Libyan Berbers Defy Regime that Denies Their Existence (Part Two)

Andrew McGregor

May 12, 2011

Under increasing pressure from Qaddafi loyalists, the Berbers of the Western Mountains of Libya continue to defy military odds in their resistance to a regime that has denied their very existence.

Berbers NalutAnti-Qaddafi Berbers at Nalut (Derek Henry Flood)

According to one Berber from the mountain town of Nalut: “We have 80 per cent unemployment in Nalut, there are no good roads, no healthcare and the education system is very poor. We are fighting because for 42 years we have been oppressed” (Irish Times, April 28). Sixty miles east of Nalut is Zintan, which is currently experiencing bombardment by Grad rockets prior to an expected government advance on the town. A massive flight of Berber civilians to Tunisia is under way, with some 30,000 people having crossed the border at the small crossing point of Dehiba (UNHCR, April 29). Government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim said the regime had proof the refugee crisis was the result of a Qatar-financed campaign to have Berber rebels force family members across the border to prompt NATO air attacks on loyalist forces.

Under Qaddafi’s rule, Berber language instruction in schools was banned, as were many forms of Berber cultural expression. Activists have been subject to detention, disappearance, or public execution. According to the regime, the non-Semitic Berber language is nothing but a dialect of Semitic Arabic. In June 2010 Qaddafi told a gathering of journalists and intellectuals that the Berbers were ancient North African tribes that no longer existed and it was therefore “pointless to use the language of these tribes which have disappeared.” Claims to the contrary were nothing but “colonialist propaganda” (Jana [Tripoli], June 2, 2010).

A 2008 Libyan diplomatic note to the U.S. mission in Tripoli presented the regime’s viewpoint on the Berber question, together with a rather dubious linguistic explanation of why these “early Arabs” had come to be known as “Berbers”:

In Great Jamahiriya, there is nothing called Berber community, and the use of this term denotes lack of true knowledge of the history of the region in general and Libya in particular, and does not reflect the reality and nature of the homogeneous Libyan society.  All Libyans come from Arab origins; they came from the Arab Peninsula by land (barr) and that’s why some tribes that had arrived earlier in Libya are called “Barbar” (or Berber). [1]

Most Libyan Berbers are members of the Ibadite sect of Islam rather than the Sunni Malikite school of Islamic jurisprudence dominant elsewhere in Libya. Though many Ibadites reject the connection, the sect is largely believed to be a more moderate form of the early Islamic Kharijite movement, whose strict interpretation of Islam and advocacy of jihad to overthrow Muslim rulers accused of ignoring Islamic law led to two centuries of bitter conflict in the Islamic world. The movement’s emphasis on asceticism and egalitarianism attracted both the Bedouin and the Mawali (non-Arab converts to Islam who found themselves oppressed by Arab Muslims who considered themselves superior due to the Arab origin of Islam). However, the Kharijite injunction to rebel against any ruler who fell short of religious expectations coupled with the tendency of individuals to decide for themselves when a ruler had failed to meet these expectations was not a recipe for political stability.

While the Kharijites (“Those who Secede”) were eventually eliminated and their name turned into a pejorative term for non-Orthodox Muslims, a breakaway group known as the Ibadites (for their founder Abd Allah ibn Ibad) maintained many of the core beliefs of the Kharijites while adopting a greater willingness to live in harmony with other Islamic groups. Today, Ibadites are estimated to number 1.5 million and are found mostly in Oman (1.2 million), with smaller communities in Libya, Zanzibar, the Djerba Island of Tunisia and the Mzab oases in Algeria.

Note

1. U.S. Embassy Tripoli cable 08TRIPOLI530, July 3, 2008, published by the Telegraph, January 31, 2011.

This article first appeared in the May 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Salafi-Jihadi Ideologist Calls for Planned Response to Bin Laden Assassination

Andrew McGregor

May 12, 2011

A noted Salafi-Jihadist shaykh who is regularly featured on jihadi internet sites has called for a carefully planned retaliation for the killing of late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by American Special Forces. Shaykh Hussein bin Mahmud’s message, entitled “Osama is Alive!,” suggests the death of Bin Laden is actually a victory for the mujahideen in a mixture of commentary, hadiths, poetry and quotations from both the Quran and Sayyid Qutb (ansarullah.com, May 9; the message itself is dated May 3). Shaykh Hussein has also issued statements on the recent Egyptian revolution and ongoing Libyan uprising.

Obl ObamaShaykh Hussein’s postings always carry a healthy amount of invective directed towards his targets; in this case he describes President Obama as “you son of an infidel woman!” He continues with a warning: “We say to Obama: we will not cry over Osama. We will not cry over his death. We will accept no condolences for him. We will not eulogize him. We will leave you to celebrate for a few days, and then after it we will continue our Islamic war against infidelity. However, it will not be a war like that of the past.”

The American version of Bin Laden’s death does not meet with the approval of the shaykh, who suggests other alternatives were more likely: If you killed him face to face, he has sped the journey of some of your troops to Hell, and if not, you struck the house from afar with your aircrafts as you did with Zarqawi, the body of whom you could not dare approach until hours after his death, may Allah have mercy on him and accept him among the martyrs.” The shaykh also mocks the United States for spending ten years and “a trillion dollars” in its efforts to find Bin Laden.

Shaykh Hussein calls on the mujahideen to avoid hasty acts of revenge and to select their targets with more care than has been practiced in the past. “We do not want sporadic operations of vengeance. Rather, we want special operations which are properly planned out, with wisdom and patience, so that it can… make America forget the attacks on Washington and New York, and say goodbye to the good old days. This is an extremely important matter, as individual and random operations of vengeance usually have negative effects.”

Shaykh Hussein discusses the assassinations of a mix of Islamic figures such as the second, third and fourth Caliphs and a variety of more recent political and military Islamist leaders such as Hassan al-Banna, Abdullah Azzam, Omar al-Baghdadi, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Ibn al-Khattab and Shamyl Basayev, asserting that in each instance these commanders were ably replaced. In conclusion he reminds his readers that the Prophet Muhammad himself died, yet jihad went on. “Jihad did not stop with the death of the highest commander of the Muslims, so how can these idiots hope that Jihad will stop with the killing of a mere soldier from the soldiers of Islam, which will remain in existence?”

This article first appeared in the May 12, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Qaddafi Loyalists Retake Strategic Oasis of Kufra

Andrew McGregor

May 5, 2011

Once known as “Forbidden Kufra,” the small group of oases clustered in the vast deserts of southeastern Libya has become the latest battlefield in Libya as government forces battle to retake Kufra from the rebels who seized the region over a month ago. Despite being one of the most isolated settlements on Earth, deep in the Sahara and nearly surrounded by sand seas on three sides, Kufra has now become a strategically important center for the control of Libya’s vital oil industry.

tubu kufra 2On April 28 a column of 60 vehicles carrying roughly 250 loyalist fighters arrived in Kufra, taking the oasis with only light resistance from its rebel defenders before raising the green national flag over the courthouse (Reuters, April 28). Saleh Muhammad al-Zaruq, the security chief for Kufra, had announced his support for the rebel forces in early April, putting the oasis region under rebel control (al-Jazeera, April 3).

According to rebel spokesmen, the loyalist forces travelled nearly 1,000 km from Sabha, a desert stronghold of Qaddafi forces surrounded by pro-regime tribes (Brnieq.com, May 3). The rebels also claimed the loyalists were accompanied by 1,500 Chadian mercenaries, though this has not been confirmed. Rebel sources tend to exaggerate numbers and the degree of foreign support for Qaddafi in order to obtain greater military support from NATO forces. Libyan state television later reported: “Libyan forces have seized full control of the town of Kufra and purified it of the armed gangs” (Reuters, April 28). The attack on Kufra came days after loyalist forces raided a remote desert oil pumping station, killing eight guards (AFP, April 25).

Kufra was long held by the Teda wing of the indigenous Tubu people, whose large Tibesti-centered desert homeland covers southeastern Libya, northern Chad and eastern Niger. However, control of the oasis region was taken over by the powerful Zuwaya Arabs in 1840. This development opened Kufra to the influence of the Sanussi religious order, which moved their headquarters there in 1895 to resist attempts by the Ottoman rulers of northern Cyrenaica to bring the Sanussis under the supervision of Istanbul. From Kufra the Sanussis expanded their growing confederacy to areas of modern-day Chad, Niger and Western Egypt, areas for which they would soon compete with the colonial armies of France, Italy and Great Britain.

Though the Sanussis had lost much of their territory to the Europeans by the end of the First World War, Kufra continued to resist conquest and remained, with the exception of several prisoners and the redoubtable Rosita Forbes, closed to non-Muslims. When an Italian column under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani arrived in 1931 with 3,000 troops, artillery and a score of warplanes, Kufra’s fate was sealed.

The Italians built a fort and an important airfield, but were relieved of their new possession by a column of Free French and Chadian colonial troops with the aid of the newly-formed British Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) in March 1941. The battle marked the first major victory in the distinguished military career of the operation’s commander, French General Philippe Leclerc. Kufra was then used as a base for desert operations by the LRDG and Special Air Service (SAS).

tubu kufra 1Tubu Militiamen

In recent years Kufra has become an important center on the Libyan desert road system that has improved transportation across the Sahara and allowed food aid shipments to be driven south directly to refugee camps in Darfur and Chad (Mathaba.net, November 24, 2004). A massive agricultural project uses water drawn from the massive aquifers discovered beneath the Libyan desert. On a darker note, Kufra has also become an important mid-way point for human traffickers shipping migrants from sub-Saharan Africa north to the Mediterranean coast, where they board overcrowded boats bound for a perilous voyage to Europe.

Zuwaya Arabs and Teda Tubu were reported to have clashed in Kufra in 2008, with the Teda getting the worst of it. The Libyan rebels claim to have support from the Zuwaya, but the Tubu are often seen as inclined towards Qaddafi (AFP, April 25). The Tubu have had their own problems with the Libyan leader, who expelled several thousand of them to Chad after a member of the Sanussi royal family tried to recruit Tubu mercenaries to fight Qaddafi in the early 1970s. Despite this, many Tubu find careers in the Libyan military that suit the warrior traditions of their noble clans. Under King Idriss al-Sanusi (1951-1969), the Tubu formed the royal guard. Loyalist operations in the oasis have the potential of reviving the local Arab-Tubu rivalry.

This article first appeared in the May 5, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Libyan Berbers Defy Regime That Denies Their Existence (Part One)

Andrew McGregor

May 5, 2011

In the remote mountains that range along Libya’s western border with Tunisia, North Africa’s indigenous Berber tribes are locked in a life-and-death struggle with Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s Arab-supremacist regime. Though they were among the first to rebel against Qaddafi’s government, the Berbers are poorly armed and severely short of food and fuel with loyalist forces in the plains cutting off supply routes. Direct military intervention by NATO warplanes appears to the Berbers to be the only way of repelling advancing loyalist troops.

Berbers 1Heavily tattooed ancient Libu as depicted in a 19th Dynasty Egyptian Tomb Painting

There are an estimated 25 million Berbers (as defined by use of Berber languages) spread across North Africa. The Berbers call themselves Imazighen (“Free Men”) and their ancestors were known to their ancient Egyptian neighbors as the Libu, the Meshwesh, the Tjehenu and the Tamahu.

Libya’s Berbers do not form a single group; a division between Eastern and Western Berbers dates back to ancient times and the desert-dwelling ethnic-Berber Tuareg developed their own independent culture centuries ago. As a result, there are three main groups of ethnic-Berbers in Libya with only minimal interrelation:

• The Western Berbers consist of two main groups.

1) The tribes of the Ait Willul live in the coastal city of Zuwara, known in Berber as Tamurt n Wat Willul (Town of the Ait Willul). Zuwara rose in revolt in February, but government forces suppressed the rebellion there a month later.

2) The Nafusa tribes live in the Western Mountains (al-Jabal al-Gharbi), better known as the Nafusa Mountains after the region’s Berber name, Adrar n Infusen. The Nafusa Berbers retreated there from the coast to isolate themselves from the mass Arabization of the Libyans after the arrival of two large Arab tribes in the 11th century, the Banu Hilal and the Banu Salim. The Nafusa declared against Qaddafi in the earliest days of the rebellion despite having little ability to defend their communities. With the government having managed to consolidate itself in other parts of western Libya, loyalist forces have now turned their attention to the mountain rebels.

• The Eastern Berbers live in the oasis towns of Jalu and Awjilah, about 250km southeast of the battlefront at Ajdabiya. Rebel sources reported a new loyalist offensive by troops in trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns and Grad rockets against the settlements this week, part of a government effort to cut off rebel-held northern Cyrenaica from the oil and water-rich Libyan interior.  The loyalist column of 45 vehicles was destroyed in a NATO airstrike on May 1 after the column attacked Jalu and Awjilah (Reuters, May 1; Upstream Online, May 2).

• The Tuareg live in communities focused on the oases of southwestern Libya. Though ethnically Berber, the Tuareg developed their own culture and version of the Berber language (Tamasheq or Tamahaq) after their ancestors migrated deep into the African interior roughly 1600 years ago. Despite insisting the Tuareg are actually Arabs, Qaddafi has also sought their favor at times due to their reputation as skilled desert fighters he could use in his efforts to expand his influence in the Sahara and Sahel regions. Qaddafi’s occasional efforts to champion the Tuareg cause and arm Tuareg rebel movements outside Libya appear to have brought large numbers of Tuareg from Mali and Niger to Libya to join the loyalist forces, though this recruitment has been achieved more through cash payments than personal loyalty to Qaddafi. [1] Libya’s own Tuareg appear divided on whether to support Qaddafi, though few, if any, appear to have joined the armed rebellion.

Berbers 2Modern Libyan Berbers Demanding Language Rights

Qaddafi has always regarded the existence of the Berbers as an annoying reminder of the Berber origins of his own Arabized tribe and hence an impediment to his efforts to become leader of the pan-Arab community. An apparent softening of the regime’s approach to the Berber minority led by Sa’if al-Islam Qaddafi in 2007 (which included lifting the ban on Berber names) was reversed by Mu’ammar Qaddafi less than a year later when the Libyan leader travelled to the Western mountains to warn Berbers; “You can call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes – Berbers, Children of Satan, whatever – but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes” [2]

Notes:

1. See Andrew McGregor, “Libyan Loyalists and Dissidents Vie for Tuareg Fighters,” Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 10, 2011.
2. U.S. Embassy Tripoli cable 08TRIPOLI530, July 3, 2008, published by the Telegraph, January 31, 2011. See also AFP, August 24, 2007.

This article first appeared in the May 5, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Strikes Algerian Military in Kabylia

Andrew McGregor

April 28, 2011

While the Saharan wing of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has dominated regional headlines in the last year, the larger core wing of AQIM operating in the northern forests and mountains of the Kabylia region has recently stepped up its activities, killing dozens of soldiers, gendarmes and civilians in a series of attacks this month.

Tizi OuzouAlgerian Soldier in Tizi Ouzou

A major AQIM raid targeted a guard post of the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) near the town of Azazga in Tizi Ouzou province on the evening of April 14/15. Local residents say the attack began at 8PM with a series of mortar explosions, followed by bursts of automatic rifle fire. Soon after the assault began, government helicopters arrived and delivered heavy fire against a nearby forest to which the assailants had fled. Other helicopters evacuated the dead and wounded to a military hospital in Algiers (Le Temps d’Algérie, April 17).

An AQIM communiqué released on April 20 claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that one mujahid was killed during the raid: “We will never forget the blood of our martyrs and we will reply to all those among us who have been killed by the evil apostates [i.e. the Algerian military]” (Ennahar [Algiers], April 20). Official sources said the militants had suffered heavy losses in the attack (Le Temps d’Algérie, April 27).

Militants have begun using roadside bombs along the RN 24 highway in Kabylia, recently re-opened after being closed for security reasons for 20 years (al-Watan [Algiers], April 13; La Tribune [Algiers], April 7). Two gendarmes were killed in Kabylia by a roadside bomb on April 27 (Reuters, April 27).

In the town of Lakhdaria, surrounded by the mountains of Kabylia, a remote-controlled bomb planted in a restaurant killed one gendarme and injured another. It was believed the bomb was meant to target Chinese nationals who frequented the restaurant, but the arrival of the gendarmes led the terrorists to detonate the device early (L’Expression [Algiers], April 18).

Algerian security forces are engaged in constant operations to eliminate the elusive cells of AQIM. Four AQIM fighters were killed on April 24 in a large military operation carried out in the Khenafou mountains of Tizi Ouzu province. Authorities said intensive intelligence work had led to the arrest of the guide of a column of roughly 20 AQIM militants. The guide was about a day and a half ahead of the rest of the group and his information allowed security forces to prepare and ambush for his comrades (Tour sur l’Algérie, April 26). Algerian authorities had earlier reported the death of eight AQIM militants in Tizi Ouzu and neighboring Boumerdès province on April 15 (L’Expression, April 18).

Algerian troops and fighter jets are also monitoring the southern Saharan region for AQIM militants crossing to and from Libya. Seven militants were reported to have been killed by border guards with shoot-to-kill orders on April 20, three of them while trying to enter Libya (al-Khabar [Algiers], April 20).

This article first appeared in the April 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Growing Dissatisfaction in Rebel Camp with NATO’s Campaign in Libya

Andrew McGregor

April 28, 2011

Since NATO air operations over Libya began on March 19, there have been increasing expectations on the part of rebel forces that NATO warplanes will act as a proxy air force for the rebel campaign to overthrow Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi. These expectations have been fuelled by rhetoric coming out of Western capitals calling for the destruction of the Libyan military and even the assassination of Qaddafi himself, though these activities would seem to exceed the aims and limitations of the UN Security Council’s authorization of a no-fly zone.

Mustafa Abd al-JalilMustafa Abd al-Jalil

The rebel viewpoint was expressed in a pan-Arab daily’s recent interview with Mustafa Abd al-Jalil, the chairman of the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) and the former justice minister in the Qaddafi government (al-Hayat, April 22).

Without reference to the terms of the no-fly zone, which authorizes air attacks for the purpose of defending civilians, Abd al-Jalil berates NATO for not striking targets identified by rebel observers, an action he claims “could have ended the war within a month.” Al-Jalil says he does not understand the reasons for NATO’s failure to strike these targets: “God knows the conditions under which the coalition operates. Perhaps there is competition among these countries, or perhaps there is inability. I do not understand military issues, and I do not know the reason.” The rebel leader does describe “prevarication” in decision-making after NATO took command of air operations on March 25: “Perhaps the reason is the difference in the attacking capabilities of the aircraft of the friends in France, Italy and Britain, and the extent of the advance of the U.S. aircraft used in the first strikes.”

Abd al-Jalil rejects suggestions that members of al-Qaeda are active in the armed opposition: “You know very well that the issue of al-Qaeda is a scarecrow used by the enemies and opponents who support Mu’ammar Qaddafi in dealing with the international community, especially with the Europeans and the United States.” Ignoring the March 12 message to Libyans from top al-Qaeda leader and Libyan native Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-Jalil claims: “Some Libyan individuals were members of al-Qaeda, but their number does not exceed ten, and they have abandoned their organization, and the organization abandoned them long ago.”

While insisting that “Libyans are capable of managing the battle by themselves,” al-Jalil admits that he is asking France, Italy and Qatar to urge NATO and its coalition partners to apply greater force against the Libyan regime. He alleges that Qaddafi is also receiving foreign support from Algeria, Niger, Chad and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) of Abd al-Wahid al-Nur. The latter is a Darfur rebel movement consisting mostly of Fur tribesmen, unlike the largely Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which has more commonly been accused of supporting Qaddafi, though no evidence of this has yet been presented. [1] According to al-Jalil, the NTC has asked France to do something about the fuel, weapons and other supplies they claim are flowing to Qaddafi’s forces from the former French colonies and is now “waiting for the results.”

Al-Jalil also suggests that the Syrian-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) of Ahmad Jibril has sent 1,000 Palestinians to Tripoli to defend the regime. The PFLP-GC was also recently blamed by Syrian authorities for the sniper killings of anti-Assad protestors in the Syrian port city of Latakia, though many observers believe the killings were the work of Syrian security forces.

There are reports of divisions within the NTC over the introduction of Western ground forces in Libya, though there is some consensus that NATO air operations are insufficient to guarantee a rebel victory. If the UN Security Council and the Arab League fail to authorize such an intervention, the rebels may seek out their own “military experts and advisers to boost the capabilities of the Free Libya Army” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 21). The NTC chairman confirms that the rebel camp has been successful in obtaining new weapons, either through purchase or donation, and that some of these weapons have been shipped to the rebels in Misurata.

Note

1. See Andrew McGregor, Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary, “Update on African Mercenaries: Have Darfur Rebels Joined Qaddafi’s Mercenary Defenders?” February 24, 2011. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37563

This article first appeared in the April 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Turkish Intelligence Says al-Qaeda Planned Rocket Attack on U.S. Air Base

Andrew McGregor

April 22, 2011

Turkish security services claim to have learned of an al-Qaeda plot to use rockets to attack U.S. military aircraft at the Incirlik Air Base in southeastern Turkey. According to intelligence collected by the National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati – MIT) and the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu), the plot was to be carried out by two Syrian members of al-Qaeda identified as Abu Muhammad al-Kurdi and Salih Battal (Today’s Zaman, April 6).

IncirlikThe Incirlik Air Base is located just outside the city of Adana and is used jointly by the U.S. Air Force and the Turkish Air Force (Turk Hava Kuwetleri). It is the permanent home of the U.S.A.F.’s 39th Air Base Wing, which acts as the host unit for American air operations using the base. Incirlik has played an important role in U.S. military and intelligence operations from the Cold War through to the war in Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A U.S. diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks dated June 8, 2006 said that Turkey had allowed Incirlik to be used as a refueling stop for U.S. aircraft involved in the CIA’s rendition program (Guardian, January 17). Incirlik is also thought to be a forward storage site for U.S. nuclear weapons.

The revelations were followed on April 12 by a series of raids in Istanbul and the eastern province of Van on the homes of suspected members of al-Qaeda and Turkish Hezbollah, a largely Kurdish Islamist militant group involved in the torture and murder of hundreds of members of the Kurdish socialist Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) rebel movement in the 1990s.

Forty-two suspects were detained by police in Istanbul and a further ten in Van. Turkish authorities said that one of the detainees was the alleged head of the Turkish chapter of al-Qaeda, Halis Bayancuk, a graduate of Cairo’s al-Azhar University and a former member of Turkish Hezbollah. He was charged with leading a terrorist organization in 2008, but released less than a year later (Today’s Zaman, April 14; Turkiye Radyo Televizyon [TRT], April 12).

In a recent move that outraged Turkish public opinion, a Turkish court ordered the release in January of at least 25 members of Turkish Hezbollah alleged to have been involved in the brutal murders of PKK members and rival Islamists. The release was ordered under a new law that states detainees cannot remain imprisoned for more than ten years without a trial. The case against the suspects was complicated by numerous allegations that Hezbollah operated as a covert arm of the state’s efforts to crush Kurdish separatism and Islamist challenges to the officially secular Turkish state (Hurriyet, January 7; BBC, January 23, 2000). Turkish authorities did not state whether any of those arrested were involved in the January release (Reuters, April 12).

The obvious importance of Incirlik Air Base to the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy interests in the region has inspired a number of Islamist militant cells to plan attacks on U.S. facilities at Incirlik. In 2002 four Arab-Americans were arrested in Detroit on charges of operating a terrorist cell. Sketches of the Incirlik air base were found in their apartment (Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2002; Washington Post, September 15, 2002). There are reports that Osama bin Laden suggested that a Turkish militant cell attack U.S. facilities at Incirlik, but the would-be attackers were dissuaded by the tight security at the base. They then turned their attentions to softer targets, bombing two Istanbul synagogues in November 2003 (Independent, December 18, 2003. There were further warnings of an imminent attack by suicide bombers or hijacked planes in February 2006.

 

This article first appeared in the April 22, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Syria Claims to Have Disrupted Terrorist Group Responsible for Protests

Andrew McGregor

April 21, 2011

Syria has implicated a leading Lebanese politician in the creation of a Damascus-based terrorist cell intent on discrediting the Syrian government by killing demonstrators and making it look like the work of the Syrian regime. The allegations were based on the confessions of three individuals carried on Syrian television. An array of weapons said to have been seized from the alleged terrorists at the time of their April 10 arrest were also displayed.

UmmayadFocus of Demonstrations: The Ummayad Mosque, Damascus

The leader of the cell, Anas Knaj, a 29-year-old billboard worker, claimed to have recruited two of his friends, Muhammad Badr al-Qalam and Muhammad Ahmad al-Sukhneh, to form a terrorist cell under the name “The Syrian Revolution,” which he said aimed to “move the country from a bad situation to a better one” (Syrian Arab News Agency [SANA], April 13; al-Ba’ath [Damascus], April 13).

The formation and arming of the cell was facilitated by a mysterious individual, Ahmad Audeh, who claimed to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Audeh told the men that he was acting on behalf of Lebanese member of parliament Jamal al-Jarrah, a member of Sa’ad al-Hariri’s Mustaqbal (Future) movement, part of the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition. Audeh suggested that al-Jarrah was part of the Muslim Brotherhood and would provide generous rewards to the members of the cell for their work. In the event of their death, their families would receive large cash payments.

Kanj reported that the cell initially received orders to instigate demonstrations near the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus by recruiting a handful of young people to begin chanting “freedom slogans” near the mosque. As hundreds of other Syrians joined the apparently spontaneous demonstration, the provocateurs slipped away before police arrived.

The Umayyad Mosque has been a focal point for protests in Damascus since the demonstrations began on March 15. The mosque is one of the world’s oldest continually used holy places, with the site successively hosting a Bronze Age temple, a Roman Temple of Jupiter, a Byzantine basilica devoted to John the Baptist and the present mosque, founded by an Ummayad caliph in 706.

Though the men had little experience with weapons, Audeh was said to have provided them with sniper rifles and training in their use. Audeh claimed to have used bribery to ship the weapons from Lebanon across the border to Syria and said Kanj’s cell was only one of many he had equipped within Syria. According to Kanj, Audeh ordered the cell members to fire on the demonstrators with their sniper rifles. Photos of the carnage were to be taken and posted to the dissident al-Thawra (Revolution) Facebook site “to make the people believe that the Syrian security members are the ones who were killing the citizens.” Their efforts were regarded as a success within the cell when the al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera news networks reported Syrian security forces were shooting unarmed demonstrators in Damascus.

Just before the men were arrested they claimed to have received orders to attack the poorly-defended Sbeineh police station outside Damascus while disguised as members of the Syrian security forces. One individual was assigned to take photos of the attack and post them to the al-Thawra Facebook site.

The exiled leader of the Syrian chapter of the Muslim Brothers, Muhammad Ri’ad Shaqfa, denied that his movement had any role in promoting unrest in Syria, though it backed demands for greater liberty: “All tyrants play the same game. They accuse their own people of serving an outside conspiracy while using violence and cunning to survive” (Reuters, April 11). The movement was banned in 1963 and membership is punishable by death since 1980.

Iranian sources claim Syria is under attack by an alliance consisting of the pro-Israeli camp in Washington, anti-Iranian elements in Saudi Arabia and the Mustaqbal movement of Sa’ad Hariri in Beirut (Press TV [Tehran], April 15). Supporters of the Syrian regime have pointed to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks that suggest Sa’ad al-Hariri had proposed replacing Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad with a coalition that would include the Muslim Brotherhood, former Syrian vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam and former Syrian Army chief-of-staff Hekmat al-Shahabi (al-Akhbar [Beirut], April 16; Ahram Online, April 16; al-Watan [Damascus], April 18). Khaddam has lived in exile in Paris since 2005 after accusing Assad of directing the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, father of current Mustaqbal leader Sa’ad Hariri. Al-Shehabi resigned after 24 years as Army chief-of-staff in 1998 and moved to California.

While confirming a personal relationship with Abdul Halim Khaddam, Lebanese MP Jamal al-Jarrah has denied any involvement in the alleged terrorist cell: “If [the Syrians] have any evidence, we call on them to present it to the Lebanese judiciary and let it rule” (iloubnan.info, April 13; al-Jadeed TV, April 13). Al-Jarrah later suggested the mysterious al-Audeh could have been an Israeli agent (Naharnet, April 16).

Syrian officials have accused the Muslim Brothers of pursuing a sectarian conflict by attacking Alawites and Christians in Syria. The Brotherhood, however, is apparently keeping a low profile in the unrest, unwilling to give Assad’s regime an excuse for a general massacre of suspected members.

This article first appeared in the April 21, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Libya: It Didn’t Start This Way, but It’s a War for Oil Now

Andrew McGregor

Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary on Libya

April 20, 2011

Libya - War for Oil 1Executive Summary: After nearly two months of fighting in Libya, what began as a revolution against Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s repressive regime has turned into an internal and international struggle for control over Libya’s oil and gas reserves. Of the country’s four major oil basins, the most productive – Sirte Basin – is only partly controlled by the rebel forces. While some reserves are in contested areas, the majority of Libya’s oil is still in government hands. Now lacking funds, arms and leaders, the rebels’ sole asset and the key to any possible success is their share of the oil fields. They are currently desperate for funds, fuel and training.  Furthermore, the rebels are almost completely dependent on NATO forces to defend their oil operations, which would require the unpopular and unlikely decision to put Western troops on the ground in Libya. However, multiple American energy producers, including ConocoPhillips, hold stakes in Libyan oil fields. The international community is now scrambling to find alternative sources of oil until UN sanctions are lifted. Qatar, which has supplied the Benghazi rebels with four shipments of petroleum products, has also agreed to market the rebel oil. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has boosted its output to meet any shortfall in supply created by the Libyan crisis. Meanwhile, the violence in this oil war is spreading, with three oil workers recently killed in loyalist attacks on the Misla and Sarir oil fields in early April.

Introduction

As ships of the U.S., French and British fleets stood by, a supertanker carrying a Libyan rebel shipment of 550,000 barrels of high-grade crude oil worth $110 million made its way from Tobruk earlier this month, headed east for China. An observer might have come to the conclusion that the war in Libya was securing the energy supplies of those who refused to sanction or join it. Without knowing it, however, this observer could also have been gazing at the last major oil shipment to leave Libya for some time, leaving a revolution the West had hoped would be self-financing instead reliant on handouts from nations that have invested too much in the revolt to turn back.

Assertions that oil was behind the conflict from the beginning are both predictable and inaccurate. The West had repaired its relations with Qaddafi who was opening the Libyan oil industry to Western participation and was selling the West prime petroleum products at market rates. There was simply no reason to destroy stability in a reliable energy producer, particularly at a time when the United States and its allies are trying to disengage from two costly wars in Muslim countries and mount their own economic recoveries.

The Libyan revolt was rather a spontaneous eruption of dissatisfaction with Qaddafi’s repressive and erratic regime. This, however, has been its greatest weakness; the revolt is unorganized, unplanned, unfunded, leaderless and militarily inferior to its opponent. Despite a month of fighting, international sanctions and a massive Western aerial intervention, the revolt that began with the slogan “Libyans can do it themselves” is now desperate for funds, fuel, food, arms and training. The rebels’ sole asset and the key to any possible success is the oil fields under their control, though recent long-range operations by Qaddafi loyalists in the Libyan desert have halted production, leaving the rebels without a source of financing and entirely dependent on Western sources of money and arms, a long way from the revolution’s once buoyant “do it ourselves” philosophy. It did not start this way, but the Libyan crisis has evolved into an internal and international struggle for control of Libya’s abundant oil and gas reserves.

Libyan Oil Production

Libya is home to four major oil basins: the Ghadames, Murzuk, Kufra and Sirte basins. The most productive is the 230,000 km² Sirte Basin, which holds roughly 80% of Libya’s proven reserves with 43 billion barrels and accounts for 90% of production. The rebels control a part of the Sirte Basin capable of producing 200,000 bpd. Some reserves are in contested areas, but the vast majority of Libya’s oil remains in government hands. While fuel supplies have been a problem in the rebel-held areas, the government continues to control nearly all Libya’s refining capacity and most of its export terminals (Reuters, April 11). Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa and is the world’s 17th largest oil producer. 85% of production goes to Europe, 5% to the United States and 10% to China.

The rebel-held oil facilities are now being operated by AGOCO (Arabian Gulf Oil Company), a 1979 split-off from the state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC). AGOCO claims it has two million barrels still in storage at Marsa al-Hariqa, though this has not been confirmed (Reuters, April 7). The NOC claims it is currently producing up to 300,000 bpd, but would have little alternative to storing production until sanctions are lifted or alternative means of sale can be established.

Besides agreeing to market the rebel oil, Qatar has also supplied the Benghazi rebels with four shipments of badly needed petroleum products through its state owned International Petroleum Marketing Co. (PennEnergy, April 13).

Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Nuaimi said Saudi Arabia has enough spare output capacity to meet any shortfall in supply created by the Libyan crisis, having already boosted its output to about nine million bpd, including a new blend it claims approximates light sweet Libyan crude (Gulf Daily News [Bahrain], April 10). However, Saudi Arabia has not produced more than 10 million bpd in recent years and some industry experts doubt it will be able to increase production to 12.5 million bpd, as it claims. There are also questions regarding the quality of the new Saudi blend, which may not be as fine as the Libyan product.

Opportunities for China and Russia?

Defected former Libyan Energy Minister Omar Fati bin Shatvan recently declared that Russia and China would not be granted the opportunity to develop oil and gas fields in Libya under a new rebel regime because they had failed to support the rebellion, adding that French and Italian companies could be rewarded with oil and gas contracts for their support (AFP, April 7). However, Qaddafi has already invited Russian, Chinese and Indian diplomats to discuss taking over Western oil operations in Libya once he has dealt with the Western supported rebellion.

Vulnerability to Attack

Three oil workers were killed in loyalist attacks by armored vehicles on the Misla oil field on April 4 and 5, and an attack on the Sarir oil field on April 6. Sarir is also home to important installations belonging to the $25 billion Great Man-Made River project, which supplies water from subterranean Saharan aquifers to Libya’s cities, including Ajdabiyah and Benghazi.

Tripoli claimed (without evidence) that the damage was caused by “British war planes,” perhaps seeking a propaganda victory on top of a series of successful raids (UKPA, April 7). The rebels are calling for NATO to defend their oil operations, but this will be difficult without putting Western troops on the ground, a move that would be opposed by many NATO members. Loyalist forces seem to be basing their attacks out of the Waha oil field, located near the center of the Sirte Basin operations. American energy producer ConocoPhillips has a 16% share in a joint venture working the Waha oil field, while Marathon Oil and Hess Corporation hold smaller stakes. Qaddafi’s forces can also operate from the desert city of Sabha, home to a large military base and the loyalist Megarha tribe, striking east to attack rebel-held oil fields.

Libya - War for Oil 2The loyalist raids targeted oil storage tanks and a diesel tank that provides fuel to the generators at Misla and Sarir. Many skilled workers capable of repairing such damage have been evacuated from Libya and the rebels have only been able to spare young, untrained fighters to defend the oilfields from further destruction (Financial Times, April 7).  Without more substantial defenses, it looks like rebel oil production will cease for the duration of the conflict. Even before the attacks, oil production at the Misla and Sarir oil fields was only one-third of capacity. AGOCO officials have said production will not resume until the oil fields have been secured (Reuters, April 13). In these circumstances, Qaddafi’s forces can continue to disrupt rebel oil operations without having to damage or destroy the most important elements of the oil fields, enabling them to be put back into production quickly in the event of a loyalist victory.

The only export terminal in rebel hands is Marsa al-Hariqa near Tobruk, which would be vulnerable to attack via the desert highway from Ajdabiyah should that city be secured by loyalist forces. Marsa al-Hariqa is the smallest of Libya’s oil terminals in terms of loading volumes. Perhaps the most vulnerable part of the infrastructure is the 500 km pipeline connecting the eastern oil fields to Marsa al-Hariqa. Other pipelines connect the same oil fields to terminals controlled by the government.

An Unfinanced Revolution

The rebel leadership is attempting to secure an exemption from UN sanctions for their oil exports.  However, even if loyalist forces are ousted from the oil fields, it is likely the rebels will be unable to produce more than about 50,000 bpd, an amount likely to be insufficient to finance services, purchase food and other goods and run an expensive military campaign against Qaddafi’s forces. Marine insurance for vessels doing business in Libya has skyrocketed, perhaps prohibitively except for countries such as Qatar that are willing to absorb the risk. UK Foreign Secretary William Hague has already asked the international community to provide “temporary” financial support to the INC. Qaddafi has considerable gold reserves stored in Tripoli, enough to keep a war running for years, while the rebels have only whatever oil is still stored at the Tobruk terminal.

In the continuing search for funds, the rebel Interim National Council (INC), recognized as Libya’s government by France, Italy and Qatar, has asked the United States for immediate access to Qaddafi’s frozen assets, believed to total more than $34 billion (Reuters, April 9). The request raises the question of whether funds that should belong to the Libyan people as a whole can be released to an unelected committee composed largely of Benghazi-based dissidents.

Stalemate or Defeat?

Without military intervention by ground forces, indicators point not toward stalemate, but toward an eventual government victory, even if NATO airstrikes cause a delay in this outcome. Strategically, Qaddafi’s forces hold the upper hand and have proven highly adaptable in developing tactics to cope with NATO’s aerial intervention.

Qaddafi is demonstrating that authoritarianism will prevail over the type of “war by committee” that is being run by both NATO and the Libyan rebels. The no-fly zone might actually have improved loyalist tactics, forcing them to abandon slow moving armor columns in favor of more mobile deployments in pick-up trucks that are able to mount quick strikes against rebel forces. U.S. and NATO commanders complain that loyalist forces assemble near civilian infrastructure such as schools and hospitals as if this was somehow “unfair.” The West has invented this form of limited warfare and should not be surprised that the Libyans and others subjected to it would devise tactical methods of response that do not involve lining up in the open desert to be destroyed by enemy airstrikes.

With many major tribes now siding with Qaddafi, whether through loyalty, tribal ties or cash payments, NATO stands in danger of being seen to be attempting to impose a national government consisting of a dissident minority. Such a state would seem to stand little chance of survival once NATO military support is withdrawn. Both sides have broken out the armories, and Libya is now flooded with arms, leaving any new government subject to armed opposition.

Having taken the lead in marketing rebel oil, the tiny emirate of Qatar appears to be taking the lead in arming the insurgents – according to rebel General Abd al-Fatah Younes (who appears to have picked up a Western security team to ensure his personal safety), Qatar has supplied the rebel forces with anti-tank weapons (al-Jazeera, April 8; Independent, April 7). Considering the military ineptness of rebel forces prone to panic and flight, there is every possibility that arms and munitions provided to the rebels will soon wind up in the hands of a grateful loyalist army.

Conclusion

NATO’s campaign might easily be called “The War of Contradictions,” since it has said one thing and done another from the beginning. Its entire framework for intervention is based on a no-fly zone to protect civilians that was exposed as a cover for battlefield air support for the Libyan rebels almost immediately. While some NATO nations see the campaign as one intended to protect civilians, France, Britain and the United States are clearly set on regime change, a course that cannot be reversed at this point. From the beginning, Western involvement in the Libyan crisis has been based on the false assumption that Qaddafi was universally disliked and unwanted in Libya. Despite ample evidence to the contrary after nearly two months of fighting, the NATO campaign continues to rest on this unfounded belief.

NATO and the Western media celebrate every time another non-combatant politician defects, but these efforts at self-preservation play no role in the battle on the ground. What is more important is the near total absence of defecting loyalist fighters. For the Libyan regulars and their mercenary auxiliaries it is clear who has the upper hand in the fighting and who has the ability to pay their troops and reward success handsomely.

Rebels now demand nothing less than unconditional surrender – probably not a realistic option, but one based on the belief that NATO will do their fighting for them. The rebels now believe their ranks to be thoroughly infiltrated by Qaddafi spies, probably a sign that morale is crumbling as rebel fighters refuse to acknowledge war is a professional’s game.

If the conflict drags on, who will be the first to break sanctions by buying oil from the Qaddafi government? Italian oil firm Eni was reported to be arranging for a shipment from a Qaddafi-controlled terminal, but believes the shipment will not violate sanctions as the oil is owned by Eni (Reuters, April 13). Italy purchases 32% of Libya’s oil and must now try to make up the shortfall.

Without oil, the rebel movement has no future. It already lacks ideology and a leader; if it also lacks a financial base it would seem to have little future. As one rebel fighter told a Reuters correspondent: “We have no coordination. We have no organization. We really have no strategy. We have no commander” (Reuters, April 10). To succeed in destroying the rebellion, Colonel Qaddafi must prevent the rebels from producing and selling oil. If the conflict drags on, the costs to Western nations involved in imposing a naval blockade, maintaining a no-fly zone, providing air support to rebel operations and funding, feeding and fueling the “liberated” areas of Libya will soon draw an outcry from the very same public that once demanded military intervention. Time is on Qaddafi’s side; eventually international pressure will force the rebels to temper their demands to find a negotiated settlement. The alternative is Western military occupation of Libya, a new and unexpected war to be added to the unresolved campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Libyan Television Chief Describes Arab-Western Conspiracy against Tripoli

Andrew McGregor

April 14, 2011

Libyan poet Ali al-Kilani is a member of Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s inner circle and has been described as the “poet of the Green Revolution.” As director of Libyan television, al-Kilani has played an important role in defining and presenting the regime’s version of events in Libya. Al-Kilani gained international attention in 2007, when he wrote a song entitled “Al-Qidis Saddam” (The Holy Saddam), which praised the late Saddam Hussein and denounced his executioners (al-Bawaba, July 19, 2007; al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2009). He recently gave his views on the current rebellion and his perception of bias in the Arab media to a pan-Arab daily (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 12).

QaddafiMu’ammar Qaddafi

From the beginning of the rebellion, the Qaddafi regime has condemned the coverage provided by most of the Arab media, going so far as to jam satellite channels such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. Al-Kilani insists that their coverage is inaccurate and influenced by foreign powers: “These channels say that al-Qaddafi is in Venezuela, while al-Qaddafi is in Libya; they say that al-Qaddafi’s daughter has fled, while she is in Libya. This is deceptive news, unfair and supported by foreign funds against Libya.”

Al-Kilani is particularly angered by the portrayal in the Western and Arab press of armed rebels as “innocent civilians”: “How can civilians possess RPG and Kalashnikov weapons, and come out with these weapons from their region to Tripoli? … From Derna to Benghazi, to Ajdabiya and to Burayqah they move riding tanks and military transport vehicles with U.S. aircraft over them; what kind of civilians are these?”

Al-Kilani describes the rebellion as a mix of religious, political, media and military elements forming a “tight-knit conspiracy.” On the ground the Libyan regime faces “the weapons of terrorism and al-Qaeda,” supported by deviant clerics and F-16 aircraft.

Rejecting all foreign intervention in Libya, al-Kilani states the conflict is an internal affair: “Today some 500 rockets from Qatar and the UAE have been used; these are our brothers; what have we done to them? We go to them as tourists; what have we done to them? What have we done to [Arab League Secretary-General] Amr Musa?” Though Qaddafi’s Libya is famous for its meddling in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, al-Kilani claims “If there is a dispute between a Qatari man and his father and brother, we have nothing to do with it; if there is a dispute in the UAE, we have nothing to do with it; therefore this is our own affair.”

Responding to reports carried by the Arab press that members of the Libyan government are confined to the Bab al-Aziziyah barracks in Tripoli, al-Kilani insisted that these were “lies and falsifications.” When asked why Minister of Defense Major General Abu Bakr Yunous  has not been heard from (he was reported to have been detained by Qaddafi in the early days of the rebellion when he refused to issue orders to fire on demonstrators), al-Kilani said: “He is there in his ministry, may God prolong his life. He is a struggler. Come and see him.”

This article first appeared in the April 14, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor