It was not long before the “mystery helicopters” were seen in Pakistan, where the “foreign allies” of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were alleged to be rescuing Taliban militants from the government offensive in South Waziristan. An Islamabad daily reported the belief of “some experts” that the airlift was part of a deal between the Western nations and the so-called “good Taliban” (Pakistan Observer [Islamabad], October 19).

Existing rumors of a Western airlift of Taliban fighters were no doubt adopted and exploited by the Karzai administration to express its displeasure with the West’s refusal to rubber stamp his election victory, but they mask a more serious problem – how has the Taliban managed to expand its operations in the north and what can be done to stop it before the Taliban is in a position to interfere with vital NATO supply lines that cross the region? By endorsing such rumors, President Karzai appears ready to endanger years of Western civil and military efforts in Afghanistan if he feels it necessary to ensure his domestic political survival.

 

This article first appeared in the November 6, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Pakistani Security Sweep Seizes Taliban Leaders in Karachi

Andrew McGregor

October 30, 2009

Pakistani security forces have announced the arrest of Akhtar Zaman Mahsud, the alleged Amir of the Karachi branch of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) as part of a major sweep of terrorist suspects in the strategically important port city.

Pak Army in KarachiPakistani Security Forces during Operations against TTP Militants in Karachi

Security forces claimed Akhtar Zaman was arrested in Karachi’s eastern suburb of Sohrab Goth following an October 18 shootout with police. However, some police sources and members of the largely Pashtun Sohrab Goth community insisted Akhtar Zaman was actually arrested in a raid on a supermarket on September 14 (The News [Islamabad], October 21; PakTribune, October 20). The alleged TTP commander and three others arrested with him (including Samiullah, a.k.a. Shamim, Fazal Kareem and Munawar Khan) were charged with involvement in an unsuccessful attack on the Kemari Oil Terminal on the night of September 14. One Islamabad daily quoted an anonymous senior police source as saying, “If we produce an accused before the court after 24 hours of his arrest, it becomes a case of habeas corpus, so normally police show the arrests of accused a day prior to their production in the court” (The News, October 21).

A police official said the suspects also wanted to plant explosives in police installations and other sensitive points in Karachi. According to police, the men were armed with 75kg of cyclotrimethylene-trinitramine (RDX) explosives, three Kalashnikov assault rifles and a TT-model pistol, commonly used as a police sidearm in Pakistan but also made by the gunsmiths of the Khyber region. The seizure followed a larger one last week, which netted two suicide jackets, four Kalashnikovs, 17 hand grenades, nine detonators and a variety of ammunition for mortars, RPGs and rifles. Police claim these weapons belonged to the same Karachi cell of the TTP (Daily Times, October 19).

Further raids by the Crime Investigation Department (CID) of the Sindh police on October 21 resulted in the arrest of Muhammad Sahib Khan (a.k.a. Qasai) in Sohrab Goth, as well as two accomplices in other parts of the city. According to police, Muhammad Sahib Khan confessed to being tied to a Swat-based TTP commander named Farooq. He was found in possession of a suicide vest and was already wanted by police for involvement in murders, assassinations, kidnappings and attacks on security services. Police charged Muhammad Sahib Khan and his accomplices with “trying to establish a Taliban network in Karachi,” as well as “plotting terrorist activities, including suicide bombings.” They were also accused of destroying schools in the Swat valley (The News, October 21; Dawn [Karachi], October 21).

According to Pakistan’s Daily Times, some 60 second-level Taliban leaders evaded the government’s offensive in Swat earlier this year by traveling by train in small groups to Karachi, where the Karachi TTP arranged for their transit by plane to various points in the Gulf states (Daily Times [Lahore], October 19). The transfer went unnoticed because many natives of Malakand work in these same Middle Eastern states.

Mahsudi tribesmen who have fled the turmoil in their native South Waziristan for Karachi suburbs like Sohrab Goth report shakedowns by local police who threaten to arrest them as TTP members, as well as marginalization by government agencies on the basis of ethnicity, which local elders claim threatens to drive peaceful Mahsudis into the arms of the Taliban (The News, October 21). Army Chief of Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kayani took the unusual step of writing an open letter to the Mahsud tribe, assuring them that the current operations in South Waziristan were aimed only at terrorists rather than the tribe as a whole (The Hindu, October 19).

Though it lies over 1,000 miles from the military operations in the tribal regions of northwestern Pakistan, the port of Karachi has become a target of Taliban and al-Qaeda associated militants since April, when members of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) terrorist group were detained while planning attacks on local transportation firms responsible for shipping supplies destined for NATO forces in Afghanistan. A campaign of threats and bombings is intended to disrupt the NATO supply chain, which relies on Pakistani companies and drivers to transport supplies along the 1,200 mile route from Karachi to the Khyber Pass.  Karachi, the starting point of the route, was once regarded as a safe port, but recently it has been subject to infiltration by Taliban and al-Qaeda sabotage units. Earlier this month security forces arrested five members of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) terrorist group who were planning attacks on transportation firms responsible for shipping NATO supplies to Peshawar. This followed a similar roundup of militants last January after they threatened transporters not to carry NATO supplies.

The new Karachi Taliban leader, who gave an interview to the Daily Times on condition of anonymity, said the local TTP chapter was in accord with the ideology of TTP leader Hakimullah Mahsud but was not authorized to carry out operations (Daily Times, October 19).

 

This article first appeared in the October 30, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Senior al-Qaeda Commander Abu Yahya al-Libi Condemns President Obama and the “Criminal Army of Pakistan”

Andrew McGregor

October 30, 2009

Establishing al-Qaeda’s battle is about establishing universal “servitude to God,” according to senior al-Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi who has expressed pride in the fact that his movement has no other agenda: “We are not a group that is concerned with finding economic solutions. We are not a group that is concerned with building skyscrapers. We are not a group that is concerned with finding solutions to social problems. All these problems were a result of people’s deviations, and occurred after the people agreed to become servants to other than God, the Great and Almighty.” The message was contained in a 45 minute video of al-Libi’s sermon on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr in September and posted to the web on October 27 (Al-Sahab Establishment for Media Production/Al-Fajr Media Center).

Pak Army in SwatPakistan Army in Swat

Typical of al-Qaeda and Taliban statements, al-Libi’s sermon heaped abuse upon President Obama, referring to him as a “black crow” who delivered a speech in Cairo while people clapped for him “as if he were Umar bin Abd al-Aziz” (an early 8th century Ummayad caliph renowned for his piety). “Obama has become the holder of the slogan of ‘change’ and the owner of the slogan of ‘openness.’ Through this openness, scores of people are being killed in Afghanistan on a daily basis and nobody hears of them.”

Al-Libi expresses his disdain for those “insane and defeated people” who urge coexistence with the non-Islamic world and mocks Western perceptions of what constitutes “acceptable” Islam: “If you become democratic, modern, or Western, the people will be content with you and praise and recognize you as a moderate and balanced Muslim.”  Al-Libi expresses astonishment that the Prophet Muhammad was never able to establish coexistence “among his people and in his house and homeland,” yet the means to coexistence have suddenly been “discovered in the 21st century.”

The senior al-Qaeda commander also condemned the “criminal Pakistani army that destroyed Swat,” asking why the army was fighting Muslims who wanted nothing more than the “Shari’a of Almighty God”

As he concluded the sermon, al-Libi called on the “mujahideen brothers all over the world” to trust in monotheism as a means of unifying their movement. Considering the source, al-Libi issued a rather surprising appeal for militant factions to be more conciliatory and less insistent in their belief that only they have the correct course of action and right to operate. “I say that there can be no possible agreement unless some groups are willing to concede some of their rights. That is a necessity. If a group holds fast to its right and the other group holds fast to its right, or what it claims to be its right, what kind of agreement or unity can be done after that?”

