Wild Boars and Black Tigers: The French Commandos of North Vietnam, 1951-54

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

AIS Military History

October 12, 2025

Sampans glide silently in the darkness over an inland waterway in north Vietnam’s Red River delta. Five Frenchmen and 120 Vietnamese commandos are on their way to make a deep behind-the-lines raid on Ho Chi Minh’s communist Viet Minh guerrillas. Their mission involves intelligence collection, seizing prisoners for interrogation and sowing confusion behind enemy lines. Among these nocturnal predators are many former Viet Minh prisoners; the lone French officer and his NCOs operate in the knowledge they may be killed by their own men at any time. This is life in the “Commandos of North Vietnam” (1951-54), a French precursor to the American Green Berets.

When General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny became commander-in-chief of the French Far East Expeditionary Corps in December 1950, French forces had been struggling for nearly six years to re-establish control over the Indochina colonies. Japanese forces destroyed the French occupation army in 1945, leaving a post-war power void exploited by Ho Chi Minh’s communist Viet Minh. The arrival of de Lattre, a legendary French soldier known to his men as “King Jean,” reinvigorates the badly demoralized Expeditionary Corps.

De Lattre, realizing the futility of following the old rules of combat, clears out incompetent officers and introduces new ideas, weapons and tactics, including a plan to create a series of new commando groups for use in northern Vietnam (“Tonkin”). These units, composed almost entirely of Vietnamese troops with a few French officers or NCOs in command, take the war to the Viet Minh using their own methods and intimate knowledge of the terrain. It is a war of no quarter, fought almost exclusively at night by men disguised as the enemy, men with a special gift for killing in the dark.

Origins

Even before the liberation of Paris, Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle was planning to re-establish French control of the Indochina colonies of Laos, Cambodia and the three regions of Vietnam – Cochin China in the south, the central region of Annam and the northern region of Tonkin. In 1944, the first Free French commando groups, officially the Corps Léger d’Intervention (C.L.I.), but better known as Gaurs (wild buffalo), are dropped into Japanese-occupied Laos. Torture is inevitable if captured and cyanide pills are regular issue. [1] Some of the commandos are highly trained veterans of the Free French companies of the British Special Air Service (SAS) and continue to wear the regiment’s green berets.

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese Army depose the French Vichy government in Indochina, slaughtering entire garrisons in surprise attacks. Two French Gaur groups are dropped into Tonkin by British planes to assist the fighting withdrawal to China of a column of starving and bloodied French colonial troops. Few of the Gaurs survive, most dying in suicidal attempts to delay the Japanese.

These early commandos are reliant on British training, transport and equipment, as the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS – predecessor to the CIA) initially supports Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist guerrillas over the French. This preference is in line with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s vision of a post-war world where national self-determination will replace European imperialism.

Battle of the Day River

After years of bitter fighting in Vietnam’s jungles and mountains, it is the performance of mixed groups of French and Vietnamese commandos at the Battle of the Day River (May 28-June 18, 1951) that convinces General de Lattre to make the commandos a formal part of the French Expeditionary Corps.

The Limestone Crags at Ninh Binh

When the Viet Minh’s 320th Division launches an offensive along the Day River, they are opposed by small French units holding two limestone crags at Ninh Binh. One of the peaks is held by “King Jean’s” son, Bernard de Lattre, who is following his father’s order to hold the French position at all costs. A mostly Vietnamese commando led by a massive young French NCO, Roger Vandenberghe, is called upon to reinforce the young lieutenant by climbing the crag under heavy fire. Machine-gun fire sends climbers plummeting down the cliff, and eventually finds Vandenberghe. Wounded, he signals his second-in-command, Sergeant Tran Dinh Vy, to finish the assault. The slight but formidable sergeant is a former seminarian who has become a master of guerrilla tactics.

During the attack, the bleeding Vandenberghe retrieves the body of his friend, Bernard, a victim of Viet mortar fire. The recovery ingratiates Vandenberghe to General de Lattre, who is deeply disturbed by the loss of his only child. [2] From this point, de Lattre acts as a patron to Vandenberghe, whose savage way of war is bringing him close to dismissal by French commanders alarmed by his methods. “King Jean,” who will declare Vandenberghe “the greatest soldier in Indochina,” authorizes the creation of formal French Army commando units on July 2, 1951.

Elsewhere at Ninh Binh, two battalions of Viet Minh, the lead elements of Giap’s offensive, run into a naval commando unit on May 28, 1951, the 76-man Commando François led by Lieutenant Albert Labbens. Cornered in an abandoned church, the commandos hold off an overwhelming communist force for 24 hours, allowing the French to rush forces to the area and stop the offensive. The end of Commando François comes when 29 mostly wounded survivors make a sally from the church after running out of ammunition. To honor their sacrifice, the commando was never reconstituted. [3]

The Battle of the Day River ends three weeks later as a disaster for Giap, who leaves 12,000 dead behind. It is a tactical lesson for the communist general, but cements the reputation of the French commandos.

Training

Responsibility for organizing the commandos is handed to Louis Fourcade, commander of the 1st Battalion of Colonial Paratroopers. Fourcade spent WWII as an officer in the Vichy colonial army in Indochina, with secret contacts to Free French agents working across the border in China. He was involved in the desperate fighting against the Japanese in the last months of the war.

Louis Fourcade

The new commando units normally include 120 Vietnamese under a European officer or, more commonly, a senior NCO, aided by four other NCOs and at least one European radio operator. Viet Minh prisoners are given the chance to avoid heavy labor by volunteering to join the new commando groups. This is a highly dangerous practice; while it brings on board men who are intimately familiar with the enemy and his methods, it also hands arms to men who might wait months before suddenly turning on their leaders. Sleeping becomes as precarious for the commando leaders as a fire-fight with the enemy. To let one’s guard down for a minute is to invite death.

Yvan Tommasi

Training is carried out at the Vat Chay commando school by SAS veteran Captain Michel Legrand. Later training of the commandos is undertaken by one of the hardest men in the French Army – Yvan Tommasi, an Algerian-born officer of the Colonial Paratroops and a Free French veteran of fighting in Africa and Europe. In 1950, he loses his right hand while seizing a bomb from the hands of a trainee who had mistakenly set it to explode. Rather than retire, Tommasi continues to jump and is appointed trainer of the commandos in February 1952. Captured leading a raid in January 1953, Tommasi spends six months in a Viet Minh prison camp. There, he is singled out by French communist and turncoat Georges Boudarel, who tries to break him by forcing him to dig all the graves for the camp with his left arm and the stump of the right. Tommasi is kept busy; 85% of the prisoners in Camp 113 die from torture and mistreatment while being forced to sing the praises of Ho Chi Minh. [4] Tommasi survives and continues to serve in the colonial paratroops in Africa until 1966. [5] Amazingly, the unrepentant Boudarel is hired as a professor by a Paris university after the war.

The commandos are taught to fight at night. As Captain Delayen of Commando 13 recalled:

After having overcome the visceral fear of the night, and the completion of special training requiring the greatest discipline, the [Vietnamese] auxiliaries were convinced that, lightly armed as they were, only night action could allow them to dominate an adversary unaccustomed to not be the only ones operating at night. [6]

Internal cohesion is achieved by recovering commando families living in Viet Minh-occupied zones, building schools, pagodas and married quarters beside the commando base, and forming the atmosphere of “a big family” through the cultivation of vegetables and the raising of chickens and pigs.

Operations

The commandos do not perform normal military duties such as routine patrols or guarding military posts. When necessary, they operate in conjunction with regular troops on larger military operations. [7] The commandos use weapons supplied by the English and Chinese weapons captured from the Viets, including Thompson machine-guns and WWII-era Sten guns. Grenade launchers and small 50- or 60-mm mortars complete the light armament of these highly mobile units. Many wear the black cotton uniform of the Viet Minh, complete with sneakers, palm helmets and a Red Star insignia.

To gather intelligence, the commandos venture deep into enemy territory to observe movements, take prisoners and disrupt communist political networks. Attendees at Viet Minh meetings live in fear of French commandos bursting in, firing their Thompson machine-guns from the waist. The commandos are taught to aim at the feet of their targets in close combat, as the Thompsons tend to jump up when fired.

In his memoir, Sergeant Bernard Gaudin of 25 Commando describes a night ambush during a deep raid on the Viet Minh. Ambushes mean hours of silent misery, uniforms soaked by an endless drizzle. Nerves are on a razor edge as eyes strain to detect movement in the inky darkness. The torment of mosquitoes is unrelenting but must be endured noiselessly:

Canh, my faithful corporal, whispers in my ear: “Chief, there are a lot of Viets.” (…) Here we go, all the Commandos who are waiting for this break loose. We can finally cough, yell – it’s recommended. The bursts and explosions of grenades tear the night apart. Immediately, there is a pack of Viets on the mat. We hear them shouting orders to try a maneuver but we shoot at everything that moves. [8]

With prisoners taken and the Viet Minh column destroyed, Gaudin leads his men back by a different route. The waiting Viet Minh begin to rain down grenades as they cross a rice paddy. Two of his men are killed before fire rakes the Commando from sharpshooters in the trees. A Dinassaut (armored landing craft) makes a welcome appearance on the river and lays down heavy fire until the shooting stops. The Commando returns to camp, where a blazing fire enables the start of “Operation Leech,” as the men burn off blood-engorged parasites with a cigarette, dropping them to sizzle in the flames. [9] Gaudin’s raid yields a treasure-trove of intelligence documents, including the cipher to the Viet Minh code. At other times, it is the commandos who are the victims; when Commando 34 operates in Laos in support of the besieged French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, Sergent-Chef Müller leads it into a devastating ambush, losing 68 of its 107 men, including Müller.

Dinassaut with a Mixed French/Viet Crew

The Dinassaut are surplus American shallow-draft LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanized), modified to bring heavy firepower to support infantry and commando operations in the shallow waterways of the Red River Delta. For this, the Dinassaut deploy heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars and even tank turrets welded onto the crafts. They save more than one commando group and are effective enough to serve as a model for later American river operations in the south.

The physical challenges alone are daunting on operations and exacerbated by a shortage of medicines and medical personnel. In the infernal heat, unbearable prickly heat is enough to drive a man mad. Clothing is little better than a curse; damp clothes and web gear rubbing on skin creates raw patches that quickly become infected before the flesh begins to rot. Boils, warts and the festering lumps provided by stinging and biting insects complete the assault on the skin. Internally, the body is host to large worms that have a disconcerting habit of popping out through the mouth as well as the anus; externally, the body sustains legions of leeches, mindless and ubiquitous creatures devoted to bleeding a man dry. Eye diseases that deprive a man of sight are rife; malaria and a multitude of tropical ailments make delirious fever an almost normal condition. Amoebic dysentery, endemic in the polluted rice paddies and streams that double as toilets for the locals, provides a slow and demoralizing death.

Despite these challenges, it is necessary for the leaders of the commandos to continually demonstrate physical and mental strength or risk losing the men under them. For officers of the French regular army, this dirty, stressful and highly dangerous work is commonly viewed as more likely to lead to an early death than promotion. Leadership roles are thus opened to audacious NCOs who may not have graduated the French St. Cyr military academy, but are capable of innovation, independent action and, most of all, killing Viet Minh. Contrary to expectations, the experience of the surviving commando leaders propels them rapidly through the ranks after the French withdrawal from Indochina. Men who understood the “new warfare” developed in Indochina would be needed in Algeria.

In response to the pressure of the commandos, the ever-adaptive Viet Minh create a counter-commando force, the Dich Van. This covert unit is assigned the task of infiltrating native troop formations aligned with the French Expeditionary Corps, often by intimidating the families of pro-French fighters. [10]  Dich Van propaganda teams recruit Foreign Legion deserters to persuade French Expeditionary Corps prisoners in French, German and other European languages to adopt Marxist ideology and take up arms against their former comrades.

The Wild Boar

Several French commanders achieve fame in this highly unconventional form of fighting, one fought with knives as much as sub-machine guns. One of these is a solid, thick-set Corsican lieutenant, Charles Alphonse Rusconi. For his ferocious fighting style, the Corsican is known as Le Sanglier, “the wild boar.”

Fanion of Commando 24

Rusconi begins his military career in 1936 by joining the Colonial Army’s 10th Regiment of Senegalese Tirailleurs (riflemen). He leads several daring commando raids behind German lines in 1940 before being wounded and captured. Escaping only two months later, he joins the French forces in Indochina in 1948, forming Commando 24 from Viet Minh prisoners and Black Colonial Army troops from Mali. The latter, mostly large men, say their commander is “small, but cunning.” Through unrelenting attacks that shatter Viet Minh morale, his group forces a significant decline in communist activity in his zone of operations.

The 33-year-old Rusconi, survivor of four wounds, is killed in February 1952 when one of his commandos, a former Viet Minh officer influenced by the Dich Van, opens a way into the camp for a company of Viet Minh. Rusconi and most of his command fall in vicious hand-to-hand fighting, knives, fists and boots flailing to the last.

The Black Tigers

Childhood for Roger Vandenberghe and his brother Albert is extremely difficult. Born in a Paris slum, their father dies from tuberculosis in 1939. Their mother, a Spanish Jew, is sent by Vichy authorities to a Nazi death camp. With little education, the boys join the French Resistance as mere teenagers, followed by service as commandos in General de Lattre’s First French Army in Alsace and Germany.  After the war, Vandenberghe and his brother arrive in Vietnam as part of the 6th Colonial Infantry regiment. Roger is immediately taken with the country, a place far different from the crowded tenements of Paris. Already decorated with the Croix de Guerre for his Resistance work, Vandenberghe quickly makes sergeant in command of a unit of Vietnamese auxiliaries that becomes Commando 24, “The Black Tigers.”

Roger Vanderberghe

Vandenberghe’s nemesis in Vietnam is Chapuis, a former French paratrooper who deserted to the communists. In June 1948, Chapuis kills Vandenberghe’s younger brother, his only family in the world. The deserter is captured by Vandenberghe in 1951 and sent to the French post at Nam Dinh, where he escapes and returns to the Viet Minh.

Vandenberghe’s most famous exploit comes when one of his turned commandos reveals the location of a Viet Minh command post. Vandenberghe allows himself to be bound as a prisoner and carried along by his men in Viet Minh uniform, passing through checkpoints by insisting they are going to collect the reward on Vandenberghe’s head.  Once inside the command post, Vandenberghe is released; he and his men slaughter everyone there, seizing a treasure trove of documents and weapons. [11]

Vanderberghe Meets an Astonished General De Lattre at Phu Ly

This fearsome NCO has little use for the officers of the French army, but is impressed by the leadership of General De Lattre, his former commander in France. He leads his men 12 miles through enemy territory to see the general at a gathering in Phu Ly. The general is astonished to see this towering European in a Viet Minh uniform and helmet. Vandenberghe explains his appearance as necessary while operating almost exclusively behind enemy lines. De Lattre is taken by this odd but unforgettable warrior, remarking a few days later: “It’s a bit as if a tiger, in addition to its fangs and claws, received a hunting license…” [12]

The French commandos fight brutal, no-quarter battles in a tropical darkness where the normal conventions of war hold no sway. Even in these conditions, Vandenberghe stands out for waging a vicious and pitiless war using methods the French command find disturbing. He drives his men hard; complaints are met with a reminder that, without him, his turncoat troops “would be in jail or eaten by maggots.” [13] Desertions are frequent and Vandenberghe is shot in the back by one of his own men in 1949. After returning from medical treatment in France he becomes even more unrestrained, his NCOs struggling to keep him in check, especially in his dealings with the civilian population.  Vandenberghe pays little heed to the criticism of his methods by French officers, insisting that war was about killing, so they were best to leave him to it. [14]

Vanderberghe and Rusconi in Hanoi, February 7, 1952

Paratrooper Phillipe de Pirey recalled a parade held in honor of General de Lattre that featured the Vandenberghe and Rusconi commandos, “most striking” in Viet Minh-style black shorts and shirts, topped with Latanier (palm) helmets with red stars on a yellow background. Beside their Sten-guns with fifty round magazines, numerous knives and grenades hung from their belts. Once onlookers managed to overcome the shock of witnessing these former Viet Minh warriors parading in the streets of Hanoi in the uniforms of the enemy, it was possible for de Pirey to admit “the men in these units looked rather splendid.” [15]

Tran Dinh Vy – Tiger and Legionnaire

On January 6, 1952, at a time when most of Commando 24 is on leave, Vietnamese sentries who had managed to infiltrate the unit allow a Viet Minh team that may include the deserter Chapuis to enter the camp. The assassins move silently and Vandenberghe is butchered in his sleep by a former Viet Minh officer under his command. Ten others are killed; the few wounded who survive include Sergeant Tran Dinh Vy, who goes on to serve in the army of South Vietnam.  Arriving in France after the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, this exceptional soldier joins the French Foreign Legion, attaining the rank of colonel.

Commando 24 in Viet Minh Uniforms

Wounded seven times by bullets, grenades and mines before his death, Vandenberghe becomes the most highly decorated French NCO of the 20th century. An obituary in a leading Paris newspaper notes that the war enabled Vandenberghe to “find in the combats of the jungle the blossoming of his barbaric personality.” [16] Five days after Vandenberghe’s death, General de Lattre dies of cancer in Paris and is laid to rest alongside his son, Bernard, marking the end of the short but eventful relationship between the king, his prince and the tiger who served them.

End of the North Vietnam Commandos

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the French command decides to evacuate the southern half of the Red River Delta. Hundreds of Vietnamese begin to desert the French forces. Two sections of Commando 35 murder their French commander, Lieutenant Nedelec, and two French NCOs before joining the enemy in July 1954. [17]

Général Salan and the Commando Yatagan in Algeria

With the French war over, the native remnants of the commando groups assemble at Haiphong and are sent to South Vietnam to form the 1st Battalion de Marche des Commandos (BMC). Their French officers and NCOs find themselves in demand and are sent to Algeria to continue French experiments in counter-insurgency. Commando 13’s Captain Jean-Louis Delayen forms the Yatagan Commando in Algeria, a French-led unit of Algerian Muslims operating along the lines established by the North Vietnam commandos. A second-generation member of the French colonial infantry, Delayen finishes his career in 1978 as one of the most decorated soldiers in the French army.

Tomb of Roger Vanderberghe, Pau, France (Joel Herbez)

Vandenberghe’s remains are repatriated to France from the Nam Dinh cemetery in 1989, where they are interred in a monument honoring the “Black Tiger” at the National NCO Academy in Pau.

By the end of the war in 1954, Viet Minh losses to the Nord Viet-Nam commandos include 3,664 dead, 481 wounded and 4,649 taken prisoner. European commando losses include 73 dead, 25 wounded and 6 missing. Losses of Vietnamese commandos in French service appear not to have been recorded but could only be described as substantial. [18]

Louis Fourcade, who had organized the commandos, honors them after the war: “Thanks to their ardor, their contempt for danger, the initiative of their leaders, the courage and undeniable devotion of their men, the North Vietnam commandos acquired and deserved their reputation of being always into the breach.” [19]

NOTES

 [1] Jean le Morillon, p.134.

[2] Bernard Fall, p. 45.

[3] Groizeleau.

[4] Yves Beigbeder, p. 73.

[5] Denizot.

[6] Captain Delayen (later General Delayen), quoted in Pissardy, p.251.

[7] LeBreton.

[8] Gaudin, Reprinted in Pissardy, p.266.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Colonel Michel Reeb.

[11] LeBreton.

[12] Forum La Guerre d’Indochine.

[13] Bergot, 1997.

[14] Favrel, 1952.

[15]  De Pirey, p.159.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Pissardy, p.51.

[18] LeBreton

[19] Reeb

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beigbeder, Yves: Judging War Crimes and Torture: French Justice and International Criminal Tribunals and Commissions,  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.

Bergot, Erwan: Commando Vandenberghe, Pygmalion, Paris, 1997.

Denizot, Jean-Jacques: L’épopée des trois Capitaines. Jean Claveranne – Henri Morin – Yvan Tommasi. Trois vies, un destin, 2000, https://www.monsieur-legionnaire.org/images/epopee-des-trois-capitaines.pdf

Fall, Bernard: Street Without Joy, Pall Mall Press, London, 1961.

Favrel, Charles: “La Mort d’un Baroudeur,” Le Monde, January 9, 1952, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1952/01/09/la-mort-d-un-baroudeur_1993178_1819218.html

Forum La Guerre d’Indochine: “L’Adjutant-Chef Roger Vandenberghe,” April 9, 2009, https://laguerreenindochine.forumactif.org/t541p1-l-adjudant-chef-roger-vandenberghe

Gaudin, Bernard, Commando 25, Paris, 1990.

Groizeleau, Vincent: “Un ancien du commando François arrive en P-51 sur la BAN d’Hyères,”
Mer et Marine, June 16, 2014, https://www-meretmarine-com.translate.goog/fr/defense/un-ancien-du-commando-francois-arrive-en-p-51-sur-la-ban-d-hyeres?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=op,sc

Kennedy, Paul J.: Dinassaut Operations in Indochina: 1946-1954, Unpublished MA Thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico VA, 2001.

LeBreton, A.: “Commandos Nord Vietnam,” Versailles, July 31, 2007, http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.acuf.fr%2FArticle%2FCommandos%2520Nord%2520Vietnam.htm

Le Morillon, Jean: Un Breton en Indochine, Paris, 2000.

de Pirey, Philippe, Operation Waste, Arco, London, 1954.

Pissardy, Jean-Pierre: Commandos Nord-Vietnam, 1951-1954, Indo Éditions, Paris, 1999.

Reeb, Colonel Michel: “Commando Nord Viet-Nam,” La Charte, December 2003.

 

Russian Military Presence in Mali Contributes to State Collapse

Posted on by

Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 22(129), Washington DC

September 30, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • The presence of Russian military personnel in Mali has failed to prevent the expansion of the jihadist insurgency into the once-safe central and western regions of the country.
  • Fissures have erupted in Mali’s ruling military junta over issues related to operational cooperation with Russian military personnel who tend to operate independently of Mali’s command structure and are accused of human-rights abuses.
  • Russian forces are unhappy with difficulties related to their entry into Mali’s lucrative minerals sector and the arrival of Turkish military contractors assigned to train the president’s security staff.

Four years into the Russian military deployment that began with the arrival of Wagner personnel, Mali has become less secure and the jihadists have grown stronger, more numerous, wider ranging, and more daring attacks on urban centers and military bases (see EDM, September 6, 2023, March 12, 2024; see Terrorism Monitor, June 26, 2020, December 11, 2024). Three months after Wagner withdrew in June and Russia’s Africa Corps began its Malian deployment, the Russian military presence is not only failing to quell Mali’s 13-year-old Islamist and separatist insurgency, but is now adding to Mali’s political turmoil (see EDM, July 9). Russian forces have both failed to retake the jihadist homeland in northern Mali and to prevent a large-scale infiltration of Islamist gunmen into the once-safe central and western regions of the country. The inability of foreign forces, such as the recently expelled French military, to repress the insurgency is beginning to create fissures in Mali’s five-year-old military junta.

JNIM celebrate after the ambush of a Russian convoy near Ténenkou, August 1, 2025

Recently, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM) movement scored a victory over Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) and the allied Russian Africa Corps when it ambushed a Russian convoy near Ténenkou in the central Malian region of Mopti on August 1. An estimated 14 Russians and over 35 Malian soldiers died (France24, August 13). The bodies of three white combatants were shown in the video, including one wounded soldier who was executed with a shot to the head. A second video showed JNIM fighters rummaging through a damaged Russian Ural-4320 truck (X/@Permafr95699535, August 1). The scene was reminiscent of the Wagner/FAMa defeat at Tinzawatène at the hands of JNIM and Tuareg separatists of the Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad (CSP-DPA) on July 25, 2024 (see EDM, September 11, 2024).

JNIM fighters inspect damaged Russian truck at Ténenkou

The region around Ténenkou is dominated by the Fulani, cattle-herding Muslims whose regular clashes with farming communities have led to reprisals by government forces and local militias. This leads to recruitment by Fulani-dominated jihadist groups such as the al-Qaeda-aligned Katiba Macina (MLF) (CTC, February 2017). Fulani fighters from the Katiba Macina were at the forefront of a September 17, 2024, raid on Russian and Malian military personnel in Mali’s capital, Bamako (see EDM, October 9, 2024). MLF leader Amadou Koufa stated that the raid was a response to civilian massacres by FAMa and their Russian allies (X/SaladinAlDronni, September 17, 2024).

The Russian military presence has failed to prevent the expansion of jihadist operations into parts of Mali that were previously unaffected by such. JNIM’s June to September offensive in western Mali climaxed with the September 3 announcement of a JNIM blockade of imports from neighboring Senegal and Mauritania (Africa Report, September 7). The blockade of the Kayes and Nioro regions is intended to prevent the import of fuel and other goods to landlocked Mali and Bamako, where fuel is already in short supply, affecting both military and commercial flights (Anadolu Ajansı, July 10). Mali’s regime responded with airstrikes in Kayes on September 8 after jihadists stopped and emptied fuel tankers from Senegal (TRT Global, September 8).

The regime’s inability to restore security to Mali, even with the aid of Russian troops, has created an atmosphere of distrust in the highest levels of the military. An unauthorized early August meeting of senior officers to discuss issues related to cooperation with the Russian Africa Corps led to a wave of arrests of front-line officers and other ranks that began on August 10 and continued for days. At least 55 soldiers were arrested, including two popular generals, on charges they were preparing a coup against the junta with the help of “foreign states” (Africa News, August 11; Al-Jazeera, August 15; L’Essor, August 19).

General Sadio Camara meets with Russian defense officials in Moscow, including Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) (Russian Defense Ministry)

One junta leader who escaped arrest was Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs Lieutenant General Sadio Camara, the individual responsible for arranging the arrival of Russian contractors in Mali. Camara has acted as the point man for the junta’s dealings with both the Wagner Group and its successor, the Africa Corps, which operates under the direction of Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Camara, however, has come under suspicion after the mass arrests of suspect officers, most of whom belong to Mali’s Garde Nationale, known as the “Brown Berets” (RFI, August 10). The Garde and its leaders are closely tied to Camara, who founded the force. Disagreements between junta leader General Assimi Goïta and Camara over the allocation of Malian mines to Russian interests may have contributed to the growing rivalry between the two men (The Sentry, August 2025). Camara is seeing much of his network of supporters dismantled, leaving him in a precarious position regarding his former ally, Goïta. While Goïta still approves of the Russian presence and has even authorized its expansion through recent talks in Moscow, he is wary of allowing a transfer of resources and national authority to the Russians, as has occurred in the Central African Republic.

Mali’s Garde Nationale – The “Brown Berets” (Bamada.net)

Only days after the purge of many of his followers, Camara represented Mali in Moscow during a meeting of defense ministers of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) and their Russian counterpart, Andrei Belousov, as well as Africa Corps leader Yunus Bek Yevkurov (see MLM, April 18, 2024; The Moscow Times, August 14; Bamada.net, August 15). During the proceedings, Camara declared his support for Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine (APA, August 14). In Mali, Camara has the support of Modibo Koné, the powerful pro-Russian leader of the Agence Nationale de Sécurité de l’État (ANSE) and a product of Camara’s Garde Nationale (Bamada.net, March 24).

SADAT mercenaries with President Erdoğan of Turkiye (North Africa Post)

Complicating the Russian relationship with the regime is the arrival in Bamako of SADAT, a self-proclaimed Turkish private military company providing “military training and defense consulting” (Sadat.com.tr, accessed September 28). SADAT’s main role in Mali appears to be the provision of training to Goïta’s security detail, though there are reports of Syrian SADAT members finding themselves on the front lines of the war against the Islamists (Le Monde, June 7, 2024). SADAT relies heavily on recruitment from Syrian fighters of the Syrian National Army (SNA, a coalition of Turkish-aligned Syrian rebels) and Turkmen from Syria’s Sultan Murad Division (NATO Defense Foundation, April 9). The organization was founded in 2012 by Erdoğan’s former military advisor, Brigadier General Adnan Tanrıverdi, and is believed to still enjoy Erdoğan’s patronage (Medya News, June 25, 2023; Le Monde, June 7, 2024; Gazete Duvar, December 27, 2024). Türkiye’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (leader of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), stated in June that “Russia’s Wagner is Türkiye’s SADAT Inc” (Duvar, June 24). SADAT’s role in protecting the junta leader suggests Goïta has some degree of suspicion regarding the ultimate intentions of the Russians or their supporters in Mali.

SADAT founder Adnan Tanriverdi (CNN Türk)

The junta appears to have been under the impression that Russian forces might enable it to escape the neo-colonialism inherent in the French and UN military presence in Mali. Instead, they have found a new partner set on accessing Mali’s natural resources, and that is even more selective in choosing which operations or actions it should carry out than the French.

The Russians so far appear to be disappointed by the lack of access to Mali’s lucrative mining sector, with the expected lucrative mining licenses failing to materialize for the most part (The Sentry, August 2025). One-half of Mali’s tax revenues derive from its gold mining industry (Reuters, July 19, 2023). Russia looks toward gold revenues from its activities in Africa to help fund its ongoing and costly war against Ukraine (see EDM, July 16).

The replacement of Wagner with the Africa Corps has not meant a wholesale replacement of Russian troops. Some 80 percent of Mali’s Africa Corps consists of Wagner personnel who chose to transfer into the new Russian Ministry of Defense unit rather than return to Russia, where they would likely find themselves on the front lines of the war against Ukraine (Africa Business Insider, August 28). There is growing friction between FAMa and the Russian troops, who tend to operate outside the Malian chain of command, appropriating resources, weapons, and transport for their operations. The Russian contractors are disliked for selectively intervening in support of FAMa.

As Mali endures economic, political, and military crises, the country’s ruling junta is seeking scapegoats. As ruptures appear in the ruling junta, it may only be a matter of time before the largely unproductive experiment with Russian security assistance offers Mali’s inept military rulers a new target for blame.

Western Sahara’s Polisario Movement: Manufacturing a Threat to Global Security

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Western Sahara’s Polisario Movement: Manufacturing a Threat to Global Security

Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 23(5)

Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

September 10, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Founded in 1973, the Polisario Front remains a UN-recognized secular liberation movement seeking independence from Moroccan rule. U.S. legislators are considering labeling the Sahrawi independence movement a terrorist group, fueled by allegations of ties to Iran, Hezbollah, and global jihadist networks, despite a lack of credible evidence. Accusations against the group appear to largely be intended to delegitimize the movement and reinforce Morocco’s ties with the United States and Israel.
  • The recent move against the group in the West is based on claims of Iranian training, rocket attacks with Iranian weapons, and a Polisario presence in Syria that appears largely fabricated or exaggerated through Moroccan, Israeli, and Western media outlets. Credible sources and intelligence officials reject a meaningful connection.

Polisario Fighters (Rue 20)

Recent media claims have put a lightly-armed group of independence-seeking desert fighters from Western Sahara, an obscure former Spanish colony, at the heart of an Iranian-backed terrorist network with designs on Morocco, Israel, Europe, and even the United States. U.S. legislators are now preparing to designate the 52-year-old Polisario movement as an international terrorist group and a general threat to world order (U.S. House of Representatives, June 24). This would represent the culmination of a massive and often contradictory campaign of misinformation and disinformation by promoters of Moroccan interests in the region, and promote closer ties between Morocco, Israel, and the United States.

The Polisario’s Progression

The Polisario (derived from the Spanish Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) was formed in 1973 with Algerian assistance to battle Spanish occupation. The Sahrawis who dwell in what is now known as Western Sahara were traditionally free-ranging nomads of Sanhaja Berber and Arab (of the Bani Hassan tribe) descent. They are Sunni Muslims of the Maliki school common to northwest Africa, and their society is tribal, with the Reguibat (who once provided native troops for the Spanish colony) forming the dominant group. The United Nations recognizes the Polisario Front as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people.

As the Polisario emerged in the 1970s, it adopted the Marxist and African socialist liberation ideology favored by independence movements across the continent at the time. However, the movement abandoned Marxism at a 1991 movement congress, a move partly inspired by the collapse of the Soviet Union that year (Guardian, February 11, 1999). When Spain relinquished its Saharan colony in 1975, the Polisario Front proclaimed the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic with its capital at Laayoune.

Its independence, however, was immediately challenged by both Mauritania and Morocco, igniting a 16-year war for independence that stopped after Mauritania relinquished its claims, and a ceasefire was achieved with Morocco in 1991. By this time, Morocco had taken control of 80 percent of Western Sahara, which it consolidated through the construction of a 1700-mile fortified berm (a sand wall, or “the wall of shame and humiliation” in Sahrawi parlance). Today, at least 90,000 Sahrawi refugees live across the Algerian border in camps in Tindouf, which forms the base of the Polisario and its military wing, the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

Sahrawis in Tindouf (Dikó Betancourt)

The ceasefire has been monitored since 1991 by UN peacekeepers, the Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Organización de un Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental (MINURSO). The 1991 agreement called for a referendum of Sahrawis to decide on union with Morocco or independence. The referendum was never held, leaving the conflict in a state of paralysis. As disputes over voter eligibility rage on, the number of Moroccans encouraged to settle in the territory grows by the day, bringing an inevitable conclusion in favor of Rabat. Morocco has offered the Sahrawi autonomy, but is inflexible in insisting that Western Sahara should be rightfully understood as a traditional territory under the sovereignty of the Moroccan king.

In 2020, the Guerguerat incident led to the Polisario’s withdrawal from the 1991 ceasefire. Guerguerat is an important border post between Mauritania and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, where a Moroccan military operation against Sahrawi protesters led to clashes with Polisario fighters (Al Jazeera, November 13, 2020). The incident ignited other clashes, as the Polisario rejected the ceasefire and returned to a state of war. This unilateral move cost the Polisario badly needed international support.

Polisario’s Unwitting Entry into the Arab–Israeli Conflict

The Sahrawis have no history of engagement in hostilities against Israel. In contrast, Morocco sent a 5,500-man expeditionary force to fight alongside Arab forces in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Jeune Afrique, November 7, 2013). Since then, Morocco, which has the Arab world’s largest Jewish population, has moved toward rehabilitating its relationship with Israel.

When Rabat signed on to the Abraham Accords (normalizing relations between Israel and Arab states) on December 10, 2020, the Trump administration rewarded Morocco by recognizing its sovereignty over Western Sahara. The idea of U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara in exchange for participation in the Abraham Accords came from an Israeli group led by former Mossad deputy director and Knesset member Ram Ben Barak. The concept was then pursued by Trump senior adviser Jared Kushner and special envoy Avi Berkowitz for two years before its realization in 2020 (Axios, December 11, 2020). Morocco, Africa’s second-largest arms importer (rival Algeria is first), has in recent years turned to Israel as a major supplier of weapons, drones, and military reconnaissance satellites (The New Arab, April 16, 2024; Le Monde, May 9, 2024; Defense Post, August 15, 2024).

Since the 2020 U.S. recognition of Moroccan rule in the Western Sahara, only the Polisario has remained to be dealt with. A broad campaign emerged from sources in Israeli media, Moroccan media, and U.S. think-tanks that accused the Sahrawi separatists of jihadist terrorism and, most potently, of being willing tools of Iran’s ayatollahs. The small and once obscure movement is now alleged to be part of a “Tindouf–Tehran connection that threatens Africa’s sovereignty and security” (Atalyar [Madrid], June 2). The movement has, in addition, been accused by various groups of trafficking refugees, narcotics, and humanitarian and medical aid, as well as engaging in forced conscription and illegal detentions (Times of Israel, July 3).

The Polisario: An Iranian Proxy?

Morocco severed ties with Iran in 2018 after Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita accused Algeria of providing operational support for Iranian and Hezbollah military and logistical aid to the Polisario (Al Jazeera, May 13, 2018; Morocco World News, June 30). The move helped align Morocco with the anti-Iran lobby in Washington. The Polisario, meanwhile, now faces U.S. bipartisan congressional legislation in the form of the “Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act,” sponsored by Republican Representative Joe Wilson and Democratic Representative Jimmy Panetta, both vocal supporters of Israeli military action against Gaza and coordinated U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran. Wilson maintains that the Polisario “is a Marxist militia” backed by Iran, Hezbollah, Cuba, and Russia, which is “providing Iran a strategic outpost in Africa” while destabilizing West Africa and the Kingdom of Morocco (X/@RepJoeWilson, January 15, June 26).

The Polisario rejects the proposed designation, in part, on the grounds that the designation requires threats to U.S. national security or U.S. citizens. The group asserts that “The Polisario Front has never attacked U.S. civilians or citizens. Its operations are directed exclusively against Moroccan military forces within the framework of a UN-recognized armed conflict” (ECSaharaui, June 27). If the legislation passes, it will make Algeria, the Polisario’s principal military, financial, and diplomatic supporter, a potential sponsor of terrorism. [1]

Polisario Patrol (SPS)

Alarming coverage in some British media has warned that the Polisario, “a Marxist militia backed by Iran [and] Hezbollah” (notably omitting Algeria), had plans to attack British and Israeli interests “as part of the group’s increasing terror alliance with Iran and their other proxies” (The Telegraph, July 1). Israeli sources similarly have claimed that the Polisario are “Iran-backed mercenaries operating from Algerian soil, funded by Tehran’s Quds Force, trained by Hezbollah operatives, and increasingly useful to Moscow … As Morocco deepens ties with Israel and the U.S., the Iran–Hezbollah axis sees the Western Sahara as the perfect place to retaliate…” (Ynet, April 19). The Polisario insists that “the ‘Iran–Hezbollah–Polisario axis’ narrative is entirely fabricated: a geopolitical propaganda tactic intended to associate the Polisario Front with U.S. regional adversaries, despite the lack of credible intelligence or official confirmation from U.S. security agencies” (ECSaharaui, June 27).

Shi’ite Iran’s efforts to create political and military relationships in the Sunni-majority Arab world have always been complicated by suspicion that it secretly intends to expand Shi’a religious influence. In 2022, Morocco’s foreign minister, Nasser Bourita, warned that “Iran plans to enter West Africa and to spread the Shi’a doctrine in the region” (New Arab, January 27, 2022). The Polisario, composed exclusively of Sunni Muslims, seems an unlikely tool if Iran’s involvement is religiously motivated.

The Polisario in Syria?

A document published on X by Moroccan former deputy Lahcen Haddad in December 2024 claimed that 120 Polisario fighters were sent to Syria in 2011 to receive military training from Syrians and Algerians. This was said to be done with “collaboration” from Hezbollah. The post saw wide distribution across the platform in 2025. The document offered alleged proof of the long-suspected “Iranian connection” to the Polisario. Despite claims that the file was found in “boxes of documents abandoned” by Bashar al-Assad during his December 2024 flight from Syria, it appears to have originated on a Moroccan Facebook page in April 2023 (X/Lahcenhaddad, December 10, 2024; Le360, April 21; African Digital Democracy Observatory, June 27).

Recent assertions of an armed Polisario presence in Syria include a 2024 article written by Fahad al-Masri, president of the National Salvation Front of Syria and a Paris-based Syrian expatriate dedicated to creating a Syrian–Moroccan partnership. Al-Masri claimed, based on anonymous but “reliable military sources on the ground in Syria,” that 200 Polisario fighters had been deployed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to a Syrian base close to the Israeli border. There, they allegedly received Iranian training for the past three years (Ynet, November 23, 2024; African Digital Democracy Observatory, June 27).

In December 2024, the Algerian ambassador to Syria, Kamel Bouchama, made an innocent remark to the effect that some 500 Algerians or individuals of Algerian descent lived in Aleppo, Syria, including some families who had resided in the area for hundreds of years. In the hands of various Moroccan sources, the statement transformed into an assertion that 500 Polisario fighters carrying Algerian passports were under IRGC command in Aleppo. Though the ambassador clarified that the presence of these fighters was “purely imaginary,” references to the “500,” now supposedly detained and awaiting trial in Syria, continue to infect coverage of the “Iranian-controlled Polisario threat” despite no evidence of their existence (Arab Weekly, April 13; Watan News, April 25; African Digital Democracy Observatory, June 27).

The story of the “500” Iranian-trained Polisario in Syrian detention was later picked up by the Washington Post. It appeared in paragraph 30 of a lengthy piece dealing with Syrian efforts to shut down an Iranian arms smuggling route used to supply Hezbollah fighters (Washington Post, April 12). The Post article was immediately cited as U.S. “confirmation” of Iran–Algeria–Polisario connections in pan-Arab and Moroccan sources (Arab Weekly, April 13; Morocco World News, April 13).

The Post published a correction on April 24 in which the movement denied any connection with Iran. The statement offered that: “suggesting that Polisario fighters would abandon their decades-long struggle against Moroccan occupation to take part in distant conflicts is not only implausible but also an insult to the dignity and determination of a people fighting for their freedom” (Watan News, April 25). Months after the correction was published, Moroccan and Israeli sources continue to cite the Post’s report. They claim it is proof of Iran’s military training of Polisario fighters, with the Times of Israel calling it “explosive” and “irrefutable” (Morocco World News, June 11; Times of Israel, July 3).

The Attack on Smara and Potential Turn to Jihadism

As international pressure grows, the Polisario has stepped up its still modest military operations in response. The SPLA fired four rockets at the West Saharan town of Smara (known in Spanish as Esmara) on June 27, 220 km (140 miles) east of Laayoune (El Pais [Madrid], July 2; Sahara Press Service, June 27). The Polisario claimed it had targeted “enemy military positions.” However, an inspection by MINURSO peacekeepers indicated that the rockets had hit only uninhabited areas without causing any casualties or damage (Hespress [Rabat], June 28).

Attack on Smara – June 27, 2025

Moroccan sources reported the four rockets were Iranian-made and targeted an “educational institution” (Aldar, June 27). According to Moroccan military analyst Abderrahmane Mekkaoui, the rockets fired by the Polisario were samples of obsolete 1960s Soviet weaponry, the BM-21 122 mm Grad rocket. Mekkaoui states that the rockets came not from Iran, but from old Libyan stockpiles of the Gaddafi era, long-since seized by Algeria and passed on to the Polisario. The Polisario’s efforts to increase the range of the rockets reduced their accuracy, which Mekkaoui interprets as indicating an ideological shift to terrorism by abandoning precision guidance (in the notoriously inaccurate Grads) that could reduce civilian casualties (Hespress, June 30).

Spain’s national intelligence center (the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, or CNI) monitors North Africa for potential threats to Spain. A recent CNI report noted that several individuals from Tindouf had acquired senior positions in Group for the Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State–West Africa Province (IS–WAP) (Hespress, June 8; Rue20 [Rabat], June 8; La Vanguardia [Barcelona], June 8). Most notable of these was Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, who spent very little time in the Polisario movement before joining a series of Salafi–Jihadi movements, ultimately becoming the leader of Islamic State–Greater Sahara (IS–GS) before his death at the hands of French forces in 2021.

Polisario Troops Fire Rockets at Morocco, 2021 (AP/ Bernat Armangue

Moroccan media hailed the report as proof of the Polisario’s “involvement in terrorist activities,” with the one-time separatist movement now “an incubator of terrorism” (Rue20 [Rabat], June 11). Conversely, a CNI counter-terrorism officer who spoke recently at a Madrid conference on the jihadist threat to Spain pointed out that there were not more than 25 to 30 Sahrawis among the 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in IS–GS. While some may have attained leadership positions, it was important to note that they commanded units drawn from other peoples of the Sahelo–Sahara region. He concluded that “there is by no means a link between the Saharawi movement or the Polisario Front with jihadism” and insisted that the presence of a small number of Sahrawi fighters in IS–GS should not “stigmatize” the Sahrawi community (ECSaharaui, June 30; La Vanguardia [Barcelona], June 30). Many Sahrawis, moreover, belong to the Qadiri and Tijani Sufi orders despised by Salafi–Jihadists.

It is clear that, by joining the jihadists, this handful of Sahrawis was abandoning the secular Sahrawi independence movement rather than transitioning it into yet another group of Sunni religious extremists. To believe that the Sahrawis are Sunni Salafi–Jihadists in thrall to Iranian Shi’ite extremists (Shi’ites being a primary target of Salafi–Jihadists) is to suggest an obviously contradictory and logically impossible ideological base for the Polisario movement. If the rump Sahrawi state decided to abandon its secular ideology to become the Taliban of northwest Africa, it would meet its first opposition from the Polisario’s sole sponsor, Algeria, which fought a long and especially bitter civil war (1992–2002) against native Islamist insurgents—something Algiers has no interest in repeating.

(Global Security.org)

Conclusion

The charges against the Polisario are as numerous as they are contradictory. According to its antagonists, today’s Polisario is a Marxist, jihadist, secular, separatist, terrorist, and atheist movement of Shiite and Sunni extremists and/or mercenaries trained, armed, and manipulated by the Russians, Iranians, Algerians, Cubans, Kurdish separatists, Chinese communists, and Lebanese Shiites to combat the forces of Morocco, Syrian rebels, Israel, and America. This is the cumulative result of an information war fought with greater intensity than anything the Polisario is involved with on the ground.

Evidence that Iran is supplying military equipment to the Polisario’s camps (which can only be done through Algeria) is dubious at best. Algeria, which suspected Iran of meddling in its civil war on behalf of the Islamist opposition, pursues a resolutely independent course in international affairs. It is difficult to believe Tehran would now be allowed direct access to the Sahrawi camps to arm and recruit local fighters to pursue the interests of Shiite Iran at Algeria’s expense.

Rather than posing a threat to Europe, America, the Middle East, and North Africa, the Polisario movement dwells in a perpetual state of political, diplomatic, and military weakness. The movement has never had a charismatic leader, and there is little internationally attractive about the movement’s isolated, militarized society, confined to barren refugee camps dependent on UN and Algerian aid as well as whatever else can be eked out from corruption. The alleged Polisario shift from a focus on local independence to an ambitious international agenda seems utterly perplexing, especially when it has failed to achieve any of its more modest local goals over five decades of struggle.

Note:

[1] At the time of publishing, the bill remains with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on the Judiciary.

Wagner Withdrawal Signals Potential Change in Russian Approach to Mali

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Andrew McGregor

July 9, 2025

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Washington DC

Executive Summary

  • Russia’s Wagner Group is being withdrawn from Mali after a three-and-a-half-year deployment with a mixed record of battlefield successes that have come at enormous civilian cost.
  • Wagner’s replacement with the Russian Defense Ministry’s Africa Corps may signal a change in tactics, but a military buildup suggests expanded military operations against insurgent and terrorist groups are on their way.
  • Security-related shifts are being accompanied by new Russian-Malian partnerships in the energy and mining sectors.

Mali’s relationship with Russia is entering a new stage with the withdrawal of the last members of the Wagner Group and the signing of new bilateral agreements on trade, development and the launch of a plan to build a Russian-designed low-power nuclear plant in Mali (TASS, June 23; Business Insider Africa, June 23). The agreements came during the second visit to Moscow of Mali’s president, General Assimi Goïta (Maliweb, June 17).

General Assimi Goïta (Idrissa Diakité/EFE/Newscom/MaxPPP)

Mali’s military government has also announced a partnership with Russian firm Yadran Group to build a gold refinery near the capital of Bamako. The move is in line with a declaration by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov that Russia intends to focus with African countries “primarily on economic and investment interaction… This also corresponds to and extends to such sensitive areas as defence and security” (al-Jazeera, June 9).

The Malian junta is currently consolidating state control over the gold industry, recently taking over the operations of Canadian giant Barrick Mining. It is envisioned that the new refinery will be a regional center for processing gold (Afrinz.ru, May 30). Most African gold is currently refined outside Africa in China, Canada and Switzerland; Mali has two existing refineries but neither meet international standards (fr.africannews.com, November 24, 2023; Business Insider Africa, June 23). Mali is Africa’s second-largest gold producer; neighboring Burkina Faso, which has also welcomed Russia’s Africa Corps, is fourth. Most of the gold found in northern Mali is obtained through artisanal mining exploited by Wagner personnel.

Artisanal Gold Mining in Mali (Sebastien Rieussec/AFP)

On the security front, the question is what changes will come as Russia’s Africa Corps, under the direction of Russia’s ministry of defense, replaces the private military contractors (PMCs) of the Wagner Group. Mali is struggling with insurgencies in northern Mali carried out by Tuareg separatists and rival al-Qaeda and Islamic State bands of Salafi-Jihadists drawn from the Arab, Tuareg and Fulani communities. The separatists and jihadists are known to cooperate on major operations such as the devastating July 2024 strike at Tinzawatène that killed scores of Wagner fighters and regular troops of the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) (see EDM, July 31, 2024; EDM, September 11, 2024).

Wagner personnel arrived in Mali in the fall of 2021 and announced the end of their mission on June 6, stating they had combated terrorism and “accomplished the main task – all regional capitals returned to the control of the legitimate authorities. The mission is complete. PMC Wagner is returning home” (Novaya Gazeta, June 5; Lenta.ru, June 6). Wagner personnel in Mali were responsible for training FAMa, combating terrorists and protecting high-ranking officials. The Russian contractors replaced long-standing French and UN missions that were unable to secure Mali despite a decade of effort. Even as Wagner was announcing a successful end to their mission, al-Qaeda associated insurgents of the Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM) were driving a FAMa garrison from their base at Boulkessi (central Mali) in a two-day attack (RFI, June 8).

Boulkessi (France24)

While the transition from Wagner to Africa Corps went smoothly in most parts of Africa with a Russian military presence, there was a degree of resistance among some Wagner personnel in Mali against coming under formal control of the Russian defense ministry. Most Wagnerites have been absorbed into the Africa Corps, while those unwilling to sign new contracts will likely be returned to Russia (Al-Jazeera, June 16).

During its three and a half years in Mali, the PMC claimed to have eliminated “four leaders of terrorist organizations, thousands of militants and 11 of their strongholds… leaving behind a stable and safe environment” (Kommersant, June 6).  According to pro-Kremlin media: “Thousands of terrorists have been neutralized. Bases and strongholds of radical gangs have been destroyed. The remnants of the groups have been pushed back into the desert, where they are deprived of infrastructure and resources” (Lenta.ru, June 6).

In reality, Wagner/FAMA forces have suffered repeated ambushes over the last year and attacks have begun to spread into central and even heavily-populated southern Mali (Militarnyi, June 16).  The junta blames the increasing tempo of anti-government attacks on alleged French sponsorship of terrorists and separatists. On June 17, Malian spokesman Colonel-Major Souleymane Dembélé referred obliquely to the former colonial power when he stated: “Remember this statement by a Chief of Staff of a former partner country who said they would return in another form… Those who have financed terrorism for years are revealing themselves today, mobilizing, rearming, and financing armed groups to sow terror and discredit our forces” (Le Matin [Bamako], June 19). The officers that took power in 2021 believe the Tuareg of northern Mali gained too much autonomy in a 2015 peace agreement and became too close to French military forces operating against Islamist terrorists in the region.

Russian Military Equipment Arrives in Bamako (DefenceWeb)

Russia’s defense ministry appears to be preparing for larger military operations in Mali. A large shipment of armored vehicles and other materiel arrived in Bamako in January after being shipped through the Guinean port of Conakry. Among the vehicles were BMD infantry fighting vehicles, T-72B3 tanks, BTR-80/82A armored personnel carriers (APCs), Lens armored cars, Spartak armored vehicles and Tigr armored vehicles (Militarnyi, January 18). Further weaponry arrived on May 31 for Africa Corps use, including 122mm and 152mm howitzers, a BTR electronic warfare APC, more Spartak armored vehicles, tanker trucks and transport trucks (Kanal 13/Youtube, June 10; RFI, June 20).

Crash of the SU-24M

Mali is proving a challenging setting for Russian military aviation. An Africa Corps SU-24M bomber made an emergency landing in the Niger River on June 14, allegedly due to the effects of a sandstorm, though it was also reported to have taken fire from insurgents (MaliActu, June 14; IntelliNews, June 18). In October 2022, a newly-delivered SU-25 fighter crashed near Gao on its return from a mission, killing its Russian pilot (Defenceweb, October 5, 2022). Its replacement also crashed near Gao in September 2023, possibly after being fired on by insurgents who had attacked the Gao airport the day before (Military Africa, September 11, 2023). Malian fixed-wing air assets have now been reduced to four L-39 jet trainers supplied in August 2022 (IntelliNews, June 18; Defenceweb, October 5, 2022).

Wagner and FAMa have been accused of brutality and massacres of civilians in their conduct of the counter-insurgency. A broad investigation carried out by a European journalist collective revealed a pattern of abuse by Wagner personnel that included “kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, no contact with the outside world, and systematic torture—sometimes to the point of death.” At least six Wagner-operated detention centers were identified, all located within FAMa bases (France24, June 12). [1]  Stills and video of atrocities and potential war crimes by Wagner and FAMa personnel have been shared on social media channels, leading to requests for an International Criminal Court investigation (Euronews, June 23).

The replacement of Wagner with the Africa Corps will be closely watched to see if it is accompanied by a change in methods and tactics, though it should be noted that most Africa Corps personnel are Wagner veterans. Atrocities and other abuses will now be the responsibility of the Russian Defense Ministry, with the deniability of Wagner now gone. There has been speculation that the shift to Africa Corps from Wagner might mean a shift from the latter’s use of extreme violence, but the methods used by Russian Defense Ministry troops in Ukraine do not encourage this belief.

In the pattern of cyclical rebellions everywhere, a rebellious people become increasingly open to more extreme ideology, in this case the adoption of Salafi-Jihadism by a people for whom such concepts were until recently unthinkable. The methods of Russian contractors and FAMa troops encourage recruitment by religious extremists and seem part of an effort to secure a realistically unattainable military solution to the latest round of rebellions that have consumed northern Mali since independence from France in 1960.

Though the Africa Corps may prefer to focus on a training mission, the current pace of attacks on FAMa and Russian targets may compel further and even larger combat missions. The influx of Russian arms and armor seems to indicate that preparation for this scenario is underway.

Note

  1. The Viktoriia Project is a collective named in memory of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who died in Russian captivity in 2024 after investigating the illegal detention of civilians in Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Battle for Jabal Arkenu: Controlling the Supply Lines in Sudan’s Civil War

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AIS Special Report

June 13, 2025

Andrew McGregor

Jabal Arkenu

The year was 1923, and Egyptian explorer Hassanein Bey was on a camel-borne search for two “lost oases” in the unknown depths of the Libyan Desert. Even the South Pole had been visited less than 12 years earlier, but this corner of the south-eastern Libyan Desert remained blank on most charts despite rumors of two mountains where water could be found in an otherwise barren, burning wasteland. Hassanein Bey and his small party of desert dwellers were 111 days out from his starting point in the Libyan port of Sollum when an amazing sight appeared:

We were having a hard time of it crossing the high steep sand-dunes when suddenly mountains rose before us like medieval castles half hidden in the mist. A few minutes later the sun was on them, turning the cold gray into warm rose and pink… I had found what I came to seek. These were the mountains of Arkenu. [1]

Though Jabal Arkenu defined remote isolation at the time, Hassanein believed that “Arkenu may conceivably prove to have strategic value at some future time.” The explorer was right; only days ago the desert round Arkenu was the scene of a battle with great implications for the future of Sudan.

Hassanein Bey

The Spiral Sisters

The area around Jabal Arkenu and its larger sister mountain Jabal ‘Uwaynat (25 km south-east of Jabal Arkenu) now mark the intersection of the borders of Libya, Egypt and Sudan, with the north-eastern corner of Chad not far to the south. As such, the region is now known as the Triangle area (al-Muthalath). The region around Jabal ‘Uwaynat, once a path for the Ancient Egyptians into the African interior according to recently discovered inscriptions, has now become a pathway for smugglers, mercenaries, rebels, human traffickers and gold miners. [2] In an otherwise waterless region, the massive spiral mountains collect local rainfall in natural basins within the rocks, a fact long known to the indigenous Tubu desert dwellers who brought their camels there to graze and water.

Jabal Arkenu

The recent discovery of gold in the region has attracted artisanal gold miners who operate in the region with little regard to borders. Egypt and Libya are seeking to replace these miners with modern mining operations, while Sudan is satisfied to collect fees through the Sudanese Minerals Resources Company without providing any services (Radio Dabanga, November 8, 2024).

The Attack on the Triangle

One hundred and two years after Hassanein Bey rediscovered the lost mountain oases, war has arrived in al-Muthalath. Possession of the desert crossing that passes through the Triangle region has suddenly become a strategic imperative for Sudanese government forces (the Sudan Armed Forces – SAF) and their adversaries in Sudan’s civil war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti.” The latter group, once a government paramilitary before breaking with the SAF, has acquired the support of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and an Islamist militia belonging to the so-called Libyan National Army of “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar.

This militia, known as Subul al-Salam (“Ways of Peace”), crossed 3 km into Sudan near Jabal Arkenu on June 6 in support of RSF units (Sudan Tribune, June 11). The joint Libyan-RSF movement displaced the main Sudanese units controlling the border, the Central Reserve Forces (a police paramilitary) and the Darfur Joint Force (Atalyar, March 21; Sudan Tribune, March 22). The SAF presence consisted of only a small number of intelligence and security agents (Mada Masr, June 14). The Darfur Joint Force (a.k.a. Sudanese Joint Force, or Juba Peace Agreement Joint Forces) consists of rebel forces that were signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement and have since sided with the Port Sudan-based Sudan government. The main elements hail from Darfur’s powerful Zaghawa minority – the Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) and Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Some SLA fighters may be using Emirati-supplied weapons obtained when they were fighting as mercenaries on behalf of Khalifa Haftar before the signing of the Juba peace agreement (France24.com, April 20).

Fighting began on June 8. The RSF announced its takeover of the Triangle border region on June 11, claiming heavy SAF losses (AFP, June 11).  After a “defensive withdrawal” of government forces, the closest Sudanese army presence may now be 400 km from the Triangle region (Sudan Tribune, June 11).  According to the RSF, the region contains “rich natural resources, including oil, gas and minerals (Rapidsupportforce.com, June 12).

The SAF said its forces in the Triangle region were subject to a “surprise attack” by the RSF’s “terrorist militia” and Libya’s Subul al-Salam battalion (Libya Observer, June 11). Sudan’s military further declared the role of the Libyan militia was “a reprehensible and unprecedented gesture and a flagrant violation of international law… the direct intervention of Khalifa Haftar’s forces alongside the Rapid Support Forces in the war is a blatant aggression against Sudan, its land, and its people, and an extension of the international and regional conspiracy against our country…” (Darfur 24, June 10).

‘Abd al-Rahman Hasham al-Kilani

For his part, Subul al-Salam commander ‘Abd al-Rahman Hasham al-Kilani brushed over the encounter, claiming it was the result of a “misunderstanding” with the Darfur Joint Force, which believed the Libyan militia had crossed the border (Mada Masr, June 14). Haftar’s military command described allegations of participation by his forces as false and “a blatant attempt to export Sudan’s internal crisis” (Radio Dabanga, June 12).

Colombian mercenaries after their convoy was attacked in North Sudan, November 20, 2024 (La Silla Vacía)

Late last year, a battalion of at least 350 Colombian mercenaries began moving in stages from Abu Dhabi to Benghazi, through the desert to the Kufra district and then south across the border into northern Darfur using a crossing just south of the Triangle region. The mercenaries, combat-experienced veterans of the Colombian army, were recruited by Dubai-based Colonel Álvaro Quijano on the understanding they would be deployed as static defense for oil installations in the Middle East. Instead their passports were seized by Libyan soldiers in Benghazi who explained they were being sent south to fight alongside the RSF in Sudan.  Quijano, a Colombian, is an associate of a private security firm, the UAE-based Global Security Service Group. One convoy was ambushed by the Darfur Joint Force after crossing the border into Sudan, leading to the loss of three men. Once in Darfur, some of the Colombians have been sent into street-to-street fighting in the besieged North Darfur capital, al-Fashir, while others have been sent to train RSF fighters in Nyala, capital of South Darfur (La Silla Vacia [Bogota], November 26, 2024; March 2, 2025; March 3, 2025).

The Salafists of Kufra

The oasis of Kufra in south-eastern Libya, home of the Subul al-Salam brigade, was for centuries a major stage for trans-Saharan caravans and the shipment of slaves until its conquest by Italy in the 1930s. Kufra was dominated for centuries by indigenous Black semi-nomadic Tubu tribesmen until they were displaced by Zuwaya Arabs in 1840. Since the 2011 Libyan Revolution, Kufra has become an important stage for the transportation of sub-Saharan African migrants moving through the Triangle region to the Mediterranean coast, with numerous clashes occurring between the rival Zuwaya and Tubu communities (Libya Observer, March 5, 2018).

Libya

The brigade was formed by ‘Abd al-Rahman Hashim al-Kilani, a Madkhali Salafist, after Zuwaya clashes with the Tubu and their Darfuri allies in 2015. Salafism is a revivalist interpretation of Islam that believes Islam’s authentic form was found in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his first three successors (the Salaf). With the encouragement and funding of Saudi Arabia, Salafism has grown rapidly in recent decades, often displacing traditional and more flexible forms of Islam around the world. It has become associated in its most extreme form with political and religious violence (Salafi-Jihadism). Madkhalism is a form of Salafism developed by Saudi shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali that emphasizes a “quietist” approach to religion, avoiding overt political involvement while emphasizing obedience to authoritarian leaders. Madkhalism has found fertile ground in Libya, where its followers have formed powerful militias in Kufra, Tripoli and other regions. [3]

Salafists oppose Sufi approaches to Islam, rejecting their rites and rituals as bid’ah (religious innovation, i.e. practices that did not exist in the times of the Salaf). Libya has a strong Sufi tradition, with the powerful Sanusi order leading the resistance to Italian colonialism. Though Kufra was the traditional headquarters of the Sanusi Sufi order, the anti-Sufi Madkhalists destroyed the funerary shrine of Sanusi leader Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (1844-1902) and stole his remains in 2018 (Terrorism Monitor, April 6, 2018). Since then, the Madkhalist Salafis have held the upper hand in southeastern Libya.

After its formation, Subul al-Salam quickly aligned with the forces of General Khalifa al-Haftar (a leading military commander under Mu’ammar Qaddafi until his defeat by Chadian forces in the 1987 “Toyota War” and later an alleged anti-Qaddafi CIA asset after his exile to the United States), who supplied the Zuwaya fighters with 40 armored Toyota trucks (Libya Herald, October 20, 2016).

Libya is currently divided politically between two factions – the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) dominated by al-Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA – an alignment of various militias and other armed groups under al-Haftar’s command rather than a true “national army”) versus the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli. The latter controls western Libya (Tripolitania), while al-Haftar’s LNA controls the east (Cyrenaïca) and the south-west (Fezzan).

Tribal ties remain important in Libya; it is worth noting al-Haftar’s mother was from the Zuwaya, who have established a trading network from Kufra in the south to the Mediterranean coast in the north. Al-Haftar relies for weapons and other support from Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is also believed to supply weapons to the RSF. Prior to the Libyan offensive, satellite imagery revealed an increase in UAE cargo aircraft arriving at the Kufra airport, including three IL-76TD cargo planes present between May 21 and May 31 (X, June 10). After the Libyan/RSF takeover of the Triangle region, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry denounced the “dangerous escalation of the Abu Dhabi regime-sponsored external aggression against Sudan,” describing it as a “flagrant violation of international law” (Al-Monitor, June 11; Fes News, June 11). The ministry further condemned the “blatant aggression… supported by the United Arab Emirates and its militias in the region” (Radio Dabanga, June 12). Al-Haftar also has Egyptian backing and has been supported in the field by Russian military contractors, most notably in his failed 2019 campaign to take Tripoli and unite Libya under his rule.

The Subul al-Salam brigade has clashed with Sudanese fighters before, killing 13 members of the Darfuri Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2016. The members of JEM, a mainly Zaghawa rebel group, were operating as mercenaries near the oasis of Jaghbub at the time alongside a group of indigenous Black Tubu fighters.

Saddam al-Hafter – The Heir Apparent

Subul al-Salam comes under the direction of Khalifa Haftar’s son, Saddam, who is being groomed to succeed his 81-year-old father. At the same time the Russian-backed Khalifa is being supplied with heavy weapons, armored vehicles and Pantsir air defense systems by the Kremlin, Saddam has been holding quiet meetings in Washington with top state department and intelligence officials in the Trump administration (Militarnyi.com, May 26; MEE, June 12). Saddam is overseeing the Russian rehabilitation of a disused Qaddafi-era airbase (Matan al-Sarra) in southeastern Libya for use by Russia’s Africa Corps (EDM, April 17). Al-Haftar has already been accused of using Matan al-Sarra as a distribution point for arms headed to the RSF. (Sudan Tribune, June 11). When completed, Matan al-Sarra will join six other bases used by Russian forces in Haftar-controlled regions of Libya – al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, and al-Qardabiya

(MAPPR)

RSF Strategic Objectives

The RSF is looking to take the war into the Northern Province (home of the Arab-Nubian elites that have governed Sudan since independence), and notes that control of the Triangle region “is a significant step that will impact multiple combat front lines, particularly in the northern desert” (Rapidsupportforce.com, June 12). The RSF is dominated by Sudan’s western Arabs (residents of Kordofan and Darfur) who have been rivals of the more politically and economically successful northern Arabs since the days of the Mahdiyya (1881-1899).

As a step towards consolidating control of northern Sudan and supply lines from southern Libya, the RSF took al-Malha (a Meidobi town 210 km northeast of al-Fashir) in March, killing 40 people and burning down the market after looting it. Al-Malha connects northeast to the strategic Nile town of al-Dabba in Northern State via the Wadi al-Milk and east to the town of Hamrat al-Shaykh in North Kordofan, which the RSF hopes to incorporate into a new state together with Darfur, one independent of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) government and the SAF in the temporary Sudanese capital in Port Sudan.

The RSF is increasingly concerned that it may lose its most important supply line for UAE arms and military materiel, which runs from an Emirati-built airbase in Um Jaras (or Amjarass, Ennedi province) east into West Darfur. SAF commander and TSC chairman General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan has demanded that Chad dismantle the Um Jaras base and close Chad’s border with Darfur to RSF-destined logistical convoys. Chad’s ruler, Mahamat Idris Déby Itno, like many of Chad’s ruling elite, is a member of the Zaghawa ethnic group, which straddles the Chad-Sudan border. However, the Darfur Zaghawa oppose the Arab-dominated RSF and sent a delegation of elders in February to meet with President Déby to urge an end to Chadian accommodation of the RSF (Mada Masr, March 7). Should Chad’s leadership decide to back away from the RSF, the establishment of a secure alternative supply route for UAE arms and supplies through Libya to northern Sudan will become imperative.

Notes

  1. AM Hassanein Bey: The Lost Oases, New York and London, 1925, pp. 210-217.
  2. Andrew McGregor, “Egyptian exploration of the African interior – Caravans to Yam,” Ancient History Magazine 15, April/May 2017, pp. 38-45. For Jabal ‘Uwaynat, see: “Jabal ‘Uwaynat: Mysterious Desert Mountain Becomes a Three-Border Security Flashpoint,” AIS Special Report, June 13, 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=3930
  3. Andrew McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis: A Profile of Salafist Shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2017, https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=5244

General Sultani Makenga, Donald Trump and the Battle for Tantalum in the Congo

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Andrew McGregor

AIS Special Report

June 2, 2025                         

During an April meeting with Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, President Donald Trump made a reference to the Congo, quickly adding “I don’t know what that is…” (Africa News, April 21). Trump’s senior advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos (whose son is married to Trump’s daughter, Tiffany), quickly reassured Africans that, despite his unfamiliarity with Africa’s second-largest country and its 110 million people, Trump “highly values Africa and African people… Africa is very important to Trump” (BBC, April 23).

Three weeks earlier, Boulos had provided the news that the United States was engaged in talks related to a security-for-critical minerals agreement with Congolese president Felix Tshisekedi (similar to that proposed to Ukraine), adding that “I am pleased to announce that the president and I have agreed on a path forward for its development.” According to Tshisekedi, American might would help keep armed factions like the Congo’s powerful rebel M23 movement “at bay” (AP, April 3). The M23 is widely believed to receive substantial military support from neighboring Rwanda.

It is difficult to say how this military security might be provided. The Congolese government envisions US forces replacing the massive but ineffective UN contingent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but any deployment of American troops under the current administration seems unlikely. General Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), told a gathering of African military leaders on May 29: “You can no longer depend on the military strength or the financial support of the United States” (Garowe Online, May 31). Washington is considering folding AFRICOM into US European Command, another step in abandoning the resource-rich continent to Russia (Reuters, May 27).

Further complicating matters is the endemic corruption and expectation of bribes that runs unchecked through Congolese society and all its business and government institutions. China has managed to navigate this system with some success in the Congo’s mineral sector through government investment and subsidies to become the DRC’s main mineral partner. Beijing is also expanding its military cooperation with African nations as America’s military steps back (Business Insider Africa, May 31).

The US administration is currently sponsoring peace negotiations between M23 and the government in Kinshasa. With both sides in the conflict having submitted draft peace agreements, US mining firms are reported to have expressed interest in operating in the Congo (The Africa Report, May 28).

Tantalum

The Battle for Tantalum

Tantalum is an especially rare critical mineral, yet its unique properties make it vital in the electronics industry and the manufacture of computer chips and medical implants. Everything from fighter jets to nuclear reactors to smart phones rely on tantalum, with new uses and demand growing daily (Institut für seltene erden und metalle AG [Lucerne], August 2024). The DRC is the world’s largest producer of tantalum, most of it coming from the northeastern provinces of Nord and Sud Kivu, war plagued regions rich in copper, tin, tungsten, gold, cobalt, lithium and the coltan from which tantalum is extracted (Mining.com, April 17).

(ResearchGate)

In 2023, the DRC claimed Rwanda, a country with few mineral deposits of its own, was exporting over $1 billion a year in tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold: “It’s all coming from DRC – that’s obvious” (Financial Times, March 21, 2023). Nonetheless, Rwanda claims to be “among the top producers of Tantalum, producing about 9 per cent of the world’s Tantalum used in electronics manufacturing” (The Great Lakes Eye, November 7, 2023). Between them (regardless of actual origin), the DRC and Rwanda account for 58% of world production of tantalum, the price of which has risen 25% since January due to the insecurity in Kivu (Discovery Alert, May 7). The United States obtains all its tantalum from foreign sources, its own reserves of coltan being of poor quality.

The Warlord of Kivu: Sultani Makenga

“In brief, my life is war, my education is war, and my language is war” (New African, February 15, 2013). In this way, Congolese “General” Sultani Makenga defines his life and purpose as part of an endless cycle of conflict and brutality centered on the Congolese province of Nord Kivu. As the military leader of M23, Makenga currently dominates the eastern Congo and its production of critical minerals.

General Sultani Makenga

Like many of his contemporaries, Makenga is the product of the 1994 Rwandan genocide of Tutsis by their Hutu neighbors that eventually spilled over into the neighboring Nord and Sud Kivu provinces of the eastern DRC. Sharing borders with Uganda and Rwanda, the Kivu region is rich in minerals and other resources, but residents cope with poverty and violence as the region has become a relentless battleground for local Tutsis, exiled Hutu génocidaires, Islamist extremists, bandit groups, a deeply corrupt Congolese army and regulars of the Ugandan and Rwandan militaries.

Under Makenga’s direction, Nord Kivu’s M23 movement has been accused of committing numerous atrocities and human rights violations, including massacres of civilians, mass rapes and the recruitment of child soldiers (US Treasury Department, November 13, 2012). Makenga is unapologetic for his role in the violence that plagues the Kivu region:

I am a soldier, and the language that I know is that of the gun. My home has been in the bush, fighting injustice and corrupt regimes in this region. Therefore, when a politician wants to play politics with me, my response won’t be the political podium but the barrel of the gun because that’s my way of fighting for my rights (New African, February 15, 2013).

Makenga’s Early Life

Makenga enjoys a reputation as one of the finest strategists and tacticians in east-central Africa (ChimpReports, February 6, 2017). Always well-guarded, Makenga avoids making speeches or public appearances, and walks with a cane after being wounded in Katanga during a rebellion there in the late 1990s (Le Monde, April 7, 2023).

This Tutsi warlord was born in the Nord Kivu town of Masisi in 1973 with the full name of Nziramakenga Ruzandiza Emmanuel Sultan, but grew up in the nearby town of Rutshuru. Makenga is a member of the Mugogwe sub-group of the Tutsi (New African, February 15, 2013). Like Makenga, many members of the M23 group are Congolese Tutsis closely related to the Tutsi population in neighboring Rwanda. Many of the Congo’s Tutsis descend from Rwandan migrant workers encouraged by Belgian colonialists to settle in Nord Kivu in the 1930s; as a result, accusations of being “foreigners” frequently surface during regional episodes of ethnic tension. Part of the M23’s effort to establish local control in these communities includes the destruction of records delineating the lineage of traditional authority in Nord Kivu (The Conversation, October 24, 2024).

The Rwandan Civil War

After dropping out of school, Makenga moved to Uganda, where he underwent six months of military training. He then joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990 at age 17 with the intention of fighting the anti-Tutsi regime of President Juvénal Habyarimana in Rwanda before the president’s assassination in 1994 (New African, February 15, 2013). The RPF was a movement of Tutsi exiles determined to end Hutu domination of Rwanda and restore “traditional” Tutsi rule.

Despite the minimal education common to herding boys like Makenga and a difficulty in speaking French or English (though he is fluent in Swahili and Kinyarwanda), the young Makenga rose to the rank of sergeant by the end of the conflict, one of the highest ranks available to Congolese Tutsis in the RPF  (Le Monde, April 7, 2023; Riftvalley.net, 2018). He became known for his tactical skills, especially in setting ambushes (Riftvalley.net, 2018).

Roughly one million Hutus fled Rwanda after the RPF victory left them fearing retribution for the murder of 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus. After their arrival in Nord Kivu, the Hutu destabilized the whole region by forming extremist militias (Interhamwe) that mounted cross-border raids and attacked local Congolese Tutsis. Little help could be obtained from the corrupt and incompetent army of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ – the Congo was renamed Zaïre from 1981 to 1997). Their failure to provide security would eventually lead to a national rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda that would depose Mobutu.

Laurent-Désiré Kabila

When the Tutsi-Hutu struggle in Rwanda ended in 1996, Makenga decided to return home to the DRC and “fight for my country.” It was then that he met Laurent-Désiré Kabila and together, in Makenga’s words, “launched the liberation struggle for the Congo” (New African, February 15, 2013).

Makenga and the First Congo War – 1996-1997

Kabila’s chief strategist, the Rwandan James Kabarebe, led the rebel Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), a coalition that captured Kinshasa, overthrew Mobutu and seized power on May 17, 1997. Burundi and Angola joined Uganda and Rwanda in supporting the broad-based military operation. Zaïre was renamed the “Democratic Republic of the Congo” (DRC) and Laurent-Désiré Kabila installed as the DRC’s new president.

Makenga broke with Kabila in 1997, accusing him of continuing the marginalization of the Congolese Tutsis. A refusal to obey AFDL orders left Makenga to serve a term on the Rwandan prison island of Iwawa in Lake Kivu (Le Monde, April 7, 2023).

The Congolese Tutsis who played a prominent part in the overthrow of Mobutu were later branded as “foreigners” by now-President Kabila, who insisted they “return” to Rwanda (New African, February 15, 2013). His declaration repeated Mobutu’s own November 1996 order for Congolese Tutsis to leave the country. As Makenga reflected: “You help someone to become president through the gun, but when he tastes power, you become his first victim” (New African, February 15, 2013).

Makenga and the Second Congo War – 1998-2003

Now opposed to the rule of Kabila, who had expelled his Rwandan supporters and persecuted the Congolese Tutsis, Makenga joined Uganda’s elite Nguruma Battalion. The unit took part in an audacious operation planned by Rwanda’s James Kabarebe, former chief-of-staff of Kabila’s armed forces before his dismissal in July 1998. The Kitona Airlift of August 1998 began with the capture of the airport at Goma (provincial capital of Nord Kivu) and the hijacking of four civilian passenger planes, which over two days ferried some 3,000 Rwandan and Ugandan troops 1200 miles to the DRC’s far west, where they seized the Atlantic port of Matadi and the Inga Dam, cutting off power to the capital of Kinshasa. The bold plan only failed due to the intervention of Zimbabwean, Namibian and Angolan troops. Both the operation and its repression were marked by widespread rape, murder and looting on all sides. Back in Nord Kivu, Rwandan forces attacked camps believed to host the Hutu militia known as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

After nearly three years of war, Joseph Kabila succeeded his father Laurent as president after the latter’s assassination by one of his cousins on January 16, 2001. Joseph Kabila would remain president until 2019, when he was succeeded by current president Félix Tshisekedi after a series of bloody mass protests against his rule.

Joseph Kabila (The Africa Report)

Makenga became a major in the Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebel movement Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) in 1998. Many members were veterans of the AFDL. The movement succeeded in taking Goma in August 1998, but by 1999-2000, the group had splintered, diminishing its importance before a regional agreement brought an end to the Second Congo War in 2003.

Makenga and the New War of the CNDP

Backed by Uganda and Rwanda, the anti-Kabila General Laurent “The Chairman” Nkunda formed the Nord Kivu-based Congrès national pour la défense du people (CNDP) in December 2006. Kabila had fallen out of favor with his former backers, including Makenga, who joined many AFDL/RCD veterans in the new movement.

An October 2008 CNDP offensive brought the group to the outskirts of Goma after the Congolese garrison had looted the city and fled. Instead of occupying the city, Nkunda declared a unilateral ceasefire, creating dissension among CNDP fighters (al-Jazeera, October 30, 2008; UNSC November 2008 Monthly Forecast, October 30, 2008).

CNDP fighters under Makenga’s command were accused of participating in the November 4-5 2008 massacre of 67 civilians in the Nord-Kivu town of Kiwanja despite the nearby presence of UN peacekeepers who failed to intervene (Independent Online [Johannesburg], June 19, 2012).

After a violent split in the movement, Nkunda was arrested by Rwandan authorities in January 2009. General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda (a Rwandan Tutsi) took over one faction of the movement, which quickly began cooperating with the Congo’s new national army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), against Hutu rebel movements (For Ntaganda, see Militant Leadership Monitor, August 31, 2012). FARDC is known for its indiscipline, poor morale and habitual shortages of food, ammunition and salaries.

Both CNDP factions were given refuge by Rwanda and Uganda, which ignored DRC extradition requests for Makenga and others (Africa Confidential, July 7, 2022). The CNDP agreed to a peace accord brokered in Nairobi on March 23, 2009 that saw many of its fighters integrated into the FARDC. Makenga was made a colonel in FARDC and served in Sud Kivu (Riftvalley.net, 2018; Le Monde, April 7, 2023).

The M23

On April 4, 2012, Ntaganda and 300 loyalists deserted the DRC but took losses in a clash with FARDC in the Rutshuru district (ChimpReports, February 6, 2017). Makenga, then second-in-command of DRC operations against the Hutu FDLR, followed Ntaganda by deserting in May. With his experience, he was made a general in the new M23 movement and took military command of the rebel force. Joseph Kabila suspended joint operations with Rwanda when the number of desertions to M23 became critical.

The new formation’s name, M23, derived from its demand for the full implementation of the March 23, 2009 accord between the DRC and the CNDP, which the DRC government was backing away from. Fuelling the new insurgency was the government’s failure to stabilize the eastern Congo and its inability to provide services to local people.

In November 2012, Makenga attracted international attention when UN defenders fled Goma and his forces briefly captured the city, the capital of Nord Kivu. It was apparently a step too far for his backers; visits from Rwandan Army chief Lieutenant General Charles Kayonga and top Ugandan officers encouraged Makenga to withdraw (ChimpReports, February 6, 2017).

Makenga claims to have taken advantage of FARDC’s corruption to equip his force: “When the Kinshasa government buys new weapons, I also get a share of it through my own contacts within the Congolese national army” (New African, February 15, 2013).

Makenga was sanctioned by the US in November 2012 for “contributing to the conflict in the DRC” (US Treasury Department, November 13, 2012).  Specifically, Makenga was cited for committing or being responsible for murder, rape of children as young as eight, kidnapping and forcible recruitment of children in Makenga’s Rutshuru home territory (UNSC, October 29, 20; BBC Africa, November 7, 2013; New African, February 15, 2013). According to Navi Pillay, then U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: “The leaders of the M23 figure among the worst perpetrators of human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or in the world for that matter” (UN News, June 19, 2012).

M23 Defeat and Split – 2013

Factionalism disrupted M23 operations, preventing the group from exploiting its successes in Nord Kivu. Makenga was deeply involved in the splits, first coming to blows with a faction led by Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero. In February 2013, Bishop Runiga, other M23 leaders and several hundred fighters were given refuge in Rwanda after intense fighting with the Makenga faction (East African, July 13, 2013).

Makenga’s forces also clashed with those of Bosco Ntaganda in March 2013 after Makenga learned Ntaganda was planning to have him killed. Ntaganda’s attack on Makenga’s base was repulsed with heavy casualties, forcing Ntaganda and 200 men to also take refuge in Rwanda. Ntaganda turned himself in to the US Embassy in Kigali and was extradited to face an ICC proceeding in the Hague (Al-Jazeera, November 5, 2013; ChimpReports, February 6, 2017).

The Terminator on Trial: Bosco Ntaganda at the ICC

In November 2013 it was Makenga’s turn to flee Nord Kivu after defeat at the hands of FARDC and the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade. Rather than Rwanda, Makenga and other members of M23 crossed into Uganda, where they surrendered to authorities. The collapse of M23 through infighting and external military pressure led to the Kampala-brokered Declarations of Nairobi ceasefire agreement signed on December 12, 2013 by the DRC Government and the M23 movement.

Reviving the M23

In November 2016 Makenga left a demobilization camp in Uganda, crossed into Nord Kivu and began recruiting from Tutsi refugee camps in an effort to revive the M23 (ChimpReports [Kampala], November 13, 2016). He was joined there by former CNDP fighters who left their cantonment in Uganda.

Beginning with a small group of 400 men, Makenga eventually relaunched the M23 rebellion in November 2021. A new offensive took large parts of Nord Kivu before a ceasefire in November 2022. Makenga, however, accused the DRC authorities of insincerity: “If they desire peace, we will achieve it together. If they choose war, we will fight. That is our stance” (Igihe [Kigali], July 7, 2023).

Retaking Nord Kivu – 2024-2025

A July 2024 report by the UNSC Group of Experts presented evidence that the UPDF and Ugandan military intelligence were actively supporting Makenga and other M23 leaders. It also claimed there were 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandans fighting alongside M23, putting Rwanda in “de facto control” of M23 operations (UNSC, June 4). Uganda rejected the claims, while Kigali insisted that the DRC was financing and fighting alongside the FDLR; Rwanda was thus only acting in self-defense (AFP, July 10, 2024; al-Jazeera, July 9, 2024).

DRC Wazalendo Militia near Rutshuru, 2022 (Moses Sawasawa/AP)

Besides FARDC and the FDLR, Makenga’s M23 are also confronted by the Wazalendo (Kiswahili – “patriots), local militias traditionally known as Mayi-Mayi and nominally aligned with the DRC government. Among these are Guidon Shimiray Mwissa’s Nduma defense du Congo – Renové (NDC-R), Janvier Karairi’s Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) and the mostly Hutu Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple’ (CMC-FDP). All these loosely-organized, drug-fuelled Mayi-Mayi groups are feared by local communities and are known for brutality, extortion and mass rape. [1]

Makenga was sentenced to death in absentia, by a Congolese military court on August 8, 2024. The M23’s military leader was one of 26 armed-group leaders condemned after a trial, including Corneille Nangaa, political leader of the rebel Congo River Alliance (which includes M23), and M23 political chief Bertrand Bisimwa (al-Jazeera, August 9). The death penalty in the DRC had been under a moratorium since 2003, but was restored in March 2024.

As the M23 closed in on Goma in 2024, a FARDC spokesman claimed the M23 had blocked legitimate trade routes through Goma to focus on smuggling tanatalum supplies into Rwanda, a claim denied by Rwandan authorities (Bloomberg News, March 15, 2024).

Makenga launched a final offensive on Goma on January 23, in which his forces, allegedly supported by Rwandan troops, quickly broke through defenders that included FARDC troops, FDLR fighters, Wazalendo gunmen, peacekeepers from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Romanian mercenaries (for the latter, see MLM, June 27, 2024). By January 30, the conquest of Goma was complete; at the same time other M23 units were seizing a number of sites in Sud Kivu producing tantalum, tin and gold.

Goma lies in the shadow of the active volcano Mount Nyiragongo

Goma Again

Some 2900 people were slaughtered in the M23 conquest of Goma, which was accompanied by the escape of hundreds of prisoners from Goma’s Munzenze prison; over 100 female prisoners were immediately raped and then left to burn alive when the escapees set fire to the facility (BBC, February 5). Bizarrely, photos of the murdered women being carried out in body bags surfaced during Donald Trump’s May 21 Oval Office meeting with South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, when they were produced by Trump as visual proof of a “white genocide” in South Africa (Reuters, May 22; IBTimes, May 28). M23 forces then entered Bukavu, capital of Sud Kivu, on February 16, taking full control of the city two days later (Al-Jazeera, February 16).

Residents greet a vehicle with M23 fighters on it in Bukavu, 2025 (Amani Alimasi/AFP)

The Hutu Mayi Mayi CMC-FDP attacked Goma on April 11 in an attempt to drive out the M23, but were repulsed. M23 spokesmen claimed South African peacekeepers supported the assault (Congovirtuel, April 13; RFI, April 13). Violent crime has plagued the city since the January conquest with M23 fighters struggling to maintain order.

Ex-president Joseph Kabila, accused since February by President Tshisekedi of being behind the M23 offensive, and apparently back in favor with Makenga and Corneille Nangaa, returned to Goma on May 25 from a self-imposed exile in South Africa and Rwanda that began in 2023. Nangaa announced Kabila was welcome “in the only part of the country where arbitrariness, political persecution, death sentences, tribalism, discrimination, hate speech… do not exist” (New Times [Kigali], May 26).

The DRC government believes Kabila is now positioning himself to assume leadership of the rebel forces (Reuters, May 28). Kabila’s return is certain to complicate the US-sponsored negotiations between the competing factions in the DRC and the mineral deal desired by the Trump administration (Kivu Morning Post, May 27; Reuters, May 28). Just as Joseph Kabila’s father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, had once labelled Congolese Tutsis as “foreigners,” the leader of President Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) declared on May 25 that Joseph Kabila was “not Congolese… Let him leave the Congolese to deal with their own problems. He, a Rwandan subject whose rule was imposed on us, must leave the Congolese alone” (France 24, May 29).

Conclusion

While American military intervention to secure critical mineral supplies in the Congo appears unlikely at present, Trump supporter and mercenary chief Erik Prince has been engaged in working out an agreement with Congo’s finance ministry that would see private military contractors assigned to tax collection duties in the mineral sector and anti-smuggling operations (Reuters, April 17, 2025). There are reports that a recruiter allegedly working for Prince has been approaching former French Legionnaires regarding military contract work in the Congo (Africa Intelligence, May 12).

Rwandan media has accused Belgium of deploying two companies of commandos to fight against M23 alongside FARDC, FDLR and Wazalendo (Great Lakes Eye, March 24; Great Lakes Eye, May 7). Eight Belgian soldiers, including a “Sergeant Jimmy Luis Flander,” are said to have been killed while operating in Nord Kivu (Great Lakes Eye, April 3). This may be part of an effort to divert attention from international accusations that Kigali is supporting M23; Belgian Foreign minister Maxime Prévot described the assertions as “grotesque fake news” and disinformation designed to “undermine Belgium’s image, to increase tensions and to legitimise a certain interventionism” (Belga News Agency, March 26).

Sultani Makenga (Chrispin Mvano)

Sultani Makenga’s career as a warlord, endlessly shifting from one faction to another in a process of continual self-enrichment, is emblematic of the interminable nature of the conflict in the Congo. The ceaseless struggle to control its abundant and strategically important wealth invites a steady stream of foreign interests willing to partner with corrupt businessmen, power hungry politicians and uniformed war criminals. Where the search for oil and gas reserves fueled international conflicts in the recent past, new elements are now sought after to achieve global dominance in a technological age. The struggle to possess these mineral properties, antagonized by post-colonial ethnic conflicts, has brought only death and displacement to millions of residents of Nord Kivu, with no end in sight. Men like Sultani Makenga, indulged and supported by parties (Western, African and Eastern) that wish to keep their hands clean of the blood of impoverished Africans, are ultimately the agents, not causes, of the resource-driven disease that ravages the Congo.

Note

  1. Mercenary leader Major Mike Hoare, who led his 5 Commando in the Kivu region in the 1960s, attributed the foundation of the Mayi Mayi movement to Chinese-trained revolutionary Pierre Mulele (1929-1968), who encouraged his Simba followers to chant “Mayi Mayi” (water water) or “Mayi Mulele” as they entered battle. The chant was intended to combine with magical water dispensed to the fighters to render them immune to bullets: “This, together with liberal doses of marijuana, rendered the recipient insensible to pain and totally incapable of intelligent action” (Hoare, Congo Mercenary, London, 1967). The practice was, in fact, an adaptation of earlier rituals used in Central Africa to overcome the superior firepower of colonial forces.

 

Drone Attacks on Port Sudan Jeopardize Plan for Russian Red Sea Naval Base

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Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 22, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC.

Andrew McGregor

May 28, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Russia’s plans to create a naval base on the Sudanese coast of the Red Sea have been upset by drone attacks launched on Port Sudan in early May. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces claimed responsibility for the attack.
  • The destruction of Port Sudan’s infrastructure demonstrates that Sudan’s domestic instability would threaten a Russian base, potentially jeopardizing a broader arms-for-access agreement that included Sudan’s acquisition of Russian warplanes.
  • Sudan accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of supplying the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones used in the attack. The UAE and the PRC may be acting to curb Russia’s naval ambitions.

Fuel depot in Port Sudan burns after drone attack, May 5, 2025 (Xinhua).

Russia’s hope of establishing a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast took a serious blow when drones shattered infrastructure at its proposed site from May 4 to 8 (Sudan Tribune, May 7, 9). The week-long drone attack, believed to have been carried out by Sudan’s rebel paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), exposed the vulnerability of the port’s proposed site to damage related to domestic instability. The alleged involvement of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the supplier of the RSF’s People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones complicates the international implications of the devastating attack.

General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, May 6, 2025 (Sudan Tribune)

Following the destruction of the Khartoum/Omdurman capital region and its industrial base early in Sudan’s civil war in 2023, Port Sudan has acted as the political and military headquarters of the Sudanese state. Port Sudan operates under the unelected Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and its dominant partner, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), commanded by General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan. Both the RSF and the UAE reject what they refer to as “the Port Sudan Authority” as the legitimate government of Sudan (Mada Masr, May 9). The city hosts Sudan’s most important port, its last functioning civil airport, a naval base, and a military airport. Crude oil from Sudan and South Sudan is exported from Port Sudan, and refined petroleum products for domestic use are stored there. It is the only delivery point for desperately needed aid and relief supplies in the war-ravaged nation.

Smoke billowed from the Sudanese Navy’s base at Flamingo Bay, 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) north of Port Sudan’s commercial port, after being struck by drones for five successive days in early May (Sudan Tribune, May 7, 9). Satellite imagery published by Russian site Insider.ru revealed what appeared to be large-scale destruction at the base (Insider.ru, May 13). Flamingo Bay is the proposed site for the new Russian naval base (AIS, March 24, 2022; see EDM, July 8, 2024, March 6, April 30; New Arab, May 8).

Flamingo Bay naval facility, north of Port Sudan (GoogleEarth)

The destruction of oil depots at Port Sudan has created immediate fuel shortages and rising prices in government-held territory. The port is suffering from shortages of food and clean water, blackouts, and looting by desperate citizens (Radio Dabanga, May 8). Thousands have fled the city as civil authorities warn of an environmental and health disaster (Sudan Tribune, May 6; Mada Masr, May 9). Drones also struck radar installations, warehouses, and munitions stores at Osman Digna Air Base in Port Sudan, causing a series of explosions (Sudan TV, May 5). The strikes halted civilian air traffic, including humanitarian aid flights, by causing heavy damage at the adjacent Port Sudan International Airport (Sudan Tribune, May 7; Radio Dabanga, May 8). Other targets included General al-Burhan’s residence and the Marina Hotel, which often houses foreign diplomats (Mada Masr, May 9). Swarms of drones struck the historic Red Sea port of Suakin, some 50 kilometers (31 miles) south of Port Sudan, and the eastern city of Kassala on May 4 to 6 (Xinhua, May 6). Qatar, the UAE’s regional rival, is redeveloping Suakin in a $4 billion project.

Osman Digna military airport in flames, May 4, 2025

As the attacks continued, Moscow expressed “deep concern over the ongoing bloody armed confrontation” in Sudan (TASS, May 5). Despite three years of Russian attacks on civilian targets and infrastructure in Ukraine, the Kremlin statement added that “Russia believes that carrying out attacks on civilian infrastructure is unacceptable” (TASS, May 5). The Russian embassy in Sudan reported operations at its temporary embassy in Port Sudan were unaffected by the bombing, saying that “the situation is tense, naturally, but not critical” (RIA Novosti, May 6).

Other than drones, the RSF does not have aerial assets or personnel operating closer to Port Sudan than Omdurman, 670 kilometers (416 miles) away. The attack’s precise targeting suggests that the RSF obtained or was given accurate coordinates by means normally unavailable to the technologically weak paramilitary. The operational range of the PRC-made Sunflower-200 one-way attack drones, which military analysts believe the RSF used, is 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers (932 to 1,242 miles), with a 30- to 40-kilogram payload (Defense Express, May 6; Cobtec International, accessed May 21). The UAE obtained the Sunflower-200 in January 2024 (Janes, January 25, 2024).

Sunflower-200 Drone (Cobtec)

The commander of the Red Sea military region and the Sudanese Navy, Lieutenant General Mahjub Bushra, claimed that drones were launched from UAE military facilities at Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland (Sudan TV, May 5). Puntland’s Minister of Information, Mahmoud Aydid Dirir, described the accusation that the UAE operated missiles from Bosaso as part of “a broader effort to undermine Puntland’s reputation and its ongoing fight against terrorism” (Mogadishu24, May 8).

SAF intelligence presented another scenario, suggesting the drones may have entered RSF-controlled regions of Sudan via the Libyan desert, past remote Jabal ‘Uwaynat (where Libya, Sudan, and Egypt meet) and into Darfur to be distributed to strategic launch points further east (AIS, June 13, 2017; France24.com, April 19; Mada Masr, May 9). Another possible route for the RSF to obtain the drones would be through the Amdjarass airstrip in Chad, close to RSF-held territory in Sudan. UAE transport aircraft make regular trips to Amdjarass. Many of the flights are believed to be delivering arms, though the UAE claims they deliver only humanitarian supplies (Reuters, December 12, 2024; Africa Defense Forum, January 7).

Sudan cut off diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi on May 6 because of their alleged involvement in the attacks, denouncing it for “state terrorism” while threatening retaliation (Middle East Eye; Sudan Tribune, May 8; Mada Masr, May 9). RSF sources confirmed the paramilitary’s responsibility for the strikes on Port Sudan, Kassala, and oil depots in Kosti (White Nile Province) as part of a plan to take the war to Port Sudan and the relatively untouched north of Sudan (Mada Masr, May 9).

An indefinite delay in the construction of a Russian naval facility at Port Sudan due to the attacks will likely jeopardize the Sudanese state’s planned acquisition of Russian warplanes, such as the Su-30 and Su-35, in exchange for the use of the port. The potential loss of Russian interest in Sudan could work in the PRC’s interest. Even though PRC-made drones caused the damage to Port Sudan, the Sudanese state (TSC/SAF) has only blamed the intermediary supplier, the UAE. If Russia backs off from the port deal and its reciprocal arms supplies, Beijing may be able to step in to make arrangements with the Sudanese state (TSC/SAF).

The PRC is obliged, as a signatory to the United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty, to prevent the UAE from selling PRC arms to a banned entity such as the RSF. It seems improbable that the PRC is unaware of how the UAE disposes of its hi-tech military imports. This raises the question of whether the UAE is mediating the transfer of PRC drones through established supply networks to the RSF to deter the expansion of Russian influence and facilities in Africa. The PRC has its own ambitions in Africa, as well as a naval base in Djibouti at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

It is uncertain whether Russia has supplied Sudan with advanced air defense systems. Sudanese Major General Mutasim ‘Abd al-Qadir indicated that Russia has discretely supplied defense systems, while Sudanese intelligence sources indicate that Sudan turned down a Russian offer to deploy a S-400 air defense system at Port Sudan due to fears of negative U.S. and European reactions (Mada Masr, May 9; Insider.ru, May 13). Advanced air defense systems would be essential for the existence of a Russian base at Port Sudan, but would also raise issues regarding the touchy issue of Sudanese sovereignty.

The UAE has taken advantage of Russian naval base troubles. After the post-Assad government of Syria canceled 2019’s 49-year agreement with Russia’s Stroynasgas to manage the port of Tartus, the UAE’s DP World signed a memorandum of agreement to take over management of the port on May 16 with a projected $800 million investment (TASS, January 21; SANA, May 16). The Russian facility at Port Sudan was intended in part to replace the loss of Tartus. As the feasibility of establishing a Russian base in the Red Sea begins to diminish under the weight of domestic insecurity and foreign intervention, Moscow may intensify discussions to create an alternative naval base at the Libyan port of Tobruk.

Russia Increasing Military Presence in Africa by Reviving Desert Airbase in the Libyan Sahara

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Andrew McGregor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

April 17, 2025

Executive Summary: 

  • Russia’s rehabilitation of an abandoned airbase in the Libyan desert offers an opportunity to create a reliable line of supply to Russian forces operating in West Africa.
  • A Russian military presence close to the borders of Egypt, Sudan, and Chad could make Moscow a player in regional politics and security activities.
  • Moscow continues to feel its way through a complex system of regional rivalries and alliances that leaves it open to counter-moves by interested parties in the West.

One of former Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s greatest foreign policy failures was undoubtedly his 1980s attempt to use his Soviet-armed military to spread Libyan rule and influence in the African Sahel region. Now, Russia is focused on a similar effort in the Sahel, using the same remote airbase in south-eastern Libya that Qaddafi used to launch his offensive into neighboring Chad. The airbase at Matan al-Sarra is the latest addition to a network of Libyan bases hosting Russian military operations and arms shipments. These include al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, and al-Qardabiya (Middle East Eye, July 10, 2023; Libya Observer, January 15).

Matan al-Sarra Airbase

Matan al-Sarra is close to the historically strategic Kufra region, a series of small oases (see Terrorism Monitor, February 23, 2012, April 6, 2018; May 5, 2011). Today, Kufra is an important staging point for illegal African migrants making for the Mediterranean coast and ultimately Europe (Libyan News Agency, April 7).

Kufra and the rest of south-eastern Libya is now controlled by self-appointed “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar, commander of the so-called “Libyan National Army” (LNA, a.k.a. Libyan Arab Armed Forces). LNA is a composite force of militias, mercenaries, tribal groups, and more formal military formations supporting one of the two rival governments in Libya, the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (MENA Research Center, August 19, 2024; AIS Special Report, November 14, 2017).

Haftar’s 2020 Russian-backed attempt to seize Tripoli and bring Libya under his sole control with the aid of Wagner Group mercenaries was a failure, owing in part to the Government of National Accord’s​​ (GNA) effective use of Turkish drones (see EDM, June 11, 2020, March 12, 2024). Rather than drop his alliance with Russia, Haftar instead decided to intensify relations with Moscow in the hope of obtaining more advanced weapons and other military materiel. Permitting Russian use of the airbase in south-eastern Cyrenaïca is part of this process.

Mobile Chadian Troops in the Toyota War, 1988

Before receiving support from Moscow for his military campaigns in Libya, Haftar had a history of cooperating with the United States. In 1987, after losing a military campaign as the then-commander of Libyan forces in Chad, Haftar was captured and disowned by Qaddafi (Libya Tribune, October 29, 2022; al-Arabiya, May 24, 2014). Valuable specimens of Soviet aircraft and radar abandoned by the Libyans were recovered from the battlefield by a US Special Operations group, temporarily damaging Libyan relations with Moscow (ARSOF, March 2022). By 1990, Haftar had agreed to move to the United States with 300 other Libyan prisoners, where he became a U.S. citizen and alleged asset for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its efforts to overthrow Qaddafi, who continued to be backed by the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991 (Libya Tribune, October 31, 2022; France24.com, May 19, 2014; al-Arabiya, May 24, 2014). Haftar returned to Libya in 2011, where he established a power base in Cyrenaïca against the internationally recognized Tripoli-based GNA, which controls most of northwestern Libya (Tripolitania) with the military assistance of Türkiye.

US Chinook Slings an Abandoned Russian-Made Libyan Mi-24 Hind from the Chadian Desert, June 11, 1988

The new six square kilometer (2.3 square mile) base at Matan al-Sarra will provide a refueling stop for Russian aircraft heading into areas of West Africa where the Russian Africa Corps is active. It is located close to the Egyptian and Sudanese borders. Most importantly, the base lies just north of Libya’s border with Chad, the latest target for Russian influence since the recent withdrawal of French and U.S. military forces stationed there. Chad’s discontent with the West follows sustained Russian influence operations and the perceived inability of its Western allies to provide effective military aid in the struggle against regional Islamist insurgencies (see EDM, June 25, 2024). Kremlin objectives in Africa are furthered by an influence and propaganda campaign that uses regional influencers and social media to encourage belief in Russia as a viable and sympathetic alternative to the West for economic and security partnerships  (Le Monde, August 6, 2023; RUSI Europe, October 25, 2023; MLM, December 4, 2019).

Troops of the LNA’s Tariq bin Zayid Battalion

Russia began transferring Syrian troops and contractors to Matan al-Sarra last December, where they were engaged alongside Russian personnel in repair and reconstruction efforts at the long-neglected base (The New Arab, January 28). Once a means of projecting Libyan power south into Chad and Sudan, the base lost its raison d’être in 2011 and was abandoned when Qaddafi’s death ended Libyan designs on the African interior. The region around the base, the supply line from Tobruk, and the route to Sudan have been secured by the LNA’s Tariq bin Ziyad Battalion, under the command of one of Khalifa Haftar’s sons, Saddam Haftar (Libya Observer, January 15). With daily temperature highs of over 90 degrees Fahrenheit (32 degrees Celsius) for six months of the year and almost zero annual precipitation, service at the isolated base will likely be considered a hardship posting for Russian personnel.

Russian operatives have been in contact with local tribal communities in the region to form useful alliances (Libya Observer, January 15). The area around Matan al-Sarra is dominated by the Tubu, the so-called “Black nomads of the Sahara” (as described by French soldier and ethnologist Jean Chapelle in his 1958 work Nomades noirs du Sahara) who were displaced from Kufra in the 1840s by their Arab rivals, the Zuwaya. Russian personnel will likely attempt to curry the favor of both groups as aligning with one against the other would create unwanted turmoil and insecurity.

A Russian presence at Matan al-Sarra would provide Moscow with the ability to ship arms to Sudanese or Chadian territory quietly. Even though Moscow has shifted most of its support in the Sudan conflict from the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the rival Sudanese Armed Forces/Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF/TSC), its forces in Libya do not appear to be interfering with Khalifa Haftar’s supply of arms and vehicles to the RSF (Middle East Eye, January 25, 2024; Agenzia Nova [Rome], January 17). Moscow likely wishes to avoid alienating the RSF and lose an opportunity to establish influence in a possible RSF-ruled state in Darfur, the home of most RSF fighters (Sudan Tribune, March 4).

Moscow’s overtures to the Chadian military regime are complicated by Moscow’s attempt to play both sides of the Sudanese conflict (see EDM, July 8, 2024). In late March, the SAF command declared that Chadian airports at N’Djamena and Amdjarras are now “legitimate targets for the Sudanese Armed Forces” following allegations that Chad is using them to forward arms from the United Arab Emirates to RSF forces inside Sudan (Middle East Eye, January 25, 2024; AFP, March 24).

Russian contractors have been heavily involved in gold-mining operations across the border in Sudanese Darfur to help pay for its war against Ukraine and may seek to expand into the Tubu-controlled Kalanga region (450 kilometers (280 miles) south-west of Kufra) in the foothills of the Tibesti Mountains along the border with Chad (Agenzia Nova [Rome], January 23). Chadian forces carried out airstrikes in the region last summer against Chadian rebels gathering there after working as mercenaries in Libya (Libya Security Monitor, August 22, 2024). The strikes came at the same time as Major General Hassan Matuq al-Zama led the LNA’s 128th Reinforced Brigade in operations to secure the border with Niger and Chad and to displace armed groups in Kalanga involved in smuggling and gold mining (Libya Review, August 19, 2024; Atalyar [Madrid], August 21, 2024).

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (Libya Observer)

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been working in the last year to develop relations with Khalifa Haftar and encourage military unification in Libya to discourage Libyan partnerships with Russia. In late February, AFRICOM conducted training exercises in Libya involving U.S. B-52H Stratofortress bombers and Libyan military forces representing both rival Libyan governments designed to promote Libyan military unification while simultaneously slowing the growth of Russian influence (Libya Observer, March 4; Agenzia Nova, March 7). The exercise came amid regular contacts between Haftar and Russian deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (responsible for Russian African Corps operations) and a growing number of Russians stationed at the LNA-controlled Brak al-Shati airbase in central Libya (Defense News, March 14). 

Russian operations in Africa continue to be characterized by a certain diplomatic inconsistency that may be due in part to inexperience in the region and unfamiliarity with the motives and methods of their would-be partners. Besides trying to keep a foot in both camps in the Sudan conflict, Moscow continues to attempt to develop relations with the Tripoli-based GNA, which only encourages Khalifa Haftar to leave himself open to U.S. overtures. A failure to make firm and visible commitments makes Kremlin strategic policy in the region a work in progress, susceptible to local manipulation as well as countermoves by Russia’s global rivals.

What Motivated Islamic State’s Mosque Attack in Muscat?

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor 23(1), Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

March 25, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Islamic State (IS) militants conducted a well-planned strike in Oman on a Shi’ite mosque on July 15, 2024. While early reports focused on the attack’s potential goal of inciting sectarian violence, it is more likely to have been meant as a warning to Muscat to cease diplomatic activities involving regional governments, Shi’ite groups, and/or the West.
  • Oman’s peace with regard to jihadism is deep-rooted in local Ibadi Muslim traditions. Muscat’s tolerance has enabled it to serve as a diplomatic hub, facilitating negotiations between the United States and Iran as well as Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Islamic State (IS) militants struck a Shi’ite mosque in Oman on July 15, 2024, scything down dozens of worshipers while hundreds of others stampeded in a desperate effort to evade an unexpected hail of bullets (see Terrorism Monitor, August 21, 2024). The attack on Muscat’s ‘Ali bin Abi Talib mosque puzzled many observers of the Middle East, as sectarian violence is nearly unknown in Oman, where most citizens, rather than being Sunni or Shi’ite, follow the relatively little-known and non-aggressive Ibadi school of Islam.

The Shi’ite mosque, on the fringe of Muscat, the Omani capital, has a mainly Pakistani congregation. Oman is a nation of four million people, of whom 40 percent are expatriate workers, mostly from South Asia. Though 400,000 of these are Pakistanis, Pakistan’s ambassador to Oman declared the attack was not “a Pakistan-targeted operation” (Times of Oman, July 17, 2024).

When the shooting began in the evening, nearly 500 people were assembled in the courtyard. Most worshipers were able to rush inside the mosque before a policeman gave his life closing the doors. Five other people were killed, including four Pakistanis and one Indian national. At least three of the dead died trying to shield children from the gunfire with their bodies (The National [Abu Dhabi], July 23, 2024). Some 30 were wounded, including emergency services personnel (Muscat Daily, July 16, 2024).

‘Ali bin Abi Talib Mosque in Muscat (Agenzia Nova)

Many survivors credited the action of the Royal Oman Police in preventing a massacre: “If not for the counter-firing by security officials stationed around the mosque, the tragedy would have been unimaginable” (Times of Oman, July 16, 2024). Most of the mosque attendees had been rescued by 2:15 AM, but a firefight between the attackers and security services continued well into the morning.

IS timed the attack to occur on Ashura, the Shi’ite day of mourning for Husayn bin ‘Ali. He was the grandson of Muhammad who refused to recognize the Umayyad succession to the Caliphate in the seventh century and was consequently killed at the Battle of Karbala. Hatred of the Shi’a was likely only a means of inciting the attackers as a geopolitical strategy was unlikely to inspire the kind of fanaticism necessary to slaughter innocents. The timing of the attack thus inflicted religious insult while provoking a maximum emotional impact on the targeted worshipers.

Islamic State’s Attackers in Oman

On July 18, 2024, IS released a three-minute video through its Amaq news agency of the three self-styled “soldiers of the Islamic State” who carried out the attack. The three native Omani brothers were, according to the Royal Oman Police, “influenced by others and had misguided ideas” (Times of Oman, July 18, 2024; Al-Watan [Muscat], July 18, 2024). The brothers are likely to have had ties to the Islamic State in Yemen Province (ISYP), whose homeland in Yemen borders Oman.

The Islamic State Attackers (Amaq)

The video was filmed outdoors in front of an apparently homemade, spray-painted IS black flag. After calling on young Arab Muslims to combat “apostates” and “tyrants,” the speaker declared their attack would avenge both Sunni jihadists held in various Shi’a prisons and the reputation of Aisha, who is “the mother of believers” and the Prophet Muhammad’s third wife. [1] 

The Omani perpetrators, who were likely Salafist Sunnis, made reference to Ibadism as a sectarian form of Islam in their video. Sunni militants condemn the Shi’a as rawafidh (“rejectionists,” i.e., of the first three caliphs, the successors of Muhammad). Most of the Sunni Muslims of southern Oman belong to the moderate Shafi’i madhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence), considered to be relatively infertile ground for religious extremism. Aside from their evident loathing for Oman’s long-accepted Shi’ite community, the attackers have thus also demonstrated an intolerance uncommon to Oman’s dominant Sunni faith.

Given the bloodshed in Gaza, the gunmen further explained that jihad did not need to only target Jews on behalf of “Palestine,” but must also strike at “polytheists” (a derogatory Salafist term for Shi’ites). The video concluded with the militants pledging allegiance to Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the fifth caliph (since August 2023) of IS’s so-called Islamic caliphate.

Islamic State “Caliph” Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quraishi

The attack showed a significant degree of planning, with the assailants taking positions behind floodlights on the roof of a neighboring building. This provided a full view of their targets while preventing a precise location of their shifting positions. Chanting “You non-believers, this is your end,” they engaged Omani police and soldiers for ten hours before their deaths (The National [Abu Dhabi], July 17, 2024).

Background to Tolerance

The empire-building Portuguese arrived in Oman in 1507, unleashing seamen recruited from the prisons of Lisbon on Muscat and other ports. Using extreme brutality to make up for inferior numbers, the Portuguese burned the mosques and mutilated or killed those Arabs who resisted. [2] However, under nearly 150 years of Portuguese rule, Oman became a regional trading center, attracting migration from India, Iran, and other points. In this way, Oman emerged as a multi-faith, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural bastion once the despised Portuguese were run out by the Ibadi Imams with Dutch and British naval assistance.

“Al-Jalali,” Portuguese Fort, Muscat (Andries Oudshoorn)

Oman’s commanding position on the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea, with the latter’s connections to the Indian Ocean, has provided historical ties through seafaring traders and merchants to many parts of Asia, east Africa, and the Middle East. The result is that, despite its isolationist reputation, Oman is home to a variety of languages, ethnicities, and faiths, including Islam and Hinduism. Oman’s majority Muslim population is roughly split between Ibadis and Sunnis, with the Shi’a forming a smaller community representing some 5 percent of the population.

This exposure to other cultures and intellectual trends, combined with the moderate nature of Ibadi Islam, created in Oman a tolerant and diverse society that has largely escaped the religious and ethnic fissures that have so troubled its neighbors in recent decades.

Who Are the Ibadis?

The Ibadis are believed to be an offshoot of the early Islamic Kharijite movement, which fought a long war against Muslim rulers they accused of violating Islamic law. A focus on asceticism and egalitarianism brought many followers to the Kharijite ranks from the nomadic Bedouin and the mawali, who are non-Arab converts to Islam (including many Berbers). In 692, ‘Abd Allah bin Ibad created a more moderate but socially conservative breakaway version of the inflexible Khawarij movement that was prepared to live in harmony with other Muslims. This movement came to be known as Ibadism after its founder.

Oman’s Ibadi Muslims generally do not pursue the spread of their madhab. For example, during the long period of direct Omani rule over Zanzibar (1698–1861), little if any effort was made to convert East Africans to Ibadi Islam. [3] Ibadis do not seek the establishment of a global caliphate nor the territorial expansion of Islam.

Outside of Oman, Ibadis are found in smaller numbers in the Tunisian island of Djerba, in the Berber community of Libya’s Nafusa Mountains, and in the Berber Mzab Valley region of Algeria, where the Ibadis played a major role in facilitating the trans-Saharan African slave trade. The Omanis also had a long presence in Zanzibar and East Africa as merchants and slave traders, creating over the years a new class of Afro–Omanis whose most prominent member was the slaver and explorer Tippu Tib (1837–1905).

The Omani Reaction

Expressing his shock that Omanis carried out the attack in IS’s name, Oman’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili, insisted that: “The norm in this good country is that Omani education rejects, by nature, any aggression against a citizen or expatriate due to an intellectual or sectarian disagreement” (IQNA [Tehran], July 19, 2024).

In contrast, one leading Omani commentator suggested responsibility for the attack lay with the United States, claiming that IS was created and directed in Washington, D.C. (Oman Daily, July 21). [4] Suspicion of American and Israeli direction of IS is common in the Middle East, especially due to IS’s focus on attacking fellow Muslims and its reluctance or inability to target Israel or Israeli interests. In Oman, a familiar but bitter joke made the rounds after the mosque massacre: Q. “When will Islamic State attack the Israelis?” A. “As soon as they convert to Islam.”

Another Omani commentator warned of the complacency created by popular belief in an “imagined Omani… tolerant, peaceful, innocent, a silent citizen…” a vision that ignores Omani society’s “many molds related to religious and political beliefs, ideas, and visions” (Oman Daily, July 22, 2024). Others, meanwhile, questioned why individuals “who have received qualitative education, hold high-level academic degrees from prestigious universities and hold lucrative jobs slip into such dangerous pitfalls” (Oman Daily, July 21, 2024). Only a handful of Omanis are known to have participated in jihadist movements since the 1990s.

The Jihadist Response

An editorial published in IS’s official magazine al-Naba condemned Oman for its good relations with Iran and called for the states of the Arabian Peninsula to expel all Shi’a to end their “cancerous infiltration.” The editorial further accused Oman’s “apostate” government of “throwing open the doors” of Oman to the Shi’a, despite their centuries-long presence there. [5] Al-Naba further accused Oman’s government of creating, through toleration, an equivalency between Sunnis and Ibadis as well as Shi’a and pagans.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Jordanian Salafist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading jihadist theorist, unfavorably contrasted the IS’s attack on a “remote and marginal” Shi’a mosque in Oman with the successful and strategic efforts of Shi’a groups like Hezbollah and the Yemen-based Houthis against the “Jews and Crusaders.” He mentioned the July 19, 2024, Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv, in particular. According to al-Maqdisi, “only a mentally ill person” would prioritize attacks on Shi’a non-combatants over strikes on Jews and Christians. [6] 

Conclusion 

To understand the attack on the ‘Ali bin Abi Talib mosque in Muscat, it is necessary to recognize what caused this IS cell to be activated at this time. Though it is entirely possible for cells, like lone wolf terrorists, to self-activate, it seems unlikely in this case. The Middle East (and even Oman) abounds with more valuable targets than an obscure mosque frequented by Pakistani expats. The slaughter of a handful of worshippers by a dedicated team of jihadists willing to give their lives will not drive the Shi’a from Oman, nor is it likely to encourage other Omanis to take up the cause of IS. Hatred of the Shi’a was likely only a means of inciting the attackers, as geopolitical strategy was unlikely to inspire the kind of fanaticism necessary to slaughter innocents.

Though Oman has been described as a mediator in Middle East conflicts, its role is better described as facilitation, offering a discrete venue for antagonists to pass messages or engage in direct talks without Omani involvement. Conducted out of sight of the media, these back-channel negotiations often yield positive results.

Despite pressure from its Sunni neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula, Oman has maintained good relations with Shi’ite Iran and acted as a facilitator in Iranian contacts with Saudi Arabia and the United States. On May 19, 2024, the Iranian mission to the UN confirmed that Oman was hosting ongoing indirect talks between the United States and Iran (Iran International, May 19, 2024). Oman has similarly facilitated talks between the Iran-backed Houthi movement and its Saudi antagonists (Al Jazeera, July 24). On July 19, 2024, IS condemned all these communications, claiming the “infidel” powers were encouraged by Oman to unite in a war against it. [7] 

If IS wished to warn off Oman from further facilitation of negotiations benefitting Shi’ite Iran and the Zaydi Shi’ite Houthi movement, the apparently pointless targeting of a Shi’a mosque in Muscat begins to make sense. Rather than being an attempt to sow sectarian discord, the attack on the ‘Ali bin Abi Talib mosque can more reasonably be interpreted as a warning to Oman to cease diplomatic activities involving Iran and its so-called proxies.

Notes: 

[1] This extraordinarily long quarrel dates back to the lifetime of Aisha bint Abu Bakr (614–678), the Prophet Muhammad’s third wife. The daughter of Abu Bakr, first of the Rashidun (rightly guided) caliphs (the first four successors of Muhammad), she gained the eternal ire of the Shi’a for opposing the succession of ‘Ali, the last of the Rashidun and the first Imam of the Shi’a. In Shi’a discourse, she is condemned for her political involvement as a female and her alleged dislike of the Ahl al-Bayt (family of the Prophet).

[2] Roger Crowley, Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire, London, 2015, pp. 196–198.

[3] Ahmed al-Ismaili: “Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Pluralism in Oman: The Link with Political Stability, Al Muntaqa 1(3), December 2018, pp. 58–73. After Oman ended direct rule in 1856, Zanzibar continued to be ruled by local Omani Arabs as the Sultanate of Zanzibar until it was made a British protectorate in 1890. Sovereign Arab rule was restored when the British terminated the protectorate in 1963, but massacres of Arabs and Indians during the leftist 1964 Zanzibar Revolution brought a final end to Omani rule.

[4] On August 11, 2016, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump insisted: “ISIS is honoring President Obama. He is the founder of ISIS. He’s the founder of ISIS, OK? He’s the founder. He founded ISIS. And I would say, the co-founder would be crooked Hillary Clinton” (CBS, August 11, 2016). The following day the candidate was given numerous opportunities by a friendly interviewer to walk back a literal interpretation of his statement, but chose instead to double down: “No, I meant [President Obama] is the founder of ISIS. I do… No, it’s no mistake” (hughhewitt.com, August 12, 2016).

[5] Al-Naba no. 452, July 19, 2024

[6] Telegram, via BBCM, July 20, 2024

[7] Al-Naba no. 452, July 19, 2024

Credibility of Russia’s Red Sea Naval Facility Agreement with Sudan

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Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 22, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC

Andrew McGregor

March 6, 2025

Executive Summary:

  • Moscow is pursuing the construction of a naval port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, reflected in the finalization of an agreement between Russia and Sudan in February.
  • The deal appears to be part of the Kremlin’s efforts to create new strategic assets in Africa following the loss of air and naval bases in Syria.
  • The elected government of Sudan’s inability to ratify the agreement reflects the salience of domestic and international opposition to a changed security situation on this vital maritime trade route.

Russia and the leading faction in Sudan’s ongoing civil war have reportedly finalized an agreement to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast. Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, there may be no more strategically important body of water in the world than the Red Sea. Access to the sea, which carries 10 to 12 percent of global trade on its waters, is gained only through the Egyptian-controlled canal to the north and the narrow Bab al-Mandab strait to the south (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed March 4). So far, no state outside of the region has established a naval base between the canal and Bab al-Mandab since the departure of the British from Sudan’s primary Red Sea port, Port Sudan, in 1956. That appeared to change on February 12 with the announcement that an agreement had been reached to construct a Russian naval base in Port Sudan.

The announcement was made by Dr. ‘Ali Yusuf Sharif, appointed in November 2024 as nominal foreign minister by Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, whose faction controls most of Sudan. During a televised press conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, Sharif said “This is an easy question, there are no obstacles, we are in complete agreement” (Izvestiya, February 12; Al Arabiya; Atalayar, February 13). After the meeting, Lavrov expressed his appreciation for the “balanced and constructive position” taken by Sudan on the situation in Ukraine (TASS, February 12). There has been no confirmation from Moscow of the official signing of this deal.

‘Ali Yusuf Sharif and Sergei Lavrov

Since 2017, Moscow and Khartoum, represented by the since-deposed Sudanese president, ‘Omar al-Bashir, have discussed the creation of a Russian naval base in Sudan (See EDM, December 6, 2017). A preliminary agreement, forming the basis for the current pact, was developed in 2020 but never implemented. This original agreement includes a 25-year lease with a possible ten-year extension (Uz Daily, November 15, 2020).

Moscow holds a vested interest in establishing a naval base in this region, especially as the future of its naval base in Tartus, Syria remains uncertain (Military Review, December 11, 2024; Izvestiya, January 22). The primary function of Russia’s new “logistical base,” as it is described by Moscow, is to repair and replenish up to four Russian naval craft at a time, including nuclear-powered vessels. The base will house up to 300 personnel, with an option to increase this number with Sudan’s permission (TASS, February 12; Sudan Tribune, February 12). Russia will be responsible for air defense and internal security, while Sudan will provide external security in tandem with temporary Russian defensive positions outside the base. Russia will be at liberty to import and export weapons, munitions, and military material to and from the base (Vreme, February 13).

Sukhoi Su—25 Aircraft (Military Africa)

The completion of the deal may open the possibility for Sudan to purchase Russian-built SU-30 and SU-35 fighter jets, which it has sought since 2017 (Sudan Tribune, July 16, 2024). The sale has been complicated by an inability to finalize the port offer, U.S. sanctions on Russian manufacturers, and Sudan’s difficulty in making payments. Oil-rich Algeria, by comparison, has just completed a deal to obtain 14 fifth-generation Russian SU-57 stealth fighters (Janes.com, February 14).

Cooperation with Russia is also attractive to Sudan given Khartoum’s need to secure oil exports on its coast. Port Sudan serves as the export point for Sudan’s troubled oil industry, now operating at only slightly more than 40 percent of pre-war production. Sudan’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MOP) is currently discussing a new partnership with Russia related to exploration, financing, and technical assistance (Sudan Tribune, January 25). In November 2024, MOP Minister Dr. Muhyaddin Na’im Muhammad Sa’id met with his Russian counterpart in Moscow to discuss prospects for joint projects and attractive areas for Russian companies to invest in oil and gas exploration (Sudan News Agency, November 16, 2024). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formerly Sudan’s main energy partner. According to one Sudanese economic expert, “the [civil] war has changed this equation” in favor of gaining expertise, especially related to oil extraction, from Russia (Sudan Tribune, January 25).

Sudan Began to Run Out of Fuel, Medicines and Wheat When Beja Protests Closed Port Sudan in 2021 (AFP)

For Russia, there is a risk in initiating the construction of an expensive naval facility during a period of continued instability in Sudan. There is also the question of overland supply from Khartoum to Port Sudan, which essentially follows a single highway that has been blocked in the past by Beja protestors (New Arab, October 27, 2021; see EDM, November 14, 2023). To mitigate such risks, Sudan appears to be trying to follow the “Djibouti approach” to hosting foreign military bases. Djibouti currently hosts separate French, Chinese, U.S., Italian, and Japanese military facilities while U.K. forces are hosted at the U.S. facility (see EDM, July 8, 2024). According to Sharif, the new Russian base in Sudan, like those in Djibouti, will not pose a threat to the sovereignty of its neighbors nor Sudan itself (Anadolu Ajansi, February 13).

There are, however, major and ongoing differences between the military and civil components of the de facto government in Port Sudan that could sideline Russian ambitions in the Red Sea. Sharif’s claim that there were “no obstacles” to implementing the agreement is not necessarily correct. There is broad opposition to the unelected leaders of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) making a deal with major implications for Sudanese sovereignty (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, 2023). As the deal cannot presently be ratified by any elected body in Sudan, there is a strong possibility that a future government (elected or otherwise) might reject the deal entirely as having no legal legitimacy. The January 20 cancellation of Russia’s 2017 49-year lease on the port of Tartus by the new Syrian regime provides an exemplary lesson on such a danger (Maritime Executive, January 21).

Another approach the Sudanese leadership may use to mitigate security risks, and in turn, may increase Russia’s attraction to creating a naval base in the country, is via deliberate changes in government representation. The de facto leader of Sudan is Lieutenant General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, chair of the unelected Transitional Sovereignty Council and commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Al-Burhan’s government is now located in Port Sudan rather than war-torn Khartoum. Al-Burhan differs from previous leaders, as he has attempted to garner support from eastern Sudan, a traditionally impoverished area with little influence or representation in the central government. Most of the rebellions, coups, and civil conflicts that have plagued Sudan since independence and effectively prevented its successful development have been sparked by the inequality, domination, and monopolization of power. Since eastern Sudan has been dominated since independence by the Arab Nubian elites of northern and central Sudan, al-Burhan’s emphasis on involving eastern Sudan in his government represents a measure to prevent future coups or conflict. One of the figures who will likely be involved in establishing a Russian naval base in Sudan is ‘Umar Banfir, the new trade minister. Banfir is the former director of Sudan’s Sea Ports Authority and is expected to represent eastern interests to the government (Jordan Times, November 4, 2024).

Sanctions imposed by the United States on the SAF and al-Burhan personally in the last days of the Biden Administration appear correlated with al-Burhan’s renewed interest in securing the naval base deal with Russia (US Treasury Department, October 24, 2024; US Department of State, January 16; US Treasury Department, January 25).

Meanwhile, there is little evidence to suggest that the new Trump administration will impose additional sanctions or attempt to restrict Sudan’s pursuit of a new deal with Russia given the previous removal of sanctions under the first Trump administration (Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2017). Nearby Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain firmly opposed to the deal (Sudan Tribune, July 16, 2024).

Domestic political opposition, foreign objections, tribal unrest, and local fears that a Russian base might attract attacks from rivals, which in turn could damage or shut down Sudan’s most important port, remain considerable threats to the construction of a Russian naval facility in Port Sudan. These considerations also threaten Russian attempts to reinvigorate Sudan’s oil production, which has been declining for years due to a lack of investment and civil conflict. While the Russian naval base deal in Sudan holds strategic potential for Moscow, its success hinges on overcoming these political, domestic, and regional challenges.