Category Archives: Afghanistan

President Obama’s Outreach to the Muslim World (I) – Afghan Taliban Attack Barack Obama’s “Arrogant” Cairo Speech

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Andrew McGregor

June 12, 2009

U.S. President Barack Obama’s June 4 speech in Cairo was seen by many observers as an outreach to the Islamic world. Within that world, some welcomed his words, some wait to see if deeds of substance accompany those words, while others, such as the Afghan Taliban, described the President’s words as nothing more than “misleading slogans” that “failed to deliver a clear and true message to the Muslim world.” The speech failed to contain any “sign of practical change in the hostile policy of America towards Muslims” (Afghan Islamic Press, June 5).

Obama Egypt 2In a point-by-point deconstruction of the speech, the Afghan Taliban analyzed and condemned most of the material within the President’s address, which sought to lay a groundwork for repairing relations with the Islamic world:

• The Taliban described the president’s claims of tolerance and good-will as inconsistent with American actions, particularly those of its “occupation forces,” which are committing “mass murder” and imprisoning Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq in “the most hateful prisons of the world.” As a result of these “illegal” activities, “Obama’s baseless speech has no importance.”

• The statement objected to the President’s justification of the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a “legitimate struggle to secure U.S. interests… According to national and international laws, the occupation of independent countries and hostile war against their free nations cannot be called a legitimate war.”

• The Taliban accused the President of wanting to separate Muslims from “their real protectors,” the mujahideen.  The speech is described as an effort to divide the Muslim community. “Today, all vigilant Muslims are engaged in jihad in one way or the other. Therefore, the U.S. war against the mujahideen is considered a war against all Muslim nations and Islam.”

• Obama’s claim that America was not seeking a permanent military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan is contradicted by the ongoing construction of military bases and airports in both countries, as well as the President’s stated intention of sending additional military forces to Afghanistan. “This large number of airports and countless number of military bases are established at a time when they do not need even half of them, given the number of their forces and daily military flights. This shows that Americans are intending to permanently remain in and occupy the region.”

• The President’s contention that U.S. forces will leave Afghanistan if peace is achieved “is quite funny… The presence of Americans is the main cause of violence and the current problems in the region. Jihad and resistance against American forces will continue as long as they are present in Afghanistan.”

• The Taliban also objected to the President’s use of the Jewish Holocaust to demand that Muslims avoid the “deeply wrong” practices of “threatening Israel with destruction – or repeating vile stereotypes about Jews.” The Taliban statement claims President Obama “described Israel as the most innocent and worthy nation of the world” while summarizing the 70-years of Palestinian suffering in “a few misleading words.” While the President did contend that “the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza does not serve Israel’s security,” the Taliban condemned Obama for failing to speak about the blockade of Gaza and Israeli efforts to deny the passage of medicines and basic food items to Gazan residents. The President also ignored the fact that “mass murders are committed [in Palestine] at every moment.”

In its summary of the President’s address, the Taliban statement remarked that President Obama did not come with conciliatory intentions, but with an “arrogant notion” to give orders to the Muslim world.

 

This article first appeared in the June 12, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Taliban Commander Describes Offensive in Afghanistan’s Northern Provinces

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Andrew McGregor

June 4, 2009

Ongoing Taliban military operations in northern Afghanistan were recently described by Khalid Haidari, the “official in charge of [Taliban] military affairs” in the province of Faryab, on the border with Turkmenistan (Voice of Jihad, May 17). The population of Faryab is largely Uzbek and Turkmen, with a sizeable Parsiwan minority (a Shi’a Tajik sub-group). Located far from the Pashtun-dominated regions of the south, where most Taliban operations take place, Faryab has been relatively peaceful since the 2001 U.S. invasion. Despite the lack of Pashtuns in Faryab, Haidari insists that the “mujahid people” of Faryab province have supported the Taliban both financially and with manpower. “The reality, contrary to what was in the past, is that the north is not a tranquil area for the internal and foreign enemies either.” Last year, the Taliban appointed Abdul Hamid Akhundzada as “governor” of Faryab province, but Akhundzada was soon killed in a raid by security forces after they received a tip-off regarding his location (Reuters, July 19, 2008).

FaryabHaidari denies the Coalition claims that the north has been cleared of mujahideen, explaining that this is a routine reaction by Coalition forces when they fail to expand the areas under their control. The Taliban leader claimed to have recently inflicted a “shameful defeat” on the enemy in “face to face fighting” that has left the Coalition in a defensive state, only able to venture out of the urban areas with an escort of dozens of tanks and aircraft.

Regarding the forthcoming Afghan elections, Haidari maintains they are nothing more than “a conspiracy by the Americans. We are seriously trying to prevent them… This is because elections in the presence of invaders are a great betrayal of Islam and the homeland.” He urged all Afghans to refrain from voting or from working in the elections.

Haidari dispensed with the coming American “surge” in Afghanistan by noting that the more troops the enemy deploys, the greater the opportunity for Taliban fighters to inflict casualties. “If our faith and belief is strong and we rely on God alone, the decrease or increase in the number of foreign soldiers or their equipment will not affect our activities.”