More specifically, al-Libi appealed to the Islamic State of Iraq and Ansar al-Islam to resolve their differences and “unite in one group and one rank.” Similarly, al-Libi also called on the Salafi mujahideen groups in Palestine to “get rid of the causes of division, disagreement, and dispute. There must be some kind of concession to make agreement and unity possible. Concession is necessary for the hearts to rejoin.”

 

This article first appeared in the October 30, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Is Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army Operating in Darfur?

Andrew McGregor

October 23, 2009

Various reports are claiming that the guerrillas of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have moved in bulk into South Darfur, where they will allegedly seek supplies and arms from the Sudanese government. The movement into Darfur was reported to have been compelled by helicopter attacks on the LRA by Ugandan Special Forces units operating out of Yambio, Sudan as part of a tripartite (DRC, Uganda, South Sudan) military offensive against the brutal fighters led by the notorious Joseph Kony.

Arrow BoysArrow Boys of Western Equatoria

Most prominent of these was a front page cover story in Britain’s Independent daily asserting Kony and a significant part of his forces had crossed into southern Darfur (Independent, October 17). The main source in the story was a statement by Major-General Kuol Deim Kuol of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of South Sudan that was carried in the Sudanese press two weeks earlier (Sudan Tribune, September 28). General Kuol claimed the bulk of the LRA forces had crossed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) into southern Darfur, where they had clashed with the local population. The General maintained SPLA reconnaissance groups had tracked the LRA across the border, where he suggested they would seek a safe base for their wives and families while seeking arms and ammunition from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

However, the Independent reported Kuol saying hunters had encountered LRA fighters near the town of Tumbara. There is no such place in southern Darfur, though there is a Tambura in the southern part of Western Equatoria (South Sudan), close to the LRA’s operations in the CAR, but far from the border with southern Darfur. The Independent added that the LRA had moved into the “Raga district in southern Darfur.” Raga is in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, also part of South Sudan rather than Darfur. The director of communications from the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) declared the mission had spent days going over reports of an LRA presence, but had failed to find any “hard evidence” to confirm them (Independent, October 17).

The original Sudan Tribune story said that “Kuol suggested that Kony is seeking protection from the Sudanese army and may be used to fight the Darfur rebels” (September 28). Basing its report on the Sudan Tribune story, the Kampala Observer claimed several days later that Kuol had stated that the LRA were fighting as mercenaries alongside the Janjaweed militia in Darfur (October 4).

Elsewhere, there were reports of LRA fighters killing two women in raids near Yambio in Western Equatoria at the same time the main group was reported to be crossing into Darfur (Sudan Tribune, October 16; New Vision [Kampala], October 16). The fighters were driven off by members of the lightly armed Arrow Boys, a local self-defense group that combats LRA incursions with weapons such as spears and bows and arrows. Yambio is roughly 650 kilometers from the border with South Darfur as the crow flies – much farther in rough and road-less bush country. If these reports are correct, they would suggest either the main body of the LRA has abandoned elements of its forces in the move north, or is still operating in the area where the DRC, CAR and Sudan borders intersect. Other LRA units were simultaneously reported to be carrying out new attacks in the northern DRC (BBC, October 14).

The presence in Darfur of the LRA, which is generally believed to have once been armed and funded by Khartoum in retaliation for Kampala’s support of the SPLA, would be a major embarrassment to President Omar al-Bashir, who is currently facing Darfur-related war crimes charges from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Salah Gosh, a senior presidential advisor who has been tied to war crimes in Darfur in his former capacity as director of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Services, accused the SPLA of issuing “fabrications,” adding, “The SPLA knows very well where Kony is” (Sudan Tribune, September 28).

The reports of an LRA entry into Darfur came as Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni invited Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to an AU summit on refugees held this week in Kampala (New Vision, October 14). Despite Uganda being a signatory to the ICC statute—and thus obligated to enforce the ICC warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest—Museveni said such an act would not be “according to the culture of the Great Lakes region in Africa… We do not believe in surprise attacks.” An ICC representative insisted Uganda had a responsibility to carry out the arrest (Daily Monitor, October 16). The issue was resolved when Sudan decided to send two junior ministers to the summit instead (New Vision, October 19). Sudan has also expressed its willingness to share its expertise in the oil sector with Uganda as the latter begins development of a one-billion barrel oil reserve discovered on the Albertine rift in Uganda (Dow Jones Newswire, October 1; Sudan Tribune, October 2).

This article first appeared in the October 23, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Pakistani Taliban Commander Describes Counter-Measures against UAV Attacks

Andrew McGregor

October 23, 2009

A commander of the Pakistan Taliban, Sahimullah Mahsud, recently provided a description of the measures taken by the Taliban forces and leadership to lower the impact of the American Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) missile attacks which have claimed the lives of scores of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in northwestern Pakistan, including the late leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mahsud. Based in South Waziristan, where he is a deputy to new Taliban leader Hakimullah Mahsud, Sahimullah provided the details in an interview with the Brussels-based Le Soir daily (October 12).

Drone 1Sahimullah described the UAV counter-measures as being based on “mobility, secrecy and anonymity”:

• If a drone is heard, fighters must disperse into small groups of no more than four people. The Taliban have weapons capable of shooting down the drones, but lack the technology to detect their approach.

• Satellite or SMS [a form of text messaging on mobile phones] forms of communication are no longer used. All communications are done orally or by code.

• Meetings are announced only at the last minute, with nothing planned in advance in order to avoid leaks. Even senior commanders do not know the precise location of regional commanders.

• Taliban leaders have reduced the size of their security escorts to one or two men “in whom they have complete confidence.”

• Taliban security agents are constantly checking the identity and credentials of those active within the movement.

The Taliban commander added that the movement has many sympathizers within the Pakistan army and the security forces in Afghanistan who provide useful intelligence on infiltration efforts, the progress of NATO convoys and the timing and location of American or Pakistani military operations. American weapons are bought from the personnel of the Afghan National Army or seized in raids on NATO convoys.

Sahimullah claimed the Taliban were ready for the Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan: “We have about 20,000 fighters and we can move from one side of the border to the other as needed. We are very mobile. In eight years the United States and NATO have not managed to defeat the Taliban. How do you expect a few Pakistani soldiers, tanks, and planes to get the better of us! It is impossible!”

This article first appeared in the October 23, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Somali Militants React to U.S. Airstrike with Threats and Roundup of “U.S. Spies”

Andrew McGregor

September 25, 2009

Fallout from the September 14 U.S. Special Forces raid on an al-Shabaab convoy in southern Somalia continues, with various Islamist factions vowing revenge strikes while pro-government militias approved of the killing of al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and a number of senior al-Shabaab members.

NabhanSaleh Ali Saleh Nabhan

Convinced that an inside source directed American helicopter gunships to the convoy, al-Shabaab organized an emergency meeting of its leadership in Mogadishu, where they decided to launch an investigation of anyone suspected of having links to Western countries. This could develop into a divisive obsession, as many of al-Shabaab’s fighters and leaders have not only lived in the West, but have also obtained citizenship in these countries.

Shaykh Hassan Abdullah Hirsi al-Turki announced to media sources in the Islamist stronghold of Kismayo that 15 Islamist fighters had been arrested for spying on behalf of the United States and other Western countries. Mu’askar Ras Kamboni, an Islamist insurgent group closely tied to al-Shabaab, claimed to have discovered a substantial Western intelligence network that had penetrated the Islamist insurgent groups. Digital cameras and other items were seized from a number of fighters (Radio Gaalkacyo, September 16).

On September 16, al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage (a.k.a. Shaykh Ali Dheere) declared that the group would strike U.S. government targets in retaliation for the raid, saying the strike would only provide the movement’s fighters with increased motivation. Two days later, two vehicles bearing UN markings drove unchallenged into the heart of AMISOM’s main base in Mogadishu. When the suicide bombers detonated their payloads, 9 AU peacekeepers and TFG soldiers were killed, with the toll later rising to 21 as the seriously injured succumbed to their wounds.  Among those who lost their lives were 12 Ugandans, five Burundians and four Somalis (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 18; Daily Monitor [Kampala], September 22).  Gun battles broke out in several places in Mogadishu after the blast. Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Shabaab. “We have got our revenge for our brother Nabhan. Two suicide car bombs targeting the AU base, praise Allah” (al-Jazeera, September 18).

The leader of Hizb al-Islam, Shaykh Hassan Dahir al-Aweys, said of the raid, “The enemy of Allah is targeting Muslims all over the world, it is not only Nabhan that they killed recently but they are targeting many others. Such attacks will only increase hate and violence” (AFP, September 20). Al-Aweys, whose militia is fighting side by side with al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, also called for an increase in suicide attacks.

Not all Somalis were sorry to hear of the airstrike. A spokesman for the Sufi-based Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a militia (a bitter enemy of al-Shabaab) announced that the group’s leadership was very pleased with the death of Nabhan and several senior members of al-Shabaab, adding that God had punished them. A Somali army spokesman also applauded the airstrike and called for further targeted killings of insurgent leaders (Radio Gaalkacyo, September 16).

This article first appeared in the September 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

U.S. Trained “Colonel Imam” Discusses Bin Laden, Stinger Missiles and the Taliban

Andrew McGregor

September 25, 2009

Karachi’s Geo News conducted an interview on September 13 with Colonel Imam, a former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer who is best known as “the Father of the Taliban” for his crucial role in helping establish the movement in Afghanistan. Colonel Imam’s real name is Amir Sultan Tarar, though he notes “My actual name has been forgotten by the people; I am mostly known as Colonel Imam now… The Afghan people gave me this name because I lead the prayers.”

Colonel ImamAmir Sultan Tarar, a.k.a. “Colonel Imam”

Colonel Imam spoke of his cultural integration into Afghan Pashtun society during his days as an ISI officer, but noted the continued survival of pre-Islamic Pashtun customs; the Pashtuns “have camouflaged the Pashtun culture [with Islam], except the Taliban, who have always practiced Islam in its true spirit. I have observed the Taliban closely; they are very simple, sincere, truthful and strong believers.”

Colonel Imam also recalled his training from U.S. Special Forces at North Carolina’s Fort Bragg in the 1970s. “A visit to the United States was as an incentive given by the Pakistan Army. We would get to study a more refined curriculum with the help of advanced technology. My subject was ‘explosive sabotage’… When I would perform prayers, they would look at me with amazement.”

The former ISI agent described the beginning of his association with Afghanistan in the 1970s, when he was asked by then-Brigadier Nasirullah Babar (later Major General and Interior Minister in the government of Benazir Bhutto) to organize and train Islamic students fleeing from a crackdown by the communist regime in Kabul. Among those trained by Colonel Imam were current Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the late ethnic-Tajik guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Masud and Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Colonel complains that by 1988, the ISI’s authority over the Afghan mujahideen had been “hijacked” by the United States.

On the controversial issue of the distribution of U.S. supplied Stinger missiles, Colonel Imam denied accusations that he sold some of the stock of 2,000 American Stingers, saying this was done instead by Benazir Bhutto’s government after it had decided to reduce the size of the military mission in Afghanistan. “I was supposed to get the missiles back. We knew those Stinger missiles were being sold in the market. Six missiles were smuggled to Iran and three to North Korea, while the remaining stock was kept by the mujahideen themselves.”

The former ISI operative distanced himself from Osama Bin Laden, particularly during the period surrounding the 9/11 attacks. “He was not in contact with me at that time. It was the Jalalabad operation in 1990 when I last met Bin Laden… He was just an ordinary citizen who would get frightened by the sight of bombing.”

In December 2008, it was reported that Amir Sultan (Colonel Imam) was one of four names of former ISI officials sent by the United States to the U.N. Security Council for inclusion in the Security Council’s list of designated international terrorists (Islam Online, December 4, 2008). Colonel Imam responded, “By blaming the retired people, it is a conspiracy to tighten the noose around Pakistan’s ISI” (AKI, December 9, 2008).

The former ISI official is open about his support for the Taliban but denies that he and retired General Hamid Gul continue to fund the Taliban, saying, “As far as support is concerned, I said in front of Americans at a seminar that I do support the Taliban. I pray for their success but neither I nor General Hamid Gul has the money to give to the Taliban. We are retired people living hand to mouth. This is an electronic age—any transaction can be traced any time. If they have any proof, bring it forward” (AKI, December 9, 2008).

This article first appeared in the September 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Djibouti Facing Local Insurgency and Threats from Somali Islamists

Andrew McGregor

September 25, 2009

Few nations in the world are as strategically important but as little known as Djibouti, a small desert nation of half a million people in the heart of the Horn of Africa. A lingering insurgency by the ethnic-Afar Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy – FRUD) that many believed was over in 2001 has re-emerged as one of a number of security problems challenging Djibouti’s continued stability.
Djibouti MapFRUD is based in northern Djibouti, the traditional home of the nomadic Afar people. The Afar ethnic group represents roughly a third of the population in Djibouti, where the dominant ethnic Somali group is divided between the majority Issa clan and smaller groups from the Issaq clan and the Gadabursi, a Dir sub-clan. Most of the nomadic Afars live in the Danakil Desert of Ethiopia, giving them their alternate name of “Danakil.” The lack of Afar representation in the central government sparked the Djiboutian Civil War in 1991. France became involved in both mediation efforts and support missions for government troops, but the conflict continued until 2001, when the remaining radical faction signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the president’s governing coalition. Since then, however, it appears that a number of Afar militants have retaken the field, dissatisfied with the implementation of the peace treaty.  Most of the movement made peace with the government in 1994, with a group of hardliners under the late FRUD founder Ahmad Dini Ahmad holding out until 2001 before cutting their own deal with the government. Though certain roles at the highest level of the government have been reserved for Afars, the rest of the administration is still largely dominated by the ethnic-Somali Issa clan.

Hassan Mokbel, the FRUD spokesman, announced in early September that the movement had fought off an attack by the Djibouti military on one of their bases in the northern Mablas region. Though the attack was supported by two helicopter gunships that bombarded FRUD positions, Mokbel claims the rebels killed four soldiers and wounded 20 others in repulsing the government attack (FRUD communiqué, carried by dabio.net, September 1; Middle East Online, September 1). The troops were units of the Armée Nationale Djiboutienne (AND) based at Gal Ela in Mablas, together with reinforcements from the barracks at Tadjourah and Obock. If the FRUD reports are accurate, the action would appear to be the Djibouti army’s biggest offensive against the Afar guerrillas since May, 2006, when Colonel Abdo Abdi Dembil of the Presidential Guard led 2000 men through the Tadjourah and Obock districts  (FRUD communiqué, May 17, 2006, carried by harowo.com, May 22, 2006).

The FRUD militants term the present Djibouti regime a 32-year-old dictatorship characterized by a refusal to conduct free and transparent elections, a refusal to honor peace agreements, the repression of social movements (including trade unions) and the killing of innocent civilians, citing the killing of five people during the November 2005 clearance of the slum district Arhiba in Djibouti City (FRUD communiqué, June 26, carried by the Sudan Tribune, July 3; FRUD communiqué, May 17, 2006, carried by harowo.com, May 22, 2006).

Djibouti AfarAfar Tribesman

According to spokesman Hassan Mokbel, “FRUD, which has a politico-military approach, does not exclude any option. For FRUD, armed struggle was never the only solution. These options come in a wide range, combining social actions and mass actions and diplomatic policies… FRUD has until today ensured its military presence on the ground and is able to respond to any aggression on the part of the AND. In addition, FRUD has considerably strengthened its positions in the Djibouti diaspora in Europe, North America and Oceania [including New Zealand and Australia]” (Les Nouvelles.org, January 24, 2006).

Mokbel complains that “international forces” are placing advanced technology such as satellite surveillance at the disposal of President Guelleh, who uses it to thwart the development of “true democracy” in Djibouti. Guelleh is also accused of playing the French army against the U.S. military to extract the greatest concessions from each (Les Nouvelles.org, January 24, 2006). The FRUD spokesman maintains that the movement has never been equated with terrorism because it has never targeted civilians – “I would even add that the activities of FRUD are the antithesis of religious proselytism (Les Nouvelles.org, January 24, 2006). In June, FRUD appealed to the people of Djibouti to “end the lifetime presidency of Ismael Omar Guelleh” and join FRUD’s struggle for “justice, for a real national state and for authentic democracy” (FRUD communiqué, June 26, carried by the Sudan Tribune, July 3).

France first arrived in the region in 1862, when it acquired the port of Obock from the local Sultans. By 1888, the Djibouti region had become the colony of French Somaliland, giving France a strategic presence in the Horn of Africa that was largely unaffected by independence in 1977 (French Somaliland was known as “The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas” from 1967 to 1977). France continues to guarantee Djibouti’s territorial integrity from foreign aggression, but now finds itself competing for the attention of Djibouti’s leaders with the powerful new American military presence based at Camp Lemonier since 2002. Camp Lemonier, once a French Foreign Legion base, now hosts the American Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which focuses on coordinating U.S. military activity in the region, including anti-terrorism operations. In recent years China has emerged as a new suitor, seeking to establish diplomatic and economic ties with Djibouti.

Though Djibouti’s ethnic-Somalis have so far escaped being dragged into the interminable conflict raging between their ethnic-Somali cousins in Somalia, Djibouti’s role as a host of French and American training of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces and its own offer of peacekeeping troops for Somalia have incensed Somalia’s al-Shabaab Islamist militants. Al-Shabaab, which has carried out a number of deadly suicide bomb attacks against AMISOM targets, has promised to prepare a similar welcome for the Djiboutians (Garowe Online, September 18).

Djibouti’s rapidly deteriorating economy and massive unemployment in an increasingly urban population is another threat to its future stability. Djibouti also has a simmering border conflict with Eritrea in the Ras Doumeira region on the Red Sea coast. Nine members of the AND were killed when fighting broke out with Eritrean forces in June, 2008.

This article first appeared in the September 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Demolition of Infamous Prison Marks Libyan Regime’s Reconciliation with Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

Andrew McGregor

September 17, 2009

In the depths of Tripoli’s notorious Abu Salim prison, imprisoned leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (al-Jama’a al-Islamiya al-Muqatila bi-Libya – LIFG) are ready to release a lengthy refutation of the extreme approach to the Islamic concept of jihad that put them behind bars. Their work, entitled Revisionist Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Hisbah and Takfir, is expected to be published later this month after being reviewed by a number of leading Islamic scholars.

JabirLibyan Defense Minister Abu Bakr Yunus Jabir

The LIFG leaders already issued a public apology to President Muammar Qadhafi on September 1st, the 40th anniversary of the Libyan revolution that brought Colonel Qadhafi to power.

With the publication of the Revisions, Libya is expected to release 50 LIFG prisoners, with the rest expected to follow soon after. These former militants may be among the last to be kept at Abu Salim, home to a quiet massacre in 1996 that may have taken the lives of as many as 1,200 Islamist prisoners (Libyan Jamahiriya Broadcasting Corporation, July 26, 2008). Run by Libya’s Internal Security Agency rather than the Justice Department, Abu Salim has a reputation for torture and summary executions. Libyan authorities have announced their intention to demolish the prison and provide compensation to the families of the victims of the 1996 slaughter following the release of the last LIFG prisoners (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 10). To this end, a judge has been appointed (Muhammad Bashir al-Khaddar), together with six legal assistants.

The decision to open compensation tribunals is reported to have come from the acting Defense Minister, Major General Abu Bakr Yunus Jabir, after a Benghazi court responded to the law suits brought by family members of missing prisoners by ordering the government to disclose the fate of the missing militants (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 10).

Libya’s experiment in rehabilitating former Islamists differs from similar experiments in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (and the mixed results obtained there) in one major way – Libya has the full institutional participation of the LIFG and its leadership in preparing a reconciliation instead of relying on the conversion of militant individuals who may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former organizations.

This article first appeared in the September 17, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Yemen’s President Accuses Iraq’s Sadrists of Backing the Houthi Insurgency

Andrew McGregor

September 17, 2009

Offers from the Iranian government and Iraq’s militant Shi’ite leader Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr to mediate the ongoing and seemingly intractable struggle between the Sana’a regime and the Zaydi Shi’ite Houthist rebels of northern Yemen have been interpreted by Yemen’s government as proof that Iran and the Sadrists are providing guidance and support to the rebel movement.

Muqtada al-Muqtada al-Sadr (AFP)

The issue was raised in a September 11 al-Jazeera interview with Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who said, “We cannot accuse the Iranian official side, but the Iranians are contacting us, saying that they are prepared for a mediation. This means that the Iranians have contacts with them [the Houthists], given that they want to mediate between the Yemeni government and them. Also, Muqtada al-Sadr in al-Najaf in Iraq is asking that he be accepted as a mediator. This means they have a link.” President Saleh also said that two Houthist cells had been arrested and the suspects had admitted receiving $100,000 from Iranian sources. While the accusations of Iranian support for the Shi’ite Houthists are not new, the suggestion that Iraq’s Sadrist movement is supporting the rebels came as a surprise to many.

Yemeni authorities say they have seized caches of weapons made in Iran, while the Houthists claim to have captured Yemeni equipment with Saudi Arabian markings, accusing Sana’a of acting as a Saudi proxy. Iran’s embassy in Sana’a rejected claims that Iranian weapons were found in north Yemen and described all claims of material or financial support to  the rebels as baseless (NewsYemen, September 8; Yemen Observer, September 10).

Iskandar al-Asbahi of Yemen’s ruling General People’s Congress suggested the rebels had asked for diplomatic intervention from their alleged Shi’ite allies. “Despite [the Houthists’] continued attacks on villages and houses, they are calling for a ceasefire and pleading with Iran and Muqtada al-Sadr, the sides which are helping and financing them, to stop the war on them.” Any effort at mediation by al-Sadr or Iran is proof “that the insurgents are agents and serving foreign agendas” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 11).

In Iraq, Saleh’s claims were denounced by Sadrist MP Zaynab al-Kenani, who declared that the Yemeni president’s “accusations against Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr are wrong, otherwise the Yemeni leader should provide evidence supporting his claims” (Aswat al-Iraq, September 12).

A spokesman for Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the rebel commander in Sa’ada Governate, said the president’s allegations of foreign support had a familiar ring. “These remarks are not new for us and the same was said during the previous wars. They are lies by the state. We challenge him to prove what he says” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 11).

While the Zaydi Shi’ites are one of the three main branches of the Shi’a movement, they have little in common theologically with the Shi’ites of Iran and Iraq and have developed in relative isolation from their fellow Shi’ites in the mountains of northern Yemen. The Zaydis have more in common with the Sunnis and even share a preference for the Sunni Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. In the al-Jazeera interview, President Saleh dismissed claims that the Zaydis were fighting religious oppression. “They accuse the regime of being against the Zaydi community, even though we are Zaydis. I am a Zaydi. Nobody says that the Zaydi books or the Zaydi denominations are wrong at all. All this is intended to deceive the public.”

This article first appeared in the September 17, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor