Category Archives: Nigeria

Captured Boko Haram Spokesman Undergoes “Intense Interrogation”

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Andrew McGregor

February 10, 2012

After enduring strong criticism over the last two years for repeated intelligence failures in its struggle against Boko Haram militants, Nigeria’s State Security Service (SSS) appears to have scored a major intelligence coup with its capture of the Boko Haram spokesman, popularly known as “Abu Qaqa,” who is now said to be providing “very useful and verifiable information to his interrogators (Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Abu Qaqa

The 42-year-old Boko Haram spokesman was retrieved from under his bed and arrested in an early morning raid in the city of Kaduna on February 1 after security services began tracking his mobile phone. After his arrest, Abu Qaqa was flown to Abuja for questioning at the SSS headquarters (Punch [Lagos], February 2). Abu Qaqa is unlikely to have an easy time in SSS captivity after threatening to kidnap or kill family members of agency personnel shortly before his arrest (Nigerian Tribune, February 12).

Wary of announcing his capture before his identity could be confirmed, the SSS initially denied making the arrest, but announced their man was indeed Abu Qaqa after the detainee “buckled under intense interrogation,” according to a source in the security services (Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Some of the confusion appeared to have been caused by the wide number of aliases used by the Boko Haram spokesman, including Muhammad Shauibu, Muhammad Bello, Abu Tiamiya, and Abdulrahman Abdullahi. Reflecting Abu Qaqa’s success at covering his identity, interrogators also discovered that their suspect was actually a member of the Ebira tribe of Kogi State rather than an Igala as they had thought earlier.

A member of Boko Haram claiming to be Abu Qaqa confirmed that a leading member of the movement had been arrested, but insisted it was actually the group’s chief of “public enlightenment” Abu Dardaa. Security services are convinced that “Abu Dardaa” is simply one of Abu Qaqa’s many aliases (AFP, February 3; Nigerian Tribune, February 4).

Following confirmation of the spokesman’s arrest came bombings in Kano and Maiduguri, where units of Nigeria’s elite Joint Task Force (JTF) are engaged in bitter street battles with Boko Haram fighters (al-Jazeera, February 6; This Day [Lagos], February 7; Vanguard [Lagos], February 3).

Sources said to be close to the interrogation claim the Boko Haram spokesman has revealed ethnic divisions within the movement, with the Hausa-Fulani members observing that Kanuri members are rarely arrested in comparison to the large number of arrests of Hausa-Fulani members. Suspicion of betrayal by the Kanuris threatens to split the movement, according to Abu Qaqa: “Some of us, the non-Kanuri… were worried at the trend of arrests of our members. It is either that the security agents were so good at their job or some of our members were moles giving us out. The worrying aspect was that most of our key members arrested were non-Kanuri…” (This Day [Lagos], February 7; The Nation [Lagos], February 6).

Abu Qaqa is also reported to have told interrogators that internal criticism of Boko Haram attacks on civilians was ruthlessly repressed by the movement’s leader: “Before I was arrested, some of us had already shown signs of tiredness. Most of us were tired of fighting but we couldn’t come out to say so because of fear of reprisal from the leader, Imam Shekau, on dissenting members. Several of our members that denounced the violent struggle were slaughtered in front of their wives and children. Seven were killed recently” (Nigerian Tribune, February 7; This Day [Lagos], February 7).

Abu Qaqa is best known for announcing Boko Haram’s responsibility for the brutal Christmas Day, 2011 bombing that killed 37 people and a series of attacks in Kano in January that resulted in the deaths of 186 people (Reuters, February 1). Qaqa recently told the Guardian in an exclusive interview that Boko Haram members were spiritual followers of al-Qaeda and the late Osama bin Laden. The spokesman further said that Boko Haram leader Muhammad Abubakr Shekau had met al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August and was able to obtain from al-Qaeda whatever financial and technical support the movement needed. Recruits from Chad, Cameroon and Niger had joined Boko Haram, according to its spokesman, who also promised that all Nigerians would need to follow the group’s inflexible version of Shari’a should the movement take power: “There are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you don’t abide by Shari’a, we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you.” (Guardian, January 27).

Nigerian reports suggest several Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, are now assisting in the hunt for the fugitive Boko Haram leader, Imam Muhammad Abubakr Shekau, who is believed to be hiding in a village in Cameroon, close to the Nigerian border, after having abandoned an earlier refuge in a village in Niger. After Abu Qaqa’s arrest, Shekau is said to be relying solely on trusted couriers to remain in communication with his movement (Nigerian Tribune, February 6).

This article first appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s February 10, 2012 issue of Terrorism Monitor.

Nigerian Salafists Follow “Martyrdom Operation” with Call for Jihad

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Andrew McGregor

July 1, 2011

nigerian salafistsAftermath of the Police Headquarters Bombing

Styling themselves as the Muwahiddin [Unitarians], a common self-appellation for Wahhabists and Salafists, Nigeria’s Islamist extremists have shared a number of their goals and aims in a statement carried on jihadist websites entitled “Demands of the Muwahiddin to the Tawaghit [those who rule without recourse to the Shari’a] and their Allies in Nigeria” (ansar1.info, June 21). The statement is allegedly penned by “Abu Muwahid” for the Brigades of Tawhid [Oneness of God] Publications.

The statement claims that the June 16 car bombing of the national police headquarters in Abuja (described here as a “martyrdom” or suicide bombing) had thrown the Nigerian tawaghit into a state of confusion and panic, leading them to seek negotiations with the Islamist militants (or Boko Haram, though the movement is not mentioned by name in the statement; For the bombing, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 23). However, the Islamists indicate that they have no interest in pursuing talks with the government: “One major thing they forgot in their consideration of negotiation is that our millah [religion], the millah of Ibrahim, forbids negotiating with all those who have rejected the supremacy of Allah’s Shari’a and all those who have taken themselves as lords besides Allah.”

Reacting to suggestions that a combination of incentives and amnesty might bring Boko Haram to the negotiating table much as it did southern Nigeria’s Movement to Emancipate the Niger Delta (MEND), the Salafists responded: “They initially thought that our ideology could be bought off with materialism like the MEND Militants of the Niger Delta region. Our ideology is far from materialism; it is an ideology that abhors shirk [polytheism] and kufr [disbelief] and seeks to eradicate the tawaghit and all their allies in the whole universe, such that the earth will become purified and all ibadah [worship] will then be directed solely to Allah.”

In addressing Nigeria’s Islamic scholars, the Muwahiddin raise the issue of colonialism, asking the scholars if they have “forgotten the pains of your fathers in the hands of the white monkeys?,” while reminding them it would be treacherous to be seen in the forefront of the grandchildren of former Nigerian colonial governors such as “Lugard, Richard, MacPherson and other white criminals whose hegemony still reigns over our head after 108 years.” [1]

With the first claimed suicide bombing in Nigeria, there are fears that others will follow, leaving Nigeria destitute of new foreign investment. As a statement from the Nigerian political party Action Congress of Nigeria (ANC) noted: “No foreign investor will wait for a travel advisory from his/her government before deciding not to visit a country where security is not guaranteed, where a drink in a pub can fetch one a bomb” (The Nation [Lagos], June 20). Meanwhile, the Nigerian police have backed away from their earlier belief that the bombing was a suicide attack, now stating instead that the evidence is inconclusive (Nigerian Tribune, June 23).

Much of the response of Nigeria’s many security services to the security crisis has consisted of trying to blame each other for the “intelligence failure” that President Goodluck Jonathan has identified as the cause of the ongoing violence in Borno and Bauchi states and its spread to the capital city of Abuja (Vanguard, June 26). Nigeria’s security services tend towards competition rather than cooperation, and intelligence sharing is a low priority.

The militants’ statement affirmed the loyalty of the Nigerian muwahiddin to the new al-Qaeda leader, “the Amir of our caravan, Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.” The Nigerian Salafists also expressed their appreciation for the work of leading Jordanian Salafi-Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, once the mentor of the late al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Salafist message also alludes to the arrival of foreign jihadists in Nigeria, who will “surely make Nigeria ungovernable the same way our brothers in Somalia have made the country ungovernable for the apostate stooge [Somali president Shaykh] Sharif [Shaykh] Ahmad.”

Even after the attempt to destroy the leadership and the Abuja headquarters of Nigeria’s national police, Boko Haram violence continues unabated in northern Nigeria. Twenty-five people were killed in Maiduguri on June 26 when motorcycle-riding militants threw bombs at local outdoor beer parlors (Vanguard, June 27).

Note:

1. Sir Frederick Lugard, Governor General of Nigeria, 1914-1919; Sir Arthur Richards, Governor of Nigeria, 1943-1948; Sir John Stuart MacPherson, Governor of Nigeria, 1948-1954, Governor General of Nigeria, 1954–1955.

This article first appeared in the July 1, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Nigeria’s Boko Haram Issues Conditions Amidst Wave of Islamist Violence

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Andrew McGregor

June 23, 2011

A continuing wave of extremist violence sweeping northern Nigeria arrived in the Nigerian capital of Abuja on June 16, when a massive car bomb was only narrowly prevented from destroying the national police headquarters and most of the service’s senior leadership. The attack was the most shocking of an almost daily series of bombings, random murders and targeted assassinations being carried out by the largely Borno State-based Boko Haram movement.

Abuja bombingBombing at Abuja Police Headquarters

The incident occurred when a Honda Civic began to follow closely behind a police convoy bringing the Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Abubakr Ringim, and a number of other important police officials to the Abjuja police headquarters. Thinking the vehicle was part of the convoy, guards allowed the Honda Civic into the compound. The two occupants of the car were allegedly carrying fake police identity cards. A quick-thinking traffic officer inside the compound diverted the car into a secondary lot, preventing it from exploding beside the building and likely preventing an enormous loss of life. As it was, the blast killed the attackers, the traffic policeman, three other men and destroyed some 40 cars immediately, with over 50 more incurring severe damage. The powerful blast broke windows and upended equipment throughout the seven-story police headquarters (Vanguard [Lagos], June 19). Examination of CCTV footage suggested that the car bomb may have been detonated by a timer or by remote control rather than being a suicide bombing (This Day [Lagos], June 20).

U.S. experts were called in to examine and identify the type of explosive used. A team of Abuja-based detectives raided a Boko Haram headquarters in the Borno capital of Maiduguri on June 20, arresting 58 suspects who were alleged to be celebrating the attack on the police headquarters. Among those arrested were a number of Somalis, Sudanese and Nigeriens. Some of the suspects claimed to have been coerced into Boko Haram membership (Nigerian Tribune, June 20).

Though the attackers failed to kill the police Inspector General, Ringim faced new problems after the bombing as many began to call for his resignation given his failure in preventing Boko Haram strikes (Nigerian Tribune, June 19). Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan is under pressure from some quarters to implement sweeping changes in the police leadership.

The report of foreign nationals being arrested in Maiduguri fueled growing suspicions in some quarters that the Abuja bombing was made possible by the infiltration of foreign militants and organizations such as al-Qaeda. Sudan, Somalia and Iran have all been mentioned as possible sources of funding for Boko Haram, though no evidence of such funding has emerged as yet (Business Day [Lagos], June 20). Security services have been asked to monitor Sudanese and Somali nationals throughout Nigeria (Vanguard, June 20). Others suspect local politicians are sponsoring the militants as a means of disrupting security after losing in the April elections (This Day, June 20).

Boko Haram extremism is even becoming a danger to Wahhabist clerics, such as Ibrahim Birkuti, who was killed by motorcycle-riding gunmen outside his home in Biu (200 km south of Maiduguri) on June 7. Imam Birkuti had been critical of Boko Haram’s violence (BBC, June 7). A sect spokesman recently said the group was also responsible for last month’s murder of the brother of the Shehu (ruler) of Borno, Alhaji Abubakar Ibn Garbai, one of Nigeria’s most important Islamic leaders. Boko Haram has accused the Shehu of playing a role in the extrajudicial killing of sect members following the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising. The Shehu has denied any role in the killings (BBC, June 7; Vanguard, June 17).

Other targets have been more predictable. On June 10, Boko Haram gunmen killed the pastor of the Church of Christ in Nigeria and the church’s assistant secretary in Maiduguri (Vanguard, June 10). Four people were killed in a Boko Haram raid on an unregistered drinking place in a suburb of Maiduguri on June 12 (Next, June 14). The attack on the Maiduguri beer drinkers came only a few hours after Boko Haram released a list of conditions that must be met before the group will enter into a dialogue with the government. The Hausa language demands included:

•    Unconditional release of all imprisoned members of Boko Haram.

•    The immediate prosecution of all those involved in the killing of Boko Haram leader Malam Muhammad Yusuf after he was taken into police custody in July 2009.

•    An investigation into the alleged poisoning of Boko Haram suspects awaiting trial.

•    Implementation of Shari’a in the twelve northern states of Nigeria. These states adopted Shari’a codes in 1999, but their current application is not strict enough to meet Boko Haram’s standards (Next, June 14).

More attacks followed the demands. Assailants on motorcycles sprayed a relaxation center in the Gomari district of Maiduguri with gunfire on June 19, killing five people (Next, June 20). On June 20, simultaneous attacks on a bank and a police station in Katsina by gunmen on motorcycles resulted in the deaths of five policemen and one private security guard. Boko Haram was a leading suspect in the attack, though their participation could not be confirmed (Daily Sun [Lagos], June 23). Unexploded bombs have also been found at a number of locations in the north (The Nation, June 14).

Boko Haram has clearly expanded its list of targets to now include Christians, traders from southern Nigeria, politicians, security officials, traditional leaders and Islamic clerics who dare to criticize the movement (This Day, June 17).

Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan has described a “carrot and stick approach” as the government’s policy in dealing with Boko Haram militants, saying he was open to dialogue with the group. Others have called for a general amnesty, as was applied to militants operating in the Niger River Delta (Next, June 19; Vanguard, June 20). Meanwhile, the government has begun to deploy a new Special Joint Military Task Force in Maiduguri. The task force will draw on security personnel from the military, police and state security services (Vanguard, June 19).

This article first appeared in the June 23, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Nigerian Elite Force Accused of Murders in Plateau State

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Andrew McGregor

January 28, 2011

Ongoing violence in Nigeria’s mixed Christian-Muslim Plateau State took a new turn when an elite force of Nigerian troops tasked with restoring order were accused of attacks on civilians in two Christian villages that killed eight, creating a new national scandal as the country approaches general elections in April. Over 100 people have been killed in the region surrounding the state capital of Jos since Christmas.

Hassan UmaruBrigadier Hassan Umaru

The government’s response to the violence was Operation Safe Haven, a campaign to be implemented by a Special Military Task Force (STF) drawing on members of the army, navy, air force and police.  The STF is led by Brigadier-General Hassan Umaru, whose wife is believed to have been killed by attackers last month (NigerianNewsService.com, December 7, 2010).

On the night of January 24 the villages of Hamman and Farin Lamba (both roughly 25 km from the state capital of Jos) were attacked by uniformed gunmen who assaulted villagers with machetes and firearms (Next [Lagos], January 25). The attackers in Farin Lamba were observed arriving and leaving in a Toyota Hilux van of the type used to transport police in the region, an observation later confirmed by Plateau State Police Commissioner Abdurrahman Akano. Many of the attackers appeared to be wearing body armor of the type worn by security forces. However, Commissioner Akano also suggested that the reported theft of 100 cattle belonging to Fulanis was the cause of what he termed “a reprisal attack,” though he provided no evidence of a connection between the two events (Next, January 25; Vanguard, January 25; Daily Trust, January 25).

The attackers at Farin Lambo first struck a vigilante squad of villagers, killing three before torching homes and barns. The vigilante group was created to repel assailants after the two villages were attacked four times in the previous two weeks (Next, January 25). The military complains that difficult terrain in the region hampers their response to incidents of violence outside the major towns, leaving such villages with little in the way of defense.

After word spread of the killings, women dressed in black attacked the camp of the largely Muslim-officered STF in Vom, shouting anti-STF slogans while throwing stones and setting fire to STF tents. Six women were reported to have been shot by the STF during the demonstration (Nigerian Tribune, January 25; Reuters, January 25).

STF commander Brigadier Umaru said he thought it unlikely that any of his troops would attack people whose safety was in their hands and asked locals to provide him with proof of such allegations (Vanguard, January 25). Some STF members were recently arrested for failing to stop killings in Jos, and the ID card of an STF member was found at the site of some of the killings (Vanguard, January 20).

Even before the latest incidents, Chief Solo Akuma, the senior advocate of Nigeria, called on military authorities to closely monitor the STF for partiality and to reassure locals of the neutrality of the STF when carrying out their duties (Vanguard, January 20).

On January 18, a Nigerian military spokesman warned that soldiers would fire on any community members seen attacking civilians or burning mosques, churches or residences (BBC, January 18).

The sectarian violence in Plateau State began in 1994 and has since claimed thousands of lives. Since 1994 there have been seven commissions of inquiry into the violence, though the results have either been concealed or largely ignored.  Though the conflict is often characterized as being a religious-based confrontation between the Muslim Fulani- Hausa and the Christian Berom, Afizere and Anaguta tribes, the dispute has more to do with competition for land and political power between indigenous Christian farmers and so-called “settlers” from the largely nomadic and Muslim communities of northern Nigeria (Next, January 23; Reuters, January 25).

There are also political differences, with the local Christian tribes generally supporting the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), while the nomadic Muslims are viewed as supporters of the opposition All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP).

This article first appeared in the January 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Unclaimed New Year’s Day Bombing in Abuja Rattles Nigeria’s Power Structure

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Andrew McGregor

January 6, 2011

A New Year’s Eve bombing within the confines of a Nigerian military base in the capital city of Abuja has damaged Nigeria’s political stability, as various politicians and civil leaders seek to implicate each other as responsible for the unclaimed blast. The bombing, which killed four civilians (including a pregnant woman) and wounded 26, was the second terrorist attack in the nation’s capital since October.

MammyThe “Mammy Market” at the Mogadishu Cantonment, Abuja
(Sahara Reporters)

The attack targeted an open-air bar and restaurant at a so-called “Mammy Market,” a civilian-run market attached to Abuja’s “Mogadishu Cantonment” military base providing shopping and recreational opportunities. The explosion culminated a week of violence in Nigeria that began with a series of bombings on Christmas Eve in the Plateau State city of Jos, a common site for sectarian violence in recent years between the Muslim and Christian communities. Eighty people were killed in the Jos bombings and subsequent retaliatory attacks. This was followed by a bombing at a rally of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Yenogoa in Bayelsa State and murders and church burnings in Maiduguri in Borno State (Next [Lagos], January 4; Vanguard [Lagos], January 3; Daily Trust [Lagos], December 30, 2010).

On January 3 the government of President Goodluck Jonathan responded to the violence by holding an emergency closed-door meeting of the nation’s top security officials. Following the meeting, spokesmen announced a number of measures to be taken, including:

  • The appointment of a special presidential advisor on terrorism.
  • The installation of new closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in sensitive areas of Abuja, though existing CCTV installations proved of little use in the latest attack.
  • New regulations regarding access to public and private establishments.
  • The creation of a presidential committee on the control of explosives and incendiary materials
  • The creation of a presidential committee on public enlightenment regarding security measures.

A presidential spokesman indicated that police had been “directed to ensure the prompt arrest and prosecution of political thugs” (Next [Abuja], January 4). Jonathan’s government has invited American FBI agents and members of Israel’s MOSSAD intelligence organization to help investigate the Abuja bombing (Vanguard, January 3; Abuja Leadership, January 3).

The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), which claimed responsibility for a pair of car bombings in the capital last October, issued a statement through spokesman Jomo Gbomo denying any involvement in the attack at the Mogadishu Cantonment: “Bombings and attacks carried out by MEND are always preceded by a warning in order to prevent casualties and followed by a statement of claim… [MEND] condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians by any persons or groups for what so ever reasons” (AFP, January 2; Vanguard, January 2).

PDP primaries next week will be followed by what is expected to be hotly contested presidential, gubernatorial and parliamentary elections in April. With the political direction of the country in the balance, few seem able to resist the temptation to link political opponents to the ongoing violence.

The campaign organization of Jonathan’s main challenger for the PDP presidential nomination for upcoming elections in April, former vice-president Atiku Abubakar, denounced what it described as efforts by the president’s paid agents to link Abubakar with the Abuja bombing: “In a moment of national crisis, President Goodluck Jonathan must demonstrate sobriety and cool-headed posture rather than losing his head to impetuous emotions… The President should allow security services to carry out intensive investigations instead of using the incident to frame up political opponents whom he perceives as stumbling blocks to his ambition” (Next, January 4).

Former military ruler of Nigeria General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) has also complained of government attempts to tie him to the Abuja bombing, describing it as “sheer blackmail”: “It exposes the weakness in the system if private persons and former leaders who are enjoying their retirement are being linked to acts of terrorism or bombings. We all should agree that there is failure in governance rather than passing the buck, or finding very idiotic and flimsy reasons to label some distinguished persons as being responsible for such failures” (Vanguard, January 3; Daily Sun [Lagos], January 3). Various NGOs, as well as religious and labor leaders have alleged that the Abuja bombing is part of an attempt to create a state of emergency leading to the military’s return to power (Nigerian Compass [Lagos], January 4; Daily Trust, January 3).

The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa’ad Muhammadu Abubakar, made an unfavorable comparison between the current state of security and that which existed under military rule. “We should blame the political class for getting us to this stage because it was not like this before,” Abubakar claimed (Daily Trust, December 30, 2010).

Nigeria’s intelligence services have come under strong public criticism for repeated failures to anticipate eruptions of sectarian violence in northern and central Nigeria. Army Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirike acknowledged the failure, saying there is a need to “enhance intelligence operations” (Daily Trust, December 30, 2010). Meanwhile, Defense Minister Prince Adetokunbo Kayode promised the investigation would continue, saying, “The perpetrators are here, they are not from the moon and we will get them” (Vanguard, January 2).

 

This article first appeared in the January 6, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea

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Andrew McGregor

November 24, 2010

A hybrid criminal/separatist movement operating in the swampy peninsula of Bakassi is now targeting oil industry infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea in its effort to shake off Cameroonian control of the region, which was administered by Nigeria until last year. Like neighboring Nigeria, Cameroon has suffered a loss in oil production as a result of the activities of coastal “pirates,” recording a 13% drop in production in 2009. Though much of Cameroon’s oil industry is still in the exploration stage, there are high expectations for further discoveries in the area. The Gulf of Guinea is a resource-rich area, with Angola, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea already major oil producers. Ghana is expected to soon join their ranks as Washington estimates the Gulf of Guinea region will supply a quarter of U.S. oil supplies by 2015 (Reuters, May 19).

Bakassi 1Cameroon is the twelfth-largest oil producer in Africa, with estimated reserves of roughly 200 million barrels in the offshore Rio del Ray Basin, the coastal Douala/Kribi-Camp Basin and the Logone Birni Basin in northern Cameroon. Despite this, Cameroon’s production has dropped from a 2005 high of 94,000 barrels per day to a current 77,000 barrels per day.

Covering an area of roughly 257 square miles, Bakassi is composed largely of creeks and mangrove covered islands, making it hard to patrol and a haven for smuggling activities. The abundant fishing grounds off Bakassi provide a livelihood for most of the population, most of whom are “Calabar people” from Nigeria’s Akwa Ibom State and Cross River State.

Violence on the Cameroon Coast

Fears of a Nigerian-style insurgency based on oil production increased with an attack on security forces near the offshore Moudi oil terminal (run by Franco-British Perenco) on the night of November 16. The attack, claimed by the “Africa Marine Commando,” left six dead, including three civilians, two members of Cameroon’s Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide (BIR – Rapid Intervention Battalion) and one of the assailants (Quotidien Mutations [Yaoundé], November 18; La Nouvelle Expression [Douala], November 18; AFP, November 18). Cameroonian security officials later said the attackers had been in contact with Perenco and the French Total oil firm for several days before the assault, demanding payment of a “security tax” to continue operations. Cameroonian officials have criticized the foreign oil companies for paying protection money to insurgents and bandits, just as local fishermen do (AFP, November 18). Boats that have paid the tax are given a small flag to indicate payment has been made.

The same Africa Marine Commando (AMC) also claimed responsibility for the abduction of six sailors from a Belgian ship anchored 40 km off Douala last September. An AMC spokesman said the hostages were moved to a camp on Nigerian territory and demanded the release of ten Ijaw fighters in a Cameroonian prison and the immediate opening of direct talks with Cameroon president Paul Biya (Le Jour [Yaoundé], September 29). The AMC, which appears to be a faction of the larger Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) movement, also kidnapped seven Chinese fishermen in Cameroonian coastal waters who were later freed in exchange for an undisclosed ransom (Radio France Internationale, March 13).

In May, gunmen in light boats attacked two cargo ships in Douala harbor, kidnapping two Russian crewmen from one ship and looting the safe and abducting the captain of the second ship, a Lithuanian refrigerated vessel (Reuters, May 19). The security of Douala’s port is a major regional concern as Douala acts as the commercial lifeline for the land-locked Central African Republic and Chad, another major petroleum producer which runs its oil through the Chad-Cameroon pipeline to the Cameroon port of Kribi.

The gunmen operating off Cameroon’s coast have carried out several daring raids, including a September 2008 operation in the fishing port of Limbe, in which gunmen landed in boats before breaking into the town’s Amity bank, where they stole several million dollars, killed one person and wounded may others (The Post [Yaoundé], September 29, 2008).

A number of other notable incidents of politically-generated violence have occurred in Bakassi in recent years:

• On November 12, 2007, 21 soldiers were killed in the Bakassi Peninsula by gunmen wearing uniforms. The attack was claimed by the previously unknown “Liberators of the Southern Cameroon People” (IRIN, November 13, 2007; November 20, 2007).

• Ten hostages (six French, two Cameroonians, one Senegalese and one Tunisian) were seized by Bakassi Freedom Fighters under Commander Ebi Dari on the night of October 30-31, 2008 (Radio France Internationale, November 2, 2008; Jeune Afrique, December 2).

• Gunmen in a canoe killed a police officer in a motorized canoe off Bakassi in December 2009, with the BFF taking responsibility for the attack (Le Jour [Yaoundé], December 21, 2009).

The Dilemma of the Bakassi Peninsula

The complex issue of what nation Bakassi belongs to began with the decision of the Obong (paramount ruler) of Calabar to sign a treaty of protection with the British in 1884, thus making his territory (including the Bakassi peninsula) a British protectorate. Bakassi fell under the Nigerian colonial administration until 1913, when Britain ceded the territory to the neighboring German colony of Kamerun in return for navigation rights to Calabar, an important commercial center. German control was short-lived, with a combined British-French-Belgian invasion force taking control of the colony in 1916 after a year-and-a-half of stiff resistance from a tiny German garrison reinforced by local troops. After the war, most of the former German colony fell under a French mandate, with a smaller portion becoming “the British Cameroons.” This included Bakassi, as recognized in a 1919 treaty with the French. However, when the rest of the former British Cameroons voted by a 1961 plebiscite to join with the new nation of Cameroon rather than join Nigeria, Bakassi remained under Nigerian administration.

After several border clashes with Nigeria over Bakassi and a northern region near Lake Chad, Cameroon took the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994. With special reference to the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 and colonial era diplomatic correspondence between the two imperial powers, the ICJ ruled in favor of Cameroon in 2002, ordering Nigeria to transfer sovereignty over Bakassi to Cameroon, but without requiring any of the Nigerian residents in Bakassi to leave or change their citizenship. The details of the transfer of sovereignty were worked out in the Green Tree Agreement, which was assembled with the additional participation of the United States, Great Britain, France and Equatorial Guinea.

Popular and political opposition to the decision within Nigeria delayed the transfer of sovereignty, though the government neither ratified nor rejected the court’s verdict. In Bakassi itself, there was wide dissatisfaction with the decision in the English-speaking Nigerian majority. As one Bakassi native told a Nigerian daily:

The United Nations should realize that we have the right to decide where we want to be and the right to self-determination. We are Nigerians and here in our ancestral home. You can see some of the graves here dating back to the 19th century. How can you force a strange culture and government on us? We appreciate what the Nigerian government is doing but let it be on record that they have betrayed us and we will fight for our survival and self-determination (The Guardian [Lagos], August 18, 2006).

 

Left in a political limbo, it was unsurprising that many residents of Bakassi tried to take control of their own political future. In July 2006 the Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination (BMSD) joined with the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) to declare the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Bakassi, an unsuccessful attempt to found a new nation in the small peninsula that brought out few supporters. After the Nigerian Senate ruled the transfer of sovereignty was illegal in 2007, the three groups again declared the independence of Bakassi in July 2008, this time with BMSD declaring it would subsume all its activities under the “joint leadership” of MEND:

With the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the Bakassi Peninsula, which takes away our last line of defense as Nigerian citizens and exposes our people to perpetual and permanent bondage of exploitation, under-development and death, which characterized life in the larger Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea over the last 50 years of multi-national oil companies’ occupation with the connivance of Nigerian leaders, we are left with no other option than to defend our land and people by any means necessary (The Post [Yaoundé], July 31, 2008).

Noting that the Green Tree Agreement violated the Nigerian constitution and had failed to be ratified by the Nigerian Senate, many Nigerian politicians condemned the transfer and challenged its legality (This Day, July 29, 2008). Nigerian residents of Bakassi were given the option of moving to a “New Bakassi” some 30 km inside Nigeria, but the new settlement had no fishing, no roads and few services. Many Nigerians wished to move from Bakassi but remained there after hearing reports of conditions in the new settlement (IRIN, November 13, 2007). The current Obong of Calabar, Edidem Ekpo Okon Abasi Otu V, has led an effort to overturn the ICJ ruling, which he says took no note of the opinions of the residents of Bakassi:

We expected that the government could have come to the people and called for a referendum so that the people would decide what they wanted for themselves. But I don’t really know why it had to be done that way. That decision was taken and part of my territory was ceded. I am not happy and my people are not happy about it. Because it [the decision] is now creating problems for my people. We cannot take care of them. We have been struggling with the relocation issue (Nigerian Compass, July 9, 2009).

The secessionist SCAPO movement had a different plan – including Bakassi with the Southern Cameroons in a secessionist “Republic of Ambazonia.”

Although the Cameroon government refused to acknowledge the political dimension of the violence in Bakassi by declining to identify the insurgents as anything other than “armed bandits,” the decision to hold the August 14, 2009, ceremony marking the transfer of authority in the Nigerian city of Calabar rather than in Bakassi was interpreted as an acknowledgement that Bakassi was far from secure (Reuters, August 13, 2008; Jeune Afrique, December 2, 2008).

Prior to the transfer of power the BFF announced a merger with another militant group battling the military in Bakassi, the Niger Delta Defense and Security Council (NDDSC), with the intention of setting Bakassi “ablaze” and crippling its economy if the handover went through (Africa Press International, July 21, 2009).

Most of the Bakassi militants disarmed on September 25, 2009, but only weeks later ex-rebels claimed Cameroon’s security forces took advantage of this to kill six Nigerians in Bakassi territorial waters as a warning to other Nigerians to stay out of Cameroonian territory. Complaints began to be heard from “Nigerian” residents of Bakassi that the Nigerian navy had abandoned them to “the Cameroonian gendarmes” (Next [Lagos], October 16, 2009). Several months after the transfer of authority, Dan Don Atekpi, the former leader of the disbanded Bakassi Salvation Front (BSF), announced that his movement would renew hostilities against Cameroon government forces in 2010. Claiming 20 Nigerians had been killed by “these heartless Cameroonians” in the first two months after the transfer, Atekpi stated: “We are being provoked to take up arms. We have no intention of doing so except for this unprovoked attack.” Atekpi was also concerned with the failure of the Cameroon government to pay former militants the daily allowance called for in the transfer terms or to provide skills training or other means of rehabilitation (Next [Lagos], January 14).

Secession in the Southern Cameroons

The two mainly English-speaking provinces that joined Cameroon by plebiscite in 1961 (known as the Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest provinces of Cameroon, or collectively as the Southern Cameroons) have also become secessionist hotbeds since the 1990s. The secessionist movements active in the South Cameroons usually include Bakassi in their plans for an independent state.

The Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) is a secessionist group that has adopted a peaceful approach to freeing Southern Cameroons “from the stranglehold of our oppressor – La République du Cameroun” (The Post [Yaoundé], October 8). The related SCAPO movement complains that the Cameroon government is interested only in the region’s oil and not the Southern Cameroonians or the Bakassians. SCAPO declared the establishment of an independent “Republic of Ambazonia” in August 2006.

Cameroon’s Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide (BIR)

The BIR was formed in 1999 as the Bataillon Léger d’Intervention (BLI), a special intervention force designed to eliminate foreign rebels, bandits and deserters (the “coupeurs de routes”) who were destroying the security of Cameroon’s northern provinces through cattle rustling, abductions, murder and highway robbery. As part of military reforms carried out in Cameroon in 2001, the unit took on its current BIR designation. BIR officers are selected from the graduates of the Ecole Militaire Interarmées in Yaoundé. The BIR commandos were sent to the coast in 2007 to assist the Delta Command in dealing with a rapidly deteriorating security situation (The Sun [Limbe], October 13, 2008).

Bakassi 2The Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide (BIR)

The BIR’s mandate has expanded from providing border security since its formation, however, the elite force has mutated into something of a Praetorian Guard for President Paul Biya, an authoritarian who has ruled Cameroon since 1982, sometimes hiring his own international observers to legitimize his victories in largely unopposed elections.

The unit’s reputation in Cameroon took a hit in February 2008, when roughly 100 unarmed civilians were killed when the unit was brought in to Doula and Yaoundé to put down protests against the high cost of living (IRIN, August 29, 2008). Several months later the BIR was again deployed in the cities to prevent protests against the elimination of presidential term limits and the granting of immunity to Biya for all actions taken while in office.

Conclusion

For once, oil is not the main source of the conflict, as Nigeria and Cameroon have agreed to share the revenues from any oil produced off the Bakassi coast. It is, however, an aggravating factor with local militants who complain of the inequitable distribution of oil revenues and the presence of large multinationals with little concern for the well-being of local residents. Bakassi remains largely underdeveloped and mounting insecurity will do little to change this state of affairs. In some cases there is resistance by the Nigerian population to use services such as hospitals provided by Cameroon, as it would be a sign of acceptance of Cameroonian rule (IRIN, August 8, 2009). Most important, however, is the growing perception in Bakassi of the BIR as a colonial-style occupation force with little, if any, local representation. The growing divide between the Anglophone residents of Bakassi and the new Francophone administration invites the spread of a Niger Delta style low-level insurgency that is willing to hobble the development of the oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea through kidnappings and armed attacks to achieve its political aims – independence or a return to Nigerian sovereignty.

Nigerian Security Commanders Dismissed after Boko Haram Militants Blast Their Way Out of Prison

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Andrew McGregor

September 16, 2010

Threats made in July by the new chief of northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram sect were fulfilled in recent days with a mass prison breakout of incarcerated sect members and what appears to be a series of killings of security personnel by motorcycle-riding gunmen. Imam Abubakr Shekau warned of a new jihad by Boko Haram members seeking revenge for the ruthless repression of their movement in July 2009 by security services angered by Boko Haram attacks on their posts and personnel (Ansar al-Mujahideen, July 11).

Bauchi PrisonBauchi Prison

The September 7 escape of over 700 prisoners in Bauchi Prison was apparently inspired by a Boko Haram pledge that their members would not spend the Eid al-Fitr holiday in prison. Eyewitness accounts told of a daring assault by a handful of militants that went on for two hours without relief from security forces. According to these accounts, the militants had cut or shaved their habitual long beards to better infiltrate prayer gatherings close to the prison. AK-47 assault rifles were concealed under their babanrigas, a loose flowing top worn over trousers. On a signal the militants began their attack on the prison gates while trying to assure terrified residents they were on “a mission” and were not there to attack civilians.

Some who were not close to the prison initially thought the gunfire was firecrackers set off to celebrate the Eid.  One witness said, “There was nothing to make anyone suspicious of them. They wore normal dress and did not sport their trademark long beards. But by the time they sprang into action, it was clear that they were well trained. The guns looked very sophisticated and they handled them with expertise like combatants” (Vanguard [Lagos], September 11). Four individuals, including a policeman, a soldier and two civilians, were killed in the attack (Nigerian Tribune, September 12). As many as 759 prisoners escaped during the assault, of whom 123 were Boko Haram members awaiting trial on charges stemming from the July 2009 violence.

The Boko Haram unit that carried out the assault had clearly planned to take advantage of the relaxed atmosphere during the Eid festivities, striking just as the guards were preparing to break their fast. According to Bauchi Governor Isa Yuguda, “All of us were caught unaware by the attackers because they came at the time nobody was expecting, considering that we are in the holy month of Ramadan, when all true Muslims are expected to be fasting and not engage in anything that could lead to the shedding of blood.”

Following the prison break, alarm spread throughout the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Kano, where 25 Boko Haram suspects are being held at the Kano Central Prison. The Kano Sallah (Eid al-Fitr) celebrations were marked by a show of force by security personnel and a military convoy including a tank accompanying Kano Governor Ibrahim Shekarau to the Kano Central Mosque (Next, September 12). The governor of Bauchi State pledged a door to door search would be conducted to find all Boko Haram suspects (Next [Lagos], September 13). Security at the Gombe State Prison was also intensified in expectation of further attacks (Vanguard, September 10).

President Goodluck Jonathan used the mass escape as an opportunity to make sweeping changes in Nigeria’s military and police leadership, sacking Chief of Army Staff Major General Abdulrahman Dambazzau (who was in New York on official duties at the time), Inspector General of Police Ogbonna Onovo, Chief of Defense Staff Air Marshal Paul Dike, Naval Chief Vice Admiral Ishaya Ibrahim and the Director General of the State Security Service Afakriya Gadzama.

Minister of Defense Prince Adetokunbo Kayode insisted the changes were not dismissals, pointing out the two year terms of the security commanders had expired in August and the president was merely exercising his prerogative to appoint new leaders (Vanguard, September 10; Nigerian Compass, September 10). The president made clear what he wanted from the security services, saying, “My expectations are that our armed forces and security agencies should be proactive. We must employ intelligence to nip crises in the bud even before it can occur” (Vanguard, September 12).

Jonathan broke the traditional stranglehold of northern Muslim tribes on the military command by appointing Major General Onyeabo Azubike Ihejirika of the Eastern Ibo tribe as the new Chief of Army Staff. Ihejirika is the first Ibo to lead the military since the Ibo-supported Biafran secession war of the 1960s. The appointment was made with wide commendation from southern Nigerian governors and politicians (Vanguard, September 10).

The prison breakout was preceded by a series of killings of policemen in northern Nigeria by motorcycle-riding gunmen. The attacks that killed six policemen in two months were initially blamed on armed robbers (Next, August 26; Nigerian Tribune, August 27).

The use of AK-47 assault rifles by the militants raised concerns over the flow of arms into the northern region. The President-General of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria accused security services of overseeing illegal arms imports through the ports. He stated, “Last week, members of Boko Haram, armed with AK47 rifles, attacked the Bauchi prison and its environs. How did they get the arms? You go to Niger Delta, come to Lagos and other parts of the country, illegal arms are everywhere and in the wrong hands” (Vanguard, September 12). Meanwhile in the north, security officials recently seized 52 AK-47 rifles, 1,700 rounds of ammunition and $32,000 in cash being smuggled from Chad to the flashpoint city of Jos, where thousands of people have been killed in sectarian violence in recent years (AfrikNews, August 18).

This article first appeared in the September 16 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Nigeria’s Imams Warn of Threat from Kala Kato Islamist Movement

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Andrew McGregor

July 24, 2010

A group of Muslim imams in Nigeria’s northern Niger state have warned state governor Dr. Muazu Babangida Aliyu of the threat posed by a radical Islamic group known as Kala-Kato. The Imams urged the state government to take action to defuse the threat before the group begins a new campaign of sectarian violence (Vanguard [Lagos], June 16; Daily Trust [Lagos], June 16). According to the chairman of the group of Islamic scholars, Mallam Isah Fari, “If action is not taken immediately and the sect is allowed to spread and strike, it will affect everybody irrespective of religious beliefs and this will be termed…a religious war.” [1] The group is said to be concentrated in the Sauka Kahuta area of Minna Township (Daily Trust, June 16).

Niger StateFollowing the teachings of Mallam Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine, Kala-Kato rejects the Hadiths and Sunna (sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad), considered by most Muslims to be integral parts of Islamic belief and jurisprudence along with the Quran. The Quran is the only book Kala-Kato followers are allowed to read. The movement considers everyone who fails to follow their unorthodox beliefs an infidel.

Friction between Nigerian security forces and Kalo-Kato members erupted into violence late last year in Bauchi State. When police tried to stop them from preaching, Kalo-Kato members responded with attacks using bows and arrows and automatic weapons seized from security forces (Bloomberg, December 29, 2009). 38 people were killed, including at least one soldier, several children and the local leader of the group, Mallam Badamsi. A subsequent police investigation suggested the violence had its origin in a crisis that erupted within the sect, when Mallam Badamsi accused some members of being responsible for an ailment from which he was suffering (Punch [Lagos], January 10). Police Commissioner Atiku Kafir reported that a search of Badamsi’s home revealed a cache of bomb-making materials and explosives, two AK-47 rifles and “a large quantity of swords, daggers and gunpowder” (Daily Independent [Lagos], December 30, 2009).

Kala-Kato, like a number of other sectarian groups in northern Nigeria, often uses juveniles in its front lines. The young members are typically released after their arrest, and by the time they come of age they are highly experienced in street violence. In the Bauchi rioting, children between the ages of 10 and 15 were reported to have set homes and buildings on fire with adults providing support (Daily Independent [Lagos], December 30, 2009).

The movement’s inspiration is Mallam Muhammadu Marwa “Maitatsine” (Hausa for “He who curses others”). A Cameroonian preacher who relocated to Nigeria’s Kano State, Maitatsine forbade his followers from using automobiles, bicycles, watches, radios and from possessing any more than the absolute minimum amount of money needed to survive. Relations with fellow Muslims, whom the movement regarded as pagans, reached their breaking point in 1979 when Maitatsine declared himself a prophet and successor to Muhammad. Maitatsine and his followers began to clash with their neighbors, police and the military, leading in 1980 to the loss of thousands of lives, including that of Maitatsine himself. Under his successor, Musa Makiniki, the movement erupted into violence again in 1982, 1984 and 1985, with the further loss of thousands of lives. One Nigerian daily suggested that sectarian violence was encouraged in the country’s north by religious-minded politicians who intervened to shield culprits from prosecution (Daily Sun [Lagos], January 8).

Note

  1. Mallam is the Hausa language adaptation of the Arabic mu’allim – Islamic scholar or teacher.

This article first appeared in the June 24, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Resurrected Boko Haram Chief Threatens United States

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Andrew McGregor

July 22, 2010

As the first anniversary of a bloody five day Islamist rebellion in northern Nigeria approaches, Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State, is awash in heavily armed riot police and intelligence officials. Their presence is in reaction to spreading rumors of an imminent rebellion to be led by a man police still insist is dead – Imam Abubakr Shekau. Formerly deputy leader of the radical Boko Haram movement, Shekau was declared dead following vicious street fighting last year between movement members and Nigeria’s security forces (AFP, July 31, 2009).

Abubakr ShekauBoko Haram Leader Abubakr Shekau

Boko Haram has existed under various names since 1995. Mallam Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf took control of the group in 2002 when its founder left to pursue religious studies in Medina. Yusuf led the group in a more militant direction, and by 2004 it had begun attacks on police outposts (Vanguard [Lagos], August 4, 2009). The movement broke into open rebellion last July in fighting that spread over four states, killing nearly 800 people. Security forces dealt with the rebels ruthlessly. Mallam Yusuf was captured by the army on July 30, 2009 and turned over to the police, who later dumped his naked and mutilated body in the street, still wearing handcuffs (al-Jazeera, February 9). Police were videotaped executing suspected members of Boko Haram, leading to the March arrest of seventeen policemen identified from the footage (Daily Independent [Lagos], March 1, al-Jazeera, March 1; Guardian [Lagos], March 4; see Terrorism Monitor, March 26).

A new video was posted to jihadi websites last week in which Shekau directed the movement’s wrath at a new target – the United States (Ansar al-Mujahideen, July 11). Describing Americans as “infidels, hypocrites and apostates” in his Hausa language address, Shekau warns “Do not think jihad is over. Rather, jihad has just begun… America, die with your fury.” The Boko Haram leader announced he has taken the leadership of Boko Haram and used part of the video to eulogize Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the late leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Qaeda in Iraq, respectively.

Police first learned last December that videos of Shekau threatening revenge on security forces were circulating through mobile telephones, but declared the images were digitally manipulated (Daily Independent [Lagos], July 3; Nigerian Tribune, July 7). Police believed Shekau was killed in an exchange of fire at Boko Haram’s Ibn Taymiyah compound, but there were no indications his body had been recovered. Shekau claims he was indeed shot in the leg, but was rescued by “fellow believers” (Daily Trust [Abuja], July 1).

A journalist provided an Abuja daily with a video he shot of Shekau in April after being driven, while blindfolded, to Shekau’s hideout. Despite his movement’s opposition to Western civilization and education (“boko”), Shekau rationalized Boko Haram’s use of firearms in stating, “Guns are not products of boko… we also can make guns, we even made and used guns” (Daily Trust, July 1).

Rumors that Shekau will return to Maiduguri this month to take revenge on police have filled the streets with security forces. Numerous flags believed to indicate allegiance to Boko Haram are reported to have appeared throughout the city, but Borno Police Commissioner, Ibrahim Abdu, says they are of no concern, as they differ from flags flown by the movement last year (Daily Independent, July 3; Nigerian Tribune, July 7). The police, however, are reluctant to begin raids to take the flags down, as this might ignite an already volatile situation. Rumors already claim the flags are actually being raised by the Borno State government to create an atmosphere of insecurity (Daily Independent, July 3).

While radical Islamist groups in northern Nigeria such as Boko Haram and Kala Kato have traditionally focused on attacks on the Nigerian federal and state governments in their attempts to establish an Islamic caliphate, Shekau’s praise of al-Qaeda and commitment to the global jihad represents a new direction for the militants.

This article first appeared in the July 22, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Militants Revive Niger Delta Insurgency with Bombing “From the Pit of Hell”

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Andrew McGregor

March 26, 2010

Nigeria’s Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) made clear its complete rejection of the amnesty program and a peaceful approach to solving the problems of the Niger Delta region on March 15 with a deadly attack on a major post-amnesty dialogue in the Delta State city of Warri.

MEND 1Delta State Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan

The conference was well attended by government officials (including the governors of four states and a former Chief of Defense Staff) and a number of prominent ex-militants who had taken advantage of the government’s amnesty program. The event, entitled “Restoring Hope in the Niger Delta,” was sponsored and organized by Nigeria’s Vanguard Media Limited.

Two bombs went off at Warri’s Delta State Government House Annex, where the meeting was being held. Though three people were killed and many more injured, MEND insisted that it had called off the detonation of a third bomb that might have caused massive casualties as those attending the event were observed fleeing in its direction. A MEND statement claimed the bombs were set off by remote control by its operatives who later retrieved the unused third bomb and returned safely to base (This Day [Lagos], March 17).

A spokesperson for the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), an umbrella group composed of Niger Delta militants, described the bombing as “an act of evil devised from the pit of hell and within the corridors of Lucifer” (This Day, March 17; Niger Delta Standard, March 17). The spokesperson went on to call MEND a “dementia infected cabal” which has “cunningly infiltrated the just and noble struggle for the liberation and emancipation of the Ijaw and Niger Delta struggle.” The MEND attack was the first claimed by the movement since MEND announced on January 30 it would no longer observe the ceasefire to which it agreed in October, 2009. A blast occurred on Shell’s Trans-Ramos pipeline only hours after the January 30 statement, but the movement issued a somewhat ambiguous denial of responsibility (Reuters, February 2; Daily Champion [Lagos], February 10).

With MEND intensifying its struggle by directly targeting government leaders rather than oil facilities, Nigeria’s Joint Security Taskforce (JST) has  begun security sweeps through the region, including a manhunt for MEND leader Henry Okah, who accepted a government amnesty in July, 2009 (This Day, March 18; Punch [Lagos], March 23). The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) is also seeking the movement’s bomb-maker, a native of Anambra State who is alleged to have been contracted by MEND to supply ten bombs (Vanguard [Lagos], March 20).

A MEND statement indicated that the attack was a response to a statement by Delta State governor, Emmanuel Uduaghan, who described MEND and its “virtual” spokesman Jomo Gbomo as “paper tigers.” It was also a reminder of how the “lands of the people of the Niger Delta were stolen by the oil companies and Northern Nigeria with a stroke of the pen” (Daily Trust [Lagos], March 17; March 21). The movement promised to strike at “oil companies across the Niger Delta,” including “companies such as Total which have been spared in the past.  We hope the actions which will follow will persuade Mr. Uduaghan that we exist outside of cyberspace” (Daily Trust, March 17).

Many ex-militants have complained that the government’s amnesty program has stalled as a consequence of the severe illness of President Umaru Yar’Adua, who was the prime mover behind the program. Temporary president Goodluck Jonathan and other ministers have said the post-amnesty program will continue and assured foreign oil companies that the government was “on top of the situation” in the Niger Delta (Port Harcourt Telegraph, March 17). The continuing violence in the Delta is beginning to have a severe effect on oil production and its revenues, on which the Nigerian state is reliant.

This article first appeared in the March 26, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor