Former Militants of Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiya Struggle for Political Success

Posted on September 27, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 27, 2012

For decades one of Egypt’s most violent extremist groups, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (GI) is currently engaged in a struggle to establish itself as an Islamist political party in post-revolutionary Egypt. Though traditionally a Salafist-Jihadi movement, GI has not established close relations with al-Nur, the largest of Egypt’s Salafist political parties. Nor is it close to the Muslim Brotherhood, which recently ignored the movement in the distribution of senior government posts.

Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya Spokesman Assem Abd al-Maged

On September 17, a GI spokesman announced that the movement had formed “al-Ansar,” a new movement drawing on young people of various Islamist trends to protect the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad by producing films about Christianity and Judaism and starting a publishing house and satellite channel to support this effort (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], September 17).

While the movement continues to work on its conversion to a political party, it appears not to have abandoned its commitment to jihad, at least beyond Egypt’s borders. GI spokesman Assem Abd al-Maged has stated that GI members were travelling to Syria to join the anti-Assad revolt and that three Egyptians affiliated to the movement were recently killed in battle in Syria. A spokesman for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) confirmed the participation of Egyptians in the armed opposition but noted that these fighters had not revealed their political affiliations (Anadolu Ajansi [Ankara], September 8; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], August 26; September 9). The GI has also attempted to insert itself into the security crisis in the Sinai by sending a delegation to meet with tribal and religious leaders in the region in early September (Al-Ahram Weekly, August 30 – September 5).

The GI is taking a hard stand on Egyptian-American relations, having urged Egyptian president Muhammad Mursi to cancel his September 23 visit to the United States to address the United Nations. Suggesting that the anti-Islamic film The Innocence of Muslims was made under “American auspices,” GI spokesman Assem Abd al-Maged argued that Egypt did not need to worry about U.S. cuts in aid to Egypt as such cuts were “not in [the United States’] interest, as they know we are the superpower in the region” (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], September 16).

According to an official with the GI’s political wing, the Building and Development Party, the movement is prepared to sever its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party following President Mursi’s failure to include GI members as presidential advisors, regional governors or members of the National Human Rights Council. The group was especially disturbed by its omission from the latter body, noting that the GI was “the faction persecuted most by the former regime, with 30,000 members having been arrested and 20 of them having died in prison due to torture and diseases” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 9; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], September 9). There has been some speculation in Egypt that the recent protests at the U.S. Embassy had less to do with anger over the anti-Muslim film than with an opportunity to embarrass the Mursi government after it failed to include the GI in the new government.

Though the Brothers may not be offering much in the way of political appointments, some veteran members of the GI are enjoying a bit of revisionary justice under the new regime. President Mursi pardoned 26 members of GI and its Islamic Jihad offshoot in July. Four members of GI who were sentenced to death in 1999 during Mubarak’s rule were released on September 5 pending a ruling in early November on their case. The four were among 43 Egyptians returned to Egypt through the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” program after being sentenced to death in absentia in the “Albanian Returnees” case of 1999 (Ahram Online, September 5; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], September 7). The GI members had been charged with attempting to overthrow the government, killing civilians and targeting Christians and the tourism industry.

One of those released, Ahmad Refa’i Taha (indicted in the United States for his role in the 1999 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa) has demanded an immediate pardon rather than wait for the November ruling, describing the case as “a huge insult to the revolution and revolutionaries…We are considered the first to fight the former regime, which nobody revolted against like us… We would like people to have shown some appreciation for those who opposed Mubarak and his regime” (al-Hayat, September 7).

Demands by the GI and other Islamist groups in Egypt and Libya for the release of former GI leader Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman from an American prison (where he is serving a life-term for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) have been supported by President Mursi, who has asked for the shaykh’s release on humanitarian grounds.
In the coming parliamentary elections, GI may seek to capitalize on growing rifts within al-Nur, the largest of the Salafist political parties (Ahram Online, September 25). According to GI leader Aboud al-Zomor, the movement will seek to form new alliances prior to the elections and is determined to increase the handful of seats won in last year’s contest (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], August 30). Aboud and his brother Tarek, both prominent GI leaders, were released from prison in March, 2011 after having been convicted in 1984 for their admitted roles in planning the assassination of former Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat. Aboud has since apologized, not for killing Sadat, but for creating the conditions that led to Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian 30-year rule.

This article first appeared in the September 27, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Kenyan Navy Softens Up Kismayo Prior to AMISOM Attack

Posted on September 13, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 13, 2012

Kenya’s navy continues to play an important role in the multi-national struggle against Somalia’s al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab movement by shelling the Shabaab-held port of Kismayo in southern Somalia. These operations come at a time when Kenya is making significant upgrades to its naval capacity through purchase or donation. These upgrades are intended to enhance Kenya’s ability to carry out anti-piracy and counter-terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean.

KNS Harambee II

Kismayo’s port operations and lucrative charcoal trade are the main source of revenue for al-Shabaab since it pulled out of Mogadishu last year. Other forces that have gathered around Kismayo in preparation for the final assault include Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM troops, Somali government forces and the local Ras Kamboni militia of Ahmad Muhammad Islam “Madobe,” which were expelled from Kismayo by al-Shabaab in 2009. British experts are reported to have played a facilitating role in planning sessions for the assault on Kismayo held in Nairobi and attended by Ugandan AMISOM commander Lieutenant General Andrew Gutti (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 4).

Since Kenya joined the campaign against al-Shabaab with Operation Linda Nchi in October, 2011, the Kenyan navy has participated in naval operations designed to restrict al-Shabaab supplies of arms and fuel, secure Kenyan waters from terrorist infiltrators and deter piracy (see Terrorism Monitor, November 11, 2011). While the Kenyan Army deployment in Somalia formally joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on June 11, the Kenyan Navy and Air Force (which has also carried out bombing operations over Kismayo) were not included in the agreement and thus do not come under the Ugandan-dominated AMISOM command structure.

Kenyan warships are now playing an important role degrading the defenses and military capacity of those al-Shabaab militants who have not seized the opportunity to join the civilian flight out of Kismayo. There are reports that al-Shabaab has attempted to stiffen its resistance by bringing in hundreds of reinforcements in armored vehicles (Jowhar.com [Mogadishu], September 7). Even if al-Shabaab is forced to make a strategic withdrawal from Kismayo, occupying AMISOM forces are almost certain to be met by improvised explosive devices, land-mines and ambushes by hidden militants (after the pattern of Mogadishu).

After reportedly being provoked by an al-Shabaab gunboat, a Kenyan navy ship fired ten rounds on Kismayo on September 3, while the port area and airport were shelled the next day (Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 5; VOA, September 4; BBC, September 4). Kenyan ships fired on what they believed to be a Kismayo arms cache on September 5, killing a reported seven Shabaab militants and destroying a stockpile of “technicals” [armored battle wagons], arms and munitions (RFI, September 6). Residents of the town said the attack began shortly after the militants had dragged the bodies of four Kenyan soldiers killed in the battle for Afmadow into the town square for public display (RFI, September 6). A Kenyan ship fired on a Shabaab anti-aircraft emplacement on September 11.

In the last few months Kenya has added two ships to its fleet that will significantly enhance its naval strength. In June, France donated the 1976 vintage patrol boat La Rieuse, one of ten ships of the P400 class used to patrol the waters of its overseas possessions. Equipped with a 40mm cannon, La Rieuse operated in the Indian Ocean from the French base at Réunion. Most of the P400 class are now being decommissioned, but La Rieuse (now renamed KNS Harambee II) was donated in the interests of helping Kenya carry out high seas security operations (Meretmarine.com, June 7; Defenceweb.com, June 10).

KNS Jasiri

Kenya has also finally taken possession of the 140-ton Jasiri, a Spanish-built oceanographic survey vessel that has been fitted with naval guns, missiles, machine-guns and radar and communications systems, making it the most powerful ship on the East African coast (Nairobi Star, August 30). The ship was supposed to be delivered in 2005, but the purchase became entangled in Kenya’s Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal. As a result, the ship sat without maintenance in a Spanish dock for seven years. A Kenyan delegation arrived to complete the deal in February but instead rejected the ship on the grounds that much of the equipment was outdated and no longer functioning. After an unsuccessful attempt to sell the ship to the Nigerian Navy, Kenya finally negotiated a deal with the Jasiri’s builders, Euromarine Industries (Nairobi Star, April 27).

Mombasa, the Kenyan Navy’s main port, was consumed by deadly street riots when the Jasiri arrived following the assassination of Muslim preacher Aboud Rogo Muhammad, a well-known supporter of al-Shabaab. A statement issued by al-Shabaab urged Kenyan Muslims to “take all necessary measures to protect their religion, their honor, their property and their lives from the enemies of Islam” (AFP, August 29).

Nonetheless, Kenyan Chief of Defense Forces, General Julius Karangi, warned that the arrival of the Jasiri had shifted the power equation on the East African coast: “Jasiri has capabilities and capacities that we did not have. If there are some people out there thinking they can come to our waters and worry us, let them know that things can get very tough for them” (Africa Review [Nairobi], August 31). The Navy has not yet announced whether the Jasiri will participate in the Kismayo operation, but its deployment there seems likely after trials are carried out.

This article first appeared in the September 13, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

South Sudan’s Yau Yau Rebellion Creating Insecurity in Jonglei State

Posted on September 13, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

September 13, 2012

Rebellions in remote regions of South Sudan continue to plague efforts to restore security in the new nation and further a disarmament process that is ironically being cited as one of the primary causes of the latest disturbance in South Sudan’s Jonglei State. The so-called Yau Yau Rebellion, named for its leader, failed politician David Yau Yau, has brought many youth belonging to South Sudan’s Murle tribe into direct conflict with troops of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the former rebel group that now forms the national army of South Sudan.

David Yau Yau

A former theology student, Yau Yau was defeated by a SPLM candidate in the April 2010 elections. Rather than accept defeat, Yau Yau gathered disaffected youth of the Jonglei-based Murle tribe and launched an attack on Pibor in May, 2010, killing several SPLA soldiers. He continued to mount ambushes on SPLA troops and South Sudan wildlife rangers until 2011, when he agreed to a ceasefire. [1] During his reintegration with the SPLM government, Yau Yau received the usual reward for rebels who have given up their struggle—a general’s rank in the SPLA, despite Yau Yau’s utter lack of military experience.

The SPLA reported in April that Yau Yau had fled to Khartoum, presumably to obtain aid for a new rebellion from the government of Omar al-Bashir, which has been engaged in a proxy war with the South for several years (Sudan Tribune, April 8). Yau Yau has since enjoyed some success in fighting on his own turf in Pibor County (south-west Jonglei State). On August 23, Yau Yau’s men were joined by armed civilians in killing as many as 40 SPLA soldiers looking for the rebel leader in the Lekuangole Payam district of Pibor (Miraya FM [Juba], August 27; Upper Nile Times, August 27 ). In the aftermath of the attack, the commander of the SPLA’s Division 8, Major General Botros Bol Bol, vowed that “Yau Yau will die like [George] Athor… they will not escape from our hands,” while Governor Manyang said the army had been instructed to teach the rebels “a lesson they will never forget” (Sudan Tribune, August 28). [2] That lesson was postponed when Yau Yau’s men attacked SPLA troops again on August 30 (Sudan Tribune, August 30).

SPLA troops involved in disarming the Murle (who fought in pro-government militias against the SPLA during the civil war) have been accused of committing numerous rapes and using various methods of torture and coercion to get Murle tribesmen to reveal where their weapons are hidden during the disarmament campaign, though an SPLA spokesman described such reports as “lies” (Sudan Tribune, August 27, August 30; BBC, May 25).

However, Jonglei governor Kuol Manyang played down the possibility the violence was connected to SPLA excesses in the disarmament process: “It is not revenge, it is a rebellion.” The governor suggested that human rights violations amongst the Murle could be the work of “individuals” amongst the 8,000 SPLA soldiers deployed in the Pibor region (Sudan Tribune, August 27). Manyang has stated that Khartoum is the sole source of arms for Yau Yau’s forces and claims that helicopters are hidden in the bush that are used to resupply the rebels (Sudan Radio Service, August 31; Sudan Times, August 30).

The Murle (Compass Media/Jeroen van Loon)

Most of the Murle live in the Upper Nile lowlands, though smaller groups live in the highlands of the Boma Plateau and across the border in southern Ethiopia, from whence they came in the 19^th century. Their pastoral lifestyle has often brought them into conflict with other pastoralists in South Sudan over scarce resources. There are also residual tensions from the civil war, in which many Murle fought against the SPLA in Major General Ismail Konyi’s pro-Khartoum Pibor Defense Forces (South Sudan News Agency, March 18). Cattle-raiding is endemic amongst the tribes of Jonglei State and has grown worse with the proliferation of automatic weapons during the civil war, but it is the Murle proclivity for abducting hundreds of children annually that has enraged their neighbors. The cause of the abductions appears to be widespread infertility amongst the Murle, which is commonly believed to be caused by an epidemic of syphilis, though very little serious research has been carried out to discover the precise reasons for the problem, which appears to be long-standing—some Nuer claim the abductions began in the 17^th century (Bor Globe, April 9; South Sudan News Agency, January 5).

In late December, 2011, a Nuer militia of over 6,000 men known as the Nuer White Army (NWA) launched “Operation Ending Murle Abductions” with the assistance of some 900 Twic-Dinka youth eager to end the pattern of Murle child-abductions and who were credited with providing the intelligence behind the successful rescue of 35 abductees. [3]

A NWA statement issued during the January campaign against the Murle offered a novel solution to the Murle infertility problem:

[The] Murle cannot increase their population by abducting Nuer, Anuak and Dinka’s children. If Murle’s women have fertility problem, the Nuer and Dinka are willing to accept intermarriage with Murle. The Dinka, Nuer and Murle’s chiefs can sit down and talk about intermarriage to assist our Murle brothers to increase their population if their women are not procreating. The chiefs can decide the number of cattle a Murle man should pay as dowries to marry a Dinka or Nuer girl (South Sudan News Agency, January 5).

The NWA was formed by Riek Machar (current vice-president of South Sudan) during the 1991 split within the SPLA, which saw many Nuer under Machar’s command join Khartoum’s loyalists in South Sudan in reaction to perceived Dinka dominance of the independence movement. The NWA, composed largely of young Lou Nuer civilians, used their official sanction to turn their arms against traditional regional enemies, such as the Bor Dinka and the Murle. Machar found it difficult to disband the youth after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. The battle-hardened veterans of the SPLA were more persuasive, slaughtering over a hundred of the NWA in May, 2005, bringing a temporary halt to the movement’s activities. [4]

The NWA today reject Riek Machar as a Nuer leader and hold him responsible for arming the Murle after siding with Khartoum in the civil war. The NWA operates outside the traditional tribal power structure, which has created friction with the community it purports to represent. In a statement released earlier this year, the NWA suggested the UN not waste its time talking to a “tiny minority, like chiefs, elders, pastors and politicians,” and further warned that if South Sudanese President Salva Kiir “wants to avoid what happened to Muammar Qaddafi, he should not mess with the Nuer White Army.” [5]

One of the organizers of the December-January raids on the Murle was Dak Kueth, a Lou Nuer “magician” who headed for the Ethiopian border with 200 armed men rather than submit to SPLA disarmament, committing further attacks on the way. In late June, Dak Kueth’s group became trapped between SPLA forces and Ethiopian troops, forcing the entire group to surrender to the Ethiopians. Some of those detained were Ethiopian nationals from the Nuer community of western Ethiopia’s Gambela district, but Dak Kueth and the Sudanese Nuer were turned over to the SPLA (Sudan Tribune, April 17; June 27).

Led by Lieutenant General Kuol Deim Kuol, the disarmament campaign that began in March has been hampered by difficult terrain, a lack of roads and Murle fears that they will be defenseless in the face of further attacks from the Nuer and Dinka (Sudan Tribune, April 17). As many as 100,000 people remain displaced after the tribal clashes of December 2011 and January 2012, in which 1,000 to 3,000 people were killed.

This article first appeared in the September 13, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Bombs, Assassinations and Kidnappings become Daily Events as the Battle for Benghazi Continues

Posted on August 10, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 10, 2012

Though incidents of urban violence continue in a number of Libyan cities, it is the former rebel capital of Benghazi where such attacks have been most intense. Bombings are common, with the central intelligence headquarters in Benghazi being a favorite target. An August 1 blast that caused damage but no casualties was only the latest in a string of attacks on the facility this year (Reuters, August 3). The carnage would be even greater if a large number of powerful bombs had not been discovered and disarmed by security officials in the last week. Many of the bombs carried a charge of 40 kilograms and have been found in places such as a school, the Criminal Investigation Department, the National Security Patrols Department and under a bridge leading to the Tibesti Hotel (Tunisa Live, August 7).

Benghazi (al-Arabiya)

Three armed men suspected of responsibility in a string of failed bombings in Benghazi were killed by security forces in a gun-battle that wounded five members of the Interior Ministry on August 5 (AFP, August 6; Reuters, August 8). Before stepping down when the new General National Congress took over from the Transitional National Council on August 8, interim Prime Minister Abd al-Rahim al-Keib said that the bombings were the work of Qaddafi loyalists and claimed that one such cell was discovered that was “presided over by persons abroad” (Sky News Arabia, August 6).

Assassinations have also become commonplace in Libya as the armed groups controlling the Libyan streets eliminate rivals and dispose of challenges to their influence. Some of these attacks seem to be a settling of accounts for grudges nursed since the Qaddafi era, particularly against those who were part of the security structure. One such assassination was that of Colonel Sulayman Bouzridah, a former official in Qaddafi’s central intelligence office who was killed in Benghazi on July 28 despite having joined the rebels during the revolution (Tunisia Live, August 7). Bouzridah was the thirteenth Qaddafi-era security official to be murdered in Benghazi in the past few weeks. Rumors circulate that the murders are being carried out by an unknown group with a death-list of 106 individuals (Libya Herald, July 31).

On July 29, gunmen attacked a convoy escorting Soviet-trained and CIA-supported Major-General Khalifa Haftar, who was nearly killed in a firefight with the Zintan militia at Tripoli Airport in December, 2011. [1] Hafter, who was unhurt, blamed pro-Qaddafi groups for the attack, which occurred shortly after the General had urged Benghazi’s rogue militias to cooperate more closely with the new National Army (Libya Herald, July 31; Magharebia, August 2).

Seven Iranian aid workers were kidnapped on their way to Benghazi’s Tibesti Hotel on July 31 and are still being held by their captors (Fars News Agency [Tehran], August 6). The delegation was in Libya at the invitation of the Libyan Red Crescent. According to Libyan Deputy Interior Minister Wanis al-Sharif, the Islamist kidnappers have demanded Iran mediate the release of Libyan prisoners held in Iraq, while some security officials claim the captives are being questioned by their abductors to determine whether their presence in Benghazi was intended to spread Shi’a Islam in the region (AFP, August 1). Iranian officials have criticized their Libyan counterparts for failing to provide adequate security to the Iranian delegation (Fars News Agency, August 2).

In a brazen raid on July 31, gunmen entered a Benghazi prison and freed one of their comrades being held in the murder of General Abd al-Fatah Yunis and two of his aides on July 28, 2011 (AP, August 1; for the murder, see Jamestown Foundation Brief, August 4, 2011). The prison had already been attacked by rocket fire on July 27, the same day a grenade was tossed at the Benghazi Appeals Court (AFP, August 1).

The violence has also spread to Misrata and Tripoli, where attacks with grenades and RPGs have targeted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the military police headquarters respectively. As in the attacks in Benghazi, the identity of the perpetrators remain unknown. The ICRC attack was the fifth of its kind in Libya in the last three months and has resulted in the humanitarian organization shutting down operations in both cities (AFP, August 5; IRNA, August 7). Some uninformed Islamist militants are under the mistaken impression that the ICRC is a Christian religious organization intent on converting Muslims.

The violence in Benghazi seems to be a mix of a settling of accounts, an attempt to rearrange the existing power structure and a demonstration by religious extremists of their determination to bring Libya under an Islamist regime regardless of the outcome of Libya’s elections. With a host of well-armed parties with varying agendas responsible for the ongoing violence, it will be extremely difficult for authorities of the new government to bring the situation under control.

Note

1. See Dario Cristiani, “The Zintan Militia and the Fragmented Libyan State,” Jamestown Foundation Hot Issue, January 19, 2012; for the attack, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, December 16, 2011; for a profile of Haftar, see Militant Leadership Monitor, March 31, 2011.

This article was originally published in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, August 10, 2012.

Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhoood: Alternative Visions of an Islamist Egypt

Posted on August 10, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 10, 2012

In late July, Shaykh al-Mujahid Hussam Abd al-Raouf a prominent al-Qaeda ideologue, member of its strategy committee and editor of Vanguards of Khurasan, the magazine of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, presented a lengthy examination of the steps Egyptian president Muhammad al-Mursi should take in transforming Egypt into an Islamic state.

In an article carried on jihadi websites entitled “If I was in Mursi’s place and sat on the Throne,” Abd al-Raouf suggests the new Egypt should be a self-sufficient state based on social justice and preparation for jihad, both defensive and offensive (Ansar1.info, July 25). According to the shaykh’ austere vision of a “New Egypt”:

The Islamic Shari’a must form the constitution of the country. It is a powerful force that can overcome any obstacle or challenge to comprehensive reform. Its implementation and progress should be explained in a monthly public broadcast. Senior figures of the old regime should be prosecuted “in all fairness and efficiency” and the funds that were looted in the past three decades should be recovered and deposited in the state treasury, “a battle that will not be easy or short.”
There must be a comprehensive change in the lifestyle and behavior of the Egyptian President. This should begin with a move from the opulence of the presidential palace in Heliopolis to much more modest quarters in the suburbs as a first sign that the president intends to follow “a policy of austerity, justice and humility.” The presidential palaces, grounds and furnishings should be put up for rent or sale, as should most of the fleets of cars and aircraft, leaving only what is essential for the operations of the president. Further austerity measures should include the abolition of Egyptian embassies in countries that do not have direct political, economic or military ties to Egypt as well as the cancellation of official celebrations and festivals.
All international conventions must be reviewed, according to the rule of law, with an eye to eliminating those conventions and treaties that have created in Egypt a cycle of poverty, underdevelopment and defeatism. Payments on enormous international debts created through usury should be canceled “on the spot.” Alternatives to such borrowing should be examined, including interest-free short-term loans, relying on Arab and Islamic solidarity for their provision.
Investment from domestic capital and Arab and Islamic countries should be encouraged to exploit the business advantages offered by Egypt, including security, cheap labor, technical competence and low wages for professionals in comparison to those of Western or Asian countries.
All Islamist political prisoners should be released immediately and the Ministry of the Interior cleansed of all those officials still loyal to the former regime. These steps should be accompanied by a review of the judicial system as a whole, including the qualifications of judges and amendments to the curricula of law schools and colleges.
Rather than be appointed by the president of the republic, the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar should be elected directly by religious scholars. The awqaf system (religious endowments) and its control by a government ministry should be reviewed and reformed, while salary increases and bonuses to improve the social status of scholars and preachers will encourage academically outstanding students to study Islamic law and the Arabic language.
The Culture and Information sectors should be cleansed of corrupt officials and those promoting apostasy, immorality and vice.
Immorality fostered by tourism is linked to corruption and decadence in Egypt. Given the impossibility of cancelling this sector due to the employment and hard currency it provides, tourism should be “Islamized” by encouraging domestic tourism and visits from other Arabs and Muslims. “Foreigners” would be welcome if they agreed to abide by community ethics and behavior consistent with Islamic law.
Citizens should be held accountable in their observance of the pillars of Islam, such as the performance of prayers, fasting and pilgrimage for those who can afford it. Of special concern should be employees of the state who do not perform prayers or who break the fast during Ramadan.
The problem of male youth unemployment and resultant issues of crime could be eliminated by removing women from the work force. Working women may spend more than their salary on transportation to and from work, nursery fees, meals, clothing and accessories while their children develop mental and physical health issues in their absence. Why not then return women to their homes where they are protected and can avoid mixing with men? In a reversal of the modern assembly-line technique of mass production, the shaykh suggests that women who seek to supplement their husband’s income can be trained by television in home production techniques and have raw materials delivered to their homes and finished products picked up later. Uneducated women can pursue sewing, embroidery, knitting and carpet production while educated women can assemble products such as watches and electronic devices.
The performance of government departments and state facilities must be improved, especially government hospitals.
Sectarian conflict must be extinguished in Egypt. According to Abdul-Raouf, the current leaders of the Coptic Church in Egypt continue to follow policies of the late Pope Shenouda III that fuelled sectarian disputes by attempting to create a Christian “state within a state.” Christians must not form part of the nation’s senior leadership as there are a sufficient number of Muslims with “experience and competence.”
All citizens must be provided with food security and adequate housing. Agricultural scientists and scholars of animal production must be employed in efforts to bring self-sufficiency in food to Egypt, which currently relies heavily on foreign imports. With many Egyptians living in slums, shanty houses and tents, the state must dedicate itself to creating new urban communities where borrowing from “Arab and friendly countries” can be used to provide housing to Egyptians with interest-free and affordable payments.
Working from the axiom that people who do not have guns do not have freedom, Egypt should abandon military assistance from the United States “which it does not need” and instead focus on becoming self-sufficient in arms production, even if this means an immediate decline in the quality of available arms. Abd al-Raouf points to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as proof that “miracles” can be achieved with even backwards arms and limited ammunition against the most powerful military forces if Egyptians “put their trust in God.” The state must become militarized in preparation for the “epic battles” to come between Muslims and infidels, with military service binding on “every sane adult.” As Islam does not acknowledge only defensive jihad, but must sometimes attack in a pre-emptive war “to nip aggression in the bud,” the responsible government department must change its name from “the Ministry of Defense.”

While new Egyptian President Muhammad al-Mursi is likely to take his advice from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau rather than al-Qaeda, the document is nevertheless interesting as a detailed proposal of how an Islamist state should be formed and organized according to al-Qaeda, which has been especially weak in dealing with such issues in the past, preferring to devote most of its ideological production to the conduct, aims and methods of global jihad.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Reformation

Shaykh Ibrahim Munir, the Secretary General of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood (and a close friend of al-Mursi) has identified Egypt’s entrenched bureaucracy and the still extant “deep state” power structure as major obstacles to the new president’s reform mission:

Shaykh Ibrahim Munir

President Mursi has to overcome obstacles, obstructions, and corrupt concepts that have accumulated during decades of individual pharaoh rule during which loyalty for the person of the ruler was put before loyalty to the country and the people. Thus, what are now called “deep state” practices, which do not distinguish between what is allowed and what is prohibited in dealing with the money, honor, or blood of the subjects, have been formed together with a terrifying backward bureaucracy that destroys any progress and efficiency, and that does not know the meaning of transparency, and regression has taken place in all the state institutions and their cultural, financial, medical, educational, services, and foreign policy actions that are related to the independence and interests of the country (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 11).

To overcome these obstacles, Shaykh Ibrahim suggests al-Mursi must do three things – surround himself with “a good entourage,” overcome the bureaucracy by correcting the culture of those working in it and subject every member of the government at every level to the statutes of the law and constitution.

Internal Dissent

As Egypt’s new leaders struggle to form a government, a vast post-revolutionary social upheaval continues. Labor strife persists; the 870 protests and strikes on the nation’s railway system alone have cost the state an estimated $120 million (al-Masry al-Youm, August 2).

Al-Mursi will also have to deal with different visions of the New Egypt even within the Muslim Brotherhood movement, whether from “liberal” Islamists like Dr. Abd al-Moneim Aboul Fotouh (a former member of the movement’s Guidance Bureau who resigned to contest the presidential election) or voices like former Brotherhood spokesman Kamal al-Halbawi, who denounced al-Mursi’s July 12 visit to Saudi Arabia (his first official visit abroad as president), which he described as “an enemy of the Egyptian Revolution” (El-Balad TV, July 31; Fars News Agency [Tehran], July 31).

Al-Mursi, who taught at California State University in the 1980s, is often regarded as a protégé of Khairat al-Shater, the wealthy chief strategist of the Muslim Brotherhood, who sponsored his rise through the ranks of the Brotherhood. His detractors regard al-Mursi as a stand-in for al-Shater, who promoted al-Mursi as a presidential candidate only after his own candidacy was disqualified by the military in April on the grounds that he had recently been in prison, a violation of the election rule that a candidate must not have been imprisoned in the previous six years (Egypt Independent, June 22).

Tourism

With the vital tourism industry off by a third since the revolution, Egypt is scrambling for ways to restore the nearly 15 million visitors it hosted in 2010. Important tombs of the ancient period that have not been open to visitors for decades are being made available to tourists and a new Egyptian Museum is scheduled to open in 2014. Though the Muslim Brotherhood appears to understand the importance of Egypt’s ancient monuments to the national economy as a source of foreign currency, Egypt’s Salafists regard all such sites as products of the pre-Islamic jahiliya (time of ignorance) and would just as soon eliminate “idolatrous” visits to Egypt’s ancient monuments (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, December 22, 2011). Fortunately for the industry, Salafist efforts to obtain the post of Minister of Tourism were unsuccessful, with the post going to an experienced technocrat, Hisham Za’azou. Nevertheless, efforts are underway by Islamist businessmen to promote Egypt as a center of “Halal Tourism” for families “committed to Shari’a.” Approved hotels and tourist facilities would not serve alcohol, would provide halal meat and offer segregated facilities for men and women. [1]

Islamization

Egypt’s Dar al-Ifta, an institution responsible for issuing fatwa-s [religious rulings] under the supervision of Egypt’s Grand Mufti, Ali Goma’a, issued a fatwa earlier this month declaring it was unacceptable for Muslims to eat or drink in public during Ramadan, calling such activity “a violation of public decency” (Daily News Egypt, August 2; Bikya Masr, August 2). Should the government decide to enforce the fatwa it will mark a major change in Egyptian society, where restaurants and cafés typically remain open during Ramadan.

On July 30, al-Mursi released and pardoned over a dozen Islamists imprisoned for trying to kill leading Egyptian officials (Ahram Online, August 1). Al-Mursi has pledged to obtain the release of Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman from an American prison, where he is serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Egypt has also asked for the release of Egyptian jihadi Tariq al-Sawah, who has been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay since he was captured in the battle for Tora Bora (AFP, August 2).

Egypt’s New Cabinet

The composition of the new cabinet reveals that several of the most important ministries remain in the hands of the pre-revolution power structure. In the Interior Ministry, responsible for internal security, Major General Ahmad Gamal al-Din has been appointed as minister despite being a former aide to the previous and much criticized interior minister, Muhammad Ibrahim (Ahram Online, August 1). The general will have to deal not only with an internal security service that has largely collapsed since the revolution, but one that has been trained for decades to regard Islamism as a major internal security threat to Egypt.

The Nour Party, the most successful of the Salafist groups to take part in the parliamentary elections, has refused to join the new cabinet, rejecting new Prime Minister Hisham Qandil’s offer of the Environment Ministry as being “unworthy” of the party (Ahram Online, August 2; al-Masry al-Youm, August 1). Until parliament is reconvened or new elections are held, this effectively leaves the Salafists on the outside of the new government, a situation they are unlikely to tolerate for long. Al-Nour had sought the Ministry of Public Enterprise, which would have given it effective control of nearly 150 state-owned corporations.

Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein al-Tantawi will retain the post of defense minister, which he has held since 1991, thus ensuring there will be little civilian oversight of the armed forces. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has suggested creating a National Defense Council that would include both military and civilian leaders to work out legislation regarding the military and its budget before its presentation to parliament. The president would only have the power to declare war after obtaining the approval of the National Defense Council and parliament, effectively limiting the president’s ability to control foreign policy and command the national armed forces (Egypt Independent, August 2).

Muhammad Yusri Ibrahim

Reports that Muhammad Yousri Ibrahim, a leading Salafist and failed parliamentary candidate for the Salafist al-Asala Party, was al-Musri’s choice to take over the role of Ministry of Religious Endowments created immediate controversy at all levels in Egypt. Though educated at al-Azhar University, Muhammad Yousri is a noted critic of the institution and his candidacy was quickly opposed by the Grand Shaykh of the Islamic university, Ahmad al-Tayeb, on the grounds that the Minister of Endowments is traditionally chosen by the Grand Shaykh (Daily News Egypt, August 2). Muhammad Yousri is a close associate of Khairat al-Shater and it seems likely that the deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood was behind the appointment. The ministry is central to the religious direction of the nation as it is responsible for mosques, licensing imams and regulating the substantial endowments of property that fund the religious establishment. The announcement was widely condemned as a sign that Saudi-style Salafism had arrived with the approval of the Muslim Brotherhood and was loudly opposed by the nation’s still influential Sufi leadership, which has endured attacks on its shrines from Salafists since the Revolution (Egypt Independent, May 17; al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], March 30, 2011). Muhammad Yousri is also well-known for leading demonstrations against the Coptic Church. Amidst a deluge of criticism, al-Musri’s decision was quickly reversed and the ministry given into the hands of Osama al-Abd, the vice-chancellor of al-Azhar.

The Coptic Question

Despite early protestations of Coptic-Muslim cooperation in the early days of the Revolution, tensions between the Coptic and Muslim communities are now at an all-time high, requiring only a tiny spark to set off street violence that security forces show little interest in controlling. Most recently, major clashes erupted in the Dashour district of the Giza Governorate after a Coptic launderer accidentally burned a Muslim customer’s shirt with his iron. The incident soon developed into street riots, looting of Coptic-owned shops and even the attempted arson of the Mary Guirguis Church, which was only narrowly prevented by security forces using tear gas (Ahram Online, August 2; al-Masry al-Youm, August 2; Bikya Masr, August 2). As many as 150 Coptic families may have fled the district. Following the clashes, Christian demonstrators who claim sectarian violence has intensified since al-Mursi became president appeared outside the Presidential Palace in Heliopolis bearing signs that said “Down with the rule of the Supreme Guide [i.e. of the Muslim Brotherhood]” (Ahram Online, August 2).

The interim leader of the Coptic Church, Bishop Pachomius, was critical of the cabinet appointments, which included only one Copt in the Ministry of Scientific Research, which Pachomius referred to as “a semi-ministry.” The Bishop, who is filling in as leader until a new Pope can be elected after the death of Shenouda III, also denounced the security services for standing by “with arms crossed” during the sectarian riots in Dahshour (AFP, August 4).

Conclusion

The election of al-Mursi is just the beginning phase of the Brotherhood’s 25-year Renaissance Project, a comprehensive effort to bring Egypt’s administration, business sector and society in line with Islamic values. The chairman of the project’s steering committee is Khairat al-Shater, who appears to be emerging as the real power behind the Egyptian throne.

The Brotherhood’s Renaissance Project will inevitably collide with the interests of SCAF and the rest of Egypt’s “Deep State” apparatus, which will be exceedingly difficult to dislodge. SCAF still holds supreme power in Egypt and controls all decisions regarding the military. The determination of the Renaissance Project to make the military’s large share of the Egyptian economy abide by free-market rules rather than continuing to use free labor (military conscripts) and free natural resources in its industries is certain to create friction (Egypt Independent, July 31). An antagonistic relationship was worsened in mid-June with the implementation of the Supplement to the Constitutional Declaration, which limited the president’s powers and increased those of SCAF, including the right to intervene in the drafting of the new constitution (Egypt Independent, August 1). The ongoing political struggle has convinced many experienced technocrats and secular politicians to turn down government appointments, leaving al-Mursi with an inexperienced Prime Minister, no parliament, no vice-president, no power over the military and a corps of advisors with ties to Khairat al-Shater. Control of the most important ministries (Defense, Justice, Finance) remain outside the hands of the Brotherhood and promises of greater representation in the cabinet for women and Christians have been thoroughly dashed. The secular and progressive forces that filled Tahrir Square 18 months ago see too many familiar faces from the old regime in the “new” government and are unlikely to be inspired by the relative unknowns who are new appointments. Though al-Shater denies exerting influence over al-Mursi, Egypt’s new president has so far made some questionable decisions in forming his new government and has generally been unable to attract Egypt’s most talented and experienced leaders to the new regime. Further decisions of this type risk alienating large numbers of Egyptians, which could make a repeat of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary victory earlier this year difficult when Egyptians return to the polls, possibly in December.

Note

1. See, for example: http://www.shouqtravel.com/index.php/en/

This article first appeared in the August 10 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Mali’s Self-Defense Militias Take the Reconquest of the North into Their Own Hands

Posted on August 10, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

August 10, 2012

With the Malian Army still in disarray, the United States urging caution and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanding the formation of a government of national unity before taking military action, a handful of “self-defense” militias from northern Mali are preparing to launch their own reconquest of the regions now controlled by Tuareg rebels and Islamist groups including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The formation for this purpose of a militia coalition known as the Forces patriotiques de résistance (FPR – Patriotic Resistance Forces) was announced at a news conference in Bamako on July 21 (Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], July 23).

Ganda Koy Militia (The Times)

The militias forming the FPR include Ganda Koy (Lords of the Land), Ganda Iso (Sons of the Land), the Forces de libération des régions nord du Mali (FLN – Liberation Forces of the Northern Regions), the Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou (ACRT – Alliance of Communities from the Timbuktu Region), the Force armée contre l’occupation (FACO – Armed Force Against the Occupation) and the Cercle de réflexion et d’action (CRA – Thought and Action Circle). The largest of the groups are believed to be the Ganda Koy, with some 2,000 members, and Ganda Iso, with an estimated 1300 fighters (L’Essor [Bamako], July 26). Ganda Koy militia leader Harouna Touré recently declared; “This war must begin as early as tomorrow with or without the national army” (L’Indépendant [Bamako], July 23). Most of these militias are centered in the Gao region of northern Mali, and are predominantly Songhai, though they also include Peul/Fulani members. After the announcement of a new coalition of militias was made, however, Ganda Iso chairman Muhammad Attaib Maiga issued a statement saying “We do not recognize ourselves as a member of this coalition… We decline any responsibility for the actions that the said coalition will take” (Info Matin [Bamako], July 26).

Another self-defense militia, the “Popular Movement Soni Ali Ber” has been created in Gao by Al-Hadj Tandjina. The movement is named for the first king of the Songhai Empire (c.1464 – 1492) and is intended to “wash [away] the affront of the occupation and recover the flouted dignity and honor of the people of Gao” (L’Observateur [Bamako], July 25). Just outside Bamako, several hundred would-be fighters are training as part of Bouyan Ba Hawi (Songhai for “Death is Better than Shame”), a militia led by Mahamadou Dioura (Jeune Afrique, August 2; Independent August 7).

An officer of Algeria’s Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS – Department of Intelligence and Security) has suggested that the defeat of the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) by the Islamists in Gao is a good development as it will send the Tuareg rebels into the arms of the Malian Army (Jeune Afrique, July 14). However, while MNLA spokesman Moussa ag Assarid recently indicated that the Tuareg rebel movement was ready to fight the “terrorist groups” alongside ECOWAS forces, he was also adamant that they would not fight alongside Malian troops (Le Républicain [Bamako], July 26).

For the Ganda Iso movement of Ibrahim Dicko the real enemy is the MNLA, “which wanted to create a state that we did not recognize. The Islamists, on the contrary, are Muslims like us” (Jeune Afrique, August 3). The Islamists appear to be seeking to divert the anger of the self-defense militias towards the Tuareg of the MNLA by exploiting racial tensions and offering the militias arms to use against the Tuareg. Modern arms appear to be in short supply for the militia fighters, some of whom are training with cudgels rather than Kalashnikovs (L’Essor [Bamako], July 25). The strategy may be working; there are reports (confirmed by both Ganda Koy and Ansar al-Din) that some 400 Ganda Koy fighters based in Douentza have already joined the Islamists of Ansar al-Din (AP, July 15). Ganda Iso took control of Douentza (170 km north of Mopti) on July 13 when it was abandoned by the Islamists but the Malian Army, which has been ordered not to advance beyond Konna, failed to move in to take control at that time.

With the Malian Army having suffered several defeats, the loss of large numbers of defectors to the rebel forces, the staging an unpopular coup and a fratricidal conflict between the “Green Beret” putschists and the “Red Beret” [paratrooper] counter-coup units, desertion has become a major problem in the demoralized military. The Ministry of Defense and Veterans has warned that deserters may be brought before the military courts in accordance with the code of military justice” (L’Essor [Bamako], July 23; L’Indépendant [Bamako], July 23; Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], July 23). According to a member of Special Unit Etia2 (Joint Tactical Echelon) commanded by Colonel al-Hadj Gamou (a Tuareg loyalist); “After the coup, the chain of command gave out. Some subordinates no longer obey their superiors. But it should also be noted that even before the coup, at the command level, there were leadership problems” (PressAfrik.com, July 30). Some Malian troops, rather than focusing on an upcoming campaign against northern extremists and rebels, are using their uniforms to extort money at the Mopti Region checkpoint at Konna from refugees fleeing the Islamist occupation, leading to frequent verbal clashes and further loss of faith in the armed services (L’Essor [Bamako], July 25).

The FPR coalition does not appear to have any official support from the Malian military, but are being sponsored by coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who has been given “former head-of-state” status in return for stepping aside for a new interim government and is alleged to be providing the militias training facilities and instructors, raising the disturbing possibility he intends to form his own private army (Le Temps d’Algerie [Algiers], July 23; Jeune Afrique, August 2). Both Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso are training close to Sévaré (Mopti Region), where the Malian Army is regrouping. FLN official Amadou Malle asserts that the militia fighters are strictly unpaid volunteers, though it appears some may have been offered places in the Malian military after the northern region has been retaken (L’Essor [Bamako], July 25).

Ganda Koy leader Harouna Touré declared last month that “We are not afraid of death, but we dread shame” (L’Indépendant [Bamako], July 5). Touré insists that the militia coalition was formed without consulting anyone and will not wait for anyone’s permission or collaboration to take action. The main objective of the coalition will be to bring a permanent end to the cycle of Tuareg rebellion and reconciliation that places northern Mali in a permanent state of instability (Septembre 22 [Bamako], July 5).

Though the present state of the Malian military would seem to preclude the possibility of bringing the self-defense militias under control, the government is nevertheless concerned that their impulsiveness will precipitate another round of civil war before the new government is prepared. While a government communiqué cited the “highly courageous initiative of the youth,” it also affirmed that recovery of the occupied territories in the north is a “task of the state and its divisions” (L’Indépendant, July 25).

Militias such as Ganda Koy have notorious reputations for human rights abuses targeted at specific ethnic groups such as the Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians of northern Mali (see Terrorism Monitor, April 20). Unleashing them in the north rather than organizing a multinational response to the Islamist occupation is likely to aggravate the security situation rather than stabilize it and may create a poisonous legacy that will ensure years of retributive violence.

This article was originally published in the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, August 10, 2012.

“A Man with No Limits or Restrictions”: New Revelations from the Court of Mu’ammar Qaddafi

Posted on July 26, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

July 26, 2012

According to a former Libyan official who was intimately acquainted with Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s personal and political affairs, “Al-Qaddafi was a man with no limits or restrictions; he did anything he wished. He was tyrannical and arrogant. He thought that no one had the right to take him to account about anything.” The revelations emerged in a five-part interview by a pan-Arab daily of Nuri al-Mismari, a former state protocol secretary with the rank of minister of state (al-Hayat, July 15; July 17; July 18; July 19). Al-Mismari was one of Qaddafi’s inner circle of aides and retainers, a position that gave him unique access to the personal and state secrets of the Qaddafi regime, secrets that would later place his life in jeopardy before he split from the regime in 2010.

Nuri al-Mismari (right) with Mu’ammar Qaddafi

The chief protocol officer says he was frequently imprisoned by Qaddafi, who would also occasionally punch him in the face. After leaving for France after being tipped off about a plot to murder him, al-Mismari claims he was told by other officials that Qaddafi was “preparing a basin of acid to drown me in as soon as I returned.”After Libya failed in its attempt to extradite al-Mismari, it sent an assassination team. The former Libyan official was placed in protective custody until the would-be assassins left France. There followed a procession of individuals trying to persuade al-Mismari to return to Libya, including the Libyan ambassador to France, members of al-Mismari’s family and even a personal visit from Qaddafi’s son, Mutassim al-Qaddafi (later killed in captivity after his capture during the October, 2011 Battle of Sirte).

Al-Mismari shed new light on the 1978 disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, the influential Iranian-born founder of the Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (AMAL – Lebanese Resistance Detachments) and two companions while visiting Libya. Libya has long claimed the three men left Libya for Italy, but Italian officials insist the men never entered the country (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 22, 2011). According to al-Mismari, former Libyan intelligence chief Abdallah al-Sanusi (then a junior intelligence officer) asked the chief of protocol to obtain Italian visas for the passports of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his two companions. Al-Mismari claims that Libyan intelligence took advantage of the lax inspection routine for those travelling under diplomatic passports by sending a military intelligence officer to Italy who resembled the Imam and who wore al-Sadr’s clothing. The officer then returned to Libya using his own diplomatic passport while the passports of the missing men were left in a hotel room in Italy to be discovered by authorities, leaving the Qaddafi regime with documented “proof” that Imam al-Sadr and his companions had left Libya for Italy.

Regarding the September, 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772 over Niger that killed 156 passengers and 15 crew members, al-Mismari confirmed the account of former Libyan foreign minister Abd al-Rahman Shalgham, who said a year ago that the bombing was part of a Libyan intelligence plot to kill opposition leader Muhammad al-Maqrif (who turned out to not be on the plane) (al-Hayat, July 18, 2011). Al-Mismari adds that Libyan officials also thought the plane was carrying a number of leading Chadian officials, including president Hissène Habrè. Abdallah al-Sanusi and five other Libyans were tried and convicted in absentia in a French court in 1999 for their role in the bombing. The missing men are believed to have been killed on Qaddafi’s orders and buried in the desert near Sirte.

Despite his efforts to establish close relations with a host of African nations, Qaddafi privately mocked their heads of state, especially those who proved particularly fawning: “Al-Qaddafi loved to scorn and insult heads of state. He would say ‘bring me the black man’ – meaning the head of state of an African country – who was preparing to meet with him. When this head of state would leave, al-Qaddafi would say ‘the black man has left, give him something.’”

According to al-Mismari, Qaddafi liked to humiliate others by sleeping with their wives. His sadistic proclivities often resulted in scandalous situations that the protocol chief and others were forced to tidy up through large cash payments or the granting of government contracts. Qaddafi was also “terribly sexually deviant… young boys and so on… They used to be called the ‘services group.’ All of those were boys, bodyguards and harem for his pleasure.” Qaddafi would “indulge his debaucheries” in a vast underground residence at the Bab al-Zawiyah compound in Tripoli. According to al-Mismari, Qaddafi was advised on matters of virility by Italian president Silvio Berlusconi and was well supplied with pills by his intelligence chief and brother-in-law Abdallah al-Sanusi “to raise his morale and make him feel brave and strong.” Of the latter, al-Mismari remarks: “He was gentle, generous, respectful to your face. But he was bloodthirsty and carried out the orders of his master.” Al-Sanusi, who is believed to have carried out the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre of 1,200 suspected Islamists and other prisoners, is now in Mauritanian custody where he faces charges of illegal entry. Libya, France, Scotland and the ICC are all interested in his extradition to face charges in various cases of terrorism and political violence (Reuters, May 21).

Having been present at all state occasions during his time as protocol chief, al-Mismari had a number of observations to offer regarding Qaddafi’s relations with various world leaders:

Qaddafi hated Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, “cursing him and calling him petty, stupid and reckless.” Qaddafi backed the Iraqi opposition while Saddam supported Qaddafi’s enemies in Chad.
Qaddafi appears to have been infatuated with former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: “He invited her to dinner, and when she entered his private suite, she saw her portrait in a frame, hanging on a wall in his suite. When she saw it, she was shocked.” Qaddafi lavished gifts on Rice worth over $212,000, including a diamond ring and a locket with Qaddafi’s picture in it. When rebels seized Qaddafi’s compound in August, 2011, they discovered a photo album full of pictures of the Secretary of State (CBS, August 25, 2011).
Qaddafi was fond of referring to presidents and kings alike as “my son,” including U.S. president Barack Obama: “He used to do that on purpose in order to belittle people. We used to beg him not to say ‘My Son’ when addressing leaders.”
Qaddafi was especially arrogant in his visits to Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union: “[Qaddafi] would set an appointment then be deliberately late. Then, Brezhnev would go and wait for him outside his room at the Kremlin until he came out. It was embarrassing. Brezhnev was old and he could barely walk. Qaddafi would say that he was coming and Brezhnev would wait and wait.”
Qaddafi liked to summon visiting leaders in the middle of the night, including Nelson Mandela: “[Qaddafi] told me to get dressed and to fetch Mandela, who was visiting Libya after having left the post of president. I spoke to Mandela’s adviser and he said: “Are you insane? The man is asleep and he is sick and his knees hurt.” I told him: “these are the instructions.” He said: “What kind of instructions? Do you think that Mandela is an employee of yours? I will not allow anyone to wake him up.”
When UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Tripoli to discuss the Lockerbie bombing Qaddafi had him brought to his tent at night by a circuitous route through the desert, though the tent was only 200 meters from the coastal road. When he finally reached the tent, Annan was genuinely alarmed by the bellowing of camels in the pitch black night, which he took for the roar of lions.
Though Egypt is a far larger and more important country than Libya, Qaddafi never regarded Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak as his equal. During an Arab summit meeting, Qaddafi wore white gloves to avoid directly shaking Mubarak’s hand. Mubarak was also once forced to visit Qaddafi in his desert tent, but said afterwards: “If there’s a desert next time, then I will not go to Libya.”

This article first appeared in the July 26, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

M23: A New Player in the Proxy Wars of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Posted on July 26, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

July 26, 2012

The Congolese province of Nord-Kivu, which borders both Rwanda and Uganda on its eastern side, is a land of active volcanoes, mountain gorillas, valuable minerals, warring militias and over 200,000 displaced people. It is also home to M23, a new and powerful militia composed of veteran rebels and professional soldiers. Well-armed and apparently more capable than local units of the national army, M23 poses a new challenge to efforts to restore stability to a region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that has been in a state of upheaval since the genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994.

Colonel Bosco Ntaganda in the hills of Nord-Kivu

M23 has its origins in the Nord-Kivu-based Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) of General Laurent “The Chairman” Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi. The largely Tutsi CNDP is believed to have been sponsored by Rwanda to fight a proxy war with the Hutu supremacist Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a militia formed partly by former Hutu genocidaires. With the CNDP under pressure from an offensive by Congolese and Rwandan troops, the movement’s leadership split in January 2009. Nkunda was arrested and detained in Rwanda while General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda, a Rwandan Tutsi wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes committed while both a rebel and an officer in the DRC national army, took control of the movement. Ntaganda agreed to integrate his forces with the Congolese national army, the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), according to the terms of the March 23, 2009 peace agreement, which also ensured Kinshasha would not pursue the ICC warrants against Ntaganda and other CNDP officers. The ICC issued a fresh arrest warrant against Ntaganda on July 13 related to crimes against humanity, murder, rape, pillaging, recruitment of child soldiers and sexual slavery (AFP, July 13). Thomas Lubanga, Ntaganda’s former commander in the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) / Forces Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC), was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the ICC earlier this month for recruiting and using child soldiers in the early 2000’s.

M23 is named for the March 23, 2009 peace agreement that movement leaders claim Kinshasha has failed to honor (East African [Nairobi], July 16). The movement was born when Colonel Ntaganda led a March mutiny of up to 600 soldiers in Nord-Kivu. Though poor living conditions, pay interruptions and other reasons were cited, it is likely that the main causes of the military revolt were a plan to transfer the former CNDP troops under Ntaganda’s command to another part of the DRC and a rumor that President Joseph Kabila had taken a new interest in enforcing the ICC warrant against Ntaganda. Colonel Ntaganda and other Tutsi officers profited from their control of rich mining areas of Nord-Kivu and by trading in tropical hardwoods grown in the region. The Tutsi officers and their men have opposed any transfer from the lucrative Kivu provinces and pose locally as the “protectors” of the Banyamulenge, Congolese Tutsis who live in the region. In the field with Ntaganda are three other senior officers, Colonel Baudouin Ngaruye, Colonel Innocent Zimurinda and Colonel Innocent Kaina, all of whom are accused of massacring civilians, mass rape, mutilations, and other crimes while profiting from illegal taxes on charcoal production and mining operations (IRIN [Nairobi], June 23; AFP, July 13).

M23 Fighters in Bunangana

The M23 movement can be viewed as a revival of the CNDP under a different name, but including many of the same individuals, leading Kinshasha to accuse Rwanda of resuming military and financial assistance to the militia. Congolese concern on this point is understandable – Rwandan forces have invaded the eastern DRC twice since 1998. Kigali in turn believes that Kinshasha has resumed support for Hutu extremists in the FDLR who are allegedly planning terrorist attacks in Rwanda.

A recent M23 offensive in a region bordering the Virunga national park captured the border town of Bunangana on July 6 and drove some 600 FARDC troops and thousands of refugees into Uganda (East African [Nairobi], July 16). The soldiers were disarmed and eventually returned to the DRC. Days later, a M23 spokesman announced the movement had pulled out of the area taken, saying the movement sought to bring the government to negotiations rather than control territory (AFP, July 13). The towns of Kiwandja and Rutshuru were handed over to local police and troops belonging to the UN peacekeeping force, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). When the towns were re-occupied by FARDC troops the M23 warned the army to get out “or be held responsible for all the consequences” (AFP, July 13).

Believing that M23 was intent on seizing the Nord-Kivu capital of Goma, MONUSCO and the Congolese army deployed over a dozen tanks on the road to Goma. The M23, however, denied it had any such intentions: “Our mission is not to go to Goma. We are strong but we are also disciplined. We know what we are doing” (AFP, July 12; Xinhua, July 13). Three UN and two DRC MI24 and MI25 helicopters flown by Ukrainian pilots strafed M23 positions in the hills of southeast Virunga National Park with rockets and 30mm rounds (AFP, July 13).

In a recent meeting of the 11 nation International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (which includes Rwanda and the DRC), it was agreed to accept a “neutral international force” to eradicate M23, the FDLR and other armed groups in the region ( Daily Monitor [Kampala], July 16AFP, July 15). [1] The idea was then endorsed by the African Union. As of yet, however, potential contributors to this force have not been identified. Meetings on this issue are planned for Kampala at an August 6-7 summit of Great Lakes states (Agence Rwandaise d’Information, July 16). In the meantime, there are reports that the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) and the Congolese troops of the FARDC have agreed to mount joint patrols along their common border (Africa Review, July 17). Plagued by indiscipline, FARDC is often viewed as nearly as great a threat to Congolese security as the militias it is supposed to be fighting.

In mid-July, roughly two dozen M23 fighters deserted and surrendered to UN forces, saying they had been recruited in Rwanda and sent to the DRC. However, when the UN took these individuals to the Rwandan border for repatriation, Rwandan authorities refused to accept them, saying there was no evidence they were Rwandan nationals. Rwanda did accept the return of seven members of the Hutu FDLR (AFP, July 15). The ICC issued a warrant this month for FDLR commander Sylvestre Mudacumura, a Rwandan Hutu facing nine counts of war crimes.

Much of the community in Nord-Kivu views the ongoing violence in the region through a prism of tribal rivalries. With M23 being composed largely of Tutsis, senior members of the DRC’s ruling party have used public rallies broadcast on state TV to threaten to hunt down all Tutsis in the DRC and send them to Rwanda. Street children and taxi drivers in Goma have used such threats as a license to attack anyone who looks like a Tutsi (IRIN [Nairobi], July 14).

Note

1. The ICGLR is composed of 11 states: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

This article was first published in the July 26, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

“Christian Brotherhood” Formed in Egypt on the Model of the Muslim Brotherhood

Posted on July 12, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

July 12, 2012

As Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood attempts to consolidate its political control of Egypt’s presidency and parliament, the formation of a new “Christian Brotherhood” was announced on July 5. The new movement does not have the endorsement of the Coptic Orthodox Church and is described by its founders as either a “sectarian” or a “liberal and secular” organization that will or will not seek political power, depending on who is asked. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which is still officially unrecognized in Egypt, the new movement will register with the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs to obtain legal status. The announcement came at a time of growing sectarian tensions and protests following incidents such as an attack by bearded Islamists on a Coptic woman in the Cairo suburb of Ma’adi for not wearing a veil (al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], July 7).

Though it is only being activated now, the idea for a Christian Brotherhood movement was first advanced in 2005 by Coptic lawyer and activist Mamdouh Nakhla, the director of the Kalema Center for Human Rights (Cairo) and political analyst Michel Fahmy. The two were later joined by Amir Ayyad of the Maspero Youths Union for Free Copts, who played an important role in organizing the group. According to Fahmy, the movement was activated after the election of Muslim Brotherhood member Muhammad al-Mursi as Egypt’s new president to “resist the Islamist religious tide… We created our group to create a balance in the Egyptian political scene.” (al-Arabiya, July 5; Bikya Masr [Cairo], July 5).

Mamdouh Nakhla

Mamdouh Nakhla described some of the goals of the new movement in a recent interview with a pan-Arab daily (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 7). Noting that the political model of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been very successful in Egypt, Nakhla insists that the Christian Brotherhood (CB) will follow this model, at times almost slavishly – for instance, the CB’s political wing will be called Hizb al-Adala wa’l-Hurryiya (Justice and Freedom Party)in imitation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Ḥizb al-Ḥurriya wa ‘l-Adala (Freedom and Justice Party). The CB will also be led by a “Supreme Guide,” just as in the MB. According to Nakhla, “We have been convinced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s success in coming to power, particularly as this group is still officially illegal. This is why we intend to implement this same idea, utilizing even the same hierarchy and positions, which may even have the same names…” The Coptic activist even suggests an alliance with the MB could be possible:

We are prepared to politically ally with them and take part in elections with them on a joint list, which could be called the “Egyptian Brotherhood” list. We may support their presidential candidate in any future elections, on the condition that presidential and ministerial posts are shared between us. Therefore, if they were to win the presidency then the vice president would be a member of the Christian Brotherhood, whilst if they form a government, ministerial portfolios would be shared between us, each according to their [parliamentary] proportion.

Ahmed al-Deif, a political adviser to the new Egyptian president, said in late June that al-Mursi was considering the appointment of two vice-presidents, a Copt and a (presumably Muslim) woman (Egypt Independent, June 26). The idea, however, ran into opposition from Egypt’s Salafists, who oppose such appointments but would permit the appointment of a Copt as a presidential adviser (Egypt Independent, July 2). The main candidate for a Coptic vice-presidency is Dr. Rafiq Habib, a Coptic intellectual who is vice-president of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, the leadership of which describes him as “a valued and very much respected member” (Ikhwan Web, August 10). Nakhla notes that Dr. Habib has joined the Muslim Brotherhood “and is promoting their views; in fact sometimes he is even more unwavering in this than the members of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau themselves!” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 7).

While reaction from the Muslim Brotherhood is still forthcoming, Nakhla does not expect any opposition to the Christian Brotherhood from that quarter: “They cannot object to this idea, for if they object, then this means that they must dissolve their own organization.” Surprisingly, Egypt’s Salafists have expressed no objections to the new movement; according to Salafist Front spokesman Khalid Sa’id: “As long as they [the Christian Brotherhood] work within a legal framework, in accordance with their religion and their faith, and aiming for the country’s interests, there is nothing wrong with it” (al-Arabiya, July 5).

Egypt’s Grand Mufti Ali Guma’a has urged al-Mursi to address the fears of his Coptic “brothers” as part of an effort to form a consensus based on the “common, national, Egyptian civilization” (Al-Masry al-Youm [Cairo], June 27). So far, al-Mursi appears to share the Mufti’s opinion, meeting with interim Coptic pope Bishop Pachomius only two days after being declared the victor in Egypt’s presidential election.

The new president’s outreach efforts stand in contrast to the heated days of the two-stage election, when al-Mursi and other members of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party accused the Copts of “betraying the revolution” by voting exclusively for Air Force General and former Mubarak administration prime minister Ahmad Shafiq, despite ample evidence that the Coptic vote was split between a range of candidates (Egypt Independent, May 29). Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Coptic Orthodox Church remained aloof from the momentous events of last year’s Egyptian revolution, unable or unwilling to split from its traditional cooperative approach to the Mubarak regime.

This article first appeared in the July 12, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Was al-Qaeda’s Saharan Amir Mokhtar Belmokhtar Killed in the Battle for Gao?

Posted on July 12, 2012 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

July 12, 2012

Though al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to deny the death of one of its leading amirs in the late June battle for the northern Malian city of Gao, the movement has yet to provide any evidence of the survival of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), the amir of AQIM’s Sahara/Sahel-based al-Mulathamin Brigade.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar Outside of Gao

Belmokhtar and his AQIM fighters are reported to have played a central role in leading the takeover of Gao by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), a sub-Saharan AQIM spin-off (Le Républicain [Bamako], June 28; for MUJWA, see Terrorism Monitor, April 6). The clashes were sparked on the night of June 25, when Idrissa Oumarou, a popular local politician and leader of a group dedicated to resisting the rebel occupation of Gao, was killed while riding his motorcycle through a checkpoint run by the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) (L’Esssor [Bamako], June 27; Info Matin [Bamako], June 27; L’Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], June 27). Youth protests began the next morning with the burning of tires in the streets. As the protest turned violent, it appears that MNLA fighters opened fire on the protesters from rooftops, wounding 12 and possibly killing one or two demonstrators (L’Esssor [Bamako], June 30; Le Combat [Bamako], June 27). At this point MUJWA launched an attack on the MNLA, which succeeded in driving the movement out of the city in which it had shared administration with the Islamists.

Accounts of Belmokhtar’s death during the battle vary only in the details. The AQIM leader was variously reported to have been killed on June 28 by a burst of gunfire to his chest, by a rocket that destroyed his vehicle, or by a rocket to his chest fired by Tuareg leader Colonel Bouna ag Atayub before the latter was himself killed in the fighting. Belmokhtar’s death has since been reported by the MNLA and confirmed by Algerian sources (Toumast Press, June 30; July 2; Ennahar TV [Algiers], June 28; Liberté [Algiers], June 30). An unnamed Mauritanian AQIM commander was also reported killed (Toumast Press, June 30; SIWEL – Agence Kabyle d’information, June 28). The other senior MNLA officer reported killed in the clashes was identified as Colonel Wari, possibly Wari ag Ibrahim, a former National Guard officer and a member of the Idnane Tuareg.

At least 35 people died in the fighting, including those drowned in the Niger River and those who died in hospital afterwards. The MNLA admitted to four dead and 10 wounded, but made the improbable claim of having killed “dozens” of MUJWA fighters (AFP, July 1). Most of the dead appear to have been MNLA fighters, along with a few civilians caught in the deadly crossfire (Le Combat [Bamako], June 29).

However, two days after Belmokhtar’s supposed death, a communiqué regarding the events in Gao issued under his alternate name of Khalid Abu al-Abbas was published by a Mauritanian news agency and later carried by jihadi websites (Agence Nouakchott d’Information. June 30). In the statement, Belmokhtar describes the deadly force used against protesters by the MNLA and goes on to describe the latter’s subsequent expulsion from Gao, though he is careful to note that the use of force “was limited in time and place,” was not intended as a declaration of war “on any party,” and cannot be interpreted as a conflict between Arabs and Tuareg. None of the events described in the communiqué appear to post-date June 28 and as Belmokhtar’s message appeared in the form of a statement rather than an interview that would verify his continued existence, it does not establish the AQIM amir’s survival past June 28.

Since expelling the MNLA, the Islamists have been conducting house-to-house searches for MNLA members or sympathizers (RFI, July 3). MUJWA has also issued warnings on local radio that they have laid anti-personnel mines in the bush areas surrounding Gao to force all traffic to use the few roads controlled by the movement and thus prevent re-infiltration of the city by MNLA forces (Le Combat [Bamako], July 3). MUJWA forces in Gao are under the command of the movement’s leader, Hamadou Ould Khairou, a Mauritanian who left AQIM last year to form a new and largely sub-Saharan militant Islamist group. Ould Khairou has been living at the Algerian consulate since his fighters seized the building and abducted seven Algerian diplomats in April and is frequently seen driving the Algerian Consul’s four-wheel drive vehicle in the streets of Gao (Jeune Afrique, July 7).

MUJWA leader Hamada Ould Khairou

Following the MUJWA takeover of Gao on June 27, Islamist reinforcements (mostly Algerian according to the MNLA) began arriving in trucks that night, joining MUJWA forces and some 100 members of Ansar al-Din already in Gao (VOA, June 28; Toumast Press, June 30). The MNLA reported the destruction on June 29 of a convoy of Islamist reinforcements in the Tarkint region of Gao by a brigade under the command of Colonel Leche ag Didi of the Idnane Tuareg (Toumast Press, June 30). Many of the MNLA’s leaders belong to the Idnane tribe, which has in recent years been engaged in a growing power struggle with the aristocratic Ifogha tribe, to which Islamists like Algabass ag Intalla and Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali belong (al-Jazeera, June 11; Info Matin [Bamako], July 4). In some quarters of Mali, the conflict between the rebel groups is seen as a proxy struggle between Algeria, the “secret sponsor” of the MNLA, and Qatar, the “secret sponsor” of the Islamists (L’Aube [Bamako], July 2).

MNLA Secretary General Bilal ag Cherif, who was wounded in the fighting (either by shrapnel or friendly fire), was airlifted to a hospital in the Burkina Faso capital of Ouagadougou by a Burkinabe helicopter, apparently under the orders of Burkinabe president Blaise Compaoré, who is hosting negotiations between the northern Mali rebel leaders and the transitional Malian government. According to some reports, Ag Cherif was accompanied by MNLA military commander Colonel Muhammad ag Najim (Le Combat [Bamako], June 29; AFP, June 28). The rest of the Gao-based MNLA appears to have withdrawn to the Gao Region town of Ménaka to regroup (L’Indépendant, June 29).

After taking Gao, the Islamists claimed to have found a “black list” of assassination targets on the computer of Muhammad Jerry Maiga, the vice-chairman of the MNLA’s Azawad transition committee. Among the names allegedly found there was that of Idrissa Oumarou, the politician whose death led to the brief struggle for Gao. MUJWA has since issued a reward of FCFA 3 million and a Land Cruiser for the death or capture of Maiga (Le Combat [Bamako], July 2). After the MUJWA victory, Maiga told French radio that MUJWA has little real strength and would soon be driven out of Gao by the MNLA (RFI, June 28).

A MUJWA spokesman, Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, claimed his group had taken 40 prisoners as well as two tanks and heavy weapons such as a Grad missile launcher abandoned by the MNLA in the fighting (al-Jazeera, June 29). One Ansar al-Din commander, Umar Ould Hamama, mocked MNLA claims that they would return to Gao after a “tactical withdrawal”: “How can they talk about a counteroffensive when they have left behind them their war arsenal and trucks full of ammunition?” (L’Essor [Bamako], June 29).

Aside from their victory in the spontaneous battle for Gao on June 30, MUJWA also claimed responsibility for an early morning attack the previous day on the regional headquarters of a paramilitary police force in the Algerian town of Ouargla that killed one and wounded three. MUJWA accuses Algeria of encouraging the MNLA to confront the Islamists in northern Mali (AFP, June 29).

This article first appeared in the July 12, 2012 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.