Faryab province is in the German-controlled sector of Afghanistan, known as Regional Command North. In response to a request from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) last year, German forces carried out a joint operation with the Afghan army designed to flush out Taliban fighters who infiltrated Faryab and neighboring Badghis province (Deutsche Welle, May 16, 2008). The German mandate calls for military operations in Afghanistan to be of a limited nature. Another 1,000 troops are on their way to join Germany’s ISAF force in northern Afghanistan, bringing the size of the force up to 4,500 troops. Four Taliban fighters were killed in an encounter with Afghan police in Faryab on May 12 (Reuters, May 12).

This article first appeared in the June 4, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Afghan Taliban Predict U.S. Change of Command Will Lead to American Collapse

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Andrew McGregor

May 26, 2009

Afghan Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi has delivered the movement’s reaction to Washington’s decision to make changes in the command of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan (Sawt al-Jihad, May 12). Responding to President Obama’s May 11 replacement of General David McKiernan with former Joint Special Operations Command Chief Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal and the appointment of a former general, Karl Eikenberry, as the new U.S. ambassador in Kabul, the Taliban spokesman suggested the changes were a sign “the Americans and their allies have totally lost their way as far as how to win the war in Afghanistan and are increasingly losing patience and focus.”

Qari Yusuf AhmadiTaliban Spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi

Qari Yusuf claimed that seven years of warfare had only resulted in “an increase in [the occupiers’] economic burden and total failure on the battlefield.” He went on to suggest the Taliban’s assessment was one shared by “international media and experts,” who were predicting total American defeat in the military and political fields. “At present, the enemy is in a state of panic throughout the country, rural areas have come under the control of the mujahideen and the enemy supply routes are under our watchful eyes. It seems that the latest urgent measures and leadership changes by the enemy are the result of this pressure.”

According to Qari Yusuf, it was only some months ago that there was steady discussion by American officials and the Western media of the failures and corruption of the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul, yet as elections approach, the U.S. has realized there is “no worthy political leadership in Afghanistan,” with the result that they are preparing Karzai and his corrupt team for another term in office. This political failure has led to changes in the political and military leadership of the American presence in Afghanistan.

With regard to the change in military command, Qari Yusuf pointed out, “In the past four years [the Americans] have repeatedly changed their military commanders – with every new commander boasting about new strategy and military experience. However, with the passing of time, it has been made clear to them that this war could not be won… Just like the former Soviet Union, they will be forced to admit to the realities, but it will be too late by then and many of their generals would have lost their lives and careers.”

This article was first published in the May 26, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Kuwait’s Hamid Abdallah al-Ali Describes Pending Defeat of Americans in Afghanistan and Pakistan

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Andrew McGregor

May 18, 2009

Shaykh Hamid Abdallah al-Ali, a leading Kuwait-based Salafist preacher and advocate of global jihad, has declared that Islam’s battle in Afghanistan will continue to escalate in the coming days, extending to Pakistan where the “Zionist-Crusader” alliance will use strategies similar to those that have already failed in Palestine, Iraq and Somalia. His analysis was contained in a May 2 article entitled; “Afghan-Pakistani Tight Spot and Zion-American Ambitions” (muslm.net, May 2). The analysis was carried by many jihadist websites.

Hamid Abdullah al-AliShaykh Hamid Abdullah al-Ali

Al-Ali says the most prominent achievement of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Baitullah Mahsud has been the rejuvenation of “the jihadist network in Afghanistan, all the warlords from Pashtun [tribes] and the mujahideen from the Punjab district… aligning them under one banner.”  The fusion of trained jihadis, funds and organizational skills has made it possible for Baitullah to strike anywhere in Pakistan. According to al-Ali, the success of the Taliban is based on its ability to win supporters and postpone “secondary disputes” within the alliance.

The Salafist preacher is, unsurprisingly, critical of Shiite Iran. Al-Ali notes that the “Safavids” (Iranians) do not cooperate with Sunni jihad movements, except temporarily to “burn out such movements” in a “wicked scheme.” “What is astonishing in their ambition is that they want a deal that reaches a degree that equalizes them with the international deals the West concludes with China or Russia.” The shaykh suggests Iran will continue to display their ability to cause harm continuously until they are given status alongside the great powers, even if it involves provoking the United States in Latin America (an apparent reference to Iranian relations with Venezuela).

The shaykh suggests that the destruction of NATO supply lines through Pakistan to Afghanistan would be one of the greatest achievements of the ongoing jihad. This would help make the Afghanistan-Pakistan region “a vast and safe camp” for Islamic jihadis. “The Afghan-Pakistani jihad is gearing up to a higher degree, taking advantage of the U.S. exhaustion caused by the Iraqi quagmire, the economic crisis, [and] the widespread American fatigue from external wars…”

Shaykh Hamid Abdallah al-Ali is best known for his 1999 fatwa declaring the government of Kuwait to be composed of disbelievers – legitimate targets for the mujahideen – and for his early 2001 fatwa sanctioning suicide bombings, including those involving the flying of aircraft into public buildings (see Terrorism Monitor, April 26, 2007).

This article was first published in the May 18, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Afghan Taliban Reject Claims they are led by al-Qaeda

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Andrew McGregor

April 30, 2009

An important interview with senior Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid attracted little attention in Western media despite indications in the interview of several important new directions in Taliban policy (Afghan Islamic Press, April 21). Most notably, Zabihullah appeared to distance the Taliban movement from al-Qaeda. Repudiating the suggestion that the resistance in Afghanistan was led by al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban, Zabihullah declared; “The ongoing resistance against the foreigners in Afghanistan is a pure Afghan resistance. The commanders and leaders of this resistance are Afghans and everything to do with this struggle is led by Afghans… The leader of our resistance is known and he is Mullah Omar Mujahid. Local commanders in each and every province and region are known.” Western media and governments have long regarded the two movements as inseparable.

While conceding the presence of foreign fighters in the Taliban ranks, the spokesman compared the situation to the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, when many foreign fighters were found in the ranks of the mujahideen; “It was obvious that the struggle was a purely Afghan movement. The current ongoing jihad and resistance is also a pure Afghan affair.” Zabihullah ended his comments on al-Qaeda by suggesting that international concerns about the terrorist group had nothing to do with the program and operations of the Afghan Taliban, saying “We are not responsible for the affairs of other parties or the world. We are only concerned about Afghanistan. It is up to al-Qaeda and the rest of the world whether they resolve their problems or not. Such issues have nothing to do with the Taliban.”

A second shift in Taliban policy was outlined in Zabihullah’s remarks on Taliban inclusiveness. The post-invasion movement is generally regarded as exclusive to Afghanistan’s Sunni Muslim Pashtun tribes, but Zabihullah insists, “This is a wrong opinion. The Taliban is composed of all the tribes and nations of Afghanistan. The Taliban appoint their commanders in each province and district from among the inhabitants of those areas. The only condition is that the individual must be a Muslim and Afghan.” Most surprising is Zabihullah’s claim that the Taliban has a growing following in Afghanistan’s Shi’a communities, despite a long history of Taliban animosity for Shi’ism, as expressed in a number of massacres of Shi’a civilians. “[The Shi’a] also do not want the foreigners and infidels to dominate Afghanistan. Therefore, they are also fighting against the foreigners in the ranks of Taliban.”

Lastly, Zabihullah commented on the expansion of the Taliban’s war to parts of northern Afghanistan previously considered stable. “The northern provinces are also part of Afghanistan. When the Taliban declared jihad against the forgoers [of religion] a few years back, some people in the northern provinces came under the foreigners’ influence and were saying that the Taliban were not mujahideen but terrorists, and that the foreign forces were in Afghanistan to help the people. But now people in the north have also realized that the Taliban are fighting and performing jihad just for the sake of Almighty Allah.”

The Taliban spokesman said that suicide bombings would play an important part in the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. The expansion of the war to northern Afghanistan will help nullify the impact of the influx of new American troops to Afghanistan while relieving pressure on Taliban operations in other parts of the country. Suicide bombers will also play a role in disrupting the upcoming national elections. During the month of April there were a number of suicide bombings and ambushes of national security forces in the previously secure northern provinces of Balkh, Kunduz, Samangan and Baghlan (Cheragh [Kabul], April 21, Afghan Islamic Press, April 12; Voice of Jihad, April 12, April 19).

 

This article first appeared in the April 30, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor 

Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive

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Andrew McGregor

April 3, 2009

Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Bradar Muhammad Akhand announced “a new series of operations” under the code name “Operation Ebrat” (Lesson) on March 27. The Taliban’s spring offensive is “aimed at giving the enemy a lesson through directing powerful strikes at it, which it can never expect, until it is forced to end the occupation of Afghanistan and withdraw all the occupier soldiers… We will add to the tactics and experiences of the past years new types of operations. The operations will also be expanded to cover all locations of the country, in order for the enemy to be weighed down everywhere” (Sawt al-Jihad, March 28). There are indications that a main target of the offensive will be the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier, in particular the strategically vital Khyber Pass.

Khyber PassKhyber Pass

Citing an improvement in the skills and capacity of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry immediately dismissed the announcement as “a psychological campaign and not a reality which could be implemented on the ground” (AFP, March 25). In reality the situation along the border is extremely precarious and threatens the ability of Coalition forces to operate within Afghanistan.

Joint Intelligence Centers on the Border

The first in a planned series of six joint intelligence centers along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border was opened at the Afghanistan border town of Torkham on March 29. When the plan is fully implemented there will be three such centers on each side of the border at a cost of $3 million each. There are high hopes for the centers, which have been described by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan as “the cornerstone upon which future cooperative efforts will grow” (Daily Times [Lahore], March 30). According to U.S. Brigadier General Joe Votel, “The macro view is to disrupt insurgents from going back and forth, going into Afghanistan and back into Pakistan, too. This is not going to instantly stop the infiltration problem, but it’s a good step forward” (Daily Times, March 30).

The centers are designed to coordinate intelligence gathering and sharing between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project is an outgrowth of the earlier Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) established in Kabul in January 2007. This center, comprising 12 ISAF, six Afghan and six Pakistani intelligence officers, was initiated by the Military Intelligence Sharing Working Group, a subcommittee of the Tripartite Plenary Commission of military commanders that meets on a bimonthly basis (American Forces Press Service, January 30, 2007). The JIOC is designed to facilitate intelligence sharing, joint operations planning and an exchange of information on improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The working languages are English, Dari and Pashto, aided by a number of translators.

The new border centers will each be manned by 15 to 20 intelligence agents. One of the main innovations is the ability to view real-time video feeds from U.S. surveillance aircraft. The commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez, described the centers as “a giant step forward in cooperation, communication and coordination” (The News [Karachi], March 29). Despite such glowing descriptions, there remains one hitch—Pakistan’s military has yet to make a full commitment to the project. According to Major General Athar Abbas, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, a military information organization, “At this time this proposal is being analyzed and evaluated by the concerned officials. But Pakistan has not yet come to a decision on this matter” (The News, March 30). General Abbas and other officials have declined to discuss Pakistan’s reservations or even to commit to a deadline for a decision. It is possible that the failure to sign on as full partners in the project may have something to do with the stated intention of Pakistan’s new prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, to pursue a greater focus on negotiation than military action in dealing with the Taliban and other frontier militants. There may also be reservations on the part of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to share intelligence on their clients within the Taliban.

Actual intelligence cooperation along the border is hampered by a number of factors, not least of which is a basic inability to agree on exactly where the border lies. In the past, Pakistan has responded to complaints from Afghanistan of Taliban fighters infiltrating across the border by threatening to fence or even mine the frontier, a shocking proposal to the Pashtun clans that straddle the artificial divide. Afghanistan’s long-standing policy is simply to refuse recognition of the colonial-era Durand Line, which it claims was forced on it by British imperialists in 1893. Pakistan accepts the Durand Line, but the two nations are frequently unable to agree on exactly where the 1,500-mile line is drawn.

U.S. Intervention in the Frontier Region?

The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to increase security and diminish the influence of the Taliban in the frontier regions of Pakistan, including a massive economic aid program, counter-insurgency training for the Frontier Corps and enhancement of the CIA’s monitoring and surveillance abilities in the area (Dawn [Karachi], February 26). The CIA already gathers information on the region from over-flights of its unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft, which can also deliver precisely targeted missiles on suspected Taliban safe-houses. Complicating efforts to increase security in the border region is a belief within Pakistan that the United States is preparing to intervene militarily in Pakistan’s frontier region (The Nation [Islamabad], March 24).

In a March 30 interview, CIA Director Michael Hayden declared that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region would be the most probable source for new terrorist attacks on the United States: “If there is another terrorist attack, it will originate there.” The CIA chief warned that the situation along the border “presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general and to the United States in particular.” Hayden also suggested that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were present in the Pakistan tribal frontier, where they were training “operatives who look Western” (NBC, March 30; Dawn, March 31).

A spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry responded angrily to the CIA director’s comments, stating that if the United States has information about the whereabouts of the al-Qaeda leadership, it should share it with Pakistan so it can take action. “Such a statement does not help trace alleged hideouts… Terrorists have threatened Pakistan and targeted our people. We are, therefore, combating terrorism in our own interest” (Daily Times, April 3). Syed Munawar Hasan, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, suggested that Hayden’s statements were “white lies,” similar to Washington’s allegations of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Munawar urged the new government to stand fast in the face of what he described as U.S. threats to invade Pakistan despite the establishment of a democratic government (The News, April 2). The provincial assembly of the North-West Frontier Province issued a unanimous condemnation of Hayden’s remarks (The Post [Lahore], April 2; Geo TV News, April 1).

The Torkham Gate

The location of the first joint intelligence center at Torkham reflects the strategic importance of this border town at the Afghanistan end of the fabled Khyber Pass. It is the main gateway for supplies to U.S. and ISAF forces within Afghanistan and is believed to be one of the main targets for the forthcoming Taliban spring offensive (The Nation, April 2). Linking Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province and Pakistan’s Khyber Agency, Torkham is traditionally the busiest commercial border post between the two countries. A new round of attacks on Torkham may have already begun—as many as 40 oil tankers destined for Coalition forces in Afghanistan were destroyed in a series of explosions in a Torkham parking lot on March 20 (Dawn, March 24). There were 70 to 100 tankers awaiting clearance to cross into Afghanistan at the time.

Torkham GateThe Torkham Gate

Only a day before the attack on the tankers, an effort by a U.S. Army colonel to expedite border clearances for military transports at Torkham failed when the chief Pakistani customs official refused to meet with her (Daily Times, March 19). Vehicles typically wait in parking lots at Torkham for up to 20 days awaiting clearance to proceed. Part of the problem is due to delays in permits faxed to Torkham from the U.S. base in Bagram—until these are received the vehicles are forbidden to cross into Afghanistan (Daily Times, March 27). There are also accusations that some tanker operators may be selling their fuel along the road in Pakistan before deliberately torching their vehicles at Torkham to claim the insurance on the missing load.

Torkham has also become a nearly unregulated transit point for legal and illegal migrants since the demolition of the border gate by the National Highway Authority of Pakistan two years ago. A series of meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials—attended as well by NATO officials—have been unable to agree on the design and other details of a replacement gate. Smuggling and illegal crossings have spun out of control while tensions between the respective border authorities nearly erupted into open fighting in September 2006 (Daily Times, April 2).

Conclusion

Pakistan’s reluctance to make a full commitment to intelligence sharing raises a number of difficult questions: Is the ISI still cooperating or even aiding the Afghan Taliban? Do the military and the intelligence services operate outside of political control? Is it possible to collaborate with the Taliban and not the Taliban’s allies, al-Qaeda? Why do the better-armed and -trained regular forces frequently relinquish their security role in the frontier regions to the poorly-equipped Pashtun Frontier Corps?

After a meeting on security and terrorism issues with Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani on April 3, a spokesman for Prime Minister Gillani stated that the prime minister was formulating a comprehensive terrorism strategy “based on political engagement, economic development and backed by a credible military element” (Daily Times, April 3). Many within the new government believe that Musharraf’s aggressive military approach to the frontier crisis is responsible for the recent rash of suicide bombings and other attacks that have taken scores of lives across the country.

In the meantime there is a dangerous lack of coordination on border issues in which all parties bear responsibility. There is every indication that the Taliban have identified Torkham as a crucial weak point in the supply and logistics system that maintains the international military presence in Afghanistan. The failure to share intelligence combined with bureaucratic delays and infighting along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier threatens the entire Coalition mission in Afghanistan

This article first appeared in the April 3, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Al-Qaeda’s Leader in Afghanistan Returns from the Dead to Threaten India

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Andrew McGregor

February 19, 2009

Despite Pakistani claims to have killed al-Qaeda’s commander in Afghanistan last summer, the veteran Egyptian militant Mustafa Ahmad “Abu al-Yazid” (a.k.a. Shaykh Said al-Misri) appeared in a 20-minute video last week threatening India with a repetition of last November’s terrorist outrage in Mumbai. Al-Yazid spoke of the shame India endured through its inability to contain the Mumbai attack and warned India that it could expect more of the same if it dared to attack Pakistan: “India should know that it will have to pay a heavy price if it attacks Pakistan… The mujahideen will sunder your armies into the ground, like they did to the Russians in Afghanistan. They will target your economic centers and raze them to the ground” (Press Trust of India, February 10; BBC, February 10).

Abu al-Yazid 2Mustafa Ahmad “Abu al-Yazid”

Lest anyone think the al-Qaeda commander was in league with Pakistan’s government, al-Yazid urged the masses of Pakistan to overthrow the government of President Asif Ali Zardari and declared that former president Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on the order of al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Abu al-Yazid is a former member of al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad group and served several years in prison before leaving Egypt for Afghanistan in 1988. Already under an Egyptian death sentence issued in absentia for terrorist activities in that country, Abu al-Yazid spent two years in Iraq before being appointed leader of al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan in May 2007. The 54-year-old appears to be primarily a financial and logistical manager for jihad activities (in the original intention of al-Qaeda) rather than a military leader.

Reports of Abu al-Yazid’s death in an August 12, 2008, Pakistani airstrike were carried widely in the international press at the time, though Pakistani authorities offered no evidence for their claim. A spokesman for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) denied the reports of Abu al-Yazid’s death (AFP, August 11).

One of Pakistan’s largest newspapers carried a report saying intelligence experts had determined Abu al-Yazid’s statement was actually the work of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (Jang [Rawalpindi], February 11). The intent was to “defame Pakistan and show that it has links with Al-Qaeda.”

This article first appeared in the February 19 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

 

Taliban Target Karachi and Peshawar Links in NATO’s Afghanistan Supply-Chain

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Andrew McGregor

January 21, 2009

The announcement yesterday by General David Petraeus that the United States had reached agreements with Russia and several Central Asian nations for a new (and costly) U.S.-NATO supply route into Afghanistan came as the struggle for control of the supply routes through Pakistan continues. While Pakistan’s military battles the Taliban to secure the Khyber Pass, a vital route for carrying U.S. and NATO supplies into Afghanistan, there are signs that the Taliban is not only continuing attacks on supply terminals in the North-West Frontier Province city of Peshawar, but now intends to choke off Coalition supplies at their offloading point in the harbor of Karachi. Roughly 75% of Coalition supplies run through Karachi to the Khyber Pass and on into Afghanistan, usually carried by private Pakistani transport contractors.

Khyber supply chain 1NATO’s Fuel Supplies are Frequently Targeted

Following months of reports concerning the infiltration of Taliban militants in the port city of Karachi, Pakistani security forces encountered stiff resistance during a series of raids on Taliban safe-houses in the Sohrab Goth neighborhood of Karachi on January 15 (Dawn [Karachi], January 15). Two security men were killed and seven wounded as 79 suspects and a large number of modern weapons were seized. The militants were alleged to have been warning transportation firms not to take on loads destined for Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The suspects allegedly included members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the banned Lashkar-e-Jhagvi. An Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) team and a detachment of the Anti-Violent Crime Unit (ACVU) participated in the raids as part of their search for a kidnapped Iranian commercial attaché. Over 100 mobile units of the police and the Sindh Rangers, a Karachi-based Interior Ministry paramilitary, also participated in the raids (Daily Times [Lahore], January 16). According to Karachi police chief Wasim Ahmed, the suspects were “planning massive terrorist activities in the city” (Press Trust of India, January 16). Residents of the neighborhood described the suspects as innocent men who worked as mechanics and laborers (Daily Times, January 16).

Khyber Supply chain 2 MapTTP spokesman Maulvi Omar boasted of the Taliban presence in Karachi last summer:

We are very strong in Karachi; our network could come in action once the central Amir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [Baitullah Mahsud] ordered the Taliban for action. We want to help improve law and order and maintain peace in Karachi. The Taliban could surface in Karachi if foreign hands do not stop interfering in the city… We are capable of capturing any city of the country at any given time (Pakistan Press International, August 6, 2008; Daily Times, August 10, 2008).

At the other end of the supply route in the north-west frontier region, NATO supply terminals were left largely unguarded earlier this month when Frontier Corps paramilitary troops were withdrawn from the ring road where the terminals are located for duty in Peshawar. Taliban militants took advantage of the lack of security to fire six rockets into the Faisal and Khyber Ittifaq terminals in Peshawar, destroying a total of six containers. The attackers fled without known casualties after a short fire-fight with the remaining security personnel (Daily Times, January 13). The attacks were the first in Peshawar since a series of strikes in December killed three people and destroyed massive quantities of military equipment awaiting shipment through the Khyber Pass. The supply terminals consist largely of open fields and have no special defenses.

Khyber supply chain 3Vulnerable NATO Supply Terminal

After the attack, Peshawar police began joint patrols with troopers from the Frontier Corps paramilitary, including checks on pedestrians and passing vehicles (Geo TV, January 14). A new security plan has been devised for protecting the 14 terminals on the Peshawar ring road. Over the next few weeks the United States is scheduled to supply Pakistan’s Frontier Police with large quantities of non-lethal security and transportation equipment (The News [Islamabad], January 15). There are continuing reports that locally contracted owners of oil tankers are heeding the warnings from the Taliban while meeting their own needs by setting fire to their trucks to collect insurance provided by foreign companies (Daily Afghanistan, December 14, 2008). Other companies hauling supplies along the 30-mile highway between Peshawar and Torkham are beginning to decline loads, citing the risk to their drivers (AFP, December 31, 2008).

The supply route through the Khyber Pass was shut down on January 13 as Pakistani military forces expanded a two-week-old offensive against Taliban militants in the Landi Kotal and Jamrud subdivisions of the Khyber Tribal Agency. With the border post at Torkham closed, as well as the entire highway between Torkham and Peshawar, Pakistani troops searched for Taliban hideouts and demolished homes believed to shelter Taliban fighters (AFP, January 13). It was the second time this month the Peshawar-Torkham highway has been closed for security purposes.

A secondary supply route through southwest Pakistan 375 miles south of the Khyber Pass has only just been reopened after tribesmen built road-blocks to protest the killing of a local man in a drug raid. The route runs from Quetta (believed to be the home of the Afghan Taliban’s top leadership) to the border point at Spin Boldak. The blockade in the town of Qila Abdullah left hundreds of trucks stranded along the road for five days until government officials negotiated a removal of the blockade. The road was immediately closed again due to snow (AFP, January 14).

 

This article first appeared in the January 21, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Mass Attack on French Paratroopers Heralds New Taliban Tactics

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Andrew McGregor

September 2, 2008

Conflicting accounts of a Taliban ambush of an elite French military unit in the Surubi district of Kabul Province on August 18 have raised new concerns about the future of France’s politically unpopular deployment in Afghanistan. Ten soldiers were killed and 21 wounded in one of the largest Taliban operations since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The French troops were part of a fresh group of 700 soldiers committed by French president Nicolas Sarkozy to join over 2,000 French troops under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command. When the new French troops arrived they relieved two American battalions in the Kapisa region, a strategically important district near Kabul (France 24, July 25). A French officer described the French troops involved in the ambush as “experienced” and “combat-capable” (Le Figaro, August 20). Nevertheless, the Taliban made a political statement by targeting the new additions to the French ISAF contingent. The proximity of a major Taliban operation to Kabul has alarmed many within the capital, who point out that previous attacks within Kabul’s security belt have heralded the eventual fall of the city to insurgent forces (Cheragh [Kabul], August 21).

Surubi 18e RPMIa in Afghanistan (Arnaud Guerin)

On August 18, 30 soldiers of the 8ème Régiment Parachutiste d’Infanterie de Marine (8th RPIMa – Airborne Infantry) and another 30 from the Régiment de Marche du Tchad (RMT) were tasked with reconnoitering the Uzbeen valley route between the Tagab district of Kapisa and the Surubi district of Kabul provinces. They were joined by two sections of Afghan troops and a unit of American Special Forces. Most of the French were carried in Armored Vanguard Vehicles (Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé – VAB), armored personnel carriers built by GIAT Industries.

Formed in 1951 for service in Indochina, the 8th RPIMa was dissolved after being virtually annihilated in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, only to be revived in 1956 for service in the Algerian conflict. Since its relocation from Algeria to the French garrison town of Castres in 1963, the 8th RPIMa has been deployed in at least fifteen countries on various missions, including recent deployments in the first Gulf War, Cambodia, Kurdish northern Iraq, the Congo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. 500 paratroopers of the RPIMa were sent to Afghanistan in June and July.

“Marine” units like the 8th RPIMa are not comparable to the U.S. or British Marines; the name refers rather to the 19th century Ministère de la Marine which was responsible for French armed forces overseas, as opposed to the Metropolitan army, which came under the Ministry of War. The troupes de marine became troupes coloniales as part of the French Colonial Army in 1900 with a consequent change in the titles of the units involved, but the term “marine” was revived after the postwar collapse of the French empire to signify volunteer units designated for overseas service. The all-volunteer troupes de marine include infantry, light cavalry, artillery, and airborne infantry units.

Surubi 2VAB of the Régiment de Marche du Tchad in Afghanistan (Ministére de la Défense)

The Régiment de Marche du Tchad is a mechanized unit of the troupes de marine. Now based in France, the RMT was formed in 1943 from metropolitan soldiers serving in the Régiment des Tirailleurs Sénégalais du Tchad after rallying to the Free French cause during General Philippe Leclerc’s campaign in Chad. 450 members of the RMT were sent to Afghanistan in May; another 150 serve as peacekeepers in Lebanon (Le Parisien, October 20). The French force also included a small number of men from the 35ème Régiment d’Artillerie Parachutiste (35e RAP – Airborne Artillery Regiment).

The multinational force struggled through difficult terrain and extreme heat along a difficult and winding mountainous road in an area known for Taliban activity. Army chief of staff General Jean-Louis Georgelin described the ambush as “a well-organized trap” on “terrain that was extremely favorable to the enemy” (Le Monde, August 21). The ambush was launched at 3:30 PM after the paratroopers left their APCs to reconnoiter a pass on foot. As one survivor pointed out, the pass was nearly three hours out from the column’s starting point; “enough time for the Taliban to be warned by their accomplices of our arrival” (Le Monde, August 21). French General Michel Stollsteiner, ISAF commander in the Kabul region, stated; “In the past two weeks we had largely secured the zone but you have to be frank, we were guilty of overconfidence” (Reuters, August 25).

French press interviews with survivors of the ambush describe a rapid breakdown in command and communications, with Taliban marksmen taking down French soldiers at will. Among the first to be killed were the deputy section leader and the radioman of the advance unit. The warrant officer in command was shot in the shoulder. Soon afterwards the paratroopers’ radio communication with the RMT broke down. Heavily outnumbered, the French remained pinned down and under fire from small arms, machine guns and rocket launchers for four hours without reinforcements. Ammunition for all weapons other than their assault rifles ran out as the soldiers were unable to reach supplies still in their vehicles, although a VAB with a section from the 35e Régiment d’Artillerie Parachutiste in the rear of the column was able to deploy the vehicle’s machine gun and four 120mm mortars in support (La Depeche, August 21).

Some of the wounded alleged that their unit was hit by fire from their Afghan allies and NATO aircraft (Le Monde, August 21; AFP, August 21). Fire from A-10 Thunderbolts was directed by the American Special Forces while a pair of F-15 fighters passed through without using their weapons because the French and Taliban were too closely intertwined. An initial attempt by American helicopters to evacuate the wounded failed due to heavy fire. French EC725 Caracal helicopters arrived to provide fire support – one helicopter brought in a doctor and ten French commandos from the rapid reaction force in Kabul. A group leader from the rapid reaction force who arrived after a 90 minute drive through difficult terrain described the situation on his arrival; “We couldn’t see the enemy and we didn’t know how many of them there were. We started climbing, but after 20 minutes we started coming under fire from the rear. We were surrounded” (AFP, September 1). 81mm mortars also arrived with the reinforcements but helicopters were unable to evacuate the wounded until 8PM. Six hours after the ambush began, Taliban fighters began to break off, though many remained in the area, launching a last attack at 9AM the next day (La Depeche, August 24; Quotidien, August 21; AFP, August 21).

Despite official assurances that nearly all the casualties occurred in the first minutes of the ambush, other accounts suggested that four soldiers were captured before being killed by Taliban fighters (Telegraph, August 19; Independent, August 20). An investigative report by French weekly Le Canard enchainé claimed that the column’s interpreter disappeared only hours before the operation began, suggesting the French troops were betrayed either by the interpreter or by Afghan troops attached to the column. The report repeated the claim four French soldiers were captured and executed by the Taliban shortly after the ambush began (Le Canard enchainé; August 27).

During the rescue of the wounded, an armored car of the RMT overturned when the road collapsed and the vehicle fell into a ravine, killing a Kanak trooper from New Caledonia and injuring four others (Oceania Flash, August 20). A medic from the 2ème Régiment Etranger Parachutiste (Foreign Legion) was also killed after making several forays to bring in wounded comrades from the 8th RPIMa.

Unlike the first-hand accounts carried by the press, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin insisted that reinforcements were sent within 20 minutes and there were no indications of friendly fire (RTL, August 21). Pentagon and NATO spokesmen also denied having any evidence of such incidents. The Afghan Ministry of Defense stated that 13 Taliban fighters, including one Pakistani, were killed in the battle (Cheragh [Kabul], August 21). Some French officers claimed 40 to 70 militants were killed, but acknowledged finding only one body (AFP, September 1). Claude Guéant, general secretary of French president Nicolas Sarkozy, maintained “the majority of the assailants were not Afghans” (Reuters, August 23).

A Taliban statement entitled “New and Interesting Information on the Killing and Wounding of the French Soldiers in Surubi” claimed that hundreds of Taliban fighters using heavy and light weapons had overwhelmed a French infantry battalion of 100 men and 18 tanks (APCs?) and other military vehicles. The statement describes the infliction of “hundreds” of French casualties and the destruction of five tanks and eight other military vehicles before locals descended to loot abandoned French weapons (Sawt al-Jihad, August 22). The region in which the attack took place is considered a stronghold of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami movement, which also issued a claim of responsibility for the attack (Afghan Islamic Press, August 19).

In the aftermath of the attack, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner declared, “Nobody is thinking of leaving Afghanistan,” but added a few days later, “We need what is called ‘Afghanization’, that’s to say to pass responsibilities, all responsibilities, as quickly as possible to the Afghans” (AFP, August 21; Reuters, August 25).

The ambush and recent suicide attacks on American outposts reveal an escalation in the violence and effectiveness of Taliban attacks on Western forces in Afghanistan. Added to the steady attrition of NATO, ISAF and U.S. personnel, these new attacks are intended to remind the West that despite seven years of campaigning, the Taliban are as strong as ever. Since the ambush, the French deployment in Afghanistan has come under sharp criticism from the public, the press, and opposition politicians. The French public has never had a taste for involvement in Afghanistan, reflected in a recent Le Parisien opinion poll that showed 55% of respondents believe France should withdraw from Afghanistan. With Prime Minister François Fillon calling for a September vote in parliament on the future of the French military commitment to Afghanistan, President Sarkozy’s efforts to expand France’s role in that country may come at a considerable political cost.

 

This article first appeared in the September 2, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

 

Al-Qaeda’s Operational Commander in Afghanistan Promises Expansion of War into Northern Provinces

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Andrew McGregor

July 23, 2008

Pakistan’s Geo-TV has released a video interview with al-Qaeda’s operational commander in Afghanistan, the Egyptian militant Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. Shaykh Sa’id). With a rifle by his side, Abu al-Yazid gave the Arabic-language interview from an undisclosed location in Khost, across the border from Pakistan’s Waziristan tribal agency (Geo-TV, July 22).

Mustafa Abu al-YazidMustafa Abu al-Yazid

A veteran jihadi, Abu al-Yazid was imprisoned along with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in Egypt following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. After joining up with Bin Laden in Pakistan in the early 1990s, Abu al-Yazid became al-Qaeda’s financial manager during Bin Laden’s stay in the Sudan. He later aided in the financing of the 9/11 attacks despite his reported opposition to the operation.

Abu al-Yazid confirmed al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the 9/11 attacks and the 1998 embassy attacks in east Africa, but denied an al-Qaeda role in last year’s mosque bombings in Pakistan. He described the June 2 bombing of the Danish embassy in Islamabad that killed six Pakistanis as an al-Qaeda operation carried out by a young militant from Mecca who was enraged by the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in Denmark: “We are proud of that attack, and I congratulated my colleagues for conducting it successfully.”

Abu al-Yazid also called for more Pakistanis to join the al-Qaeda/Taliban struggle: “In fact it is obligatory for them to render this help and is a responsibility that is imposed by religion. It is not only obligatory for residents of the tribal regions but all of Pakistan.” The Egyptian militant criticized Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf for authorizing the arrest of Arab mujahideen and their transfer to American hands: “Pervez Musharraf and his government have committed crimes for which there are no examples in the entire world… This is an ugly spot on Pakistan’s history which cannot be forgotten until doomsday.”

The Egyptian commander confirmed al-Qaeda is in the process of expanding its operations into north Afghanistan and promised that the group would free Afghanistan from foreign occupation “very soon.” Earlier this month Abu al-Yazid issued a statement swearing revenge for the death of al-Qaeda field commander Abdallah Muhammad al-Abid in a firefight with Coalition forces in Afghanistan (Pajhwok Afghan News, July 7).

This article first appeared in the July 23, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus.