Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Says Mujahideen Will Defend the Tunisian Revolution

Posted on February 3, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 3, 2011

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has responded to the overthrow of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali with a statement calling on Tunisians to complete their revolution and beware of the machinations of the “Jews and Crusaders” (al-Andalus Media/al-Fajr Media Center, January 26).

The statement describes the deposed Ben Ali as a taghut, an unjust ruler who rules by laws other than those revealed by Allah. While praising the Muslims of Tunisia for removing Ben Ali (“You have revived hope in a people in despair!”), AQIM warns that the “taghuti system remains” and the beneficial results of the revolution remain prone to “theft and circumvention.” While Ben Ali has fled to Saudi Arabia (a favorite target of al-Qaeda), his “apostate regime of tyranny and corruption” remains in Tunisia’s “constitution, laws and institutions.” According to AQIM, the battle against kufr [disbelief] and transgression will be a long one, and this is only the first round.

AQIM describes the Tunisian revolution as “a devastating earthquake which reached the throne of the taghut Ibn Ali,” who fled in humiliation and disgrace. The revolution was a warning to other Arab rulers, an earthquake that “was felt in each and every capital city in the Arab world, frightening its rulers out of their wits and preoccupying their minds and speech.”

AQIM sees a role for armed Islamists in consolidating the revolution and defending it from America, France (“the Mother of all Evils”) and the infidel West. France in particular is singled out by AQIM, which has had a number of confrontations with French troops in the Sahel/Sahara region in the last year:

France is the one who supported Ben Ali till his last breath, helping him to such an extent that they even offered him their expertise in quelling the revolution. The French Crusaders are the ones who supported the Taghut regime of the criminal generals in Algeria, and they are the ones who help them to kill and suppress the Muslims there to this day. Based on these facts, we have not the slightest doubt that America and France will play the same filthy role in the future of Tunisia, unless they are repelled by the strikes of the mujahideen, the progeny of Yusuf bin Tashfin [a reference to the 11th century Berber king of the Almoravid dynasty who ruled North Africa and Spain].

More generally, the statement also warns that all intelligence agencies in the Arab World are “apparatuses of repression” whose role is to defend Arab rulers from their subjects: “For this reason, they will never think twice about committing the most atrocious crimes or massacres to repress a revolution or mass uprising.”

The statement also denounces the important role tourism plays in the Tunisian economy, suggesting that local Muslims were “almost like Ahl al-Dhimmah [literally ‘the people of the contract,’ i.e. non-Muslim subjects] to the Christians who invaded it under the pretext of ‘tourism’.” Ben Ali is condemned for his efforts to impose secularism in Tunisia and his repression of Islamists. In a warning that might also be intended for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, AQIM notes that when Ben Ali’s “oppression and crimes were exposed to the world, the infidels washed their hands of him, deserted him and handed him over. The loyalty he paid to them and his many years of service to them did him no good.”

This article first appeared in the February 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Afghan Taliban Issue Guidelines for Establishment of Islamic Emirate

Posted on February 3, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 3, 2011

One of the major weaknesses of most militant Islamist groups is their almost complete lack of a political program or consideration of how an Islamic State should be run beyond a general commitment to Shari’a and the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Details as to how this caliphate is to be administered or who is to be its leader are rarely considered by militants. The last Caliph, Abdul Mejid II, was deposed by Turkish secularist Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” in 1924. A notable exception to this trend is Afghanistan’s Taliban movement, which actually has experience running a country, as it did in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The Afghan model as pursued by the Taliban is more realistic in seeking an Emirate (a regional command) rather than a Caliphate (the latter encompassing the entire Islamic world).

The Last Caliph – Abdul Mejid II

Nevertheless, the Emirate is “based upon the principles of the Islamic Caliphate… in dividing the country into provinces, appointing pious and righteous governors, guiding workers to piety and justice, encouraging the establishment of a religious and worldly policy, tending to the needs of the people, instructing them in matters of religion and encouraging them to make the utmost effort in promoting virtue and preventing vice.”

Discussion of the Taliban’s administrative plans for Afghanistan has been stirred by a detailed outline of these plans in the movement’s Voice of Jihad website (January 27). The outline, written by Ikram Miyundi, was previously published in the movement’s al-Somood Magazine (Issue 55, December 25, 2010).

For guidance, the Islamic Emirate must draw on the Koran, the Sunnah (sayings and habits) of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunnah of the Khulafa ur-Rashidun (The Caliphs of Righteousness, i.e. the first four caliphs after Muhammad), the sayings of the Companions (of the Prophet), as well as various fatwas (religious-based legal decisions) issued by respected scholars of Islam.

Administratively, the Emirate divides Afghanistan into 34 provinces, which are in turn divided into directorates and villages:

• The village is run by a leader appointed by the Emirate who is responsible for civilian and military affairs. In this he is assisted by a group of ten to 50 mujahideen.

• The directorate is administered by a governor “of known piety” who is assisted by a deputy familiar with the region. Under them are committees dealing with dispute resolution, education, development and local military affairs.

• Provincial administration is handled by a provincial governor, “a man of religion and morality who fears no one but Allah,” and a deputy. The governor directs the province’s military, civilian, financial and legal affairs and is responsible for the implementation of Shari’a laws and statutes. The governor is appointed and dismissed by the Supreme Commander after consultation with the High Shura Council.

Just below the High Shura Councils are the “Main Committees,” which in effect replace the existing ministries of the Afghan government. These include:

• The Military Committee – Overseeing the mujahideen and replacing the Ministry of Defense.

• Preaching and Guidance Committee – Senior scholars issuing fatwas and advice on matters of Islamic jurisprudence.

• Culture and Information Committee – Responsible for broadcasting statements of the Amir al-Mu’minin and other government directors. This committee is also responsible for news dissemination and refuting claims of enemies of the Emirate on internet websites.

• Political Committee – Replaces the Foreign Ministry.

• Education Committee – Responsible for spreading “Islamic and contemporary learning.”

• Financial Committee – Responsible for all financial affairs and resources.

• Committee for Prisoners and Orphans – Works for the release of mujahideen prisoners and provides resources for the upbringing of their children and the children of martyrs.

• Health Committee – Responsible for treating wounded and sick mujahideen.

• Committee for Foreign Establishments – This committee directs the operations of foreign relief and aid agencies and makes sure they do not do anything contrary to Islamic theology and beliefs.

Directing the committees is the High Shura Council, appointed by the Amir al-Mu’minin and responsible for drafting laws and regulations in accordance with Islamic principles.

At the peak of the administration is the Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful): “The leader is the axis around which matters pivot. He employs the community to achieve his goals and directs people to goodness and happiness. He warns them against evil and danger according to his lights.” The Amir must be male, of sound mind and emotion, and possess the qualities of knowledge, vision, strength, courage and wisdom. He must have excellent organizational skills as well as other qualities mentioned in the existing books of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and ‘aqidah (Islamic theology).

This title, first used by the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, has been used in various capacities by both the Sunni and Shiite communities. It became widely used by the leaders of the Sahelian sultanates in Africa (such as Darfur) and continues to be used by the Sultan of Morocco. Mullah Omar has used the title since founding the Taliban in 1994.

This article first appeared in the February 3, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Special Commentary: Egypt’s Lotus Revolution- Scenarios for a New Middle East

Posted on February 1, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

February 1, 2011

Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s February 1 announcement that he would step down at the end of his term in September but would not leave Egypt (“I will die on its soil”) seems to indicate Mubarak and his military colleagues are seeking enough time to consolidate the power of the military-security structure that controls Egypt in the face of massive demonstrations calling for political change. His pledge to address corruption and other issues probably comes too late in his 30-year term as president to mollify angry protesters demanding his resignation, exile, or worse.

The popular uprising in Egypt, whether it succeeds or not, is already guaranteed to mark a turning point in the Middle East’s political and geo-strategic balance. However, after 58 years of rule under a succession of four Egyptian generals (Naguib, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak), Egypt’s military-security structure has deep roots – changing this would require something on the scale of the French Revolution. Many powerful people stand to lose everything should a popular revolt go too far and there are few signs of unrest so far among the more traditional fellahin of rural Egypt. The following scenarios are all directions the current unrest could take, each with great significance for the future of the Middle East:

• A Military Takeover

While the demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria have been largely peaceful, the security situation in the strategic Sinai is beginning to collapse, with armed Bedouin assaulting police stations, killing policemen and seizing weapons. This or an upsurge of violence in the cities could be used as justification for taking control. This might discourage other Arab risings initially, but if Mubarak loyalists take over Mubarak’s assured gentle landing in comfortable exile would not endear the new regime with the public and the revolution will only be postponed. This scenario would result in the least damage to Egypt’s official relationship with Israel but could cause strain with the United States which is newly committed to a real democratic transition. Individuals to watch are Military Intelligence Chief and new Vice-President Umar Sulayman (who may try to hold onto the presidency in the event of a Mubarak resignation), Field Marshal and new Deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant General Samy Enan. This scenario could get messy if it was opposed by the public and required military force to impose. The genie of fraternization between the largely conscript army and the demonstrators as witnessed in recent days will be difficult to return to the bottle. A move by junior officers to seize power (as in 1952) cannot be ruled out, but the ethnic dynamic (Arab vs. Turko-Circassian elite) that drove the revolution of 1952 no longer exists.

• A Military Takeover Followed by a Transition to Democracy

This has been a common pattern in African nations in the last decade, though all too often the coup leader resigns and wins an overwhelming victory at the first “democratic” polls. Hosni Mubarak is not a charismatic leader, but he does control a widespread and pervasive patronage system that has preserved his personal leadership for three decades. If the military-security structure can be assured of the wholesale transfer of this system to a new leader (and member of the elite), Hosni Mubarak suddenly becomes irrelevant – even an impediment to the continued existence of the elite. Gamal Mubarak, without any support base, is finished even if the government returns.

The best analogy here would be the 1985 Sudanese military coup in which General Swar al-Dahab took power only after a popular rising in Sudan ousted President Field Marshal Ja’afar Nimeiri, who went into exile in Egypt. After the restoration of state security and a short transitional period, Swar al-Dahab resigned and allowed free elections (see al-Arabiya, January 20).

• Mubarak Maintains Power

This scenario is not as unlikely as it is being treated in parts of the international media. The withdrawal of the police from city streets may be part of a strategy to allow the security situation to deteriorate to the point the public will demand the return of law and order, naturally in the person of Mubarak, who would require the support of the army in this scenario. The widely disliked police, who would have the most to lose in any transition of power, would likely support Mubarak. Nevertheless, nothing short of major concessions, the abandonment of the scheme to make Mubarak’s son Gamal his successor and a restoration of some food subsidies (as has been done in Algeria in the face of local protests) would be required to make this work. Real and substantial change would be unlikely, however, and the revolution would again only be postponed.

• Democratic Elections Introduce a New Government

The heavily entrenched military-security structure that dominates the government and much of the business community will strongly oppose this scenario unless they are assured a sympathetic candidate will win.

• Islamists Take Control of Egypt through Elections

While many reports suggest a Muslim Brotherhood takeover is imminent, results from the last relatively free elections in which they were able to contend indicate the MB has the support of roughly 20% of the electorate. The Muslim Brothers’ armed wing was dissolved long ago and there are no indications of the movement turning to violence in the current turmoil. Having committed to a policy of building an Islamic state through grass-roots activism after top-down efforts to seize power in Egypt nearly resulted in the destruction of the movement in the 1960s, the Brothers are in the midst of an ideological dilemma – stay the course and possibly be left behind or ignore the movement’s principles to try and maneuver the movement into a leading position in the effort to overthrow the government. The Brothers are as likely to split over this issue as they are to become a late player in the uprising. For now, the movement is calling for the installation of the chief of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, Farouk Ahmad Sultan, as president, and has affirmed its intention of honoring Egypt’s international treaties (Ikhwanweb.com, February 1).

The Salafist groups in Egypt are committed to their belief citizens should not oppose a Muslim leader and have taken little, if any, part so far in the demonstrations. The Muslim Brothers, on the other hand, did not initially take part in the demonstrations, but have joined them now in an effort to maintain some influence on events.

Though relatively unlikely, an Islamist victory at the polls would lead to three possibilities:

a) Countercoup – The Algerian Scenario: When the FIS appeared to be winning the Algerian general elections in 1991, the Algerian military moved quickly to seize the government with U.S. and French support. The United States may similarly decide Egypt, as the leading nation of the Arab world, is simply too important to leave to Islamists of any stripe.

b) A moderate Islamist government willing to work with the West as well as the East, on the pattern of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (increasingly the Islamist’s model of choice).

c) An Islamist government sacrifices much needed American subsidies to break with the West, renege on the treaties with Israel and provide a haven to extremists. This scenario remains the most unlikely at the moment. While the existing relationship with Israel will be re-examined by almost any new government, a break with the West would have little appeal to most Egyptians.

• The repeal of Egypt’s Emergency Laws (in force for most of the last three decades) by a new government and/or a security collapse allows Egyptian militants in exile to re-enter Egypt

Egypt’s military and intelligence services are highly likely to survive any transition of power largely intact and will continue to resist the infiltration of foreign-based militants or a local resumption of the ruthless 1990s war between Islamist militants and Egyptian security services that ended with the disruption of the Islamist networks and the expulsion of remaining militant leaders such as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Returning militants would not find a very warm welcome from Egypt’s existing Islamist factions, most of which have abandoned the concept of seizing power by force.

• Election of a Secular Government

Egypt’s opposition parties are badly organized, poorly financed and have had little opportunity to build a popular base – hence their general inability to use current uprising to their benefit. Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) is clearly finished in its current incarnation – having relied on rigged elections for too long, it has neglected to maintain a popular base. NDP offices, including their headquarters in Cairo, have been the target of arson attacks. The party does, however, have a strong political machine fueled by patronage and may easily reform under a new name and leadership with few changes to its structure and policies. Former International Atomic Energy Agency chairman Muhammad ElBaradei has returned to Egypt, but many in Egypt know little or nothing about him and he has been no more successful in harnessing the popular anger than other opposition figures.

• Government Rejection of Change Leads to Armed Revolt

Al-Qaeda is completely out of the picture at the moment and the utter disruption of militant networks by Egypt’s pervasive security services makes it unlikely al-Qaeda will be able to influence events in the short term. Unlike other Arab states like Yemen and Iraq, the population is largely unarmed, but some elements are now seizing police weapons. However, since Arabization of the military (previously dominated by non-Arab military professionals) most male Egyptians over 20 have completed military service and know how to use weapons. In the Sinai, where the Bedouin are armed, the police have evacuated large parts of the region. The Bedouin are now on the offensive, attacking police stations and killing officers to seize more weapons. The low-level rebellion in the strategically important Sinai may be about to explode.

• Egypt’s Revolt Creates Political Convulsions Across the Arab Middle East

From an internal point of view, most scenarios point to the existing power structure in Egypt making superficial changes in most areas, though it is very likely an new regime will attempt to improve ties with the larger Arab and Muslim world, from which Egypt has been largely estranged for over three decades due to its accommodation with Israel. The wild card is the degree to which Egypt’s uprising both inspires and feeds from other popular revolts in the Arab world.

Mass demonstrations spread to Khartoum last weekend. Sudanese President Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir may be at the height of his unpopularity in Sudan despite a massive triumph In recent elections, having lost much of his traditional support as the man who has allowed South Sudan to separate His status as an alleged war criminal wanted by the International Criminal Court is an embarrassment even for members of the ruling party. In the event of mass demonstrations in Khartoum, watch for a military provocation on the new border with the South to enable strict security measures in the capital. These type of uprisings are not new in Sudan – Generals Mahmoud Abboud (1964) and Ja’afar Nimeiri (1985) were both removed by popular revolt in the Sudan.

Algeria might follow the Egyptian and Tunisian lead, but the Algiers government has warned such protests will not be tolerated. Nevertheless, there have already been significant demonstrations in Algeria and there are now signs that the Kabylia Berber revolt could restart (Kabyle.com, January 30). There have been ten attempts at self-immolation so far in protest of the regime (Ennahar [Algiers], January 30). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) could seek to exploit this violence as many of their bases are in the Kabyle Mountains. Smaller demonstrations and even acts of self-immolation have taken place in Jordan, Yemen and Mauritania. Libya would also appear to be a prime candidate for new protests.

A U.S. pro-democracy stance will have little influence on the protestors – the riot equipment, batons and tear gas of the security forces are all U.S. supplied, as are the F-16 fighter-jets making menacing low passes over Cairo. Egyptians are well aware Washington is the Mubarak regime’s greatest sponsor. However, U.S. influence in the Egyptian officer corps is strong and Egypt must deal carefully with the United States or risk losing important food aid. American aid and subsidies are important to Egypt, which is undergoing a food price crisis that is in large part fuelling the unrest. A new government could not afford to break with U.S. without losing a major part of its budget.

Israel might have ideological difficulties in coping with a new Egyptian democracy after boasting for many years they were the only democracy in the Middle East. Opposing democracy would be a contradiction in Israeli foreign policy (see their support for the Iranian democracy demonstrations), but the Mubarak dictatorship has been the guarantor of Israeli security as no Arab nation would go to war with Israel without Egypt’s participation.

Any successor to Mubarak will find it extremely difficult to maintain Egypt’s current and highly unpopular level of cooperation with Israel against the Palestinians of Gaza. The best Israel could hope for is a new Egyptian military-security regime that would demand only token changes in the current agreements in hope of a local propaganda victory.

Defeating the “Forces of Paganism”: Former Military Intelligence Chief Hamid Gul Blends Pakistani Nationalism and Islamic Revolution

Posted on January 28, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 28, 2011

The retired former chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, is one of the most controversial political figures in Pakistan. Despite his once extremely close ties with the American Central Intelligence Agency during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Gul has since become one of Pakistan’s harshest critics of American foreign policy in South and Central Asia. Speaking at a recent Sufi ceremony in the northeastern Punjab town of Gujranwala, Gul, who was director of the ISI from 1987 to 1989, suggested that conflicts in Afghanistan have historically been a catalyst for massive change in South Asia and that “this change is knocking at our door… The forces of paganism have faced the worst defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but these forces are reluctant to accept their defeat. By 2012, these forces will be totally exhausted.” In Pakistan, however, Gul says what is needed is not a bloodbath, but rather a “soft Islamic revolution” (Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, January 17).

Hamid Gul and Taliban Friends

General Gul is certainly one of the most talkative former intelligence directors in the world, constantly seeking the spotlight through provocative remarks presented in a seemingly endless series of television and print interviews. While the United States has regularly claimed Gul is a supporter of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, Gul counters that his activities are strictly based on morality, Pakistani sovereignty and the struggle of Muslims to free themselves from foreign occupation and manipulation:

The Americans sent my name to the UN Security Council to put me on a sanctions list and declare me an international terrorist. But they failed because the Chinese knew the truth well and blocked that move. Basically, the Americans have nothing against me. I saw the charges and I replied to them in the English-language press in Pakistan. I said if they have anything against me to bring it forward, put me on trial. Tell me what wrong I have done. I have been taking moral stands. The Americans talk of freedom of speech, but apparently my speech hurts them because it counters their excesses… I do not support terror at all, but jihad is our right when a nation is oppressed. According to the United Nations Charter, national resistance for liberation is a right. We call this a jihad (al-Jazeera, February 17, 2010).

Pakistan’s Relations with the United States

In his capacity as Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and later ISI director under Benazir Bhutto, Gul worked closely with American intelligence agencies in coordinating and supplying the Afghan mujahideen’s struggle against Soviet occupation. This relationship began to suffer when Gul observed that American funding and interest in Afghanistan declined rapidly after the expulsion of the Soviets in 1989. Sanctions related to Pakistan’s secret nuclear program further inflamed Gul, who tried to rally Muslim opposition to the U.S. led “War on Terrorism.” According to Gul: “The Muslim world must stand united to confront the U.S. in its so-called war against terror which is in reality a war against Muslims. Let us destroy America wherever its troops are trapped” (Daily Times [Lahore], August 30, 2003).

Gul continues to view the United States as the adversary of the Islamic world, telling a Rawalpindi daily that America will never be Pakistan’s friend – in fact, it is an even greater enemy than India (Nawa-i-Waqt [Rawalpindi], January 17). The former ISI chief claims U.S. military contractors (read Blackwater/XE) and CIA-directed drone attacks are actively working to destabilize Pakistan from within.

The former ISI chief continues to maintain the 9/11 attacks were part of an American plot to seize the resource-rich Muslim states, a plot that later instigated the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in 2007 as a means of bringing the Muslim mujahideen and the Pakistan Army into confrontation (South Asian News Agency, January 19). He cites as proof of American intentions the fact that U.S. forces did not quickly withdraw from Afghanistan after dispersing al-Qaeda elements in late 2001 and claims the Obama administration is now working to replace U.S. government troops with American mercenaries as a means of deflecting negative public opinion: “This is a very dangerous trend if we are to believe that mercenaries can win wars and carry forward the political objectives of the country. This means that whoever has more money can employ more mercenaries, win wars, win territories, etc.” (al-Jazeera, February 18, 2010).

Gul was consistent in his response to recent news of the death of his long-time associate and former ISI Colonel (retd) Sultan Amir Tarar (a.k.a. Colonel Imam) while in the hands of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Colonel Imam was kidnapped in March 2010 while on a mysterious mission to North Waziristan along with two other men, one of whom was murdered last year. Though the Taliban’s demands for the release of prisoners in government prisons were never met, the group is claiming Colonel Imam died of heart failure. Gul insists that his former colleague did not suffer from heart problems, but was instead killed by Indian intelligence and agents of private military contractor Blackwater/XE under a U.S. contract (Express Tribune [Karachi], January 23; The News [Islamabad], January 27).

Wikileaks Controversy

General Gul’s name appears in 92,000 of the U.S. diplomatic cables leaked to Wikileaks, most often in connection to his alleged ties with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda operatives. While the cables represent only raw, unanalyzed intelligence reports, the sheer volume of those mentioning Gul in connection with militant groups is nevertheless alarming. Included in the documents are reports of Gul obtaining arms and munitions for the Taliban, orchestrating the abduction of United Nations personnel in Afghanistan and bragging about his role in ordering suicide bombings, all of which remain unverified.

Gul’s response to the allegations contained in the cables was emphatic: “These documents are nonsense. They are ironic, wrong and stupid. I deny every single word in them… It is all rubbish.” For once, Gul did not blame the United States, saying the allegations were more likely the work of Afghan and Indian intelligence services (Der Spiegel, July 26, 2010).

Despite his alleged connections to Afghanistan’s Taliban, Gul sees a different motivation behind the activities of Pakistan’s own Taliban: “The Pakistani Taliban are being sponsored by the Indian intelligence and the Mossad, by the way, to carry out their attacks in Pakistan. Mossad is very active in Pakistan and they are providing all the guidance and technical support to the Indian intelligence. So, Pakistan has to have its back covered – no country can fight on two fronts.” These remarks run contrary to the belief of Western governments that Pakistan’s ISI has close ties to the Pakistani Taliban.

General Ahmed Shuga Pasha

Dueling Court Cases

This month a Brooklyn-based U.S. court summoned current ISI Director Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, his predecessor, Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj (current Adjutant-General of the Pakistan Army), and two other Pakistan Army officers in connection with a suit brought by two Israeli-Americans who lost relatives in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

The summons threatens to be another major blow to American-Pakistani relations, with the Islamabad government promising to resist all attempts to make serving officers of its military appear before an American court. Just in case the government’s will falters, Islamist political parties have been issuing threats of insurrection if the government fails to resist. According to Jamaat-ud-Dawah official Professor Hafiz Abdur Rehman Makki: “The Americans are the most foolish people in the world. They think that Pakistan is like an article in a cupboard and they will order it the way they like. It is due to our rulers only” (Nawa-i-Waqt, January 19). Many of the Islamists view the court case as a conspiracy engineered by Indian and Israeli intelligence agencies.

The case seems ready made for one of Gul’s appeals to Pakistani nationalism. The former ISI chief told an American periodical, “The United States [doesn’t] care about any international law or the sovereignty and dignity of any country. [The] United States of America is the violator of all the international rules and laws.” Gul further claimed the court might give a biased verdict that would slander Pakistan in the eyes of the international community (New American, January 24).

The case appears to have already had repercussions after the name of the CIA’s Islamabad station chief was leaked to a Pakistani journalist who has filed a murder case against CIA station chief Jonathan Banks, with other notices being served on CIA director Leon Panetta and U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates in relation to the death of journalist Karim Khan’s brother and son in a December 2009 drone attack in North Waziristan. Gul suggests the ISI may have leaked Banks’ name as revenge for the summons issued on its director, General Shuja Pasha, in the Brooklyn Mumbai trial (Newsweek Pakistan, January 10).

The Benazir Bhutto Assassination

Though Gul was frequently named as a suspect in Bhutto’s assassination, he was largely cleared of involvement by the Pakistan government in April 2010. It was Bhutto who replaced Gul as ISI director in 1987. The rift between Bhutto and Gul reached a critical point when Bhutto named Gul as one of four prominent Pakistanis she claimed were behind the October 18, 2007, bombing of her motorcade in Karachi, which killed 139 people and left hundreds injured.

Gul has frequently claimed Washington was behind Bhutto’s murder, but more recently has set his sights on former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf as a main suspect, saying Musharraf was responsible for Bhutto’s death and should be subject to investigation and questioning (The Nation [Islamabad], December 27, 2010; The News [Islamabad], January 5; Times of India, December 27, 2010).

Conclusion

It is difficult to assess Gul’s importance in the ongoing struggle for Pakistan’s future. There seems little doubt that Gul maintains extensive contacts within the shadowy and dangerous world of covert operations in South Asia. However, the seriousness of the Western allegations leveled at the former ISI chief seem incompatible with his accessibility to the press, leading some to dismiss his importance. Nevertheless, General Gul presents an attractive mix of Islamic revolution and Pakistani nationalism that finds a ready audience inside Pakistan. His claims that allegations of ties to terrorism are an American/Israeli/Indian conspiracy to deny him his role as a “credible critic” of Western intervention in the region likewise reverberate favorably with the Pakistani public. Gul’s importance stands primarily in the extent to which he represents a pro-Islamist, anti-American trend in Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, organizations which will ultimately have far more to do with the future direction of Pakistan than Taliban gunmen.

Nigerian Elite Force Accused of Murders in Plateau State

Posted on January 28, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 28, 2011

Ongoing violence in Nigeria’s mixed Christian-Muslim Plateau State took a new turn when an elite force of Nigerian troops tasked with restoring order were accused of attacks on civilians in two Christian villages that killed eight, creating a new national scandal as the country approaches general elections in April. Over 100 people have been killed in the region surrounding the state capital of Jos since Christmas.

Brigadier Hassan Umaru

The government’s response to the violence was Operation Safe Haven, a campaign to be implemented by a Special Military Task Force (STF) drawing on members of the army, navy, air force and police. The STF is led by Brigadier-General Hassan Umaru, whose wife is believed to have been killed by attackers last month (NigerianNewsService.com, December 7, 2010).

On the night of January 24 the villages of Hamman and Farin Lamba (both roughly 25 km from the state capital of Jos) were attacked by uniformed gunmen who assaulted villagers with machetes and firearms (Next [Lagos], January 25). The attackers in Farin Lamba were observed arriving and leaving in a Toyota Hilux van of the type used to transport police in the region, an observation later confirmed by Plateau State Police Commissioner Abdurrahman Akano. Many of the attackers appeared to be wearing body armor of the type worn by security forces. However, Commissioner Akano also suggested that the reported theft of 100 cattle belonging to Fulanis was the cause of what he termed “a reprisal attack,” though he provided no evidence of a connection between the two events (Next, January 25; Vanguard, January 25; Daily Trust, January 25).

The attackers at Farin Lambo first struck a vigilante squad of villagers, killing three before torching homes and barns. The vigilante group was created to repel assailants after the two villages were attacked four times in the previous two weeks (Next, January 25). The military complains that difficult terrain in the region hampers their response to incidents of violence outside the major towns, leaving such villages with little in the way of defense.

After word spread of the killings, women dressed in black attacked the camp of the largely Muslim-officered STF in Vom, shouting anti-STF slogans while throwing stones and setting fire to STF tents. Six women were reported to have been shot by the STF during the demonstration (Nigerian Tribune, January 25; Reuters, January 25).

STF commander Brigadier Umaru said he thought it unlikely that any of his troops would attack people whose safety was in their hands and asked locals to provide him with proof of such allegations (Vanguard, January 25). Some STF members were recently arrested for failing to stop killings in Jos, and the ID card of an STF member was found at the site of some of the killings (Vanguard, January 20).

Even before the latest incidents, Chief Solo Akuma, the senior advocate of Nigeria, called on military authorities to closely monitor the STF for partiality and to reassure locals of the neutrality of the STF when carrying out their duties (Vanguard, January 20).

On January 18, a Nigerian military spokesman warned that soldiers would fire on any community members seen attacking civilians or burning mosques, churches or residences (BBC, January 18).

The sectarian violence in Plateau State began in 1994 and has since claimed thousands of lives. Since 1994 there have been seven commissions of inquiry into the violence, though the results have either been concealed or largely ignored. Though the conflict is often characterized as being a religious-based confrontation between the Muslim Fulani- Hausa and the Christian Berom, Afizere and Anaguta tribes, the dispute has more to do with competition for land and political power between indigenous Christian farmers and so-called “settlers” from the largely nomadic and Muslim communities of northern Nigeria (Next, January 23; Reuters, January 25).

There are also political differences, with the local Christian tribes generally supporting the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), while the nomadic Muslims are viewed as supporters of the opposition All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP).

This article first appeared in the January 28, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Former “Afghan Arab” Ali Al-Kurdi Says Jihad against South Yemen’s Separatists Is the First Priority

Posted on January 20, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 20, 2011

A leading Yemeni jihadi and veteran of the post-Soviet struggle for power in Afghanistan has assumed the leadership of a possibly government-backed unity “committee” in the southern Yemeni port of Aden, where the Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) has been organizing a campaign to return the South to its former status as an independent state (Marib Press, January 3). In a recent interview, Ali al-Kurdi described the pro-unity plans of his new organization (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 4).

According to al-Kurdi, an electrical engineer by trade, the Popular Committee for national unity that he chairs does not receive any state funds (“the committee does not have ten riyals”), but is supported by those who suffered from the economic consequences of socialist rule in southern Yemen’s People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY – 1970-1990). Al-Kurdi says socialist rule introduced “freedom of debauchery, alcohol drinking and the like” as well as enabling political persecution on the slightest of pretexts. The former mujahid is ambivalent about his relationship with the regime, on the one hand saying it would be an honor to collaborate with President Ali Abdullah Salih, while on the other recalling his numerous clashes with Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO) and a raid on his house that caused his sister to miscarry. He also recalls that it was the entry of Salih’s mixed force of tribesmen, former mujahidin and army regulars into Aden that prevented his execution by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in 1994.

Al-Kurdi has a long history as a mujahid, armed militant and suspected terrorist. After leaving the PDRY’s army in 1989, al-Kurdi says he left for Sana’a and moved on to Afghanistan after rejecting PDRY claims that he had been exposed to in the army that Afghani Muslims were fighting alongside the Soviets to drive out anti-Islamic mujahideen. Al-Kurdi claims to have carried out attacks in Khost, Jalalabad, Lugar and on the periphery of Kabul during his time in Afghanistan prior to his return to Aden in 1992.

Al-Kurdi was also charged but released as a suspect in the USS Cole bombing of 2000. He later complained of “dirty treatment” and beatings by “jailers and Shiite officials” (Yemen Times, February 26, 2006; Marib Press, January 2). Al-Kurdi was also charged with being a member of al-Qaeda in a 2006 trial of 19 alleged al-Qaeda operatives accused of plotting to assassinate Westerners and blow up a hotel used by American visitors to Yemen. The defendants were freed when the judge ruled Shari’a permitted jihad against the occupiers of Iraq (AP, July 9, 2006). Salih has deployed ex-mujahideen against the Southern separatists before, most notably in the 1994 civil war, when thousands of jihadis were recruited to fight Southerners in exchange for special consideration in post-war Yemen.

The ex-mujahid claims that AQAP has “no connection” to the core al-Qaeda organization, but was rather created by Sunnis who experienced persecution at the hands of (Zaidi) Shiites in PSO prisons. He denied any current relationship with al-Qaeda and downplayed its local significance as a militant group: “Al-Qaeda exists as an organization in all countries of the world, but I rule out [this group] undertaking any operations in Yemen” (Marib Press, January 2).

Though his committee may be poorly funded by his own account, al-Kurdi and his followers are prepared to “repulse” SMM loyalists who might opt for violent resistance to the regime, even through the use of “martyrdom-seeking attacks.” Al-Kurdi asserts that “Jihad for Yemen’s unity takes precedence over jihad in Afghanistan and Palestine. And jihad against the SMM takes precedence over jihad against Jews and Christians.”

Al-Kurdi sees the separatist troubles of southern Yemen as part of a larger effort to divide and rule the Islamic world: “There is a conspiracy to divide Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Iraq. Iraq has already been divided and now it is Sudan’s turn. The [conspirators] will then move on to Saudi Arabia and Yemen… Mecca and Medina’s turn will follow because Yemen constitutes the bulwark of Saudi Arabia. Even the Turks who formerly ruled Yemen viewed Yemen as such.

There are indications that a major campaign of assassination of senior Yemeni military officials has begun inside Yemen, with numerous officers and soldiers being killed in Abyan, Shabwah, Hadramawt and elsewhere (al-Hayat, January 9). Al-Turki blamed the officers and soldiers themselves, though not without assigning some blame to the SMM: “Frankly speaking, these officers and soldiers provide the justification for assassinations and lack of security, because some officers arrest people. When a person goes to prison, he is placed with al-Qaeda affiliated detainees. When such a person gets out of prison, he is angry and seeks revenge on the state. These are revenge acts by some citizens against security personnel. The SMM may be behind some attacks.”

This article first appeared in the January 20, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Sudanese Ansar Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi Rejects the Violence of the “al-Qaeda Mentality”

Posted on January 20, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 20, 2011

Sudan’s leading opposition figure, Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, has been increasingly vocal in recent weeks as public dissatisfaction grows in North Sudan over the role of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and its leader, President Omar al-Bashir, in losing the oil-rich South Sudan in a referendum on secession.

Sadiq al-Mahdi

In a recent interview with a pan-Arab daily, the former Prime Minister and hereditary leader of the Sufi “Ansar” (Helpers) of the western and central Sudan rejected the method of “direct individual violence” adopted by al-Qaeda. Sadiq gives three reasons used to justify extremist violence:

• The presence of foreign occupiers in Muslim lands.
• The presence of foreign usurpers, as in Palestine.
• The existence of social injustice (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9).

While Sadiq acknowledges that these problems must be dealt with even by “Islamic Centrists” such as himself, he rejects al-Qaeda’s approach while questioning the perception of al-Qaeda as an hierarchical organization with a central leadership:

“Many people believe that al-Qaeda is an organization; however, my opinion is that al-Qaeda is a mentality, and according to this mentality some people act in a decentralized way. It is not necessary that instructions come from al-Qaeda’s leadership. There is a mentality based on Islamic interpretative judgment, which in its turn is based on the implementation of these rulings, and anyone who does not agree to this is considered an infidel, whether he is a Muslim or non-Muslim; also [shedding] the infidel’s blood is allowed.”

Al-Mahdi has joined several other opposition leaders in giving the NCP government a January 26 deadline for the formation of a national unity government. The day was selected as the anniversary of the triumph of Sadiq’s great grandfather, Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, over Turco-Egyptian forces in Khartoum in 1885. The national unity government is required to negotiate relations with the new South Sudanese state and to resolve the Darfur issue and the arrest warrant of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on related war crimes charges: “The ICC issue has to be dealt with on a rational basis and not superficially by thinking that it can be ignored, and that it will be resolved and pass on its own.” The Sudanese President was succinct in his response: “Whoever wants to overthrow the government can lick his elbow….. There will not be a national government” (Sudan Tribune, December 28, 2010).

Sadiq also criticized the United States for its support of Southern independence while ignoring the development of democracy in the North:

I believe that there is a fundamental dysfunction in the United States. The foreign policy is drawn up by “lobbies,” and what these “lobbies” believe influences the policy of the U.S. Administration. “The lobbies” in existence today are interested in conducting the referendum and the birth of the South State without enough interest in what happens in the North State. This is despite the fact that any rational thinking considers it to be extremely necessary for the North State itself to be rational so that it does not contain any tendency to sabotage the South State.

The former prime minister went on to suggest that after the “failure of its policies” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States wants to present the secession of the South as “an achievement of its foreign policy.” He fears that U.S. support for secession has taken little account of the need for the new state to exist in peace with North Sudan. “The United States ought to understand that the referendum cannot be allowed to be a cause for new wars,” Sadiq stated.

Looking at the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) of Omar al-Bashir, Sadiq suggests that the party no longer speaks with one voice, with leading members advocating everything from wanting to get rid of the South to more effectively Islamize the rest of the nation, to those who declare the Muslim signatories of any peace treaty with the South to be infidels. “The NCP is close to becoming a ‘vehicle of convenience’ and not an institution; each passenger speaks in his own language.”

However, Sadiq says that he does not regard al-Bashir as an extremist, but notes that “he can become enthusiastic. It is extremely possible that there are groups that have exerted pressure in this direction [i.e. religious extremism], and he responded to them.”

Mubarak al-Fadl, Sadiq’s cousin and leader of the Umma Reform and Renewal Party (URRP), was even more direct in his criticism of the NCP, saying it now feared a popular uprising in the North after using most of its oil wealth for “security and political functions”; “The National Congress Party is just using religion to support the police state and step up the oppression of the population… Al-Bashir is a military man who swore an oath to preserve the territorial integrity of Sudan and now he has to let the South go away. He cannot swallow that” (Sudan Tribune, December 21, 2010). Al-Fadl’s opposition to the NCP began in 2004 after he was removed from his post as a presidential adviser. Though he has often clashed with his cousin Sadiq (much of Khartoum’s political elite is related through blood or marriage), al-Fadl announced the dissolution of the URRP on the last day of 2010, saying he would now integrate his party with that of Sadiq Umma.

This article first appeared in the January 20, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

New Law Sets Notorious Turkish Hezbollah Members Free

Posted on January 13, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 13, 2011

Turkish Hezbollah Military Leader Haci Inan (Haberler)

At least 25 suspected terrorists in a notorious mass torture-murder investigation have been released by a Turkish court under the new terms of article 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which forbids detention for more than ten years without the conclusion of a trial. The release of the suspects from Turkish Hezbollah has pitted politicians and judges in a dispute over responsibility while an outraged public questions the state’s dedication to eliminating terrorist groups in Turkey. The men are among as many as 1,000 suspected criminals expected to be released under the new law (NTV, January 5; Hurriyet, January 6; Today’s Zaman, January 5). Many more terrorist suspects, including the killer of journalist Hrant Dink, could be released within the coming year. Other beneficiaries of the changes include members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – PKK) and various left-wing organizations. Some of the suspects did not reach the streets after their release from custody, however; having failed to complete mandatory military service, they were taken straight to military recruiting offices.

Edip Gumus

The freed members of the ethnic Kurdish and Sunni Hezbollah movement (no connection to Lebanon’s Shi’a Hezbollah) include military leader Haci Inan, Istanbul leader Ilyas Kutulman and assassin Edip Gumus, who is accused of killing 42 people. The suspects were arrested in a January 2000 investigation that resulted in the death of Hezbollah leader Huseyin Velioglu and the discovery of dozens of bodies (many showing signs of torture and restraint) beneath a number of Hezbollah safe-houses. Many of the dead showed signs of having been buried alive. Searches discovered hundreds of videotapes recording the torture and execution of Kurdish PKK members and rival Islamists, many of them moderates (see Terrorism Monitor, January 25, 2008). Inan and Kutulman were charged with “attempting to overturn the constitutional order via force of arms,” based on Hezbollah’s avowed intention to replace the existing state with an Islamic government by force (Anatolia, January 4). The case is complicated by numerous allegations that Hezbollah operated as a covert arm of the state’s efforts to crush Kurdish separatism and Islamist challenges to the officially secular Turkish state (Hurriyet, January 7; BBC, January 23, 2000).

Many of the Hezbollah suspects were quickly given life sentences in local courts after their arrest, but once the cases arrived at the Supreme Court of Appeals in Ankara they became bogged down in the sluggish and undermanned Turkish justice system (Hurriyet, January 7). Others received life sentences in December 2009.

Though the suspects are not allowed to travel and must report to police on a regular basis, there is no indication that the appeals court will arrive at a verdict any time soon. The ordinance has come under legal criticism in Turkey as still failing to meet EU standards as intended.

This article first appeared in the January 13, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Arabs and Tuareg Clash over Narcotics Smuggling in Northern Mali

Posted on January 13, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 13, 2011

Emerging reports describe a major gun-battle between Bérabiche Arabs escorting a convoy of Moroccan cannabis through the Malian Sahel and a party of armed Tuareg nobles who appeared, in traditional fashion, to demand a fee for passing through their territory (El Watan [Algiers], January 4). The convoy of roughly 20 four-wheel drive vehicles was on its way through northeastern Mali, bound for Libya via Niger. An intense battle lasting several hours followed the convoy’s attempt to bypass the Tuareg gunmen, resulting in the death of five traffickers and two Tuareg, along with an unknown number of wounded.

Armed Tuareg

Some factions of Mali’s Tuareg have been petitioning the government for permission to form government-sponsored anti-terrorist militias (See Terrorism Monitor Briefs, November 4, 2010). Implementation of this plan appears to have been postponed to avoid an “unpredictable reaction” from the al-Qaeda kidnappers of seven foreign hostages (including five Frenchmen) seized at the Areva uranium plant in northern Niger. The hostages are currently being held at AQIM strongholds in northwest Mali.

It has been suggested that al-Qaeda is involved in the flourishing narcotics smuggling in the Sahara/Sahel region, but other sources indicate that while there is an overlap in the use of smugglers and drivers that work in the narcotics trade, al-Qaeda makes ample money from its kidnappings and wishes to avoid the additional security complications that would follow a full-scale commitment to international narcotics trafficking (El Watan, January 3).

Drug cartels from Venezuela, Spain, Portugal and Colombia are reported to be active in the Malian capital of Bamako, where their violent competition often appears to elude the attention of local police (El Watan, January 3). Malian police recently entered a Bamako cement warehouse to find a Venezuelan and a Portuguese trafficker using a chainsaw to cut up the body of a Colombian using a fake Ukrainian passport. The discovery was not part of an investigation and the Portuguese suspect has already escaped (Le Monde, January 3).

Malian authorities reported breaking up a trafficking network during a raid near the Mauritanian border on December 9, 2010. The network was allegedly composed of ex-fighters of the West Saharan Polisario Front, now confined to camps in southern Algeria (AFP, December 10, 2010). Tamensa, located near the meeting point of the Algerian, Nigerien and Malian borders, appears to be a hotspot of trafficking and smuggling activity (al-Hayat, January 1). In the cities of northern Mali, specifically Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, a mini-building boom has followed the influx of kidnapping and trafficking revenues and banks are reported to accept bags of cash without question (Le Monde, December 22, 2010).

There are indications, however, that a Tuareg vs. Arab paradigm may not reflect the reality of the violence in northern Mali. The introduction of democracy by the state has created something of a social revolution in the region. Since the April 2009 regional elections, the traditional leaders of the Arab community, the Arab-Berber Kounta, and the traditional leaders of the Tuareg, the Ifogha, have lost a great deal of their previous influence. The “noble” groups blame this on the alleged use of smuggling money by their respective vassal communities (the Telemsi and Bérabiche Arabs and the Imghad Tuareg) to buy victory in the elections, creating an inversion of the existing power structure in northern Mali. The growing dispute has erupted in ambushes of Arab-Imghad narcotics convoys crossing the region (U.S. Embassy Bamako cable, February 1, 2010, as published in the Guardian, December 14, 2010; Le Monde, December 22, 2010; MaliKounda.com, December 7, 2009; see also Terrorism Monitor, November 4, 2010).

This article first appeared in the January 13, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Unclaimed New Year’s Day Bombing in Abuja Rattles Nigeria’s Power Structure

Posted on January 6, 2011 by McGregor

Andrew McGregor

January 6, 2011

A New Year’s Eve bombing within the confines of a Nigerian military base in the capital city of Abuja has damaged Nigeria’s political stability, as various politicians and civil leaders seek to implicate each other as responsible for the unclaimed blast. The bombing, which killed four civilians (including a pregnant woman) and wounded 26, was the second terrorist attack in the nation’s capital since October.

The “Mammy Market” at the Mogadishu Cantonment, Abuja
(Sahara Reporters)

The attack targeted an open-air bar and restaurant at a so-called “Mammy Market,” a civilian-run market attached to Abuja’s “Mogadishu Cantonment” military base providing shopping and recreational opportunities. The explosion culminated a week of violence in Nigeria that began with a series of bombings on Christmas Eve in the Plateau State city of Jos, a common site for sectarian violence in recent years between the Muslim and Christian communities. Eighty people were killed in the Jos bombings and subsequent retaliatory attacks. This was followed by a bombing at a rally of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Yenogoa in Bayelsa State and murders and church burnings in Maiduguri in Borno State (Next [Lagos], January 4; Vanguard [Lagos], January 3; Daily Trust [Lagos], December 30, 2010).

On January 3 the government of President Goodluck Jonathan responded to the violence by holding an emergency closed-door meeting of the nation’s top security officials. Following the meeting, spokesmen announced a number of measures to be taken, including:

The appointment of a special presidential advisor on terrorism.
The installation of new closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in sensitive areas of Abuja, though existing CCTV installations proved of little use in the latest attack.
New regulations regarding access to public and private establishments.
The creation of a presidential committee on the control of explosives and incendiary materials
The creation of a presidential committee on public enlightenment regarding security measures.

A presidential spokesman indicated that police had been “directed to ensure the prompt arrest and prosecution of political thugs” (Next [Abuja], January 4). Jonathan’s government has invited American FBI agents and members of Israel’s MOSSAD intelligence organization to help investigate the Abuja bombing (Vanguard, January 3; Abuja Leadership, January 3).

The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), which claimed responsibility for a pair of car bombings in the capital last October, issued a statement through spokesman Jomo Gbomo denying any involvement in the attack at the Mogadishu Cantonment: “Bombings and attacks carried out by MEND are always preceded by a warning in order to prevent casualties and followed by a statement of claim… [MEND] condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians by any persons or groups for what so ever reasons” (AFP, January 2; Vanguard, January 2).

PDP primaries next week will be followed by what is expected to be hotly contested presidential, gubernatorial and parliamentary elections in April. With the political direction of the country in the balance, few seem able to resist the temptation to link political opponents to the ongoing violence.

The campaign organization of Jonathan’s main challenger for the PDP presidential nomination for upcoming elections in April, former vice-president Atiku Abubakar, denounced what it described as efforts by the president’s paid agents to link Abubakar with the Abuja bombing: “In a moment of national crisis, President Goodluck Jonathan must demonstrate sobriety and cool-headed posture rather than losing his head to impetuous emotions… The President should allow security services to carry out intensive investigations instead of using the incident to frame up political opponents whom he perceives as stumbling blocks to his ambition” (Next, January 4).

Former military ruler of Nigeria General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) has also complained of government attempts to tie him to the Abuja bombing, describing it as “sheer blackmail”: “It exposes the weakness in the system if private persons and former leaders who are enjoying their retirement are being linked to acts of terrorism or bombings. We all should agree that there is failure in governance rather than passing the buck, or finding very idiotic and flimsy reasons to label some distinguished persons as being responsible for such failures” (Vanguard, January 3; Daily Sun [Lagos], January 3). Various NGOs, as well as religious and labor leaders have alleged that the Abuja bombing is part of an attempt to create a state of emergency leading to the military’s return to power (Nigerian Compass [Lagos], January 4; Daily Trust, January 3).

The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa’ad Muhammadu Abubakar, made an unfavorable comparison between the current state of security and that which existed under military rule. “We should blame the political class for getting us to this stage because it was not like this before,” Abubakar claimed (Daily Trust, December 30, 2010).

Nigeria’s intelligence services have come under strong public criticism for repeated failures to anticipate eruptions of sectarian violence in northern and central Nigeria. Army Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirike acknowledged the failure, saying there is a need to “enhance intelligence operations” (Daily Trust, December 30, 2010). Meanwhile, Defense Minister Prince Adetokunbo Kayode promised the investigation would continue, saying, “The perpetrators are here, they are not from the moon and we will get them” (Vanguard, January 2).

This article first appeared in the January 6, 2011 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor