Andrew McGregor

November 4 2010

On October 14 former Tuareg rebels under the command of Ibrahim ag Bahanga attacked a heavily armed convoy of cocaine smugglers roughly 60 miles from the northern Mali town of Kidal. Some 12 people were killed in the clash in which the Tuareg fighters received “material support” from the Malian army, according to a local government official (Reuters, October 18; Jeune Afrique, October 18; Afrique en Ligne, October 20). It is unclear whether the Tuareg fighters were acting under their own initiative as a kind of demonstration of their potential in combating AQIM and narco-traffickers, or whether the action was officially sanctioned by the Bamako government, which has so far been reluctant to rearm the Tuareg. The traffickers were alleged to be running a shipment of cocaine from Morocco to Egypt across the sparsely populated Sahel region.

Ibrahim ag Bahanga

Ag Bahanga is a noted smuggler and rebel commander who is a leading proponent of transforming former Tuareg rebels into armed units tasked with expelling al-Qaeda operatives from the Sahel/Sahara region. Though his proposal was given a sympathetic ear in Algeria, the long-time rebel is little trusted in Bamako and continues to operate from self-imposed exile in Libya. Ag Bahanga’s proposal has elicited little sympathy from Mali’s press. One commentator noted that “in the recent past Bahanga has demonstrated proof of his inconsistency and his warlike inclination by swearing peace one day and indulging in atrocities the next day” (Info Matin [Bamako], October 20). Another commentator complained that Ag Bahanga’s “renewed patriotism” was “hard to understand” and rearming the Tuareg could turn Mali into “another Afghanistan” (Nouvelle Libération [Bamako], October 12).

Nevertheless, the Tuareg attack came only days after Ag Bahanga was reported to have met with Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré on the sidelines of the October 10 African-Arab summit meeting in the Libyan city of Sirte to discuss the reintegration of Ag Bahanga and his men into the Malian army (Nouvelle Libération [Bamako], October 12).

According to former rebel spokesman Ahmada Ag Bibi (now a parliamentary deputy in Bamako), “AQIM wants to dirty the image of our region. We aren’t going to accept that. [AQIM fighters] often seek shelter on our land, and we know the terrain. If we were armed we could easily take care of them… We’re just waiting for the Malian government to give us the green light to chase al-Qaeda from our desert” (AFP, October 10).

The 2006 Algiers Accord between Bamako and the Tuareg rebels provides for the establishment of Tuareg military units under officers of the Malian regular army, but like many aspects of the accord, these provisions have never been implemented. There are indications now, however, that such units may be formed soon – according to an authority in the Kidal administration, their establishment may be only weeks away (Afrique en Ligne, October 20; Ennahar [Algiers], October 10).

A small number of Tuareg are believed to be working for AQIM as drivers and guides, though there are also unconfirmed reports that a Tuareg imam from Kidal named Abdelkrim has become an amir in the AQIM organization (Libération [Bamako], October 31; Jeune Afrique, October 9). Though direct Tuareg participation in AQIM activities may be limited, there are signs, nonetheless, that the massive influx of cash into the region from AQIM-obtained ransoms has had an indirect benefit to the Tuareg and Arab tribes of the region. In the town of Kidal, expansive new villas and shiny 4 x 4’s have begun to appear in a region almost entirely devoid of development (Libération [Bamako], October 31).

A veteran Tuareg rebel, Iyad ag Ghali, has been designated as the government’s official mediator with AQIM forces in northern Mali (Le Républicain [Bamako], October 4). An AQIM katiba (military unit) led by Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid is believed to have established bases in the rugged Timetrine Mountains of northern Mali (once a refuge for Tuareg rebels) and is currently believed to be holding French and African hostages there who were kidnapped from the French-owned uranium operations in neighboring Niger (Le Monde, October 18).

Many Malian politicians complain that they have been excluded from the decision-making process in regard to the security of northern Mali. Such decisions are now made exclusively by the president, himself a former military commander in the north, and a small group of senior officers, including General Habib Sissoko, General Kafougouna Kone, Brigadier Gabriel Poudiougou and Colonel Mamy Coulibaly (Jeune Afrique, October 9).

This article first appeared in the November 4 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

January 21, 2010

In a recent interview with an Algerian newspaper, a spokesman for the Tuareg rebel group Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour le Changement (ADC) suggested that the Malian government’s failure to implement a two and one-half year-old peace agreement was a direct cause of the growth of al-Qaeda forces in the Tuareg-dominated Kidal region of northern Mali (El Watan [Algiers], January 14).

Hama ag Sid Ahmed

Spokesman Hama ag Sid Ahmed claims al-Qaeda forces in the area have grown from 250 to 800 members in the last year alone. At the same time, the Malian government has little presence in the region despite the commitment of vast sums of money for development projects. The absence of development efforts has been exacerbated by the return of drought to the area. The Tuareg “have a hard time understanding where their money has been spent.” The ADC claims the devastation brought by the drought has been subject to a news blackout orchestrated by Bamako. The result has been a steady alienation of the Malian Tuareg, especially the youth.  The failure to provide development or security appears to the ADC to be a “premeditated wish to push these young people towards drugs, smuggling, or terrorism.” Hama ag Sid Ahmed says he and others have warned young Tuareg against allowing their dissatisfaction with the government to lead them into a trap that will result in their destruction.

According to the ADC spokesman, forces belonging to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) now consist of 800 full-time members and 200 auxiliary members. Hama Ag Sid Ahmed warns that AQIM’s tactic of kidnapping Westerners in the region has understandably drawn the attention of numerous Western intelligence agencies concerned with terrorism.

The non-Arab Tuareg (a branch of North Africa’s indigenous Berber people) have traditionally been rivals of the Arabs for control of large swathes of the Sahara. Sufi rather than Salafist, the Tuareg have until now had little reason to identify with the dominantly Arab and Salafist al-Qaeda movement. Asked how it was possible for Mali’s Tuareg to allow the growth of AQIM forces in their own region, Hama ag Sig Ahmed explained that such growth was impossible when the Tuareg maintained security in the region before the Algiers Agreement of 2006. Since then, however, Bamako has taken over security for the region under the terms of the agreement, without, however, creating the Tuareg special security units called for by the agreement. While AQIM could not previously have been active in the region without the permission of the Tuareg, the latter have changed from “actors to observers”: “The Tuareg have always wanted to chase the terrorists out of the region, but the army officers prevented them from acting, telling them: ‘These matters do not concern you. You are citizens, stay far away. We will catch the terrorists. That is why we are here, and if you play at being the police we will arrest you.’ That is how the Malian Army reacts each time the Tuareg try to chase the Salafists.”

This article first appeared in the January 21, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

June 25, 2009

Assassins believed to be with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) burst into the Timbuktu residence of a Malian intelligence officer on the evening of June 10, blowing half his head away with point-blank gunfire before making their escape. The veteran Arab officer had just made a number of high-profile arrests of AQIM members as part of an ongoing campaign against al-Qaeda elements in northern Mali (Le Challenger [Bamako], June 11; Nouvelle Libération, [Bamako], June 16).

Tessalit Oasis

Troops pursued the assassins of the well-known officer into the Tadoudeni area of Northern Mali (an important region for salt mines), with the Salafists laying landmines behind them as they withdrew to the north (Info-Matin [Bamako], June 17).

Lieutenant Colonel Lamana Ould Bou was with Mali’s military intelligence and led operations against AQIM in northern Mali. He was a former member of the Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad (Arab Islamic Front of Azawad – FIAA), a rebel movement based around northern Mali’s Arab minority. He became a member of the Malian security forces after a peace accord was signed in 1991. His valuable contribution to anti-terrorist operations was described by a fellow officer: “As a native of Timbuktu Region, he had very profound knowledge of the area and knew where to find the enemy. So, of late, he had been of great assistance in tracking and arresting a score of Islamists and terrorists” (L’Independent [Bamako], June 16).

After a funeral attended by thousands, the army took revenge in a June 16 attack on an AQIM base in the Tessalit Oasis, killing anywhere from 16 to 26 fighters, though some sources suggest these numbers may be inflated {Le Républicain, June 18; al-Hayat, June 18). According to Malian military sources, the Salafist camp was under the command of Abd al-Hamid Abu Za’id. Three Bérabich Arab militiamen and two Malian regulars were killed when their military vehicle struck an AQIM landmine during the pursuit (Nouvelle Libération [Bamako], June 17). Arab and Tuareg militias have been increasingly employed by the Malian government for desert operations in remote northern Mali. Algerian security sources said the raid was part of an attempt to encircle AQIM forces near the Algerian border and liberate a Swiss hostage (al-Hayat, June 18).

According to reports from the Malian capital of Bamako, President Amadou Toumani Touré has been reluctant to enter into a full-scale campaign in the vast lands and harsh conditions of northern Mali, preferring a path of negotiations. Since security operations were scaled back after the defeat of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga’s Tuareg rebels in February, trafficking in arms and other contraband has increased in the north as the tribes begin to rearm for what they regard as an inevitable resumption of hostilities in the region (Le Matin [Bamako], June 17; Info-Matin, June 17; for Ag Bahanga, see Terrorism Focus, February 26). The government in Bamako is dominated by the southern Bambara tribe, part of the larger West African Mande group.

Algeria has been providing the Malian military with arms, fuel and ammunition to combat the Salafist militants in northern Mali (Le Républicain [Bamako], June 18). There are approximately 300 U.S. Special Forces trainers and advisers in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu, as well as a smaller number of British troops. There are reports of American and British officials following closely behind the Malian offensive, questioning local tribes about the location and strength of AQIM forces in the region (al-Hayat, June 18). AQIM executed British hostage Edwin Dyer in Malian territory on May 31 after its demand for the release of al-Qaeda ideologist Abu Qatada was refused by the U.K. government.

This article first appeared in the June 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Andrew McGregor

February 25, 2009

Mali’s security forces appear to have broken the latest Tuareg rebellion in that country as a month-long offensive concludes with the seizure of all Tuareg bases in north Mali. The leader of the revolt, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, is believed to have escaped across the border to Algeria, where he may try to regroup despite the loss of most of his fighters to amnesties or Malian military operations. Mali is eager to bring a series of Tuareg rebellions to an end to allow for more intensive oil exploration by Chinese and Australian firms already at work in northern Mali.

Hassan ag Fagaga (left) and Hajj ag Gamou (center)

The offensive followed a deadly raid by Ag Bahanga’s Alliance Touareg Nord-Mali (ATNM) forces on a military camp in northern Mali in December. A rebel column led by Ag Bahanga is reported to have traveled 1,000 kilometers from its base near the Algerian border to attack the military garrison at Namapala. After the garrison repelled the first attack, a former rebel recently integrated into the army killed his platoon leader, leading to panic in the garrison forces. The second attack overran the camp, killing anywhere from 9 to 20 soldiers (Jeune Afrique, January 27). Afterwards, questions were raised as to how a Tuareg column was able to advance for a week undetected. Newsmagazine Jeune Afrique reported that the column was spotted by U.S. satellites, but the intelligence was not taken seriously in Bamako. Mali lost its own aerial reconnaissance capability when the Ukrainian pilots from its military helicopters returned home last April after one of the pilots was killed by rebel fire (Jeune Afrique, January 27).

At least 30 rebels were killed during the government’s response, an offensive through the Gao and Kidal regions of north Mali that included a three-hour battle at Tin Essalek on January 19 (Le Malien [Bamako], January 22). A prisoner who later succumbed to his wounds was identified by the Malian press as Shaykh Abdul, a Lebanese mercenary (Le Malien, January 19). Ag Bahanga proclaimed, “Today, the only alternative offered to us is the counter-thrust and armed warfare” (El Khabar [Algiers], January 25). U.S. Special Forces training missions are based in Mali as part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, but there are no reports of direct U.S. involvement in the government offensive.

The offensive was led by Colonel al-Hajj ag Gamou, a Tuareg, and Colonel Muhammad Ould Meïdou, an Arab from Timbuktu (L’Indépendant [Bamako], February 4). The combination of these two hardened officers with an intimate knowledge of northern Mali’s barren and inhospitable terrain shattered Ag Bahanga’s forces in a matter of weeks. At the risk of pitting Tuaregs against Arabs, Bamako has allowed Colonel Meïdou to assemble a force of several hundred Bérabiche Arabs for the work of eliminating Ag Bahanga’s rebels (Jeune Afrique, January 27). Hama Ag Sidahmed, an ATNM spokesman, alleged that Mali’s regular army has yielded its place to combined Arab-Tuareg militias designed to fight the Tuareg rebel movement (L’Indépendant [Bamako], February 4). The Bamako government is dominated by the southern Bambara, part of the larger West African Mande group.

Security forces reported the capture of 22 rebels and quantities of vehicles, fuel, food, arms (including heavy machine guns), and ammunition as they swept through the Tuareg camps. A Malian government official claimed that “All the operational and logistical bases of the group of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga have been taken and are under the control of our army and security forces” (Independent, February 11; L’Essor [Bamako], February 11). A spokesman for Ag Bahanga later denied in an interview that any rebel bases had been captured, claiming that the only bases taken by the military belonged to Algerian traders (BBC, February 11). Ag Bahanga’s main base was at Tinzaoutin, close to the Algerian border. Other bases were located at Tin Assalek, Abeïbara, Boureïssa, and Inerdjane (L’Essor, February 11). From these locations his men took scores of soldiers hostage and planted land mines on routes likely to be used by the military.

Ag Bahanga has repeatedly rejected participation in the Algerian-brokered peace talks that have brought most Tuareg rebels back into the national fold. Under pressure from the military offensive, Ag Bahanga had a sudden change of heart and appealed to Bamako and Algiers to reopen the peace process, but Mali’s government has run out of patience with Ag Bahanga and clearly stated there would be no further negotiations (El Watan [Algiers], February 12; L’Indépendant, February 4). The government in Bamako described Ag Bahanga’s appeal as a typical delaying tactic employed whenever things began to turn badly for the rebel leader (Afrol News, February 5). The last of Ag Bahanga’s hostages were released on January 25, 2009, after mediation from Libya and Algeria (Afrique en ligne, January 26).

The July 2006 Algiers agreement calls for greater development efforts in the northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal on the part of the national government in return for Tuareg rebels abandoning their demands for regional autonomy. A key part of the negotiations focused on the creation of mixed security units of former rebels and government troops to keep order in the north. Ag Bahanga’s rapidly diminishing group of rebels appears to have little public support in the region, possibly confirming speculation that the ATNM is only a front for Ag Bahanga’s smuggling activities (Le Malien, January 22; BBC, November 5, 2007).

On February 6, a Malian army officer spoke to the French press from the remote northern region, stating that Ag Bahanga was “no longer on Malian territory” (AFP, February 6). Algerian officials monitoring implementation of the Algiers agreement confirmed Malian reports that Ag Bahanga had crossed into Algeria with Malian troops in a pursuit as far as the border (Ennahar [Algiers], February 6). As the government offensive continued, ATNM fighters and members of Ag Bahanga’s own family began to pour into camps where former members of the dominant Tuareg rebel group, The Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC), were gathering for a disarmament ceremony in the town of Kidal rather than follow Ag Bahanga across the frontier (Radio France Internationale, February 12). One of the leaders of those seeking reconciliation with the government is Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Ag Fagaga, who twice deserted the army to join his rebel cousin, Ag Bahanga (L’Essor, September 18, 2007).

The Ag Bahanga rebellion is the latest in a series of Tuareg uprisings in Mali and Niger since those countries gained independence from France in the 1960s. In a promising sign of surrender, nearly 600 former rebels met with authorities in Kidal on February 17 to lay down their weapons and return arms and vehicles seized from government forces (Elkhabar, February 17). The Tuareg rebellion has been exhausted for now, but continuing oil exploration on Tuareg lands in northern Mali promises to provide a new point of contention between the vastly different peoples of northern and southern Mali.

This article first appeared in the February 25, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Andrew McGregor

April 23, 2008

The bodies of three brutally executed men were found in the desert region of Kidal in northern Mali last week. The victims turned out to be two Tuareg negotiators and a driver, assigned to mediate the release of two Austrian tourists, Wolfgang Ebner and Andrea Kloiber, who were kidnapped in February by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) while on an “adventure holiday” in Tunisia. The kidnappers are believed to be under the command of AQIM leader Abd al-Hamid Abu Zayd, though the Saharan amir of AQIM, Yahya Abu Amar, selected the mediators and made arrangements for the meeting. In exchange for the Austrians, AQIM is demanding a ransom and the release of an Islamist and his wife that the group claims are being held and tortured in “the Austrian Guantanamo” (AFP, April 7).

AQIM commander Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid

The murders of two of the six mediators appointed to negotiate the release of the two Austrians came only several days after negotiation efforts began (Al-Jazeera, April 16). The mediators were former rebel Tuareg commanders who were recently integrated into the Malian army as part of a peace deal struck last year. A student who was acting as a driver for mediator Baraka Cheikh was also killed after apparently being mistaken for Colonel Muhammad Ould Meydou, an Arab officer loyal to Bamako (El Khabar [Algiers], April 20). On arrival at a tent sent up for the purpose of negotiations, the men were tied up and repeatedly shot in the head.

The military commander of the Malian Tuareg rebels is Lt. Col. Hassan ag Fagaga, who has twice been integrated into the Malian army but has returned to the desert rebellion both times. Fagaga is now reported to be in league with rebel leader Ibrahim ag Bahanga, who held out from last year’s accord with the government (Reuters, April 8). In March Fagaga threatened to “eliminate” any al-Qaeda operatives who ventured into the area controlled by the Tuareg rebels, though he acknowledged that some AQIM members had infiltrated the area around Kidal, close to the Algerian border and the scene of heavy fighting between the rebels and the Malian army last month (El Khabar, March 5).

Though there is little evidence so far as to who is responsible for this crime, some Tuareg suspect intelligence agents connected to the Malian Army of carrying out the murders. Referring to continuing ethnic tensions within Mali, Ag Fagaga claims: “There is a plan to execute the commanders in the Malian army of Tuareg origin in the north…” (El Khabar, April 17). After the announcement of an unofficial truce earlier this month between Tuareg rebels and the Malian army, the heavy fighting seen in March has slackened off, though both sides remain on a war footing. The Tuareg rebels have their own hostages: 33 Malian soldiers who were captured last month but not released as they were supposed to be under the terms of the latest ceasefire.

Hassan ag Fagaga (MaliActu.net)

Negotiations for the release of the Austrians appear to have been suspended, though the Austrian Foreign Ministry asserts that efforts are continuing to obtain the release of the pair. Libya has also become involved in the negotiations at the highest levels, but three deadlines set by AQIM have already expired. Austria has denied sending its “Cobra” Special Forces team (Einsatzkommando Cobra, or EKO) to Mali to retrieve the hostages (El Khabar, March 26).

This article first appeared in the April 23, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus