Mali’s Self-Defense Militias Take the Reconquest of the North into Their Own Hands

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Andrew McGregor

August 10, 2012

With the Malian Army still in disarray, the United States urging caution and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanding the formation of a government of national unity before taking military action, a handful of “self-defense” militias from northern Mali are preparing to launch their own reconquest of the regions now controlled by Tuareg rebels and Islamist groups including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The formation for this purpose of a militia coalition known as the Forces patriotiques de résistance (FPR – Patriotic Resistance Forces) was announced at a news conference in Bamako on July 21 (Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], July 23).

Ganda KoyGanda Koy Militia (The Times)

The militias forming the FPR include Ganda Koy (Lords of the Land), Ganda Iso (Sons of the Land), the Forces de libération des régions nord du Mali (FLN – Liberation Forces of the Northern Regions), the Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou (ACRT – Alliance of Communities from the Timbuktu Region), the Force armée contre l’occupation (FACO – Armed Force Against the Occupation) and the Cercle de réflexion et d’action (CRA – Thought and Action Circle). The largest of the groups are believed to be the Ganda Koy, with some 2,000 members, and Ganda Iso, with an estimated 1300 fighters (L’Essor [Bamako], July 26). Ganda Koy militia leader Harouna Touré recently declared; “This war must begin as early as tomorrow with or without the national army” (L’Indépendant [Bamako], July 23). Most of these militias are centered in the Gao region of northern Mali, and are predominantly Songhai, though they also include Peul/Fulani members. After the announcement of a new coalition of militias was made, however, Ganda Iso chairman Muhammad Attaib Maiga issued a statement saying “We do not recognize ourselves as a member of this coalition… We decline any responsibility for the actions that the said coalition will take” (Info Matin [Bamako], July 26).

Another self-defense militia, the “Popular Movement Soni Ali Ber” has been created in Gao by Al-Hadj Tandjina. The movement is named for the first king of the Songhai Empire (c.1464 – 1492) and is intended to “wash [away] the affront of the occupation and recover the flouted dignity and honor of the people of Gao” (L’Observateur [Bamako], July 25). Just outside Bamako, several hundred would-be fighters are training as part of Bouyan Ba Hawi (Songhai for “Death is Better than Shame”), a militia led by Mahamadou Dioura (Jeune Afrique, August 2; Independent August 7).

An officer of Algeria’s Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS – Department of Intelligence and Security) has suggested that the defeat of the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) by the Islamists in Gao is a good development as it will send the Tuareg rebels into the arms of the Malian Army (Jeune Afrique, July 14). However, while MNLA spokesman Moussa ag Assarid recently indicated that the Tuareg rebel movement was ready to fight the “terrorist groups” alongside ECOWAS forces, he was also adamant that they would not fight alongside Malian troops (Le Républicain [Bamako], July 26).

For the Ganda Iso movement of Ibrahim Dicko the real enemy is the MNLA, “which wanted to create a state that we did not recognize. The Islamists, on the contrary, are Muslims like us” (Jeune Afrique, August 3). The Islamists appear to be seeking to divert the anger of the self-defense militias towards the Tuareg of the MNLA by exploiting racial tensions and offering the militias arms to use against the Tuareg. Modern arms appear to be in short supply for the militia fighters, some of whom are training with cudgels rather than Kalashnikovs (L’Essor [Bamako], July 25). The strategy may be working; there are reports (confirmed by both Ganda Koy and Ansar al-Din) that some 400 Ganda Koy fighters based in Douentza have already joined the Islamists of Ansar al-Din (AP, July 15). Ganda Iso took control of Douentza (170 km north of Mopti) on July 13 when it was abandoned by the Islamists but the Malian Army, which has been ordered not to advance beyond Konna, failed to move in to take control at that time.

With the Malian Army having suffered several defeats, the loss of large numbers of defectors to the rebel forces, the staging an unpopular coup and a fratricidal conflict between the “Green Beret” putschists and the “Red Beret” [paratrooper] counter-coup units, desertion has become a major problem in the demoralized military. The Ministry of Defense and Veterans has warned that deserters may be brought before the military courts in accordance with the code of military justice” (L’Essor [Bamako], July 23; L’Indépendant [Bamako], July 23; Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], July 23). According to a member of Special Unit Etia2 (Joint Tactical Echelon) commanded by Colonel al-Hadj Gamou (a Tuareg loyalist); “After the coup, the chain of command gave out. Some subordinates no longer obey their superiors. But it should also be noted that even before the coup, at the command level, there were leadership problems” (PressAfrik.com, July 30). Some Malian troops, rather than focusing on an upcoming campaign against northern extremists and rebels, are using their uniforms to extort money at the Mopti Region checkpoint at Konna from refugees fleeing the Islamist occupation, leading to frequent verbal clashes and further loss of faith in the armed services (L’Essor [Bamako], July 25).

The FPR coalition does not appear to have any official support from the Malian military, but are being sponsored by coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who has been given “former head-of-state” status in return for stepping aside for a new interim government and is alleged to be providing the militias training facilities and instructors, raising the disturbing possibility he intends to form his own private army (Le Temps d’Algerie [Algiers], July 23; Jeune Afrique, August 2).  Both Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso are training close to Sévaré (Mopti Region), where the Malian Army is regrouping. FLN official Amadou Malle asserts that the militia fighters are strictly unpaid volunteers, though it appears some may have been offered places in the Malian military after the northern region has been retaken (L’Essor [Bamako], July 25).

Ganda Koy leader Harouna Touré declared last month that “We are not afraid of death, but we dread shame” (L’Indépendant [Bamako], July 5). Touré insists that the militia coalition was formed without consulting anyone and will not wait for anyone’s permission or collaboration to take action. The main objective of the coalition will be to bring a permanent end to the cycle of Tuareg rebellion and reconciliation that places northern Mali in a permanent state of instability (Septembre 22 [Bamako], July 5). 

Though the present state of the Malian military would seem to preclude the possibility of bringing the self-defense militias under control, the government is nevertheless concerned that their impulsiveness will precipitate another round of civil war before the new government is prepared. While a government communiqué cited the “highly courageous initiative of the youth,” it also affirmed that recovery of the occupied territories in the north is a “task of the state and its divisions” (L’Indépendant, July 25).

Militias such as Ganda Koy have notorious reputations for human rights abuses targeted at specific ethnic groups such as the Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians of northern Mali (see Terrorism Monitor, April 20). Unleashing them in the north rather than organizing a multinational response to the Islamist occupation is likely to aggravate the security situation rather than stabilize it and may create a poisonous legacy that will ensure years of retributive violence.

This article was originally published in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, August 10, 2012.

“A Man with No Limits or Restrictions”: New Revelations from the Court of Mu’ammar Qaddafi

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Andrew McGregor

July 26, 2012

According to a former Libyan official who was intimately acquainted with Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s personal and political affairs, “Al-Qaddafi was a man with no limits or restrictions; he did anything he wished. He was tyrannical and arrogant. He thought that no one had the right to take him to account about anything.” The revelations emerged in a five-part interview by a pan-Arab daily of Nuri al-Mismari, a former state protocol secretary with the rank of minister of state (al-Hayat, July 15; July 17; July 18; July 19). Al-Mismari was one of Qaddafi’s inner circle of aides and retainers, a position that gave him unique access to the personal and state secrets of the Qaddafi regime, secrets that would later place his life in jeopardy before he split from the regime in 2010.

Nuri al-Mismari (right) with Mu’ammar Qaddafi

The chief protocol officer says he was frequently imprisoned by Qaddafi, who would also occasionally punch him in the face. After leaving for France after being tipped off about a plot to murder him, al-Mismari claims he was told by other officials that Qaddafi was “preparing a basin of acid to drown me in as soon as I returned.”After Libya failed in its attempt to extradite al-Mismari, it sent an assassination team. The former Libyan official was placed in protective custody until the would-be assassins left France. There followed a procession of individuals trying to persuade al-Mismari to return to Libya, including the Libyan ambassador to France, members of al-Mismari’s family and even a personal visit from Qaddafi’s son, Mutassim al-Qaddafi (later killed in captivity after his capture during the October, 2011 Battle of Sirte).

Al-Mismari shed new light on the 1978 disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, the influential Iranian-born founder of the Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (AMAL – Lebanese Resistance Detachments) and two companions while visiting Libya. Libya has long claimed the three men left Libya for Italy, but Italian officials insist the men never entered the country (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 22, 2011). According to al-Mismari, former Libyan intelligence chief Abdallah al-Sanusi (then a junior intelligence officer) asked the chief of protocol to obtain Italian visas for the passports of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his two companions. Al-Mismari claims that Libyan intelligence took advantage of the lax inspection routine for those travelling under diplomatic passports by sending a military intelligence officer to Italy who resembled the Imam and who wore al-Sadr’s clothing. The officer then returned to Libya using his own diplomatic passport while the passports of the missing men were left in a hotel room in Italy to be discovered by authorities, leaving the Qaddafi regime with documented “proof” that Imam al-Sadr and his companions had left Libya for Italy.

Regarding the September, 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772 over Niger that killed 156 passengers and 15 crew members, al-Mismari confirmed the account of former Libyan foreign minister Abd al-Rahman Shalgham, who said a year ago that the bombing was part of a Libyan intelligence plot to kill opposition leader Muhammad al-Maqrif (who turned out to not be on the plane) (al-Hayat, July 18, 2011).  Al-Mismari adds that Libyan officials also thought the plane was carrying a number of leading Chadian officials, including president Hissène Habrè.  Abdallah al-Sanusi and five other Libyans were tried and convicted in absentia in a French court in 1999 for their role in the bombing. The missing men are believed to have been killed on Qaddafi’s orders and buried in the desert near Sirte.

Despite his efforts to establish close relations with a host of African nations, Qaddafi privately mocked their heads of state, especially those who proved particularly fawning: “Al-Qaddafi loved to scorn and insult heads of state. He would say ‘bring me the black man’ – meaning the head of state of an African country – who was preparing to meet with him. When this head of state would leave, al-Qaddafi would say ‘the black man has left, give him something.’”

According to al-Mismari, Qaddafi liked to humiliate others by sleeping with their wives. His sadistic proclivities often resulted in scandalous situations that the protocol chief and others were forced to tidy up through large cash payments or the granting of government contracts. Qaddafi was also “terribly sexually deviant… young boys and so on… They used to be called the ‘services group.’ All of those were boys, bodyguards and harem for his pleasure.” Qaddafi would “indulge his debaucheries” in a vast underground residence at the Bab al-Zawiyah compound in Tripoli. According to al-Mismari, Qaddafi was advised on matters of virility by Italian president Silvio Berlusconi and was well supplied with pills by his intelligence chief and brother-in-law Abdallah al-Sanusi “to raise his morale and make him feel brave and strong.” Of the latter, al-Mismari remarks: “He was gentle, generous, respectful to your face. But he was bloodthirsty and carried out the orders of his master.” Al-Sanusi, who is believed to have carried out the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre of 1,200 suspected Islamists and other prisoners, is now in Mauritanian custody where he faces charges of illegal entry. Libya, France, Scotland and the ICC are all interested in his extradition to face charges in various cases of terrorism and political violence (Reuters, May 21).

Having been present at all state occasions during his time as protocol chief, al-Mismari had a number of observations to offer regarding Qaddafi’s relations with various world leaders:

  • Qaddafi hated Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, “cursing him and calling him petty, stupid and reckless.” Qaddafi backed the Iraqi opposition while Saddam supported Qaddafi’s enemies in Chad.
  • Qaddafi appears to have been infatuated with former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: “He invited her to dinner, and when she entered his private suite, she saw her portrait in a frame, hanging on a wall in his suite. When she saw it, she was shocked.” Qaddafi lavished gifts on Rice worth over $212,000, including a diamond ring and a locket with Qaddafi’s picture in it. When rebels seized Qaddafi’s compound in August, 2011, they discovered a photo album full of pictures of the Secretary of State (CBS, August 25, 2011).
  • Qaddafi was fond of referring to presidents and kings alike as “my son,” including U.S. president Barack Obama: “He used to do that on purpose in order to belittle people. We used to beg him not to say ‘My Son’ when addressing leaders.”
  • Qaddafi was especially arrogant in his visits to Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union: “[Qaddafi] would set an appointment then be deliberately late. Then, Brezhnev would go and wait for him outside his room at the Kremlin until he came out. It was embarrassing. Brezhnev was old and he could barely walk. Qaddafi would say that he was coming and Brezhnev would wait and wait.”
  • Qaddafi liked to summon visiting leaders in the middle of the night, including Nelson Mandela: “[Qaddafi] told me to get dressed and to fetch Mandela, who was visiting Libya after having left the post of president. I spoke to Mandela’s adviser and he said: “Are you insane? The man is asleep and he is sick and his knees hurt.” I told him: “these are the instructions.” He said: “What kind of instructions? Do you think that Mandela is an employee of yours? I will not allow anyone to wake him up.”
  • When UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Tripoli to discuss the Lockerbie bombing Qaddafi had him brought to his tent at night by a circuitous route through the desert, though the tent was only 200 meters from the coastal road. When he finally reached the tent, Annan was genuinely alarmed by the bellowing of camels in the pitch black night, which he took for the roar of lions.
  • Though Egypt is a far larger and more important country than Libya, Qaddafi never regarded Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak as his equal. During an Arab summit meeting, Qaddafi wore white gloves to avoid directly shaking Mubarak’s hand. Mubarak was also once forced to visit Qaddafi in his desert tent, but said afterwards: “If there’s a desert next time, then I will not go to Libya.”

This article first appeared in the July 26, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

M23: A New Player in the Proxy Wars of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Andrew McGregor

July 26, 2012

The Congolese province of Nord-Kivu, which borders both Rwanda and Uganda on its eastern side, is a land of active volcanoes, mountain gorillas, valuable minerals, warring militias and over 200,000 displaced people. It is also home to M23, a new and powerful militia composed of veteran rebels and professional soldiers. Well-armed and apparently more capable than local units of the national army, M23 poses a new challenge to efforts to restore stability to a region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that has been in a state of upheaval since the genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994. 

Colonel Bosco Ntaganda in the hills of Nord-Kivu

M23 has its origins in the Nord-Kivu-based Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) of General Laurent “The Chairman” Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi. The largely Tutsi CNDP is believed to have been sponsored by Rwanda to fight a proxy war with the Hutu supremacist Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a militia formed partly by former Hutu genocidaires. With the CNDP under pressure from an offensive by Congolese and Rwandan troops, the movement’s leadership split in January 2009. Nkunda was arrested and detained in Rwanda while General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda, a Rwandan Tutsi wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes committed while both a rebel and an officer in the DRC national army, took control of the movement. Ntaganda agreed to integrate his forces with the Congolese national army, the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC),  according to the terms of the March 23, 2009 peace agreement, which also ensured Kinshasha would not pursue the ICC warrants against Ntaganda and other CNDP officers. The ICC issued a fresh arrest warrant against Ntaganda on July 13 related to crimes against humanity, murder, rape, pillaging, recruitment of child soldiers and sexual slavery (AFP, July 13). Thomas Lubanga, Ntaganda’s former commander in the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) / Forces Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC), was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the ICC earlier this month for recruiting and using child soldiers in the early 2000’s.

M23 is named for the March 23, 2009 peace agreement that movement leaders claim Kinshasha has failed to honor (East African [Nairobi], July 16).  The movement was born when Colonel Ntaganda led a March mutiny of up to 600 soldiers in Nord-Kivu. Though poor living conditions, pay interruptions and other reasons were cited, it is likely that the main causes of the military revolt were a plan to transfer the former CNDP troops under Ntaganda’s command to another part of the DRC and a rumor that President Joseph Kabila had taken a new interest in enforcing the ICC warrant against Ntaganda. Colonel Ntaganda and other Tutsi officers profited from their control of rich mining areas of Nord-Kivu and by trading in tropical hardwoods grown in the region. The Tutsi officers and their men have opposed any transfer from the lucrative Kivu provinces and pose locally as the “protectors” of the Banyamulenge, Congolese Tutsis who live in the region. In the field with Ntaganda are three other senior officers, Colonel Baudouin Ngaruye, Colonel Innocent Zimurinda and Colonel Innocent Kaina, all of whom are accused of massacring civilians, mass rape, mutilations, and other crimes while profiting from illegal taxes on charcoal production and mining operations (IRIN [Nairobi], June 23; AFP, July 13).

M23 Fighters in Bunangana

The M23 movement can be viewed as a revival of the CNDP under a different name, but including many of the same individuals, leading Kinshasha to accuse Rwanda of resuming military and financial assistance to the militia. Congolese concern on this point is understandable – Rwandan forces have invaded the eastern DRC twice since 1998. Kigali in turn believes that Kinshasha has resumed support for Hutu extremists in the FDLR who are allegedly planning terrorist attacks in Rwanda.

A recent M23 offensive in a region bordering the Virunga national park captured the border town of Bunangana on July 6 and drove some 600 FARDC troops and thousands of refugees into Uganda (East African [Nairobi], July 16). The soldiers were disarmed and eventually returned to the DRC. Days later, a M23 spokesman announced the movement had pulled out of the area taken, saying the movement sought to bring the government to negotiations rather than control territory (AFP, July 13). The towns of Kiwandja and Rutshuru were handed over to local police and troops belonging to the UN peacekeeping force, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). When the towns were re-occupied by FARDC troops the M23 warned the army to get out “or be held responsible for all the consequences” (AFP, July 13).

Believing that M23 was intent on seizing the Nord-Kivu capital of Goma, MONUSCO and the Congolese army deployed over a dozen tanks on the road to Goma. The M23, however, denied it had any such intentions: “Our mission is not to go to Goma. We are strong but we are also disciplined. We know what we are doing” (AFP, July 12; Xinhua, July 13). Three UN and two DRC MI24 and MI25 helicopters flown by Ukrainian pilots strafed M23 positions in the hills of southeast Virunga National Park with rockets and 30mm rounds (AFP, July 13).

In a recent meeting of the 11 nation International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (which includes Rwanda and the DRC), it was agreed to accept a “neutral international force” to eradicate M23, the FDLR and other armed groups in the region ( Daily Monitor [Kampala], July 16AFP, July 15).  [1] The idea was then endorsed by the African Union. As of yet, however, potential contributors to this force have not been identified. Meetings on this issue are planned for Kampala at an August 6-7 summit of Great Lakes states (Agence Rwandaise d’Information, July 16). In the meantime, there are reports that the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) and the Congolese troops of the FARDC have agreed to mount joint patrols along their common border (Africa Review, July 17). Plagued by indiscipline, FARDC is often viewed as nearly as great a threat to Congolese security as the militias it is supposed to be fighting.

In mid-July, roughly two dozen M23 fighters deserted and surrendered to UN forces, saying they had been recruited in Rwanda and sent to the DRC. However, when the UN took these individuals to the Rwandan border for repatriation, Rwandan authorities refused to accept them, saying there was no evidence they were Rwandan nationals. Rwanda did accept the return of seven members of the Hutu FDLR (AFP, July 15). The ICC issued a warrant this month for FDLR commander Sylvestre Mudacumura, a Rwandan Hutu facing nine counts of war crimes.

Much of the community in Nord-Kivu views the ongoing violence in the region through a prism of tribal rivalries. With M23 being composed largely of Tutsis, senior members of the DRC’s ruling party have used public rallies broadcast on state TV to threaten to hunt down all Tutsis in the DRC and send them to Rwanda. Street children and taxi drivers in Goma have used such threats as a license to attack anyone who looks like a Tutsi (IRIN [Nairobi], July 14).

Note

1. The ICGLR is composed of 11 states: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

This article was first published in the July 26, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

“Christian Brotherhood” Formed in Egypt on the Model of the Muslim Brotherhood

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Andrew McGregor

July 12, 2012

As Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood attempts to consolidate its political control of Egypt’s presidency and parliament, the formation of a new “Christian Brotherhood” was announced on July 5. The new movement does not have the endorsement of the Coptic Orthodox Church and is described by its founders as either a “sectarian” or a “liberal and secular” organization that will or will not seek political power, depending on who is asked. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which is still officially unrecognized in Egypt, the new movement will register with the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs to obtain legal status. The announcement came at a time of growing sectarian tensions and protests following incidents such as an attack by bearded Islamists on a Coptic woman in the Cairo suburb of Ma’adi for not wearing a veil (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], July 7).

Though it is only being activated now, the idea for a Christian Brotherhood movement was first advanced in 2005 by Coptic lawyer and activist Mamdouh Nakhla, the director of the Kalema Center for Human Rights (Cairo) and political analyst Michel Fahmy. The two were later joined by Amir Ayyad of the Maspero Youths Union for Free Copts, who played an important role in organizing the group. According to Fahmy, the movement was activated after the election of Muslim Brotherhood member Muhammad al-Mursi as Egypt’s new president to “resist the Islamist religious tide… We created our group to create a balance in the Egyptian political scene.” (al-Arabiya, July 5; Bikya Masr [Cairo], July 5).

Mamdouh Nakhla

Mamdouh Nakhla described some of the goals of the new movement in a recent interview with a pan-Arab daily (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 7). Noting that the political model of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been very successful in Egypt, Nakhla insists that the Christian Brotherhood (CB) will follow this model, at times almost slavishly – for instance, the CB’s political wing will be called Hizb al-Adala wa’l-Hurryiya (Justice and Freedom Party)in imitation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Ḥizb al-Ḥurriya wa ‘l-Adala (Freedom and Justice Party).  The CB will also be led by a “Supreme Guide,” just as in the MB.  According to Nakhla, “We have been convinced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s success in coming to power, particularly as this group is still officially illegal. This is why we intend to implement this same idea, utilizing even the same hierarchy and positions, which may even have the same names…” The Coptic activist even suggests an alliance with the MB could be possible:

We are prepared to politically ally with them and take part in elections with them on a joint list, which could be called the “Egyptian Brotherhood” list. We may support their presidential candidate in any future elections, on the condition that presidential and ministerial posts are shared between us. Therefore, if they were to win the presidency then the vice president would be a member of the Christian Brotherhood, whilst if they form a government, ministerial portfolios would be shared between us, each according to their [parliamentary] proportion.

Ahmed al-Deif, a political adviser to the new Egyptian president, said in late June that al-Mursi was considering the appointment of two vice-presidents, a Copt and a (presumably Muslim) woman (Egypt Independent, June 26). The idea, however, ran into opposition from Egypt’s Salafists, who oppose such appointments but would permit the appointment of a Copt as a presidential adviser (Egypt Independent, July 2). The main candidate for a Coptic vice-presidency is Dr. Rafiq Habib, a Coptic intellectual who is vice-president of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, the leadership of which describes him as “a valued and very much respected member” (Ikhwan Web, August 10). Nakhla notes that Dr. Habib has joined the Muslim Brotherhood “and is promoting their views; in fact sometimes he is even more unwavering in this than the members of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau themselves!” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 7).

While reaction from the Muslim Brotherhood is still forthcoming, Nakhla does not expect any opposition to the Christian Brotherhood from that quarter: “They cannot object to this idea, for if they object, then this means that they must dissolve their own organization.” Surprisingly, Egypt’s Salafists have expressed no objections to the new movement; according to Salafist Front spokesman Khalid Sa’id: “As long as they [the Christian Brotherhood] work within a legal framework, in accordance with their religion and their faith, and aiming for the country’s interests, there is nothing wrong with it” (al-Arabiya, July 5).

Egypt’s Grand Mufti Ali Guma’a has urged al-Mursi to address the fears of his Coptic “brothers” as part of an effort to form a consensus based on the “common, national, Egyptian civilization” (Al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], June 27). So far, al-Mursi appears to share the Mufti’s opinion, meeting with interim Coptic pope Bishop Pachomius only two days after being declared the victor in Egypt’s presidential election.

The new president’s outreach efforts stand in contrast to the heated days of the two-stage election, when al-Mursi and other members of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party accused the Copts of “betraying the revolution” by voting exclusively for Air Force General and former Mubarak administration prime minister Ahmad Shafiq, despite ample evidence that the Coptic vote was split between a range of candidates (Egypt Independent, May 29). Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Coptic Orthodox Church remained aloof from the momentous events of last year’s Egyptian revolution, unable or unwilling to split from its traditional cooperative approach to the Mubarak regime.

This article first appeared in the July 12, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Was al-Qaeda’s Saharan Amir Mokhtar Belmokhtar Killed in the Battle for Gao?

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Andrew McGregor

July 12, 2012

Though al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to deny the death of one of its leading amirs in the late June battle for the northern Malian city of Gao, the movement has yet to provide any evidence of the survival of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), the amir of AQIM’s Sahara/Sahel-based al-Mulathamin Brigade.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar Outside of Gao

Belmokhtar and his AQIM fighters are reported to have played a central role in leading the takeover of Gao by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), a sub-Saharan AQIM spin-off (Le Républicain [Bamako], June 28; for MUJWA, see Terrorism Monitor, April 6). The clashes were sparked on the night of June 25, when Idrissa Oumarou, a popular local politician and leader of a group dedicated to resisting the rebel occupation of Gao, was killed while riding his motorcycle through a checkpoint run by the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) (L’Esssor [Bamako], June 27; Info Matin [Bamako], June 27; L’Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], June 27). Youth protests began the next morning with the burning of tires in the streets. As the protest turned violent, it appears that MNLA fighters opened fire on the protesters from rooftops, wounding 12 and possibly killing one or two demonstrators (L’Esssor [Bamako], June 30; Le Combat [Bamako], June 27). At this point MUJWA launched an attack on the MNLA, which succeeded in driving the movement out of the city in which it had shared administration with the Islamists.

Accounts of Belmokhtar’s death during the battle vary only in the details. The AQIM leader was variously reported to have been killed on June 28 by a burst of gunfire to his chest, by a rocket that destroyed his vehicle, or by a rocket to his chest fired by Tuareg leader Colonel Bouna ag Atayub before the latter was himself killed in the fighting. Belmokhtar’s death has since been reported by the MNLA and confirmed by Algerian sources (Toumast Press, June 30; July 2; Ennahar TV [Algiers], June 28; Liberté [Algiers], June 30). An unnamed Mauritanian AQIM commander was also reported killed (Toumast Press, June 30; SIWEL – Agence Kabyle d’information, June 28). The other senior MNLA officer reported killed in the clashes was identified as Colonel Wari, possibly Wari ag Ibrahim, a former National Guard officer and a member of the Idnane Tuareg.

At least 35 people died in the fighting, including those drowned in the Niger River and those who died in hospital afterwards. The MNLA admitted to four dead and 10 wounded, but made the improbable claim of having killed “dozens” of MUJWA fighters (AFP, July 1). Most of the dead appear to have been MNLA fighters, along with a few civilians caught in the deadly crossfire (Le Combat [Bamako], June 29).

However, two days after Belmokhtar’s supposed death, a communiqué regarding the events in Gao issued under his alternate name of Khalid Abu al-Abbas was published by a Mauritanian news agency and later carried by jihadi websites (Agence Nouakchott d’Information. June 30).  In the statement, Belmokhtar describes the deadly force used against protesters by the MNLA and goes on to describe the latter’s subsequent expulsion from Gao, though he is careful to note that the use of force “was limited in time and place,” was not intended as a declaration of war “on any party,” and cannot be interpreted as a conflict between Arabs and Tuareg. None of the events described in the communiqué appear to post-date June 28 and as Belmokhtar’s message appeared in the form of a statement rather than an interview that would verify his continued existence, it does not establish the AQIM amir’s survival past June 28.  

Since expelling the MNLA, the Islamists have been conducting house-to-house searches for MNLA members or sympathizers (RFI, July 3). MUJWA has also issued warnings on local radio that they have laid anti-personnel mines in the bush areas surrounding Gao to force all traffic to use the few roads controlled by the movement and thus prevent re-infiltration of the city by MNLA forces (Le Combat [Bamako], July 3). MUJWA forces in Gao are under the command of the movement’s leader, Hamadou Ould Khairou, a Mauritanian who left AQIM last year to form a new and largely sub-Saharan militant Islamist group. Ould Khairou has been living at the Algerian consulate since his fighters seized the building and abducted seven Algerian diplomats in April and is frequently seen driving the Algerian Consul’s four-wheel drive vehicle in the streets of Gao (Jeune Afrique, July 7).

MUJWA leader Hamada Ould Khairou

Following the MUJWA takeover of Gao on June 27, Islamist reinforcements (mostly Algerian according to the MNLA) began arriving in trucks that night, joining MUJWA forces and some 100 members of Ansar al-Din already in Gao (VOA, June 28; Toumast Press, June 30).  The MNLA reported the destruction on June 29 of a convoy of Islamist reinforcements in the Tarkint region of Gao by a brigade under the command of Colonel Leche ag Didi of the Idnane Tuareg (Toumast Press, June 30). Many of the MNLA’s leaders belong to the Idnane tribe, which has in recent years been engaged in a growing power struggle with the aristocratic Ifogha tribe, to which Islamists like Algabass ag Intalla and Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali belong (al-Jazeera, June 11; Info Matin [Bamako], July 4). In some quarters of Mali, the conflict between the rebel groups is seen as a proxy struggle between Algeria, the “secret sponsor” of the MNLA, and Qatar, the “secret sponsor” of the Islamists (L’Aube [Bamako], July 2).

MNLA Secretary General Bilal ag Cherif, who was wounded in the fighting (either by shrapnel or friendly fire), was airlifted to a hospital in the Burkina Faso capital of Ouagadougou by a Burkinabe helicopter, apparently under the orders of Burkinabe president Blaise Compaoré, who is hosting negotiations between the northern Mali rebel leaders and the transitional Malian government. According to some reports, Ag Cherif was accompanied by MNLA military commander Colonel Muhammad ag Najim (Le Combat [Bamako], June 29; AFP, June 28). The rest of the Gao-based MNLA appears to have withdrawn to the Gao Region town of Ménaka to regroup (L’Indépendant, June 29).

After taking Gao, the Islamists claimed to have found a “black list” of assassination targets on the computer of Muhammad Jerry Maiga, the vice-chairman of the MNLA’s Azawad transition committee. Among the names allegedly found there was that of Idrissa Oumarou, the politician whose death led to the brief struggle for Gao. MUJWA has since issued a reward of FCFA 3 million and a Land Cruiser for the death or capture of Maiga (Le Combat [Bamako], July 2). After the MUJWA victory, Maiga told French radio that MUJWA has little real strength and would soon be driven out of Gao by the MNLA (RFI, June 28).

A MUJWA spokesman, Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, claimed his group had taken 40 prisoners as well as two tanks and heavy weapons such as a Grad missile launcher abandoned by the MNLA in the fighting (al-Jazeera, June 29). One Ansar al-Din commander, Umar Ould Hamama, mocked MNLA claims that they would return to Gao after a “tactical withdrawal”: “How can they talk about a counteroffensive when they have left behind them their war arsenal and trucks full of ammunition?” (L’Essor [Bamako], June 29).

Aside from their victory in the spontaneous battle for Gao on June 30, MUJWA also claimed responsibility for an early morning attack the previous day on the regional headquarters of a paramilitary police force in the Algerian town of Ouargla that killed one and wounded three. MUJWA accuses Algeria of encouraging the MNLA to confront the Islamists in northern Mali (AFP, June 29).

This article first appeared in the July 12, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Mallam Muhammadu Marwa and the Roots of Religious Extremism in Northern Nigeria

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Andrew McGregor

June 29, 2012

A statement from the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) issued on June 21 warned that last week’s Boko Haram attacks on Christians in Kaduna and Zaria and the subsequent reprisals against innocent Muslims represented a descent into a complete social breakdown in Nigeria “reminiscent of the horrific inter-ethnic and religious war that marked the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia” (Nigerian Tribune, June 21). As the crisis mounts in Nigeria, the recent and surprising release from prison of a former leader of sectarian violence in northern Nigeria has almost been overlooked, but in itself threatens a resumption of the murderous outrages of the Maitatsine movement of the early 1980s that claimed nearly 10,000 lives and nearly shattered Nigeria’s social and political order.  Though not identical in ideology, the ongoing violence of the Boko Haram movement in many ways takes its inspiration from one of the most dreaded and controversial figures  in post-independence Nigeria – the late Mallam Muhammadu Marwa, better known by his Hausa nickname, “Maitatsine,” or “The One Who Damns.”  As his successor Makaniki returns to the streets of northern Nigeria, it is worthwhile to re-examine the life of Muhammadu Marwa, a man who sought not merely to reform Islam, but to change it completely, regardless of the cost in blood this would require.

Early Life of Muhammadu Marwa

Though Marwa was born a member of the powerful and widespread Fulani tribe in the town of Marwa in northern Cameroon (close to the Nigerian border), we know little of his early life before he emerged as a young itinerant mallam (Islamic teacher). [1] From the beginning, there were aspects to his teaching that orthodox Muslims found provocative, and it was not long before authorities in British Cameroon quietly pushed him across the border to British-occupied Nigeria in 1945 in the hopes he would become someone else’s problem. [2] Physically, Marwa was described as unimposing; a small, slender man, soft-spoken in his early days, bearded and with two gold incisor teeth. [3]

Central Mosque, Kano

Marwa arrived in the garb of a religious scholar in Kano in the 1950s, where his idiosyncratic interpretation of Islam and claims that Muhammad was not an actual prophet drew his presence to the attention of Ado Bayero, the Emir of Kano, who had the controversial  preacher shipped back to Cameroon in 1962. His residency there was short-lived; however, as local Cameroonian authorities facilitated the return of this disturbing individual to Nigeria in 1966, where he established himself as a Quranic teacher to young boys, a situation that permitted him to begin building a loyal following indoctrinated in his particular interpretation of Islam, though not before he served another stretch in prison beginning in 1973 when authorities objected to his methods and teachings. [4] This incarceration appeared to have little effect on Marwa’s progress in Kano, and it was not long before his followers began to comb the city for homeless youth who could be easily enticed by promises of food and shelter. With a development boom infused with petrodollars, Kano went from a city of 400,000 people largely confined within the old city walls in 1970 to a sprawling metropolis of 1.7 million people only ten years later. Wealth remained concentrated in the hands of a privileged few, however, and the streets of Kano were filled with young people seeking any means of survival. [5] In building his following, Marwa made full use of the almajiri system in which boys, usually between ten to 14 years-old, were attached to a religious teacher who provided sufficient instruction in Arabic to permit the reading and memorization of Islamic scriptures.

The students were largely self-supporting through daily begging for alms (a traditional means of support for religious students), a portion of which went directly to Marwa. The movement’s funding was supplemented by Marwa’s growing reputation as a composer of allegedly powerful amulets and charms, an activity shunned by better-educated religious scholars, but one that appealed to a wide spectrum of Muslims still influenced by traditional interpretations of Islam that incorporated pre-Islamic belief systems. Marwa’s efforts in this area hearkened back to the 1906 Mahdist Satiru Rebellion in northern Nigeria, in which a briefly successful uprising eventually came to grief when insurgents eschewed the use of fire-arms in favor of traditional weapons and charms produced by a holy man named Dan Makafo that promised to turn bullets into water. [6]

Building a Base for Islamic Renewal in Kano

During the 1970s, Marwa began to take on the established Sunni scholars, condemning anyone who used any other scriptural source than the Quran, including the Sunna and the Hadiths. [7] More broadly, he damned those who read any book other than the Quran or used watches cars, bicycles, televisions, cigarettes and many other products that reflected Western life, earning himself the nickname “Maitatsine,” or “The One Who Damns.”  By the late 1970’s, Marwa had become a well-known public figure by challenging all manner of authority. Such activities earned him a year in prison at hard labor in 1978, but this did little to deter him. Indeed, Marwa grew more powerful from this point as his followers began appropriating properties beside his Quaranic school, eventually developing a self-ruling enclave of several thousand men to which opponents and alleged “traitors” to the movement were brought and summarily executed after a brief and predictable appearance before the movement’s own “court.” [8]

The 1979 Iranian Revolution encouraged the growing millenarian trend in the Muslim community and Marwa’s own followers became increasingly violent in their rejection of state authority, partly by exploiting the greater degree of political and individual freedom promulgated by Nigeria’s 1979 constitution. The growing tensions in northern Nigeria’s Islamic community led to dozens of clashes between authorities and various Islamic groups in the lead-up to the Kano insurrection of 1980. Marwa began work on a new center for his followers, located in the unfinished ‘Yan Awaki district of Kano. The fortified compound was based on high ground and partly protected by a stream that wound round part of the property. A separate one-storey building at the rear of the compound was known as “the slaughter-house,” where numerous victims of the sect were murdered and their bodies dumped through a trap-door into the stream. Efforts to rein in Marwa through legislation against unorthodox preaching failed through fears it could be applied against the more mainstream ulema (religious scholars and clergy) and the Maitatsine enclave and its surroundings became a “no-go” area for local police. Even undercover work was abandoned, leaving security forces with little intelligence regarding the movement’s intentions. In the absence of any opposition by authorities, Marwa continued to illegally expropriate neighboring properties and encouraged his supporters to settle on any unoccupied real estate, asserting that all land belonged to Allah and his people. By 1980, Marwa had roughly 10,000 followers (mostly in Kano but with smaller groups in Bauchi, Gombe, Maiduguri and Yola) and confrontations with police and the ulema became common, often degenerating into pitched street-battles with multiple fatalities.

Marwa was accompanied by bodyguards everywhere and his followers began to appear armed at public events, having received training under the supervision of the movement’s military commander Saidu Rabiu from former soldiers and policemen who had joined the movement. It was common for sect members to carry concealed weapons in the streets while confident of the protection against firearms and other weapons bestowed by the charms and amulets produced by Marwa. [9] In this atmosphere it became clear that matters would soon come to a head, especially when rumors began to circulate that Marwa intended to take over Kano’s market and main mosques. [10] Nonetheless, authorities in Lagos denied repeated requests from Kano for police reinforcements to deal with Marwa and his followers, who by this time vastly outnumbered the available police in Kano.

Beyond Orthodoxy

Marwa’s message appealed to the largely unemployed or underemployed masses that the rapid expansion of Kano attracted from the Nigerian countryside and even from across regional borders, many of whom could not afford the consumer goods denounced by the increasingly bellicose religious leader. Marwa’s prohibition against carrying only small amounts of cash on the grounds that carrying more displayed a lack of faith in Allah did not require much adaptation by the migrants, working poor and impoverished students who flocked to his leadership, who were often inspired as much by resentment against the flourishing corruption and mismanagement that concentrated money in the hands of a few as by religious concerns. The anti-materialist theme in Marwa’s teachings gave focus to the lives of the impoverished, replacing envy with righteousness. Though Marwa sought to reform Islam through a highly individual interpretation of what constituted orthodoxy, he did not hesitate to employ older, pre-Islamic spiritual beliefs regarding the concentration of magical powers in certain individuals, traditions that were familiar to his largely rural-origin following. Marwa also changed the wording and the ritual involved in daily prayer, a shocking display of arrogance to most Muslims. Most controversial, however, was Marwa’s 1979 claim to be a nabi, or prophet, at times equating himself with the Prophet Muhammad, and at other times declaring his superiority to this “mere Arab.” [11] For orthodox Muslims, who believe Muhammad is the last Prophet, Marwa had now gone beyond all reasonable interpretations of Islam and placed himself at odds with the larger Muslim community in northern Nigeria.

An Inevitable Confrontation

In response to public complaints, Kano State governor Muhammad Rimi (who was alleged to have previously had ties to the cult) sent Marwa a message on November 24, 1980 demanding that he and his followers vacate their illegally expropriated holdings or face government action. Marwa, in turn, began summoning his followers to his defense.

When police attempted to prevent a public demonstration by arresting some leaders of the ‘Yan Tatsine (as Marwa’s followers were known) at Kano’s Shahuci Playing Grounds on December 18, 1980, they were attacked by ‘Yan Tatsine wielding machetes, knives, spears, axes and bows and arrows. Police arms quickly fell into the eager hands of the ‘Yan Tatsine and it did not take long for the security forces to lose control of the situation entirely. Kano was turned over to mobs of ‘Yan Tatsine who murdered, raped and pillaged in the city for days, often while singing movement favorites like Yau Zamu Sha Jini (“Today We Will Suck Blood”). [12] At times the marauders were opposed by vigilante groups (the ‘Yan Tauri), but these were generally ineffective as supporters of Marwa continued to pour into the city. [13] By December 22, with many of the outnumbered and demoralized police no longer showing up for duty, it was felt necessary to deploy the Nigerian military to retake Kano, which they began by “softening up” the militants (and their unfortunate neighbors) with a ten-hour mortar barrage by the 146th Infantry Battalion, together with aerial support. Militants and innocents alike perished in the bombardment, which was followed by military forces mopping up the remaining resistance with rockets and machine guns in bitter street fighting. Battalion Major Haliru Akilu noted later that the militants showed little fear of the Army’s superior weapons: “They were ready to kill first, or be killed, but never to run” (The Age [Lagos], February 21, 1981).

A contributing factor to the ferocity of the onslaught of the ‘Yan Tatsine on the ordinary citizens of Kano appears to have been the death shortly before the clashes of Marwa’s eldest son Tijani (a.k.a. Kana’ana). Though Tijani appears to have opted for association with members of Kano’s criminal underworld rather than the pursuit of religion, Marwa blamed Tijani’s death at the hands of his criminal associates on the people of Kano as a whole and vowed to make every father “taste the bitterness of losing a child” (Sunday Trust [Abuja], December 26, 2010).

Separated by only a decade from a bitter civil war, Nigeria’s largely northern ruling class was in no mood to tolerate such challenges to its authority or national unity. Official figures claimed over 4,000 dead, though other sources suggest the figure was far larger. At least 100,000 people were displaced by the fighting. [14] Hundreds of children abducted by the sect for indoctrination were also freed when soldiers entered the Maitatsine compound.

Rumors that the insurgents had been aided by Libyan troops or provided with Libyan arms soon proved false (Libyan troops were fighting across the border in Chad at the time). Other claims that “Zionist forces” or various Western intelligence agencies were behind the rebellion were raised at the subsequent Aniagolu Commission of Inquiry but remained unsubstantiated. [15] The Zionist allegation appears to have had its origin in the sect’s practice of praying while facing Jerusalem rather than Mecca. [16]

The Legacy of Maitatsine

Once the Army had retaken control of Kano, Marwa’s body was exhumed from a shallow grave on the outskirts of the city (News Agency of Nigeria, December 31, 1980). The would-be prophet was variously reported to have died from smoke inhalation or wounds to his leg during the attack on his compound (The Age, February 21, 1981). [17] On the orders of Justice Aniagolu the remains were cremated and remain today in an officially sealed jar on the shelf of the police laboratory in Kano (Sunday Trust [Abuja], December 26, 2010). The area where Marwa built his enclave is now home to a police barracks, all traces of the former complex having been destroyed in the fighting or demolished soon afterwards.

In the commission of inquiry that followed the devastation of Kano, there was inevitable criticism of police efforts. Most of the police rank-and-file came from the same culture as the members of the ‘Yan Tatsine, and were just as prone to believing in the efficacy of the charms and amulets worn by Marwa’s followers. Their leaders also came under criticism, with the commission declaring the acting commissioner of police at the time “had totally succumbed to the permanent existence of the threat, which like the state governor and other government functionaries, was believed to be beyond suppression. It was a case of total surrender to an overwhelming situation” (Sunday Trust [Abuja], December 26, 2010).

Attempts by some Nigerian authorities to create an “Outsider Narrative” to explain the events in Kano were not supported by evidence.  Police records confirm that Nigeriens, Chadians and Cameroonians were among Marwa’s followers arrested after the 1980 uprising, but their numbers were relatively small and did not justify government attempts to characterize the ‘Yan Tatsine as a “foreign” movement that had infiltrated Nigeria.

Marwa’s rise took place at a time and in a region where Islam was perhaps more of a divisive than a unifying force.  There was intense competition between the major Sufi orders (the Qadiriya and the Tijaniya), Saudi-inspired Salafists, anti-Sufists of the Saudi-supported ‘Yan Izala movement and politically conscious Muslims inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution.  Wrapped in a resolutely anti-authoritarian, anti-state and anti-materialist garb, Marwa was able to present himself as the final prophet of Islam based on the millenarian fervor existing in the Islamic year AH 1400 (1979-1980). In doing so, Marwa exploited strong currents of Mahdism in the region, which was in expectation of a mujaddid, or “Renewer,” an individual believed to appear at the end of every century (on the Islamic calendar) to restore Islam to its original purity. The strength of these beliefs not only gave Marwa a certain degree of immunity in the Muslim community, but also allowed for the close connections he was alleged to have with certain politicians and prominent businessmen in the area.

Despite the deaths in Kano and the arrest of several thousand of Marwa’s supporters, the ‘Yan Tatsine continued to exist, though much of the movement relocated to the city of Maiduguri in Borno State. Drawing strength from the belief that Marwa was not actually dead, the movement was soon operating in defiance of the state once more.

  • ·         October, 1982 – A ‘Yan Tatsine clash with police at Bulunkutu, outside Maiduguri, left over 450 dead before the fighting spread to Kaduna State, where scores more were killed.
  • ·         February, 1984 – More than 1,000 people were killed during rampages in Jimeta (Gongola State) that followed the mass escape of ‘Yan Tatsine from a local jail.
  • ·         April, 1985 – Efforts to arrest Marwa’s successor al-Makaniki (“the Mechanic,” a.k.a. Yusufu Amadu) in Gombe (Bauchi State) left at least another 150 dead after the ‘Yan Tatsine engaged in a gunfight with security forces. Makaniki fled to Cameroon, where he remained until 2004, when he returned to Nigeria and was arrested. In a surprise development, Makaniki was acquitted and discharged as a free man in early May, 2012 (Daily Trust [Abuja], May 9).

In 2006, one of Maitatsine’s wives, Zainab, told a reporter that Marwa had nothing to do with the Kano violence in 1980 and that her late husband was “an embodiment of scholarship, a father and a religious reformer that was misunderstood. He preached tolerance, peace, harmony and religious revival… To the best of our understanding of him, he was a man of humility and we are sure he was framed, misunderstood and castigated for preaching” (Sunday Trust [Abuja], December 26, 2010). While most Nigerians reject such an interpretation of the Maitatsine legacy, the calculated viciousness of contemporary attacks by Boko Haram extremists against Muslims and Christians alike suggest that religious extremism, police corruption, lack of opportunity, inept intelligence work, economic inequity and uninhibited urban growth continue to provide fertile ground for periodic and uncontrollable explosions of religiously-inspired violence in northern Nigeria.

Notes

1. For contemporary Fulani militancy in Africa, see Andrew McGregor, “Central Africa’s Tribal Marauder: A Profile of Fulani Insurgent Leader General Abdel Kader Baba Laddé,” Militant Leadership Monitor 3(4), April 30, 2012.

2. Francis Ohanyido, “Poverty and Politics at The Bottom of Terror (Part 1 – The Maitatsine Phenomenon),” Ayaka 3(2), June 2012, http://www.ayakaonline.com/politics/poverty-and-politics-at-the-bottom-of-terror-part-1-%E2%80%93-the-maitatsine-phenomenon/

3. Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, Rochester, 1998, p.141.

4. The dates of Marwa’s various convictions and the duration of his sentences are a matter of some dispute in the literature concerning him and is likely due to inconsistent record-keeping.

5. Michael Watts, “Black Gold, White Heat: State violence, local resistance and the national question in Nigeria,” in: Michael Keith and Steven Pile (eds.), Geographies of Resistance, London, 1997, p.47.

6. J.S. Hogendorn and Paul E. Lovejoy, “Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Early Colonial Rule in Northern Nigeria and Niger,” African Studies Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute of the University of the Witwatersrand, May 1979, pp.26-27.

7. Niels Kastfelt, “Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria,” African Affairs 83(350), 1989, p. 83.

8. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Africa: Evidence and Analysis, World Bank Publications, 2005, p.103.

9. Falola, op cit, p.146.

10. Rosalind I.J. Hackett, “Exploring Theories of Religious Violence: Nigeria’s ‘Maitatsine’ Phenomenon,” in: Timothy Light and Brian C. Wilson (eds.), Religion as a Human Capacity: A Festschrift in Honor of E. Thomas Lawson, Leiden, 2004, p.197.

11. Falola, op cit, p.143.

12. Ibid, p.154.

13. Allan Pred and Michael John Watts, Reworking Modernity: Capitalisms and Symbolic Discontent, Rutgers, 1992, p.24.

14. Watts, op cit, p.55.

15. Elizabeth Isichei,“The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited,” Journal of Religion in Africa 17(3), October 1987, pp.76-78.

16. Hackett, op cit, pp.199-200.

17. Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Islam in Nigeria, Zaria, 1984, p.299.

This article was first published in the June 29, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor

Intervening in Mali: West African Nations Plan Offensive against Islamists and Tuareg Rebels

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Andrew McGregor

June 28, 2012

As Tuareg rebels battle radical Islamists with heavy weapons for control of the northern Mali city of Gao, Mali and the other 15 nations of the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) are planning a military offensive designed to drive both groups out of northern Mali in an effort to re-impose order in the region and prevent the six-month old conflict from destabilizing the entire region. So far, however, operational planning has not been detailed enough to gain the approval of the UN Security Council for authorization of a Chapter Seven military intervention, leaving ECOWAS and the African Union with the option of delaying the campaign or proceeding without UN approval.

An ECOWAS Intervention Force

ECOWAS maintains that a military intervention would be a last resort if talks hosted by the ECOWAS-appointed mediator (Burkino Faso President Blaise Compaore) should fail, but with negotiations in Ouagadougou going nowhere and divisions between the formerly allied rebel groups erupting into open conflict in northern Mali, there will be inevitable pressure to step up preparations for a military intervention. One obstacle to deployment so far has been the absence of a formal invitation from Malian authorities, though there has been discussion within ECOWAS of launching a military intervention without Mali’s consent (PANA Online [Dakar], June 9; Le Combat [Bamako], June 20).

MNLA Fighters in Northern Mali

ECOWAS has explicitly rejected the rebels’ “so-called declaration of independence” and has stated that it will “never compromise on the territorial integrity of Mali” (PANA Online [Dakar], May 30). Though the Islamists have agreed to talks, the mediators in Ouagadougou have insisted the largely Tuareg Islamist Ansar al-Din movement of Iyad ag Ghali sever all ties with al-Qaeda before talks can proceed, a move that seems most unlikely at this point (AFP, June 18; for a profile of Ag Ghali, see Militant Leadership Monitor, February 2012). Ansar al-Din spokesman Sena Ould Boumama has warned that his movement “will fight ECOWAS if it engages us in northern Mali” (al-Akhbar [Timbuktu], n.d., via Le Politicien [Bamako], June 7).

Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger and Nigeria are all expected to contribute troops to the mission if it receives authorization. Mauritania, which has conducted cross-border counter-terrorist operations in Mali in the past but is not a member of ECOWAS, has only expressed its “availability to join common efforts” to resolve the crisis (AFP, June 4). The ECOWAS intervention, which is projected to consist of 3,270 men, will have to stabilize southern Mali before it can effectively restore control of the north to the Bamako government.

Algeria, with a capability for desert operations and a powerful military with decades of combat experience, has been urged by some Western and regional nations to take a leading role in any intervention, but appears reluctant to provide ground forces. Algeria’s participation is widely viewed as key to the success of any military intervention. Earlier this month, Algerian intelligence chief General Muhammad “Toufik” Mediène described a potential Algerian role consisting of intelligence provision and airlifts of necessary materiel from Tamanrasset and Reggane (Jeune Afrique, June 14). Algeria’s main condition for participation will likely be the complete absence of Western troops from the campaign, particularly French forces.

Niger’s president Mahamadou Issoufou is a strong supporter of the intervention and claims to have information regarding the presence of Afghan and Pakistani instructors working with the Islamists in northern Mali, but has not shared the details publically (France 24, June 7. With a large and often restless Tuareg minority in northern Niger, Issoufou has much to lose by allowing the creation of an independent state in northern Mali. The Niger Foreign Minister has stated that “the military option is the only one” for Mali (Le Politicien [Bamako], June 7).

The Government in Bamako

In post-coup Bamako, the lack of political leadership remains a major stumbling block to resolving the crisis. Dissatisfaction is growing in many quarters with the prevarications of Transitional Government Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra and his continued opposition to a foreign military intervention (22 Septembre [Bamako], June 19). Mali’s 70-year-old transitional president, Dioncounda Traoré, was attacked by pro-coup demonstrators in Bamako on May 22, enduring injuries that forced his evacuation to a Paris hospital (AFP, June 5). Complicating matters is the continued presence of coup-leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, despite the ECOWAS-ordered dissolution of Sanogo’s Comité National pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l’Etat (CNRDRE) on June 7.

In return for ending his destructive putsch and agreeing to step aside for a transitional government, Sanogo has been rewarded with official former head-of-state status, a generous monthly allowance, a prominent residence and two vehicles. This decision came despite the opposition of ECOWAS, which wanted to return Sanago to a subordinate position in the military (L’Indépendant [Bamako], May 23; Le Combat [Bamako], June 12). The 39-year-old American-trained Sanogo is reported to rarely leave his well-guarded residence inside the Kati military base outside of Bamako. In a recent interview, Sanogo insisted that if the Army were given the means, it “would recover the north in a few days” (Jeune Afrique, June 9). Members of the CNRDRE, including Sanogo, continue to wield influence by having formed the Comité militaire de suivi de la réforme des forces de défense et de sécurité (CMSRFDS) on June 12 to absorb the CNRDRE, though the new committee will allegedly act in only an advisory role (Le Pays [Ouagadougou],  June 14; L’indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], June 18).

Supporters and opponents of the March military coup have organized themselves into two fronts: the pro-putsch Coordination of the Patriotic Organizations of Mali (COPAM) and the anti-putsch Front for Safeguarding Democracy and Republic (FDR), though in a positive sign, the two groups have been meeting for discussions of Mali’s political future (Le Republicain [Bamako], June 18). COPAM took advantage of the attack on Dioncounda Traoré to hold a convention to advance the name of Captain Sanogo as the new transitional president, which only created further suspicion as to the motives and identity of those behind the attack on the transitional president (L’Indépendant [Bamako], May 23, May 25; Le Combat [Bamako], June 2; Info Matin [Bamako], June 7). Since then, several leaders of COPAM have been jailed while others appear to have left the country. Nonetheless, a pro-Sanogo radio station, Raio Kayira, urges opposition to ECOWAS “meddling” in Malian affairs and hosts regular calls for the death of Dioncounda Traoré and former members of the government (Jeune Afrique, May 30).

Clashes between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din

On May 26, Ansar al-Din and the secular Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) announced their merger as the Transitional Council of the Islamic State of Azawad (L’Essor [Bamako], May 30). However, by June 1, the MNLA had issued a new document declaring all provisions of the May 26 merger agreement “null and void” (AFP, June 1). Mossa ag Attaher, a MNLA spokesman, admitted that the group had made a mistake in drafting the agreement: “[We] accepted the idea of an Islamic State but it should have been written that we will practice a moderate and tolerant Islam, with no mention of Shari’a” (AFP, June 1).

A June 8 statement from Ansar al-Din expressed the movement’s disappointment with the MNLA’s withdrawal from the Gao Agreement, but stated the movement would continue alone if necessary: “Unfortunately we were surprised with the Nouakchott statement issued by the Political Bureau of the movement which stated its clear refusal of the project of the Islamic state… therefore the Jama’at Ansar Al-Din declares and ensures to the sons of its Islamic ummah [community] its adherence to the Islamic project.”[1] Clashes between the two movements were reported the same day in Kidal, resulting in the city being roughly divided between the two armed groups (AFP, June 8).

Though the short-lived agreement spoke of an “independent Azawad” nation, Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali has since returned to his opposition to the establishment of a new state: “We are not asking for much: just the application of Shari’a law in the northern and southern regions. We are Malians and we are against the division of Mali… Anyone who does not lead the fight under our flag is our enemy and will be fought. Secularism is disbelief. Whoever is for a secular state is our enemy and will fought by all means” (Reuters, June 16).

While the MNLA were willing to agree to an Islamic State, their conception of a moderate and tolerant Islamic base quickly proved at odds with the Islamists of Ansar al-Din and the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) splinter group, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), whose eagerness to begin lashing people for trivial offenses threatens to dissipate even the small popular support they may have enjoyed several months ago.  Their numerous prohibitions and severe punishments have defied even the advice of the AQIM Amir, Abu MusabAbdul Wadud (a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel), who used a May 23 audiotape release to warn the Islamists: “It is a mistake to impose all the rules of Islam at once on people overnight… So, for example, shutting down places of drugs, liquors and immoralities is something that they can seek to do now without delay, but the implementation of the just punishment is the responsibility of the Shari’a legislators and should come gradually” (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], May 23).

Face-to-face negotiations between Iyad ag Ghali and MNLA leader Muhammad ag Najim in Gao have had little success, as the gulf between the freedom and independence sought by the Tuareg of the MNLA and the strictly regulated future offered by the Salafists of Ansar al-Din is too great (Le Republicain [Bamako], May 30). Ag Ghali, who is reported to now speak only Arabic and wishes to be known by the Arabic name of Abu Fadil, is insistent on giving space to AQIM in the new state of Azawad, a breaking point in negotiations with the MNLA (Jeune Afrique, June 9).

Prior to the current fighting in Gao, a major clash between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din occurred in Timbuktu on June 13. Other confrontations have been reported in northern towns where residents have demonstrated in favor of the MNLA and against the Islamists (L’Essor [Bamako], June 19; AFP, June 13). The Malian government is also preparing a file for submission to the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning the slaughter of disarmed prisoners at Aguelhok in late January,an action claimed by Ansar al-Din during a joint operation with the MNLA(Le Combat [Bamako], June 12). In its public statements and attitudes, it is clear the MNLA is now trying to distance itself from the Islamist factions, particularly with possible ICC prosecutions looming if ECOWAS is successful in retaking northern Mali (Info Matin [Bamako], June 12).

Dissension in the North

There are many indications that those northern Malians who have not fled the country outright have already tired of Islamist rule. By some reports, the situation in Gao (co-administered by the MNLA) is becoming critical, with a lack of food, water, electricity and currency (L’Essor [Bamako], May 23). In Kidal, youth and women tired of Ansar al-Din’s social restrictions gathered to display their opposition to the movement with slogans, public smoking in defiance of the ban on tobacco use, and stone-throwing by the women, who removed their Islamist-decreed veils after Ansar al-Din elements retreated in damaged vehicles (Le Republicain [Bamako], June 7; Le Combat [Bamako], June 7).

In the town of Bourem, MUJWA outraged local residents by opening three prisons for those “caught doing sin,” one for men, one for women and one for children. In Douentza (Mopti Region), the power supply has been shut down for lack of fuel and MNLA fighters are reported to be looting local homes (L’Essor, June 12, June 19).  In the town of Goundam, two-thirds of the population of 12,000 has left, while the remaining young men often have verbal confrontations with the rebels that result in their arrest (L’Essor [Bamako], June 7).

The Malian Army

Since 1991, the Malian military has suffered from underfunding, nepotism, corruption, under training, poor pay and a failure to maintain its aircraft and armor. Chronic demoralization is the result of purges of the officer corps, attempts to integrate former Tuareg rebels with loyalist troops and being required to operate in unfamiliar desert terrain with a lack of intelligence, equipment or ammunition (Jeune Afrique, June 17). Malian troops suffered greatly in the northern campaign earlier this year from an almost total lack of air support from the much-decayed Malian air assets.

On a recent visit to the Amadoui Cheickou Tall military base, Malian Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra told government troops: “If God gives me the time and strength to liberate the country, I promise that my government will not spare any effort to create a strong, modern, efficient and effective army, an army that frightens, an army that brings peace” (L’Essor [Bamako], June 5). Where the money will come from to support a revival of the military is uncertain; the economic disaster that followed the coup d’état has resulted in the state budget being reduced from FCFA 1400 billion to FCFA 870 billion (Le Combat [Bamako], June 4). Even the removal of ECOWAS sanctions has failed to renew capital flows into Mali until the army returns to its barracks and a new, elected government is formed.

Colonel Ould Meydou

Malian fortunes in the north will rest in the hands of three senior officers known for their fighting skills and distaste for barracks life: Colonel al-Hajj Gamou, a Tuareg, Colonel Ould Meydou, anArab, and Colonel Didier Dakuo, a southerner. Gamou and Meydou met with Algerian authorities last month regarding future operations in northern Mali (AFP, May 24). Colonel Meydou narrowly escaped the military revolt at the Kati military base that started the coup and took refuge in Mauritania, where he says he is prepared to return to the field with 1,000 men of the Arab militia he commands (Jeune Afrique, June 17). 

Using deceit, Colonel Ag Gamou was able to escape from northern Mali into Niger with his command intact when the rest of the Malian Army collapsed. Though presently disarmed, some 600 pro-state Tuareg fighters under his command are awaiting redeployment into northern Mali at a military base near Niamey (Independent [London], May 10; L’Indépendant [Bamako], June 18).

In addition to the desert-fighting skills of these militias, roughly 2,000 regulars with ten armored vehicles under Colonel Dakuo are available in the Mopti Region town of Sévaré, close to the southernmost area occupied by the rebels. For now, this total group of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 men represents all the forces the Malian Army can count on. They will face rebels equipped with superior Libyan arms supplemented by vast stocks of military materiel seized from the Malian Army earlier this year. Nearly all the Army’s Russian-made assault tanks have been destroyed or disabled.

Mali’s military will be handicapped in their re-conquest of the north by the absence of its elite unit, the “Red Beret” parachute commando regiment of some 600 men under the command of Colonel Abidine Guindo. The regiment, which doubled as the presidential guard, was officially disbanded by the putschists after it remained loyal to ex-President Amadou Toumani Touré and succeeded in spiriting Touré out of the country before he could be arrested. A failed counter-coup led by the “Red Berets” on April 30 complicated matters further, with members of the regiment now being put on trial for opposing the new government.

The Role of Militias

The Arabs of northern Mali have largely remained loyal to the concept of a secular and unified Malian state and have no wish to come under Tuareg rule, whether secular or Islamist. An armed branch of the Arab opposition, the Front national de libération de l’Azawad (FNLA, also known as al-Jabhah al-Arabiya, “the Arab Front”), has vowed to wage war “for the liberation of Timbuktu and the independence of our territory,” while maintaining a secular, non-secessionist and non-Islamist identity (AFP, June 5; L’Essor [Bamako], June 7).

Another group is the Front de libération du Nord-Mali (FLNM – National Front for the Liberation of Northern Mali), formed on May 28 as an umbrella group for the largely Black African Songhai and Peul/Fulani Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso militias, which have a strong anti-Arab and anti-Tuareg character (Le Republicain [Bamako], May 30; for the Ganda Koy, Ganda Iso and other Malian militias, see Terrorism Monitor, April 20). The militias, which have a notorious reputation for violence against civilians, say that the peace talks in Burkina Faso do not concern them as negotiations should follow military action (VOA, June 26).

A Timbuktu militia allegedly formed from the Songhai and Tuareg ethnic groups has vowed to expel the Islamists from that city. According to Hamidou Maiga, a former officer in the Malian Army, the Mouvement patriotique de résistance pour la libération de Tombouctou (MPRLT) “will engage in military action against the invaders until they leave” (AFP, June 7).

Retaking Northern Mali

Malian military sources have indicated a plan to retake the north would begin with the liberation of Douentza in Mopti region. Military operations are projected to employ irregular but unreliable units such as the Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy militias (Le Politicien [Bamako], June 7). A drive from the south could be accompanied by the reinsertion of Colonel Ag Gamou’s Tuareg militia from the southeastern border with Niger. The number of rebels is uncertain, but the MNLA claims to have 10,000 men under its command, while the Ansar al-Din is estimated to have 500 and MUJWA to have some 300. Driving these groups out of the cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu might require challenging urban warfare, but dealing with a guerrilla campaign in the desert wilderness could prove even more difficult.

Washington and Paris would undoubtedly be called on to provide intelligence (particularly aerial surveillance), logistical support and financial support. If Algeria prevents the use of American or French special forces for gathering operational intelligence on the ground, it might deploy its own Groupe d’Intervention Spécial (GIS) for this purpose.

The deployment of air assets, whatever their source, will be complicated by the possible rebel possession of anti-aircraft weapons from Libya’s armories. Such weapons appear to have been used by Ansar al-Din on June 15 against two unmarked planes (likely American surveillance aircraft) flying over Timbuktu (AFP, June 17).

Conclusion

While both Ansar al-Din and the MNLA are engaged in talks in Burkina Faso, it is safe to say that time is running out for a negotiated solution. The crisis in Mali and the outflow of refugees is destabilizing the entire region. There is also no desire either regionally or internationally to allow the further entrenchment of terrorist groups in the area such as AQIM or MUJWA, neither of which are involved in negotiations or any other effort to restore order to northern Mali. However, the opposition of Algeria to the involvement of Western militaries (on the ground at least) and a general Western reluctance to become heavily involved in such efforts after the Libyan debacle will ultimately leave such efforts in the hands of ECOWAS. However, this organization can deploy only a limited number of troops from a handful of countries with a limited history of cooperation in the field.  The use of different languages, arms and communications systems will not enhance the efficiency of a West African intervention force, and the absence of accurate intelligence could prove fatal in a confrontation with experienced, determined and well-armed rebels on their home turf. Without substantial cooperation and support from Algeria or Western militaries, the small composite force of roughly 3,300 men envisaged by ECOWAS may experience many of the same setbacks experienced by the shattered Malian military earlier this year. While growing divisions amongst the Malian rebels may seem to present an opportune time for intervention, any military defeat suffered as the result of an over-hasty deployment could rock the political foundations of West African nations such as Nigeria that are enduring bloody insurgencies of their own.

Note

1. Sanda Ould Bouamama, Spokesman of Jama’at Ansar al-Din, “Statement from Jamaat Ansar Al-Din about the MNLA repealing of the Gao agreement,” Timbuktu, June 8, 2012.

This article first appeared in the June 28, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

The Mysterious Death in Custody of Boko Haram Leader Habib Bama

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Andrew McGregor

June 28, 2012

Habib Bama, who is alleged to have directed numerous bombings in north and central Nigeria,was arrested in the Yobe State town of Damaturu in the early hours of June 21 by members of the Joint Task Force (JTF), an elite Nigerian counterterrorist unit. According to the JTF’s Yobe State commander, Colonel Dahiru Abdulsalam, Bama was picked up while trying to escape after JTF agents were tipped off by local residents (Guardian Nigeria, June 22). According to the Nigerian State Security Service (SSS), Habib Bama (a.k.a. Shuabu Bama, Habib Mamman) is a Kanuri from Borno State and a former private in the Nigerian Army before his dismissal. (Vanguard [Lagos], February 15). The arrest concluded a manhunt for Bama that began on February 15. Before his death in custody, Bama was reported to be providing useful information to JTF interrogators, who said they were “still extracting words from him,” but might move him to Abuja if his condition improved (The Nation [Lagos], June 22; Leadership [Abuja], June 22).

Habib Bama

Nigerian security sources have cited Habib Bama as playing a leading role in a number of especially bloody attacks:

  • Mogadishu Barracks Mammy Market, Abuja – December 31, 2010 (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, January 6, 2011).
  • Suicide bombing of Police Headquarters in Abuja – June 16, 2011 (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, June 23, 2011).
  • Suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja – August 26, 2011.
  • Car bomb attack on St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State – December 25, 2011.

Various accounts have circulated regarding the manner of Bama’s arrest. One version maintains that the JTF stormed his base in Damaturu on June 21 and engaged Bama and his aides in a gun battle in which Bama was fatally wounded (Daily Trust [Lagos], June 22). Another account suggests that Bama was shopping for food in the market when he was identified by a former army colleague on patrol with his unit. Bama reportedly tried to grab one of the soldier’s weapons but was shot in the leg before four soldiers overpowered him. Two young men who were with Bama reportedly escaped in the confusion (The Nation, June 22). A day later it was reported that the two young men (by now “armed to the teeth”) had been arrested along with Bama and were undergoing interrogation, where they had made “some useful statements” according to the JTF (The Nation, June 23). .

According to another JTF source, Bama was shot in the market “to incapacitate him,” as JTF men were unsure if he and his companions were armed. The latter ran away, while Bama was “given the best of medical treatment to save his life” but died despite the efforts of doctors, though not before “providing some leads for the JTF” (The Nation, June 23).

A further JTF source added that “security agencies were able to interrogate him even while in pain and he was able to respond to some questions… It was unfortunate that Bama died of gunshots. We had planned to fly him to Abuja for the best treatment, but he could not just make it” (The Nation, June 23).

Gunshot wounds to the leg are rarely fatal if medical treatment is received in a timely fashion, making Bama’s subsequent death in JTF custody somewhat unusual. However, a source from the SSS was quoted as saying that “a deliberate decision” was made to deny Bama medical care, a decision made in light of recent difficulties encountered in obtaining convictions for alleged Boko Haram militants in Nigerian courts due to the reluctance of witnesses to testify against the movement (SaharaReporters.com [Lagos], June 22).

This article first appeared in the June 28, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Is Russia Sending a Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet to Syria?

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Andrew McGregor

June 28, 2012

Despite a recent flurry of contradictory reports, it appears that a detachment composed of ships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet and possibly the Baltic Fleet is preparing for deployment to the Russian naval port at Tartus, Syria. The date for their departure has not been finalized and appears to be dependent on developments in the Syrian insurgency, but the ships are reported to be ready to leave on four hours’ notice (Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, June 20). Preparations appeared to intensify following an unannounced visit to Moscow on June 14 by the Syrian Defense Minister, Brigadier Dawud Rajihah (al-Quds al-Arabi, June 19).

The Russian Defense Ministry had earlier described American reports that the large amphibious warfare ship (LAWS) Kaliningrad of the Baltic Fleet was being sent to Syria as “disinformation… aimed at further escalating the situation in Syria…” adding that “the only true piece of information in these reports is that the LAWS Kaliningrad is indeed part of the Baltic Fleet” (RIA Novosti, June 19). Nevertheless, a source in the Russian Navy headquarters told Interfax-AVN the same day that the Kaliningrad would depart for Tartus “in a few days” (Interfax-AVN, June 19). The Russian Defense Ministry had also denied reports carried by American media sources to the effect that Russian ships had already departed for Syria by June 15 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, June 18). Pentagon reports that U.S. satellite imagery revealed the BDK (Bolshoy Desantny Korabl – large amphibious landing ship) Nikolay Filchenkov was heading for Tartus earlier this month appear to have been incorrect, at least so far as timing is concerned. Loaded with military hardware, the ship left the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol (on lease to Russia) on June 21 bound for the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk rather than Tartus, but was due back in Sevastopol on June 25 (CNN, June 16; RIA-Novosti, June 21).

BDK Nikolay Filchenkov

Despite the denials, a Russian media source specializing in defense issues claimed its sources had confirmed that the large landing ships Nikolai Filchenkov and Tzar Kunikov and the SB-15 rescue tugboat of the Black Sea Fleet together with units of a Russian Marine brigade were prepared to leave for Tartus once the Nikolai Filchenkov returned to Sevastopol (Interfax-AVN, June 20; June 19). Aerial protection of the ships has been guaranteed by Major General Vladimir Gradusov, deputy commander of the Russian Air Force (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, June 19).

The Tartus facility was established in 1971 at a time when the Soviet Union had similar facilities in the Syrian port of Latakia and the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Mersa Matruh. Today, only the facility at Tartus remains. Officially, Russia does not call the Tartus a naval base, but rather a “Navy Sustainment Center” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 19). Under the official name of the Russian Federation Navy 720th Logistic-Support Station, the strategically important Tartus facility provides repair, refueling and re-provisioning services for Russian naval vessels operating in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Following a dredging program that began in 2009, the floating maintenance station (the PM-138), floating docks and workshops at Tartus can handle even the Russian Fleet’s largest ships, such as the Soviet-era aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, which visited Tartus in January. [1] The station is leased from Syria at a cost of $2 million per year, with payments made in both cash and arms (Komsomolskaya Pravda Online, June 15). Tartus is also said to act as the receiving port for Russian arms shipments, like that allegedly delivered by the MV Professor Katsman in sealed containers on May 26 (Interfax, June 4).

If Moscow remains committed to its opposition to foreign military intervention in the Syrian crisis, any Russian military mission would likely be limited to a primary task of evacuating Russian citizens and personnel, with the option of a secondary task of defending Russian installations at Tartus. The floating PM-138 can actually be moved offshore if threatened.

The Kaliningrad

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has estimated there are approximately 100,000 Russian citizens in Syria, many with Syrian wives and families (Vedomosti Online, June 22). With such numbers, it is certain that a naval evacuation would prioritize diplomatic and military personnel in its calculations. The number of Russian stationed at the Tartus naval facility is estimated at no more than 100 (Vedomosti Online, June 22).

Though a website sympathetic to the Syrian insurrection had announced the Free Syrian Army (FSA – the main armed opposition group) intended to attack Tartus and had already infiltrated troops for this purpose, the FSA’s Colonel Malik al-Kurdi described such speculation as “irresponsible talk” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 18).

Units of Russia’s Naval Infantry (Morskoy Pekhoty – colloquially known as “Marines”) under the command of Hero of Russia Colonel Vladimir Belyavskiy are reported to be ready to board all three Baltic Fleet ships on the receipt of orders (Interfax-AVN, June 19).  Colonel Belyavskiy received his award for commanding Russian Marines of the Black Sea Fleet in a desperate engagement with Chechen mujahidin at the Tezen-Kale Gorge in February, 1995. [2]

The Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the missile cruiser Moskva, was scheduled to visit Tartus earlier this month, but its voyage was cancelled for reasons apparently related to the Syrian crisis (Interfax-AVN, May 23). The Soviet-era destroyer Smetlivy, which was to be relieved by the Moskva, was instead ordered to extend its cruise in the Mediterranean (Interfax, May 18). A Black Sea Fleet spokesman reported that security for the Smetlivy was provided in Tartus by a counterterrorism unit of Russian marines (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, June 19).

While a unilateral intervention by Russia in Syria appears to be out of the question for now, the possibility of Russian participation in a UN-authorized multinational force remains open. There is also speculation that a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO – a military alliance of seven former Soviet states, including Russia) might have a role in Syria. Various elite Russian military formations are reported to be receiving training for such an eventuality, including the 15th Combined Arms Brigade in Samara and the Pskov 75th Air Assault Division, which has previous experience with peacekeeping in Kosovo and in combat operations in Chechnya and Georgia. Also mentioned as likely participants in such a force are the Chechen Vostok and Zapad battalions of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which participated in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and more active operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, June 15). [3]

The view of Tartus as strategically vital to Russia’s defense is not unanimous, however. A new report from the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (described as having close ties to the Russian defense community) downplayed the strategic importance of the Syrian naval facility, suggesting that Tartus was “more of a symbolic rather than practical value to the Russian navy,” whose loss “would have no significant effect on Russia’s naval capabilities” (Financial Times, June 26).

Notes

1. The Russian designation for ships of this type is Tyazholyy avianesushchiy raketnyy kreyser, “heavy aircraft-carrying missile cruiser.” 

2. See http://rusnavy.com/history/branches/bv/belyavskiy.htm.

3. For Vostok and Zapad activities outside Chechnya, see Andrew McGregor, “Chechen Troops Accompany Russian Soldiers in Lebanon,” Chechnya Weekly, October 26, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=416&issue_id=3902&article_id=2371588, and “Peacekeepers or Provocateurs? Kremlin-Backed Chechen Troops Raise Tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” North Caucasus Weekly, December 6, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/article.php?articleid=2373839.

This article first appeared in the June 28, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Fatwa Wars Continue as Saudi Cleric Bans Jihad in Syria

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Andrew McGregor

Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2012

As both clashes with rebels and punitive violence increase in intensity within Syria, there have been numerous accounts of foreign jihadis entering Syria to exploit the struggle in furtherance of global Salafist-Jihadi objectives. However, such efforts encountered resistance last week from the official Saudi religious establishment. Shaykh Ali Abbas al-Hikmi, a member of the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars, issued a fatwa (religious ruling) on June 7 forbidding Muslims from initiating or participating in a Syrian jihad. While acknowledging that Syrians were “facing injustice, persecution and the force of an arrogant and haughty regime,” al-Hikmi made it clear that the decision to launch a jihad could only be made “under the authority of the guardian” (i.e. responsible authorities) in harmony with a nation’s foreign policy: “Everything is linked to a system and to the country’s policies and no person should be allowed to disobey the guardian and call for jihad” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 7; al-Akhbar, June 7). The senior cleric’s decision appears to have been spurred by growing calls on Saudi social media for individuals to travel to Syria to partake in a jihad against the Assad regime (al-Shorfa, June 7).

SyriaSimilar anti-jihad fatwas have had little impact in the past, as Salafist-Jihadis tend to regard members of the Saudi religious establishment as compromised scholars and respect only those rulings issued by scholars sympathetic to their movement and its aims. Most relevant to those Salafi-Jihadis entering Syria are the three fatwas regarding the status of the Alawite community (to which the Assad clan and many of Syria’s ruling class belong) issued by Shaykh Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), the intellectual hero of the Salafi-Jihadist movement. Issued while Muslim Mamluk rule of Syria was threatened by Mongol invasion, these fatwas collectively describe the Alawis as “deceptive unbelievers” whose rejection of Islam is greater than that of the Jews and Christians: “Their religion externally is [Shi’ism] but internally it is pure unbelief.” [1]

The Alawi community has been the subject of more favorable fatwas in the past, though these are unlikely to influence the Salafi-Jihadists. A fatwa issued by Grand Mufti of Jerusalem al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (best remembered now for his pro-Nazi sympathies) recognized the Alawis as Muslims and played a large role in their acceptance into the Islamic community of the region. [2] Musa Sadr, the influential Iranian-born founder of the Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (AMAL – Lebanese Resistance Detachments), issued an important fatwa in 1974 affirming that Alawis were members of the Twelver Shi’a community (the dominant Shi’a faction in both Iran and southern Lebanon) before he and two companions disappeared during a 1978 visit to Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s Tripoli. [3]

The Saudi government has been generally supportive of the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA) and would like to see foreign support directed to that group rather than encourage another round of radicalization of young Saudis in militant jihadi organizations, as happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. This position was supported by another member of the Council of Senior Scholars, Shaykh Abdullah al-Mutlaq, who emphasized that it is the FSA that is “in charge of fighting and jihad in Syria and should be supported” (al-Akhbar/AFP, June 7). However, the Saudi position has been characterized elsewhere in the Arab world as too close to the stance of the United States – typical of these characterizations was the recent suggestion by an Israeli-based Arab daily that the Saudis and the Arab League were trying “to victimize Syria and sacrifice it on the shrine of colonialism. We don’t know which Arab country is going to be next” (Ma’a al-Hadath [Tamra], June 8). On February 26, popular Saudi scholar Dr. A’id al-Qarni used a television broadcast to issue a fatwa calling for the death of Bashar al-Assad, whom he described as a heretic who had lost his legitimacy as a ruler and “a murderer who killed hundreds of children and destroyed mosques instead of protecting the Golan Heights.” [4]

Syrian authorities have in the past gone out of their way to mock the fatwas of the Saudi religious scholars as both backwards and dangerous. On April 5, Syria’s permanent representative to the United Nations Dr. Bashar Ja’afari told a press gathering:

I have good news for you. The Saudi Mufti… has issued a fatwa saying young people now have the right to enter the malls and supermarkets… Could you believe it? We are on April the 5th, 2012, and the Saudi Imam is still thinking about whether the young people should have access to the malls or not. The second good news, another fatwa from the same Imam, saying that women could attend football matches but in separate places, and they should not raise their voices when they get excited by the game, and they should abstain from attracting the attention of the males… The third good news… the same Imam said that all churches in the Gulf area should be destroyed and that a Christian or a Jew should not have the right to be buried in the area of the Gulf States. We are April the 5th, 2012, and we still hear such ridiculous and provocative statements coming from Saudi Arabia on behalf of people who call themselves the Custodians of the Holy Shrines. [5]

Official Syrian media has also suggested that the recent Saudi fatwa calling for a ban on new Christian churches in the Arabian Peninsula and the demolition of existing churches “could also give a boost to the armed Islamists within Syria, who already persecute, kidnap, torture and kill Syrian Christians” (Syria News, March 24).

Last February, 107 prominent Islamic scholars signed a statement denouncing the Syrian regime with the following rulings and calls for action:

• Members of the Syrian security forces are forbidden to kill citizens or discharge weapons in their direction. It is their duty to desert and disobey orders, “even if that means being killed.”
• Members of the regular army and security forces should join the Free Syrian Army to protect civilians, cities and public institutions.
• It is a duty for all Muslims to support the revolutionaries in Syria “so that they can successfully complete their revolution and attain their rights and their freedom.”
• Arab states must take a firm stand against those members of the international community, such as Russia and China, which continue to support the Syrian regime.
• In a gesture of magnanimity towards the Alawi community and a warning to Islamist radicals, the scholars said it was essential to “protect the ethnic and religious minorities which have lived for more than a thousand years as part of the Syrian people,” noting that only the regime bears responsibility for its crimes, “and not the minorities they may belong to.”

Among the signatories were Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Qatar, Shaykh Ali Guma’a (Chief Mufti of Egypt), Shaykh Rashid Ghanouchi of Tunisia, and Shaykh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani of Yemen. [6] Al-Qaradawi, a highly-influential Doha-based member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, recently condemned the pattern of hereditary succession intended or achieved in Arab republics such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Syria before predicting the “downfall and annihilation” of Bashar al-Assad (Gulf Times Online [Doha], June 9).

Notes:

1. See Yvette Talhamy, “The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis of Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies 46(2), 2010, pp. 175-194; Nibras Kazimi, Syria through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy, Washington, 2010.
2. For the full broadcast, see Al-Arabiya, February 25, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAx4H0RCnCE. For al-Qarni, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, December 1, 2011.
3. For new light on this case, see Terrorism Monitor Briefs, September 22, 2011.
4. See Paulo Boneschi, “Une fatwà du Grande Mufti de Jérusalem Muhammad Amin al-Husayni sur les Alawites,” Revue de l’histoire des religions 122(1), July-August 1940, pp. 42-54.
5. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33_SqXvmoFs
6. For the full text, see http://www.islam21c.com/editorials/2407-fatwa-on-syria-by-107-scholars.