Security Implications for North Africa in the Wake of the Arab Revolution

Posted on March 18, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 18, 2011

Speech delivered to the Jamestown Foundation Conference – “The Impact of Arab Uprisings on Regional Stability in the Middle East and North Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, March 18, 2011.

Storming the Bastille – Revolution in France, 1789

Introduction

Nostradamus himself could not have foretold the wave of political change that has been unleashed on the Arab world, all sparked by the self-immolation of a single Tunisian sidewalk vendor who could not find any other way of expressing his indignation at a corrupt and authoritarian system.

Revolutions are dangerous creatures that can unleash all kinds of unpredictable social forces that can take a revolution a long way from where it started.

The French Revolution of 1789, which both inspired and terrified Europe, began with the journées, days of mass action much like the “days of anger” we see today in the Arab world. Though the king and queen were led to their death, it was not long after that leading revolutionaries such as Robespierre had their own meetings with Madame Guillotine. Liberty, Fraternity and Equality became a mere slogan as Napoleon Bonaparte, the revolution’s leading general, restored authoritarianism to France and directing the slaughter of a generation of young men in pursuit of imperial conquest.

The European Revolution of 1848 and the Arab Revolution of 2011

In its size, sudden development and transnational character, the Arab Revolution most closely resembles the revolutions that shook Europe in 1848. There were many similarities, including:

A rapid spread from country to country, despite each nation’s revolution having a different character and circumstances
The revolts crossed social boundaries, even attracting an often reluctant middle class
Governments appeared to cave in at first
Too many university graduates were pursuing too few jobs. Higher education actually left them without the skills to pursue other types of employment
No charismatic leader emerged along the lines of a Bolivar, Garibaldi, Castro or even Washington.

Revolution in Berlin, 1848

The Results of the 1848 Revolutions?

Small concessions from the governments led to dwindling interest in revolution
When the casual revolutionaries gave up, the revolutions were doomed
The revolutions came to be dominated by a single political perspective (in this case, the left)
By the summer of 1848, the forces of counter-revolution had time to reorganize and began clearing the barricades with the loss of thousands of lives
The revolts in Hungary and Italy became larger wars of national liberation, but within one year both had been solidly defeated by the Hapsburgs
In France, the Second Republic was soon replaced by the Second Empire of Louis-Napoleon.

In the end, all of the national revolts failed, but they laid the foundation and provided the inspiration for later revolts such as the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Most importantly, they signaled that the end of absolute monarchies was in sight. In this sense, even failed revolutions can have an enormous impact on political developments decades later.

Arms for Africa

It has been suggested in some quarters that the military weakness of Libya’s rebels can be overcome with supplies of modern weapons. It must be noted, though, that every influx of arms into the Sahel/Sahara region in the last century has been followed by years of violence.

It was an influx of arms that contributed to the breakdown of order in Darfur that eventually resulted in tens of thousands of dead. Darfur used a centuries old inter-tribal resolution system usually involving compensation in cash or animals to deal with incidents of violence such as murder. However, this system broke down when the introduction of automatic weapons allowed the slaughter of dozens of people at a time by a single individual. Traditional methods of maintaining peace and security were simply overwhelmed by advances in killing technology.

Arms may be the solution to Qaddafi, but they will not bring stability to North Africa. Those advocating the shipment of modern arms to Libya’s rebels speak of controls over whose hands they wind up in. This, however, is wishful thinking. Once introduced, arms are sold, abandoned, lost, stolen, surrendered, or given away. Reports that anti-aircraft missiles taken from the armories of eastern Libya have already found their way to the hands of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb should give pause to those backing a military solution to the Libyan insurrection.

Libya – Key to African Security or African Chaos?

The half-hearted endorsement of a no fly zone by the Arab League was taken by NATO as a green light for attacks on Qaddafi’s forces. In reality, with the exception of wealthy but distant Qatar, most of the Arab League has kept a committed distance from the conflict. Egypt, with its own internal crisis that has largely disappeared from the news, appears unable or unwilling to exert influence on the events in Libya. To the west, there are unverified rumors that Algeria’s own military-based regime is providing arms and aid to Qaddafi. Algeria has no desire to see the Arab revolution wash up on the shores of Tripoli, and giving the Libyan rebels a bloody nose would go a long way to discouraging like-minded dissidents in Algeria.

In neighboring Chad and Sudan two other political survivors, General Idriss Deby and Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir, will not be hasty in counting out Qaddafi. Both nations have deep if turbulent ties with Libya, which has fluctuated between assisting their development and interfering in their internal affairs. In the meantime both are keeping their distance, but if Qaddafi falls it is likely that both will attempt to exert their own influence on the formation of a new regime.

Qaddafi’s Desert Alternative

The fall of Tripoli would not necessarily mean the end of Qaddafi or his regime. The Libyan leader would have the option of retiring on military bases in the desert where he enjoys solid support. With access to fighters from neighboring countries, Qaddafi or his successors could continue low-scale but debilitating attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that would effectively prevent any new Libyan government from getting off the ground without substantial foreign aid and assistance. It would not be difficult to raise a tribal force opposed to what would be seen as a Benghazi-based government intent on depriving the western and southern tribes of power, influence and funds. Such a conflict could go on for years, with predictable effects on oil prices. The rebels do not have the means, and possibly not even the inclination, to distribute oil revenues throughout the larger Libyan society.

Revolution in Libya, 2011

Should Qaddafi feel he is losing his grip on Libya it is possible that he could turn to asymmetrical warfare by once again sponsoring international terrorism, especially with strikes against the Western nations leading the attack on his regime. We also have no reason to suppose that a rump government in Benghazi would be a force for restoring security in the region. The rebels lack a trained security force or any kind of administration with a common goal other than the removal of Mu’ammar Qaddafi.

The al-Qaeda Question

The question here is not whether al-Qaeda will want to take advantage of instability in North Africa, but whether it can operate in any meaningful way.

Egypt is the historical crossroads of the world and as such it is an appealing theater of operations for al-Qaeda, which has ideological roots there through the works of Ibn at-Taymiyya and Sayid Qutb. Al-Qaeda could certainly attempt to penetrate Egypt and resume operations there, a course that would definitely appeal to Ayman al-Zawahiri and the other Egyptians in exile that form much of core al-Qaeda. However, al-Qaeda does not appear to have any active cells in Egypt, or even many sympathizers. There is little appetite for a return to the dirty backstreet war between Islamist extremists and the regime in the 1990s. More importantly, most Egyptians recognize that instability equals poverty, that terrorism isolates Egypt from the international community, depriving them of markets and important sources of foreign currency.

Al-Qaeda still does not present a political alternative developed beyond slogans promising the establishment of a Caliphate and the implementation of Shari’a law. With insufficient agricultural production, a rapidly increasing population, massive unemployment and underemployment and threats to its water supply that pose dangers to cultivation and power supplies, Egypt is in need of more thoughtful strategies than those supplied by the extremists. There are many sincere Muslims in the region who desire Shari’a, but they would also be the first to question the wisdom of leaving this in the hands of the band of kidnappers, murderers and drug traffickers that make up al-Qaeda in North Africa.

Opportunities will nevertheless be presented for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb from the conflicts that will inevitably follow revolution. Attention and resources will be diverted from their activities, while arms and alliances will become available to strengthen their position.

Sudan – Darfur

Cobbled together from scores of ethnic and tribal groups speaking hundreds of different languages, Sudan, unsurprisingly, has been a center of dissent, rebellion and outright civil war from its first day of independence. While popular revolts may be something new along the Mediterranean coast, Sudan’s people have already overthrown two dictators (Ibrahim Abboud, 1964; Ja’afar Nimeiri, 1984).

With the conflict in Darfur continuing despite a decline in foreign or media interest, and a number of unresolved issues threatening the peaceful separation of the south from the north, Sudan is now faced with the possibility of further disruptions to security arriving from its northern neighbors of Egypt and Libya. Qaddafi’s Libya has actually played a vital role in negotiating a peace settlement in Darfur and it is uncertain who would step up to fill the void. A small protest movement in Khartoum has been firmly repressed so far, but there is enormous dissatisfaction in the North with President Omar al-Bashir, who has failed to keep the country together and has lost most of its oil revenues to the new southern state. In the current situation there is the possibility of both North and South Sudan turning into failed states with enormous consequences for a large part of Africa.

The Tuareg – What Will They Do After Libya?

The collapse of the Qaddafi regime will have an enormous impact on the states of the Sahara and Sahel, including Chad, Mali and Niger. Libya is an integral part of the economies of many of these states, both through financial donations and the employment of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from these countries. Qaddafi regards this region as the Libyan hinterland and has played in important if sometimes destabilizing role in the area, particularly through his recruitment and sponsorship of the Tuareg peoples, whose ancient homeland has been divided between half a dozen nations in the post-colonial era. Having long acted as a kind of sponsor for the activities of Tuareg fighters battling regimes that regard the Tuareg presence as inconvenient and undesirable, Qaddafi is now arming Tuareg warriors who are rallying to his cause. Regardless of whether Qaddafi wins or loses, there is immense concern in these nations that the Tuareg fighters will return to their home states to initiate a new round of rebellions in poorly secured but oil and uranium-rich regions.

What Direction for Egyptian Security?

The Egyptian Revolution is not yet history. In fact, we may only have witnessed the first phase of a process that could continue for years or even decades. It is unlikely that Egypt’s officer corps, unquestionably part of Egypt’s elite, is willing to oversee the transfer of power from that same well-entrenched elite to the masses. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to think that this would be their first instinct. In Egypt, political revolution is also social revolution, and these things don’t usually happen overnight.

Egypt’s internal security services collapsed in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution and are in the difficult process of being rebuilt and restructured with a new mandate that promises to pursue genuine security threats rather than internal political opposition.

While there were many cases of government violence against demonstrators, there were remarkably few incidents of retaliatory violence against members of the security services during the revolution. Egypt does not have a taste for violent revolution. Such matters are traditionally handled by the nation’s elite, now formed from the military leadership.

The question here is how effective will a restructured security service devoted, as promised, to foreign rather than internal threats will be in controlling extremists. Egypt managed to destroy its radical Islamist movement by deploying an Interior Ministry force three times the size of the military, aided by legions of informers, both paid and coerced. Securing Egypt from Islamist extremism has come at a considerable cost to the liberty of most Egyptians, a cost no longer considered acceptable. The question, however, is whether a lighter and less-intrusive security presence still be as effective in eliminating Islamist extremism.

Unforeseen Consequences

Qaddafi’s Libya has always been one of the major financial backers of the African Union. These donations have stopped now with significant consequences for the African Union Mission in Somalia, which already suffers from underfunding. There is no guarantee a new Libyan regime would renew such support, nor is it likely another African state would be able to step in to fill the shortfall.

Sub-Saharan countries have been effectively excluded from partaking in the resolution of the Libyan conflict, even though they will inevitably be affected by what happens in Libya and, moreover, have close ties and influence with Libya. The African Union negotiations were treated as an unimportant sideshow by the nations busy taking out Libya’s armor and air defenses. At some point the West will have to shrug off a self-assumed “White Man’s Burden” that has become outrageously expensive and deeply destabilizing. While it is true that African Union diplomatic and peacekeeping missions have an uneven record, it is also true that African troops aren’t going to get any better at this kind of thing by sitting in their barracks. More cooperative efforts between the West and Africa that acknowledge the interests of those actually living in the continent and the limitations of external parties would do more to stabilize North Africa than a hail of bombs and rockets.

Conclusion

In short, revolution is not an easy thing – most fail, and it would be presumptuous to assume that revolts in Egypt or Libya or the Middle East will lead to inevitable success, regardless of how this success is interpreted. However, whether successful or not, their repercussions can rarely be tamed, making them recipes for insecurity. At best they can be managed, with a bit of luck. At worst, efforts to contain or reverse social and political transformation are only capping the volcano – if it doesn’t erupt there, it will erupt somewhere else, at a time of its own choosing.

Libyan al-Qaeda Leader Says Jihad Is the Only Solution for Libya

Posted on March 17, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 17, 2011

A Libyan al-Qaeda spokesman has released a 31-minute video claiming al-Qaeda created the conditions that allowed for revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and inspired the ongoing rebellion in Libya (Ansar1.info, March 12). Produced by al-Sahab Media Productions, the video entitled “To Our People in Libya” features leading jihad ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi (a.k.a. Muhammad Hassan Abu Bakr or Hassan Qayid).

Abu Yahya al-Libi

Al-Libi was captured by NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2002 and detained without trial at Bagram Prison until he escaped in 2005. Since then, he is believed to be living in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan where he has become an important spokesman for al-Qaeda due to his training in Islamic scholarship, producing numerous videotaped messages. Al-Libi’s brother, Abdulwahab Muhammad Kayid, was one of 110 former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) freed by Qaddafi’s regime on February 16 (Guardian, March 11).

Al-Libi called on Libyans to follow the example of Sidi Omar al-Mukhtar, the Libyan national hero who led the resistance against Italian occupation in the 1920s. Al-Libi used the term “Shaykh of the Martyrs” to refer to al-Mukhtar, whose legacy has been claimed by both Qaddafi and the Libyan rebels.

Al-Libi denounced the West for its support of “the Pharaoh Hosni Mubarak” and “the tyrant Ben Ali,” claiming that Western nations care only for their own interests without regard for Muslims enduring dictatorship. Citing four decades of mistreatment at the hands of the Qaddafi regime, al-Libi accused Qaddafi of using the Libyans “as a testing ground for his violent, rambling and disgusting thoughts.”

With rebel forces steadily falling back on their stronghold of Benghazi under Libyan military pressure, al-Libi warned of the price that would accompany failure: “Retreating will mean decades of harsher oppression and greater injustices than what you have endured [so far].” He also warned the rebels against surrendering their weapons to loyalist forces, suggesting instead that they build stockpiles of weapons for future use.

The Libyan militant mocked U.S. expressions of sympathy for the rebels, saying that al-Qaeda had shattered the “barrier of fear” that had restrained Muslims from rising against their governments: “There is no dignity without cost, and no dignity without sacrifice.” Though Qaddafi has claimed numerous times that the Libyan revolt is led by al-Qaeda operatives, there is no evidence so far that this is the case.

Al-Libi stated that only the rule of Shari’a can save Libyans and other Muslims living under the rule of Western-backed dictatorships: “The only solution for our country is jihad for Islam.”

This article first appeared in the March 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Turkey’s Opposition to Military Intervention in Libya

Posted on March 17, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 17, 2011

Ankara continues to forge an independent identity for its foreign policy by rejecting calls from some NATO partners for military intervention in the Libyan rebellion. Of all the NATO nations, Turkey has the closest historical and economic ties to the North African nation, a relationship that dates back to the period of Ottoman rule in Libya (1551-1912).

Mustafa Kemal (left) and Libyan Troops, 1911

Turkey has adopted what it describes as a “principled approach” to the crisis in Libya, though it is certain that political chaos and uncertainty do little to further Turkey’s economic relationship with Libya, which now includes more than $15 billion worth of projects in Libya employing 25,000 Turkish workers and bilateral trade worth $2.4 billion in 2010. Ankara’s measured response to the Libyan insurrection was described by Foreign Ministry deputy undersecretary Selim Yenel: “Turkish foreign policy is based on the rule of law, justice, human rights and universal values. At the same time, we have concerns for the large Turkish expat community in Libya. We have to be very careful in our approach and not risk any reprisals against our citizens or the harming of our interests” (Today’s Zaman, March 6). Though some 20,000 individuals (including non-Turks) were evacuated from Libya by Turkish ships and aircraft, there are believed to be several thousand Turkish nationals who have chosen to remain in the country.

While Turkey was the first country to call for Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to step down, it has not taken this approach in Libya. Unlike other NATO countries, Turkey has maintained official and even informal contacts with the Libyan regime during the rebellion, with Prime Minister Erdogan disclosing he had called Qaddafi personally to discuss the crisis and to urge the Libyan ruler to appoint a political figure with popular support to seek a solution (al-Arabiya, March 14). Turkey did not freeze Libyan assets or make any change in its diplomatic representation. Ankara has, however, indicated that it would respect any decisions regarding sanctions or military intervention that are passed by the UN Security Council. Libyan dissident Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, the deputy leader of the rebel National Libyan Council, has demanded that Turkey give the rebel group official recognition and direct support, but without success (Journal of the Turkish Weekly, March 12).

Ankara has repeatedly expressed concerns that foreign military intervention, particularly any involving the United States or former colonial powers, would run the immediate risk of delegitimizing not only the Libyan rebellion, but any further revolts against autocratic rule in the Arab world. Said Erdogan: “”We need to give the Libyan people permission to chart their own course” (Reuters, March 14). There is also uncertainty regarding what kind of administration or regime might follow the expulsion of Qaddafi, recognizing the possibility that a rebel victory might be exploited by other forces, including the radical Islamist movement.

Turkey has pointed out that NATO’s mandate does not cover events occurring in Libya. As Prime Minister Erdogan bluntly told a gathering in Hanover, Germany: “What has NATO got to do with Libya? NATO’s intervention in Libya is out of the question. We are against such a thing” (Today’s Zaman, March 6). Turkish President Abdullah Gul later questioned whether military intervention was even desired by the rebels, who used the slogan “Libyans can do it alone!” in the early phases of the rebellion: “A direct NATO intervention in Libya is out of the question… The people, government and opposition in Libya do not want a foreign force in the country” (AFP, March 14).

Turkey has also pointed out that there are alternative means of helping Libyans. According to the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu: “We are not abandoning Libya. We are taking a temporary measure. We will take every step necessary in the humanitarian aid of the Libyan people” (Anatolia, March 12). Turkey joined with the United Arab Emirates to provide the first humanitarian aid shipment to Libya since the crisis began, sending a Turkish naval frigate to accompany two ships carrying 388 tons of food, 32 tons of medicine, water, portable shelters, mobile ovens and a Turkish Red Crescent team (Hurriyet, March 13; Gulf News, March 13). The Turkish foreign minister noted: “This humanitarian assistance is not aimed at a specific group or region, but at the entire Libyan nation. We aim, circumstances permitting, to have our assistance continue to flow into Libya and reach regions in need throughout the country” (Today’s Zaman, March 14).

The Turkish Prime Minister has been heavily criticized in parliament and the press for accepting the Qaddafi International Prize for Human Rights in a ceremony last November (Hurriyet, February 21; AFP, November 26, 2010). Critics within Turkey have also complained the government’s response places Ankara too close to the Qaddafi regime, but there are signs that Turkey is ready to resume normal relations with Tripoli when the crisis ends. Turkish firm TAV Airports Holding has already announced it is preparing to return to Tripoli to resume work on the construction of two new terminal buildings at Tripoli Airport, part of Turkey’s substantial economic role in developing Libya (Hurriyet, March 17).

This article first appeared in the March 17, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Burundian Forces Take Heavy Losses in Successful Fight against Somalia’s al-Shabaab

Posted on March 10, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 10, 2011Burundian Troops in Somalia

While the world’s attention focuses on the uprisings in Arab countries, Burundian troops have made significant progress in leading an offensive against Somalia’s al-Shabaab movement, the first sign of real military progress since the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created in early 2007. Burundi’s contribution of four battalions represents roughly 3,000 of AMISOM’s total of 8,000 troops, with the rest drawn from Uganda’s military.

The offensive is a joint operation involving AMISOM forces and troops of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The AMISOM offensive began by rolling up the elaborate system of trenches and tunnels that al-Shabaab has used to infiltrate their fighters into government-held areas of Mogadishu. Burundian troops supported by Somali TFG militias seized the old Ministry of Defense, the Milk Factory and a number of other important sites in Mogadishu that had acted as bases for al-Shabaab forces, reportedly killing 80 Islamists (Agence Burundaise de Presse, February 24; Shabelle Media Network, February 28). Al-Shabaab forces counter-attacked in an effort to retake the Defense Ministry building on March 5, but were repelled by Burundian forces in heavy fighting (Shabelle Media Network, March 5). An AMISOM spokesman claimed African Union forces now controlled 60 to 70% of Mogadishu, representing a major reversal of fortunes for the Islamist radicals (Daily Monitor [Kampala], March 7).

Though government officials claimed only light casualties in the Mogadishu offensive, military sources in Bujumbura have confirmed a total of 43 dead and 110 wounded is closer to the mark since the offensive began on February 23 (AFP, March 5). Wounded soldiers are being transported to the Bouffard French military hospital in Djibouti (Suna Times, March 2; AFP, March 2). Al-Shabaab claims to have taken a number of Burundian prisoners and says it is holding the bodies of 18 dead Burundian soldiers (BBC, March 4). The Islamists have also posted photos of burnt and mutilated Burundian soldiers on the internet.

In ritual fashion the bodies of dead Burundian soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by al-Shabaab fighters and sympathizers. Al-Shabaab radio reported: “Many Muslim residents and top Islamist officials turned up at the stadium where the bodies of the dead soldiers were displayed and dragged. The residents expressed satisfaction over the death of the Christian forces” (Radio Andalus [Kismayo], February 24).

General Godefroid Niyombare

Burundi’s military commanders have attempted to downplay the losses; Chief of Staff General Godefroid Niyombare responded to inquiries by saying, “Whether six, ten or 20 are dead, I don’t see what would change if I told you,” adding, “What matters is not so much the number of victims in the Somali war as the work already done by our courageous soldiers“ (AFP, March 2; PANA Online [Dakar], March 2). With questions being asked in Burundi regarding the apparently open-ended Burundian commitment to a military mission in Somalia, government authorities appear to have implemented a plan to keep awareness of Burundian casualties to a minimum. Families have complained of a lack of news about their dead or wounded and local media coverage of burial ceremonies has been banned (Radio Netherlands, March 10).

At the height of the offensive, al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” issued an audiotape directed at “the people and government of Burundi,” calling for the withdrawal of Burundi’s military from Somalia:

It is obvious that your boys and your forces have been deceived and that they do not have a clue or understand the realities that exist in Mogadishu. You have to know that in Mogadishu, countries and alliances that are much stronger than you have been defeated. The United States failed in Mogadishu with their coalition from all around the world. Ethiopia lost after they brought a power that is much stronger than yours. Now, your beating started and the evidence is the dead bodies of your forces being dragged in the streets and your prisoners seized in the fight. If you do not take that as a warning, your loss will be even worse than that of the previous occupiers (SomaliMemo.net, March 2).

The message did not mention Ugandan forces, suggesting Godane was trying to create internal divisions within Burundi even as his al-Shabaab fighters were under heavy pressure by Burundian forces.

The operations in Mogadishu are part of a larger coordinated offensive involving AMISOM, TFG and even Ethiopian forces at several vital points in southern Somalia. AMISOM forces aided by Ethiopian troops are reported to have taken the towns of Bulo Hawo and Luq near the Kenyan border from al-Shabaab elements. There are also reports of large Ethiopian troop movements in central Somalia, apparently heading to the al-Bur district to hook up with the Somali Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna wa’l-Jama’a for an offensive against al-Shabaab strongholds in the area (AFP, March 8). The controversial presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was confirmed by TFG president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, though the president, who had once led the fight against the 2006 Ethiopian invasion and occupation, qualified his remarks by stating the Ethiopians were only providing logistical support to TFG forces (Shabelle Media Network, March 6).

Though the Libyan uprising has overshadowed important developments in Somalia, the Libyan crisis may have an inadvertent effect on AMISOM operations – Qaddafi’s Libya supplies 15% of the budget for the African Union (East African [Nairobi], March 7). If the regime falls it will have a direct effect on AMISOM operations unless the United States and Europe steps in to make up the lost revenues.

Libyan Loyalists and Dissidents Vie for Tuareg Fighters

Posted on March 10, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 10, 2011

With the fate of Libya in the balance, both sides in the struggle to determine its future are appealing to North Africa’s indigenous Tuareg warriors for military help. Libya’s own Tuareg population of roughly 50,000 has been simultaneously courted and deprived of its cultural and ethnic heritage by the Qaddafi government. The regime classes the non-Semitic Berber Tuareg as a branch of the Arab nation and describes its indigenous non-Semitic Tamasheq language as merely a dialect of Arabic. In the past, Tuareg fighters poured into northern Libya in 1912 to defend the Ottoman provinces from Italian invasion and later served in large numbers in Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s now defunct Islamic Legion.

Musa al-Kuni

While reports and rumors of Qaddafi’s recruitment of the Tuareg continued to circulate, the newly-resigned Libyan consul-general to Mali has issued an appeal to the Tuareg to “align themselves with the people to fight Mu’ammar Qaddafi.” The former Libyan representative, Musa al-Kuni, slipped out of Mali on March 1 and announced his resignation when he reached Paris the same day. Himself a Tuareg, Musa claimed to speak on behalf of the Libyan Tuareg dwelling in the Sabha region of the Libyan interior. Sabha is home to a Libyan military base once connected to Qaddafi’s nuclear weapons development program. Musa’s brother is Ibrahim al-Kuni, one of North Africa’s foremost Arabic-language novelists. The former diplomat said that the Libyan Tuareg were suffering “an injustice” by being portrayed as “Qaddafi’s mercenaries” (AFP, March 8).

Musa al-Kuni’s appeal appeared to have little resonance across the border in Tuareg-dominated northern Mali, where elected Tuareg representatives described him as “an imposter and an opportunist” and declared “this gentleman represents only himself” (AFP, March 9).

Ibrahim ag Bahanga

A Bamako daily suggested that former Tuareg rebel Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who has close ties to the Libyan regime, plays a key role in recruiting and forwarding Tuareg fighters from across the Sahel and Sahara. The daily states Ag Bahanga has been spotted leading a convoy of 30 4×4 vehicles on their way to Libya via the Tuareg town of Djanet in Algeria from a point near the Algerian-Mauritanian border (Le Combat, Bamako, March 3; for Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, see Terrorism Focus, February 25, 2009; Terrorism Monitor Briefs, November 4, 2010; Militant Leadership Monitor, April 2, 2010). Ag Bahanga was last reported to have returned to Mali from self-exile in Libya in January to accept the Algiers Accord and accept reintegration, though it is not impossible that Ag Bahanga has since accepted a commission to raise Tuareg fighters for use in Libya (Info Matin [Bamako], January 18; L’Observateur [Bamako], January 17).

Libya has backed Tuareg rebel movements in Niger and Mali and acted as an intermediary in negotiations, a method of operation that has not impressed Algeria, which has also inserted itself as a peace negotiator in the Tuareg rebellions.

Elsewhere in Mali, representatives of the northern Seventh Region (Timbuktu) gathered to declare, “The representatives of the North Mali communities, signatory to this document, offer their unwavering support to the Guide of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [i.e. Mu’ammar Qaddafi] as well as to the Libyan people” (L’Aube (Bamako), March 3).

The Libyan Battle for the Heritage of Omar al-Mukhtar, the “Lion of the Desert”

Posted on March 10, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 10, 2011

Beyond the battle for the towns and cities of Libya, there is another battle raging over the legacy of Sidi Omar al-Mukhtar, Libya’s “Lion of the Desert.” The symbol of Libyan nationalism and pride, the inheritance of this stalwart of the Islamic and anti-colonial struggle against Italian fascism has been cited as the inspiration of both the Qaddafi regime and the rebels who oppose it. Al-Mukhtar’s heritage is also cited by the foreign Islamists who would seek to influence events in Libya.

Omar al-Mukhtar in Chains After his Arrest by Italian Officials

Omar al-Mukhtar and the Roman Riconquista

An Islamic scholar turned guerrilla fighter, Omar al-Mukhtar was a member of the Minifa, a tribe of Arabized Berbers. Educated in the schools of the powerful Sanusi Sufi order, al-Mukhtar joined the Sanusi resistance to the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911. Unable to control little more than the coastal strip, the Italians turned to a series of treaties in an effort to expand their presence in the interior. These accords were abrogated when the fascists came to power in Italy in 1922. In the following year Mussolini’s forces embarked on the riconquista, the ruthless “reconquest” of the ancient Roman colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Drawing on his experience fighting both Italians and British under Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi, al-Mukhtar organized the armed resistance in Cyrenaica and launched an eight year campaign against Italian rule using the slogan “We will win or die!” Combining lightning raids and widespread popular support, al-Mukhtar was soon in control of what Libyans referred to as “the nocturnal government.”

Fascist forces responded with ever growing levels of brutality designed to eliminate support for the rebels. A 200-mile-long barbed wire fence was built along the Egyptian border to cut the resistance off from supporters in Egypt and Sudan. The Sanusis, already compromised by the deals they had made with the Italians, quickly folded under the pressure, leaving al-Mukhtar as the de facto leader of the anti-colonial Islamic resistance. A social transformation accompanied the desert uprising as the Murabtin (tribes of Arabized Berbers) grew more prominent through their leadership of the resistance in relation to the traditional Sa’adi Arab elite formed from the descendants of the 11th century Arab Bani Hillal conquerors of North Africa. [1] Finally, in a battle with the Italians in September 1931, al-Mukhtar was pinned beneath his fallen horse, wounded and eventually captured.

Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, the leader of the Italian military forces, came from Rome to question the resistance leader before his execution. He asked al-Mukhtar if he really believed he could win a war against the Italians, to which the unyielding al-Mukhtar replied: “War is a duty for us and victory comes from God.” [2] Al-Mukhtar was executed before an estimated 20,000 fellow Libyans and within a year Italian forces had trapped the remaining resistance leaders against the barrier with Egypt. By the time Italian rule came to an end in Libya in 1943, nearly 50% of Libya’s population had been starved, killed or forced into exile.

The little known but horrific methods used in the riconquista foreshadowed the methods of extermination practiced in the Second World War; the bombing of civilians and livestock, poisoning of wells, thousands of public hangings, the use of poison gas, prisoners thrown out of airplanes and the establishment of vast concentration camps where Libyans were sent to die of starvation and illness by the tens of thousands. Graziani felt little remorse for his tactics, but did lament “the clamor of unpopularity and slander and disparagement which was spread everywhere against me.” [3]

Though al-Mukhtar had emerged as a national hero, his memory was suppressed by the Sanusi royalty that ruled Libya from independence in 1951 to the time of their overthrow in 1969. As Qaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) claimed his legacy, Omar al-Mukhtar’s name and image suddenly became ubiquitous in Libya. Roads were named for him, his image appeared on Libyan currency, a center was formed for the study of the Libyan jihad and the government financed a 1981 movie, “Lion of the Desert,” in which Anthony Quinn played al-Mukhtar and Oliver Reed portrayed a menacing Marshal Graziani. While the film was shown regularly on Libyan state television, it was banned in Italy until its first broadcast on Italian TV in 2009.

A Hero to Mu’ammar Qaddafi

From the time of the 1969 military coup that brought Mu’ammar Qaddafi and the other members of the RCC to power, Libya’s “Guide” has told listeners that his childhood hero was Omar al-Mukhtar and that his father, Abu Minyar, had fought under al-Mukhtar against the Italians (though the latter claim is disputed – see Arab Times, March 4). Like al-Mukhtar, Qaddafi was also a member of a Murabtin tribe, the Qaddadfa.

Qaddafi’s efforts to identify himself with al-Mukhtar’s legacy began almost immediately. His first public speech as Libya’s new leader came on September 16, 1969 – the anniversary of al-Mukhtar’s execution – and was delivered in front of al-Mukhtar’s tomb in Benghazi. In the address, Qaddafi emphasized the need to continue the struggle for “national liberation.” However, Qaddafi’s focus on pan-Arab unity led only three months later to the first coup attempt against his regime by factions more interested in a focus on democracy and development.

Mu’ammar Qaddafi Wore a Photo of Omar al-Mukhtar During a State Visit to Italy

Nevertheless, Qaddafi has continued to call on al-Mukhtar’s legacy to validate his regime, frequently referring to Libyans as “followers” of Omar al-Mukhtar, reinforcing a shared heritage of anti-colonialism designed to support Qaddafi’s own anti-Western policies. [4] In recent speeches, such as the bizarre address of February 21, Qaddafi has continued to represent himself as the heir of Omar al-Mukhtar. On February 25, Qaddafi told followers in Tripoli’s Green Square: “You are the enthusiastic youth of the [Green] revolution. You see pride and dignity in the revolution. You see history and glory in revolution – it is the jihad of the heroes. It is the revolution that gave birth to Omar al-Mukhtar” (al-Jazeera, February 25).

Despite Qaddafi’s occasional efforts to channel the spirit of Omar al-Mukhtar for his own benefit, he would most probably have been opposed by the former Qu’ranic teacher al-Mukhtar when he described his own view of jihad to a 1980 gathering:

To be engaged in the battle of jihad today is better than the worship of a thousand years of egotistical litanies of praise and penitent devotion. Islam is the religion of power, of challenge, of steadfastness and of jihad. It behooves us, therefore, to scatter our prayer beads if they were to keep our hands away from arms. We should put our copies of the Qu’ran on the shelf if they were to distract us from implementing its teachings. [5]

Libyan rebels have actively challenged Qaddafi’s claims to be the inheritor of al-Mukhtar’s legacy, particularly in eastern Libya, the Cyrenaican homeland of al-Mukhtar and his Islamic resistance. Rebel fighters in Benghazi were recently observed marching through the streets shouting the slogan used by al-Mukhtar’s forces, “We will win or die!” (BBC, March 4).

The Islamists Call on Omar al-Mukhtar

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was quick to make its own use of Omar al-Mukhtar’s legacy, releasing a statement entitled “In Defense and Support of the Revolution of Our Fellow Free Muslims, the Progeny of Omar al-Mukhtar” (al-Andalus Media Foundation, February 23).

The message praises the “honorable revolt against the taghut [an unjust ruler who relies on laws other than those revealed by Allah] of Libya, the modern Musaylimah [i.e. a false prophet], who has made the progeny of Omar al-Mukhtar taste 40 years of suppression, crime and humiliation… The continual massacres which the modern Musaylimah is committing through the use of African mercenaries and fighter jets against the Libyan people clearly exposes that these ruling tawagheet [pl. of taghut] are more than ready to kill Muslims and eradicate them to preserve their thrones.” The comparison with Musaylimah, a rival prophet to Muhammad who was killed by the forces of Caliph Abu Bakr at the Battle of Yamama (632 CE), is based on the 1975 release of Qaddafi’s al-Kitab al-Ahdar (Green Book), which was widely perceived in Islamic circles as a presumptuous rival to the holy Qu’ran.

Amidst much invective directed towards Qaddafi, whose brutal methods destroyed Libya’s own radical Islamist movement, AQIM declares it is with the rebels and will not desert them; “We will spend whatever we have to help you.” Though there are as of yet no indications that AQIM has fulfilled these pledges or intends to honor them in any way, the movement describes the revolt in Libya as a “jihad” and encourages the rebels to use the motto of “the Shaykh of the Mujahideen, Omar al-Mukhtar: ‘We will never surrender! We will either gain victory or die!’”

Fresh from a triumphant return to his native Egypt in the wake of the Lotus Revolution, influential Qatar-based Muslim Brother and TV Preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa (religious ruling) permitting Libyans to “put a bullet in Qaddafi’s head” and called on “the grandsons of Omar al-Mukhtar” to continue fighting until Libya was returned to its Arab and Islamic roots (al-Jazeera, February 21; al-Masry al-Youm, February 22).

However, the London-based Egyptian Salafist and al-Qaeda supporter, Dr. Hani al-Siba’i, accused al-Qaradawi in his Friday sermon of having been a friend of Gaddafi until recently, describing the rebels as the descendants of Omar al-Mukhtar, “whom we consider a martyr at the hands of the Italian criminals” (al-Ansar1.info, February 25).

A member of Qaradawi’s Islam Online editorial team elaborated on the rebels’ connection to Omar al-Mukhtar, describing them as the “descendants of the freedom fighter Omar al-Mukhtar… famous for his saying, “I believe in my right to freedom, and my country’s right to life, and this belief is stronger than any weapon.” The writer made a subtle tie between Qaddafi and the Italian imperialists who hung al-Mukhtar and thousands of others, pointing to Qaddafi’s use of a public gallows, from which “the bodies of the opposition to his ‘revolution’ hung from the nooses” (Islam Online, February 23).

Conclusion

The record of Italian rule in Libya is the basis of today’s rejection of foreign military intervention on the ground by both the loyalist and rebel camps. After leading the first Friday prayers since dislodging the regime in Benghazi, a local imam supporting the rebels warned: “We do not want any foreign military intervention. If they try to intervene, Omar Mukhtar will come forth again” (AFP, February 24).

Perhaps the last word in the debate over Omar al-Mukhtar’s legacy should go to his 90-year-old son, Muhammad Omar, who has taken a position in favor of democracy and in opposition to the visions of both al-Qaeda and al-Qaddafi, saying his father “would have a similar position to mine for the benefit of the country.” Asked what advice he would offer the embattled leader, Muhammad Omar replied: “He doesn’t listen to advice. A lot of people try to advise him but he still has a hard head and he doesn’t want to listen.” Al-Mukhtar’s son described Qaddafi’s killing of civilians as “appalling… nobody expected him to behave like this” (Irish Times, March 2; al-Arabiya, February 27).

Notes:

1. Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 2nd ed., New York, 2009.
2. Tahir al-Zawi: ‘Umar al-Mukhtar, Tripoli, 1970, p.84.
3. David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution, London, 1987, p.37.
4. Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, London, 1998, p.130.
5. Quoted in Mahmoud Ayoub, Islam and the Third Universal Theory: The Religious Thought of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, London, 1987, pp. 133-34.

Taliban Spokesman Sees “Prescription of Democracy” As Part of U.S. Military Strategy

Posted on March 3, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 3, 2011

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid gave an interview to the media service of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” on February 23 concerning the “current political and military situation” in Afghanistan. The interview was carried by a number of jihadi websites (Ansar1.info, February 24).

Zabihullah Mujahid

Zabihullah begins by addressing the efforts in Kabul to launch a session of the new parliament five months after a vote that was marked by fraud and court challenges. Following an extended dispute, parliamentarians have finally agreed on Uzbek warlord Abdul Rahoof Ibrahimi as the new Speaker of Parliament, the last step in enabling the new parliament to begin work (Reuters, February 27). Zabihullah, however, views the parliament as “part of the invaders’ military strategy,” fulfilling a “strategic military need” for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Taliban spokesman explained the rationale of foreign support for the “fake parliament” – efforts of the invaders to “enforce their ‘prescription’ of democracy” have resulted in a “popular elected government and parliament; hence no one has the right to continue their struggle against the elected government.” By “purchasing” puppet MPs, the foreign invaders will succeed in obtaining a long-term strategic alliance with Afghanistan that will allow a continued foreign military presence. Zabihullah challenges the legitimacy of the new government, suggesting the parliamentarians “are accountable for crimes and corruption” and their work will be limited to “pocketing salaries.”

Claims by General David Petraeus that the Coalition is making progress in securing Afghanistan are also challenged by the Taliban spokesman, who responds that such statements are made under “great political pressure” given the enormous cost of the occupation in lives and public funds: It is a known fact that the invaders have been defeated in Afghanistan, but they continue their propaganda through which they want to compel the world to believe in their so-called progress in Afghanistan.” Zabihullah cites a report by an unnamed European security firm that claimed there was a 64% increase in Taliban attacks in 2010.

Responding to claims by Kabul’s National Directorate for Security that 1,500 Taliban militants have switched sides in northern Afghanistan, Zabihullah says the mujahideen are actually gaining momentum in the north and that Kabul is attempting to introduce various warlords as Taliban before claiming their defection to the government (Central Asia Online, February 11).

The Taliban see a direct connection between the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the economic crisis in the West: “Fortunately, [the occupiers] were faced with distressing resistance and for ten long years they have been trapped in a ruinous war. As a result, the Coalition countries, particularly America, are suffering a terrible economic depression.”

However, Zabihullah believes public opposition to the war is growing in the West as politicians begin to waver in their support for the ongoing and unusually lengthy conflict. The Taliban spokesman concludes by raising the specter of the Vietnam War, where Americans “had dreadful experiences and even up until today every American has a particular sense of fear and terror about it; hence, in such a situation the invasion and overrunning of a war-torn, small Afghanistan, which seemed very easy and almost costless to them, turned out to be very difficult and enormously expensive.”

This article first appeared in the March 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Oromo Liberation Front Calls for “Egyptian and Tunisian-Style Revolution” in Ethiopia

Posted on March 3, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

March 3, 2011

Political reverberations from the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt continue to sweep through the Horn of Africa, which has already witnessed demonstrations against the Transitional Federal Government and its Islamist opponents in Somalia (see Terrorism Monitor Briefs, February 17). Now militants belonging to Ethiopia’s Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have called for all of Ethiopia’s ethnic and religious groups to emulate the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts and unite in deposing the Tigrayan-dominated government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, leader of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, the major element of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition.

Rebels of the Oromo Liberation Front

In a statement broadcast in both Afan Oromo and Amharic, the OLF maintained that only a revolution in the streets could command the attention of the West: “Until [Addis Ababa] becomes the next Tunis or Cairo, their ears will not listen,” though “most of the superpower countries, the hitherto supporters and handlers of the tyrannical regimes, were forced to quickly abandon their darlings and side with the people in revolt.” Most importantly, the Oromo must unite with Ethiopia’s Amharic speakers to provide a long-term solution to the country’s ills (Jimma Times, February 27).

The Oromo are the largest single ethnic group in Ethiopia and dwell principally in central and southern Ethiopia, though there is a high degree of social integration with Ethiopia’s Amharic-speaking peoples, the traditional rulers of the nation until 1991. The Oromo are religiously diverse, with members of the ethnic group following Islam, Christianity and traditional religions, but not all Oromo opposition leaders and parties agree on the necessity of a revolution.

In recent days, a joint operation along the border by Ethiopian and Kenyan military forces that began last November is reported to have resulted in the arrest of at least 120 OLF fighters and the seizure of a quantity of arms, grenades and missiles. The existence of a cross-border Oromo community is reported to have complicated efforts to identify OLF members; according to a local Kenyan provincial commissioner, “These people speak the local dialect and it may be hard to distinguish them from the locals but the locals themselves are volunteering information that will lead to their arrest.” The operation will continue to search for other OLF members (Sudan Tribune, February 26).

The OLF began an armed struggle for Oromo self-determination and local autonomy from the Amhara monarchy in 1973. After dropping out of the coalition government formed after the conclusion of the Ethiopian civil war and the fall of the communist Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, the OLF then took up arms against the new Tigrayan-dominated government. Addis Ababa classifies the OLF as a terrorist organization and has accused it of being responsible for a series of bombings in Addis Ababa in 2008, a claim denied by the OLF (see the OLF statement published in the Sudan Tribune, May 29, 2008).

Despite assertions by Ethiopian authorities that the military capabilities of the OLF and its armed wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), have been much diminished by constant pressure from government security services, the movement recently claimed that a special unit of the OLA operating in the OLF’s so-called “Eastern Zone” raided and destroyed a government military base in Kombolcha, killing 19 soldiers and injuring 25 others (Voice of Oromo Liberation Radio, February 25; OLF News, February 26; for OLF military capabilities, see Militant Leadership Monitor Briefs, January 29, 2010). The attack and the alleged casualties have not been confirmed by government sources. Kombolcha is 12km from the commercial center of Harar. The OLA has also claimed responsibility for the February assassination of a government intelligence official in the Eastern Oromia district who was accused of harassing members of the local Oromo community. An OLA statement warned: “Those who continue to be part of the TPLF killing machine will face the same death penalty unless they refrain from such evil acts” (OLF News, February 6; Jimma Times, February 9).

This article first appeared in the March 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

AQAP Deputy Leader Sa’id al-Shihri Outlives Reports of His Death

Posted on February 24, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor
February 24, 2011

Despite a series of reports suggesting that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Deputy Leader Sa’id al-Shihri (a.k.a. Abu Sufyan al-Azdi) had died in an explosion while manufacturing a bomb on February 9, there are now indications that the veteran jihadist is still alive (for al-Shihri, see Terrorism Monitor, September 9, 2010; January 14, 2011).

Sa’id al-Shihri

A native Saudi, al-Shihri spent six years in the Guantanamo Bay detention center before being released to a Saudi rehabilitation program in 2007. After completing the apparently ineffective rehabilitation, al-Shihri left for Yemen, where he joined up with al-Qaeda elements, soon becoming a high-ranking member of the newly formed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which united Yemeni and Saudi militants.

Initial reports claimed that al-Shihri was killed together with five other members of AQAP (including an unnamed senior figure) while building an explosive device in the Lawdar district of Abyan governorate (Yemen Post, February 12; al-Ittihad [Abu Dhabi], February 12). Lawdar was the scene of heavy fighting between government forces and al-Qaeda fighters last summer (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, September 16, 2010).

Brigadier Abd al-Razaq al-Maruni, the security chief for Abyan governorate, was quoted by a Saudi daily as having told the paper by telephone that “We have received confirmation that al-Shihri was killed in Lawdar in Abyan.” However, Interior Ministry spokesman General Mansur al-Turki said his ministry had no such information, as did the Yemeni embassy in Riyadh (al-Watan [Riyadh], February 14, 2011).

The next day, Brigadier Abd al-Razaq al-Maruni used the Defense Ministry website to deny reports of al-Shihri’s death (including any statements attributed to him by local media), describing such reports as a likely effort to mislead security forces (26sep.net, February 14, 2011; Saba [Sana’a], February 15, 2011).

A tribal figure from the Lawdar area who works as a mediator between the government and AQAP told a Yemeni daily that al-Shihri’s death was “absolutely not true. We are among them [al-Qaeda] and nothing happened.” The report was also denied by other local residents, who said such an event could not take place without them hearing about it (Yemen Observer, February 15, 2011). AQAP has yet to release a statement on the alleged incident.

Female relatives of al-Shihri scandalized Saudi officials earlier this month when they protested the detention of family members outside the Interior Ministry in Riyadh. The women were unaccompanied by male guardians and authorities promised an investigation into how they were able to travel to the Saudi capital without male relatives as escorts (Gulf News, February 6, 2011).
This article first appeared in the February 24, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Have Darfur Rebels Joined Qaddafi’s Mercenary Defenders?

Posted on February 24, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 24, 2011

A handful of unconfirmed reports from Libya have cited the presence of Darfur rebels in the ranks of the African mercenaries defending the regime of President Mu’ammar Qaddafi (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], February 21, 2011; Reuters, February 22, 2011). A spokesman for the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a press gathering that authorities were investigating the claims (Sudan Tribune, February 22, 2011). Darfur has strong historical ties to Libya, its northern neighbor, and Qaddafi has played a large role in hosting peace talks and encouraging the unification of Darfur’s many rebel groups. Perhaps mindful of his own future, Qaddafi has also been one of the main defenders of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir from possible arrest and prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in Darfur, using his influence in the African Union to pressure other African leaders on the issue, many of whom are also mindful of the precedent that could be set by al-Bashir’s prosecution.

JEM Rebels

Officials of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the strongest of Darfur’s rebel movements, reacted with anger to the allegations, saying JEM has no fighters in Libya, has no interest in interfering with Libyan affairs and will hold Khartoum responsible for any harm that comes to the thousands of Sudanese citizens working in Libya (Sudan Tribune, February 22, 2011). When a Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman later announced that his ministry now had proof (as of yet undisclosed) that Darfur rebels were engaged in the fighting in Libya, JEM official al-Tahir al-Feki responded: “These allegations are very offensive and show no sensitivity towards the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who reside in Libya who will be put in jeopardy as being seen as mercenaries or taking sides. To say that there are JEM fighters in Libya fighting for Gaddafi, this is just provoking the Libyans to go after all the Sudanese” (Reuters, February 23, 2011). There are an estimated half million Sudanese living in Libya and Sudanese officials say they are working on an evacuation plan should that prove necessary (SUNA [Khartoum], February 21, 2011).

JEM’s leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, has been harbored in Libya since May 2010, when he was refused re-entry to Chad, JEM’s former base (Sudan Tribune, May 19, 2010). The relocation was the result of a peace agreement between Chad and Sudan that ended a long-running proxy war across the Chad-Sudan border (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 28, 2010). Khartoum was extremely displeased with the Libyan decision to offer the JEM leader refuge and it would not be surprising to see Sudanese officials taking the opportunity to try and discredit JEM by linking its fighters to the mercenaries firing on civilians in Libya.

There is something of a precedent here; JEM rebels were active in the defense of their Chadian host when Chadian rebels operating out of Darfur attacked the Chadian capital of N’Djamena in February 2008. There were different circumstances at work, however; JEM stood to lose their Chadian bases if a Sudanese-backed faction took power in Sudan. There were also tribal ties between the Chadian leadership and the leadership of JEM, both of which are dominated by members of the cross-border Zaghawa tribe. In this context, however, it should also be mentioned that the Chadian rebels were Zaghawa as well (see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 30, 2010). A number of Zaghawa are believed to have served in Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion in the 1990s.

As the protesters grow in strength, suspected mercenaries are being dealt summary justice in the streets, often through hanging. Growing numbers of suspected mercenaries are also being detained by revolutionary committees, including alleged gunmen from Chad, Niger and Sudan (Reuters, February 24). Libya has a substantial black African work force and student population that are likely to come under suspicion in the chaotic events engulfing that nation. As mercenaries in Libya come to realize they are both expendable and unlikely to be paid, they will likely use violent and unpredictable means to extricate themselves from the situation.

The reported use of mercenaries in a desperate attempt by Qaddafi’s regime to retain power in Libya is threatening to blow up into a pan-African scandal. It is difficult to believe that gunmen with military experience were hired and flown out of various African nations without the knowledge of security services in those countries, suggesting some African governments have cooperated with the plan or at the very least looked the other way. The issue has been raised in the parliaments of Kenya and Zimbabwe, with the defense minister of the latter nation skirting the question by saying he had “no mandate in my duty as Minister of Defense to investigate activities happening in another African country” (News Day [Harare], February 23, 2011; Daily Nation [Nairobi], February 23, 2011).

This article first appeared in the February 24, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.